ML18043A441

Forwards Revised Tables Re Systematic Evaluation Program Topic V-11.A Originally Submitted 781221.Water clean-up Sys Valves Item Revised to Reflect Correct high-pressure to low- Pressure Interfaces

ML18043A441
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades, Big Rock Point  File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	01/26/1979
From:	Bixel D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-05-11.A, TASK-5-11.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7901310029
Download: ML18043A441 (6)

Text

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consumers

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Power company General Offices: 212 west Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201

• Area Code 517 788-0550 January 26, 1979 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKETS 50-155 Al"'ID 50-255 - LICENSES DPR-6 AIID DPR BIG ROCK POINT Al"'ID PALIS.ADES PLANTS - SEP TOPIC V-ll.A, "REQUIREMENTS FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH- Al"'ID LOW-PRESSURE SYSTEMS"

.) By letter dated December 21, 1978, Consumers Power Company was requested

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to verify the correctness of tabulated information concerning SEP Topic V-11.A, "Requirements for Isolation of High- and Low-Pressure Systems" for Big Rock Point and Palisades.

Consumers Power Company has reviewed the tables provided by the December 2l, 1978 letter and has revised these tables where necessary. In the case of the Big Rock Point water clean-up system,. the valves discussed in the table forwarded by the December 21, 1978 letter are not high-pressure to low-pressure interfaces; this item has been revised to accurately reflect the high- to low-pressure interfaces in this system. The revised tables are attached.

David A Bixel (Signed)

David A Bixel Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC JGKeppler, USNRC REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY BCC SEP Owners Group Members 79013100~~

l'LAtlT; l'tllhadeo t.'valuatlon or bola ti on of Lo!!  !'i-\<-::* ':\'; S:ystems Fr<l!R Rc.,ctor Cool"nt Syotem Rev 0

-....JJ! 1-23-79 Dlroct Intorfo.ce~ J,li

• loleeto Redundancy Tea tabla Location or Hethod or  ;

Iaolatlo~ of Type Ile tween *111'/Ll' a.eek v.. ivo rresuure Method of Remark*

Criteria Jaolation Vnlveo Valvee Interface Orientation Reduction Isolation Hl'/Il' Orlflces, Hl flow shut3 6 lnd~~ Contahunent llV, &.nd CV2001 on Water Cleanup 6ystcm

"~ 1'heW1111tic Yo* Il'/IJ" . throttlln~ high tempe1*11ture.

Inlet Ou~~ldq Containment N,\ va}.ves CllP&cllR shut CV-2009 Hand svitche*

tn control room l'newna tic lo HA6 for CV-2111,CV-2113,

!lo 0utaid* C!>ntdnment l'Orisont,1 CV-2115, &. CV-2117.

a.eek.. **

l'cl' Beal and/ Excess Flow Controlled ueal or throttled aieck.Valveo bleed-off collected lfo valve plue designed to and processed by the RV-2062 clone by CVCS. No isolation (1ot &t lli5 15gpm criteria specified.

p~i11) l'reuuure reduced by ueal and throttled valve. RV-2oll2 Umita line preuaura.

2 tn. c~ HOV opens on 61 Low Preaourc verttcii.i' *I gnal. Pre:u*uro

~ nol'lllAlly

~njecqcin

• other* limited between clo*ed

!l!!rho11t'~ checks by pressure

., control system uee SJ tanks below.

AcGumu1"tor1 (Safety Injectlcin TanKa) Deference fSAn13

¥*~ Yea lfA uectlon 6.l.).l and figure 6-1 (t\111 no H-203)

Swn1>l l!Js System l'reuure cur & cun Jlet'erence dwa reducins for 11utcmatlc no. H-219

~p~ll&ey' CI8 velveu IUIR Sy*tem Each valVll Valve poslUonu (Shutdown Coollns Syot.w) Ho tor No Jnat~a.0ont11i111Dent KA powored from lndl c..ted In control Operated upperat!' buq ~om. 11v-olio1 (set Suction Sida &ht. press. at 2~65 pslg)llmita Comioon preuuro pressure between the interlock tor HOV'a when valvoa are t>oth wlvea. abut. RV-316~ (set at

~00 polg) limit&

prossure downstream of the HOV'u.

