ML18054B431

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Info Re Qualification of Viking Potted Connectors, as Followup to Insp Rept 50-255/90-05.Connector Qualification Lacks Only Test Data Re Insulation Resistance Breakdown
ML18054B431
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/07/1990
From: Berry K
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9002220478
Download: ML18054B431 (27)
v • d • e


Text

-v. ..

--. I\

consumers Power Kenneth W Berry Director l'OWERINli Nuclear Licensing MICHlliA_N'S l'ROliRESS General Offices: 1945 West Parnall Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-1636 February 7, 1990 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -

EEQ FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION, OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION As a result of the EEQ followup inspection (90-005), the NRC requested additional information regarding Consumers Power Company's basis for qualifi-cation of Viking potted connectors with respect to IR losses during a transient (LOCA, MSLB). Consumers Power Company submitted the additional information, off the docket, on January 31, 1990. Attachment 1 contains a brief consolida-tion of that information.

On February 1, 1990 a telecon was held among NRR, Region III and Consumers Power Company to discuss the submitted information. The NRC determined that Consumers Power Company had not shown qualification for the Viking potted connectors and that Consumers Power Company should submit on the docket an operability determination for: (1) Viking connector instrumentation circuits by Noon on February 6, 1990, and (2) for Viking connector control circuits by the end of the work day on February 7, 1990. The operability determination for Viking connector instrumentation circuits was submitted on February 6, 1990.

Attachment 2, operability determination for Viking connector control circuits, is a detailed breakdown of which control circuits go through the potted Viking connectors and the function of those controls. Also included is a discussion on how the safety functions provided by the control circuits inside contain-ment with potted penetration connectors will be achieved to maintain the reactor in a safe condition. This operability determination has been reviewed and approved by the Plant Review Committee and found not to involve an unreviewed safety question.

For both operability determinations provided (instrumentation circuits (provided 2/6/90) and control circuits), worst case conditions were assumed, thereby assuring operability. The connectors have been tested and shown that they will not catastrophically fail. The connector qualification lacks only the test data with respect to insulation resistance breakdown. These losses will only result in degradation of the signal during the high temperature portion of the accident and not a complete failure of the connectors.

OC0290-0004-NL02

,---9o6222o4~7s--9-0020;1 PDR ADOCK 05000255 A OHS' ENERGY COMPANY Q PNU

,_.__,,N~clear Regulatory Commission 2

'I Palisades Plant EEQ Followup Inspection February 7, 1990 Furthermore, EEQ analyses based on MIL Spec testing of similar devices, has provided reasonable assurance of acceptable circuit performance during the accident. Because of the conservative process used for the operability determination and the high reliability of the connectors determined by, MIL Spec-based analyses, we believe the safety functions of the circuits with these connectors will be maintained during accident conditions.

The final resolutions of this issue will be the replacement of all Viking Industry potted connectors. Every effort will be made to complete all replace-ments during the 1990 Spring Maintenance Outage. As committed in our February 6, 1990 letter, a specific replacement schedule will be submitted to the NRC by March 1, 1990. The additional time is needed to allow us to determine replacement parts availability, engineering and construction resources, and to complete our evaluation of the circuit functions and prioritize replacement.

Those that cannot be replaced during the Spring Maintenance Outage will be r~~e-;;~ REFOUT, Kenneth W Berry Director, Nuclear Licensing CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment

  • OC0290-0004-NL02

ATTACHMENT 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 CONSOLIDATION OF INFORMATION INFORMALLY SUBMITTED ON JANUARY 31, 1990 February 7, 1990

  • OC0290-0004-NL02 1 Page

'---..J, QUALIFICATION OF VIKING CONNECTORS TO MIL SPEC #MIL-C-5015

  • In response to Bechtel's bid request Specification 5935-E-20 to supply penetration assemblies. Viking Industries responded by letter 1/19/68. In this letter an attachment describes Vikings background with the military.

It is stated that "Viking maintains a Quality Assurance Program which meets all military standards." It goes on to state "Recently the Defense Supply Agency awarded us the Alternative Procedures - Contractor Releases of Shipment. This procedure permits Viking to release shipments without the signature of the "Government Quality Assurance Representative." In this document Viking also provided and outline of their capabilities for manufacturing and testing equipment.

Even though military specifications are not called out in the Bechtel Specification, it is clear in Viking's response that they have a quality product due to their standing with the military. It also seems clear that they intended to use this same quality process in developing penetration assemblies for the nuclear industry.

Palisades stated in a letter to the NRC dated 12/08/77 (Palisades Response to IE Bulletins 77-05,77-05A) connectors utilized at Palisades were manufactured by Viking Industries or purchased to a Viking specification.

CPCo talked to a representative of Viking on 1/30/90. He verified that parts were used from Amphenol, Bendix and Cannon. He also stated that Viking Industries performed testing on the connectors (Insulation Resistance and Hi Pot)

  • CPCo talked with a representative of Amphenol Corp., Bendix Connector Operations. The representative stated that the Department of the Navy oversees the required testing programs to assure the connectors meet MIL Spec requirements. The representative also provided a copy of their qualified Products list of Products Under Military specification #MIL-C-5015.

