ML18041A187
| ML18041A187 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1989 |
| From: | Mellor R, St Laurent N YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| BYR-89-029, BYR-89-29, LER-89-002, LER-89-2, NUDOCS 8902170016 | |
| Download: ML18041A187 (436) | |
Text
FORM LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUf'lBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 029 1989 002 0 8902170016 213101 01/11/89 DOCKiT:029 YANKEE ROME TYPE:PMR REGION 1 NSSS:Mi ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: YANKEE ATOblIC ELECTRIC CO SYHBOL: YAE COHNENTS STEPS 4i5: EFF XX VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS'ATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL - 000%~ ON 1/11/89'T 1937 HOURS'ITH THE PLANT IN MOPE 3i WHILE CONDUCTING CONTROL ROD DROP TINE NEASUREPiENTS FOLLOWING A REFUELING OUTAGEr THi REACTOR PROTECTXON SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY ACTUATiD AT THE TItlE OF THE EVENT THE NO 1 VITAL BUS INVERTER MAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE'ITH THE VITAL BUS INVERTER POWER SUPPLY IN BYPASS IN THIS CONFIGURATION POWER TO THE VITAL BUS MAS SUPPLIED FROM EMERGENCY t1CC-5 THE RiACTOR MAS SUBCRITICAL AND THE GROUP A CONTROL RODS WERE AT 82 INCHESr BEING MXTHDRAMN TO 90 INCHES THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT IS ATTRIBUTED TO A VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION ON THE VITAL BUS MHICH INDUCiD A FALSE HIGH STARTUP RATE SCRAM SIGNALr OPENING THE SCRAM BREAKERS'K 1 AND BK 2 ~ THE UNPLANNED OPENXNG OF BK-1 AND 2 CONSTITUTES AN ACTUATION OF THE RPS. THE VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION OCCURRED WHEN THE NO 1 BOILER FEED PUHP WAS STARTED NORHALLYr THE VITAL BUS INVERTER WOULD HAVE PREVENT'ED THE VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION ON THE EflERGENCY llCC-5 FROM AFFECTING THE RPS. THE OPERATORS TOOK ACTION TO PRECLUDE THE STARTING OF HEAVY LOADS WHILE THE VITAL BUS INVERTER MAS IN BYPASS. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS EVENT CONDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS MILL BE ADDED TO THE APPROPRIATE PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS NATURE.
NO FURTHiR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE DEEHED NECESSARY. THE RPS FUNCTIONcD AS DFSIGNED ~
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FORM LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 029 1991 002 0 9107220232 222520 06/15/91
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DOCKET:029 YANKEE ROME TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL cNGINEER SMXX FACiLITY OPERATOR: YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
SYMBOL: YAE COMMENTS STEP 10: EFF IX VOLTAGE TRANSIENT STEP 8: ACTUAL TINE OF START OF EMERGENCY FEED MATER PUMP NOT GIVEN (MUST BE MANUAl LY ACTUATED). STEP 17=
COHP XR PROCESS RECORDERS STEP 18: COMP XR EVENTS RiCORDER WATCH-LiST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
11 ACTS OF NATURE 943 ALERT REPORTABILETY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50-73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 029/80-021 2 029/82-019 3 029/83-022 4 029/86-004 5 029/88-008 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 088X ~ ON 6/15/91r AT 2350 HOURSr WHII E IN NODE 1 AT 55K REACTOR POWER A LEGHTNING STRiKi RESULTEO IN DESTRUCTiON OF A LIGHTNING ARRESTOR ON THE NO. 3 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER (SST) ANO FLASHOVER OF AN XNSULATOR ON THE Z-126 115 KV TRANSMiSSEON LINE DISCONNECT SMITCH. AS A RESULTr Al L OFFSETE C POWER MAS LOSTr AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM AND TURBINE TRIP OCCURREOr .ANO ALL THREE FDGS OPERATiD AS DESIGNED ~ ON 6/16/91r AT 0010 HOURSr AN UNUSUAL EVENT (UE)
WAS DECLARED BASED ON THE 1055 OF OFFSETE POWER AND A FIRE EMERGENCY (SHOLOFRiNG ARRESTOR) AT 0014 HOURSr ONE SOURCE OF OFFSITE POMER MAS RESTORED. AT 0130 HOURS. AN ALERT MAS OECLAREO AT THE DISCRETION OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO NORHALlZE THE EMERGENCY BUSSESr AN INADVERTENT Si ACTUATION SIGNAL WAS INITIATED AT 0155 HOURS ~ FOLLOMING RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL COHNUNXCATEON SYSTEMS AND PLANT iQUIPMENTr THE ALERT WAS Di ESCALATED TO AN UE AT 0450 HOURS ON 6/17/91r THE PLANT ATTAINED A COLO SHUTDOWN CONDITION AT 0755 HOURS AND THE UE MAS TiRHINATEO AT 0925 HOURS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO LIGHTNING-INDUCED TRANSIENTS EHHEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INVOLVED REPAIRING AND TESTING OF AFFECTED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT AND PLANT ENSTRUNENTATEONr ANO RETURNING NORMAL AND EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT BACK TO ScRVICE
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0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i
FORH 3 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMB ER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 155 1983 013 0 8310270245 186257 09/21/83
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DOCKET:155 BIG ROCK POINT TYPE:B MR REGION: 3 NSSS:G ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILXTY OPERATOR: CONSUNERS POWER CO.
SYHBOL: CPC CONHENTS STEPS 5 THRU 7 COHP ZZZ = UNKNOWN EQUIPHENTr EFFECT IX = ELECTRICALLY OAHAGE0.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 155/78-040 2 155/79-015 ABSTRACT FOLLOMING A LIGHTNING STRIKE AT THE PLANT SITEr OPERATORS OBSERVED A BLOWN FUSE ON THE STATIC INVERTER EQUIPMENT FOR ONE OF TWO CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELXEF LOOPS THUS THE VENTILATION SUPPLY l OOP WAS INOPERABLE AND THE FUSE MAS XMHEOIATELY REPLACED'HE REDUNDANT LOOP MAS NOT AFFECTED AND RENAINED OPERABLE PRIOR FUSE Bl OWING REPORTED IN LER 78-40 AND LER 79 15 BUT NOT RELATED TO LIGHTNING. FOLLOMING THE LIGHTNING STRIKE INVESTIGATION REVEALED DANAGE TO PLANT TELEPHONE SYSTEHSr SECURITY SYSTEM EQUIPNENT~ DOMESTIC WATER CONTROLS'S '>JELL AS THE BLOWN FUSE DESCRIBEO ABOVE. SAFETY RELATED SYSTENS IN THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN PRONE TO PRIOR LXGHTNING DAMAGE REPORTABILITY BASED ON TECH SPEC 6. 9. 2. B (2) .
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 II I ~~
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FORM LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 213 1982 002 0 8203030431 1 721? 8 01 /20/82 DOCKET:213 CONNECTICUT YANKEE TYPE PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: CONN YANKEE ATONIC POWER CO SYi4iBOL: CYA ABSTRACT SECONDARY LOOP 2 FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSHITTER FAILED HIGHS RENDERING THE STEAN FLOW/FEED HIS-HATCH LOGIC INOPERABLE THE OPERATOR TOOK NANUAL CONTROL OF THE CHANNEL. LOOP 2 STEAtt GENERATOR FEEOMATER FLOM TRANSHITTER INDICATED A HiGH READING AS A RESULT OF A FAILED 400 CYCLE INVERTER THE FAILED INVERTER WAS REPLACED'ND THE F EEDWATER FLOW TRAN SltITTER PLACED BACK It<TO SERVICE.
0 e e e e e e o e e e e e e o o e e o e e 0 ~ 0 0 1 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 l 0
FORM LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 213 1 990 007 0 9007300001 2'j8984 06/26/90 DOCKET: 213 CONNECTICUT YANKEE TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGXNEER SWXX FACILXTY OPERATOR: CONN. YANKEE ATOi4llC POWER CO.
S YiRBOL: CYA COtlH ENT S STEP 9: UNSPECIFXEO CONTROL ANO INSTRUHENTATION CIRCUITRY IN THE CONTROL ROON WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY 231 UNEXPECTED SYSTEH ACTION OR RESPONSE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f ulfillment of a saf ety function.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%. ON JUNE 26 1990 AT 1400 HOURS WITH THE PLANT SHUT DOWN IN NODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) AND ENGINEERING EVALUATION OETERi~lINEO THAT A RUPTURE OF THE HEATING STEAM SYSTEMS LOCATED IN BOTH THE "A" SWITCHGEAR ROOt1 ANO THE NECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROON ADJACENT TO THE CONTROL ROON COULD CREATE A HARSH ENVIRONMENT FOR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPNENT CONTAINED IN THESE AREAS. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT APPEARS TO BE AN INCORRECT CONCLUSION DRAWN FROH A HXGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB)
STUDY CONOUCTEO IN 1973 SHORT TERN CORRECTXVE ACTION CONSISTS OF MODIFYING THE HEATING STEAi~l SYSTEH PIPING TO ELIMINATE THE POTENTIAL FOR PIPE RUPTURES IN THESE AREAS LONG TERN CORRECTIVE ACTION CONSISTS OF EVALUATING OTHER AREAS CONTAINING SAFETY RELATED FQUIPHENT FOR SIHILAR PROBLEMS ~ THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.73(A) (2) (V) (A) SINCE THiS CONDXTiON Al ONE COULD HAVE PREVENTEO THE FULFILLNENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF A SYSTEN NECDED TO SHUT DOWN THE REACTOR ANO HAINTAIN IT IN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION
0 e o o e e e e o o o o o e o e e o ~ e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 219 1990 002 0 9003200198 217369 02/07/90 DOCKET:219 OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BNRO FACILITY OPERATOR: GENERAL PUBI IC UTILITIES CORP ~
SYMBOL: GPU WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABILI TY CODES FOR 'THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50-73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCi LERS:
1 219/86-017 2 219/87-027 3 219/88-031 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000'N FFBRUARY 7r 1990r AT APPROXIHATELY 1715 HOURSr A PARTIAL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONr SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND STANDBY GAS TREATt'IENT SYSTEM (SBGTS) INITIATiON OCCURRED. THIS WAS A RESULT OF A tlOMENTARY LOSS OF POWER TO ASSOCIATEO RcLAYS AND TRIP UNITS THE POWER LOSS OCCURRiD DURING AN AUTOMATIC ELECTRICA1 BUS TRANSFER AS A RESULT OF REMOVING F ROt'l SERVICE THE ROTARY INVERTER POWER SUPPLY TO THE INSTRUMENT PANEL THE ROTARY INVERTER WAS REHOViD FROM SERVICE TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE XHHEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MERE TAKEN TO RESTORE SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS TO NORMAL THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS CONSIDERED tliNIHAL. THIS EVENT MAS CAUSED BY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY~
THE ViTAL POWER SYSTEtl PROCEDURE DID NOT ADEQUATELY AODRcSS THE EFFECT OF REHOVXNG THE ROTARY INVERTER FROM SERViCE ~ TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS EVENTr THE VITAL POWER SYSTEM PROCEDURE WILL BE REVIiWED AND REVISED AS NECESSARY
)l 0 0 ~ i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 7 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91
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DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 247 1986 020 0 8607300291 200301 06/24/86 DOCKET: 247 INDIAN POINT 2 REGXON: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: UECX FACILITY OPERATOR: CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO SYMBOL: CEC COMMENTS
~ STEP 4: CAUSE XX OC COHPONENT IMPOSED ON AC BUS. STEP 4: ISYS ZZ NUHEROUS BLOWN INSTRUNENT FUSES.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
15 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (vii): Single failure criteria.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100%a ON JUNE 24r 1986r WITH INDIAN P01NT UNIT 2 AT 100%
REACTOR POWERS TMO OF SIX HIGH HIGH CONTAINNENT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BECAME INOPERABLE WHEN NO 24 STATIC INVERTER TRIPPED AND THE ALTERNATE A C. FEED TO NO ~ 24 INSTRUHENT THUS DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENERGIZE DURING THE BRXEF PERIOD OF TINE THE EQUIPHENT FAILURE MAS IDENTIFIED AND THE XNVERTER MAS RETURNED TO SERVICEi CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION FROM HIGH-HIGH CONTAINNENT PRESSURE XNSTRUNENTS IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) MAS REDUCED TO A TMO OUT OF TWO'WICE LOGICr AS FOUR INSTRUMENTS MERE Siil L AVAILABLE TO iRAKE UP THE NECESSARY LOGIC SEQUENCE. OTHER AFFECTED INSTRUMENTS ENTcRED THEiR SAFE (TRIP) CONDITION AS DESIGNED.
FUSES BLEM IN HANY INSTRUMENTS. THE CAUSE OF THE XNVERTER TRIP AND FAILURE OF THE ALTERNATE FEED TO AUTOMATICALLY ENERGIZE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED THE CONDITION COULD NOT BE OUPLICATEO OR REPEATED AFTER EXTENSIVE TROUBLESHOOTING AND TESTING ~ ALL AFFECTED EQUIPMENT MAS VERIFIED OPERABLE AND RETURNED TO SERVXCE. THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WERE NOT AFFECTED
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 '.
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0 0 ~ P 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORhl LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 POCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 247 1987 013 2 8806290254 209695 11/05/87 DOCKET: 247 INDIAN POXN T 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS: WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER UECX FACiLITY OPERATOR: CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO SYMBOL: CEC COhlMENTS STEP 10: COMP X MELO CHANNEL AND PENETRATION PRESSURiZATION SYSTEhl ACTUATION HATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFXCIENCY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON NOVENBER Sr 1 987r WHiLE THE PLANT WAS AT COLO SHUTDOWN FOR THE 1987 REFUELING OUTAGEr A TECHNXCXAN INITIATEO A PARTIAL SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEN (SIS) ACTUATION SIGNAL THE TECHNICIAN MAS PERFORNING PREVFNTIVE hlAINTENANCE (Phl) TO CHECK PROPER RELAY FREEDOM OF COIL hlOVEhlENT. ALL THREE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) WERE INOPERABLE OUE TO WORK BEING PERFORhlEP ON THE EPG SERVICE MATER (SM) SYSTEM ~ AS A RESULT OF THE PARTIAL SIS ACTUATION SIGNALr
.A LOSS OF 480 VOLT ViTAL POWER OCCURRED SiNCE THE EDGS MERE TAGGED DUD THE OPERATORS RECOGNIZED THE LOSS OF 480 VOLT VITAL POWER AND RESTORED NORMAL SUPPLY FROll OFFSITE POWER AS PERHITTED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ALhlOST ALL ENGINE RED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)
WERE TAGGED OUT OF OPERATION FOR HAiNTENANCE THE MELD CHANNEL AND PENETRATION PRESSURIZATION SYSTEN (MCPPS) DID OPERATE. THERE WAS NO IMPACT UPON THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC
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FORH 9 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
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DOCKET YEAR LER NUfABER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 250 1 985 01 8 0 8508190627 195293 07/16/85
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DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POMER 8 LIGHT CO SYHBOL: FPL REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/84-003 2 250/84-014 3 250/84-026 4 251/84-011 5 251/84-021 6 251/84"022 7 251/85-012 8 251/85-013 9 251/85-017 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX ~ ON 7 16 85r UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRXP FROM HOT STANDBY CONDITIONS THi 3C XNVERTER THAT WAS IN SERVICE SUPPLYING POWER TO 120V VITAL INSTRUHENT PANEL 3P06r TRIPPED ~ LOSS OF POWER TO 3P06 RESULTED IN A LOSS OF POWER TO THE NUCLEAR INSTRUHENTATXON SYSTEN (NIS) SOURCE RANGi CHANNEL N-31 THE LOSS OF POWER TO CHANNEL N-31 GENERATED A SOURCE RANGE HX FLUX REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL WHICH OPENED BOTH REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS RESULTING IN BOTH SHUTDOWN BANKS FALLING INTO THE CORE THE CONTROL ROD BANKS WERE ALREADY IN THE CORE AT THE TINE OF THE EVENT INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE LOSS OF THE 3C INVERTER COULD NOT RiVEAL ANY APPARENT ROOT CAUSE ~
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: POWER TO THE VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS FOR PANEL 3P06 MAS RE-FSTABLXSHED AND THE AFFECTED EQUIPHENT WAS RiTURNEO TO NORt'IAL LINEUP THE 3C XNVERTER WAS INSPECTEO AND CHECKED AS PER MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS. FUSE F6 MAS FOUND BLOWN AND REPLACED ~ THE BLOWN FUSE WAS A RESULT AND NOT THE CAUSE OF THE LOSS OF THE 3C INVERTER. NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS MERE FOUND. THE ON-GOING CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO REPLACE THE INVERTERS WITH A MODEL OF A DXFFiRENT MANUFACTURER THE 3C INVERTER MAS REHOVED FROM SERVICE FOR THIS REPLACEMENT ON 7 19 85 'XHXLAR OCCURRENCES 250/84 003r 250/84 014r 250/84 026r 251/84 011 r 251/84 021r 251/84 022r 251/85 012r 251/85 013r AND 251/85-017.
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FORM 10 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 250 1987 015 0 8706250132 204945 05/22/87
- A************A********************************************
DOCKET: 250 TURKE Y POIN T 3 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINiiR: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT CO SYMBOL: FPL COMMENTS STEP 6: COMP MXZ INVERTER AND BATTERY ROOMS WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY REPORTABII ITY CODiS FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have pr evented fvlfillment o f a saf ety f unction.
15 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (vii): Single failure criter ia.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVcL 000% ~ ON MAY 22r 1987r WITH UNlT 3 IN tlODE 6 AND UNIT 4 IN MODE Sr IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SUBSEQUENT TO A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LOOP ) r A S INGLE FAILURE COULD RESULT 'lN A LOSS OF HVAC TO THE OC EQUIPMENT/INVERTER ROOMS OTHER SCENARIOS WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF HVAC TO CERTAIN ROOtlS WERE ALSO IDENTIFIED THE LOSS OF HVAC COULD RiSULT IN ELEVATED TEMPiRATURES OF THE AFFECTED ROOMS.
SHORT TERM OPERATION OF THE SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IN THESE AREAS AT TEMPERATURES UP TO 135 DEGREES F WOULD NOT RESULT IN A LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION. THE INITIAL DESIGN WAS EXACERBATED IN THE CURRENT DESIGN OUE TO tlOOIFICATIONS WHICH ADDED TO THE ROOM HEAT LOAOSr AND THE ADDITION OF WALLS ANO DOORS LIMITING AIR Fl OWr TO SATISFY APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS PERIODIC INSPECTIONS FOR THE A/C UNITS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED~ AS AN INTERXtl MEASURE TO IMPROVE THE AIR FLOW OXSTRIBUTIONr TWO DOORS WILL BE BLOCKEO OPEN ROOM TEt'lPERATURES
'WILL BE CHECKED HOURLY ~ IF TEMPERATURES XN THE AFFECTED AREAS REACH 100 DEGREES Fr SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING WILL BE INITIATED~ THIS WILL CONSIST OF THE TEMPORARY USE OF PORTABLE FANS UNTIL NORMAL COOLING CAN Bi RESTORED ~ A PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION (PC/M) INSTALLING ADDITIONAL VITAL El ECTRICAL OUTLETS AND SEISMIC STORAGE RACKS FOR THE PORTABLE FANS HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED.
0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a a, rt' I
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,P 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
FORM 11, LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91
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DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSXC EVENT DATE 250 1988 032 0 8901030388 212197 12/02/88
- 4********************+**************
DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT CO SYMBOL: FPL WATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR 40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/87-032 2 251/88-002 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000'N 12/2/88< AT 0500'ETH UNIT 3 IN COLD SHUTDOWN AND UNIT 4 DEFU LEOs A NUCLEAR TURBINE OPERATOR (NTO) MAS ATTEMPTING TO RENOVE THE 4B NORHAL INVERTER FROM SERVICE TO ALLOW HAIiVTENANCE TO BE PERFORl'1ED AFTER TRANSFERRXNG l OAD TO THE "B" SPARE INVERTERr THE NTO NISTAKENLY OPENED THE OUTPUT BREAKER FOR THE "B" SPARE INVERTER INSTEAD OF OPENING THE OUTPUT BREAKER FOR THE 4B NORMAL INVERTER.
THIS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF POWER TO THE 120 VITAL AC BUS 4P08 AND THE PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING RACK LOSS OF THE PROCESS RADIATION HONITORING RACK RESULTED IN THE AUTONATIC ISOLATION OF THE CONTAINHENT VENTILATION AND CONTROL ROON VENTILATION SYSTEMS THE BREAKER MAS CLOSED APPROX 30 SiCONDS AFTER BEING OPENEDr AND AT 0540 THE CONTROL ROON VENTiLATION SYSTEM MAS RETURNED TO XTS NORllAL ALIGNHENT THE CAUSi OF THE EVENT MAS PERSONNEL ERROR XN THAT THE NTO OPENED THE OUTPUT BREAKER FOR THE "B" SPARE XNVERTER INSTEAD OF OPENING THE OUTPUT BRiAKiR FOR THE 4B NORNAL INVERTER. HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT IN THAT THE "B" SPARE INVERTER WAS HIS-LABELED AS "B STANDBY INVERTER" ~ THE NTO MAS COUNSELED FOLLOWING THE EVENT. THE SPARE INVERTERS MILL BE RE-LABELED AS SPARE INVERTERS. THE PROCEDURE IN USE WILL BE REVISED TO REQUIRE THAT THE OPERATOR VERIFY THAT THE INVERTER TO BE DE-ENERGIZED IS NOT SUPPLYING POWER TO THE BUS.
0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t
~ 1 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 12 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- ic**************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 251 1 984 011 0 8407130079 1 90542 06/10/84 DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPiRATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL COHHENTS STEP 1: EFFECT IX ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/84-009 2 250/84-013 3 250/84-015 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100%>> ON JUNE 10r 1984r AT 12 TO APPROXINATELY 510 MEGAWATTS OCCURRED
'8 A ~ N~r A TURBINE RUNBACK THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROH AN ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT IN THE "NORllAL" (4A)
STATIC INVERTER (4Y01) THAT WAS IN SERVICE SUPPLYING POWER TO A VXTAL 120 VOLT (A C ) INSTRUHEiElT POWER BUS (PANEL 4P07) . THIS RESULTED IN A MOMENTARY LOSS OF POWER TO VITAL PANEL 4P07 AND ITS FEEDS TO THE NUCLEAR XNSTRUHENTATION SYSTEH (NIS) CHANNEL N-42 POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION A HOf1ENTARY I OSS OF NIS CHANNEL N-42 DETECTOR VOLTAGE RESULTED AND INITIATED AM "NIS ROO DROP" SIGNAL WHICH GENERATFD THE TURBINE RUNBACK. IHNEOIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED STABILIZING THE UNITr SWAPPING THE VITAL PANEL ONTO THE "STANDBY" (AS)
STATIC INV E RT ER (3 Y04) AND COl'1PL ETION OF SATISFACTORY LOG XC CIRCUIT TESTING AND LOAD TiSTING OF THE 4A INVERTER WITH A RESISTIVE LOAD OF 53 ANPS PERFORMED WITH LINE DISTURBANCi MONITORING EQUIPMENT WHICH DID NOT RECORD ANY ABNORl1AL FLUCTUATIONS. THE 4A INVERTER WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AND LICENS ED OPERATORS WERE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN AN AWARENESS OF THi INVERTERS STATUS. SIHILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250 84 009'ER 250 84 01 3r AND LER 250 84 01 5 ~
0 e o o o e o o o e e o o* e e e e a o e e 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 13 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4************************************************
DOCKET YCAR LiR NUNBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 255 1986 034 0 8609240211 201023 08/26/86 DOCKET:255 PALISADFS TYPE:P WR 0 REGION: 3 NSSS:C ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: CONSUMERS POWER CO ~
SYNBOL: CPC COHNENTS STEPS 13r25 CONP RLX AUXILIARY RELAY>> MATCH 975 LOSS OF ONE DC BUS COINCIDENT WITH LOCA COULD RESULT IN FAILURE OF ALL ESF PUttPS ~
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT REPORTABXLXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
11 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii): Unanalyzed conditions.
ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL OOOX DURING AUGUST 1 986'ITH THE PLANT IN COLD SHUTDOWN< AN EVALUATION OF THE 125 VOLT OC BUSES CONCLUOFD THAT A POSTULATiD S INGLE FAILURE OF ONE DC BUS CAN RESULT IN NO ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SYSTEN PUtlPS DELIVERING WATER UNTIL MANUAI OPiRATOR ACTION IS TAKEN. THIS DESIGN DEFICIENCY HAS EXISTED SiNCE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION THE DESIGN ERROR MILL BE CORRECTEOs PRIOR TO STARTUP FROt1 THi CURRENT OUTAGE BY t'IOOIFYING THE RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SYSTEM LOGIC FROM TWO- OUT-OF-FOUR TO ONE-OUT-OF-TMO TAKEN TWICE
0 e e e o e e e e o o a e e o e o e o e -
d 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0
FORM 14 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 259 1985 032 1 8509040362 198437 06/20/85 DOCKET:259 BROWNS FERRY 1 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TVAX FACILITY OPERATOR: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SYMBOL: TVA MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
913 UPDATE NEEDED REPORTABILITY CODFS FOR THIS LER ARE:
11 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii): Unanalyzed conditions.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 000% ~ BASED ON ANALYTICAL CALCULATIONS BY TVA'S OFFICE OF ENGINEERINGr THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR THE 250 VDC MAIN BATTERY TERMINAL VOLTAGE TO DROP BELOW THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR)
SECTION 8.6.2 SPECIFIED FINAL VALUE OF 210 VDC FOR A SHORT TRANSIENT CONDITION FOLLOWING POSTULATED ACCIDENTS ~ THE CALCULATED TRANSIENT VALUE IS 207 VOC. THIS SHORT TRANSIENT COULD CAUSE AN INADVERTENT TRIP OF THE STATION INVERTERS WHICH POWER THE WIDE RANGE TORUS TEMPERATURE MONITORS AND THE TOPAZ INVERTERS WHICH POWER THE HIGH PR SSURE COOLANT INJECTiON CONTROL ER CIRCUITRY CORRECTIVE ACTiON PENDING FURTHER EVALUATIONr IS TO LOWER THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP SETTING ON THE INVERTERS
0 0 ~ 1 0 i 0 0 i i 0 0 0 0 I '
t l
~ e e ~ e e ~ e o o e e o o o e o o e ~ ~ 0
FORM 15 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 263 1987 013 0 8707140436 205202 06/07/87
- A'*********************************************************
DOCKET: 263 HONTICELLO TYPE:BMR REGION: 3 NSSS: GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: NORTHERN STATES POWER CO ~
SYMBOL: NSP COHNENTS MATCH 975: POTENTIAL COHAON CAUSE FAILURE MODE ~ STEP 96. MODEL 5K404AK981A.
