ML18054B085

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Forwards Detailed 1989 Maint Outage Steam Generator Insp Results.Licensee Concludes That Probability or Consequences of Accident or Malfunction of Equipment Important to Safety Will Not Be Increased by Continued Operation W/Generators
ML18054B085
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/03/1989
From: Berry K
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
TAC-69344, NUDOCS 8911130204
Download: ML18054B085 (60)
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consumers Power Kenneth W Berry_

Director POWERiNii Nuclear licensing MICHIGAN'S PROliRESS General Offices: 1945 West Parnell Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-1636 November 3, 1989 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -

1989 MAINTENANCE OUTAGE STEAM GENERATOR INSPECTION RESULTS (TAC NO 69344)

Following plant startup on March 1, 1989 primary to secondary leakage was detected. Operation of the plant with an average calculated leak rate of 0.015 gallons per minute continued until October 1, 1989 when Palisades was shut down to repair suspect Westinghouse mechanical tube plugs. As detailed in the Attachment, Eddy Current Testing (ECT) of both steam generators was completed.

  • As a result of the ECT, twenty seven tubes, of which eleven contained crack-like indications, were plugged in the "A" steam generator. In the "B" steam generator 118 tubes, of which 69 contained crack-like indications, were plugged.

Crack-like indications were found in hot leg tubes which are similar to those previously observed in the "B" steam generator and are of limited circumferential extent. Crack-like indications were also found in cold leg tubes which have a wider range of circumferential extent but lower average depth of penetration.

Some cold leg tubes have localized regions of deep crack penetration over a limited circumferential extent. It is expected that the deep portion of these cracks will propagate through wall and result in leakage before the region of deep penetration achieves an arc length of 90 degrees.

Current plans are to remove the steam generator nozzle dams on November 4, 1989 and proceed with plant operation at 80 percent of.rated power until replacement of both steam generators in the fall of 1990. An administrative limit of 0.05 gallons per minute primary to secondary leakage will continue to be imposed during plant operation.

Consumers Power Company concludes the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by continued operation with the existing steam generators. Also, the margin 0Cll89-0217-NL04

( 8911130204 891103 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G PNU l A Ci1if5' ENERGY COMPANY

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Palisades Nuclear Plant 1989 Maintenance Outage S/G Results

  • 2 November 3, 1989 of safety specified in technical specifications bases is not reduced and, in-fact, is increased due to the more restrictive administrative limits imposed on primary to secondary leakage, reduced operating power level, and the low primary system activity. MPR Associates has reviewed the ECT inspection results and our plans for continued operation and have reached similar conclusions.

Kenneth W Berry (Signed)

Kenneth W Berry Director, Nuclear Licensing CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRG Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment OC1189-0217-NL04

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consumers Power Kenneth W Berry Director POWERIN& Nuclear Licensing MICHlliAN'S PRO&RESS General Offices: 1945 West Parnall Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-1636 November 3, 1989 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -

1989 MAINTENANCE OUTAGE STEAM GENERATOR INSPECTION RESULTS (TAC NO 69344)

Following plant startup on March 1, 1989 primary to secondary leakage was detected. Operation of the plant with an average calculated leak rate of 0.015 gallons per minute continued until October 1, 1989 when Palisades was shut down to repair suspect Westinghouse mechanical tube plugs. As detailed in the Attachment, Eddy Current Testing (ECT) of both steam generators was completed.

  • As a result of the ECT, twenty seven tubes, of which eleven contained crack-like indications, were plugged in the "A" steam generator. In the "B" steam generator 118 tubes, of which 69 contained crack-like indications, were plugged.

Crack-like indications were found in hot leg tubes which are similar to those previously observed in the "B" steam generator and are of limited circumferential extent. Crack-like indications were also found in cold leg tubes which have a wider range of circumferential extent but lower average depth of penetration.

Some cold leg tubes have localized regions of deep crack penetration over a limited circumferential extent. It is expected that the deep portion of these cracks will propagate through wall and result in leakage before the region of deep penetration achieves an arc length of 90 degrees.

Current plans are to remove the steam generator nozzle dams on November 4, 1989 and proceed with plant operation at 80 perceDt of.rated power until replace~ent of both steam generators in the fall of 1990. An administrative limit of 0.05 gallons per minute primary to secondary leakage will continue to be imposed during plant operation.

Consumers Power Company concludes the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by continued operation with the existing steam generators. Also, the margin OC1189-0217-NL04

'??'llfB fPCJ4 cj.~o(fy CMSCNCRGYCOMPANY

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2 Palisades Nuclear Plant 1989 Maintenance Outage S/G Results November 3, 1989 of safety specified in technical specifications bases is not reduced and, in-fact, is increased due to the more restrictive administrative limits imposed on primary to secondary leakage, reduced operating power level, and the low primary system activity. MPR Associates has reviewed the ECT inspection results and our plans for continued operation and have reached similar conclusions.

Kenneth W Berry Director, Nuclear Licensing CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment OC1189-0217-NL04

ATTACHMENT Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 DETAILED 1989 MAINTENANCE OUTAGE EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION RESULTS November 3, 1989 27 Pages OC1189-0217-NL04

1 I. EDDY CUR.RENT INSPECTION RESULTS Over the *last two years several leaks due to cracked tubes in the "B" steam generator (S/G) hot leg at tube support plates 3 and 13 have occurred. In March 1989 an increase in off-gas activity indicated another crack may exist.

Consumers Power Company contracted MPR Associates to perform a support plate stress evaluation prior to starting Palisades October 1989 Maintenance Outage. The purpose of the evaluation was to identify tubes within the S/G which are most susceptible to circumferential stress corrosion cracking. Stress and deflection analyses of the support plates, the location of tube support plate flow circulation holes and the recent history with respect to tube leaks and tube cracking were all taken into consideration in completing the evaluation. A total of 1,006 tubes iri the "A" S/G hot leg were recommended for inspection with the 8xl pancake probe which was specifically qualified to detect stress corrosion cracking and of those, 239 were recommended for additional inspection with the motorized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) probe at support plates 3 or 13. In the "B" S/G hot leg, a total of 783 tubes were recommended for inspection of which 94 tubes were recommended for further inspection with the MRPC at support plates 3 or 13. All previous tube leaks have occurred in S/G hot legs, therefore, cold leg inspections were not recommended.

As stated in Consumers Power Company's letter to the NRC dated September 28, 1989, Consumers Power decided to perform the recommended testing of the most highly stressed tubes in the October 1989 Maintenance Outage. In addition, because the 8xl probe was qualified for the detection of circumferential cracks, but not for sizing !GA or wastage type defects, a limited bobbin probe inspection was planned to address

  • 11 non-crack" indications. In order to ensure that the "non-crack" defects had not grown since the last time they were inspected, Consumers Power planned to use the Miz-12 540 SFW bobbin probe to inspect a minimum of 100 tubes containing "non-crack" indications. The 540 SFW bobbin probe with the Miz-12 tester was to be used in lieu of the Miz-18/ 580 bobbin in order to obtain a direct comparison with the previous eddy current test results.

A chronology of the eddy current inspection and testing results follows:

A. LEAK TEST AND INSPECTION OF LEAKERS OCTOBER 1, 1989 - Palisades shutdown for the Fall Maintenance Outage~

Prior to shutting down, the Plant was operating at 80 percent power with a calculated primary to secondary leak rate of approximately 0.018 gpm.

OCTOBER 11, 1989 - A tubesheet scan for leaks was completed in both "A" and "B" S/G hot legs while the S/Gs were under nitrogen overpressurization.

Two tubes in "B" S/G were identified as leakers: Q2 L13 Rl28 at 13+ 0.5" and Q3 L72 R69 at 11. Both of these tubes were included in the recommended stress inspection scope. No leakers were identified in the "A" S/G. Cold leg visual inspections were not conducted at this time due to all previous leakage indications being in the hot legs.

S/G-L!Ol

2 OCTOBER 13, 1989 - Two rings of tubes around each of the leaking tubes in "B" S/G were inspected with the 8xl probe. This testing resulted in identifying two additional crack-like indications: Q2 Ll5 Rl28 at V3 and Q3 L73 R66 at 11. Two rings of tubes around each of these tubes were then inspected. No other crack-like indications were found. Note: All potential crack-like indications were inspected with the MR.PC in addition to the 8xl probe.

B. 8 x 1 INSPECTION OF HIGH STRESS TUBES OCTOBER 18, 1989 - The inspection of most highly stressed tubes with the 8xl and MRPC probes was completed in "A" and "B" S/Gs. A total of seven crack-like indications, including the two leakers identified on October 11, 1989 were found in "B" hot leg. These tubes are:

Quad Line Row Elevation Description 2 13 120 3 2 13 128 13+ 0.5" Leaker 2 15 128 V3 3 72 69 11 Leaker 3 73 66 11 2 76 57 4 2 76 59 4 Each tube with a crack-like indication was again bounded by inspection of two rings of tubes adjacent to it. No tubes were found in the "A" S/G hot leg which contained crack-like indications.

C. IGA AND WASTAGE INSPECTION The Miz-12 540 SFW bobbin inspection began in "A" hot leg. The total number of "non-crack" indications found with the 8xl probe was significantly smaller than expected, therefore, 100 tubes were scheduled for inspection in accordance with Consumers Power letter to the NRC dated September 28, 1989. All 100 of the tubes selected for the "non-crack" inspection were from the "A" S/G because it contained significantly more of these indications than the "B" S/G. The 540 bobbin testing was completed October 20, 1989 with no IGA or wastage degradation noted.