Dhchargo Sldo

~oa Yo* Im,2CK Ina14~ Cont&tnmont 2 tn. Cla >>J nonnally IUIR dhchargea vertical cloaed. thru LPSI ltno1.

at.here h.o.-1&ontGl

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I

• PLArfl': llig Jlock Point f;v1duation of Isolation of I.all Preiwure ::iyntems from llenctor Coplnnt Syr.tem Rev 0 1-23-79

• Meets Redund11nc¥ Testable I~cation of Me~hod qf 1Direct Interfaces 3 ' " Isolatio? of Type Between UP/LP Check Valve l'ressure Method of Criteria Iuoiation Valves Valves Interf11:ce Orieqtat.Ion ReducUop. Ii;olation jlemarlts Dem in is 17 Valves nonnally Reference 6 closed.CV's can drawint: M-107 Water Cleanup System Pneumatic :i:nsi4e . 3 isolated and Jlesin 'fransfer lf0 16 rell & Ma,nual t{o COQt11,i11111ent ~ vented per close on high*

procedure pres!iure, SS, and remotf6 manuall i

Throttle1 9 Drain to Radwaste )'e1l 8

yes Pne\llllfltiC No Ind de C0 ntai!'IJllent l'ffi Valves 20 Reference d1*awing M-107 e

ECCS No low pres::rnre I.ow Pressure injection system.

Injection Normally lllgh presr.ure Low Pres~ure Core interlock prevents

.J Spray . . yes  ? Kl ~

Yer; ll}side Uor\zont~l M closed initiates Yell + cpeck Contaill!llent on RPS signal automatic opening and remote of the valveR when Jledundant Core manually reactor p1*e~icure i;;

Spray 2 MO ~ Inside Horizonta:i,. NJ\

'.(ea yea Y~I! higher than 200 nsJ.

1 checlt Containment Sampling System Inside Sampling*of r.yr.temn

>>anua+ done mnnually no C!mtainment line~ penetrate con ta imr.ent boundar:t

!Uffi S¥stem - Normally closed, Jlefcrcnce drawing Suction Side No2l 1

ye11.

Motor 0p1m1ted Motor No

j:nside C<!ntairune11t Inside HA 22 hi-press. inter- M-107 & E-112 lock.prevents opening or provides auto-e Diacharge Side ucl ¥1111 Operated No c~mtainment liA 22 closure of valves with primary 2 prese >300 psig.3

Rev 0 1-23-79 FOOTNOTES:

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1. PWRs only.

2. BWRs only.

3. Only direct interfaces considered--service water and component cooling water systems not evaluated.

4. High pressure systems (ie, control rod drive hydraulic, isolation condenser, standby liquid control, high pressure injection, & RCIC) connected to reactor coolant pressure boundary not evaluated.

5. Inadvertent overpressurization of makeup tank due to reactor coolant pump seal leak off.

6. Reactor water cleanup system for BWRs. and. CVCS or Letdown System for PWRS.

7. i:solation.requi:-ements for ECCS specified in SRP 6.3 (Section III), for rum system in BTP RSB 5-1 attached to SRP 5.4.7 and for* water cleanup.

and sampling system in GDC 55.

8 .. NA - Not applicable.

9. The isolation requirements* in-GDC 55 refer to containment boundary isolation which is provided by one automatic valve CV-2009 and one manual valve outside. containment. and hand switch operation of the letdown control. valves inside containment. This however* does not meet the containment isolation requirements: of having automatic or lock cl.osed valves on either side of containment.

10. The high pressure to low pressure interface in the. letdown line is a two stage pressure reduction. Initial. depressurization results from the let-down control.valves and their associated orifices. The* final reduction is controlled by the letdown back pressure valves outside containment.

Reference FSAR section. 9.10.2.1. and figure 9.18 (dwg no M-202). Relief valve 2006 in addition is set to open at 600 psig which provides an additional means of overpressure protection of the intermediate pressure letdown piping and the letdown heat exchanger. The valve capacity of RV20o6 is equal to the combined capacity of all the letdown orifices.

Redundant high pressure signals* are.provided.upstream of the relief valve to close<:the* letdown orifice bypass stop valves a.t a.. pressure below 600 psig.

ll *. The letdown line will be isolated via CV-200l on high temperature at the outlet of the* regenerative heat exchangers. Automatic containment isolation is provided by CV-2009 which isolates.on either containment high pressure or high radiation signals.

J.2. HPSI design pressure is 1600 psig. Redundant HPSI design pressure is 2485 psig.

Rev o 1-23-79 2

13. The safety injection check valves a.re tested quarterly. The pres~ure

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control system between the check valves is also used for this testing .