STEP 97: SERIAL 0 7929AR ~
WATCH LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY 975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT 942 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f
f illment o f a sa e ty f unction.
vlf 15 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (vii): Single failure criteria.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100%. THREE EVENTS OCCURRED RELATED TO BREAKER/FUSE HISCOORDINATION THE FIRST TWO INVOLVED TRIP OF AN ESSENTIA DIVISION Il NCC. OPERATORS ACTED TO COMPLY MITH TECH SPEC LCO STATEHENTS BASED ON THE INOPERABLE 480V LOADS NUE'S WERE DECLARED ANO NORMAL SHUTDOWNS INITIATED EQUIPMENT WAS HEGGARED ANO NO FAUl T FOUND. LOADS WERE RESTORED AND THE NUE' TERMINATED. THIRD EVENT MAS DECLAREO MHEN BREAKER/FUSE HISCOOROINATION WAS FOUND AND DETERNXNED TO PROVIDE POTENTIAL FOR EVENTS THAT HIGHT CAUSE REDUNDANT 480V HCC SOURCES TO BE TRIPPEO AN NUE MAS DECLAREO AND NORMAL SHUTDOWN iNITIATEO~ CAUSE OF THE NISCOORDINATION CONOITiON MAS PERSONNEL ERROR AND PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY THAT ALl OWED BREAKER TRiP DEViCE INSTALLATION WXTH INADEQUATE REVIEW CAUSE OF THE BREAKER TRIPS WAS INTERNITTENT GROUND FAULTS iN MIRING FOR A DRYWELL COOLER FAN ~ TRIP DEVICE GROUND FAULT OETECTiON FEATURE MAS JUNPEREDr LEAVING OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FEATURES INSTALLED THE NUE WAS TERMINATED~ APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN NOTXFXED OF THE EVENTS AND HOM TO PREVENT FUTURE INADEQUACY REVIEMS OF PLANT CHANGES WERE PERFORMED WITH NO SIMILAR PROBLEN FOUND ~ FURTHER REVIEW OF ELECTRICAL COORDINATION ANO ADHINISTRATIVE PROCESSES ARE BEING PERFORHED.
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ -
g 4 jO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
FORM 16 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMB ER REVISION DCS NUhlBER NSIC EVENT DATE 266 1 981 007 0 8107200080 1 66824 06/26/81
- 0****************
DOCKET:266 POINT BEACH 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO SYMBOL: WEP ABSTRACT THE UNIT TRIPPED DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER TO THE RED INSTRUMENT BUS ~
THE TRIP MAS INDUCED OUE TO THE EFFECT OF THE POWER LOSS ON BOTH PROTECTIVE AND CONTROL SYSTEhlS. AN ADDXTIONAL RESULT OF THE LOSS OF POWER MAS THE LOSS OF 1PT 945r CONTAINilENT PRESSURE ~ THE LOSS OF THIS CHANNEL FOR LESS THAN ONE MINUTE REDUCED THE DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY TO ZEROS THE CAUSE OF THE LOST BUS WAS ATTRIBUTEO TO A CONTRACTOR EhlPLOYEE PERFORHING BACKFITTING HODXFICATIONS REQUIRED TO MEET NEM REGULATORY REQUIREhlENTS. THE CONTRACTOR MAS WORKING IN THE IHhlEDIATE AREA ANO ACCIDENTALLY INTERRUPTED THE BUS POWER SUPPLY. THE BUS MAS IMhlEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO ITS ALTERNATE SUPPLY AND THE RECOVERY FROH THE TRIP WAS NORNAL.
0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 h
h 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 17 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 266 1 985 006 0 85101001 28 1 96108 09/03/85
- dc*********A*******A********************************
DOCKET:266 POINT BEACH 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
SYMBOL: WEP COMMENTS STEP 1 5 2: EFFECT IX NEGATIVE VOLTAGE SPIKE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% AT 1453 HRS ON 9-3-85'NIT 1 EXPERIENCED A TURBINE RUNBACK FROM 100% TO 80% POWER ~ THIS RUNBACK WAS DUE TO A MOMENTARY DOWNWARD SPIKE ON THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CAUSED BY A VOLTAGE SPIKE ON THE RED INSTRUMENT BUS ALL SYSTEMS OPERATED AS DESIGNED' RETURN TO 100% POWER WAS COMMENCED AT 1456 HOURS.
i 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C
r 0 0 0 y 0 0 y 0 y l l ~ 0 y 0 0 0 1
FORH 18 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSXC EVENT DATE 266 1985 007 0 8510220439 1 96274 09/11/85
- A***********%'*************4*************************************
DOCKET:266 POINT BEACH 1 TYPE:PWR REGION 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
SYMBOL: WEP COMMENTS STEP 1: COMP ISL FIRE BARRIER PACK FOR CONDUITS ~
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations ~
ABSTRACT POWER LiVEL 100% AT 1315 HRS ON 9-11-85 UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED A TURBINE RUNBACK r RON 100% TO APPROX 80% POWER ~ THIS MAS DUE TO A HONENTARY NEGATIVE DOWNWARD SPIKE ON THE NUCLiAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) CAUSED BY A VOLTAGE SPIKE ON THE YELLOW INSTRUNiNT BUS FEEDXNG NXS CHANNEL 44. THE VOLTAGE SPIKE WAS CAUSED BY A CONTRACTOR PACKING FIRE BARRIER NATERIAL INTO AN ELECTRICAL CONDUIT CONTAINING THi POWER SUPPlY TO THE INVERTER SUPPLYING THE YELLOW INSTRUMENT BUS THE PLANT MAS RETURNED TO 100% POWER A SHORT TIHE AFTER THE EVENT ALL RESPONSE TO THE TURBINE RUNBACK WAS NORMAL
0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 gF
~e s ~
1 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 19 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC cVENT DATE 266 1986 003 0 8607090090 199975 06/03/86 DOCKET:266 POINT BEACH 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO SYHBOL: WEP COMMENTS STEPS 38-43: COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF UNIT 2 EVENT GIVEN XN LER 301/86-003.
WATCH 975 TRANSIENT INITIATED ON BOTH UNITS DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LcRS:
1 301/86-003 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ~ ON 6 3 86r UNIT 1 AT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP OUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER ON THE MHITE INST RUt'lENT BUS ~ THE POWER LOSS MAS DUE TO THi TRIP OF THE MHITE INVERTER (1DY03) OUTPUT BREAKER FEiOING THE WHITE INSTRUHENT BUS THE BREAKER TRIP WAS CAUSED WHENr AFTER HAINTENANCEr THE SWING INVERTER (DYOC) WAS INCORRECTLY RESTORiD TO OPERATION ON THE DC BUS FEEDING THE WHITE INVERTERS TO BOTH UNiT 1 AND UNIT 2 (10Y03 ANO 2DY03 RESPECTIVELY) THE WHITE INSTRUNENT BUS SUPPLIFS A CHANNEL OF POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUHENTATION WHEN POWER WAS INTERRUPTEOr THIS INSTRUHENTATION GENERATED A 20% LOAD REFERiNCE TURBINE RUNBACK FROH ITS DROPPEO ROD DETECTION CIRCUITRY THE STEP DECREASE IN POWER CAUSED THE STEAtl DUMP SYSTEM TO ARM ~ BECAUSE THE WHITE BUS ALSO SUPPLIES POWER TO THE TREF INSTRUtdENTr TREF FAXLEO LOM GENERATING A TEHPERATURE DEVIATION SIGNAL WHICH CAUSED THE STEAN DUMPS TO GO FULL OPEN AND CONTROL RODS TO STEP XN AT !4AXINUN SPEED. THESE EVENTS CREATiD A PRIMARY SYSTEH COOLDOWN MHICH CAUSED PRIMARY SYSTEM PRiSSURE TO DECRESE BELOW THE REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT. THE REACTOR TRIPPED.
THE PRIH'ARY SYSTEM CONTINUED TO COOL DOWN AFTiR THE REACTOR TRXP WHEN THE AUXILIARY FEEOWATER SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY STARTED THIS COOLDOWN RESULTED IN ACTUATION OF THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEH ~ ALL SAFETY SYSTEHS FUNCTIONED AS DESIGN. PLANT SYSTEHS WERE STABILIZED AND SAFEGUAROS CIRCUXTS RESET.
Ig FORM 20 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 266 1 986 006 0 8612300366 202333 11/28/86 DOCKET: 266 POINT BEACH 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:Mi ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO SYMBOL: WiP COMMENTS STiP 4: MODEL 253-1-103~
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actvations REFERiNCE LERS:
1 266/86-001 2 266/86-003 3 301/86-003 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100/i ~ AT 0752 HOURS ON NOVEMBER 28r 1986 WHILE UNIT 1 WAS OPERATING AT 1 OOX POMERr A 2 5 SECOND TURBINE" RUNBACK TO APPROXIHATELY 95/ POWER MAS EXPERIENCED THE RUNBACK WAS DUE TO A MOMENTARY LOSS OF POWER ON THE WHITE INSTRUMENT BUS WHICH OCCURRED WHILE THE INSTRUMENT BUS NORMAL POWER SUPPLY INVERTER MAS BEING TRANSFERREO TO THE SPARE INVFRTER. THE REACTOR MAS RETURNED TO 100X POWER AT 0800 HOURS AN EVALUATION IS BEING PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF PROVIDING A BUFFER BETWEEN THE INVERTER ANO NEM COMPUTER LOADS WHICH ARi CAUSING VOLTAGi HARMONICS ON THE INSTRUHENT BUS. THE HARMONICS ARE CAUSING THE INVERTER PROTECTIVE CIRCUITS TO HOHENTARILY INTiRRUPT OUTPUT POWER WHEN TRANSFERS OF THIS TYPE ARE HADE
~ %
~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 21 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 272 1983 024 0 8307050036 1 83948 05/25/83
- a**************************************************************
DOCKET:272 SALEM 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSEG FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBI IC SERVICE ELECTRIC 5 GAS CO.
SYMBOL: PEG COMMENTS UNIT 2 OPERATORr DURING TAG OUT PROCEDUREr INADVERTENTLY ENTERED UNIT 1 AND OPENED VITAL IiNSTRUMENT BREAKER WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
975 POSSXBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT ABSTRACT ON MAY 25r 1983r DURING ROUTINE POWER OPFRATIONr AN OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY OPENED THE SUPPlY BREAKER TO NO 1C VITAL INSTRUMENT INVERTER AN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER TO THE ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY OCCURRED WITH NO LOSS OF EQUIPMENT OR INDICATiON. WITH THE INVERTER DE-ENERGIZEDr NO ~ 1C VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS AiND ITS ASSOCIATEO BUS TRAIN WAS INOPERABLEr ANO ACTXON STATEMENT 3 8 2 ~ 1 APPLIEO ~ THE EVENT CONSTITUTEO OPERATIOiN IN A DEGRADED MODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPECS 6 9 1 9B THE OPERATOR WAS IMPLEMENTING A TAGGXNG REQUEST FOR THE NO ~ 2C VITAL INSTRUMENT INVERTER ANO ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED UNIT 1r DE-ENERGIZING THE WRONG INVERTER. THE IiNVERTER WAS IMMEDXATELY RESTORED TO SERVICE AiNO THE ACTION STATEMENT WAS TERMINATCD~ THE OPERATOR INVOLVED WAS REPRIMANDEDr A RECENTLY COMPLETED STUDY OF TAGGING OPERATIONS CONSIDERS DUAL PLANT OPERATION AND IS UNDER EVALUATION
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 4 ay II ~
I 4.
S 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 ~
FORth 22 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUllBER REVISION DCS NUNB E R NSIC EV ENT DATE
.275 1984 001 0 8402100245 189156 01/06/84 DOCKET:275 DIABLO CANYON 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PGEC FACILXTY OPERATOR: PACIFIC GAS 8 ELECTRIC CO.
S Ytl BOL: P GE COHHENTS STEP 2: CONP RLX - SLAVE RELAY ~ STEP 7: CAUSE AX CALIBRATION ACTIVITIES.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 000/ DURING INSTALLATION OF TEST EQUIPtlENT THE AC SUPPLY TO A SOLiD STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM (SSPS) SLAVE RELAY CIRCUIT MAS l10t'IENTAR ILY GROUNDED ~ THIS CAUSED A MOHENTAR Y DROP IN Xi'ERTER OUTPUT VOLTAGES MHICH SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL ON ONE TRAIN OF THc ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM ~ THE SIGNAL CAUSED ONE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGXNG PUMP AND ONE DIESEL GENERATOR TO START ALSOr ONE TRAIN OF CONTAXNYiENT PHASE A ISOLATION VALVES ACTUATED~ THE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP WAS IN THE RECIRCULATION t<ODEr SO THERE WAS NO INJECTION OF MATER INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEt'l CORRECTIVE ACTION MAS A HEHO TO OPERATORSr INSTRUCTING THEN TO PUT THE SSPS IN THE 'TEST'ODE (BLOCKING THE ESF ACTUATION SiGNAi)
EXCEPT WHEN REQUIRED FOR ESF TESTING OR OPERATION
'-'~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 II 4 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 23 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4****************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 275 1 984 007 0 84041 301 58 1 891 59 03/09/84
- 4**********************
DOCKET: 275 DIABLO CANYON 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PGEC FACILITY OPERATOR: PACIFIC GAS 8 ELECTRIC CO SYh1BOL: PGE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON NARCH 9r 1984r WHILE IN NOD E 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) z THE 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT A C ~ BUS 1-3 WAS DE-ENERGIZED WHEN AN OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY RESET THE "INVERTER INPUT" BREAKER WHICH APPEARED TO BE TRIPPED. THIS ACTION DE-ENERGIZED THE BUS WHICH RESULTED IN THE AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF TMO ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) SYSTEHS THE ESF SYSTEHS ACTUATED MERE THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATXON SYSTEM AiVD THE CONTROL ROON VENTILATION SYSTEM ~ TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS EVENTr ADDITIONAL LABELING HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE INVERTER PANEI S TO CLARXFY EACH BREAKER'S FUNCTION
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 '=
jO ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 24 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 275 1985 006 0 8503010423 193346 01/25/85 DOCKET:275 DIABLO CANYON 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS: ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PGEC FACILITY OPFRATOR: PACIFIC GAS 5 ELECTRIC CO.
SYNBOL: PGE REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
15 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (vii): Single failure .criter ia.
4 REFERENCE LERS:
1 275/85-005 2 275/84-004 ABSTRACT POMER LEV L 000%~ AT 1750 PSTr 1-25-85r WITH UNIT 1 IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) r A LOSS OF VITAL 4KV BUS VOI TAGE RESULTEO IN THE AUTOSTARTS OF DG 1 2r CONTAINHENT FAN COOLER SYSTEM 1 5r AND AUX SALTWATER PUMP 1 2i ANO THE TRANSFER OF THE CONTROL ROOH VENTILATION SYSTEH TO NODE 4 IN ADDITIONr FOR APPROX 2 N NSr THE DECAY HEAT RENOVAL CAPABILITY WAS LOST WHEN THE CLOSURE OF THE LOOP 4 RHR SUCTION VALVE (HOV-8702)
RESULTEO IN BOTH RHR TRAXNS BEING ISOLATED FROYi THE RCS ~ THE RHR SUCTION VALVE MAS SUBSEQUENTLY OPENED AND RHR Fl OW ESTABLISHED WITHIN 2 HINS ALI OTHER AFFECTED EQUIPHENT ANO SYSTEHS WERE RETURNED TO THEiR NORNAL STANDBY CONDITIONS ~ INVESTIGATXON HAS SHOWN THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS EVENT MAS lliSADJUSTNENT OF THE AUX SMITCHES ON THE BUS G FEEDER BREAKERS (HG 13 ANO 14) . THE AUX SWITCHES WERc ADJUSTED TO A NEW TOLERANCE ANO THE BREAKERS WERE TESTEO MITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS ~
TO P REVENT RECURRENCE'ROCEDURE E 51 ~ Zr "4 ~ 1 6KV CIRCUIT BREAKER Pt1 (PREVENTATIVE llAINTENANCE) r" IS BEING REVISED TO XDENTIF Y THE SPECIFIC AUX SMITCH AOJUSTHENT REQUXRED FOR THE BUS FEEDER BREAKERS SINILAR EVENTS 275/85-004 ANO 85"005.
t~
t ~~
FORM 25 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A*********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 275 1985 033 0 8512100697 1 97543 10/25/85
- 4***********************************************************
DOCKET:275 DIABLO CANYON 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PGEC FACILITY OPERATOR: PACIFIC GAS 8 ELECTRIC CO S YMBOL: PGE COM14 ENT S STEP 4 COMP MEI COMPARATOR STYLE 41 11 082 001 r STEPS 758 COilp RLX RELAY MONITORING RCP BREAKER POSITION REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS.
1 275/85-012 2 275/85-01 5 ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 100% AT 1321 PDTr 10 25-85 WHILE IN tlODE 1 AT 100%
POMERr AUTOt'lATIC REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIPS OCCURRED TMO PLANT TECHNiCiANS WERE RESTORING THE BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK LEVEL INDICATING/ALARM CIRCUIT WHEN A FUSE MAS BEING INSTALLED WHILE RETURNING THE CIRCUIT TO OPERATIONr A SHORTED CAPACITOR IN A COMPARATOR MODULE CREATED A MOMENTARY SHORT IN A 120V POWER SUPPLY BUS CIRCUIT THE RESULTANT REDUCTION IN INV RTER VOLTAGE OUTPUT CAUSED A RELAY XN THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION RACKSr MHICH MONITORS RCP BREAKER POSITIONr TO MOMENTARILY DROP OUT SINCE THE UNIT MAS ABOVE P Br ONLY 1 RCP BREAKER OPEN SIGNAL WAS REQUIRED TO INITIATE A REACTOR TRIP ~ THE COMPARATOR MODULE MAS REPLACED AND THE UNIT MAS RETURNED TO POWER IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES. TO PREVENT RECURRENCEr PGSE IS SEEKING EXPEDITIOUS NRC APPROVAL OF A LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO CHANGE THE RCP BREAKER POSITION TRIP LOGIC ~ THIS MILL PREVENT A SINGLE F AILUREr SUCH AS THE FAILED COMPARATOR IN THXS CASEr FROM-,.
PUTTING THE PLANT THROUGH AN UNNECESSARY TRANSIENT
e o o o 0 a e o e e e e o e e a e e ~ e 0 o e e e e e e e e e e e o e. e e e ~ e e
F ORh1 26 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUllBER REVISION OCS NUMBER hlSIC EVENT DATE 275 1990 019 0 9102040174 220842 12/27/90
- 4***********************************+*********************
DOCKET:275 DIABLO CANYON 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS: WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PGEC FACILITY OP" RATOR: PACiFIC GAS 8 ELECTRiC CO SYMBOL: PGE WATCH-LEST CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR 941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE-13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 275/86-007 2 275/86-014 3 275/86-015 4 275/87-003 5 275/87-021 6 275/88-007 7 275/89-001 8 275/89-011 9 323/90-004 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON DECEMBER 27r 1990r AT 1431 PSTr WITH UNIT 1 IN MOD- 3 (HOT STANDBY)r A CONTAINM NT VENTILATION iSOLATXON (CVI)
ACTUATION OCCURRED THiS EVENT CONSTITUTES AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION~ THE 4 HOURr NON EMERGENCY REPORT REQUIRFO BY 10 CFR 50~72 (8) (2) (ii) WAS MADE TO THE NRC ON DECEMiBER 27r 1990r AT 151 8 PST A CONTRACT ELECTRICIAN WAS PERFORMING DESIGN MOOIFiCATIONS IN AN ENERGIZED RADIATION MONITOR CABINET. AS THE ELECTRICIAN REHOVEO THE PLIERS FROM THE CABINETr THE PLXERS CAhlE IN CONTACT WITH THE TERMINALS ON A FUSE BLOCKr CAUSING A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT ON AN INVERTER THE TRANSIENT CAUSED ALARMS ON TMO RAOIATiON MONITORS SUPPLIED BY THE INVERTERr RESULTING IN THE CVI THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE PERSONNEL ERROR (COGNITIVE) IN THAT IF THE ELECTRICIAN HAD TAPED THE TOOL IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD WORK PRACTICES FOR WORKING iN ENERGIZED CABXNETSr El ECTRICAL CONTACT WITH THE FUSE BLOCK MAY NOT HAVE OCCURRED' CONTRIBUTARY CAUSE MAS DETERMINED TO BE THAT A PREVXOUSLY XSSUED MAINTENANCE BULLETXN REGARDING WORK ON ENERGIZED EQUIPMENT r WHICH R E COhIMENOS TAPING TOOLSr HAD NOT BEEN RE VI E WED WITH THE ELECTRICIAN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS EVENTr ALL PREVIOUS MAINTENANCE BULLETINS NOT DISTRIBUTED TO GENERAL CONSTRUCTION (GC)
WILL BE DISTRIBUTEDr TAILBOARD MEETINGS MXLL,BE HELD WITH A11 GC CREWS TO REVIEW PREVIOUS MAINTENANCE BULLETINS RELEVANT TO THIS EVENT.
0 o e o o o o o e 0 o o e e e e a ~ e e II
~ e
'I ~1 Ih I I
0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 t ~ 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
FORN 27 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 275 1991 004 0 9104150273 221 448 03/07/91
- k * **************** 4 ***************************************
DOCKET:275 DIABLO CANYON 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:ME ARCHITcCTURAL ENGINEER: PGEC FACILITY OPERATOR: PACIFIC GAS 5 ELECTRIC CO SYMBOL: PGE COHiRENTS MATCH 932 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 90-25.
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR 403 HEAVY EQUIPHENT HANOI lNG 913 UPDATE NEEDED 932 RESULT OF IE BULLETINSr ORDERSr ETC ~ (IEB 81-7) 942 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50-73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
14 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented ulfillment of a safety function.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%~ ON 3/7/91r AT 0807 PSTr WITH UNIT 1 IN NODE 6 (REFUELING) AT 0% POWERS A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TO UNIT 1 OCCURRED MHEN A MOBILE CRANE BOON CANE TOO CLOSE TO THE 500 KV POWER LINES ~
THE 500 KV LINE ARCED TO GROUND THROUGH THE CRANE BOON< AND CAUSED THE LOSS OF POWERS THE EHERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS STARTED AND LOADED TO THE VITAL BUSSES'N UNUSUAL EVENT MAS DECLARED AT 0830 PSTr MARCH 7i 1991. A ONE-HOUR EMERGENCY REPORT MAS HADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50 72(A)(3) AT 0900 PST A FOUR-HOUR NON-EMERGENCY REPORT MAS IN ACCORDANCE MITH 10 CFR 50 72(B) (2) (II) AND (B) (2) (III) ON NARCH 7r 1991 r AT 1011 PSTr DUE TO THE ACTUATION OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AND MOMENTARY LOSS OF RHRi RESPECTIVELY. THE SPECIAL REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED AS THE RESULT OF THE NON VALID FAILURE OF DG 1 1 THAT OCCURRED DURING THE EVENT THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE PERSONNEL ERROR BY THE CRANE OPERATOR AND THE FORCHAN IN IMPLEt'1ENTATION OF PGRE' ACCIDENT P REVENTION RULES CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES INCLUDED INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS HADE IN RESPONSE TO NUREG-141 REGARDING THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AT VOGTLEr INADEQUATE TRAINING CONCERNING ELECTRICAL SAFETY ISSUES FOR NON ELECTRICAL WORKERSr AND WORK PRACTICES NOT REQUIRING A CLEARANCE FOR CRANE OPERATXON IN THE AREA OF HIGH VOLTAGc LINES AND TRANSFORHERS FOLLOWING THE EVENTr THE PLANT MANAGER STOPPED ALL NON-CRITICAL WORK FOR 24 HOURS ~
4
~ A 0 o e 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
FORM 28 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUl'IBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 277 1987 009 0 8707150601 205235 06/02/87
- 4***********
DOCKET: 277 PEACH BOTTOH 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO ~
S YNBOL: P EC CONHENTS STEPS 3i4 MODEL NO ~ A4515 ~ STEPS 8r9 COHP RLX LOGIC RELAY WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50 ~ 73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 277/86-004 2 277/86-006 3 278/86-001 4 278/87-006 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON JUNE 2r 1987'T 1640 HOURSr A PRIHARY CONTAINNENT iSOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) GROUP XXI OUTBOARD VALVE ISOLATION AND A HALF-SCRAN OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) OCCURRED ~
THESE ACTIONS OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF A LOSS-OF-POWER TO THE PROTECTION SYSTEH BUS ~ AS A RESULT OF OUTAGE HAINTENANCE BEING 'B'EACTOR PERFORHEO TO THE B MOTOR GENERATOR SETw THE B REACTOR P ROTECTION SYSTEM BUS WAS RECEIVING POMLR THROUGH THE R'ECENTl Y NODIFIED R ACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEi4l ALTERNATE FEED SOURCE THE VOLTAGE REGULATING TRANSFORHER XN THE CIRCUIT MAS DRAWING HIGHER CURRENT THAN EXPECTED MHICH CAUSED A CIRCUIT OVERLOAD ANO THE NO. 23 BREAKER TO TRIP.
ADDITXONALLYr THE UPS ALT ERNATE SUPPLY BREAKER NO ~ 52 3691 MAS FOUND XN THE "OFF" POSITION. THE CURRENTI Y INSTALLED VOLTAGE REGULATING TRANSFORNER WILL BE REPLACED METH ANOTHER VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER.
0 e e e e e e e e o e o o e e e e o e e e 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORtl 29 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 277 1 991 003 0 9102250279 221016 01/21/91
- A*******************************************************Br DOCKET:277 PEACH BOTTOH 2 TYPi: BMR REGION: 1 NSSS: GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRiC CO.
S YHBOL: PEC WATCH-LXST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actvations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 277/86-004 2 277/86-006 3 278/86-001 4 278/88-008 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX~ ON 1/21/91r AT 0252 HOURS< A UNIT 2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) GROUP IIX OUTBOARD ISOLATION OCCURRED ALONG WITH INITIATION OF THE STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SBGT) WHEN THE B REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEt't (RPS) BUS TRIPPED ON UhlDERVOLTAGE ~ THESE ACTIONS OCCURRED WHEN THE UNIT 3 'Bs RECIRCULATION PUMP tlOTOR-GENERATOR (N-G) SET WAS STARTED STARTING THE RECIRC H-G SET LOWERED THE VOLTAGE ON THE UNIT 2 STARTUP SOURCE WHICH CAUSED AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION ON THE SANE BUS THAT MAS SUPPl YING THE "2B" RPS LOGIC AND THE OUTBOARD PCXS LOGIC THE "2B" RPS 'MAS BEING SUPPLIED BY THE ALTERNATE SUPPlY MXTH THE STATIC INVERTER BYPASSED THE LOM VOLTAGE CONDITION CAUSED AN UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP OF THE ALTERNATE SOURCE BREAKER THEREBY REHOVING POWER TO THE "2B" RPS AND OUTBOARD PCIS LOGIC NO ACTUAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OCCURRED AS A RiSULT OF THIS EVENT ~ THE PROCEDURE USED FOR STARTING A RECIRCULATION t10TOR-GENERATOR SET HAS BEEN REVISED TO INFORM OPERATIONS PERSONNEL THAT WHEN STARTING A tl-G SET WHICH IS PO'MERED BY THE SANE STARTUP SOURCE AS THE RPS ALTiRNATE POWER SUPPLY THEY ilAY RECEIVE A HALF SCRANCH HALF GROUP IXI ISOLATION/ AND A SBGT START IF RPS IS BEING SUPPI IED FROH ITS ALTERNATE SOURCi WITH THE STATIC INVERTER BYPASSED THERE ARE FOUR PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS.
0 e e e o o e e o o e e e e e e e e e e ~ 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 i
FORH 30 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 278 1987 007 0 8710090261 206671 08/29/87
- %*************A'****************A'*********
DOCKET:278 PEACH BOTTOH 3 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 hlSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACXLXTY OPERATOR PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO.
SYtlBOL: PEC COMMENTS STEP 2: ihliODEL 4 CR1 20K22002A8.
MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUIPMENT F AILURE REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented f ulf'lment of a safety function.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%~ ON AUGUST 29r 1987 AT APPROXli4lATELY 0645 HOURSr THE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEtl (HPCI) MAS RENDERED INOPERABLE DUE TO A LOSS OF INSTRUMENT POWER TO THE HPCI PRESSURE TRANSHXTTERS AND FLOW CONTROL CIRCUIT THE LOSS OF POWER WAS THE RESULT OF THE FAXLURE OF RELAY COIL 23A K50r LOCATED IN CONTROL ROOM PANEl 30C048r WHICH tlONXTORS THE AC OUTPUT OF THE HPCX SYSTEl'1 DC INVERTER ~ THE EVENT WAS DETECTED 8Y THE ANNUNCIATlON OF THE "HPCI INVERTER POWER FAILURE" ALARM It< THE HAIN CONTROL ROOM THERE MERE NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS EVENT WHICH WOULD HAVE AFFECT D PLANT SAFETY AT THE TitlE OF THE EVENTr THE HPCI SYSTEH MAS NOT IN USE NOR WAS IT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE BECAUSE THE PRIMARY SYSTEM MAS DEPRESSURIZED. THE CAUSE OF THE RELAY COIL FAILURE MAS ATTRIBUTED TO DETERIORATION DUE TO NORMAL WEAR ~ THE RELAY IIAS REPLACED 'ON SEPTEHBER 18r 1987 ~ THE SYSTEf1 REilAINED OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO OTHER WORK ACTIVITIES BEING PERFORtlED ON THIS SYSTEH. AS AiN ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCEr THIS RELAY COIL MILL BE ADDED TO THE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AhlD REPLACED ON A SIX YEAR INTERVAL.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 FORM 31 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A*************************W*********************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 278 1988 003 2 8905240243 213874 05/20/88
- A*******A*****A*************************************************
DOCKET:278 PEACH BOTTOM 3 REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO.
S YtlBOL: P EC COHMENTS STEPS 3r 4 cFF IX LIGHTLY LOADED ~
WATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 0 ES IG N ERROR OR IhlADEQUAC Y REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS I ER ARE.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCi LERS:
1 278/87-006 2 278/88-001 ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL OOOX ON HAY 20 1988 AND ON MAY 22 1988 A UNIT 3 PRIHARY CONTAINNENT ISOLATION SYSTEM GROUP XII INBOARD ISOLATION AND A HALF REACTOR SCRAll OCCURRED ON THE UNIT 3 STARTUP FEEDS WHICH WAS CAUSED BY THE TRIP OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEH (RPS) ALTERNATE FEED BREAKERS THE RPS ALTERNATE FEED WAS IN SERVICE AT THE TXhlE OF BOTH BECAUSE THE "A" RPS h10TOR GENERATED (M G) SET WAS BLOCKED OUT-OF-SERVICE ~ THERE WAS NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT ~ THE EQUIPhlENT OPERATEO AS DESIGNED ~ THEREFORE IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENTS ANY RADIOACTIVE RELEASE MOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS AN RPS OVERVOLTAGE RELAY WHICH DRIFTED OUT OF CALIBRATION AN INVESTIGATION INDICATED THAT THE RPSr LOAD CENTERS AND EHERGENCY AUXILIARY TRANSFORHERS MERE LIGHTLY LOADEDr THEREBY INCREASING THE RPS SENSITIVITY TO FLUCTUATIONS IN THE 13 KV VOLTAGFS WHICH ALLOWED THE OUT-OF-CALIBRATION RELAY TO TRIP TO PREVENT RECURRENCi OF THIS EVENT MODIFICATIONS WILL BE PERFORMED TO REPLACE THE STATIC INVERTER AND RPS OVERVOLTAGE AND UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS.
0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 -
~ 8 I'
I ~
e o o o o e e o e e e o o e e e ~ e e e 0
FORM 32 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- %************************************mk*************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 278 1990 006 0 90061 90034 21 8 51 3 05/11 /90 DOCKET:278 PEACH BOTTOM 3 TYPE:BWR RcGXON: 1
. NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO S YMBOL: PEG WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR 40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY 942 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specif ication violations.
14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented f ulfillment of a saf ety function.
15 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (vii): Single failure criteria.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 278/84-003 2 278/86-006 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 085K. ON 5/11/90 A BLOWN FUSE FROM THE "3B" BATTERY CHARGER RESULTED IN DECI ARXNG THE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEMr CORE SPRAY (CS) "B" LOGICr RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) "B" LOGICs "B" CS SUBSYSTEMr "B" RHR SUBSYSTEM ANO E2 5 E4 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (FOR UNIT 3 ONLY) iNOPERABLE AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLAREO AS A RESULT OF THE NUMEROUS HIGH ANO LOW PRESSURE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AFFECTED'HE ROOT CAUSES OF THE EVENT INCLUDE INADEQUATE SELF CHECKING BY THE XNVOLVED IRC TECHNICIANS AND LESS THAN ADEQUATE INITIAL WORK PLANNiNG FOR THE CALIBRATION OF THE VOLTMETER ON THE CHARGER ~ THE USE OF A SCHEMATIC INSTEAD OF THE CONNECTlON DIAGRAM CONTRXBUTEO TO THE ERROR. THE FUSE WAS REPLACED AND THE CHARGER RESTORED TO SERVICE ~ THE TECHNICIANS WERE COUNSELLED THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ISC TECHNICXANS ANO IEC/ELECTRICAL PLANNERS HAS BEEN REVISED TO EMPHASIZE USE OF CONNECTION DIAGRAMS ANO SELF CHECKING ~ THE MASTER CALIBRATION SHEET FOR THE VOLTMETER HAS BEEN REVISED TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE CONNECTION DIAGRAM. THERE WERE NO ACTUAL ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THIS EVENT. NO PREVIOUS SIMILAR LERS WERE IDENTIFIED.
0 e e e e e e o e e e o e o o e e e e o e 0 a ~ ~
4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 ~ 0
FORN 33 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A*********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 282 1980 021 1 80101S0482 160105 07/18/80 DOCKET: 282 PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FLPR FACXLITY OPERATOR: NORTHERN STATES POWER CO SYMBOL: NSP ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% CAUSE DESIGN CHANGE DISCREPANCIES ~ THE REPLACNENT OF NO ~ 13 INVERTER WAS UNDERTAKEN~ DURING THE COURSE OF THE WORKS DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND IN THE WORK AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE A SPECIAL QA AUDIT MAS DONE ON THE DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE MHICH REVEALEO THE LACK OF SEISNIC ANALYSIS FOR HOUNTXNG THE INVERTER/ A STOP MORK ORDER MAS ISSUED+ PLANT STARTUP WAS DONE WITH INSTRUMENT BUS 113 POWEREO BY PANEL 117 AS ALLOMED BY T ~ ST THE CAUSE IS PERSONNEL ERRORS XNPROV EHENTS IN THE DESIGN CHANGE PROCESS ARE BEING PURSUED ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i a 0 ~ 0 0 0 0
FORI'1 34 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 285 1987 011 0 8706030405 204751 04/28/87
- 4*%******+***********
DOCKET:285 FT CALHOUN 1
~
REGION: 4 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GIBB FACILiTY OPERATOR: OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT SYMBOL: OPP COMMENTS STEP 1: EFF KX INADVERTENT AUTO-TRANSFLR.
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUiPMENT F AILURE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF ectuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 285/87-015 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%. DURING A REFUELING SHUTDOWNr AN UNANTICIPATED ACTUATION OF THE VENTILATION iSOLATION ACTUATIOtt SYSTEM (VIAS)
OCCURRED AT 1111 HOURS (CDT) ON APRIl 28r 1987r AT FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR POWER STATION. DURING THE PROCESS OF ENERGIZING THE CLUTCHES TO COUPLE THE CONTROL RODSr THE CLUTCH POWER SUPPLY MAS TRANSFERRED DURING THE CLUTCH POWER SUPPLY TRANSFERr AN INVERTER AUTO TRANSFERREO FROM ITS OC SUPPLY TO ITS 480 VAC BYPASS TRANSFORMER DURING THXS INADVERTENT AUTO TRANSFERr ONE OF THF ELECTRONIC BLOCKS FOR THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOM SIGNAL (PPLS) OEENERGIZEOr UNBLOCKING PPLS AND INITIATING SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL (SIAS) AND VENTilATION ISOLATION ACTUATiON SIGNAL (VIAS). ONLY VIAS ACTUATEDr SIAS WAS CUTOFF OUE TO THE REFUELING MODE OF THE PLANT ~ ALL PLANT SYSTEf1S INVOLVED XN THIS INCIDENT OPERATED MXTHXN THEIR DESIGN BASIS METH NO EQUIPMENT DAMAGE OR FAILURES IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT HAD THIS EVENT OCCURRED DURING POWER OPERATIONr NO ESF ACTUATION,WOULD HAVE RESULTEO PPLS MAS IMMEDIATELY REBLOCKEO ANO THEN SiAS AND VIAS ENGXNEERED SAFEGUAROS MERE RESET. THE CONTAINMENT PURG- THAT WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME OF THE VIAS MAS RESTARTED NO VIOLATION OF TECHNiCAL SPECIFICATIONS OR OPERATOR ERRORS OCCURRED ~ BASED UPON THIS AND A SUBSEQUENT (SIMILARr ALTHOUGH NOT IDENTICAL) EVENTr TESTiNG HAS BEEN DONE ON THE INVERTERS TO ATTEt1PT TO ISOLATE THE CONDITIONS WHICH RESULTEO XN THIS AND THE SUBSEQUENT EVENT.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y
4*
I 0 e e ~ o e e ~ e e o e e e o e e o o o ~
FORH 35 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 285 1987 012 0 8705210294 204473 04/13/87
- A**************************************************************
DOCKET 285 FT. CALHOUN 1 REGION: 4 ARCHXTFCTURAL ENGINEER. GIBB FACILITY OPERATOR: OMAHA PUBLiC POMER DISTRICT SYMBOL: OPP MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THXS LER ARE:
60 SPURIOUS/ UNK N OWN CAUSE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARF:
~ 13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%. WHILE IN THE REFUELING SHUTDOWN CONDITXON AT 1825 HOURS (C DT) ON APRIL 1 3r 1 987r AN UNPLANNED LOSS OF POW'ER OCCURRED TO 120 VAC INSTRUt1ENT BUS "A" RESULTING IN THE PARTIAL ACTUATION O. THE ENGINEiRED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. THE LOSS OF POWER TO INSTRUHENT BUS "A" OCCURRED AT THE SAME TiitE TECHNICIANS WERE PULLING FUSES TO AN INSTRUMENT BEING POWERED FROH INSTRUMENT BUS "A". AN APPARENT CURRENT OR VOLTAGE TRANSIENT OF UNKNOWN MAGNITUDE AND ORIGIN RESULTEOr CAUSXNG INVERTER "A"r WHICH WAS POWERING INSTRUMENT BUS "A" AT THE TIHEr TO SWAP TO ITS ALTERNATE SOURCES THE ALTERNATE SOURCE WAS NOT IN AN ENERGENCY STANDBY CONDITION AT THE TINE DUE TO ON-GOING HODIFICATION WORK. THE RESULT WAS A LOSS OF OUTPUT POWER FROH INVERTER "A" THE LOSS OF POWER TO INSTRUHENT BUS "A" CAUSED THE UNBLOCK OF ENGXNEEREO SAFEGUARDS CHANNEL A PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOW SIGNAL (PPLS) AND THE RESULTANT PARTIAL ACTUATION OF THE ENGXNiERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. OPPD ATTEMPTED TO REPRODUCE THE TRANSIENT BY PERFORMING THE TEST SEQUENCE AGAiN AND REPULLING THE FUSESr BUT MAS UNSUCCESSFUL SINCE THE TRANSiiNT COULD NOT BE RECRiATEDr SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE WOULD BE INAPPROPRXATE ~
HOWiVERr MODIFICATIONS TO THE FOUR SAFETY RELATED INVERTERS ANO THEIR BYPASS TRANSFORl'lERS WERE CONPLETED ON APRIL 27r 1987r AND SHOULD PREVENT FUTURE LOSSES OF POWER OF THIS NATURE
M All 8 I t ~ Itl"
~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 1 1 0 0 0 0 5
FORH 36 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A ********************** % **********************************
m DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUt<BER NSIC EVENT DATE 285 1988 038 1 8904260021 213625 1 2/31/88 DOCKET:285 FT CALHOUN 1 TYPE:PWR R EGiON: NSSS-CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GIBB FACILITY OPERATOR: OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT S YN BOL: OP P WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARi:
35 HUHAN ERROR 941 REPORT ASSOCiATED WITH 10 CFR 50.?2 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERiNCE LERS:
1 2 85/ 8? -011 2 2 85/ 87-01 2 3 285/87-015 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON 12/31/88 AT 2156 HOURS CST WHILE IN NODE 5g A TECHNICIAN WHO MAS MORKING ON A NODXFICATION TO PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUtliNTATION BEHIND CONTROL ROOtl PANELS CB-1/2/3 CAUSED A SHORT CIRCUIT WHILE INSTALLING A JUtlPER. THIS CAUSED A LOSS OF INVERTER D
~
AND SUBSEQUENTLY A NOHENTARY LOSS OF POWER TO INSTRUMENT BUS AI-40D WHICH IN TURN CAUSED A LOSS OF "B" CHANNEL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOW SIGNAL (PPLS) BLOCK. LOSS OF "B" CHANNEL PPLS BLOCK CAUSED "B" CHANNEL PPLS TO ACTUATE MHICH INITIATED A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL (SIAS)r A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (CIAS) z AND A VENTILATION ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAl (VIAS) . ALL SYSTEtlS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED ANO MERE RETURNED TO NORMAL AFTER THE CAUSE OF THEXR ACTUATXON MAS DETERMINED. AT NO TItlE DURING THIS INCIDENT MAS THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF PLANT PERSONNiL OR THE PUBLIC XN JEOPARDY.
0 e e e e e o o e o o o o e e e e e e e e 0' 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 37 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 286 1 987 010 1 8805190143 209301 09/03/87
- 0'*************************%************%**************************
DOCKET:286 INDIAN POINT 3 TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS: ME A RCHI TEC T UR AL ENGINE ER: UEC X FACILITY OPiRATOR: POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NY SYHBOL: PN Y COHHENTS STEP 3: CQHP XS HAINTENANCi BYPASS SMITCH.
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUHAN ERROR REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE-DOOZY'T 13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 2336 HRS ON 9/3/87r WITH THE REACTOR SUBCRITXCALr THE CONTROL ROOH REACTOR OPERATOR WAS IN THE PROCESS OF HANUALLY INSERTING CONTROL RODS IN ORDER TO SHUT DOWN FOR TURBINE HAINTENANCE DURING THE COURSE OF THIS SHUTDOWN A REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION (SI) ACTUATION OCCURRED AUTOh1ATICALLY AND ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED PROPERLY. NO MATER MAS INJECTED INTO THE REACTOR BECAUSE THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEt1 (RCS) MAS AT NORHAL OPERATING PRESSURE ~ INVESTIGATION REVEALED THATr WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING NO 32 STATIC INVERTERi A LICENSED OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY INTERRUPTEO THE POWER SUPPLY TO XNSTRUHENT BUS 32 (PROTECTION CHANNEL I) g CAUSING ITS VOLTAGE TO DROP TO ZERO THE LOSS OF POWER TO INSTRUHENT BUS 32 (PROTECTION CHANNEL I) CAUSED ASSOCiATED RiACTOR PROTECTION RELAYS TO DE-ENERGIZE AND INITIATED A REACTOR TRIP VIA THE NUCLEAR INSTRUHENTATION SYSTEH (NIS) INTERHEDIATE RANGE 35 HIGH FLUX SIGNAL DUE TO THE DE-ENERGIZATION OF PROTECTION CHANNEL I~ ALL SI RELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH PROTECTION CHANNEL I STEAH FLOM TRANSHITTERS AND LOM TAVERAGE FOR RCS LOOP 1 ALSO DE-ENERGIZcD. THE REHAXNING PORTION OF THE SX LOGIC MAS HADE UP MHEN THE ACTUAL RCS LOOP 2 TAVERAGE DECREASED BELOW THE LOM SiT POINT (542F) FOR SI ACTUATION. XN ORDER TO PRFCLUDE RECURRENCE' DISCUSSION OF THIS EVENT HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALXFICATION PRORAH
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 '
FORM 38 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4'*******************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION QCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 293 1981 050 0 8110130344 1 691 55 08/12/81
- A*****************************
DOCKET:293 PILGRXN 1 TYPE : BMR REGION: 1 NSSS GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: BOSTON EDISON CO SYMBOL: BEC ABSTRACT ON 9/12/81 A GROUND FAULT INDICATION ON THE 125 VOC SYSTEH MAS RECEIVED ELIMINATION OF THIS FAULT CU1NiNATED iN THE TRIPPING OF BREAKFR D4-3 TRIPPING BREAKER 04-3 RESULTEO IN AN iNAOVERTENT REDUCTION BELOM THE HINXNUN NUMBER OF PCIS INSTRUNENT CHANNELS iNEEDED FOR SONE RCIC VALVE ISOLATIOiNS. THiS CONOITXON MAS CORRECTEO ON 9/16/81 BY RESTORiNG THE D4-3 BREAKER ~ THE CAUSE OF THE GROUND FAULT MAS DETERMINED TO BE A SHORT CIRCUXT IN A TOPAZ DC TO AC iNVERTER WHICH MAS REPAiRED THE CAUSE OF THE PCIS CHANNEL REDUCTION WAS PROCEOURAl TO CORRECT THIS INADEQUACY A REVISiON TO THE INSPECTION/TROUBLE SHOOTING ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS PROCEDURE HAS BEEN INITIATED THIS MILL BE COHPLETEO BY OCTOBER 1i 1981 ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ P 4$ ~
P e e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 39 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- i'c**
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSZC EVENT DATE 293 1985 029 0 8511220008 196999 10/18/85 DOCKET:293 PILGRIH 1 TYPE:BMR REGION: NSSS:GE ARCHZTECTURAl ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: BOSTON EDISON CO SYl4BOL: BEC CONNENTS PREVIOUS SZHZLAR EVENT DESCRIBED IN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE REPORT 73-2-1 r STEP 2: HOOiL 5352 MODIFIED PER GE SERVICE ZNFORNATION LETTER NO 418 REV 1i STEP 6: MODEL 20 AMP ~
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v): Event that could have pr evented f ulfillment o f a sa f ety f unction-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ON 10/18/85r AT APPROXIMATELY 1545 HOURS'HE HPCI ZNVERTER CIRCUIT FAILURE ALARM AND AN ATWS TROUBLi ALARM MERE RECEIVED IN THE CONTROL ROON. AN INHEDZATE ZNVESTIGATXON REVEALED THAT THE HPCZ INVERTER ANO BREAKER THAT FEEDS THE ATWS INVERTER ("8" AND "0" CHANNELS) HAD TRIPPED ~ ZNllEDZATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TO RESET THE HPCI ZNVERTER ANO ATMS BREAKERS ALSOr A NAINTENANCE REQUEST WAS INITIATED TO ZNVESTXGATE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT ~ THE HPCI INViRTER AND ATWS BREAKER WERE INOPERABLE FOR APPROXIMATELY 60 SECONDS THi HOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE HPCI ZNVERTER ANO BREAKER TRIPPING WAS ATTRIBUTED TO A POSSIBLE FLUCTUATION OF THE INPUT DC VOLTAGE ~ BOTH THE INVERTER AND BREAKER ARE FED FRON A COHi4tON BUS FURTHER EVALUATION IS BEING CONDUCTEO TO CONFIRH THE CAUSE OF THIS EVENT AN UPDATE REPORT WILL BE SUBNITTED ZF THE CAUSE IS OXFFERENT FROM WHAT IS STATED ABOVE REDUNDANT SYSTEMS THAT WERE OPERABLE INCLUDED LPCXr CORE SPRAYS AOSr AND RCZC ~
I I'
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ i 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
FORH 40 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 293 1991 006 0 9104290246 221905 03/26/91
- A*******************9r****************************dr****
DOCKET:293 PILGRIM 1 TYPE :BMR REGION: 1 NSSS :GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: BOSTON EDISON CO ~
SYMBOL: BEC COMMENTS 0 STEP 12: MODEL NO. 125-GW-125(60)
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LiR ARE:
20 EQUIPMENT FAILURE 941 REPORT ASSOCIATED MXTH 10 CFR 50-72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 293/85-029 2 293/91-005 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 030% ON MARCH 26/ 1 991 WHEN STARTING THE B REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUHPr THE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) ANO REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCXC) SYSTEM INVERTERS TRiPPED ON HIGH VOLTAGE. THE HPCI ANO RCIC SYSTEMS WERE INOPERABLE FOR NINEHINUTES THE CAUSE OF THE INVERTER TRIPS WAS A VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION THAT OCCURRED DURING PUNP START THE LOAD REQUIRED BY THE PUHP START CAUSED THE BATTERY CHARGER THAT SUPPLIES DC VOLTAGE TO THE INVERTERS TO OVERCOHPENSATE RESULTING XN A VOLTAGE SURGE THE TRIP SETPOINT OF THE INVcRTERS WAS EXCEEDED DURING THIS SURGE CORRECTIVE ACTXON MAS TAKEN TO RESET THE INVERTERS. AN ENGiNEERING EVALUATION HAS BEEN INITIATED TO INVESTIGATE ENHANCEMENTS TO PRECLUDE THE INVERTERS FROH TRIPPING AS A RESULT OF LARGE PUMP STARTS. INTERIM MEASURES MILL INCLUDE AN ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE TO CAUTION OPiRATXONS PERSONNEL THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR INVERTER TRIPS EXISTS. THE INVERTiRS MERE NANUFACTURED BY TOPAZ ELECTRONICS'ODEL NO ~ 125-GW-125 (60)- THE EVENT OCCURRED AT POWER OPERATION WITH -THE REACTOR NODE SELECTOR SMITCH IN THE RUN POSITION ~ THE REACTOR VESSEL (RV) PRESSUR MAS APPROXIMATELY 956 PSXG AND THE RV WATER TEMPERATURE WAS 542 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT. THE REACTOR POMER LEVEL MAS 30 PERCENT ~ THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.73(A) (2) (V) (0) AND THE EV" NT POSED NO THREAT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH ANO SAFETY.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0
FORM 41 LEQ SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A***********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 295 1982 035 0 8211120352 178946 10/08/82
- +*********************************************************
DOCKET:295 ZION 1 REGiON: 3 ARCHITiCTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
S YMBOL: CWi COMMENTS STEP 1: COMP i~1SC - COMPARATOR.
ABSTRACT DURING INSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCi PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION COMPARATOR 1PC-4560 WAS FOUND FAILEO IN THE RiSET MODi THIS IS NON-CONSERVATIVE FOR PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION THE REDUNDANT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CHANNEL WHICH FEEDS LOW PRESSURE SX WERE OPERABLE THIS DEVIATION WAS CAUSED BY FAILURE OF AN INVERTER AMPLIFIER TRANSISTOR (SPRAGUE/(W) ASM-3915) IN THE COMPARATOR (HAGAN w118) ~ THE ENTXRi COMPARATOR WAS RiPLACED WITH A SPAREi AND THE CHANNEL WAS RETURNED TO SERVXCE. THE FAILEO COMPARATOR WAS REPAIRED ANO PUT BACK XN STOCK
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0
~ ~
N fl' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 42 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +***************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER 'NSIC EVENT DATE 295 1989 017 0 8911080058 215788 10/04/89
- A**%****%*************************%**********
DOCKET:295 ZION 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS: Mi ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR CONHONWEALTH EDISON CO SYHBOL: CME MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
60 SPURIOUS/ UNKNOWN CAUSE REPORTABZLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POllER LiVEL - 000X. UNIT 1 WAS OEFUELED. SAFEGUAROS WAS DEENERGZZED ~
AT APPROXIMATELY 1 330 ON 1 0/4/89r NUNEROUS ALARHS ASSOCIATEO WITH STEAI'1 GiNERATOR (S/G) LEVEL AND FLOW INDICATION MERE RECEIVED SZHULTANEOUSLYr THE UNIT 1 PROCESS COMPUTER WENT DO'MNr AND AT APPROXIHATELY THE SANE TINE THE FOLLOMING ZNSTRUNENTS MERE OBSERVED AS BEING 'FAILED ON-SCALE'FAILEO ON-SCALE MEANS THEY SHOULD HAVE INDICATED ZcROr BUT WERE INSTEAD READING AN INTERNEDIATE POSITION) 1LI 537r 1LI 529r 1LI 549r 1LI 519r 1l I 5028r 1LZ 548r 1FI 540r 1FI-520. ABOUT THREE MINUTES LATER IT MAS NOTED THAT 1FCV-PR24A HAD CLOSED 1FCV-PR24A IS ONE OF TMO SERIES CONTAZNNENT ISOLATION VALVES THAT ARE ALSO SUCTION VALVES FOR THE CONTAINNENT SYSTEM PARTICULATE IODINE NOBLE GAS (SPING) MONITOR THE SPING CLOSES THE CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVES UPON DETECTING A. HIGH RADIATION CONDITION. NO SPECIFIC CAUSE FOR THE CLOSURE OF 1FCV-PR24A COULD BE FOUND THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE IS NINZNAL BECAUSE THE UNIT WAS DEFUELEDr AND CONTAZNNENT PURGE WAS NOT IN PROGRcSS
0 FORM 43 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISiON DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 295 1991 005 0 9105290170 222111 04/21/91
- %*****************************ic************************************
DOCKET:295 ZION 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COi~lNONWEALTH EDISON CO 9 SYHBOL: CME MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER APE:
20 EQUXPHENT FAILURE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented fulfillment of a saf ety function.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON 4/21/91r AT 0805 HOURSr DURING COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION WITH NO TESTING IN PROGRESSr INSTRUMENT BUS 111 WAS NOtlENTARILY LOSS DUE TO THE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT INVERTER 111'S OUTPUT POWER CAUSiNG REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLES TO TRIP AND THE RESIDUAL HEAT RENOVAL (RHR) LOOP SUCTION VALVEr 1 tlOV RH8702r TO START CLOS ING THE INVERTER RECOVERED 0 22 SECONDS AFTER THE START OF THE EVENTr RE-ENERGIZED THE AC INSTRUMENT BUS AND RESUMED OPERATION WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INCIDENT THE REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLES RESET INtlEDIATELY AFTER THE AC INSTRUMENT BUS MAS RE-ENERGiZED. THE NSO SECURED THE 1A RHR PUMP BEFORE THE RHR LOOP SUCTiON VALVEr 1t<OV-RH8702r MAS COMPLETELY CLOSED ~ THE NSO RE-OPENED 1NOV-RH8702 AFTER IT WENT CLOSED AND THE EVENT WAS CONCLUDED WHEN THE 1A RHR PUMP MAS RESTARTED AT 0809 HOURSr APPROXIHATELY 4 NXNUTES AFTER THE INVERTER FAILURE ~ THE LOSS OF RHR MAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE NONENTARY LOSS OF THC INSTRUtlENT INVERTER OUTPUT POMER WHICH RESULTED IN THE RCS PRESSURE TRANSNITTER GENE RATING A HOi~lEN TA R Y Si GNA L IN EXCESS OF 600 PS IG WHICH CLOSED RHR LOOP SUCTION VALVEr 1NOV RH8702 ~ THIS SIGNAL PROViDES PROTECT10N TO PREVENT OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE RHR SYSTEN WHEN IT IS IN SERVICE.
THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THiS EVENT WAS NININAL. XT IS BELIEVED THE LOSS OF POWER WAS DUE TO A FAULT OF THE INVERTER
0 o o e o e e e e e e o e e o o e e o e e t
~o o ~ e o e e o o o e o e e o e e o o e 0
FORM 44 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4 *
- k A**************************
A DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REViSION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 301 1986 003 0 8607090083 199907 06/03/86
- A*********************************************************
DOCKET: 301 POINT BEACH 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR- WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POMER CO SYHBOL: MEP COHHENTS WATCH 975 TRANSIENTS INITIATED IN TWO UNXTS AS THE RESULT OF A SINGI-E FAILURE. STEPS 25-37: COMPLETE DESCRIPTXON OF UNIT 1 EVENT (WHICH XNCLUDEO A SCRAM) IS DESCRIBED IN LER 266/86-003.
MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT RiPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 266/86-003 2 301/85-003 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100%~ ON JUNE 3i 1986~ UNXT 2 AT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCED A 6 TO 8% TURBINE RUNBACK DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWiR ON THE WHITE INSTRUYiENT BUS. THE POWER LOSS MAS DUE TO THE TRIP OF THE WHITE INVERTER (2DY03) OUTPUT BREAKER FEEDING THE WHITi INSTRUMENT BUS THE BREAKER TRIP WAS CAUSED WHEN THE SWING XNVERTER (DYOC) MAS INCORRECTLY RESTORED TO OPERATION ON THE DC BUS FEEDING THE WHITE INVERTERS TO BOTH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 (1DY03 ANO 2DY03 RESPECTIVELY).
THE WHITE XNSTRUHENT BUS SUPPLXES POWER TO A CHANNEL OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION~ WHEN THE POWER MAS INTERRUPTED'HIS INSTRUMENTATION GENERATED A LOAD REFERENCE AND A LOAD LXNIT TURBINE RUNBACK FROlh ITS DROPPED ROD DETCCTXON CIRCUITRY. THE MHXTE BUS ALSO SUPPLIES POWER TO A FIRST-STAGE PRESSURE INSTRUNENT CHANNFL THAT ENABLES THE LOAD LIMIT RUNBACK'HEREFORE> WHEN POWER WAS XNTERRUPTEDr THF LOAD LIHXT RUNBACK MAS DiFEATED. DUE TO AN APPARENT MISMATCH BETWEcN LOAD REFERENCE ANO ACTUAL FIRST STAGE PRESSUREr THE TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEH SHIFTED TO NANUAL AND STOPPED THE RUNBACK AT 6 TO 8% RATHER THAN THE EXPECTED 20% ~ THE UNIT STABILIZED AT APPROXXNATELY 94% POWER THE MHITi INVERTER FOR UNIT 2 MAS RESTORED TO SERVICE AND THE UNIT WAS RETURNED TO 100% POWER. THE DC BUS TRANSIFNT ALSO CAUSED THE OUTPUT BREAKER OF THE UNIT 1 WHITE INVERT ER (LDY03) TO TRXPz RESULTING IiV A RUNBACK AND RCACTOR TRIP ON UNIT 1 (SEE LcR 86 003 00r UNIT 1) ~
0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f
lh t
0 0 e ~ t ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 a e e 0 0
FORN 45 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A**************A*********A***************A*******A'*****+**
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 301 1988 001 0 8805240310 211 631 04/07/88 DOCKET:301. POXNT BEACH 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: MISCONSIN ELiCTRIC POWER CO.
S YNBOL: WiP CONNENTS STEP 4: PART NO HEK"3DT1 STEP 6: EFF IX VOLTAGE OSCII LATIONS.
HATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
33 CONSTRUCTION ERROR OR INADEQUACY 35 HUNAN ERROR 40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LCR ARC.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-REFERENCE I ERS:
1266/85-006 2 266/86-005 3 266/87-004 ABSTRACT POWER LcVEL 100% AT 0904 HOURS ON 4/7/88 A RCACTOR TRIP OCCURRED FRON 100% POMER THE TRIP MAS CAUSED BY A LOW PRESSURXZER PRCSSURE SIGNAL. SAFETY INJCCTION ALSO INITIATED DUE TO A LOM PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SIGNAL. THESE AND OTHER ANONALIES WERE CAUSED BY RED INSTRUNENT BUS VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS RESULTING FRON THE PRINARY ANO ALTiRNATE INVERTcRS FEEDING THE RED XNSTRUNENT BUS WITH THE INVERTERS CONNECTE 0 IN PARA LI EL THE INVERT ER PARA LI. EL OP ERAT ION OCCURRED OUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE NECHANXCAL INTERLOCKr WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE SINULTANEOUS CONNECTION OF THE INVERTERS TO THE I OAD.
DURING THE RECOVERYi WITH PRINARY PRESSURE NEAR THE SAFETY INJECTION SET POINT AND SAFETY INJECTION RESETr SAFCTY INJECTION OCCURRED A SECOND TINE OUE TO COOLING OF THE PRINARY COOLANT SYSTEII WHEN STEAN MAS R STOPED TO THE TURBiNE HALL. ALI SYSTENS OPERATED AS EXPECTED DURING THE TRANSIENT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE OF THE TMO SOURCi RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUNENTATION CHANNELS ~ THIS CHANNEL FAILED TO ENERGIZE AFTER THE TRIP ~ THIS CHANNEL RENAINS OUT OF SERVICE AND blAS PLACED XN THE TRIP BLOCKED CONDITION AS ALLOWEO BY POINT BEACH TECH SPECS ~
INNEDXATE CORRECTIVE ACTION INCLUDED THE POSTING OF AN OPERATOR AIO AT THE LOCATION OF THE INSTRUNENT BUS BREAKER CABINETS'HICH PROVIDES INSTRUCTXONS TO REDUCE THE PROBABXLITY OF THIS TYPE OF OCCURRENCE XN THE FUTURE
0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 46 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4***********************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REViSION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 301 1989 001 0 8903130398 213202 02/03/89
- k*******************************************************
DOCKET: 301 POINT BEACH 2 REGXON: 3 ARCHITECTURAL iNGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO S Yth BOL: MEP COMMENTS STEP 4: MODEL NO FA STEP 5: tlODEL NO ~ NEB 1P/2W. STEP 6. COHP X TURBINi RUNBACK'ATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE.
941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50.72 20 EQUIPHENT FAILURE REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 266/86-006 2 301/88-001 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100%. ON 2/2/89 THE NORHAL POMER SUPPLY (INVERTER 2-DY03) FOR INSTRUMENT BUS 2-Y03 MAS TAGGED OUT OF SERVXCF TO CORRECT A HINOR AUXXLIARY SMITCH INDICATION PROBLEN THE NEXT DAYi WHEN REPAIRS WERE COHPLETE r OPERATIONS PE RSOt'tNCL BEGAN RESTORING THE NORMAL LINEUP FOR INSTRUMENT BUS 2-Y03- UNIT 2 MAS AT 100% POWER AT 1852 HOURSr AN OPERATOR REPOSITIONED BOTH SUPPLY BREAKERS FOR 2 Y03 INSTRUHENT BUS AN ALARM ANNUNCIATED FROM THE HAIN CONTROL BOARDS AND A SIHULTANEOUS AUTOMATIC TURBINE RUNBACK CONHENCED. HEARING THE ALARNs THE OPERATOR XNSPECTEO THE PANEL AND DXSCOVERED BOTH SUPPLY BREAKERS IN AN "OPEN" POSITION ~ XNNEOIATELY THE NORMAL SUPPLY BRcAKiR MAS CLOSED'ND POWER WAS RESTORED TO THE BUS ~ THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TOOK t ESS THAN 2 7 SECONDS OPERATORS STABILIZED THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SYSTEhlS THE NRC HEADQUARTERS WAS NOTIFIED VIA THE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTENr AND THE UNIT I'tAS RESTORED TO 100% POWER 29 MINUTES LATER.
0 e a e o o e o e 0 o o e o e e a 0 o 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORt~i 47 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A ***********************+ *********************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVEtlT DATE 302 1 981 021 0 8105190376 1 66228 04/11/81 DOCKET:302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POMER CORPORATION SYMBOL: FPC ABSTRACT DURING NORMAL OPERATION VITAL BUS VBOP-6 MAS LOST DUE TO FAILURE OF INVERTER D. AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT A REACTOR/TURBINE TRIP OCCURRED ~ THE VITAL BUS WAS PLACED ON REDUNDANT TRANSFORMER ANO MAINTENANCE WAS INITIATED THIS WAS THE SECOND OCCURRENCE FOR 0 INVERTER. THE CAUSE IS A SHORTEO DIODE ANO A BLOWN FUSE WHICH HAY HAVE RESULTED FROM OVERHEATING IN THE INVERTER CABINET. THE OVERHEATING WAS CAUSED BY INADEQUATE VENTILATION OUE TO IHPROPER COMPLETION OF A tROOIFICATION~ THE DIODE ANO THE FUSE MERE REPLACED ANO THE MODIFICATION WAS PROPERLY COMPLETED THE tlODIFICATION PROCEDURE HAS BFEN REVISED AND SHOULD PREVENT RECURRENCE
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 h
0 i 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORN 48 LiR SCSS DATA 09-23"91 DOCKET YEAR LER tlUNBER REVISION OCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 302 1 981 046 0 81082001 74 1 68308 07/14/81
- k*4*********************************************************
DOCKET: 302 CRYSTAL RXV ER 3 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SYt1BOL: FPC ABSTRACT 120 A C~ VITAL BUS 43A WAS DE ENERGIZED WHEN POWER MAS XNTERRUPTEO AT THE "A" INVERTER THIS CREATED AN EVENT CONTRARY TO TECH SPEC AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENTr A REACTOR/TURBINE TRIP OCCURRED>> POWER MAS RESTORED TO THE VITAL BUS WITHIN TEN MINUTES THE CAUSE OF THIS EVENT IS ATTRiBUTED TO INADVERTENT SHORTING OF THE "A" STATION BATTERY DURING MAINTENANCE RESULTING XN FAILURE OF THE "A" INVERTER WHICH WAS SUPPLYING POWER TO THE VITAL BUS ~ THE XNVERTER WAS REPAIRED ~
tlAINTENANCE IN THE BATTERY ROON WILL UTILIZE TOOLS WITH INSULATED HANDLESr AND OF A LENGTH DiSIGNED TO PREVENT SHORTING AND CAUTION SIGNS MiLL BE POSTED AT THE ENTRANCE ~
0 o e o e e e e e e e o e e e o e e e e e 0
~a ~
0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
FORM 49 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91.
- ie********************************************x****************
DOCKET YiAR lER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 302 1983 014 0 8304260259 183043 03/10/83
- it**4***4************************************************
DOCKET:302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 TYPE=PMR REGION: 2 NSSS: BW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT FACilITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWLR CORPORATION SYMBOL: FPC COMMENTS TWENTY SEVENTH REPORT TMO OCCURRENCiS WITHIN 7 DAYS ABSTRACT AT 1432 DURING NORMAL OPERATIONr POWER MAS LOST TO THE METEROLOGICAl MONiTORING SYSTEtl (TECH SPEC 3.3.3.4). POWER WAS RESTORED MITHIN ONE (1 ) MINUTE ~ ON MARCH 17r 1 983 AT 1 836r POME R MAS LOST AGAIN FOR 10 MINUTEST THE SECONDARY POWER SOURCE WAS SUPPLYXNG THE NECESSARY POWER FOR THE SYSTEMr THEREFORE NO ALTERNATIVC POMiR SUPPLY WAS AVAILABLE THIS MAS THE FOURTH TIME THIS SYSTEtl EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF POWER AND THE TWENTY-SEVENTH REPORT UNDER TECH SPEC 3'3.3.4. THIS EVENT MAS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF A SYNCH CARO IN THE PRIMARY INVERTiR POWER SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL AT CRYSTAL RIViR UNITS 1 AND 2 TRANSFERRING THE SECONDARY POWER SOURCE DURING AN ELECTRICAL CHANGE IN THi CRUSHER HOUSE PROCEDURES MILL BE REVISEO TO INCLUDE REQUIREMENTS FOR METEOROLOGICAL SYSTEtl POWER SOURCE VERIFXCATION~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 em I
0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
FORM 50 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- ***********+********************
YEAR LER NUI'lBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE A'OCKET 302 1987 021 0 8800000000 209907 10/14/87
- A***************************************Br***
DOCKET:302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 TYPE-PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:BM ARCHITECTURAL iNGXNEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SYHSOL: FPC COHHENTS WATCH LIST 946 SiCURITY SAFEGUARDS EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF PLANT SECURITY SYSTEN DETAILS OF SECURITY EVENT DISCUSSED IN SECURITY LER 01-S87-000 ~
WATCH 975 SUSTAINED LOSS OF 2 VITAL INSTRUMENT BUSSES PLUS LOSS OF EVENTS RECORDER SYSTEMs CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATORY PLANT SECURITY SYSTENi AND EHERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEH DETAILS OF LOSS OF POWER TO ANNUNCIATOR BOARD AND EVENT RECORDER NOT GIVEN>> STEPS 19r23 HOOEL 12HEA61C234X2~ STEP 22: CAUSE LX REPEATED RESET OF LOCKOUT FEATURE STEP 8: CAUSE AX TESTING.
MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
946 PHYSICAL SECURITY/SAFEGUARDS 975 POSSIBLE SiGNIFXCANT >>"VENT 94 2 UNUSUAL EVENT 35 HUMAN ERROR REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS I ER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): iSF actuations ABSTRACT PO'MER LEVEL 000% ON OCTOBER 14r 1987r CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT THREE EXPERIiNCEO A SUSTAINED LOSS OF ELECTRICAl POllER TO VITAL BUSES 'A'ND C THE PLANT 'WAS IN THE REF UE LING NODE ( t<OD E 6) AND THE iNGINEEREO SAFEGUARDS (ES) ELECTRICAL BUSES WiRE ALIGNED AS SHOWN IN FIGURES I ANO Ii ~ THE EVENT MAS INITIATEO WHEN THE 4160V iS BUS 3A MAS IMPROPERLY DE-ENERGIZED IN PREPARATiON FOR HAINTENANCE ANO MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES~ BECAUSi OF A PROTECTIVE INTERLOCK BETWEEN THE 4160V BUS AND THE 480V CROSS TIE BR AKERr POWER WAS AI SO LOST TO THE 480V ES BUS 3A ANO THE ASSOCIATED ViTAL BUSiS. LOSS OF THi VITAL BUSES ACTUATED THE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS WHICH COMPLICATED THE RESTORATION OF POWER BY ACTUATING ADDITIONAL PROTECTIVE INTERLOCKS MITHIN THE ES ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEll. RESTORATION WAS ALSO IHPACTEO WHEN A PROTECTIVE RELAY COIL BURNED OUT ~ POWER MAS RESTORED BY RE-ESTABLISHING THE 480V ES BUS 3A CROSS- Tii WITH THE 480V ES BUS 3B THE EVENT WAS CAUSED BY PERSONNEL NOT OE-ENERGIZING THE 416PV ES BUS 3A iN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE. THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED HAVE BEEN COUNSELEO ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING WRITTEN PROCiDURES THE BURNED OUT RELAY COIL WAS REPLACED
0 o e o e e e e e o e e e e e e e e o e e 4~ ~ I 1
0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
FORM 51 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- k********k*******************+********x***********************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISiON OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 302 1987 025 0 8712240085 207506 10/16/87 DOCKET:302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:BW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SYHBOL: FPC COMMENTS
' STEP 7: CAUSE AX TO PERi~lIT TESTING OF BATTERIES STEP 20: COMP XR EVENTS RECORDER e
31 ACCiDENTAL ACTION 943 ALERT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERcNCc LcRS 1 302/87-021 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%~ ON OCTOBER 1 6r 1 987~ CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 WAS SHUT DOWN XN A REFUELING OUTAGE AT 2119~ PERSONNEL WORKING IN THE VICINITY OF THE UNIT STARTUP TRANSFORMER RAISED A METAL POI E AND HADE ELECTRiCAL CONTACT MITH A 230 KV FEEDER INTERRUPTING THE PLANT OFFSITE POWER SUPPLY. THF FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RESULTED: THE ENGINEEREO SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM ACTUATED'HE B DIEScL GENERATOR STARTED ANO LOADEDr NORHAL POWER WAS LOST TO THE SECURITY SYSTEMS'ND THE REACTOR BUILDING PURGE ISOLATED. ADDITIONALLY'OWER TO THE FOLLOWING WAS LOST ONE NEUTRON MONITORING CHANNELr THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTXLATXON SYSTEM EXHAUST FANS'HE CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATOR AND EVENT RECORDERr AND THE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEN PHONE ~ THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY ACCIDENTAL GROUNDING OF THE UNiT STARTUP TRANSFORMER 230 KV FEEDER RESULTING XN INTERRUPTION OF THE OFFSITE POWER SUPPLY ELECTRICAL DiSTRIBUTION SYSTEN LINEUPS MERE RESTORED TO THEIR PRE-EVENT STATUS AND THE DAMAGED 230 KV FEEDER MAS REPAIRED WORK ACTIVITIES IN THE VICINITY OF THE UNIT STARTUP TRANSFORHER HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED
0 e e e o o o o e o o o e o e o e o o e ~ 0 A
~ ~
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 52 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +****************A**************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVXSXON DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 302 1987 028 0 8801110541 207713 12/05/87 DOCKET: 302 CRYSTAL RIViR 3 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:BM ARCHITECTURAL. ENGINEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATiON SYMBOL: FPC MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE 36 INADEQUATE TRAINING REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 302/87-021 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON DECEMBER 5x 1987r CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 WAS SHUT DOWN IN A REFUELING OUTAGE POWER TO VITAL BUSES 4 ANO 6 ("B" ENGINEiRED SAFEGUARDS TRAIN VITAL BUSES) MAS BEING SUPPLIED BY THE ALTiRNATE AC SOURCES VIA MANUAL BYPASS SWITCHES'ATHER THAN NORHAL ALIGNMENT TO THE INVERTERS AT 1230r OPERATIONS TO POWER DOMN THE "B" INVERTER FOR MAINTENANCE MERE IN PROGRESS A "B" TRAIN iNGINEiRED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION OCCURRED DURING THESE OPERATIONS. THi IYibIEOIATE CAUSE OF THIS EVENT MAS THi tlOHENTARY LINEUP OF THE VITAL BUSES TO DE-ENERGIZED POMER SUPPLIES BECAUSE OF AN IMPROPER SWITCHING SEQUENCE ~
THE ROOT CAUSE OF THi EViNT MAS INADEQUATE OPERATOR TRAINING ON THE FUNCTION OF THE XNVERTER STATIC TRANSFER SWXTCHES AND NANUAL BYPASS SMITCHES ~ FOLLOWING THE ENGINEEREO SAFEGUARDS SYSTEH ACTUATIONr THE TRIPPED CHANNELS MERE RESET AND THE PLANT WAS RETURNED TO ITS PRE-EVENT STATUS'HE OPERATORS INVOLVED IN THE EVENT HAVE REVIEWED THEIR ACTIONS AND ARE AWARE THAT THE IHPROPER SWITCHING SEQUENCE RESULTEO IN THE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION. ENHANCED TRAINING IN THE FUNCTION OF THE INVERTER STATIC TRANSFER ANO HANUAL BYPASS SWITCHES MILL BE GIVEN TO ALL LICENSED OPERATORS>> ADDITIONALLY~ A SCHEHATIC DIAGRAM OF THi VITAL BUS POWER SUPPLIES ANO SMXTCHING ARRANGEMENTS MXLL BE PROVIDED AS OPERATOR AIDS XN EACH OF THE INVERTER ROOMS
~ ~
4
FORH 53 LE R SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 302 1 988 027 1 8905020306 213703 12/09/88 DOCKET: 302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 TYPE: PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:BM ARCHITECTURAL ENGiNEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SYHBOL: FPC COMMENTS MATCH 932 - IE BULLETIN 79-01B WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESiGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY 932 RESULT OF IE BULLETINSr ORDERS/ ETC ~ (IEB 81 7)
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
11 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii): Unanalyzed conditions.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 302/86-007 2 302/88-01 5 3 302/88-016 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON 1 2/9/88 WHILE IN t'iOD E 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) r IT MAS DETERHINED THAT CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 HAD OPERAT D OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS SINCE A CRACK IN THE AUXILIARY STEAt4 (AS) LINE TO THE WASTE EVAPORATORS COULD CAUSE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS THAT EXCEED THE QUALIFICATION RATINGS OF SOtlE EQUIPMENT ~ THE iNTENT OF THE AS LINE DESIGN WAS FOR PRESSURE SWITCHES TO ACTUATE FOLLOWING AN AS LINE BREAKr THUS ISOLATING THE LINE ANO TERMINATING THE RELEASE OF STEAN IN THE AREA. THE LINE WELL NOT ISOLATE FOR CRACKS THAT DO NOT DEPRESSURIZE THE SYSTEN TO THE PRESSURE SMITCH SETPOINT THE LINE MAS NOT IN SERVICE ON 10/28/88 AND WAS CONFIRNEO TO BE ISOLATED. A MODIFICATION TO THE EXISTING ISOLATION DESIGN XS BEING ENVIRONtlENTAL QUALIFICATION ASSUHPTIONS ARE BEING REVIEWED'ND EVALUATED'THER DESIGN BASIS OOCUHENTS ARE BEING UPDATED
0 o e o o o o e e e ~ e o e o e e e e ~ e P r
0
~4 0 o e e e e e ~ e o ~ o e e o e, e o e e
FORM 54 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A * ********************************4 ********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 302 1990 004 0 9004030078 217564 03/01/90
- A***********************************************************
DOCKET:302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT FACXLITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SYHBOL: FPC MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50 '2 34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
11 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii): Unanalyzed conditions.
15 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (vii): Single failure criteria.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 302/86-025 2 302/88-023 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 096% DURING AN ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS (ES) SYSTEM DESIGN REVIEWS A UTILITY DESIGN ENGXNEER DISCOVERFO THAT A FAILURE OF A SXNGLE POWER SUPPLY MOULD DEFEAT THE DECAY HFAT REHOVAL SYSTEH AUTOMATIC Cl OSURE AND iNTERLOCK SYSTEM (ACIS) FOLLOWING FIELD VERIFICATION OF ACTUAL SYSTEM WIRING/ AT 1 305 ON NARCH 1 1 i POMER CORPORATION (FPC) CONCLUDED THIS CONDITION MAS OUTSIDE 990'LORIDA THE DESIGN BASXS ~ AT THE TXNEi CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 WAS IN NODE 1 (POWER OPERATiON) AT 96% POWER. THIS CONDITION MAS CAUSED BY AN OVERSIGHT BY THE CONTRACT ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER AND BY INADEQUATE INDEPENDENT REVIEM OF AN ES NODIFICATION IN 1976. THE ACIS POWER SUPPLY MILL BE NOD IFIED TO ENSURE COHPLETE SEPARATION OF THE ACIS TRAINS SINCE 1976r NUCLEAR ENGINEERING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON INDEPENDENT ENGINEERING REVIEWS.
~~
~ /
Il
~ I'
FORM 55 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 304 1985 023 0 8511220011 196951 10/16/85 DOCKET:304 ZION 2 REGION: 3 ARCHITECTURAL ENGiNEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COHNONMEALTH EDISON CO SYMBOL: CME REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON OCTOBER 1 6r 1 985 WITH ZION UNIT TMO IN THE REFUELING HOOEr A TECH STAFF SPECIAL PROCEDURE WAS BEING PERFORMED WHICH INVOLVED DROPPING THE ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) ELECTRICAL BUSES ONE AT A TINE WHEN BUS 247 MAS DROPPEO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 2FCV PR24A MENT CLOSEDr AND WHEN BUS 248 WAS DROPPEDr CONTAINHENT ISOLATION VALVE 2FCV PR24B MENT CLOSED ~ THESE VALVES WENT SHUT BECAUSE THE ESF ELECTRICAL BUSES WERE FEEDING THE XNSTRUNENT BUSES THAT CONTROL THESE VALVES~ NORHALLY THE INSTRUHENT BUSES ARE FED FROM THE IiVSTRUNENT INVERTERS WHICH MILL REVERT TO THE DC BATTERY SYSTEM DURING THE LOSS OF AN ESF BUS ANO REMAIN OPERABLE THE INSTRUMENT XNVERTERS MERE OUT OF SERVICE AT THE TiNE FOR MAINTENANCE AND TESTiNG ~ THE VALVE CLOSURES MERE ANTICIPATEO BY THE LICENSED OPERATOR PRIOR TO DROPPING THE BUSES'HE TECH SPEC PROCEDURE XN USE REFERENCED THE ZION ELECTRICAl DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURE WHICH IOENTIFXEO THE ESF COMPONENTS MHICH WOULD ACTUATE. THE PROCEDURE STATED THAT THE VALVES MOULD GO CLOSED WHEN THE BUSES WERE DROPPEO
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
'1 V
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 56 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91
- k***********************************************k********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 304 1986 001 0 8602060332 198307 01/03/86
- k**k***************************************k*k********
DOCKET:304 ZION 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGXNEER: SLXX FACXLXTY OPERATOR: COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
SYMBOL: CWE COMNENTS OTHER REPORTABILITY- TECH ~ SPEC ~ 6 6.3 H~ STEP 1: EFF IX- POWER FLUCTATXON.
REPORTABILITY CODcS FOR THIS LER ARE:
21 OTHER: Voluntary reports special reports Part 21 reports etc ~
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%. AT 1547 ON 1-3-86 UNIT 2 MAS SHUT DOWN FOR A REFUELING OUTAGE AND THE RCS WAS FILLED SOLID WITH NO BUBBLE IN THE PRESSURIZER A HONENTARY FLUCTUATION OF OUTPUT OF XNVERTER POMER SUPPLY BUS 213 (CAUSE UNKNOWN) CAUSED THE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL VALVEr 2VC FCV1 21 r TO FAIL TO THE 20X OEHANO POSITIONS AND ALSO CAUSED 2NOV-RH8701 THE RHR PUNP SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE TO FAIL CLOSED. THIS INCREASEO CHARGING FLOW FROM 39 TO 190 GPHr AND ISOLATEO LETDOWN FLOW RESULTING IN LIFTING OF THE PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORV S) ~ WHILE INVESTIGATING THE CAUSEr BUS 213 MAS AGAIN DEENERGIZED AND THE PORV'S AGAIN LIFTED. THE CAUSE OF THE BUS OUTPUT FLUCTUATION IS CURRENTLY -UNKNOWN~ THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE SINCE TECH SPEC 6 6 ~ 3 ~ H REQUIRES A 30 OAY WRITTEN REPORT ON ACTUATION OF THE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
,"'I
~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 57 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 kkkk*k*kkkkkk*kkkk**kkkkkkkkkkk*kkkkk**kk*kkkk*k*kkk**kkkkkkkkkkkkk*
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 304 1986 007 0 8602270366 198544 01/23/86 DOCKET:304 ZION 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR. CONNONMEALTH EDISON CO SYMBOL: CME CONHENTS STEP 2 - SWITCHING POWER SOURCES MHILE SCRAN BREAKERS CLOSEDr>> STEPS 354:
CAUSE IX NOHENTARY INTiRRUPTION IN A C. POMiR.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 295/85-021 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%>> ON JANUARY 23r 1 986r AT 0830r THE Ul'lIT WAS IN HOT SHUTDOMN ANO THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS MERE CLOSED FOR CONTROL ROD TESTING INSTRUMENT INVERTER 211r MHICH SUPPl IES REGULATEO A ~ C POWER TO NUCLEAR XNSTRUNENTATION SYSTEM (NXS) CHANNELS N31 AND N35r WAS OUT OF SERVICE AND THOSE CHANNELS WERE SUPPLIED WITH NONREGULATED POWER CONTROL ROON PERSONNEl MiRE PREPARING TO SMITCH BACK FROM NONREGULATED POWER TO THE INVERTER. THE PROCEDURE WARNED THAT THIS MOULD CAUSE A MOMENTARY INTERRUPTION IN POWER TO THE NIS CHANNELSr CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL ~ AFTER SENDING AN EQUIPHENT OPERATOR TO SWITCH POWER SUPPLIESr THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR DECIDED TO HAVE THE TRIP BREAKERS OPENED MANUALLY BEFORE HE COULD DO THISr THE POWER SUPPLY WAS SWITCHED AND THE AUTOHATIC TRIP OCCURRED. TO PREVENT RECURRENCEr ALL LICENSED SHIFT SUPERVISORS WiLL BE TRAINED AND A STANDING ORDER MILL CLARIFY THE PROPER ACTION TO TAKE WHEN AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE OR THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEN IS iXPECTED.