D. VISUAL EXAMINATION AND ECT INSPECTION Tubesheet scans of "A" and "B" cold legs were performed to ensure no abnormalities were present. No anomalies were found in "B" cold leg, however, the scan in "A" cold leg identified a region of wetness (no actual drips were seen) close to the divider plate. Fifteen tubes bounding the wet area were tested with the 8xl probe and possible crack-like indications were identified in five tubes. Subsequent testing with the MRPC confirmed the presence of three crack-like indications in the following tubes:

S/G:-LIOl

3 Quad Line Row Elevation Description 4 55 14 3 suspected leaker 4 53 14 3 4 54 13 3 2 flaws Each of these tubes had been last inspected in August 1983 with no apparent degradation present at the third support plate.

OCTOBER 19, 1989 - Based on the above tube degradation, the following were inspected:

1. All tubes located within three rings of the degraded tubes in "A" cold leg quad 4 (39 tubes).
2. All tubes located within three rings of the degraded tubes in "A" cold leg quad 1 (38 tubes).
3. All tubes in rows 12-14 (along the divider plate) in both quads 1 and 4 of "A" cold leg (125 tubes).

OCTOBER 21, 1989 - The 8xl probe testing of the*"leaker" areas and rows 12-14 in "A" cold leg were completed. A total of 20 potential crack-like indications (including the three known crack-like indications) were found (19 were at support plate 3 and one was at support plate 7). Of the potential cracks, nine were dispositioned with the MR.PC as satisfactory, leaving 11 crack-like indications of which ten were at support plate 3.

Consumers Power made the decision to _expand the inspection scope as follows:

E. EXPANDED INSPECTION OF A S/G

1. Test all tubes in rows 15-16 in "A" cold leg and in rows 12-14 in "A" hot leg. If a crack-like indication was found then testing would expand into the next two rows in the affected quad.
2. Perform a five percent random inspection in both "A" hot and cold .

legs. If a crack-like indication is found, then two rings of tubes around each suspect tube will be tested. The five percent random sample was chosen because if no pluggable indications were found it would provide a 95 percent confidence factor that less than one percent of the tubes in the S/G are degraded.

OCTOBER 22, 1989 - One potential crack-like indication was found in rows 15-16 in quad 4, therefore, the inspection scope expanded into rows 17-18 in that quad. No crack-like indications were found in rows 17-18.

Consumers Power requested that MPR Associates review the eddy current inspection results and to provide a crack mechanism assessment.

S/G-LIOl

\

4 OCTOBER 24, 1989 - MPR Associates reviewed all of the eddy current results and provided an assessment which is summarized below:

1. There are two probable mechanisms responsible for the cracking found on the cold legs; in-plane loads due to severe denting and out-of-plane loads due to thermal expansion stresses.
2. The average denting values for the third support plate based on the December 1987 profilometry inspection are as follows: -

Diametrical Dent (mils)

A cold leg 33.6 A hot leg 21. l B cold leg 24.4 B hot leg 21.5 The above values indicate significantly high denting. Concern for stresses in the plate is compounded by the fact that the third support plate does not have flow circulation holes, which provide stress relief in other plates.

3. Added to the denting stresses are the thermal expansion loads. The tubes adjacent to areas of plugged tubes are subjected to higher than normal thermal expansion stresses. This is particularly true in the case of the short radius tubes which have the "hottest" primary water at the cold leg tube sheet. Most of the tubes in rows 1-12 are plugged. Hence, the unplugged tubes closest to the divider plate should see the highest out-of-plane loads in the S/Gs due to thermal_expansion stresses.
4. The second most probable area of high stress would be at tubes located in lug regions. The restraining force of the lug, in addition to thermal expansion stresses between the "cold" lug and a hot tube make this a high suspect area. For this reason MPR
  • r_ecommended Consumers Power inspect six tubes at each of the five lug regions at support plate 3. Consumers Power made the decision to perform this "lug" inspection.

Testing in "A" cold leg with the exception of the "lug" inspection was completed. No additional crack-like indications were found.

OCTOBER 25, 1989 - The "lug" inspection was completed in "A" cold leg with no additional indications being found. Testing in "A" hot leg was completed, also with no indications being found. All "A" S/G inspections resulted in detecting a total of 11 crack-like indications by the cold leg divider plate region. None were found in the hot leg.

In summary, the "A" S/G hot leg inspection had covered 1,017 tubes specifically targeted by the original MPR inspection plan plus 130 tubes along the divider plate to verify no problem existed, plus a five percent random sample for a total of 22.7 percent of the tubes inspected with no S/G-LIOl

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5 cracks identified. The "A" S/G cold leg inspection had covered 360 tubes along the divider plate, 29 tubes at the lugs and a five percent random sample, which provided reasonable assurance that the affected areas had been defined and inspected.

F. EXPANDED INSPECTION OF B S/G Consumers Power also made the decision to inspect rows 12-14 in the "B" S/G cold leg and to continue inspections similar to the "A" S/G if indications were noted.

OCTOBER 27, 1989 - Inspection of "B" cold leg identified 24 crack-like indications in rows 12-14. Testing was expanded into rows 15-16 in which 10 additional crack-like indications were found. Expansion continued into rows 17-18 of both quads 1 and 4. Another 16 crack-like indications were found resulting in expansion into rows 19-20. No additional cracks were found in these two rows. A total of 50 crack-like indications were found in rows 12-18. All but two were at the third support plate. The other two were at the tubesheet.

Based on the above degradation, Consumers Power made the decision to perform a five percent random inspection in "B" cold leg and to test rows 12-14 in "B" hot leg, to verify problem areas had been identified and bounded.

OCTOBER 28, 1989 - "B" hot leg inspection of rows 12-14 was completed. No crack-like indications were found.

OCTOBER 29, 1989 - "B" cold leg random sample was completed. Five crack-like indications were found:

No Quad Line Row Elevation Description 1 4 36 117 4 tested 8/88 - ok 2 4 35 116 4 tested 8/88 - ok 3 4 38 117 4 tested 8/88 - ok 4 4 36 71 4 tested 8/83 - ok 5 4 64 81 3 tested 8/88 - ok All of the above tubes are located in areas of suspected high stress due to denting or thermal expansion loads and were in or near areas that had already been inspected on the hot leg side based on the initial MPR recommended sample. Number 1 through 3 are adjacent to plugged tubes which were part of the "block" plugging effort performed in February 1989.

Number 4 is in area subject to high in-plane plate stresses and Number 5 is located in a lug region. Two rings of tubes adjacent to each of these tubes were inspected with no further indications found.

S/G-LIOl

6 Consumers Power then made the decision to follow the Palisades Technical Specification 4.14 supplementary sample criteria which states that if more than one percent of the inspected tubes in a leg have indications of tube wall degradation in excess of the repair criteria where no wall degradation greater than 30 percent was detected in the previous two inspections then, an additional six percent sample will be performed in the affected leg.

Based on this, Consumers Power performed an additional six percent random sample in "B" cold leg. No crack-like indications were found, thus resulting in a 95 percent confidence that less than one percent of tubes in the B S/G are degraded.

OCTOBER 30, 1989 - Following a recormnendation from the NRC made during the ongoing status briefings, the "B" cold leg inspection was expanded to further bound the five tubes with crack-like indications found in the original five percent random sample.

1. Test all of the tubes adjacent to the "block" plugging pattern in quad 4 (55 tubes total).
2. Test the entire support plate 3 lug region by tube Q4 164 R81 (61 tubes total),
3. Test the "T" zone defined by plates 3 and 4 by tube Q4 136 R71 (48 tubes total).

In addition, the tubes passing through support plate 3 in rows 21-22 were inspected (25 tubes).

OCTOBER 31, 1989 - The six percent random sample in "B" cold leg was

.completed. Seven tubes in the support plate 3 lug region were. found to contain crack-like indications:

Quad Line Row Elevation Description 4 69 72 7 tested 8/88 - ok 4 70 71 3 tested 8/88 - ok 4 67 80 7 tested 8/88 - ok 4 68 79 7 tested 8/88 - ok 5 tested 8/88 - ok 4 69 74 7 tested 8/88 - ok 5 tested 37 percent 8/88 4 69 76 7 tested 8/88 - ok 5 tested 8/88 - ok 4 70 73 5 tested 36 percent 8/88 A minimum of two rings of tubes surrounding the defective tubes were tested. No additional crack-like indications were found in this sample nor S/G-1101 I I

7 were they found in the other expanded "bounding" samples. All 'B' S/G inspections resulted in detecting a total of 69 crack-like indications.

Based on the inspection results, testing was determined to be complete in both "A" and "B" S/Gs at this time.

In summary, the 'B' S/G hot leg inspection had included 783 tubes from the initial MPR sample, 156 tubes at the divider plate. No defects were identified outside the original MPR sample area. The 'B' S/G cold leg inspection had included 542 tubes along the divider plate, 30 tubes at lugs, 158 tubes bounding other suspect areas identified by the 5% random sample, and finally a 6% random sample to provide reasonable assurance that the suspect areas had been identified and bounded.