The check valv~ closest to the tank can be tested by opening the pressure control valve. As the pressure between the check valves decreases, the check valve will open under the influence of the tank pressure, and a flowmeter in the test line will verify flow and operation of the check valve .. A line from the disc"1.arge header of the charging pumi:;s provides the capability of testing the check valve closest to the primary system.

The charging pump will be lined up through the redundant high-pressure safety injection header to inject water into one loop. The leakage pressure controller setting will then be increased to primary coolant system pressure* or* greater. Flow meter readings on the loop injection line and the. safety injection test and leakage return line verify that the check valve opens:.

14.. Isolation requirements of' either locked closed or automatic vaJ.ves on both sides of containment a.re not met by the sampling sy~tem. The system. does have two automatic* isolationva.lves outside* containment that close* on either. high containment radia.t:icn or high: containment radiation.

15. Isolation* criteria specified in BTP-RS:R' 5-1 is* met except. for the- valves having indep.endent~ di.verse interlocks. One: pressure switch. pro:vides the*

valve* interioclt. for* both, val.ves.

16. The isoiationc requirements. in GDC 55 refer to. containment boundary isolation which*requires: a. locked.closed orautoma.tic isolation: valve Oll' both sides of: containment.*, The resin. t.ra.nsfer line has two automatic isolation: valves; inside containment and one normally closed manual.. valve outsidec containment~ Resin** transfer is. controlled by procedure and the manual isolation vaJ..ve outside containment is in: a. controlled radiation and security area so inadvertant* opeAing. of the valve is extremely

~ikely *. The automatic. isolation. valves receive signals- from, both the safety system and. pressure switch 625,, they may a.1.so. be' operated by hand switch 7025 in the control room. PS-625 allows the valves. to open. on falling pressure at 50* psig and closes. the vaJ..ves. on rising pressure at 100* ps.ig.

1 T.. Operation: of. the. transfer line to add or remove *resins; from the clean up demineralizer is: controlled by procedure. Rv;.5o64 set. a.t ~75 psig limits, pressure between the* resin. inlet, outlet; and resin transfer val.ves. (CV-409Z,. CV-4o93*,. and CV-409I).

J.8. Containment isolation. is provided by two* a.utoma.tic isolation val.ves CV-4o27, and. CV-4ll7 ,,. located on either side of" containment *.

19. Throttle valves. CV-4040.- (used when reactor presslire* is above 300 psig) and CV-4ll.4 (used when reactor pressure* is below 300 psig) are opened per procedure,. after the containment isolation valves* have been opened venting the line to an. atmospheric- tank.

Rev 0 1-23-79 3

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• 20. The containment isolation valves* CV-4027 .& 4117 isolate via the safety

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system or by hand switch 70o6 in the control room. The drain valves CV-4040 and 4114 have remote manual controllers. The drain valves are interlocked (PS-686) so that if 30 psig or greater exists in the line the

.valves will not open.or will close if opened. RV-5025, downstream from the drain valves, relieves at 35 psig.

21. The isolation requirements for the BHR system as stated in BTP-RSB 5-1 are not met by the shutdown cooling systems suction.and discharge sides.

The motor O!lerated valves (M0-7056 and 7057 on the suction side and M0-7070 and 7079 on the discharge side) are pressure interlocked with -

PS-619 & 620 which do not meet the BTP requirements for diverse inter-locks, and the discharge side does not have the alternate requirement of having isolation check valves at the HP/LP interface.

22. The. bleed-off line between the 'Primary and secondary isolation valves is provided with a restricting orifice which insures against overpressure downstream of the control valve from leakage through the MOV's. These bleed-off lines have solenoid controlled air operated control valves which are electrically interlocked with the primary isolation valves.

These bleed-off control valves are closed when the isolation valves are opened and vice versa. High pressure in the bleed-off' lines and system lines is* also alarmed in the control room*. RV 5018 and 5019 (set at 300 psig) downstream of the secondary MOV' s limit* pressure in the' system.

23.= The motor operated valves. are no.rmally closed valves, pressure interlocks PS:..619 and 620 prevent opening, of the valves. when the primary system pressure is greater than 300 psig. The MOV's also have* an autoclosure feature which closes the~valves if the pressure is greater than 300 psig, but autoclosure is dependent on the valve hand control handle position.

In the* pulled out position all operation of the valve. is blocked.