CPCo talked with a representative of Amphenol Corp., Bendix Connector Operations, who is the Manager of QA. He stated that testing is performed by Amphenol to verify conformance to the MIL Spec #MIL-C-5015.

CPCo talked with a representative of ITT Cannon with respect to MIL Spec's.

She stated that the connector part number that we gave her (CA-3106R36-4S) was covered by MIL Spec # MS3106R36-4S and MIL Spec #MIL-C-5015. She also stated the testing is performed to maintain conformance to the MIL Spec's.

Based on the above information Palisades is confident that our connectors meet the quality and standards specified in MIL Spec #MIL-C-5015, which meets or exceeds the requested Bechtel Specification 5935-E-20. CPCo has taken a conservative approach in using the MIL Spec since the MIL Spec applies to an unpotted connector.

CPCo has used the MIL Spec data to develop IR loss data during an accident.

The use of this was deemed appropriate since the connector is totally encased in the potting compound, therefore not subjected to the environment.

Temperature is the only element that would effect IR losses *

  • OC0290-0004-NL02

'-----..J~

ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 NRC NOTIFICATION DETERMINATION SAFETY REVIEW/EVALUATION OPERABILITY DETERMINATION February 7, 1990 The information contained in this attachment has been facsmile transmitted to Region III and NRR at the following facsmile numbers:

Region III: (708) 790-5693 NRR: (301) 492-0259, 0260, 0261 or 1137

  • OC0290-0004-NL02

-W*

PALISADES NUCEAR PLANT Pree No 3.07 SAFETY REVIEW Attachment 2 Revision 4 Page 1 of 1

':?S.tl 90 -01a1 Item To Be Evaluated: Operability of Item Iden ti fi eat ion:

Controlled Circuits With Viking Potted Connectors Inside Containment No NA Rev Yes No

l. Does the item involve a change to procedures as described in the FSAR?

FSAR Sections affected None x FSAR Sections reviewed Reviewed the FSAR Index

2. Does the item involve a change to the facility as described in the FSAR?
  • and Appendix 7C FSAR Sections affected Sections l.8,6 2 5.1.4.10 2 8.l.3 1 s.2.2.1 x FSAR Sections reviewed Reviewed the FSAR Index
3. Does the item involve a test or experiment not described in the FSAR? x FSAR Sections affected None --

FSAR Sections reviewed Reviewed FSAR Index -

4. Does the item require a change tc the Technical Specification?

TS Sections affected None x TS Sections reviewed Reviewed Tech s2ec Index and Section 3.17 NOTE:

This Safety Evaluation is written to address the environmental qualification concern of Viking potted connectors inside containment. This concern was raised by NRC inspectors during an EEQ inspection. Although ther~ is not a physical change to the Facility involved here, question two is marked "yes" since the FSAR sections listed are the ones which describe the qualification program at Palisades, and since the qualification of the Viking potted connectors per the FSAi description is in question.

1f any Safety Review question listed above is answered Yes, perform a written - - ~'

Safety Evaluation according to Section 5.3-.--- *-:-----: __ r_ ~--

    • ~***

If all Safety Review questions listed above are answered No, a written Safety Evaluation. is not required. Howevla!r, this Attachment shall accompany other documentation for the itein being evaluated in crd.er to provide documentation that a Safety Evaluation was not required.