Tubesheet maps showing the tubes inspected ~re attached. The following table summarizes the total number of tubes inspected with the 8xl probe in "A" and "B" S/Gs:

G. INSPECTION STATISTICS Approximate Number Of Tubes S/G Leg Tested With The 8xl Probe A Hot 1473 (22.7 percent)

A Cold 714 (11.0 percent)

B Hot 939 (15. 2 percent)

B Cold 1425 (23. 0 percent)

A total of 27 tubes are to be plugged in the "A" S/G of which 11 contain crack-like indications. In the "B" S/G, 118 tubes are to be plugged, of which 69 contain crack-like indications. Tubes which are adjacent to leakers or to tubes containing crack indications in excess of 80 degrees circumferential are also to be plugged. The plugged tube listings for "A" and "B" S/Gs are attached.

II. CHARACTERIZATION OF CRACK-LIKE INDICATIONS Circumferentially oriented crack-like indications were detected in "B" S/G hot leg tubing and in "A" S/G cold leg tubing. The indications occur at various support plate elevations and are typically located within the bounds and near the top edge of the affected support plate. The indications have been reviewed to* characterize circumferential extents and depths of penetration of crack-like indications based on 8xl probe and MRPC data.

In the "B" hot leg, all indications have circumferential extents on the order of 50 degrees or less. The two leakers are described below. Q2 113 Rl28, has a circumferential extent of 49 degrees and has a non-uniform depth of penetration estimated range from approximately 80 percent to nearly through wall over the affected area. Depth estimates are derived from correlation of 8xl probe data and MR.PC phase angle and amplitude measurements with values obtained from calibration _standards. Q3 172 R69, has a circumferential extent of nearly 50 degrees and has a nearly uniform S/G-1101

8 depth of penetration which measures approximately through wall. These two indications have characteristics that are similar to, although not as severe as, indications found in "B" S/G leaking tubes during December 1987, August 1988 and February 1989 inspections. All indications associated with leaking tubes in "B" S/G hot leg since December 1987 have been MRPC examined and have had circumferential extents varying from 49 degrees to 83 degrees with an average extent of 63 degrees.

The cold leg indications in both "A" and "B" S/Gs differ from the "B" hot leg indications in that they possess a wider range of circumferential extents (up to 220 degrees) and lower average depths of penetration distributed over each affected area. Somewhat in common with "B" hot leg, however, the location of deepest penetration within each affected area is localized and confined to a limited circumferential extent. For example, the suspected leaker in "A" S/G, Q4 155 Rl4, has a circumferential extent of approximately 210-220 degrees. The depth of penetration is non-uniform and relatively shallow throughout this affected area except for a sector having an arc length between 45 and 90 degrees where the estimated depth increases to nearly throughwall.

For all indications reviewed on the cold legs, the characteristics are essentially the same; ie, there are affected areas of varied circumferential extent having non-uniform and generally low average depths of penetration. In the few instances of affected areas wherein localized depths have been evaluated as being in excess of 70-80 percent throughwall, the associated arc lengths of deep penetration are in all cases conservatively estimated to be less than 90 degrees. It is also apparent that for cold leg indications, the smaller the circumferential extent of the affected area, the lower the average depth of penetration. Since the abundance of cold leg indications have total circumferential extents less than 100 degrees, the average depths of penetrations are relatively low (reference Figure A).

In summary, h.ot leg crack-like indications are similar to those observed in "B" S/G and are of limited circumferential extent. This experience suggests that hot leg cracks propagate through wall resulting in leakage before they reach circumferential extents greater than 65 degrees on the average. Cold leg indications have a wider range of circumferential extent than do hot leg indications but lower average depths of penetration. The localized regions of deep penetration within ~old leg affected areas occur over a limited circumferential extent comparable to that of hot leg indications. Based on the leaker in "A" S/G cold leg and the characteristics of cold leg indications of comparable severity, it can be expected that deep cold leg cracks with limited circumferential extent within a larger affected area will propagate throughwall and result in leakage before the region of deep penetration achieves an arc length conservatively estimated at 90 degrees.

III STRENGTH OF TUBING As noted in Consumers Power's submittals dated April 19, 1984 and May 22, 1989, the maximum throughwall crack size than can exist in a Palisades S/G S/G-LIOl

9 tube without bursting during a main steam line break (MSLB) is 187 degrees circumferential. Based on the preceding crack characterization description, it is evident that only one of the cracks exceed 187 degrees circumferential extent, and none of the indications approached throughwall for more than 90 degrees found in the Palisades S/Gs approach being 187 degrees circumferential. The maximum throughwall circumferential extent found during this inspection was conservatively estimated to. be less than 90 degrees.

In addition, Consumers Power has demonstrated through previous analyses (CPCo to NRC submittal dated April 19, 1984 and MPR analyses of May, 1989) and by actual tube leakage experienced, that throughwall cracking will develop and be detected by installed Plant equipment prior to a crack reaching the critical circumferential length for a MSLB event.

IV UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION The probability of a throughwall crack which exceeds 187 degrees circumferential extent or that could grow to such an extent during operation without producing detectable leakage is believed to be essentially zero. This is based on the following:

1. A total of 4,551 (17.9% of total) tubes have been inspected in October 1989 with none exhibiting throughwall "crack-like" indications exceeding a conservatively estimated 90. degrees circumferential extent.
2. Areas representing the highest stress areas have been thoroughly tested and ramdom samples have provided reasonable assurance that no new unidentified areas of degradation exist.
3. Average calculated primary to secondary leakage of approximately 0.015 gallons per minute experienced until Plant shutdown on December 1, 1989, resulting from throughwall indications not exceeding the conservatively estimated 90 degree circumferential extent, corresponds well with leakage predicted by the May, 1989 MPR analysis. The ability to detect low levels during operation assures that throughwall tube cracks resulting in low leakage flow rates will be detected.

Palisades FSAR Section 14.14 "Steam Line Rupture Accident" assumes a maximum primary to secondary leakage of 0.6 gpm to be occurring at the time of the event. Palisades FSAR Section 14.15, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture Incident" assumes a double ended tube rupture occurs with the primary coolant system containing activity equivalent to one percent fuel failure.

Both events assume the Plant is operating at a minimum of 100 percent of rated power. Neither of these events result in doses at the site boundary that approach limits specified in 10CFRl00.11.

Current plans are for Plant operation at 80 percent of rated power until S/G replacement in the Fall of 1990. Technical Specification 3.1.5 limits primary to secondary system leakage to 0.3 gallons per minute and an S/G-LIOL

10 administrative limit of 0.05 gallons per minute will continue to be imposed during Plant operation providing a safety factor of 12 for the MSLB. One percent failed fuel, (A steam generator tube rupture accident assumption) is equivalent to 6.4 micro Curies per gram dose equivalent iodine.

Technical Specification 3.1.4 limits primary coolant system dose equivalent iodine to one micro Curie per gram. Therefore, a factor of safety of 6.4 is provided. Additionally it should be noted that the primary system dose equivalent iodine at the time of this past shutdown was 2.14E-2 micro Curies per gram. This provided a safety factor of approximately 300.

Based on the above, Consumers Power concludes that the probability and consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by continued operation with the existing S/Gs with established administrative limits.

Further, the margin of safety afforded by Technical Specifications is not reduced and in fact is increased due to; administrative limits imposed on primary to secondary leakage, the reduced power operation level and low primary system activity level.

After review of the analyzed accidents presented in the Palisades FSAR, it has been determined that for a different type of accident or malfunction to occur, an MSLB must occur which induces a failure of a S/G tube. As noted in MFR Associates analyses .of May, 1989 which was submitted to the NRC on j May 22, 1989, for an MSLB to induce a tube rupture, a throughwall circumferential crack of 187 degrees must be present at the initiation of an MSLB *

. While Consumers Power believes it to be of very low probability for a throughwall indication of 187 degrees to exist without detectable leakage, or for a 187 degrees throughwall leak may be induced during operation without detection, Consumers Power has conservatively estimated that the probability of such a defect existing in an uninspected tube to be 1.7E-2.

This is based on the number of tubes with "crack-like" indications identified (80) and the number of tubes inspected (4,551) during October 1989 and that a throughwall crack which will exceed 187 degrees circumferential extent may be induced from "any" existing defect.

In order for an MSLB to induce a tube rupture, it is assumed the flow rate through this type of break must be much greater than the capacity through two open ADVs, assuming the opposite generator is isolated from the break.

This limits the scope of pipe breaks to those 18 inches or larger in the pipe sections between the S/G and the first isolation or normally closed*

valve. Large pipes are most likely to break at the welds bety en sections.

0 WASH-1400 (Table III, 4-1) reports a weld failure rate of 10- /segment-hr.

For any of the welds beyond the MSIVs to cause S/G blowdown, the associated MSIV would also have to fail to close in conjunction with the pipe failure.

As noted in the NRC's safety evaluation report dated February 28, 1986 for single failures associated with a MSLB, the calculated core-damage frequency is 5.8E-5 per year.

S/G-LIOl

_J 11 Considering only the main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs and the main feed lines, there are a total of 59 welds that me~ the large MSLB criteria. This leads to a failure rate of 2.6Xl0 08 /reactor year. The reactor is expected to operate with the current S/Gs for less than 8 additi~5~l months. This gives a large MSLB core-damage frequency of 4.3Xl0 /reactor year. Significant differences between the current results and those provided in the 1983 submittal are: 1) The current analysis includes the use of condensate pumps to backup auxiliary feedwater as identified in the 1983 submittal and 2) It also includes feed and bleed as a core heat removal mechanism (this was not considered in the 1983 submittal).