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ':
0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 58 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVcNT DATE 304 1987 005 0 8708250267 205832 07/23/87 DOCKET: 304 ZION 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS: ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COllMONMEALTH EDISON CO SYMBOL: CWE COMMENTS STEP 1. CAUSE AX CALIBRATION OF THE POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMcNT CHANNEL.
WATCH-LiST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-REFERENCE LERS 1 304/87-004 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000'N JULY 23r 1987 AT 21:39 HOURSr UNIT 2 MAS XN COLO SHUTDOWN AND OPERATING MAS PERFORMING PROCEDURE PT-10 (SAFEGUAROS ACTUATION) THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS WERE CLOSED PER PROCEDURE THE BiSTABLE FOR POMER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUtlENTATXON (NIS) CHANNEL 43 MAS TRIPPEO FOR MAINTENANCE~ IN STEP 9H OF PT 10r THE OPERATOR MANUALLY TRIPPED THE 4KV BREAKER FEEDXtJG SAFEGUAROS BUS 248r DE EiNERGIZIiNG NiS CHANNEL 42 THIS 2/4 COMBINATIOit OF NIS CHANNELS TRIPPEO THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY CONSXSTING OF: 1) NO INITIAL CONOiTIONS GIVEN FOR EACH INDEPENDENT TEST SECTION ANO 2) A CAUTION STATEMENT FOR EACH BUS DROP SECTION REFERRING OPcRATORS TO AN "APPENDIX A" WHICH OOESN'T PROVIDE ANY SPECIFIC BUS" RELATED INFORMATION- THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Of THIS EVENT WAS MINIMAL BECAUSE UNIT 2 MAS IN COLO SHUTDOWN WITH ALL RODS INSERTED IN THE CORE ~ XF THIS:"VENT HAD OCCURRED AT POWER OPERATIONSr THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN INADVERTENT REACTOR TRIP AtJD/OR A SAFETY INJECTION ~ AS CORRECTIVE ACTIONr PT 10 HILL BE REVISED TO INCLUDE SEPARATE XNITIAL CONDITIONS FOR EACH SLCTION OF THE TESTr IMPROVE EACH BUS DROP SECTION SO THAT THE OPERATOR IS REFERRED TO THE ZION ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION COiJTROLLED DOCUMENTr DELTE APPENDIX Ar ANO CLOSE THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS ONLY WHEN REQUIRED
~O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 IIL ' ~
Ct 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0
FORH 59 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMB ER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 309 1990 002 1 90091 301 96 21 9467 04/1 4/90 DOCKET:309 NAINE YANKEE TYPE:PMR REGION: NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: HAXNE YANKEE ATONIC POWER CO.
SYMBOL. HYA CONHENTS STEP 2: CORRECTIVE ACTION X VITAL BUS TRANSFER PANELS LABELING IMPROVED.
STEP 8: COMP MEI TURNSTILE. STEP 9: COMP HEI X-RAY MACHINE. STEP 10:
COHP NEI " EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR.
MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUllAN ERROR 38 POOR ERGONOHICS OR HUHAN ENVIRONMENT REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 309/84-007 ABSTRACT POWER l EVEL 000% ON 4/14/90 WHILE IN A REFUELING SHUTDOMN CONDITIONs AN XNADVERTENT ACTUATION OF ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD FEATURES OCCURRED WHILE RETURNING AN INVERTER TO SERVICEr OPERATORS INCORRECTLY OPENED THE OUTPUT BREAKER OF AN OPERATING INVERTER THIS INVERTER MAS SUPPLYING POWER TO ITS OMN BUS AS WELL AS ALTERNATE POWER FOR THE INVERTER WHICH HAD BEEN OUT OF SERVICE. OPENING THE OUTPUT BREAKER CAUSED A LOSS Oi POWER TO THE TWO VITAL AC BUSSES CONNECTED TO IT ~ DUE TO THE FAILSAFE DESIGN OF THE SAFETY IN JECTION ACTUATION SYSTEM (SIAS) LOGICr THE SYSTEM ACTUATED UPON LOSS OF POWER TO TWO CHANNELS
~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ o ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ e o ~ e o ~ ~ e FORH 60 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR l ER NUNBER REVISION OCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 311 1983 021 0 8306170207 183368 05/25/83
- A********
DOCKET:311. SALEiN 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSEG FACILITY OPiRATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE iLECTRIC L GAS CO.
SYhlBOL: PEG COHhlENTS PROBLEtlS WERE EXPERIENCED RETURNING INVERTER TO SERVICE AND CONT PENETRATION DOORS WEREN'T CLOSED WXTHXN' HR ~ OF INITIAL INViRTER REMOVAL STEP 3: EFFECT XX DAMAGED ~ STEP 6: CAUSE XX - ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATEO WITH THE REFUELING SHUTDOWN REFERENCE LERS:
1 311/83-022 ABSTRACT ON hlAY 25r 1983r DURING ROUTINE SHUTDOWN OPERATIONr THE NO ~ 2C VITAL INSTRUilENT INVERTER MAS DE-ENERGIZED FOR PLANNED NAINTENANCEr RENDERING THE ASSOCIATEO ELECTRICAL BUS TRAIN INOPERABLE. SINCE NO.
2A DIESEL GENERATOR WAS ALSO INOPERABI E AT THE TIHEr ACTION STATEMENT 3 8 2 2 MAS ENTEREO. UNEXPECTED PROBLEhlS MERE ENCOUNTiRED DURING THE MORK ON THE INViRTERr AND CONTAXNNENT INTEGRITY COULD NOT BE iSTABLISHEO WITHIN 8 HOURS AS REQUIRED BY THE ACTION STATEMENT DUE TO OPERATION LESS CONSERVATIVE THAN THE LEAST CONSERVATIVE ASPECT OF A LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONr THE EVENT IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6 9.1 9B ~ FOLLOWING HAINTENANCE THE INVERTER WAS RE ENERGIZED ~ THE OEVICi FAILED DURING STARTUPr HOMEViRr INSUFFICIiNT TINE REHAINED TO ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY AS REQUIRED A REVIEW OF APPLICABLE PROCEDURES AND TECH SPECS MILL BE PERFORhlED TO IDENTIFY IhlPROVEblENTS WHICH MILL PREVENT RECURRENCE THi INVERTER MAS REPAIRED AND THE ACTION STATEMENT WAS TERhliNATED
0
~ 0 Q 0
a a I al h b
FORM 61 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- %**A**********%*********************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBcR RcVISION OCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 311 1983 022 0 8306170362 183365 05/30/83
- +*********************************************************
DOCKET:311 SALEM 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSEG FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 5 GAS CO ~
SYMBOL: PEG COHHENTS STEP 2: IX- INVERTER CHATTERINGS STEP 4: XA - UNKNOWN Al ARM TYPES'TEP 7:
HEI- SPRINKLERS ANO FIRE HOSE STATiONS REFERENCE LERS:
1 311/83-021 ABSTRACT ON HAY 30r 1983r DURING ROUTINE SHUTDOWN OPERATIONs THE NO ~ 2C VITAL INSTRUMENT INVERTcR FAILEOr RENDERING THE ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL BUS TRAIN INOPERABLE. SINCi NO ~ 2A DIESEL GENERATOR MAS ALSO INOPERABLE AT THE TINE s ACTION STATEMENT 3 ~ 8 ~ 2 ~ 2 MAS iNTERED ~ CONTAI NNENT INTEGRITY WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN 8 HOURS AS REQUIRED BY TH ACTION STATEH NT ~
DUE TO OPERATION LESS CONSERVATIVE THAN THE LEAST CONSERVATXVE ASPECT OF A LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONr THE EVENT XS REPORTABl E IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6 9 1 88 THE FACT THAT ONE SURVEILLANCE TEST NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY WAS EXPIRED WAS OVERLOOKED UNTIL INSUFFICIENT TillE RENAINED TO COHPLETE THE TEST. A REVIEW OF APPLICABLE PROCEDURES ANO TECH SPECS WILL BE PERFORMED TO IDENTIFY ildPROVEiRENTS WHICH MILL PREVENT RECURRiNCE THE INVERTER WAS REPAIRED AND THE ACTiON STATENENT MAS TERNINATED.
rg
~ ~
r4
~ 4
FORN 62 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC FVENT DATE 311 1983 024 0 8306170153 183369 05/14/83
- +*********************
DOCKET:311 SALEM 2 TYPc-PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER. PSEG FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 5 GAS CO SYMBOL: PEG COt1NENTS STEP 8: HSC = COtlPARATOR ABSTRACT ON TMO SEPARATE OCCASIONSr ON HAY 14r AND HAY 15r 1983r A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEN SUCTION VALVE WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE CLOSEDr THUS ELIAINATING FLOW iN THE OPERATING RHR LOOP ~ IN EACH INSTANCE THE OPERATING PUHP MAS STOPP Or AND ACTION STATEMENT 3 ~ 4 ~ 1 48 MAS ENTERED. NO REDUCTION IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BORON CONCENTRATION OCCURRED WITH AN RHR LOOP OUT OF SERVICE. A LOOP MAS IHHEDIATELY RESTORED TO SERVICE ~ THE EVENTS CONSTITUTED OPERATION IN A DEGRADED NODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6 9 ~ 1 9B ~ INVESTIGATION IN THE FIRST CASE REVEALED THAT THE NO. 2B VITAL INSTRUNENT BUS HAD BEEN DE ENERGIZED FOR i~lAINTENANCE CAUSING THE RHR SUCTION VALVE TO CLOSE ~
IN THE SECOND CASE COHPARATOR 2PC 405A B APPARENTLY FAILEDr CAUSING THE VALVE TO CLOSE. PERSONNEL MERE COUNSELEO CONCERNING THE FIRST INCIDENT AND THE COHPARATOR WAS REPLACED.
4
~ ~ 4
~ ~
FORN 63 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 311 1983 060 0 8312200125 1 88136 11/Z8/83
- dr***********
DOCKET:311 SALEM 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS: ME ARCHITiCTURAL ENGINEER: PSEG FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRXC 8 GAS CO.
SYNBOL: PEG ABSTRACT ON NOV ~ 28 1983 DURING A MAINTENANCE SHUTDOMN ZB AND 2C VITAL INSTRUMENT INVERTERS MERE ENERGIZED AND SUPPLYXNG THEIR RESPECTIVE BUSESr ALTHOUGH 2B INVERTER MAS TECHNICALLY INOPERABLE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT CONNECTED TO ITS DC BUS AS REQUIRED BY THE TECH SPECS BECAUSE OPERATION OF THE UNIT MAS LESS CONSERVATIVE THAN THE LEAST CONSERVATIVE ASPECT OF THE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATXON ESTABlISHED XN THE TECH SPECS'HE EVENT IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE MXTH TECH SPEC 6 9 1 BB THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE INVERTER CONNECTED TO ITS DC BUS MAS OVERSIGHTED DUE TO DIFFERENT TECH SPEC REQUIREHENTS BETM EN THE UNITS LICENSING IS PRESENTLY RESOLVING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TFCH SPECS.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, ~ 0 ~
4 [0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 54 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 311 1983 062 0 8401240002 188407 11/28/83 DOCKET:311 SALEll 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSEG FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE Et ECTRIC tt GAS CO.
SYMBOL: PEG COMt1EN T 5 STEP 2: EFFECT IX - VOLTAGE TRAiNSIENT ABSTRACT ON NOVEMBER 28r 1983'URING A MAINTENANCE SHUTOOWNr 2A VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS WAS TRANSFERREO TO ITS ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY TO PERFORM ROUTINE METER CALIBRATIONS ON 2A INVERTER A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT CAUSED 2RH2 TO SHUT RESULTING XN A LOSS OF RHR FLOW THE VALVE WAS IMMEDIATELY REOPENEDr ANO RHR FLOW WAS RE-ESTABLISHED BECAUSF THE EVENT CONSTITUTEO OPERATION IN A DEGRADED tlODE PERMITTED BY A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION THE OCCURRENCE IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6 9.1.9B. BECAUSE THIS EVOLUTION CAUSES A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT WHICH. EFFECTS CERTAIN EQUIPNENTr THIS EQUIPNENT WILL BE IDENTIFIED ANO PROCEDURES WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT EQUIPMENT TO BE MONITORED ANO APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN.
~O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 1
'1 O-O 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 65 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +*%*************************************%*+********4**
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUt'IBER NSIC EVENT DATE 311 1983 066 0 8402030323 1 88754 1 2/20/83 DOCKFT:311 SALEH 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSEG FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 8 GAS CO.
SYt1BOL: PEG REFERENCE LERS:
1 311/83-063 ABSTRACT ON DECEMBER 20r 1983r DURING A HAINTENANCE SHUTOOMNr 2RH1 CLOSEDr RESULTING IN A LOSS OF RHR FLOM THE EVENT TOOK PLACE DURING THE TRANSFER OF 2B4KV VITAL BUS FROM ONE STATION POWER TRANSFORftER TO THE OTHER. THE BACKUP POWER SUPPLY FOR 2B INSTRUHENT INVERTER WAS DE-ENERGIZED FOR MAINTENANCE~ THE TRANSFER RESULTEO IN A MOMENTARY LOSS OF THE INSTRUHENT BUSr 2RH1 CLOSED ON INTERLOCK ~ DUE TO OPERATION IN A DEGRADED HODEr PERMITTED BY A LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONs THE EVENT IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6~9~1 ~9~ B~ MHEN 2RH1 CLOSEDr THE OPERATOR SECURED 22 RHR PUMP~ THE CAUSE MAS DETERHIN D AND ZRH1 MAS REOPENED ~ 22 RHR PUMP WAS STARTEOr AND RHR FlOW MAS REESTABLISHED MITHIN 22 tlINUTES OF THE OCCURRENCE ~
THE INCIDENT WAS ADDRESSED IiN AN OPERATIONS DEPARTNENT NEWS LETTER
0 e e 0 e e a 0 0 a 0 e e a 0 0 ~ ~ 4 I I 4 ~~4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORN 66 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4******************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER RcVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 311 1986 005 0 8608200149 200689 07/15/86 DOCKET: 311 SALEM 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSEG FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC tt GAS CO.
SYMBOL: PEG MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARc:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABZLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50 ~ 73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 002%a AT 0637 HOURS/ JUl Y 15/ 1986r DURING A REACTOR STARTUP~ A VOLTAGE SPIKE OCCURRED ON 28 VITAL INSTRUHENT INVERTER DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING ~ THE TECHNICIAN PERFORMING THE SURVEZLLAtlCE CONNECTED THE TEST LEADS ZNCORRECTLYr INDUCING AN ARC WHICH RESULTED IN A VOLTAGE SPIKE. THE VOLTAGE SPIKE REINSTATED THE P 7 PERHISSIVE INTERLOCK THE LOGIC CIRCUIT SENS ED THE UNIT WAS ABOVE 10% POMER WHICH CORRELATED THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEN CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR INITIATION OF A TRIP SIGNAL THE REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A TURBINE TRIP ABOVE 10% POWER IS AN ANTICIPATORY TRIP TO REDUCE THE PRIMARY PLANT TRANSIENT IHPOSED BY THE LOSS OF LOAD- IN THIS INSTANCEr THE INDICATION OF POWER LEVEL ABOVE 10%x MAS A FALSE INDICATION DUc TO THE SPIKE ON THE 28 VITAL INSTRUHENT INVERTER THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS PERSONNEL ERROR COMPOUNDED BY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY THE ELECTRICIAN AND I5C TECHNICIANS WERE COUNSELE CONCERNING THE ZHPLICATIONS OF THIS OCCURRENCE AND THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE MAS REVISED. THIS EVENT MILL BE REVXEMEO BY THE NUCLEAR TRAINING DEPARTMENT FOR POSSIBLE INCORPORATION INTO EXISTING OR FUTURE TRAINING PROGRAMS
0 e e o o e e o e o e o 0 e e e o o. e e ':-'.
I 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 ~ t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 67 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 312 1980 028 0 8006300405 158261 06/09/80 DOCKET:312 RANCHO SECO TYPE:PWR RcGION: 5 NSSS:BW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SACRAMcNTO MUNICIPAL UTIL DISTRICT SYMBOL SMU COMMENTS STEP 3: COMP RLX LOGIC RELAY.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 095X CAUSE INVERTER DFSIGN ERROR A REVIEW OF THE SFAS REVEALED THAT UNDER SPECIFIC CONDITIONSr A SINGLE FAILURE COULD PREVENT AN AUTOMATIC SFAS INITIATION. THE DIGITAL SECTION OF THE SYSTEM REQUIRES POWER TO ACTUATE. THIS POWER IS SUPPLiED BY CLASS 1A INVERTERS HOWEVERS IF ONE INVERTER WAS OUT OF SERVICEr FAILURE OF THE REMAINING INVERTER WOULD DXSABl E THE SFAS. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN WAS ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO PLACE OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON INVERTER OPERABILITY~ IF XNVERTER IS OUT OF SERVICE FOR 48 HRSr THE PLANT WILL BE BROUGHT TO HOT SHUTDOWN
~ ~ 4 F ORtl 68 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER RcVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 312 1982 015 0 8208020202 175222 06/24/82
- +***+*******
DOCKET:312 RANCHO SECO REGION: 5 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SACRAtlENTO HUNICIPAL UTIL- DISTRICT S YMBOL: SHU ABSTRACT DURING A P REVENTIVE l'1AINTENANCE PROCEDURE ON THE B INVERTERs THERE MAS A MOMENTARY LOSS OF POWiR TO THE 8 BUS. THIS IN TURN CAUSED A SHORT DURATION. LOSS OF DHRS THE CORi TEMPERATURE RENAINEO UNAFFECTED BY THIS LOSS OF FLOWs AND THE A SYSTEH WAS AVAILABLE ON STANDBYS THE LOSS OF POWER TO THc 8 BUS RESUl TEO WHEN TECHNICIANS ATTEMPTED TO PARALLEL THE 8 INVERTER TO A TEHPORARY TEST POMiR SOURCE BEING USED TO ENERGIZE THE BUS WHILE HAINTENANCE blAS BEING PERFORNED PROCEOURiS WILL BE RE-WRITTiN TO ENHANCi CONNUNICATION BETMEEN tlAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS PERSONNEL.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,
0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 69 LER SCSS DATA 09-. 23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSEC EVENT DATE 312 1986 016 2 8711230220 207159 10/03/86
- 4*********************************************+***********
DOCKET: 312 RANCHO SECO REGION: 5 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILiTY OPERATOR: SACRAHENTO NUNXCIPAL UTIL. DISTRICT 5 YM BOL: SOU CONflENTS STEPS 6r7r9 ISYS SF OHS PUMP ROOM SUHP ~ STEP 4 CAUSE AY SNUBBER SEAL REPLACEMENTS STEP 10: EFF EX-VOLTAGE TRANSIENT.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
14 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f vlfillment of a saf ety function.
REFERcNCE LERS:
1 312/78-001 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ WHILE IN COLD SHUTDOWN ON OCTOBER 3r 1 986r DURING INSTRUNEiVT 8 CONTROL ENVcSTIGATION OF ABNORMAL INDICATION ON PANEl H2SFB FOR DECAY HEAT SYSTEM (DHS) "B" ROOM SUMP STACK LIGHTSr SFAS "B" BISTABLES TRIPPED CAUSING HV 20002 TO CLOSEr WHICH TRIPP 0 DHS "B" PUHP. THE PLANT ltAS WITHOUT THE USE OF THE NORMAl OHS FOR APPROXEHATELY 13 MINUTES DUE TO THE EXTENDED PERiOD THAT THE PLANT HAS BEEN SHUTDOMNr THERE WAS A SNALLr BUT DETECTABLE INCREASE OF REACTOR COOLANT TEtlPERATURE STEPS MERE TAKEN iHNEDIATELY TO RESTORE A OHS TRAIN TO SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENT OF TECH SPEC 3 1 1 5~ THIS EVENT IS REPORTABI E ACCORDING TO 10 CFR PART 50 73(A) (2) (IV 5 V). THE IMHEDIATE CAUSE OF THE ENCEOENT ltAS AN ARC THAT OCCURRED WHEN ISC TECHNICIANS WERE TROUBLESHOOTING AN ABNORMAL INDICATION ON PANEL H2SFB FOR OHS "B" PUtlP ROOM (EAST) SUMP STACK LIGHTS (1B INCH I EVEL INDICATION). THE ARC INITIATEO THE TRIP OF INVERTER "B" THE PAINT ON THE LENS RETAINING CLiP OF THE INDICATOR HAD DETEREORATEDr AND THc METAL OF THE CLIP PROVIDED A PATH TO GROUNDS AS CORR" CTIVE ACTIONSr THE LENS CLIPS FOR THE INDICATORS INSTALLED IN THE PLANT WILL BE REPAINTED OR REPLACED BY FEBRUARY 28r 1 988 ~
ADOITiONALLYr THES EVENT MILL BE INCLUDEO XN ONGOING OPERATOR TRAINIiVG~ AS A LONG TERH CORRECTIVE ACTIONr THE DC VITAL POWER SUPPLIES MILL BE tlOOIFIED TO BE EQUIPPED WXTH STATIC TRAiVSFER SMIT CHES ~
0 e o e o o 'e o o e o o e a o o e o o o o ';
4 I
P rO ~ 8 0 0 0 y 0 0 y 0 0 0 y 0 0' 0 {
FORH 70 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +*****************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 312 1989 004 0 8905010104 213732 03/28/89 DOCKET:312 RANCHO SECO TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:BM ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTIL DISTRICT SYNBOL: SHU CONNENTS STEP 3: HODEL 500-GE-125-60-115'FF IX LARGE VOLTAGE SMING DURING AUTORESTART~ STEP 4 NODELS BFTA AND BFTB>> STEPS 5>6r11 MODEL EMH 32AN~
STEP 21: COl1P MEI - VALVE COVERS. STEP 22- EFF HK LOW VACUUM MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR 34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 312/78-001 2 31 2/79-001 3 312/84-007 4 312/85-023 5 31 2/85-025 6 31 2/88-018 ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 093K ON NARCH 28r 1989'T 1516 HOURS'HILE OPERATING AT 93% POMERr THE Pl ANT S HAIN FEEDMATER PUNPS (HFPS) EXPERIENCED SPEED CONTROL PROBLEblS ~ THIS RESULTED IN A RAPID LOSS OF F EEDMATER FLOM TO THE STEAN GENERATORS THE CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEH (RCS) PRESSURE CAUSED THE Pl ANT TO AUTOHATICALLY SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF THE HFP CONTROLLER PROBLEHSr THE INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM (ICS) RESPONSE TO THE PRE-TRIP UNDERFEED CAUSED THE POST-TRIP FEEOMATER REFEED TO THc RCS TO BE GREATER THAN EXPECTED. THiS RESULTED IN A PRESSURIZER LEVEL DROP TO THE ELEVATION OF THE LEVEL INDICATOR TAP THE PLANT DIO NOT EXIT THE POST-TRIP MINDOMi AND NORMAL POST-TRIP LEVELS MERE ESTABLISHED 14 MINUTES AFTER THc TRIP ~
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
I h '
1 ~
m r I
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 71 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4******************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVXSION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 315 1984 008 0 8407260149 19061 2 06/17/84
- A*************************************%'*********************
DOCKET:315 COOK 1 TYPE:PWR REGiON: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: AEPS FACILITY OPERATOR: INDIANA 8 MICHIGAN ELECTRiC CO SYNBOL: INE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 315/80-020 2 315/79-022 3 316/83-081 4 316/83-052 5 316/81-027 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 068% ~ ON JUN 17r 1984~ AT 2034 HRSr WHILE IN NOD F 1 AND OPERATING AT 68% POMERr A REACTOR TRXP AND SAFcTY INJECTION OCCURRED FROH THE LOSS OF C R I D. (CONTROL ROON XNSTRUHFNT DISTRIBUTION) IV INVERTER THE REACTOR TRXP OCCURRED DUE TO INDICATION OF LOM RCS FLOW MITH REACTOR POMER GREATER THAN THE P-8 SETPOINT. THE SAFETY INJECTION OCCURRED DUE TO AN INDICATION OF LOM STEAHLINE PRESSURE CONCURRENT WITH HIGH STEAN FLOW CAUSED BY THE OPERATION OF THE STEAM OUHPS THc CAUSE OF THE C.R ~ I.D. FAILURE MAS DETERMINED TO BE A SHORTED C-2 CAPACITOR ON THE SHORTING CIRCUIT BOARD. THIS EVENT AND THE PREVIOUS C-2 CAPACiTOR FAiLURE ARE THE RESULT OF HIGH ANBIENT TEMPERATURES ~ A DESIGN CHANGE HAS BEEN INSTALLED WHICH REPLACED THE C-2 CAPACITORS IN ALL FOUR INVERTERS WITH CAPACITORS HAVING A HIGHER TEMPERATURE RATING -AXR CONDITIONING MAS ALSO ADDED SO THAT COOL AIR IS DIRECTED INTO THE INVERTER ENCLOSURES
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,
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FORM 72 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4****************************
DOCKET YFAR LER NUMBER REVlSION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 315 1 984 01 8 0 8409260423 1 91 687 08/14/84
- A*A'****************************+****************************
DOCKET:315 COOK 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: AEPS FACILITY OPERATOR: INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC CO SYHBOL: INE CONHENTS OTHER REPORTABILITY SPECIAL REPORT ~ STEP 3 EFFECT XX WATER ON FLOORr P 5 YS S M-SMITCHGE AR ROON 0 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
21 OTHER: Voluntary reports special reports Pat t 21 report<
etc ~
ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 100% ON 8 14 84 AT APPROXINATEI Y 1520 HOURS'HE UNIT MAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER WHEN THE CRIO IV INVERTER ABNORHAL ALARH CANE IN THE OPERATOR DISPATCHED TO THE SWITCHGEAR ROON REPORTED WATER ON THE FLOOR OF THE ROON. A TEMPORARY Bl OWER LOCATED ON THE FLOOR WAS BEING USED TO COOL THE INVERTERS ANO MAS SPRAYING A FINE HIST INTO THE BACK OF THE INVERTER AT APPROXIMATELY 1529 HOURS'S POWER MAS BEING REDUCED'HE GRID INVERTER FAILED RESULTING IN A REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTlON ~ THE CRIO INVERTER WAS LATER REPLACED AND THE UNIT RESTARTED. A SAFETY INJECTION REPORT IS INCLUDED WITH THIS LER AT APPROXIMATELY 1400 HOURS A SURVEILLANCi WAS BEING PERFORHEO ON TH- BATTERY ROON EHERGENCY SHOWER ANO EYEWASH STATION. THE TECHNICIAN COULD NOT GET MATER FLOM FROM THE STATION.