~~e..hf<to Robert J C rbett Prepared By I 2/06/90 Date

~~~ Reviewed By I i.7/90 Pater-

  • CONTROLLED CIRCUITS-TC07

PALISADES NUCAR PLANT Proc:: No 3.07 NRC NOTI~ICATION DETERMINATION At tachrnent: 2

'~ .

Revision 4 Page l of l Item To Be Evaluated: Operability Item Identification:

of Control Circuits With Viking Potted Connectors Inside Containment No N/A Rev SIC'l"IOll I Yes No

1. Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the x FSAR be increased?
2. Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the x FSAR be increased?
3. Will the probability of malfunctions of equipment important to x safety be increased?
4. Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to x safety be increased?
s. Will the possibility of an accident of a different type than any x previously evaluated in the FSAR be created?
6. Will the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. be created?
7. Will the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any x Technical Specification be reduced?

If any of. the above questions are answered Yes, an unreviewed safety question is involved. A written Safety Analysis shall be prepared and the item shall not be implemented without prior NRC concurrence.

If all of the above questions are answered No, a written Safety Analysis shall be prepared *to provide the doci.unented ba1ia for concluding the proposed item does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

SBCTIOB II

1. Should this be included in an FSAR updat~? x__
2. Is prior NRC approval and/or an application for amendment to the Palis~des Operatina Licen1e required? .. ., ...,,___;:

SEi?ZCo~.~

Robe<t J I 2/06/90 Prepared By Date Reviewed By CONTROL CIRCUITS/B-TC07

.'It 1. Tt1e probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not

-. be increased. The concern raised is that of the degree of insulation de-gradation the potted connectors suffer during an accident. Connector failure cannot result in an accident. Since the insulation resistance is not degraded during normal operation the probability of an accident pre-viously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

2. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The attached analysis describes how the safety related functions of the associated control circuits are still achieved even if the insulation resistance of the connector decreases beyond that previously expected. Since these safety functions are still achieved the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased.
3. The probability of malfunctions of equipment important to safety will not be increased. As described in the attached analysis, the safety related functions required by the affected control circuits will be performed.

Since the required safety functions are still performed the probability of a malfunction *of equipment important to safety is not increased.

4. The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The attached analysis describes how the safety related func-tions provided by the affected control circuits are still achieved. Since the safety related functions are still achieved, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety have not been increased.
5. The possibility of an accident of a different type than those previously evaluated will not be created. Connector failure cannot result in an accident. The safety functions provided by the affected control circuits (see attached analysis) will still be achieved and hence no new accident type will be created.

The possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated wHl not be created, The attached analysis describes how the safety related functions provided by the affected control circuits will still be achieved. Since these safety functions are still achieved the possibility of a malfunction of a different type is not created.

7. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifica-tion will not be reduced. The attached analysis has shown all control circuits will perform their safety related fijnctions fo~ a LOCA or MSLB.

Since the safety fl.lnction* assumed in the LOCA and MSLB analysis will still be achieved.. The margin of safety as defined in the Tech Specs

~ill not be reduced.

_,...,,.., : . =' *

- ~.. .;:-* .

  • ONTR.OLL!D CIRCUITS-TC07
  • Written By/Date:

OP!RABILITY OF CONTROL CIRCUITS WITH VIKING POTT£1> CONNECTORS Ops Review/Date:

Tech Review/Date; I. OBJECTIVE This is written to show that control circuits with Viking potted connectors in containment will not affect the safety of the plant during a LOCA or MSLB.

This analysis is being performed because of a NRC concern about. the Insulation Resistance (IR) losses through Viking connectors during accident conditions.

Because IR loss readings were not taken during the test report, the NRC is of the opinion that the losses must equal the size of the fuse that monitors the equipment during the test (Attachinent 2). As stated by Wyle, thi1 fuse is typically a 1 Amp fuse.

II, ANALYSIS INPUT *During the Wyle test the circuit was pr~tected by a l A!np fuse. Therefore, the losses experienced during the test could not have exceeded 1 Amp *

  • SIAS signal is initiated at the onset of a LOCA.