In order to determine the resultant probability that the MSLB would induce a tube rupture, the probability for the MSLB is multiplied by the probability that a 187 degrees circumferential crack would be present at the initi~rfon of the MSLB. This results in a total core damage frequency of 7.3Xl0 .

Further, pre-existing throughwall cracks of approximately 90 degrees circumferential extend should exhibit detectable leakage and would not be expected to grow to greater than 117 degrees during an MSLB event. Recent analyses performed for tubes with an initial crack size of 130 degrees, indicate that vibration due to an MSLB would.not result in a crack beyond the limiting 187 degree extent, even if the initial crack were throughwall for the entire 130 degree circumference. The growth rate of cracks can be estimated by comparing the current inspection results with previous results. For the worst case tube, indications went from no indication to indications extending to 132 degrees circumferential extent. Therefore, it is concluded that the possibility for a new type of accident or malfunction has not been created.

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12 FIGURE A PALISADES OCTOBER 1989 CIRCUMFERENTIAL INDICATIONS

SUMMARY

CHART No of Circumferential Crack Indications S/G Leg 0-50 deg 51-100 deg >100 deg A Cold 7 0 4 A Hot 0 0 0 B Cold 44 14 6 B Hot 7 0 0 Total 58 14 10 80 *~

60 *la 40 ..

20 ..

I I 0-50 degrees51-100 degrees >100 degrees

j 13

' OCTOBER 1989 PLUGGED TUBE LISTING LEGEND SYMBOL DESCRIPTION H 8 X 1 Inspection R MRPC Inspection F Bobbin Inspection 99 Crack-Like Indication 97 Potential Crack-Like Indication 98 Volumetric Indication (Not sized with the given technique)

All Other Percent Throughwall with Numbers the Given Technique FIGURE B

PALISADES EDDY CURRENT TEST COVER SHEET PALISADES 'B' S/G OCTOBER 1989 PLUGGED TUBE LIST 1 11-1-89 5 pages Revison -- Date ~~~~~~~~

==

Description:==

'B' S/G October 1989 plugging candidate list which contains as a minimum all tubes with indications which exceed Palisades plugging criteria as specified in Technical Specification 4.14.

Reference:

I I Technical I Administrative

,,1.~I Review II

~;:~

It'~ , I I Date / 1 I Date 11 t I <""' . I Master Controlled Copy No Information Only V Issued By:

MI0289-1675A-TC01

. . . . TSO FOREGROUND HARUCOPY ****

Uifo.IAHC11f.So.211U5wilPLAH#.U-&-J--- * - *-- . * - ..... *-* *-**----~-~--

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KT-SG-89-028 PAGE 1 Of 5 I ll/9l/89 ' ~

RE II 1

  • -*- --**P-lcll&Aol:-S -eG*fUdl::-14---19~ -Plut>GtO* flit)c* Lf!if-* --*- *--*** *---** --*---- --****-**---* *--*** - **--****-----------

1 d 1 STtAH GENfRATOR lYBE - - *--t OfH~ e5-P-OH£H Nb* r UBE fff& *-** 1:

COUNT (JUAI) LINE: RO~ ELEll. KEASuN fuR PLUGGlN~ ~UAu LINE RUw

--t-l---ie-2---la;,l&---*-1~1 2 12 129

-*-~.--fiJ--l.E-AK-E~

ADJ, Tu Ll::AKER

--* * -** * -* -------------1:----*-*-*- - i~*-

1 12

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129 l *

  • ---*------.-*-- I 0 3 2 13 120 ] H991 R99 1 13 i.,:o o\9,je la LEA-.cR _ _ _,,_3..._ . - i-rb - ..... ****- ***-** **--- *-----***** . --*-*****----*******-*--**** - -***--------***- ..

5 z 128 H991 R99t f97 LEAKER 1 u ll.8 )::

b l. 13 130 ADJ. TO LEAKER l 13 130 1

I 2 14 129

--,----l:k------t:c'l:r---*-*-::*--*-*---*- * ** * *-* - --**---* ---** -*-*---**

---*"-----,:"':k#.:,j.,:.,.._,:H:;t-i:O;t::1'-:Wl:l-t:lltl:..._,...,....,_,..,,:,,,,,,'."",;:""::"';lf"";/"lc""<""*'

9 2 15 128 V3 l 15 128

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2 l6 0$9 ~ H97, R99 l 16 059 1~

12 15 3

3 3

11 n

72 12 068 065 Obl ADJ. TO LEAKER CONSERVATIVE PLUG ADJ. TO LEAKER 4 71 12 Ob8 g7g Ob5 Oo7

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I' J6 l Oo9 u --1rt+9"'~..,,~J1.,..9019o.-te~f-'-"'B.. i.._..Lollifi~A...

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3 1Z 011 ADJ. TO LEAt(ER 4 7Z 071 i I'"

18 3 73 064 CUNSERllATIVE PLUG 4 13 () b't 13 20 3 73 068 ADJ. TO LEAKER 4 H Obtl J ..

I-'

21 3 74 Ob5 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 4 Oo5 Vl "

~IUl.Ul~-~- ----------** -*-"'---*-- _74 *.

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PAGE 2 uf 5

. ----*----~-

lU8E tORRtS~ONDIN~ fUdE END COUNT QUAO LINE ROW ElEV. REASON FUR PLUGGl~G JUAD LINE ROW ________ JJ' 23 l 28 015 TS+4 H98t R'J9, F7l lB 015

    • l----~* -015 2* tH5 25 lb l

l 34 35 I) 016 l7 3

t197; R.99 2 34 017 I.

2 3'i Ult..

---2:*1-*-- -**i---- "*" . 015 j .. Jo 0 lS 26 l 36 Ol 7 ti'H* K99 2 3b l) l7 29 l 015 3 t197, R'19 01~

---'l'-'-UL-----*-*-*--l--*----4-9---*- ca--. **l*-** *-*-****-**-- ***~--fW9-9--.f.~- ****-- - - - - - - - - - * **-*--** ~--**--*-* ---*-**-~ .....

  • i l

l 5b 013 013 3

ti991 R991 Fll H99, R99, fbd

~'...... _.

2 54 013 013

--.;J;hl~---A.L.---_.C.*l.---1CJ~ll."'t-..... **** *-*------H¥4-..-l~~---___,, ,,,_--..------il~------*-av *.............

l 66 015 l tf97J R991 F59 2 66 015 ..

35 l 68 013 3 H971 ~99 2 013 lo 1 015 ....H:o.;9.. ,....J ,,_.li""'9'"'9-----~-------l----~ta~s--.-O.J..5..- ....... . ****--*-***--- ***--*--*- ----** '

37 1 71 014 ] tf981 R99t F58 2 71 014 ]::

]8 39

'tO 41 l

4 72 Ut Z9 30 015 0111 OU 3

3 3

TS+3 H97, R99 H99, R99 H97 9 R99, F86 R98 2

--l----~Hl.'39'-"'i~---------------------------0..l.l. ****-*************--****-** *****-*** ****--*** **-

3 3

72 Z9 30 015 016 013

        • -****--****** -- .... ************-****--*
  • 1:

1~

31 01'\ 3 li98t R99t F57 3 31 OH

_ __,it._3i_____,.~-..........:la..iJ'---~-- --~-- ---"H"'-9.._J._,.....R"-'9~9-- *-----------~3----_,3,....lo---~8 --

44 4 32 017 j H97, R99 3 32 Ol1 34 017 3 H'11 9 R99 3 34 017 I

.. .AQ..l. ....JO LAA GE-~IUC.L----*-- *-*- -**-**-- .. -~l-----~--- - - -l 15- -* i'"

f--'

0\

ADJ. TO lAKG~ CKAtK j4 ll7 35 070 ADJ~ TO LARGE CKACK 3 070 I

--*92---------*-* - - l i 072 - OU.

L ____ _

TUBE COUNT QUAD LINE ROW ELEV.

CORRL5PO~UING iJUAIJ PAGt: 3 uF 5 LINE TUoE ENO I.,.

I '

50 35 ll't ADJ. TU LAKGE C~AC~ 3 35 114

---4-1---------+- --- --- -n- -- - i 1* l.l6 52 4 36 015 3 3 36 015

/:

53 4 3b 011 3 r-i97t R99 J 36 011 54 - - ----.U.--- --Oo!il -- -----~- ~---

55 4 36 071 H9° R99, Fll 3 36 Oll 5o 4 3b OH ADJ. TO LARGE CRACK 3 ]b 013

-~-------~---- -l-!-~ -

58 36 111 4 H99t R99 3 lo 117 59 4 37 018 3 H99t R99 -1 3 31 018 ..

--~6-1.10"-----4--~--- - 010 J..