THE DEHINERALIZED WATER h1AKE-UP PLANT MAS OUT OF SERVICE AT THE TIHE MHICH RESULTS IN NO MATER PRiSSURE FOR THE EYEWASH STATiONS THE iHERGENC Y SHOWER VALVi HAD NOT FULLY SEAT'ED AND WHEN THE HEADER WAS REPRESSURIZED THE VALVE LEAKED CAUSING THE MATER ACCUYiULATION ON THE Fl OOR WHICH MAS PICKED UP BY THE BLOMER. A DESIGN CHANGE IS BiING PROCESSED WHICH UPGRADES THE VENTILATION IN THE INVERTER ROON SO BLOMERS MILL NOT BE NEEDED IN HOT MEATHER. THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN CHANGED TO REQUIRE DIRECT CONTROL OF AN EYEMASH STATION IF NO FLOW IS OBTAINED DURING A TEST UNTIL THE PROBLEhl IS CORRECTFD.
0 e e o o e e e e o e o e e o o 0 e e o I
g 4 i k
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 73 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- k*kk********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 316 1983 113 0 831221025S 1 88001 11/17/83
- A'*********************************************************
DOCKET:316 COOK 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: AEPS FACII ITY OPERATOR: INDIANA tt MICHIGAN ELECTRIC CO SYMBOL: IHE COHHENTS STEP 2 CONP XA-SYSTEM ABNORHAL ALARM ABSTRACT CO2 SYSTEH ABNORMAL ALARM FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS MOULD NOT CLEAR MHEN THE C02 SMITCH FOR THE CD DIESEL GENERATOR WAS RETURNED TO NORMAL THE C02 SYSTEH FOR THE AB DIESEL GENERATORS CD DIESEL GENERATOR AND DIESEI FUEL OIL ROOil MAS ISOLATED AND DECLARED INOPERABLE FOR REPAIR AT 1610 HOURS ON 11-17-83. THiS EVENT MAS NONCONSERVATIVE MITH RESPECT TO TECH SPEC 3 ~ 3 3 8s TABLE 3 ~ 3 11 INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE INVERTER IN THE ALISON CONTROL TEMPERATURE ALARt1 SYSTEM HAD FAILED THE INVERTER MAS REPLACED'HE SYSTEM VERIFIED TO OPERATE CORRECTLY AND DECLARED OPERABLE AT 2148 HOURS ON 11-17-83
0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 .
I 0 0 ~ O.O 0 0 t t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 74 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A************************************************************A***
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 316 1985 003 0 8503060600 193458 01/26/85
~ ***********A*****************************************A**************
DOCKET:316 COOK 2 TYPE:PWR RcGION. 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: AsPS FACILITY OPERATOR: INDIANA 8 HICHIGAN ELECTRIC CO SYMBOL: IHE COHHENTS STEP 5: CONPONENT HSC LATCHING LINKAGE.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-REFERENCE LsRS 1.315/84-008 2 315/80-020 3 315/79-022 4 316/83-081 5 316/83-052 6 316/81-027 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 096X ~ ON 1 26 85 AT 0925 HRSr WHILE AT 96K POWERr THE FAiLURi OF THE 120V AC VITAL BUS iiI INVERTER RESULTED IN AN OPEN INDICATION OF THE LOOP 3 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BREAKER THE INDICATION IN COINCIDENCE WITH REACTOR POWER GREATER THAN THE P-8 SETPOINT INITIATED A REACTOR TRIP. DURING THE REACTOR TRIP SEQUENCEr THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEiDWATER PUMP FAILiD TO AUTOMATICALLY START THE CAUSE OF THE XNVERTER FAILURE WAS NOT DETERHINEDr THEREFOREr ALL SUSPECT COHPONENTS MERE REPLACED ~ THE INVERTER MAS THiN LOAD TESTEO ANO RETURNED TO SERVICE THE FAILURE OF THE TDAFP TO AUTOHATICALLY START WAS THE RESULT OF EXCESSIVE CLEARANCE XN THE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE I ATCHING i~lECHANISH~ TO PRcVENT RECURRENCE: 1) A DESIGN CHANGE HAS BEiN APPROVED THAT REPLACES THE EXISTING INVERTCRS WITH A DESIGN FEATURING INCREASED RcLIABXLITYr 2) A PROCEDURE MILL BE WRITTEN BY 8 1 85r TO ENSURE THAT PRECiSi AND CONSISTENT TDAFT TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE LATCHING HECHANISt4 ADJUSTMENTS ARE t<AINTAINEDr ANO 3) AN ACCELiRATED TESTING PROGRAi~l HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED CONSISTING OF MEEKLY TDAFP STARTSr ANO VISUALLY CORRECT TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE LATCHING DURING EACH OPERATING SHIFT. THIS SUPPLEMENTAL TESTING MILL BE CONTINUEO UNTIL TDAFP RELiABILITY IS ASSURED PREVIOUS FAILURES:
31 5/84 008r 31 5/80 020r 31 5/79 022r 31 6/83 081 r 31 6/83 052r AND 316/81-027.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ."-
AC 1 1 g
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORth 75 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91
- 4*************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUthBER REVISION OCS NUtlBER NSXC EVENT DATE 316 1985 014 1 8603120023 198501 07/28/85
- k**************k*********Br***************+*
DOCKET:316 COOK 2 TYPE:PWR REGION 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: AEPS FACILITY OPERATOR: INDIANA tt thICHIGAN ELECTRIC CO.
SYMBOL: IthE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF aciuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% THIS REVISION IS SUBtlITTED TO CLA'RIF Y THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH, LEO UP TO AND CAUSED THE INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL ~ ON JULY 28r 1985r AT 1840 HOURS MITH THE UNIT IN NODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOMN) AN INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL blAS GENERATcD DURING THE INSTALLATXON OF A DESIGN CHANGE THE EVENT OCCURRED WHEN TWO OF THE FOUR VITAL INSTRUNENT BUSSES MERE BEXNG POMEREO BY THE ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE (BUS 20) THE SIGNAL MAS GENERATEO WHEN REACTOR COOLANT PUthP NO ~ 3r ALSO POWERED FROhl BUS 20r WAS STARTED CAUSING A VOLTAGE DROP RESULTING IN A NOthENTARY REDUCTION OF POWEP, TO VITAL XNSTRUthENT BUSSES III AND IV. THIS REDUCED THE OUTPUT FROth CHANNELS III AND IV OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEth WHICH IN TURN INITXATEO THE SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL THcRE MAS NO WATER INJECTED INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEth AS THE FLOW PATH WAS ISOLATED FOR LOW PRESSUREr OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION AND FOR OPERATION OF THc RESIDUAL HEAT R EthOVAL 5 YS TEN. THIS EVENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNR EVI Ebt ED SAFETY CONCERN SINCE THE EVENT OCCURRED WHEN THE ECCS MAS NOT REQUIRED (thODE 5) ~ THE CONDITIONS RcSPONSIBLE FOR THIS EVENT WERc THE RcSULT OF THE INSTALLATION OF A DESIGN CHANGEr THEREFOREr NO ACTION WAS TAKEN TO P REVENT RECURRENCE ~
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FORM 76 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUt<BER NSIC EVENT DATE 316 1985 035 0 8512090375 197633 10/29/85
- +*****************************************
DOCKET:316 COOK 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHITiCTURAL iNGINiER: AEPS FACILITY OPERATOR: INDIANA 8 HZCHZGAH ELECTRIC CO.
S YtlBOL: IHE COHERENT S STEP 2: CONP HEZ PHOTOHiLIC CELLr STEP 7: COMP tlSC LINKAGE REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations ABSTRACT POWER LiVEL 079/. ON 10-29-85 AT 1357 HRSr A REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL WAS ReCEIVED FROM RCS LOM FLOW REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 'A'AILED TO OPEN ON RECEIPT OF THE TRIP SIGNAL THE INSERVICE 'B'EACTOR TRIP BREAKER FUNCTIONED CORRiCTLY AND THE REACTOR WAS PROPERLY SHUT DOWN ~
POST-TRIP REVIEW SHOWED THAT THE ORIGINAL TRIP INITIATOR WAS A SPURIOUS INDICATION OF LOSS OF FLOW DUE TO FAI SE OPEN INDICATION OF THE NO ~ 2 RCP BREAKER. XT XS BELIEVED THAT THE TRIP SIGNAL MAS XN REACTION TO A NOHENTARY DXP IN THi OUTPUT VOLTAGE OF THE CRID AND THE
'LOSS OF RCP'AS THE FIRST REACTION TO THIS VOLTAGE DIP. THIS VOLTAGE DIP IS BELIiVED TO HAVE BEcN CAUSED BY AN INTiRNITTENT SHORTr ACTIVATED BY BUl'lPZNG A RADIATION MONITOR DURING TROUBLE SHOOTING ACTIVITIES THE BREAKER FAILED TO TRIP DUE TO FAILURi OF THE UNDiRVOLTAGE TRIP ASSEMBLY DEVICE TO FUNCTION PROPERLY. THE UNIT 2
'A'. REACTOR TRIP BREAKER HAS BEEN REPLACcO WITH A SPARE BREAKER WHICH HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY INSPECTED AND TESTED PER PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES.
TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: 1) ZEC SUPERVISOR HAS CAUTIONED ALL TECHNXCZANS ANO SUPERVISORS ON THE POTiNTIAL IHPACT OF ACCIDENTAL SHORTING OR COMPONENT FAILURE IN EQUIPHEt<T POWER FRON CRID BUS INVERTERSr 2) PRIOR TO TROUBLiSHOOTING THESE TYPES OF LOADSr EFFORTS MILL BE HADE TO ISOLATE THE COMPONENT FROH THE GRID BUS INVERTERSr 3)
THE REACTOR TRIP AND BYPASS BREAKERS ON BOTH DC COOK UNITS HAVE BEiN THOROUGHLY INSPECTED AND TESTED AND CAN BE RELIED UPON
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
AI
~ 0 0 0 0 1 4 l 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 77 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUt1BER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 317 1982 068 0 821 221 03 84 1 79674 1 1/09/82 DOCKET:317 CALVERT CLIFFS 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACIlITY OPERATOR: BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
SYNBOL: BGE COHHENTS STEP 6 COHP RLX POWER SUPPLY REI AY.'BSTRACT POMER MAS LOST TO 120V AC VITAL BUS A'11 (TECH SPEC 3.8 2.1) A DC FEEDER BREAKER TO THE INVERTER SUPPLYING THIS BUS HAD APPARENTLY BEEN INADVERTENTLY TRIPPED OPEN BY A CONTRACTOR MORKING IN THE AREA ~ DUE TO A FEEDMATER REGULATING VALVE POWER SUPPLY REl AY FAILUREr A REACTOR TRIP ENSUED ~ TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THE EVENTr A MODIFICATION MILL BE PERFORMED TO THE INVERTER CABINETS TO PREVENT INADVERTENT OPENING OF THE BREAKERS
0 e e e e e e e e . e o e e e e o o o e ,
~~
o o o e ~ e o ~ e e o o e o e e e e e
FORN 78 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A******************************~****************************
DOCKiT YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 318 1983 001 1 8306210099 185732 01/04/83
- 4**********************************
DOCKET:318 CALVERT CLIFFS 2 REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINiER: BECH FACXLITY OPERATOR: BALTINORE GAS 8 ELECTRIC CO.
SYNBOL: BGE REFERENCE LERS:
1 318/82-055 ABSTRACT DURING SURVEXLLANCE TESTING AT 0305r 021 VITAL INVERTER TRIPPED RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF 21 VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS (2Y01 ) ~ THE LOSS OF 2Y01 CAUSED PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROLLER 2-PIC-103 TO BE DEiNERGIZED THEREBY SHUTTING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING RETURN ISOLATION VALVE (SI-651) AND RENDERING BOTH SHUTDOWN COOLING LOOPS XNOPERABLE (TECH SPEC 3 4 1 3 A) POWER TO THE CONTROLLER MAS RESTORED AND SHUTDOWN COOLING REESTABLISHED AT 0320r TERN NATING THi EVENT>>
SINILAR EVENT: 50-318/82-55. TESTING AND RESEARCH HAS SHOWN THAT THE VITAL INSTRUYiENT BUS FUSES WiRE XNPROPER. THE PROPER FUSES MERE INSTALLiD XN. BOTH UNXTS'iTAL BUSES UNDER FACILXTY CHANGE 83-1001 ~
THE CURRENT LINITING FiATURE OF INVERTERS 11r 12'1 ANO 22 HAS BEEN RENOVED UNDER THIS CHANG-" ALSO REPLACEMENT OF ALL INVERTERS TO STATi-OF-THE-ART DESIGN IS BEING CONSIDERED ~
0 e e e-o e o o e o o o e e e o 0 e e o I ~ e r
~ II 4 ~ 0 0 0 ~ 0 1 0 ~ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 79 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 321 1981 052 1 8501110347 194555 06/21/81 DOCKET: 321 HATCH 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO.
SYMBOL: GPC REFERENCE LiRS:
1 321/80-082 2 321/80-092 3 321/80-102 ABSTRACT
'B'PCI INVERTER R44-5003 TRIPPED ON 4 SEPARATE OCCASIONS ON HIGH TENP RESULTING IN LOSS OF POWER TO 'B'ECIRCULATION SUCTION ANO DISCHARGE VALVES AND LPCI INJECTION VALVE (MAKING RHR B LOOP INOP)
UNIT 2 'B'PCI INVERTiR 2R44-S003 TRIPPED MHII E SEPARATELY BACKSEATING RECIRCULATION SUCTION AND DISCHARGE VALVES 2B31-F023B AND F031 Bi RESPECTIVELY THE RECIRCULATION VALVES AND LPCI XNJECTION VALVE HAD NO POWER tlAKING RHR 6 LOOP INOPERABLE. TRIPPING OF R44-S003 AND 2R44-S003 WAS ATTRIBUTiD TO DEFECTIVE THERMAL TEMPERATURE SMITCH(ES) IN THE INVERTER LEG(S) ~ BY 7-13-81 ALL DEFECTIVE THERNAL TEHPERATURE SWITCHES MiRE REPLACED IN THE INVERTER LiGS OF R44-S003 AND 2R44-S003
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4'I I"
~ l 0 0 0 1 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t
FORtl 80 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVXSION DCS NU~lBER NSIC EVENT DATE 322 1989 002 0 8904140508 213574 03/09/89 DOCKET: 322 SHOREHAN TYPE:BMR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SMXX FACXLiTY OPERATOR: LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
SYMBOL: LIL COHMENTS STEP 1: CAUSE AX - TESTING WATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR 941 REPORT ASSOCIATED METH 10 CFR 50 '2 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON 3/9/89 AT 2037r A FULL RPS ACTUATION OCCURRED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE POMER TO THE "8" RPS BUS DURING THE PERFORi4lANCE OF AN OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE TEST THE PLANT MAS IN OPERATIONAL CONDITiON 4 (COLD SHUTDOWN) METH THE NODE SIMTCH IN SHUTDOWN AND ALL RODS INSERTED IN THE CORE AFTER EHERGENCY BUS 102 WAS DEENERGIZED DURING A SItlULATED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LOOP) BY PROCEDURE SP (24 307 ~ 02) ANO REENERGIZED BY ITS ASSOCIATED DIESEL (EDG 102) OPERATORS ATTEMPTED TO REENERGIZE TH "8" RPS BUS. THE BUS OEENERGXZATION MAS AN EXPECTED RESPONSEr RESULTXNG IN A 1/2 REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL ~ HOMEVERr THE "8" RPS HG SET OUTPUT BRcAKER MOULD NOT RESET AND REHAIN CLOSED ~ DURING THE COURSE OF TROUBLESHOOTINGr THE WATCH ENGINEER INADVERTENTLY DOMNPOMERED AN APRH XNVERTER ON THE SIOEr THEN REPOWERED IT CAUSING A FALS HIGH FLUX SIGNAL RESULTING IN AN "A" SIDE REACTOR TRiP SINCc THE "8" SIDE REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL MAS ALREADY PRESENT DURING THE TROUBLESHOOTXNGr A FULL REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED ~ PLANT l'1ANAGENENT MAS NOTIFIED AND THE NRC MAS NOTIFIEO AT ZZ15 PER 10CFR50 72 INVESTIGATION REVEALEO THAT TRANSIENTS RESULTiNG FROth THE LOADING OF THE "8" RPS BUS CAUSED A PEAK VOLTAGE OF 135 VAC THE OVERVOLTAGE TRIP SETPOINT OF THE HG SET OUTPUT BREAKER MAS SET AT 129 3 VAC ADJUSTMENTS WERE HADE TO TH VOLTAGE REGULATOR AND THE OUTPUT BREAKER WITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5~
0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 81 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4**************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUthBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 323 1 986 002 1 8703040373 202880 01/17/86 DOCKET:323 D1ABLO CANYON 2 TYPE:PMR REGION 5 NSSS: WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PGEC FACILITY OPERATOR: PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO SYMBOL: PGE COMMENTS STEP 1 CAUSE XX NORMAL LINE-UP FOR PLANT CONDITIONS STEP 3: EFF IH MOMENTARY POWER LOSS STEP 10: LATE 10 CFR 50 72 REPORT MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATED METH 10 CFR 50 ~ 72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
14 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f ulfillrnent o f a sa f ety f unction.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 275/85-005 2 275/85-020 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX AT 0455 PST ON JANUARY 17r 1986r WITH THE UNIT IN MODE 5 (COLO SHUTDOWN) r DURING AN ATTEMPT TO TRANSFER INSTRUthENT AC PANEL PY 2 1 A FROM NORMAL TO BACKUP POWER SUPPLYr AN UNLICENSED OPERATOR MENT TO THE WRONG PANEL AND 1NAOVERTENTLY TRANSFERRED INST RUilENT AC PANE L P Y 2 1 TO ITS BACKUP POWER SOURC E ~ THIS MOMENTAR Y LOSS OF POWER CAUSED RELAY ACTUATIOiN WHICH RESULTEO IN THE CLOSURE OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) VALVE 8702. IN RESPONSE TO THE ENSUING LOSS OF FLOW ALARMr RHR PUMP 2 1 MAS SECURED BY A LICENSED OPERATOR RHR VALVE 8702 MAS REOPENED FROth THE CONTROL ROOM RHR PUMP 2-1 WAS RESTARTEDr OBSERVED FOR SEAL DAtlAGEr ANO DECLARcD OPERABLE AT 0508 PSTr JANUARY 17r 19B6 ~ NO OPERATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS THAT INVOLVED A REDUCTION IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEtl BORON CONCENTRATION THUSr THE REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3 ~ 4 1 4 1 ACTION B WERE MET.
TO PREVENT RECURRENCE THE OPERATOR INVOLVED HAS BEEN COUNSELED OPERATING PROCEDURES ON TRANSFERRING IiNSTRUMENT AC PANEL POWER SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN REVISEDr ANO PANEL IDENTIFICATION LABELS IN THE INSTRUMENT AC PANELS HAVE BEEN UPGRADED ~ DUE TO AN ERROR IN INITIAL DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITYr THE FOUR-HOUR REPORT REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 50 72(B) (2) (III) (B) MAS NOT HADE ~ TO PREVENT RECURRENCEr LICENSED SHIFT OPERATORS HAVE RECEIVED ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON 10 CFR 50.72 REPORTABILITY
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P I
4 % ~
p (
0 e ~ e e o e e e e e ~ o o e o e o ~ e ~ 1
FORM DOCKiT 82 YEAR
'ER LER NUl'lBER SCSS REVISION DATA
- 4*********************************************************
OCS NUtlBER NSIC 09-23"91 EVENT DATE 323 1 987 022 1 8807070194 209780 10/12/87
- +***4**************
DOCKET: 323 DIABLO CANYON 2 TYPi:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGXNiER: PGEC FACILITY OPERATOR: PACIFIC GAS 8 ELECTRIC CO.
SYMBOL: PGE COHH ENTS STEP 3: EFFiCT MX UNKNOMN PARAMETER OF ACTUATION'ATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50 72 60 SPURIOUS/ UNKNOWN CAUSE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
LERS:
REFERENCE 1 323/87-014- 2 323/88-001 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 097% ~ ON OCTOBER 12' 987'T 01 47 POTE WITH THE UNIT IN BODE 1 (POMER OPERATION) AT 97 . ERCENT POM R THE FUEL HANDl ING BUILDING (FHB) VENTILATION SYSTEt1 SHIFTEO INTO THE IODINE RENOVAL MODE THIS NODE CHANGE CONSTITUTES THE ACTUATION OF AN ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE ~ THE FHB VENTILATION SYSTEtl WAS SHIFTED BACK TO THE NORMAL NODE OF OPERATION AT 0220 PDT THE FOUR-HOUR NONEHERGENCY REPORT REQUXRED BY 10 CFR 50.72 MAS COi4lPLETEO BY 0406 PDT THE CAUSE FOR THE FHB ViNTILATION SYSTEM SHIFTING INTO IODINE REMOVAL NODE HAS NOT YiT BEiN IDENTXFIEO THERE WERE NO PRINTOUTS ON THE ANNUNCIATOR TYPEWRITER (IO) XNOICATING A FAN FAILURE OR A RADIATION MONITOR SIGNAL. INVESTIGATION XNCLUDED CHECKS OF THE DIGITAL CIRCUITRY LOGIC DIAGRANS AND LOGIC STATES TO DETERllXNE POSSIBLE CAUSES NO ABNORMALITIES WERE XOENTIFIEO A LOGIC ANALYZER WAS INSTALLED FOR AN 80-DAY PERIOD FOLLOWING THE EVENT TO CONTItlUOUSLY MONITOR THE FHB VENTILAT ON SYSTEM LOGIC CIRCUITRY>> THi iVENT OID NOT RECUR DURING THE 80-DAY PERIOD AND NO SPECIFIC PROBLEH MITH THE CIRCUITRY WAS IDENTIFIED THE FHB VENTILATION SYSTEN h10DE CHANGE FROM NORHAL TO IODINi REl'1OVAL NODE REPRiSENTS A CONSERVATIVE RESPONSi ~ AT NO TINE
.OID AN ACTUAL HIGH RADIATION CONDITION EXIST ~ THEREFORE~ THiRE MERE NO ADVERSE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OR INPLICATIONS RESULTING FROM THIS iVENT ~
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ~
I 1
I I 1
4 0 0 O' 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 O. 0 4 0 0 0 0
FORM 83 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A'***********************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUtlBER NSIC EVENT DATE 324 1986 024 0 8612010160 202015 10/21/86 DOCKET:324 BRUNSMICK 2 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: UEC X FACILITY OPERATOR: CAROLINA POWER 5 LIGHT CO S Yhl BOL: CPL COHHENTS STEP 5: CAUSE AX FOR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE~ STEP 6: ESTIhlATEO 7500-9000 GALLONS OF MATER INJECTED INTO CORE BY CORE SPRAY SYSTEH ~
REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LiVEL OOOO'. AT 0101 HOURS ON 10/21/86'HE UNIT 2 CORE SPRAY (CS) SUBS YSTEHS 'UtlPS A AiVD B AUTOHATICALLY STARTED ANO IN J ECTEO DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES MHILE IN COLD SHUTDOMN FOR A SCHEDULED SHORT-TERM HAINTENANCE OUTAGE THE UNITS 1 AND 2 ihlERGENCY AC DXESEL GENERATORS AUTOMATICALLY STARTED ANO AUTOMATIC INITIATION SIGNALS MERE RFCEIVED BY THE HIGH PRES SURE COOLANT IN JECTION SYSTEhl AND AUTOhlATIC OEPRESSURIZATION SYSTE l. AN ESTIhlATED 7500-9000 GALLONS OF MATER FROhl THE TORUS MAS INJECTED INTO THE REACTOR THE CS SUBSYSTEhlS'UhlPS MERE MANUALLY STOPPED. WITHIN APPROXIt'1ATEI Y FIVE MINUTES THE INITIATION LOGIC SIGNAL MAS RiSET ~ THIS EVENT RESULTEO FROhl PERSONNEL ERROR DURING tlAINTENANCE ACTIVXTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE POWER SUPPLY INVERTERS AND 24 VDC POWER SUPPLXES OF THE DIVISION II EhlERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTiH (ECCS) ANALOG INSTRUhtENTATION CABINET. ELECTRICAL CONTACT OF THE INPUT POWER LEAD TO THE NO. 2 IhlVERTER WAS MOMENTARILY BROKEN WHILE THE NO. 2 INVERTER AND POWER SUPPLY WFRE SUPPLYING POWER TO THi INSTRUhlENTATION CABINET. INVOLVED TECHNICIANS FAILED TO IDENTIFY THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON THE NO 2 INVERTER INSTEAD OF THE NO. 1 INVERTER WHICH WAS ALREADY OiENERGIZED INVOLVED PERSONNEL WERE OISCIPLINEO CONCERNING THIS EVENT ~ APPROPRIATE CHANGES MILL BE HADE TO THE IDENTIFICATION TAGS OF THE INVERTERS ON UNITS 1 ANO 2.
0 e e 0 e o e e o 0 e o e 0 o ~ o o II I
I R
It 4 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 84 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 325 1982 023 0 8204020453 172676 02/11/82
- A********************************************************
DOCKET:325 BRUNSWICK 1 TYPE:BMR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE A RCHITECT URAL EiNGINEER: UEC X FACILITY OPERATOR: CAROLINA POWER 8 LIGHT CO SYtlBOL: CPL COHMENTS ALL 4 EVENTS WERE WITHIN 4 HOURS LAST THREE MERE WITHIN 20 MINUTES ABSTRACT DURING PLANT OPERATIONr A ONE HALF SCRAN SIGNAL ON RPS CHANNEL Br A ONE-HALF GROUP 1 PCIS SIGNALr AN AUTONATIC START OF ALL 4 DIESEL GENERATORSr AN AUTO START OF BOTH "A" AND "B" CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS AND A TRIP OF "B" REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUNP OCCURRED SIt'lULTANEOUSLY THIS EVENT OCCURRED 3 NORE TINES ON 2/12/82. IN EACH CASE NO WATER MAS INJECTED TO THE REACTORY BY ANY ECCS TECH ~ SPECS 3 4 1 ~ 1r 3 ~ 8 ~ 2 ~ 3r 6 9 ~ 1 ~ 98 ~ THESE EVEiNTS OCCURRFD DUE TO UiNSOl DERED WIRING CONNECTIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL CIRCUITRY OF OC ELECTRICAL BATTERY CHARGER 1B-2 AilPLIFIER BOAR Dr PART NO ~ F55 2738 10r WHICH RESULTED IN ACTUATION OF DIVISION 2 RPS AND ECCS ANALOG TRIP UNITS. THE ANPLIFIER BOARD WAS REPLACEDr WITH ONE OF PART NO ~ F55 2738 7r AND THE BATTERY CHARGERr ALONG MITH ITS AFFECTED IiNSTRUtlENTATIONr WAS RETURNED TO NORNAL SERVICE.
0 o o e e e e o e e e o o e e e e e o e o 11 l d 0 0 4 ~ 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 P ~
FORN 85 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 325 1990 001 0 9002080244 21 6701 01/02/90 DOCKET: 325 BRUNSWICK 1 TYPE:BMR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: UECX FACiLITY OPERATOR: CAROLINA POWER 5 LIGHT CO SYMBOL. CPL CONNENTS STEP 1: EFF OX UNSPECIFiEO FAILURE WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUHAN ERROR REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical speci f ication violations.
14 10 CFR 50-73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f ulfillment of a safety function.