  • Low Pressure Safety Injection Valves are required to open only for LOCA and not required for MSLB.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

  • Initially it will be assumed that a gross failure will oceur. This failQre will result in the blowing of the fuse. If the consequences of a blown fuse is unaccept-able, further analysis' will be performed.
  • The further analy1i1 usinc the l Amp criteria will be to show that the fuse in the circuit will not blow. * * '-.i--*

If the fuse doe1 ncaL blow then power wil 1 be a.vailst;te__,~ ' .:

  • to the circuit and it "2.11 perform its function. '.*
  • Containment Air Cooler V-2A is runnina before the accident.

IV. ANALYSIS Attachment 1 provides a list of EEQ control circuits

~ich contain Vikina potted connectors.

~ initial review of Attachment l equipment is provided.

This review will assume gross failure resulting from Il lo**es and determine the affects of the failure *

  • MI0290-1722A-TC01 Paae 1 of 12
  • For items for which gross failure analysis is not successful, further analysis will be performed. This will analyze circuit load based on l Amp maximum IR loss Yalue. The total existing load plus the IR loss will be shown to be below the fuse interrupting capability.

As shown in Attachment 2 the test setup by Wyle did include monitoring for IR losses. Though the test did not record values of losses, it ran the losses through a fused circuit, with the fuse size of 1 Amp. Therefore, any losses experienced could not exceed lamp. The test setup monitored circuits through multiple pins of the connector. Therefore, the IR max loss of l Amp would apply to the connector for multiple pins.

CONTAINMENT AIR COOLER V-2A SV-0864, SV-0865, POS-0864 and POS-0865 share the same scheme, namely 81209. This section will show that the containment air cooler V-2A will be available for ser-vice despite the effects of IR losses.

SV-0864, SV-0865 SV-0864 - Air Supply to CV-0864 SV-0865 - Air Supply to CV-0865 CV-0864 - V-2A Service Water Discharge, CV-0865 - V-2A Service Water Inlet SV-0864 is normally energized, passing air to CV-0864.

CV-0864 requires air to close. Therefore, CV-0864 is closed with SV-0864 energized and CV-0864 is open with SV-0864 deenergized.

SV-0864 becomes deenergized on a SIAS at the initiation of the LOCA. The deenergization of SV-0864 would cause CV-0864 to open, thus allowing discharge £low of service water from V-2A.

SV-0865 is normally deenergized. Whex'l SV-0865 is energized it passes air to CV-0865, \ihich will close the CV. Therefore, CV-0865 is closed with SV-0865 energized and CV-0865 is ppen ~h SV-0865 deenergized. SV-086>-*~:*- :* * ***

does not receive an SIAS.

If due to gross failure from IR losses, SV-0865 would blow its 2 or 5 Amp fuse, thu.s isolatina it from the circuit. SV-0864 is already deenergized from the SIS signal, so no effect would occur here *

  • HI0290-1722A-TC01 Page 2 of 12

The failure **mode would be for CV-0865 to fail open and CV-0864 has been opened by the SIAS (CV-0864 would fail open on loss of power). this failure will allow service water to conatantly flow through V-2A and is acceptable.

POS-0864 POS-0865 POS-0864 - Position Switch for CV-0864 POS-0865 - Position Switch for CV-0865 CV-0864 - V-2A Service Water Discharge CV;..0865 - V-2A Service Water Inlet These position switches provide indication of valve position for their respective control valve. The switche~ share a containment penetration connector, and have a direct path. back to the control circuit fuse.

If due to gross failure from IR losses, the control circuit fuse for V-2A would blow. This would leave V-2A with no control circuit power.

The containment air cooler V-2A would continue to run, but control would not be available. This approach does not provide adequate solution to the problem. Further analysis is provided below.

Detailed Analysis This section will address the connector Ia loss impact on the circuit (namely, 1 Amp).

The limiting case would be V-2A having to start.

To start V-2A, SV-0864 and SV-0865 are deenergized so no load is drawn from these.

The load on the circuit from the motor starter is .84 Amps. The only other load on the ci~~uit is five indi-cating lights which operate at 6W each (.OS Amps per . ~ _.. ...

light). - .... ,_.., .....q;;.-.r;...* -*'*-"'*.:~

The normal operatina current is then .30 Amp1.

Using the 1 Amp maximum leakage current "1e would experl-ence 1 Amp additional load through the connector pin.-

The total accident load equal1 2.14 Amps.

Per field verificatio.n, the control circuit is protected by a 30 Amp fuse *

  • MI0290-1722A-TCOl Page 3 of 12

The total* accident load of 2.14 Amps is well below the 30 Amp fuse and is thus acceptable.

CONTAINMENT AIR COOLER V-4A SV-0867, SV-0869, POS-0867 and POS-0869 share the same scheme, namely Bl108. This section will show that con*

tainment air cooler V-4A will not be available as a result of an accident, but the service water isolation valves will *perform their design function.

SV-0867, SV-0869 SV-0867 - Air Supply to CV-0867 SV-0869 - Air Supply to CV-0869 CV-0867 - V-4A Service Water Discharge CV-0869 - V-4A Service Water Inlet SV-0867 is normally energizedt passing air to CV-0867.