61 07Z 3 37 OlZ 6l. 4 116 ADJ. TO LARGE CRACK 3 Jl 116

--a6.aJ---... 4---~J..._d----l-l-1-- ---it-- --------~-R-..9*9---------------- ~---**- ---l---H*

4 41 012 H91t R99 3 41 012 I-*

- 65 4 41 018 3 H97t R99, F63 3 'tl 018 I

I

--.o.6.o.6---... 4--~---~0~1~2- --1------------~--R.99 ---------------- *---6------~~ ---------0--!~----- .. I 67 43 o14 ADJ. TO LARGc CRACK 3 43 014 b8 4 44 013 3 H97, R'l9 3 44 013

--.0.6_,,.9_ _ _... lt----'t4--- *-*-- OJ.5------ --- ---AD.J...---+-U- ~~- -~AU'.--------* ----~-----------44---- ..... -415 '

10 4 45 012 H99t R9q, F51 3 45 012 11 't 45 014 ADJ. TO LARGc CRACK 3 014

<1'-42;,.___---- - --45-- OU~ - -.! .. --~--------45 --- OUI 73 4 4b 013 ADJ* TU LAKG~ CRACK 3 46 013 74 4 017 ) H9-1t R'l9 3 46 017 75 -- !t 012 - __ J._ __ ------ --- ~ 012 I-*

ADJ. TO 49 014 76 4 49 014 LARG~ CRAC~ 3

/-'

L

PAGE 4 OF <;

r*, -*I llW.~.MiMli.!------ - - - ** -* *-**-* **-***- ... Cu~~cSPOH01~~-TUIH:*tNO COUNT QUAD LINE ROW E:U:V. RfASON FOR PLUuGING ~UAD LINE ROW

--i7J-..7J-----+---- ~-- * --0-U !J. H9~* H-99 . on --*--- ----* J:

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8Q 4 -----~-. Ol't* 3 - H9-1* *R99 014 - I-d1 4 52 013 3 H9'l* R9'J 013 82 4 53 012 3 H9J1 R99 012

--4--*-Y-*--***0-14 **- .. ,.. **-*---- tf-<>>y -A - . --**- .. -*-- - - - - - *- - --- --5-3 64 4 64 061 3 H991 R99 o4 081 85 65 012 3 65 012 "

I "

67 4 66 013 3 H99 1 R991 f 55

---~---~---

3 66

-014 .

013

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88 4 66 OJ5 AD~, ro LARG~ ta6 015 ... j**

--OH- ---- - ..

90 4 67 012 ADJ. TU LARGE CRACK o7 'J l .2 91 Ol't ADJ. TO LARGE CRACK 67 014

* t 93 96 4 68 68 68 015 OJ7 077 3 H971 R9<J

~: 9
, ARGF ADJ. TO LARGE CRACK 3

cue, __________,:...__ _ __.:...:.___

6d bli 015

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-***----. *--* * - *---**-*--_ .__ *--_-- *i: -

~------------------------*

91 68 079 1 3 68 079 016 3 *----- - _ _ _ _ L-.-~b-9~--0U...-. *-*

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  • R99 102 4 69 078 . AOJ. ro LARGE (RACK 3 o9 078  !*

/.'

PAGt: j uF 5 TUl:\E

1-- I LOKKLSPONDIN~ TUBE END f.BUNf ~"'AO LINE ~ow -- -H.EV. ~EA SUN FoJH PLUGG ll'fo ~vA-tt l I ttt -- R tnil --- ------------~---

101 4 70 Oll 3

'i'l 1 ' K99 3 IJ 071 104 4 70 013 5 H99t i<99 3 10 (J /3

~§....---- ----1-{}-- - - Gl j. AUJ. TQ -lA.tb-c f.kA(.1'. -_--3 10 *O IS 106 4 70 017 ADJ* TO lAKGE (KACI< 3 10 () 11 107 4 71 012 AOJ. Tu lARGt CRACK 3 7l 012

- - 1... i---'-.-1--R---- ---014 -

Q... - --- ---------- 3 -11 OH 109 4 11 072 AOJ. TO LAKGE CRACK 3 71 OU 110 4 71 074 ADJ. TO LARGt CRACK 3 11 0 74

---.1Lhllhll....__ __.,4,_;*---.1l'-"".i!"---~gf-Al,;1J~__._. ____________ .iM1t,19~'1Hitr-llillr'll9'-"'ilHit,_..F*~f-------- ----}..------- - ** -G-13 uz " 72 015 3 1l. 015 ]..

113 4 74 013 3 J 74 lJ 13

---1L.....L,-11lt~--....<t~--1....:;;~- ~-----~------ --*- ---f4';l 1, ~UHi . . , . , - - - - - - - - --~---*--- -*** Q.ll -* -*

115 014 H99t R99 3 75 014 116 4 75 018 3 3 75 018

--.a.l*L~l----'lt,.._---1a~OJ--~ -~--- --<~l*~W-71-t.-.R-iw-9------------_..,.;,_ _ _ ~-------G-l~-----*- .

118 10 017 3 CONS~RVATIVE PLUG 3 80 017 A"

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- - - - - - - - - -_- * -* . I F

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- - - - - -- *-- - ---- - I" I,

I, 1-

PALISADES EDDY CURRENT TEST COVER SHEET Document ECT-SG-89-027 Title PALISADES 'A' S/G OCTOBER 1989 PLUGGED TUBE LIST

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Revison 0 Date 10/26/89 2 pages

==

Description:==

'A' S/G October 1989 plugging candidate list which contains as a minimum all tubes with indications which exceed the Palisades plugging criteria as specified in Technical Specification 4.14. Additional tubes are being conservatively plugged in the 'A' cold leg divider plate region (Rows 12-16).

Reference:

I Technical I Administrative Review I ,!;view D~e~

/,p.~,~

Date /d µ, /1>t I Master Controlled Copy No _ _

Information Only v/ !med By:/.<<~

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0 MI0289-1675A-TC01

. I

______ __Jj

I I

PAGE 2 OF 2 TUBE CORRESPONDING TUBE END COUfH QUAD LINE ROH ELEV. REASON FOR PLUGGING QUAD LINE ROW 24 4 62 013 3 H97. R99 3 62 013 25 26 4

4 65 77 016 014 9

3 H97. R98 CONSERVATIVE PLUG H97. R99 3

3 65 77 016 014 e

27 4 80 013 7 H97. R99 3 80 013

[\)

[\)

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OCTOBER, 1989 TUBE SHEET INSPECTION MAPS (The large circles represent tubes which were inspected)

(The small dots represent plugged tubes)

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ATTACHMENT Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 DETAILED 1989 MAINTENANCE OUTAGE EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION RESULTS November 3, 1989

  • OC 1189-0217-NL04 27 Pages

._ 1 I. EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION RESULTS Over the last two years several leaks due to cracked tubes in the "B" steam generator (S/G) hot leg at tube support plates 3 and 13 have occurred. In March 1989 an increase in off-gas activity indicated another crack may exist.

Consumers Power Company contracted MPR Associates to perform a support plate stress evaluation prior to starting Palisades October 1989 Maintenance Outage. The purpose of the evaluation was to identify tubes within the S/G which are most susceptible to circumferential stress corrosion cracking. Stress and deflection analyses of the support plates, the location of tube support plate flow circulation holes and the recent history with respect to tube leaks and tube cracking were all taken into consideration in completing the evaluation. A total of 1,006 tubes in the "A" S/G hot leg were recommended for inspection with the 8xl pancake probe which was specifically qualified to detect stress corrosion cracking and of those, 239 were recommended for additional inspection with the motorized rotating pancake coil (MR.PC) probe at support plates 3 or 13. In the "B" S/G hot leg, a total of 783 tubes were recommended for inspection of which 94 tubes were recommended for further inspection with the MR.PC at support plates 3 or 13. All previous tube leaks have occurred in S/G hot legs, therefore, cold leg inspections were not recommended.

As stated in Consumers Power Company's letter to the NRC dated September 28, 1989, Consumers Power decided to perform the recommended testing of the most highly stressed tubes in the October 1989 Maintenance Outage. I~ addition, because the 8xl probe was qualified for the detection of circumferential cracks, but not for sizing IGA or wastage type defects, a limited bobbin probe inspection was planned to address "non-crack" indications. In order to ensure that the "non-crack" defects had not grown since the last time they were inspected, Consumers Power planned to use the Miz-12 540 SFW bobbin probe to inspect a minimum of 100 tubes containing "non-crack" indications. The 540 SFW bobbin probe with the Miz-12 tester was to be used in lieu of the Miz-18/ 580 bobbin in order to obtain a direct comparison with the previous eddy current test results.

A chronology of the eddy current inspection and testing results follows:

A. LEAK TEST AND INSPECTION OF LEAKERS OCTOBER 1, 1989 - Palisades shutdown for the Fall Maintenance Outage~

Prior to shutting down, the Plant was operating at 80 percent power with a calculated primary to secondary leak rate of approximately 0.018 gpm.

OCTOBER 11, 1989 - A tubesheet scan for leaks was completed in both "A" and "B" S/G hot legs while the S/Gs were under nitrogen overpressurization.

Two tubes in "B" S/G were identified as leakers: Q2 Ll3 Rl28 at 13+ 0.5" and Q3 L72 R69 at 11. Both of these tubes were included in the recommended stress inspection scope. No leakers were identified in the "A" S/G. Cold leg visual inspections were not conducted at this time due to all previous leakage indications being in the hot legs *

  • S/G-LIOl

2

  • OCTOBER 13, 1989 - Two rings of tubes around each of the leaking tubes in "B" S/G were inspected with the 8xl probe. This testing resulted in identifying two additional crack-~ike indications: Q2 LIS Rl28 at V3 and Q3 L73 R66 at 11. Two rings of tubes around each of these tubes were then inspected. No other crack-like indications were found. Note: All potential crack-like indications were inspected with the MR.PC in addition to the 8xl probe.

B. 8 x 1 INSPECTION OF HIGH STRESS TUBES OCTOBER 18, 1989 - The inspection of most highly stressed tubes with the 8xl and MR.PC probes was completed in "A" and "B" S/Gs. A total of seven crack-like indications, including the two leakers identified on October 11, 1989 were found in "B" hot leg. These tubes are:

Quad Line Row Elevation Description 2 13 120 3 2 13 128 13+ o.*5" Leaker 2 15 128 V3 3 72 69 11 Leaker 3 73 66 11 2 76 57 4 2 76 59 4 Each tube with a crack-like indication was again bounded by inspection of two rings of tubes adjacent to it. No tubes were found in the "A" S/G hot leg.which contained crack-like indications.

C. IGA AND WASTAGE INSPECTION The Miz-12 540 SFW bobbin* inspection began in "A" hot leg. The total number of "non-crack" indications found with the 8xl probe was significantly smaller than expected, therefore, 100 tubes were scheduled for inspection in accordance with Consumers Power letter to the NRC dated September 28, 1989. All 100 of the tubes selected for the "non-crack" inspection were from the "A" S/G because it contained significantly more of these indications than the "B" S/G. The 540 bobbin testing was completed October 20, 1989 with no IGA or wastage degradation noted.

D. VISUAL EXAMINATION AND ECT INSPECTION Tubesheet scans of "A" and "B" cold legs were performed to ensure no abnormalities were present. No anomalies were found in "B" cold leg, however, the scan in "A" cold leg identified a region of wetness (no actual drips were seen) close to the divider plate. Fifteen tubes bounding the wet area were tested with the 8xl probe and possible crack-like indications were identified in five tubes. Subsequent testing with the MR.PC confirmed the presence of three crack-like indications in the following tubes:

  • S/G-LIOl

3 Quad Line Row Elevation Description 4 55 14 3 suspected leaker 4 53 14 3 4 54 13 3 , 2 flaws Each of these tubes had been last inspected in August 1983 with no apparent degradation present at the third support plate.

OCTOBER 19, 1989 - Based on the above tube degradation, the following were inspected:

L All tubes located within three rings of the degraded tubes in "A" cold leg quad 4 (39 tubes).

2. All tubes located within three rings of the degraded tubes in "A" cold leg quad 1 (38 tubes).
3. All tubes in rows 12-14 (along the divider plate) in both quads 1 and 4 of "A" cold leg (125 tubes).

OCTOBER 21, 1989 - The 8xl probe testing of the "leaker" areas and rows 12-14 in "A" cold leg were completed. A total of 20 potential crack-like indications (including the three known crack-like indications) were found (19 were at support plate 3 and one was at support plate 7). Of the potential cracks, nine were dispositioned with the MR.PC as satisfactory, leaving 11 crack-like indications of which ten were at support plate 3.

Consumers Power made the decision to expand the inspection scope as follows:

  • E. EXPANDED INSPECTION OF A S/G
1. Test all tubes in rows 15-16 in "A" cold leg and in rows 12-14 in "A" hot leg~ If a crack-'like indication was found then testing would expand into the next two rows in the affected quad.
2. Perrorm a five percent random inspection in both "A" hot and cold legs. If a crack-like indication is found, then two rings of tubes around each suspect tube will be tested. The five percent random sample was chosen because if no pluggable indications were found it would provide a 95 percent confidence factor that less than one percent of the tubes in the S/G are degraded.

OCTOBER 22, 1989 - One potential crack-like indication was found in rows 15-16 in quad 4, therefore, the inspection scope expanded into rows 17-18 in that quad. No crack-like indications were found in rows 17-18.

Consumers Power requested that MPR Associates review the eddy current inspection results and to provide a crack mechanism assessment.

S/G-LIOl

4 OCTOBER 24, 1989 - MPR Associates reviewed all of the eddy current results and provided an assessment which is summarized below:

1. There are two probable mechanisms responsible for the cracking found on the cold legs; in-plane loads due* to severe denting and out-of-plane loads due to thermal expansion stresses.
2. The average denting values for the third support plate based on the December 1987 profilometry inspection are as follows:

Diametrical Dent (mils)

A cold leg 33.6 A hot leg 21.1 B cold leg 24.4 B hot leg 21.5 The above values indicate significantly high denting. Concern for stresses in the plate is compounded by the fact that the third support plate does not have flow circulation holes, whicli provide stress relief in other plates.

3. Added to the denting stresses are the thermal expansion loads. The tubes adjacent to areas of plugged tubes are subjected to higher than normal thermal expansion stresses. This is particularly true in the case of the short radius tubes which have the "hottest" primary water at the cold leg tube sheet. Most of the tubes in rows 1-12 are plugged. Hence, the unplugged tubes closest to the divider plate should see the highest out-of-plane loads in the S/Gs due to. thermal expansion stresses.
4. The second most probable area of high stress would be at tubes located in lug regions. The restraining force of the lug, in addition to thermal expansion stresses between the "cold" lug and a hot tube make this a high suspect area. For this reason MPR recommended Consumers Power inspect six tubes at each of the five lug regions at support plate 3. Consumers Power made the decision to perform this "lug" inspection.

Testing in "A" cold leg with the exception of the "lug" inspection was completed. No additional crack-like indications were found.

OCTOBER 25, 1989 - The "lug" inspection was completed in "A" cold leg with no additional indications being found. Testing in "A" hot leg was completed, also with no indications being found, All "A" S/G inspections resulted in detecting a total of 11 crack~like indications by the cold leg divider plate region. None were found in the hot leg.

In summary, the "A" S/G hot leg inspection had covered 1,017 tubes specifically targeted by the original MPR inspection plan plus 130 tubes along the .divider plate to verify no problem existed, plus a five percent random sample for a total of 22.7 percent of the tubes inspected with no S/G-LIOl

...J 5

cracks identified. The "A" S/G cold leg inspection had covered 360 tubes along the divider plate, 29 tubes at the lugs and a five-percent random sample, which provided reasonable assurance that the affected areas had been defined and inspected.

F. EXPANDED INSPECTION OF B S/G Consumers Power also made the decision to inspect rows 12-14 in the "B" S/G cold leg and to continue inspections similar to the "A" S/G if indications were noted.

OCTOBER 27, 1989 - Inspection of "B" cold leg identified 24 crack-like indications in rows 12-14. Testing was expanded into rows 15-16 in which 10 additional crack-like indications were found. Expansion continued into rows 17-18 of both quads 1 and 4. Another 16 crack-like indications were found resulting in expansion into rows 19-20. No additional cracks were found in these two rows. A total of 50 crack-like indications were found

-in rows 12-18. All but two were at the third support plate. The other two were at the tubesheet.

Based on the above degradation, Consumers Power made the decision to perform a five percent random inspection in "B" cold leg and to test rows 12-14 in "B" hot; leg, to verify problem areas had been identified and bounded.

OCTOBER 28~ 1989 - "B" hot leg inspection of rows 12-14 was completed. No crack-like indications were found.

OCTOBER 29, 1989 - "B" cold leg random sample was completed. Five crack-like indications were found:

No Quad Line Row Elevation Description 1 4 36 117 4 tested 8/88 - ok 2 4 35 116 4 tested 8/88 - ok 3 4 38 117 4 tested 8/88 - ok 4 4 36 71 4 tested 8/83 - ok 5 4 64 81 3 tested 8/88 - ok All of the above tubes are located in areas of suspected high stress due to denting or thermal expansion loads and were in or near areas that had already been inspe~ted on the hot leg side based on the initial MPR recommended sample. Number 1 through 3 are adjacent to plugged tubes which were part of the "block" plugging effort performed in February 1989.

Number 4 is in area subject to high in-plane plate stresses and Number 5 is located in a lug region. Two rings of tubes adjacent to each of these tubes were inspected with no further indications found.

S/G-LIOl

6 Consumers Power then made the decision to follow the Palisades Technical Specification 4.14 supplementary sample criteria which states that if more than one percent of the inspected tubes in a leg have indications of tube wall degradation in excess of the repair criteria where no wall degradation greater than 30 percent was detected in the previous two inspections then, an additional six percent sample will be performed in the affected leg.

Based on this, Consumers Power performed an additional six percent random sample in "B" cold leg. No crack-like indications were found, thus resulting in a 95 percent confidence that less than one percent of tubes in the B S/G are degraded.

OCTOBER 30, 1989 - Following a recommendation from the NRC made during the ongoing status briefings, the "B" cold leg inspection was expanded* to further bound the five tubes with crack-like indications found in the original five percent random sample.

1. Test all of the tubes adjacent to the "block" plugging pattern in quad 4 (55 tubes total).
2. Test the entire support plate 3 lug region by tube Q4 L64 R81 (61 tubes total).
3. Test the "T" zone defined by plates 3 and 4 by tube Q4 L36 R71 (48 tubes total).

In add-ition, the tubes passing through support plate 3 in rows 21-22 were inspected (25 tubes).

OCTOBER 31, 1989 - The six percent random sample in "B" cold leg was completed. Seven tubes in the support plate 3 lug region were found to contain crack-like indications:

Quad Line- Row Elevation Description 4 69 72 7 tested 8/88 - ok 4 70 71 3 tested 8/88 - ok 4 67 80 7 tested 8/88 - ok

.4 68 79 7 tested 8/88 - ok 5 tested 8/88 - ok 4 69 74 7 tested 8/88 - ok 5 tested 37 percent 8/88 4 69 76 7 tested 8/88 - ok 5 tested 8/88 - ok 4 70 73 5 tested 36 percent 8/88

  • S/G-LIOl A minimum of two rings of tubes surrounding the defective tubes were tested. No additional crack-like indications were found in this sample nor

7 were they found in the other expanded "bounding" samples. All 'B' S/G inspections resulted in detecting a total of 69 crack-like indications.