CV-0867 requires air to open. Therefore, CV-0867 is open with SV-0867 energized and CV-0867 is closed with SV-0867 deenergized.

SV-0867 becomes deenergized on SIS signal, thus causing CV-0867 to close, pteventing SW from discharging from V-4A. This is acceptable as the design requires this isolation of V-4A to maintain flow of SW to the other three CAC.

If SV-0869 were to experience gross failure on its connector it woutd blow its two or five amp fuse, thus isolating it from the remaining circuit.

This is acceptable, as SIS to SV-0867 performs required safety related function.

POS-0867, POS-0869 POS-0867

  • Position of CV-0867 POS-0869 - Position of CV-0869 CV-0867 - V-4A Service Water Discharge CV-0869 - V-4A Set'Vice Water Inlet These position switches provide indication in the ........

control room of CV po&J.tion.

If due to a gross failure from IR losses the control fuse for V-4A were to blow, this would leave V-4A with no control power.

As deS.cribed above, a SIS signal will cause CV-0867 to close, thus isolating V-4A from service w~ter supply.

This is acceptable aa this is by design.

MI0290-1722A-TC01 Page 4 of 12

  • The loss of the entire control circuit for V-4A is aeeeptable as it is not ~equired to mitigate the acci-dent. The only requirement ia to isolate the service water which is not effected by this failure.

SV-3069 SAFETY INJECTION TANK DRAIN VALVE SV-3069 is normally energized, supplying air to CV-3069.

CV-3069 requires air to open. Therefore, CV-3069 is open with SV-3069 energi2ed. CV-3069 is closed with SV-3069 deenergized.

SV-3069 becomes deenergized on an SIS signal, thus performing its safety related function. SV-3069 also has its own control fuse.

This item is acceptable.

CHARGING DISTRIBUTION LINE SV-2113 and POS-2113 share the same scheme, namely SSS.

This analysis will show that the safety related function of CV-2113 will be performed despite the effects of* IR loss, and that no detrimental impact will occur on the other scheme components.

SV-2113 SV-2113 - Air Supply to cv-2113 CV-2113 - Flow to Charging Line Loop lA This item shares a connector with POS-2113.

SV-2113 is normally deenergized. cv-2113 requires air to close. Therefore, cv-2113 is open with SV-2113 deenergized and CV-2113 is closed with SV-2113 energized.

If due to a gross failure from II losses the 3A control fuse would blow, This would result in SV-211'1, 2113, 2115 and 2117 becoming deenergized. Thit would result in CV-2111, 2113 and 2115 failing open. They perform the following:  ;..*

  • CV-2111
  • Charging discharge from pumps CV-2113 - Charging line* to Loop lA CV-2115 - Charging line to Loop 2A CV-2117 would fail closed. This valve provides pres-suri2er auxiliary spray.

MI0290-1722A-TC01 Page 5 of 12

Failure of CV-2111 to the open position is an acceptable failure, but CV-2113 and CV-2115 failing open and CV-2117 failing closed is not acceptable. This is because to perform cooldown, it is necessary to close CV-2113 and CV-2115 .and open CV-2117. This approach does not provide adequate solution to the problem. Further analysis is provided below.

Detailed Analysis SV-2113 - Air Supply to CV-2113 POS-2113 - CV-2113 Position This section will address the connector IR loss impact on the circuit (namely, l Amp),

Operation of this system during an accident would be one of three wayst A. SV-2111, 2113, 2115 and 2117 deenergized. This lineup provides flow for charging to reactor from both paths.

B. SV-2113 or SV-2115 energized and SV-2111 and SV-2117 deenergized. This lineup would provide flow through one charging line *

  • c. SV-2117, SV-2113 and SV-2115 are energized and SV-2111 is deenergized. This line up provides auxiliary spray to the pressurizer.

As seen, Case C is the most limiting. An additional load of four indicating lights (6 W or .05 Amps) is also present.

Per vendor* the SV loads are:

sv-2111, 23 w SV-2113, 35.1 W sv-211.s. 35. l w SV-2117, 17,4 W Normal operating current, worst case is +/- =

35.l + 35.1 + 17.4 + 24 -

125 VDC

.98 Amp1 MI0290-l722A-TCOl Page 6 of 12

  • Using the l Amp maximum leakage current, we would experience one* additional ainp through the pin, thus making the accident current draw equal 1.98 Amps.

1,98 Amps is below the fuse size of 3 Amps and is therefore acceptable.

POS-2113 POS-2113 - Position of CV-2113 This item shares a connector with CV-2113.

If due to a gross failure from IR losses, the 3A control fuse would blow (same £use as in SV-2113 discussion).

The results would be the same as that for SV-2113.

This approach does not provide adequate solution to the problem. See the further analysis in SV-2113 discussion above.

M0-3008, M0-3010, LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION MOTOR OPERATED VALVES M0-3012, M0-3014 M0-3008, M0-3010, M0-3012, M0-3014 - LPSI These motor operated valves provide the path for low pressure safety injection to the reactor, These valves receive an i111nediate open signal on SIS. Their design stroke time is 18 seconds and the LOCA analysis accept-ance criteria is 14 seconds. There is also 14 seconds of delay for DG start and other delays and conservatisms in the LOCA analysis. The LOCA analysis assumed delivery time of 28 seconds. Reference basis document for Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure Q0-5 "Valve Testing Program."

As shown on E-48 Sh 3, temperature rise (or LOCA. would be at is peak in approximately 6 seconds. The IR losses due to temperature increase would happen some time after that, but the exact time is hard to quantify, Assuming a gross failure due to IR losses at approxi-mately 1 seconds "1ould cause the control circuit fuse to ,*.. -*- .~.~~-':

biow, and the loss of control power "10uld cause the motor starter to deenergize, its contacts would open, thus no power to the motor.

The valve would be at some intermediate position open and no power would be available to open it further.

This approach does not provide adequate solution to the problem. Further analysi* is provided below.

HI0290-l722A-TC01 Page 7 of 12

Detail Analysis Equipment: H0-3008, M0-3010 During an accident the valve would be stroking open.

Normal current draw would be from the motor starter, auxiliary relay, and indicating lights.

M/S Cultler Hamner A50DNVO Size 2 Catalog Data 23 VA Auxiliary Relay C£ 12HFA51A49H 32 VA Four Indicating Lights @ 6 W Each 24 79 VA Normal operating current 79/120 VAC * .66 Amps For the DG limiting case calculate the current using the degraded voltage average from the DC load profile (90%

or 108 Volts).

Degraded operating cur~ent 79/108 = .73 Amps Using the 1 Amp max leakage current during the limiting case of degraded voltage we would experience an addi-tional l Amp during the accidentf thus the accident current~ 1.73 Amps.

  • Per walk.downs circuit is protected by .6 and 2 Amp fuse in series.

A review of the 0,6 Amp fuse time over current curve (Attachment 3) sho~s that the fuse would pass 1.8 Amps

.for approximately 24 seconds before it would melt.

The Insulation Resistance loss begins at six seconds (peak accident temperature time). This aives minimum total time of 30 seconds before the fuse would melt.

As stated above, the valve will take no aiore than 28 seconds to openf with or without offsite power. Thirty seconds is available which is sufficent to meet the required time of 28 seconds to stroke the valve full open. This circuit is therefore acceptable, The time vs current curve calculations show that the circuits in question "ill not fail to perform their function. However, to provide more ma.rein we are aolna to replace the existing fuse with one of a laraer size as soon as practical, based on parts availability and

~eing able to remove the existinl$ fuse from the circuit.

Equipment: H0-3012 4 LPSI

  • MI0290-l722A-TC01 Page 8 of 12

During an accident the valve would be stroking open.

Normal current draw would be £rom the motor starter, auxiliary relay and indicating lights.

M/S - Cultler Hammer M/N A50DNVO, Size 2, 23 VA Catalog Data Aux Relay CE 12HFA51A49H Catalog Data 32 VA Four Indicating Lights at 6 W Each li__

79 VA Normal current = 79/120 = .66 Amps.

For the DG limiting case calculate the current using the degraded voltage average from the DC load profile (90%

or 108 Volts}.

Degraded operating current 79/108@ .73 Amps Using the l Amp max Leakage current during limiting case of degraded voltage we would experience an additional 1 Amp during the accident. Thus, total accident load equals 1.73 Amps.

Per walkdowns, exhting fuse size is 1.A and 2A in series.

A review of t:he l Amp fuse time over current curve (Attachment 3) shows that the fuse would pass 2 Amps for approximately 55 seconds before it would melt. The Insulation Resistance loss begins at six seconds (peak accident temperature time). This gives minimum total time of 61 seconds before the fuse would melt. As stated above, the valve will take no more than 28 seconds to open. with or without offsite power. Sh::ty-one seconds is available which is suff icent to meet the required time of 28 seconds to stroke the valve full open. This circuit is therefore acceptable.

The time vs current curve calculations show that the circuits in question will not fail to perform their function. However, to provide more margin we are going to replace the existina fuse with one of a larger size aa soon as practical* based on parts availability and bein& able to remove the existing fuse from the circuit.

Equipment: M0~3014 - LPSI MI0290-l722A-TC01 Page 9 of 12

During an accident the valve would be stroking open.

Normal current draw would be from the motor starter, auxiliary relay and indicating lights.

M/S - Cultler Hammer M/N 9656Hl58A, Size 1, 20 VA Catalog Data Aux Relay GE 12HFA5lA49H Catalog Data 32 VA Four Indicating Lights at 6 W Each 24 76 VA Normal current ~ 76/120 ~ .63 Amps.

For the DG limiting case calculate the current using the degraded voltage average from the DG load profile (90%

or 108 Volts).

Degraded operating current 76/108 ~ .70 Amps Using the l Amp max leakage current during limiting case we would experience an additional 1 Amp during the acci-dent, Thus, total accident load equals 1.70 Amps.

Per walkdowns, existing fuse si~e is lA and 2A in series.