Based on the inspecti9n results, testing was determined to be complete in both "A" and "B" S/Gs at this time.

In summary, the 'B' S/G hot leg inspection had included 783 tubes from the initial MPR sample, 156 tubes at the divider plate. No defects were identified outside the original MPR sample area. The 'B' S/G cold leg inspection had included 542 tubes along the divider plate, 30 tubes at lugs, 158 tubes bounding other suspect areas identified by the 5% random sample, and finally a 6% random sample to provide reasonable assurance that the suspect areas had been identified and bounded.

Tubesheet maps showing the tubes inspected are attached. The following table summarizes the total number of tubes inspected with the 8xl probe in "A" and "B" S/Gs:

G. INSPECTION STATISTICS Approximate NumQer Of Tubes S/G Leg Tested With The 8xl Probe A Hot 1473 (22. 7 percent)

A Cold 714 (11.0 percent)

B Hot 939 (15. 2 percent)

B Cold 142,5 (23. 0 percent)

A total of 27 tubes are to be plugged in the "A" S/G of which 11 contain crack-like indications. In the "B" S/G, 118 tubes are to be plugged, of which 69 contain crack-like indications. Tubes which are adjacent to leakers or to tubes containing crack indications in excess of 80 degrees circumferential are also to be plugged. The plugged tube listings for "A" and "B" S/Gs are attached.

II. CHARACTERIZATION OF CRACK-LIKE INDICATIONS Circumferentially oriented crack-like indications were detected in "B" S/G hot leg tubing and in "A" S/G cold leg.tubing. The indications occur at various support plate elevations and are typically located within the bounds and near the top edge of the affected support plate. The indications have been reviewed to characterize circumferential extents and depths of penetration of crack-like indications based on 8xl probe and MRPC data.

In the "B" hot leg, all indications have circumferential extents on the order of 50 degrees or less. The two leakers are described below. Q2 Ll3 Rl28, has a circumferential extent of 49 degrees and has a non-uniform depth of penetration estimated range from approximately 80 percent to nearly through wall over the affected area. Depth estimates are derived from correlation of 8xl probe data and MRPC phase angle and amplitude measurements with values obtained from calibration standards. Q3 L72R69,*

has a circumferential extent of nearly 50 degrees and has a nearly uniform S/G-LIOl

8 depth of penetration which measures approximately through wall. These two indications have characteristics that are similar to, although not as seve*re as, indications found in "B" *s/G leaking tubes during December 1987, August 1988 and February 1989 inspections. All indications associated with leaking tubes in "B" S/G hot leg since December 1987 have been MRPC examined and have had circumferential extents varying from 49 degrees to 83 degrees with an average extent of 63 degrees.

The cold leg indications in both "A" and "B" S/Gs differ from the "B" hot leg indications in that they possess a wider range of circumferential extents (up to 220 degrees) and lower average depths of penetration distributed over each affected area. Somewhat in common with "B" hot leg, however, the location of deepest penetration within each affected area is localized and confined to a limited circumferential extent. For example, the suspected leaker in "A" S/G, Q4 155 Rl4, has a circumferential extent of approximately 210-220 degrees. The depth of penetration is non-uniform and relatively shallow throughout this affected area except for a sector having an arc length between 45 and 90 degrees where the estimated depth increases to nearly throughwall.

For all indications reviewed on the cold legs, the characteristics are essentially the same; ie, there are affected areas of varied circumferential extent having non-uniform and generally low average depths of penetration. In the few instances of affected areas wherein localized depths have been evaluated as being in excess of 70-80 percent throughwall, the associated arc lengths of deep penetration are in all cases conservatively estimated to be less than 90 degrees. It is also apparent that for cold leg indications, the smaller the circumferential extent of the affected area, the lower the average depth of penetration. Since the abundance of cold leg indications have total cir~umf erential extents less than 100 degrees, the average depths of penetrations are relatively low (reference Figure A).

In summary, hot leg crack-like indications are similar to those observed in "B" S/G and are of limited circumferential extent. This experience suggests that hot leg cracks propagate through wall resulting in leakage before they reach c_ircumferential extents greater than 65 degrees on the average. Cold leg indications have a wider range of circumferential extent than do hot leg indications but lower average depths of penetration. The localized regions of _deep penetration within cold leg affected areas occur over a limited circumferential extent comparable to that of hot leg indications. Based on the leaker in "A" S/G cold leg and the characteristics of cold leg indications of comparable severity, it can be expected that deep cold leg cracks with limited circumferential extent within a larger affected area will propagate throughwall and result in leakage before the region of deep penetration achieves an arc length

  • conservatively estimated at 90 deg,rees.

III STRENGTH OF TUBING As noted in Consumers Power's submittals dated April 19, 1984 and May 22, 1989, the maximum throughwall crack size than can exist in a Palisades S/G S/G-LIOl

9

  • tube without bursting during a main steam line break (MSLB) is 187 degrees circumferential. Based on the preceding crack characterization description, it is evident that only one of the cracks exceed 187 degrees circumferential extent, and none of the indications approached throughwall for more than 90 degrees found in the Palisades S/Gs approach being 187 degrees circumferential. The maximum throughwall circumferential extent found during this inspection was conservatively estimated to be less than 90 degrees.

In addition, Consumers Power has demonstrated through previous analyses (CPCo to NRC submittal dated April 19, 1984 and MPR analyses of May, 1989) and by actual tube leakage experienced, that throughwall cracking will develop and be detected by installed Plant equipment prior to a crack reaching the critical circumferential length for a MSLB event.

IV UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION The probability of a throughwall crack which exceeds 187 degrees circumferential extent or that could grow to such an extent during operation without producing detectable leakage is believed to be essentially zero. This is-based on the following:

1. A total of 4,551 (17.9% of total) tubes have beeri inspected in October 1989 with none exhibiting throughwall "crack-like" indications exceeding a conservatively estimated 90 degrees circumferential extent.
2. Areas representing the highest stress areas have been thoroughly tested and ramdom samples have provided reasonable assurance that no new unidentified areas of degradation exist.
3. Average calculated primary to secondary leakage of approximately 0.015 gallons per minute experienced until Plant shutdown on December 1, 1989, resulting from throughwall indications not exceeding the conservatively estimated 90 degree circumferential extent, corresponds well with leakage predicted by the May, 1989 MFR analysis. The ability to detect low levels during operation assures that throughwall tube cracks resulting in low leakage flow rates will be detected.

Palisades FSAR Section 14.14 "Steam Line Rupture Accident" assumes a maximum primary to secondary leakage of 0.6 gpm to be occurring at the time of the event. Palisades FSAR Section 14.15, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture Incident" assumes a double ended tube rupture occurs with the primary coolant system containing activity equivalent to one percent fuel failure.

Both events assume the Plant is operating at a minimum of 100 percent of rated power. Neither of these events result in doses at the site boundary that approach limits specified in 10CFRl00.11.

Current plans are for Plant operation at 80 percent of rated power until S/G replacement in the Fall of 1990. Technical Specification 3.1.5 limits primary to secondary system leakage to 0.3 gallons per minute and an S/G-LIOl

. 10 administrative limit of a.as gallons per minute will continue to be imposed during Plant operation providing a safety factor of 12 for .the MSLB. One percent failed fuel, (A steam generator tube rupture accident assumption) is equivalent to 6.4 micro Curies per gram dose equivalent iodine.

Technical Specification 3.1.4 limits primary coolant system dose equivalent iodine to one micro Curie per gram. Therefore, a factor of safety of 6.4 is provided. Additionally it should be noted that the primary system dose equivalent iodine at the time of this past shutdown was 2.14E-2 micro Curies per gram. This provided a safety factor of approximately 300.

Based on the above, Consumers Power concludes that the probability and consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by continued operation with the existing S/Gs with established administrative limits.

Further, the margin of safety afforded by Technical Specifications is not reduced and in fact is increased due to; administrative limits imposed on primary to secondary leakage, the reduced power operation level and low primary system activity level.

After review of the analyzed accidents presented in the Palisades FSAR, it has been determined that for a different type of accident or malfunction to occur, an MSLB must occur which induces a failure of a S/G tube. As noted in MPR Associates analyses of May, 1989 which was submitted to the NRC on May 22, 1989, for an MSLB to induce a tube rupture, .a throughwall circumferential crack of 187 degrees must be present at the initiation of an MSLB *

  • While Consumers Power believes it to be of very low probability for a throughwall indication of 187 degrees to exist without detectable leakage, or for a 187 degrees throughwall leak may be induced during operation without detection, Consumers Power has conservatively estimated that the probability of such a defect existing in an uninspected tube to be 1.7E-2.

This is based on the number of tubes with "crack-like" indications identified (80) and the number of tubes inspected (4,551) during October 1989 and that a throughwall crack which will exceed 187 degrees circumferential extent may be induced from "any" existing defect.

In order for an MSLB to induce a tube rupture, it is assumed the flow rate through this type of break must be much greater than the capacity through two open ADVs, assuming the opposite generator is isolated from the break *.

This limits the scope of pipe breaks to those 18 inches or larger in the pipe sections between the S/G and the first isolation or normally closed*

valve. Large pipes are most likely to break at the welds bety en sections.

0 WASH-1400 (Table III, 4-1) reports a weld failure rate of 10- /segment-hr.

For any of the welds beyond the MSIVs to cause S/G blowdown, the associated MSIV would also have to fail to close in conjunction with the pipe failure.