A review of the 1 Amp fuse time over current curve (Attachment 3) shows that the fuse would pass 2 Amps for approximately 55 seconds before it would melt.

  • The Insulation Resistance loss begins at six seconds (peak accident temperature time). This gives minimum total time of 61 seconds before the fuse would melt. As stated above, the valve will take no more than 28 seconds to open* with or without offsite power. Sixty-one seconds is available which is sufficent to meet the required time of 28 seconds to stroke the valve full open. This circuit is therefore acceptable.

The time vs current curve calculations show that the circuits in question will not fail to perform their function. However, to provide more margin we are going to replace the existing fuse with one of a larger size as soon as practical, based on parts availability and being able to remove the existing fuse from the circuit, M0-3007, M0-3009, HICH PRESSURE .SAFETY INJECTION MOTOR OPERATED VALVES M0-3011, M0-3013, M0-3062, M0-3064, M0-3066, M0-306~

MI0290-1722A-TC01 Page 10 of 12

  • M0-3007, M0-3009, M0-3011, M0-3013 - HPSI M0-3062, M0-3064, M0-3066, M0-3068 - Redundant HPSI These motor operated valves provide the path for high pressure safety injection and redundant high pressure safety injection to the reactor. These valves receive an immediate open signal on SIS. Their design stroke time is 18 seconds and the LOCA analysis acceptance criteria is 12.5 seconds. There is also 14 seconds of delay for PC start and other delays and conservatisms in the LOCA analysis. The LOCA analysis assumes a delivery time of 27 seconds. Reference basis document for Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure QO-S "Valve Test-ing llrogram,"

As shown on E-48 Sh 3, temperature rise for LOCA would be at is peak in approximately 6 seconds. The IR losses due to temperature increase would happen some time after that, but the exact time is hard to quantify *.

Assuming a gross failure due to IR losses at approxi-mately 7 seconds would cause the control circuit fuse to blow, and the loss of control power would cause the motor starter to deenergize, its contacts would open, thus no power to the motor.

The valve would be at some intermediate position open and no power would be available to open it further.

This approach does not provide adequate solution to the problem, Further analysis is provided below.

Detailed Analysis Equipment: M0-3007, M0-3009, M0-3011, M0-3013 - HPSI M0-3064, M0-3066, M0-3062, M0-3069 - Redundant HPSI During an accident the valve would be stroking open.

Normal current draw would be from the motor starter, auxiliary relay and indicating lights.

H/S - Culter Hammer M/N 9656Hl58A, Size l, 20 VA Catalog Data Aux Relay CS M/N 12HFA51A49H 32 VA Four Indicating Liahts @6 W Each 1!_

76 VA Normal current dra~ 76/120 ~ ,63 Amps *

  • MI0290-1722A-TC01 Page 11 of 12
  • Using the 1 Amp max leakage current we would experience an additional 1 Amp lamp during the accident. Thus, the total accident loud equa*ls 1.63 Amps.

Per walkdowns existing fuse size is 3 Amps, which is sufficient to protect circuit.

This is an acceptable circuit.

V. CONCLUSION The safety related function of all control circuits will be performed to mitigate a LOCA or MSLB, and will not result in an unsafe condition, All equipment shall remain operable *

  • MI0290-l722A-TC01 Page 12 of 12

MOV PENETRATION EVALUTION ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 1 OF3 EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT PENETRATION SCHEMATIC P&IO WIRING FUSE NUMBER FUNCTIONAL NUMBER DRAWING DRAWING SIZE MOV's DESCRIPTION Z-XXXXX E-610SH E-XXX SH M-XXXX 3008 LPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 1A 121 12 101 244 1 203 2 FJELD 2,.6 3009 HPSJ TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 1B 121 10 99 244 1 203 2 FIELD 3 3012 LPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2A 221 14 291 244 1 203 2 FIELD 2, 1 3014 LPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2B 221 15 292 244 1 203 2 FIELD 2, 1 t .

3062 AHPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2B TRAIN 2 221 13 290 244 1 203 2 FIELD 3 3010 lPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 1B 121 14 103 244 1 203 2 FIELD 2, .6 3064 RHPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2A TRAIN 2 221 14 291 244 1 203 2 FIELD 3 3007 HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 1A 121 9 98 244 1 203 2 FIELD 3 3011 HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2A 121 11 100 244 4 203 2 FIELD 3 3013 HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2B 121 13 102 244 4 203 2 FIELD 3 3068

POS PENETRATION EVALUATION ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 2 OF 3 EOWPMENT EQUIPMENT PENETRATION SCHEMATIC P&ID WIRING FUSE NUMBER FUNCTIONAL NUMBER DRAWING DRAWING SIZE

~... POS's DESCRIPTION z-xxxxx E-610 SH E-XXX SH M-XXXX

.-~  :*.

. *-.'l 1A 2113 Charging dlstbutlon Une stop valve POSITION 121 23 112 236 2 202-18 E-236SH 2 3 18 0869 Sentlce Waler Inlet 10 V..fA POSITION 121 2 91 217 1 208--10 FIELD 30

  • ~' ....

18 0867 Service Water discharge from V-4A POSITION 121 2 91 217 4 208-1 B FIELD 30

.\

  • -:.j.

1C 0864 Service Water dlscharge ftom V-2A POSITION 221 24 301 216 1A 208-18 FIELD 30

.. *'. ~

1C 0865 Service Water Inlet to V-2A POSlTION 221 24 301 216 1A 208-18 FIELD 30

_. *. 1

~I t, 1. SHARE SAME CONNECTOR WITH SIMULAIR ALPHAS IN LIST.

-~

a;

.,, J l SV PENETRATION EVALUATION ATIACHMENT 1 PAGE 3 OF 3 EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT PENETRATION SCHEMATIC P&ID WlRING FUSE NUMBER Fl!NCTIONAL NUMBER DRAWING DRAWING SIZE SV's DESCRIPTION Z-XXXXX E-610 SH E-XXX SH M-XXXX AMPS 18 0867 SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM V4A-NEJNO 121 2 91 217 4 208-18 FIELD 30 18 0869 SERVICE WATER INLETTO V4A-NDINC 121 2 91 217 4 208-16 E-216 2, 5

..* . * ; 1C *0665 SERVICE WATER INLET TO V2A-NOJNC 221 24 301 216 1A 208-16 E-216 2, 5

  • -:.**. 3069 SAFTEY INJECTION TANK DRAIN VALVE - NE/NO 221 15 292 245 3 203-1 E-245 5 1A 2113 . CHARGING DISTRIBUTION STOP VALVE 121 23 112 236 2 202-1B E-236 3 I
1

~ 1. SHARE SAME CONNECTOR WITH SIMUL.AIR ALPHAS IN UST

.: 4

.w. *:*

':"l

- ~ .

i

  • Con tact l*JOrt ot:

Date at CHtact:

Flavou1 lohnso*

.February 2, 1990 i -J

~ 1 I

Consumers Power Company P11i1ade1 Nuclear Plant 27710 Blue Star W.morlat Hiahway Coycrt, Mii:bi1an -4900 Persoa Co*tactedi Robert Burnett (616) 764*8913, E1t. 0622 Purpou: Quettions on Wyl1 Tost Report .C3913*2 Dl1eut1loa:

Bob c11tcd with quttrions on WyJe Test lteport 43913*2, He had previously teie;opied 1im Oleasoa a paac trom the subject teat rcpon which 'ontaJned schematic di11rams of the =lr~uiu used to power the test apecianoH durin1 th1 Accident Slnn1lation (c:opy attached). Hit que1tion1 primarily coAeerncd the 120 VAC tesc spcf:lman* (cocnectors) and wert ti tollowr.

or tbe drcu1t.

(1) Bob 11ked tor lft npl1n1doa (2) Would tht ~lrcuh hive Uanited or prevented current lcakaae from oc:cu.l'.rina.

Kent SulUrt and r provided Bob tho toJiowi111 answers and discuuion:

( 1) Tile circuit w11 a polarized clrcuU, inoanin1 that tl1e currellt thro1.11h the specimen wa1 provided rrom a low volt111/h11Jl current tran1rormor (id11tJfled as 1:20 CT Jo the F'Jaure). Tho 1peclinea Ht* as the load tor chit rr1a1torm1t.

Th* POteatltl to 1rouad Ja provided by an isot1tioa tran1tormer Identified H 120:120 ln tho Fl1ur1. OM 1ld1 ot tbc ueoadtry i1 coancctc4 to 1roalCI. Th* othlr side is connected to the 1peoim1n. A brcaJcdo*n 121 the

. "'-'"""~-

  • * *
  • luulaUon would "u" leakap ;urreac to flow from the
  • PMfm1n to around. ThJa ri11 in cuneat tJow would be retlccced in the pri*rr ot tis* laolatJon tt1n1tormcr.

(2) nt Ofimary 1ld1 ot tht JlolatJoa trHlf'Ormor bad Ill ill*liae fUN iMtllJtd; thereroro, any current leak*** from tht *P.t~lmta co lto\Ulcl would h*"*

baa Umhcd co tho maaJmum curre11 capacity ot Che lu1t. Tb* actual tu* Y*h*o 11 not 1how1 on tbo P!1u..._

I told lo&t that tJd1 teat pro1r1111 w11 coaducled (11rly 1971) prior to aay requirement*

tor me11url1* actual lcakau curreou trom electrical devJa.s. Althouah no r-... vaJu1 i*

1ivo11, it Ia 011 opJaJoa. (based upo.a PA*t exoeri*ac:" wJt.h .JmUar tnc HC*Ultl) tbac the ru11 etrobeldr w11 I amp; chtrttora, tho maximu111 undottotccl loaka.. currcsac would

  • ha,.., bna approxlmatoly I amp.

WYLI &.AllMTOW HIUllaWUt* ,lllUtw .

Contact Report of Flavou1 Johasoa

---ft*~~c.,,~h*~-~t-

- f 2 7-of 3

/f.

Ftbtw1r1 2, 1990

, *** 2 We also diseusaod tho ~ao V t:iri:uh showa on che same Fiaurc. A ruse \llh.1e or 5*1 amps js 1ho*n in this circuit. We pointed ouc that the Isolation transformer in this circuit was a 120:*00, meaniftl that the current hl th~ secondary sidt would havo bsen J/4 ot chat in th* prJmary side; thorerore, the maximum undeteeted current leakaae Jn chit circuit would have been 1.25 ~ 2 ampt.

Bob uked thlt I tax 1 copy ot this Co11taot Report to Ptul Sond&trath, which I 11rccd to do.

Copln Toi J. Oieason. D. Bates, w. Dysart, K.. Bushart, S. Hyten, (Paul Sond1crath, Conaumen Po*cr Compan)')

PRJ:wo

12'"V4C

- I I" - - - - -~

I: ZOCT IZO#l1'1-S * :.s!~~J~r~.J-

  • - r

~o -----~--~---*=P 0-- 5-B,,RIPF'tlSE'

-qc (/ 2 CIR.Gii/TS R!!t;>'p C&IJftJP -Ofl '

~hJPPRtJSE 70VERl"f J2o SICtJNl>fMY CrJA.~fllT

=

CIJ'Wn8£A.

T'IPICllL &al6111Rnc FOR CDW/lee To~ -1.6/ICI{ 480 V'f'C-J2DIJ -3Pltl P/I( 2"1**p00'1- 0000 -

'"--------------~----**--- ------------.

,_.~~--""~-------~,*:sr~u~~ ~ *.

  • I  ;;o -0
  • R> II>

TYPJC.'ll. SClllEOJIJYIC l=tJR 2 CDWNE'CTt"<5 -~

U*O e11 1-co,11A1ec'14'ct PfN *2'1 *00';J'f-o<'o~ ":c;

  • Zo '\/llC ... l4J'J- 12P1,.r C

~

1- COl/NEC1"ell P/>I '180 -Of>lfJ -2q ..,,

/Zo Vl/C .. Joll- l'I PIN :_,

TY P1c,u.. SCN*'1t/11Ttc P~R. COAl'-'!!c:rl)q_ - 'e /IC,., FJGUQE I PIN qgo -cou;-031 4-fJO'll'/ Crl'fl} - '3PJN

Average Melting Time Current Characteristic Curves*

1/10to'f2 amper* FRN*R FUSETRON Ou.al-Element Fuses (250 **olt a.c.)

  • C~,~*~*~***ii-l;lcJ.lli(¢~!1~ i1~1J*li~~~~~~~~~**~~~

~*i=

~9 -~  ::~ ~ (\J ~7 \() i:c 2 1 1 3 1 *: ...

20¢ IC¢ ...

lC ao 1

~

VI 0

4 z 3 0

u i.:.i

  • 1

(/)

2 I

s;

!.i.J

~

~ ,7

.4

.07

.o~

,04

.03

...................... -:u~RENT IN AMPERC:S 9

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML18054B431&oldid=2506974"