As noted in the NRC's* safety evaluation report dated February 28, 1986 for single failures associated with a MSLB, the calculated core-damage frequency is S.8E-5 per year.

S/G-LIOl

11 Considering only the main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs and the main feed lines, there are a total of 59 welds that me~ the large MSLB criteria. This leads to a failure rate of 2.6Xl0 08 /reactor year. The reactor is expected to operate with the current S/Gs for less than 8 additi~5~l months. This gives a large MSLB core-damage frequency of 4.3Xl0 /reactor year. Significant differences between the current results and those provided in the 1983 submittal are: 1) The current analysis includes the use of condensate pumps to backup auxiliary feedwater as identified in the 1983 submittal and 2) It also includes feed and bleed as a core heat removal mechanism (this was not considered in the 1983 submittal).

In order to determine the resultant probability that the MSLB would induce a tube rupture, the probability for the MSLB is multiplied by the probability that a 187 degrees circumferential crack would be present at the initi~ifon of the MSLB. This results in a total core damage frequency of 7.3X10

  • Further, pre-existing throughwall cracks of approximately 90 degrees circumferential extend should exhibit detectable leakage and would not be expected to grow to greater than 117 degrees during an MSLB event. Recent analyses performed for tubes with an initial crack size of 130 degrees, indicate that vibration due to an MSLB would not result in a crack beyond the limiting 187 degree extent, even if the initial crack were throughwall for the entire 130 degree circumference. The growth rate of cracks can be estimated by comparing the current inspection results with previous results. For the worst case tube, indications went from no indication to indications extending to 132 degrees circumferential extent. Therefore, it is concluded that the possibility for a new type of accident or malfunction has not been created *
  • S/G-LIOl I

I

______J

' - 12

  • FIGURE A PALISADES OCTOBER 1989 CIRCUMFERENTIAL INDICATIONS

SUMMARY

CHART No of Circumferential crack Indications S/G Leg 0-50 deg 51-100 deg >100 deg A Cold 7 0 4 A Hot 0 0 0 B Cold 44 14 6 B Hot 7 0 0 Total 58 14 10 80 ..

60 ...

40 ..

20 ...

I I 0-50 degrees51-100 degrees >100 degrees

~-

~. 13

  • OCTOBER 1989 PLUGGED TUBE LISTING LEGEND SYMBOL DESCRIPTION H 8 X 1 Inspection R MRPC Inspection F Bobbin Inspection 99 Crack-Like Indication 97 Potential Crack-Like Indication 98 Volumetric Indication (Not sized with the given technique)

All Other Percent Throughwall with Numbers the Given Technique FIGURE B

PALISADES EDDY CURRENT TEST COVER SHEET 1

PALISADES B 1 . S/G OCTOBER 1989 PLUGGED TUBE LIST 1 11-1-89 5 pages Revison ~-

Date ~~~~~~~~

==

Description:==

1 B 1 S/G October 1989 plugging candidate list which contains as a minimum all tubes with indications which exceed Palisades plugging criteria as specified in Technical Specification 4.14.

Reference:

I I Technical I Administrative I J/. R~eview I Review I KM . I .zr.;~

I Date / 1 I Date 11 1 I <"'. I Master Controlled Copy No ----'--

Information Only v Issued By:

MI0289-1675A-TC01

.... TSO FORE

          • wo.m~ -n -

UNO HARUCOPY ****

PAGE 1 OF 5 REV 1

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~------------

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H9h fl99 l 12 ADJ* TO LEAKER 4 71 Ob8 AQ.I

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18 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 4 H

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  • -1 PAGE 2 uf 5

-*----- J lU8E LORRtS~ONDlN~ TUttE ENO COUNT QUAO LINE ROW ElEV. REASON FOR PLUGGING JUAO LINE ROW 23 1 28 015 T~+4 H98, R'19, F7 l lB 015 3 i i .. tH5 26 l 35 016 3 tt97, R99 2 2

34 35 017 u lb I:

Oli - -*-***-** -*** **l OlS 017 l H97e R99 2 36 l) 17 015 3 H97e R'19 Ol':i

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3't l 66 015 35 J li9TJ R99t F59 2 66 015

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l 68 013 3 H97e 1(99 2 08 013

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li9th R99t F58 2 71 014 I

38 l 12 015 3 H97, R99 l. 72 015

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3't 017 3 H'Jle R99 3 34 017 I

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f-'

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47 4 34 117 ADJ. TO LAKG~ CKAtK J4 ll 7

.'t8 35 070 AOJe TO LARGE CRACK 3 070

___...91-----~-- --35.. 072 .AOJ *. [U L~ CJL4(.I{. . -* 3. - . OU '*

PAGE 3 Uf 5 TUBE CORRLSPO~UING TUdc END COUNT QUAD LINE ROW ELEV. i.JUAIJ LINE R 0\,1 1*

50 4 35 114 ADJ. TU LAKG~ (~AC~ 35 114 H6 53 4 3b 011 3

3 tl9 "It R 9~

3 j

36 36 015 IJ l1 I:

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______ ----------- - J..

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3 'tl 012 ..

65 4 41 018 3 3 't l l) 18 "

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[__ ~:H- :

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014 ADJ. TO LARGc CRACK 3 49 014 I

PAGE 4 Of r; iOlUY.iAIA*i-----*-*-*--* --*---**--------- CtmtH:~POMHNb- JUSC-tHO - ---.----- - --

OUNT QUAD LINE ROW E:Ll:lle REASON FOR PLU~~JNG ~UAO LINE ROW

-l#---71----*---+--- ---4{}- ---0-U J. ~o - - on .-------- *---* J:

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j.

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3 b6 077 68 079

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  • tl.E 11.

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'i'I 1

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l I NE *-

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  • iHIW 071 5
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113 74 013 3 l 74 lJ 13

,,..,.--------**--~-*- --01.l **-

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* *---*--- J --

I-I 1*

1..

f-'

\()

I.

1*

PALISADES EDDY CURRENT TEST . I COVER SHEET Document ECT-SG-89-027 Title PALISADES 'A' S/G OCTOBER 1989 PLUGGED TUBE LIST

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Revison 0 Date 10/26/89 2 pages

==

Description:==

'A' S/G October 1989 plugging candidate list which contains as a minimum all tubes with indications which exceed the Palisades plugging criteria as specified in Technical Specification 4.14. Additional tubes are being conservatively plugged in the 'A' cold leg divider plate region (Rows 12-16).

Reference:

I Technical I Administrative Review I ~eview

/.P.~-~ .ttli.,~*

Date "" µ, /1>t I Date~

I Master Controlled Copy No _ _

Information Only V"" Issued By: /<<'~

fl) 0 HI0289-1675A-TC01

I I

e (>

  • ft~* TSO FOREGROUND HARDCOPY ****

DSNAME=TS02215.APLUG.LIST ECT-SG-89-027 PAGE i OF 2 10/261'89 REV 0 PALISADES OCTOBER 1989 PLUGGED TUBE LIST

'A' STEAM GENERATOR TUDE CORRESPOtlDING TUBE END COUNT QUAD LINE ROW ELEV. REASON FOR PLUGGING QUAD ___

LINE.;... ROW 1 l 30 013 .3 ---------------------------

H97

  • R99 2 30 013 2 4 25 014 3 H97, R98 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 3 25 014

~

3 4 26 013 3 H97, R99 3 26 013 4 4 29 012 3 H97, R98 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 3 29 012 5 4 29 014 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LARGE CRACK 3 29 014 6 4 30 013 3 H97, R99 3 30 013

. *1 7 4 30 015 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LARGE CRACK 3 30 015 a 4 31 012 ADJ. TO LEAKERl'lARGE CRACK 3 31 012 9 4 31 014 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LARGE CRACK 3 31 014 10 4 48 013 3 H97, R98 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 3 48 013 11 4 52 013 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LAROE CRACK 3 52 013 12 4 52 015 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LARGE CRACK 3 52 015 13 4 53 014 3 R97, R99 POSSIBLE LEAKER 3 .53 014 14 4 53 016 3 H97, R98, F51 3 53 016 1.5 4 54 013 3 H97, R99 POSSIBLE LEAKER 3 54 013 16 4 .54 015 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LARGE CRACK 3 .54 015 17 4 55 014 3 H99, R99 LEAKER. 3 55 014 18 4 55 016 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LARGE CRACK 3 55 016 19 4 56 013 3 H97. R98 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 3 56 013 20 4 56 015 ADJ. TO LEAKER/LARGE CRACK 3 56 015 21 4 57 014 3 H97. R99 3 57 014 [\)

f--'

22 4 58 013 3 H97, R98 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 3 58 013 23 4 61 014 3 H97, R99 3 61 014

I I *-- *

  • PAGE Z OF Z TUBE CORRESPONDING TUBE EHD COUNT QUAD LINE ROl'I ELEV. REASON FOR PLUGGING QUAD LINE ROH 24 'i 62 013 3 -------------------

H97, R99 3 62 013 25 4 65 016 9 H97, R98 CONSERVATIVE PLUG 26 4 77 014 3 H97, R99 3

3 65 77 016 014 27 4 80 013 7 H97, R99 3 80 013

  • I f\)

f\)

)

' I c

OCTOBER, 1989 TUBE SHEET INSPECTION MAPS (The large circles represent tubes which were inspected)

(The small dots represent plugged tubes)

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