REFERENCE LERS 0 1 324/89" 015 ~
2 324/89-016 3 325/89-008 4 325/89-015 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100%. ON JANUARY 2r 1990'HE UNIT 1 REACTOR MAS OPERATING AT 100% POMER. RCiC MAS RENOVED FROM SERVICE. HPCIi ADSr CSr ANO LPCI SYSTENS MERE OPERABLE IN STANDBY READINESS>> AT 1 542 HPCI WAS RENDERED INOPERABLE FOR APPROXINATELY TMO i4lXNUTES WHICH PLACED THE UNIT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFiCATION 3 0 3. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT MAS PERSONNEL ERROR ON THE PART OF A SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR WHO FAILEO TO RESEARCH PLANT DRAWINGS IN ACCORDANCE MITH THE EQUiPNENT CLEARANCE PROCEDURE>> THE FAILURE RESULTED IN THE CIRCUIT BREAKER WHICH SUPPLIES POWER TO THE HPCI 1NVERTER BElNG OPENED UNDER A CLEARANCE FOR RCIC.
THE CIRCUIT HAS BOTH HPCI AND RCIC LOADS THE INVOLVED SRO MAS COUNSELEOr A HEND MAS WRITTEN TO LICENSED PERSONNEL HIGHLIGHTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EQUXPNENT CLEARANCE PROC DURE'LEARANCES ARE CURRENTLY BEING RESEARCHED SEPARATELY BY TMO NRC LICENSED PERSONNEL AND CONPARFD FOR DISCREPANCIES PRTOR TO APPROVAL. THIS EVENT HAD NINIHAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
4 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n
~~4 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 86 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR l ER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUthBER NSIC EVENT DATE 327 1 981 011 0 8104170411 165151 01/30/81 DOCKET:327 SEQUOYAH 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TVAX FACILITY OPERATOR: TENNESSEE VA1 LEY AUTHORITY SYMBOL: TVA COMMENTS 15 PREVIOUS ARE REFERiNCED BUT NOT LISTED MATCH-LiST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
401 VULNiRABILITY OF BURXEO CONPONENTS 914 INADEQUACIES OF INFORMATION ABSTRACT CABLE B30I MAS CUT WHILE CORE DRILLING THIS CABl E SUPPLIES BATTERY POWER TO VITAL INVERTER 1-I THIS RiNDEREO VITAL INSTRUHENT POWER BOARD 1 "I XNOPERATIVE PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES ON ALL EIGHT VITAL INSTRUNENT POWER BOARDS 15. NEM CABLE MAS PULLED THROUGH NEW CONDUIT AND RETiRthil'lATED. THE EXACT LOCATION OF THXS EHBEOOEO CONDUIT WAS NOT SPECIFIiD ON THE WORKPLAN DRAWINGS SINCF IT MAS FIELD ROUTED CONDUIT
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . ~ 0
'A I'
$~ ~
0 0 t 0 t ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
FORM 87 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- k******************************************+************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 327 1987 033 0 8708310007 205894 01/29/87 DOCKET:327 SEQUOYAH 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TVAX FACILITY OPERATOR: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SYMBOL: TVA COMMENTS OTHER RiPORTABILITY VOLUNTARY REPORT STEPS 2i3 COMP XS DISTRIBUTION PANEL TRANSFER SMITCH STEPS 7~8: COMP FU - IN-LINE PROTECTIVE DEVICES STEPS 9r10 MODEL NCX2400 STEP 1 CALCULATIONS MHICH SUPPORT APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS AND SHORT CIRCUIT WITHSTAND CAPABILITIES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PERFORMED.
MATCH LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
21 OTHER: Voluntary reports special reportr Part 21 reports etc.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX ~ ON JANUARY 29'987'ITH BOTH UNITS IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOMN) (0 PERCENT POWER) s A S XGNIFICANT CONOI TION REPORT (SCR) MAS SUBMITTED TO IDENTIFY CONDITIONS POTENTIALLY ADVERSE TO QUALITY ON THE 125 VOLT DC VITAI BATTERY V. THiS REPORT IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS RELATXNG TO ADEQUATE DESIGN CALCUl ATIONS BEING UNAVAILABLE TO ENSURE THE DESIGN BASES OF THE SYSTEM ARE MET TECH SPECS 3.8 2 ~ 3 AND 3 8.2.4 ALLOM USE OF THE VITAL BATTFRY V AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ONE OF THE OTHiR FOUR 125 VOLT DC VITAI BATTERIES (li Iir Illr OR IV)
DURING MODES 1 THROUGH 4 (TECH SPEC 3 8 ~ 2.3) OR MODES 5 AND 6 (TECH SPEC 3 8 2 4). THE VITAL BATTERY V HAS BEEN USiD ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ONE OF THE ORIGINAL FOUR OTHER BATTERIES TO SATISFY TECH SPEC REQUIREHENTS THE CAUSE OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE CALCULATIONS HAS BEEN A LACK OF ESTABLISHED CALCULATION R QUIRENENTS EXISTING TO ENSURE THE DESIGN BASES OF THE PLANT ARE MET ~ AN ESSENTIAL MINIMUM SET OF CALCULATXONS HAVE NOM BEEN SPECIFIED IN A DIVISION OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (Dt)E) r ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH (iEB) PROCEDURE METHOD TO ENSURE THE MINIMUM CALCULATIONS ARE PERFORMED TO SUPPORT THE DESIGN BASES OF THE PLANT ~
~ 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
FORH 88 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A**********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUNBER NSZC EVENT DATE 327 1990 027 0 9011260234 220058 10/17/90 DOCKET:327 SEQUOYAH 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TVAX FACILITY OPERATOR: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SYHBOL: TVA MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR REPORTABiLiTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CF R 50 ~ 73 (a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
11 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii): Unanalyzed conditions.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 32?/87-001 2 327/87-045 3 327/87-061 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON 10/17/90r AT 1606 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME (EDT) ~
WITH UNIT 1 OPERATING IN HOT SHUTDOMNr LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) 3 0 ' MAS ENTERED. LCOS 3.8 '.1 ANO 3 BE SATISFIED WHEN NORE THAN ONE VITAL iNVERTER ANO ONE VITAL BATTERY
' ' ' COULD NOT CHARGER WERE OECLAREO INOPERABLE ~ THE TRAIN "A" VITAL ZNVERTERS AND VITAL BATTERY CHARGERS MERE DECLARED INOPERABLE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF SELECTIVE COORDiNATXON BETWEEN THE INSTRUMENT POWER PRIHARY FUSE ISOLATORS (IPPFiS) ANO THE 480-VOLT (V) FEEDER BREAKERS THAT SERVICE VITAL INVERTERS 1 I ANO 2 lr 1 III AND 2 IXX~ REVISIONS TO THE SQN SELECTIVE COORDINATION CALCULATIONS MERE HADE DURING THE EXTENDED SQN SHUTDOMNr HOWEVERs XOENTIFIED DEFICiENCIES WERE NOT CAPTURED ZN DOCUHENTS TRACKING ONGOING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I THIS S ATTRIBUTEO TO PERSONNEL OVERSIGHT ON THE PART OF THE INDIVXDUAL MHO ZDENTIFIEO THE SELECTIVE COOROINATXON DEF ICZENCZES ~ IHHEOXATE CORRECTiVE ACTIONS WERE INZTIATEO AND MODIFICATIONS MERE ISSUED TO PROVIDE BREAKERS THAT WOULD COORDINATE METH THE IPPFXS. FIELD WORK AND TESTING MAS COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT 12 HOURS ANO AT 0530 EOTr ON 10/1 8/90r THE LCOS MERE EXITED. REViEMS OF RESTART-ERA CALCULATIONS AND 1E TO NON-1E ELECTRICAL INTERFACES MILL BE CONOUCTEO TO VERIFY THAT DEFICIENCIES HAVE BEEN PROPERLY DISPOSITIONED-
~ ~
~ 4 ~
, 4 4
~4 gI
FORM 89 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 328 1983 181 0 8401120386 188429 12/23/83
- %**%******A******************************A*******************
DOCKET:328 SEQUOYAH 2 REGION: 2 A RCHITECT URAI ENGINE cR: TVAX FACILITY OPERATOR: TENNESScE VALLEY AUTHORITY SYMBOL: TVA COMMiENTS STEP 1: CAUSE XX = TO PERFORM A TEST ABSTRACT UNIT 1 IN MODE 5 (130 DEGREES Fr 300 PSIG) AND UNIT 2 IN MODE 1 (100%
POWER) ~ OiN 1 2/23/83'T WAS DISCOVERED. THAT 1 20V AC VITAL INVERT ER 1=I HAD BEEN TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR TEST MI-10.6r "120V VITAL INSTRUMENT POW" R BOARD CHECK"r ANO HAO NOT BEEN RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 24 HOURS. THIS EVENT REQUIRED ENTRY INTO LCO 3 8.2 ~ 1.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES NONE' ONLY UNIT 1 WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE INVERTER WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE ~ THIS INVERTER WAS NOT REQUIRED PER TECH SPECS IN MODE 5 ON UNIT 1i BUT IT WAS REQUIRED FOR UNIT 2 ~
MAXNTENANCE INSTRUCTION 10 6 IS BEING REVISEO TO iNCLUDE SIGNOFFS FOR BOTH UNITS TO ENSURE BOTH UNIT NOTIFICATION AND APPLICABILITY.
0
0 o e e e o ~ e o e o o e e e o o o o e o
, N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i i 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 90 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +**************************************************************4 OOCKFT YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUttBER'SIC EVENT DATE 331 1990 017 0 9010310238 219873 09/20/90 DOCKET:331 ARNOLD TYPE:BMR REGION: 3 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL. ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT 8 POWER CO SYMBOL: IEL COHHENTS STEP 3: EFF IX FAILURE TO TRANSFER BUS LOADS TO STANDBY TRANSFORMER HATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 331 /86-026 2 331 /87-006 ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 000'N SEPTET'IBER 20i 1990'ETH THE PLANT SHUTDOWNr POWER MAS LOST TO THE 'B'NSTRUHENT AC SYSTEH BUS THIS RESULTED IN A PRIHARY CONTAINHENT ISOLATION SYSTEN GROUP V ISOLATION OF THE REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ANO ALSO INITIATEO OPFRATION OF THE ' 'ONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION STANDBY FILTER UNIT THE LOSS OF THE BUS WAS DUE TO THE 'B'NSTRUMENT AC INVERTER TRANSFER OVERRIDE SMITCH INADVERTENT Y SELECTED TO PREVENT THE AUTO-TRANSFER OF BUS LOAD TO THE STAt>DBY 'B'NSTRUMENT AC REGULATING TRANSFORt1ER THE ROOT CAUSE FOR THE OVERRIDE OF THE AUTO-TRANSFER IS UNKNOWN ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO RESTORE THE AFFECTED SYSTEMS- SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION REHOVEO THE TRANSFER OVERRIDE SWITCH TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS EVENT.
0 e e e e e e o e a o e e e e e o e e 4
~ I lt
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 91 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YiAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 333 1981 041 0 8106160263 16661 7 05/15/81
- %*A*********************************************************
DOCKiT: 333 FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACXLITY OPERATOR: POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NY SYMBOL: PNY REFERENCE LERS:
1 333/80-040 2 333/80-072 3 333/80-075 ABSTRACT LPCI MOV INDEPENDENT POWiR SUPPLY INVERTER A TRXPPED WHEN REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE BY TECH. SPEC ~ THE MOV BUS WAS IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO THE MAINTENANCE POWER SUPPLY AND THE B POWER SUPPLY WAS VERIFIED OPERABLE AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC A SHORTEO CAPACITOR IN GATE FIRING MODULE A1 CAUSED FAILURE OF THE LOGIC POWER SUPPLY AND INVERTER TRIP FOLLOWING PARTS REPLACEMENTr THE INVERTER WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE IN A FULLY OPERABLE STATUS IN APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS. LER 80 040r 072 AND 075 ARE RELATED EVENTS ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 a e 0 e e .
0 II 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 92 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4 *********************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC ""VENT DATE 333 1982 056 0 8301170476 1 81 727 1 2/1 5/82
- 4**********************
DOCKET: 333 FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER - SWXX FACiLITY OPERATOR: POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NY SYMBOL: PNY ABSTRACT DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS THE "A" LPCI INVERTER TRIPPEO WHEN REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3 9 F POWER WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE MAINTENANCE SUPPLY AND TH" REDUNDANT SYSTEM WAS VERIFIED OPERABLE AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.9.F.2. THE TRIP TOOK PLACE ON 12/15/82 AND WAS REPAIRED AND MADE OPERABLE WITHIN THE ALLOWED 7-OAY LCO PERIOD ~ THE TRIP WAS A RESULT OF AN ELECTRIC FAILURE THE FAILED COMPONENT WAS A GATE TIMiNG CONTROL CARD ~ THE FAILEO CARO HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE VENDOR FOR FAiLURE ANALYSIS AND REPAIR A COPY OF THE FAILURE ANALYSIS WILL BE ON FILE AT THE JAF SITE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED
0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
' S
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 93 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4*************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUilBER NSIC EVENT DATE 333 1983 063 0 8401270429 188578 12/15/83
- k****************ir*************************
DOCKET: 333 f ITZPAT RICK TYPE:BMR RcGION. 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINE iR: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NY SYHBOL: PNY ABSTRACT DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONr THE "A" LPCI INDEPENDENT POWER SUPPLY TRIPPED ~ THi "A" LPCI BUS MAS PLACED ON MAINTENANCE POWER AND THE SURViILLANCE TESTING WAS PERFORMED PER TECH SPEC 3 9 F 2 REDUNDANT ECCS EQUIPHENT WAS AVAILABLE. INVFSTIGATION OF THE POMER SUPPLY REVEALEO THAT THE UNIT TRIPPED AS THE BATTERY CHARGER SECTION SWITCHED FROM iQUALIZE VOLTAGE TO FLOAT VOLTAGE. NO DEFECTS WERE FOUND AND THE OCCURRENCE COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED. THE POWER SUPPLY MAS RETURNED TO SERVICE 3 HOURS AFTER THE EVENT AND MAS MONITORED CLOSELY DURING THE NEXT EQUALIZING CYCLE NO FURTHER TRIPS WERE OBSERVED
0 o o o e e e e o e o o e o o e o o e e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 94 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91
- 4*********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISXON DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 333 1984 004 0 8403060193 189397 02/10/84 DOCKET:333 FITZPATRICK TYPE-BWR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAI ENGINEER: SWXX FACXLITY OPERATOR: POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NY SYMBOL: PNY REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v): vent that could have prevented f ulfillment of a saf e ty function.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100%. DURING POWER OPERATION W1TH THE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE' D C GROUND OCCURRED ON "k" STATION BATTERY. DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GROUND ISOLATION PROCEDURE THE D C ~ CONTROL POWER TO THE RCIC XNVERTER WAS MOMiNTARILY INTERRUPTED. THE MOMENTARY LOSS OF D C ~
POWER TO THE RCIC INVERTER REQUIRES A MANUAL RESET TO RE-POWER UP THE INVERTER ~ THE GROUND ISOLATION PROCEDURE DID NOT INFORM THE OPERATOR THAT A MANUAL RESET WAS REQUIRED ~ THE LOSS OF BOTH HPCX AND RCIC PLACED THE PLANT ON A 24 HOUR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ~ THE OPERATORr AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE INVERTER WOULD NOT RESET AUTOMATICALLYr PFRFORM D A MANUAL RESET ~ SURVEILLANCE TESTING FOR RCIC OPERABILITY WAS IMMEDIATELY CONDUCTED AND RCIC blAS DECLARED OPERABLE.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS OCCURRENCE WERE MINIMIZED DUE TO THE SHORT OUTAGE OF THE RCIC SYSTiM (APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES) AND BECAUSE THE ADS AND LOW PRiSSURE INJECTION SYSTEMS WERE OPERABLE A CHANGE TO THE GROUND ISOLATION PROCEDURE WAS INCORPORATED TO INSTRUCT THi OPERATOR TO MANUALLY RESET THE RCIC INVERTED
0 e e o e o e e e e o e o o e e e e o o o 0 0 ~ i 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 1 0 0 0 ~ i 0 8
FOR tl 95 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A***********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 334 1982 015 0 8205240529 173454 04/14/82 DOCKET:334 BEAVER VALLEY 1 TYPE:PMR RFGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
SYNBOL: DUQ ABSTRACT THE NO. 3 125VDC BATTERY MAS PUT ON iQUALIZING CHARGE AS PART OF A WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE TEST FOLLOWED BY THE RECEIPT OF THE NO 3 VITAL BUS AND BATTERY OPERATION ALARNS ~ WHILE RESPONDING TO THESE ALARNSr POWER TO THE VITAL BUS THRU ITS INVERTER SUPPLY WAS LOST AT 1345 HOURS POMER TO THE VITAL BUS THRU ITS AUXILIARY SUPPLY WAS ESTABLISHED AT 1350 HOURS THE ALARNS MERE THE RESULT OF THE CHARGER OUTPUT EXCEEDING THE NORMAL AC SUPPLY TO THE INVERTER CAUSING A TRANSFER OF POWER TO THi DC BUS SOURCE. THIS MAS CORRECTED BY AN ADJUSTNENT OF THE CHARGER EQUALIZING SETPOINT WHICH MAS FOUND SLIGHTLY ABOVE ITS NOMINAL VALUE THE VITAL BUS POWER LOSS WHICH OCCURRED MAS THE RESULT OF A PERSONNEL ERROR
0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 '
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
FORN 96 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91
- k****************%******%*******A'**********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUfABER NSIC EVENT DATE 334 1990 002 0 9002270257 216952 01/19/90
- A************+*****************************************
DOCKET:334 SEA VER VALLEY 1 TYPE: PMR REGION: 1 NSSS:
A RCHITECT URAL ENGiNEER: SWXX FACiLiTY OPERATOR: DUQUESNE LIGHT CO S YNBOL: DUQ MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE-35 HUMAN ERROR REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100'N 1/14/90 AT 0325 HOURS'HE 120VAC INVERTER FOR VITAL BUS NO 3 EXPERIENCED A BLOWN DC INPUT FUSE. THE INVERTER MAS BYPASSED AND ALIGNED TO THE 480VAC EMERGENCY POWER TO SUPPLY THE 120VAC NO 3 VITAL BUS ~ ON 1/19/90r NRC INQUIRED AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3 8.2 1i WITH RESPECT TO THE NO ~ 3 XNVERTER. THE STATION HAS HISTORICALLY INTERPRETED THAT VXTAL BUS OPERABILITY DiD NOT REQUIRE THE INVERTER TO BE OPERABLE TO NEET THE EXISTING WORDING OF THE TECHNICAL SPECiFICATION NRC ACCEPTANCE OF REVISED TS 3~8~2 1 (REV~ 5)s REQUIRED THE INVERTERS TO BE OPERABLE AFTcR DISCUSSXONS WITH NRC STATION HANAGEHENT CONHITTED TO A REVXSEO INTERPRETATION OF VITAL BUS OPERABILITY WITH RESPECT TO TS 3.8.2.1. A VOLUNTARY MANUAL SHUTDOWN WAS COHNENCEO AT 1622 HOURS ON 1/19/90. THE STATION REACHED HOT SHUTDOWN AT 1808 HOURS ON 1/19/90 ~ AT 201 5 HOURSr THE NO ~ 3 INVERTER MAS RETURNED TO SERVXCE AT 2115 HOURSr THE NO 3 INVERTER MAS DECLARED OPERABLE THE CAUSE FOR THIS EVENT MAS NANAGE~lENT ACTION iN RESPONSE TO NRC DISCUSSION AS TO THE iNTENT OF THE REVISED TS 3 8.2 1 ~ ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE HAS BEEN ISSUED CLARIFYING THE INTENT OF TS 3.8 2 1 ~ THERE MERE NO SAFETY IHPLICATXONS AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. THE NO 3 VITAL BUS RENAINED ENERGIZED THROUQHOUT THE ENTIRE TINE PERIOD THE INVERTER MAS OUT OF SERVICE ~
0
~ ~
FORM 97 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A'******* *****************
A ********************** A ********
DOCKET YiAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 335 1981. 053 0 8201060355 171 810 11/25/81 DOCKET:335 ST LUCIE 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER R. LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL COMMENTS WATCH 975 LOSS OF CONTROL ROOt'l ALARM FUNCTION.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LiR ARF:
975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT REFERENCE LERS:
1 335/79-028 ABSTRACT B2 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER FAILEDr DEENERGIZING THE B2 480V LOAD CENTER ABOUT 3 MINUTES LATER THE 2 TIE BREAKERS FEiDiNG THE AB DC BUS FROM THE B BUS TRIPPED'E'ENERGI ZING THE AB DC BUS ~ LOSS OF THIS CAUSED A LOSS OF AB CONTROL POWiR AND 120V VITAL AC WHICH FEEDS Al L CONTROL ROOM ALARMS BUT NOT INSTRUMENTS ~ THE DC BUSs 120V AC AND ALARMS WERE RESTORiD WITHIN 15 MINUTES SEE LER 335-79-28 FOR RELATED EVENTS. THE B TO AB TIE BREAKERS WERE THOROUGHLY TESTED AND INSPECTED A LOOSE POWER TERMiNATION WAS DISCOVERED ON THE B SIDE BREAKER AND THE INSTANTANEOUS OVER CURRENT TRIP WAS SET ON 'LO'N BOTH BREAKERS THE TRiP WAS RESET TO HI PER DESIGN ANO ALL CONNECTIONS WERE TORQUED. ALL SIMILAR BREAKERS WERE CHECKED
e o o o o e o ~ e o o o e e e e o o e e '
t~
0 e o e e e e o e o o e e e e e e o e ~
FORM 98 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A*********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LiR NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 335 1982 026 0 8208020416 175205 06/22/82
- +*********************************4*4**4************************
DOCKET-335 ST LUCIE 1 TYPE:PWR RiGION: 2 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL El'tGINEER: EBAS FACXLITY OPERATOR: FLORiDA POWER lt LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL REFERENCE LERS 1 335/76-026 ABSTRACT TWXCE DURING NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATIONr ONE OF TH 4 REDUNDANT 120 VOLT AC INSTRUMENT POWER BUSSES 'WAS LOST WHEN THE OUTPUT BREAKER OF THE 1A STATIC XNVERTER OPENED THE SECOND EVENT OCCURRED ON 06"23-82 (29 HOURS LATER). EACH EVENT CAUSED THE LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION ANO ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS. IN BOTH CASES THE BUS WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE IMMEDIATEIY BY USi OF THE ASSOCIATED MAXNTEtlAtlCE BYPASS BUS ~ UPON INVESTIGATION IN EACH CASEs NO APPARENT CAUSE FOR THE EVENTS WAS FOUND. THE 1A INVERTER WAS FOUND TO BE FUNCTIONING PROPiRLY ~ AFTER THE SECOND OCCURRENCES THE OSCILLATOR CIRCUIT BOARD WAS REPLACED AS A PREVENTIVE tlEASURE BASED UPON A PREVIOUS EVENT OF THIS TYPE (REF LER 335-76-26). THE OUTPUT BREAKER WAS RECLOSED AND THE LINE UP RETURNED TO NORMAL.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
'l 1 0 l l 0 0 0 0 1 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4}
FORN 99 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A******4******************A*******************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 335 1982 067 0 8301 21 001 2 1 81 729 1 2/25/82
- 4**************************************************************
DOCKET: 335 ST ~ LUC IE 1 TYPE:PWR RFGION: 2 NSSS:Ci ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL REFERENCc LERS:
1 335/82-026 ABSTRACT DURING NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATIONr ONE OF FOUR RiDUNDANT 1 20 VOLT AC INSTRUilENT POWER BUSSES WAS LOST WHEN THE OUTPUT BREAKER OF THE 1 A STATIC INVERTER OPENED. THE EVENT CAUSED A LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION ANO ENGINEEREO SAFEGUAROS SYSTENS THE BUS MAS IHHiOIATELY RETURNED TO SERVICE BY USE OF THE ASSOCIATED MAINTENANCE BYPASS BUS SEE LER 82-26 FOR A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION INTO THi EViNT RcVEALEO A DEFECTIVE OUTPUT FREQUENCY NODULE. THE HODULE MAS AOJUSTEDr THi OUTPUT BREAKER RECLOSEOr ANO THE LINEUP RETURNED TO NORMAL'
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
t t e 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
FORN 100 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +**************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUflBER NSIC EVENT DATE 335 1982 068 0 8302010467 181486 12/20/82
- A******ie*****************+**********************************
DOCKET:335 ST LUCIE 1 TYPE:PWR REGION 2 NSSS:CE ARCHiTECTURAL ENGINEER: iBAS FACILITY OPcRATOR FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL REFERENCE LERS:
1 335/82-026 2 335/82-067 ABSTRACT DURING NORNAL FULL POWER OPERATIONs ONE OF FOUR REDUNDANT 1 20 V AC INSTRUMENT POMER BUSSES WAS LOST WHEN THE OUTPUT BREAKER OF THE 1A STATIC INVERTER OPENiD ~ THIS CAUSED A LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION AND iNGINEEREO SAFEGUARDS SYSTEHS ~ THE BUS WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE BY USE OF THE ASSOCIATEO NAINTENANCE BYPASS BUS THiS IS THE THIRD EVENT OF THIS TYPE. SEE LER 82-26 ANO LER 82-67.
INVESTIGATION INTO THIS EVENT OISCLOSEO NO APPARiNT CAUSE OF FAILURF THE INVERTER CONTACTS MiRE CLEANED AND TESTEOi AND THE INVERTER MAS PLACED BACK IN SERVICE
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
FORH 101 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A ******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 335 1982 071 0 8302140109 181038 12/30/82
- A********************************k*****************************
DOCKET:335 ST LUCIE 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POMER 8 LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL COt1MENTS FIFTH INVERTER FAILURES FOURTEENTH IODINE SPIKE ABSTRACT WHILE TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKiR 07 WAS ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED FOR NAINTENANCEr ONi OF THE FOUR 120 VAC INSTRUNENT POWiR BUSSES WAS LOST MHEN THE OUTPUT BREAKER OF THE 1A STATiC INVERTER OPENED ~ FOUR TCBS OPENED CAUSING AN OPEN CIRCUIT IN THE RPS TRIP LOGIC. THE TURBINE AND REACTOR TRIPPEO. DUE TO THE TRANSIENT A DEQ I-131 SPIKE OCCURRED (SEE ATTACHED) THIS IS THE 5TH INVERTER FAILURE AND THE 14TH IODINE SPIKE ~ UPON INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSE OF THE TRIPr IT WAS DETERNINED THAT THE FREQUENCY OSCILLATOR FOR THE 1A INViRTER HAO DRIFTEO THE OSCILLATOR CIRCUIT BOARD WAS REPLACED THE OUTPUT BREAKER MAS RECLOSED AND THE LINE UP RETURNED TO NORi4IAL
e e e e o ~ e o o e e a e e e ~ e .
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.O 0
FORM 102 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4**************************
DOCKiT YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATi 335 1985 011 0 8601080685 198168 11/29/85 DOCKiT:335 ST ~ LUCXE 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:Ci ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY S YH BOL: FPL COHH ENTS STEP 4: COMP HSC-SPRING STEP 5: COHP MEI-FUSE HOLDERS PART NO. KP-351.
RiPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON 11-29-85 AT 13:16 ST. LUCXE 1 HAD AN UNEXPFCTED ACTUATION OF THE 'A'RAIN OF THE ESFAS DUE TO POOR ELECTRICAL CONTACT IN A FUSE HOLDiR THE UNIT WAS SHUT DOMN FOR NORMAI REFUELING THE ONLY EQUIPMENT AFFECTiD WERE CCW TO REACTOR COOLANT PUHPS 1A1 AND 1A2 WERE ISOLATED AND THE CONTAINMENT BLDG PURGE WAS SECURED THIS ESFAS ACTUATION MAS CAUSED BY A PARTIAL LOSS OF POMER TO THi a As TRAIN ACTUATION CABINET EACH ACTUATION TRAIN IS NORMAL! Y POWERED FROM 2 AUCTIONEERiD POWER SOURCES (INSTRUHENT BUSSES A AND C FOR THE 'A'RAIN) ~ AS A PLANNED ""VOLUTION FOR PLANT NODIFICATIONi THE 1A2 480V LOAD CENTER WAS DE-ENERGIZED AT 13:09 THIS MAS THE POWER SUPPLY TO THE C INSTRUMENT BUS. THE C INVERTER MAS NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE IT WAS BEING REPLACED. SEVEN MINS LATER AT 13:16 A FUSE TO A 24V UNREGULATED LOGIC POMER SUPPLY FROM THE A SIDE FAULTED BECAUSE OF POOR El ECTRICAL CONTACT. THIS RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF POWER FROtl BOTH SOURCES AND GAVE THE 'A'RAIN ACTUATION~ THE REASON THAT THE ELECTRICAL CONTACT FOR THE 'A'IDE POWER SUPPLY FUSE DEGRADED WAS THAT THE SPRING IN THE FUSE CAP WAS REI AXEOr AND THUS NOT PROVIDING PROPER TENSION THESE FUSE HOLDERS WERE FOR SHALL GLASS FUSES WITH A PUSH AND TURN 1/4 TURN TYPE CAP ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0
FOR h1 1 03 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91-DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 335 1987 010 0 8705210283 204483 04/14/87 k****************************************A**************************
DOCKET: 335 ST. LUCIE 1 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUh1AN ERROR REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 335/82-071 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON APRIL 14'987/ AT 1204 HOURSr ST ~ LUCIE UNIT 1 WAS TRIPPED FROM MODE 2 (POWER </= 5%r AV ERAGE COOLANT TEMP ERATURE
>/= 325 DEGRCES F ) DUE TO THE LOSS OF TWO INSTRUMENT INVERTERS AND THE SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE 1MO ANO 1MB 120 VOLT AC BUSSES (EIIS:EF)
THE LOSS OF THE AC BUSSES RESULTED IN THE ACTUATION OF THE DEENERGIZE TO ACTUATE FUNCTIONS OF THE REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM (RPS) (EIIS: JC)
AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) (EIIS.JE) ~
THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS A COGNITIVE PERSONNEL ERROR ON THE PART OF A UTILITY NON-LICENSED OPERATOR IN FOLLOWING A PLANT APPROVED PROCEDURE FOR THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE 120 VOLT AC CLASS 1E SYSTEMS IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED THE RESETTING OF ALL TRIP SIGNALS AND THE RESTORATION OF ALI AFFECTED EQUIPMENT TO THE NORMAL OPERATING STATUS'ND THE COUNSELING OF THE NON LICENSED OPERATOR BY HIS SUPERVISOR ON THE NEED FOR GREATER ATTENTiON TO DETAIL WHIl E PERFORMING HIS JOB FUNCTIONS. LONGTERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE THE REVISION OF THE PROCEDURE TO INCLUDE A CAuTION STATEMENT IN THE SECTION DISCUSSING THE REMOVAL OF INSTRUMENT INVERTERS FROM SERVICEi AND A REVIEW OF THIS EVENT BY THE PLANT TRAINING DEPARTh1ENT TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS ANO t'lETHOOS
4 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r a
~~
U I'I ll 1 4 i ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 104 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 4 **************** ***************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMB ER REVISION DCS NUt'lB E R -
NS IC E V ENT DATE 336 1982 002 0 8202090098 172670 01/06/82
- 4***********************************
DOCKET: 336 MILLSTONE 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO SYMBOL: NNE ABSTRACT WITH THE PLANT SHUTDOWN FOR REFUELINGr FUSES IN INVERTERS 2 AND 6 BLEW RESULTING IN LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUNENT PANEL VA-20 CAUSING CLOSURE OF THE OVERPRESSURE CIRCUIT FOR SHUTDOMN COOLING MHICH CAUSED VALVE 2-S1-652 TO CLOSE SHUTDOWN COOLING MAS RESTORED IN 7 HINUTES A SHORT CXRCUXTED TEST LEAD CAUSED A PRINTED CIRCUIT TO FAXL THE LOAD WAS TRANSFERRED FROtl INVERTER 2 TO INVERTER 6. A LARGE CURRENT FLOW RESULTEDr WHICH BLEW THE FUSES IN BOTH INVERTERS A DEPARTMENTAL HEHO WAS ISSUED TO ALL TECHNICIANS TO CHECK ALL LEADS PRIOR TO TEST EQUIPHENT
0 e e o e e e e o e e e e o o e e o e e e J
It tl Ih tl Ih e e o o ~ o e o o e e e o o e e e e e e O
FORH 105 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER RiVISXON DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 336 1982 024 0 8207200148 175402 06/06/82
- k*****************************A******************************
DOCKET:336 HILLSTONi 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO ~
S YHBOL: NNE ABSTRACT 120 VOLT AC (VIAC-1) WAS LOST. THE LOSS OF VIAC-1, CAUSED THE POWER FUSES TO BLOW IN FACXLITY I ESAS CABINET THE PLANT OPERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.8 ~ 2.1 AND 3.3.2 ~ 1. VIAC-1 WAS DEENERGIZED FOR APPROXIHATELY 4 HOURS. THE FACILITY I ESAS CABINET WAS DEENERGIZED FOR APPROXIMATELY 6 1/2 HOURS SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:
NONE THE INVERTER IS A SOLID STATE CONTROLS INC ~ i HOOEL SV 12150/TS-150 NB A ROOF LEAK RESUI TiNG F RON ABNORMALLY HEAVY RAINS ALLOWED WATER TO-ENTER THE TOP OF THE INVERTERr SHORTING THE CIRCUITRY THE ALTERNATE 120 VOLT AC SOURCE WAS UNAVAILABLE AT THE TINE ~ THE INVERTiR WAS INSPECTED AND WETTED COMPONENTS CORRECTEO THE FACILITY I ESAS CABINiT FUSES MERE REPLACED WHEN VIAC-1 WAS RESTORED. A MATER SHIELD HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR INVERTERS 5 ANO 6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 . 0 ~ 0 I
4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
F OR Jit 106 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +***************************+***
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 336 1986 014 0 8612040483 202026 10/29/86
- A***********************************************************
DOCKET: 336 MILLSTONE 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 1 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACiLITY OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
S YHBOL: NNE CONHENTS STEP 1 " 3: HODEL 0 APH 22B-G25 BETA SCINTiLLATION PROBE NNC-SC-2B STEP 6:
CAUSE AX - OUT FOR TES) ING. STEP 8: COMP XS STATIC SMITCH ~
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 336/85-002 2 336/85-007 3 336/86-009 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%. THIS LER ADDRESSES TMO (2) UNRELATED EVENTS CONCERNiNG ENGlNEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) SYSTEN ACTUATIONr RESULTING IN A CONTAINNENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION. AT 0234 HOURS ON OCTOBER 29r 198o WITH THE UNIT lN NODE 6r AN AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF THE ESF SYSTEH OCCURRED RESULTING IN A CONTAINNENT PURGE ISOLATiON SIGNAL. ALL EQUXPHENT ANO PERSONNEL FUNCTIONED AS EXPECTED. THIS AUTOHATZC ACTUATION MAS ATTRIBUTEO TO A NOISE SPIKE IN RADIATION i'MONITOR (R51) 8123A THE RAD MONITOR MAS ABLE TO BE RESET ZHthEOIATELY ANO NO OTHER RAD MONITORS SHOWED ANY CHANGE DURING THIS EVENT THE ESF SIGiitALS MERE RESET AtJD CONTAINNENT PURGlNG MAS REINITIATED~ NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED AT 1 430 HOURS ON OCTOBER 29r 1 986r MITH THE UNIT IN NODE 6r AN AUTOi~lATIC ACTUATION OF THE ESF SYSTEH OCCURRED RESULTING IN A CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION SXGNAL.
THIS ACTUATIOt'J MAS DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR WHICH CAUSED A LOSS OF POWER TO THE FACILITY ONE ESF ACTUATION CABINET LOSS OF POWER CAUSED, THE CONTAINHENT PURGE VALVES TO ISOLATE ~ ALL EQUiPMENT FUNCTIONEO AS REQUIRED AND NO OTHFR ESF ACTUATIONS OCCURRED. POWER MAS RESTORED TO THE ESF CABINET THE ESF SIGNALS MERE RESET AND CONTAINltENT PURGE REINZTZATED NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0
FORM 107 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 .
- 4***A*******%***************************************************
DOCKET YFAR LER NUHBER REVISXON DCS NUt1BER NSIC EVENT DATE 336 1991 002 0 9102220260 221064 01/18/91
- +************************
DOCKET:336 HILLSTONE 2 REGION: I ARCHXTECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILXTY OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO SYHBOL: NNE WATCH"LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY 91 3 UPDATE NEEDED REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THXS LER ARE 10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100/ ON 1/18/91 AT 1330 HOURS WITH THE PLANT AT 100K POWER AND NORI'1AL OPERATIONS THE PLANT WAS NOTIFIED OF THE RESULTS OF AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION THAT HAD DETERHINED THAT OPERATION OF THE FOUR VITAL 1 20 VOLT ALTERNATING CURRENT (AC) BUSES ON THEIR ALTERNATE SOURCES IS UNSATISFACTORY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FOUR VITAL AC BUSES ARE DESCRIBED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3.8.2.1 THXS IS BEING REPORTED AS AN OPERATION OR CONDITION PROHIBXTED BY THE PLANT-'S TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF A REVISED INTERPRETATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. PREVIOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE REQUIRENENTS OF SECTION 3 8 ~ 2 1 WAS THAT IT REQUIRED THE VITAL 120 VOLT BUSES BE ENERGIZED TO BE CONSIDERED OPERABLE. FOLLOWING THE REVIEM OF THE ENGINEERING EVALUATIONr THE DETERMINATION MAS HADE THAT SXNCE THE ALTERNATE SOURCES OF POWER FOR THE VITAL 120 VOLT AC BUSES ARE NON VITALS THEN OPERATION OF THE UNIT WITH THESE BUSSES POWERED FROM ALTERNATE SOURCES FOR A PERIOD OF TINE LONGER THAN ALLOWED BY .THE ACTION STATEMENT (8 HOURS) WOULD NAKE THE BUSSES INOPERABLE ~ TO AVOID A RECURRENCEr SPECIFIC WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO INFORN THE PLANT OPFRATING STAFF OF THE REVISEO INTERP RETATION OF SECTION 3 8 ~ 2 1 r AND OF THE REQUIREMENTS TO ENTER THE ACTION STATE!RENT IF ANY OF THE FOUR VITAL 120 VOL'T AC BUSES ARE POMERED FRON THEIR ALTERNATE SOURCES.
0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S ~
'& D 4 [ 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0=
FORH 108 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4******************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 336 1991 003 0 9103210046 221230 02/12/91
- %*****A***************************************************
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
S YiNBOL: NNE CONHENTS OTHER REPORTABILITY 10 CFR 50.72(B) (2) (III)(A) STEP 10: PSYS SH DC SMITCHGEAR ROOHS.
'WATCH LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY 40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY 941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50.72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f ulfillment of a saf ety func.ion.
21 OTHER: Voluntary reportr special reports Part 21 reports etc ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100X ON FEBRUARY 12r 1991 AT 1055 HOURSr MHXLE THE PLANT WAS AT 100/ POWERS A REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION blAS 'ADE CONCERNING A DESIGN INADEQUACY NOTED BY A UNIT 2 PROBABILISTXC SAFETY STUDY THE STUDY DETERHINED THAT A LOSS OF INSTRUNENT AXR COULD RESULT IN THE EVENTUAL LOSS OF BOTH VITAL DC SWITCHGEAR TRAINSr DUE TO THE LOSS OF ROON COOLING. THE REPORTABXLITY EVALUATION DETERNINEO THAT BOTH DC SMXTCHGEAR TRAINS WERE INOPERABLE ANO AN INHEDIATE REPORT WAS iMADE (IRF 91-19) PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR50 72 (B) (2) (III) (A) PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE REPORTABILITY DETERMINATIONS WHEN THE PROBLEH MAS ORlGINALLY.
RECOGNIZEOr A PROCEDURE CHANGE WAS INPLEHENTED TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCY UPON A LOSS OF INSTRUNENT AIR THE NORMAL CHXLLED WATER FLOM TO THE DC SMITCHGEAR COOLERS IS ISOLATED HOMEVER UNLESS THERE IS A CONCURRENT SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATIONr THE VITAL CHILLED WATER PUMPS AND CHILLERS DO NOT RECEIVE A START SIGNAL ~ THE RESULT WOULD BE THE LOSS OF VENTILATION COOLING TO BOTH OC SWITCHGEAR ROOHSi POSSIBLY FOLLOWED BY INVERTER ANO DC EQUIPNENT FAILURE THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DESIGN INADEQUACY THE DESIGN DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE LOSS OF XNSTRUHENT AIR F AILURE HOOE OF THE NORMAL CHILL MATER SUPPLY VALVES
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 e e e o e ~ e e e ~ o e e e e e e o o ~ o 0
F ORth 109 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A***A*****************************************************
DOCKiT YEAR LER NUhlBER REVISION DCS NUhlBER NSIC EVENT DATE 338 1980 078 1 8010140436 163519 09/08/80
- i<*********************A**********************4*******
DOCKET:338 NORTH ANNA 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SMXX FACiLITY OPERATOR: VIRGINIA ELECTRIC POWER CO SYNBOL: VEP COtlNENTS STEP 7: ISYS SM UNKNOWN STRUCTURES'OhlP hlEI - FLOW ORIFICE ~ REFERENCE LER 338/80-080 DESCRIBES EVENTS RELATED TO INVERTER FAILURE.
REFERENCE LERS 1 338/80-080 2 338/80-087 ABSTRACT POllER LEVEL 000%. CAUSE - INCORRECT GOVERNOR SETTING THE GOVERNOR VALVE FOR THE STEAN DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUhlP WAS FOUND TO BE IN THE TRIPPED CONDITION RENDERING THE PUMP INOPERABLE THE GOVERNOR VALVE APPARENTLY TRIPPED DUE TO PUhlP OVcRSPcED FOLLOWiNG A UNIT TRiP.
THE CAUSE OF THE OVERSPEiD MAS APPARENTLY AN INCORRECT GOVERNOR SETTING ~ THE GOVERNOR VALVE WAS RESETr THE GOVERNOR VALVE SiTTING ADJUSTED TO ITS PROPER SETTiNG AND THE PERiODIC TEST ON THE AUXILIARY FEEDMATER PUMP MAS CONPLiTELY SATISFACTORILY.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 h
k 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORtl 110 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91,
- +****A***************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISXON DCS NUttBER NSIC EVENT DATE 338 1980 080 1 8010140423 1 63521 09/08/80
- %A*********************************************************
DOCKET:338 NORTH ANNA 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SMXX FACILITY OPERATOR: VIRGINIA ELECTRIC POWER CO SYNBOL: VEP CONffENTS REFERENCE LER 338/80 078 DESCRIBES EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE SCRAM.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 338/80-078 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% CAUSE UNKNOWN POWER TO THE 120 VOLT A C. VITAL BUS 1-IV WAS LOST CONTRARY TO TECH SPEC THE SUPPLY BREAKER FOR THE XNVERTER WHICH SUPPLIES POWER TO VITAL BUS IV WAS FOUND IN THE OPEN POSITION HOW THE BREAKER BECANE OPEN COULD NOT BE DETERMINED ~ POWER TO THE VITAI BUS MAS RESTORED VIA THE INSTALLED TRANSFORHER ~ POWER SUPPLY TO THE VITAL BUS WAS LATER SWITCHED TO THE XNVERTER.
~~
~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 t 0 0 0
FORI1 111 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 338 1982 078 1 8301200330 180732 11/25/82
- A***********************************************
DOCKET:338 NORTH ANNA 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER SMXX FACILITY OPERATOR: VIRGINIA ELECTRIC POWER CO.
SYHBOL: VEP ABSTRACT 120V AC ViTAL BUS 1-IV LOST VOI TAGE DUE TO THE FAILURE OF ITS NORHAL POWER SUPPLY INVERTER 1-VB-I-04. THIS EVENT IS CONTRARY TO TECH SPEC 3 8 2 1 AND REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6 9.1 9 B POWER SUPPLY TO ViTAL BUS 1-iV WAS HANUAl LY SWITCHED TO THE VOLTAGE REGULATING TRANSFORMER THE INVERTER MAS EXANINED AND FOUND TO HAVE A FAILED OSCILLATOR BOARDS TRANSFORHER AND FUSE. THESE COMPONENTS MERE SUBSEQUENTLY REPLACED AND THE INVERTER TESTED SATISFACTORII Y.
t+Q 0
FORM 112 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91.
- dr*************k**********************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 338 1983 042 0 8307120562 184232 06/06/83 DOCKET:338 NORTH ANNA 1.
REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILXTY OPERATOR: VIRGINIA ELECTRIC, POWER CO ~
S YNBOL: VEP ABSTRACT ON JUNE 6r 1 983'ITH UNIT 1 AT 100% POWER VITAL BUS 1 -I WAS HOHENTARILY DE-ENERGIZED MHILE TRYING TO CLEAR AN INVERTER TROUBLE ALARH THE TEMPORARY POMER LOSS CAUSED A TURBINE TRIP AND REACTOR TRIP THE REACTOR MAS STABILIZED IN NODE 3 AND ALL REACTOR PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED NORMALLY. THIS EVENT IS WITHIN THE LCO FOR TECH SPEC 3.8 2 1. AND REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6 9 1 9 B THE VITAL BUS MAS DE-ENERGIZED DUE TO OPERATOR ERROR DURING TRANSFER OF THE BUS FROM THE INVERTER TO THE ALTERNATE AC SOURCE THE HONENTARY LOSS OF POWER RESULTED IN A TURBINE TRIP AND CONSEQUENTlY A REACTOR TRIP THE VITAL BUS MAS IHMEDIATELY ENERGIZED FROH THE ALTERNATE AC SOURCE.
0 e e o e e e o e e e o e o e e e e o o t~
0 ~ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 113 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A****************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSiC EVENT DATE 339 1985 006 0 8505170283 194588 04/26/85
- %************************************A*****************A DOCKET:339 NORTH ANNA 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SMXX FACILITY OPERATOR: VIRGINIA ELECTRiC POWER CO>>
SYHBOL: VEP REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
~ 13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% AT 0915 ON 4-26-85 UNIT 2 TRIPPEO FROM 100% POMER WHEN THE 120V AC VITAL BUS 2-I WAS INADVERTENTLY DE-ENERGIZED. THE 120V AC VITAL BUS 2-I SUPPLIES POWER TO THE RELAY MHICH SENSES THE BREAKER POSITION OF REACTOR COOLANT PUNP 'A'. WHEN THE 2-I 120V AC VITAL BUS MAS DE ENERGIZ Or THIS RELAY MAS DE ENERGIZED WHICH CAUSED THE RPS TO SENSE THAT THE EACTOR COOLANT PUHP BREAKER WAS OPEN A REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL MAS GENERATED AS A RESULT OF THE RPS SENSING THE
'A'EACTOR COOLANT PUHP BREAKER OPEN COINCIDENT WITH REACTOR POWER GREATER THAN 30%. REACTOR COOLANT PUHP 'A'ID NOT ACTUALLY TRIP DURING THIS EVFNT POWER MAS RESTORED TO THE 120V AC VITAL BUS 2-I WITHIN SECS BY OPERATOR ACTION. ALL PLANT PARAHETERS RESPONDED AS EXPECTED THE UNIT MAS RETURNED TO CRITICALITY ON 4-27-85 AND REACHED 100% P OM E R 4-30-85.
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0
~ ~ I t
Il 4 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ . 0 0 9
FORM 114 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4********** +*****************************************%'***********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUtlBER NSIC EVENT DATE 341 1988 006 0 8804050172 208725 02/29/88 DOCKET:341 FERMI 2 TYPE:BMR REGION: 3 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGENEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: DETROIT EDISON CO ~
SYMBOL: OEC COMMENTS STEP 2: EFF IX TRANSFERRFO TO ALTERNATE SOURCES SL/TP.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR REPORTABELETY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE-
' 13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS-1 341/87-037 2 341/88-002 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX ON FEBRUARY 29'988 AN UNEXPECTED LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING MAS EXPERIENCED AFTER THE TRANSFER OF THE "B" REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) POWER SUPPLY THE OPERATOR'S PROMPT ACTION STOPPED THE RHR SHUTDOMN COOLING ISOLATION VALVE HID-STROKE AND REVERSED ITS MOVEMENT THE RHR PUMP TRIPPED AS A RESULT OF THE VALVEeS MOVEMENT SHUTDOWN COOLING MAS RESTORED IN APPROXIMATELY ONE H NUTE. NO CHANGE IN VESSEL TEMPERATURE WAS OBS RVED ~ APPARENTLY'HE OPERATOR DED NOT PROPERLY RESET THE ISOLATION VALVE'S CLOSURE LOGIC AFTER THE TRANSFER REQUIRED READING WAS ISSUED ON THES EVENT AND CAUTIONS MERE ADDED TO THE APPROPRIATL SECTiON OF THE OPERATING PROCEDURE. THE OPERATING PROCEDURE WILL BE REVISED TO INCLUDE ACTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ACTUATION OF THE ISOLATEON VALVE'S CLOSURE LOGIC
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 '
f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 115 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUiMBER NSIC EVEiNT DATE 344 1980 025 0 8012230455 162436 11/12/80
- re********************************************
DOCKET:344 TROJAN TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGIiNEER: BFCH FACILITY OPERATOR: PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
SYi'IBOL: PGC ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100X CAUSE LICENSED OPERATOR USED WRONG ELECTRICAL LINEUP. IT MAS DISCOVERED THAT THREE VITAL PREFERRED 120V AC INSTRUMENT BUSESr Y11r Y13 AND Y24r MERE POWEREO FROM THE SAN EMERGENCY POMER SOURCE TRAIN THE CAUSE MAS THE FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY DETERMINE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE ALTERNATE El ECTRICAL SUPPLY LINEUP PRIOR TO REMOVING ONE OF TMO VITAL BUS SUPPLIES FROM SERVICE NORNAL POWER SUPPLY WAS REESTABLISHED ANO PROCEDURES TO CONTROL SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPHENT OUTAGES MILL BE IMPROVED ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~O 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ ~
FORH 116 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A***************%********************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 344 1 982 001 1 8203100571 172511 01/18/82 DOCKET:344 TROJAN REGION: 5 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
S YYiBOL: PGC COHHENTS EVENT HAPPENED t4ANY TINES DURING 2 MONTH PERIOD OG MAS INOPERABLE AND MAS NOT KNOWN MATCH 975 POTENTIAL DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABILITY. STEP 2-CAUSE XX TO SUPPLY BUS FROM ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE.
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EViNT ABSTRACT IT MAS DISCOVERED THAT THE NO. 2 EDG IS EFFECTIVELY INOPERABLE WHEN 120 VAC PREFERRED INSTRUMENT BUSES Y22 OR Y24 ARE POMEREO FROM NONPREFERREO INSTRUHENT BUS Y02. FROM 12-1-81 TO 1-4-82 POWER TO Y24 MAS SUPPLIED BY Y02 RiNDERING THE NO. 2 EOG INOPERABLi FOR 34 DAYS THIS OCCURRENCE RESULTEO FROM INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BEING FORWARDED TO THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT CONCERNING WHICH PREFiRREO INSTRUflENT BUSES AFFECT OPERATION OF THE NO. 2 EDG THE CORRECT INFORHATION HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO OPERATIONS ~ INVESTIGATION HAS BEGUN ON A DESIGN CHANGE llHICH MOULD IMPROVE EDG AVAILABILITYANO INSTRUHENT INVERTER RELIABILITY.
0 o e e e e e e o o e e o e e e o o e e o k
~~ I ~
~ ~
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
FORH 117 LER SCSS DATA 09-23" 91
- a************************************+*******
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER RFVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 344 1991 006 0 910405027? 221 378 03/03/91 DOCKET:344 TROJAN REGION: 5 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO SYNBOI PGC MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUZPNENT FAILURE 35 HUHAN ERROR 942 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ON 3/3/91'HE PLANT MAS ZN ilOOE 1 AT 100% RATED THERHAL POWER. AT 0720'N INVERTFR TROUBLE ALARN WAS RECEIVED IN THE CONTROL ROOM. ZT WAS FOUND THAT ONE OF THE 125-V OC-BACKED INVERTERS SUPPLYING A 120-V AC PREFERRED INSTRUMENT PANEL HAD AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERRED THE PANEL TO THE 120-V AC BYPASS SOURCE ~ THE P REFERRED INSTRUMENT PANEL MAS OcCLARED iNOPERABLE AND AN EIGHT-HOUR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATXON ACTION STATEMENT MAS ENTERED THE PLANT WAS SHUTDOWN TO NODE 5 BECAUSE INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTION OF THE CAUSE OF THE AUTOMATIC TRANSFER ANO NOTFD INVERTER CIRCUIT DAHAGE WAS NOT ACCOHPLISHED WITHIN THE TINE REQUZRENENTS OF THE ACTION STATEMENT. AN INVESTIGATION OETERHINEO THAT THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARXO IS THAT THE AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF THE INVERTER WAS INITIATED BY A RANDOH COMPONENT FAILURE OF AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT ON A LOGIC BOARD IN THE INVERTED ZT IS POSTULATED THAT THE AUTOHATIC TRANSFER MAS ACCOHPANZED BY A.
CURRENT SURGE WHICH OAHAGED ZNVERTFR CIRCUIT COMPONENTS THAT HAY HAVE BEEN STRESSEO BY TRANSFERS OCCURRING AT EXCESSIVE PHASE ANGLE DIFFERENCES>> THE ZNVERTER WAS INVESTZGATEDr REPAZREDr TESTED'ND RETURNED TO SERVICE. SYNCHRONIZATION CHECKS MERE ALSO PERFORMED ON THE THREE REMAINING XNVERTERS AN ADJUSTHENT WAS HADE ON ONE OF THE THREE INVERT ERSr AND ADJUSTilENTS MILL BE t'lADE ON THE OTHER TWO INVERTERS DURING THE 1991 RFFUELZNG OUTAGE ~
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S 0 0 .
W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i i 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 118 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 346 1 980 081 0 8012150118 1 61859 11/12/80 DOCKET:346 DAVIS-BESSE 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:BW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BiCH FACILITY OPERATOR: TOLEDO EDISON CO.
SYMBOL TEC COflNENTS STEP 2: PSYS ZX TiSTING CONNECTION TO STEAN/FEEDMATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEili COMP HEI OSCILLOSCOPE FOR MAVEFORM TEST ~
REFERENCE LERS:
1 346/80-056 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 039X ~ CAUSE HAINTENANCE ERRORS AT 1403 HOURSr THE UNiT iXPFRIENCED A LOSS OF ESSENTIAL BUS Y2 THIS BUS POWERS RPS CHANNEL 2 WHICH MAS THi SOURCE OF RCS FLOM TO THF INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEYi THE LOSS OF FLOW INDICATION STARTED A SiRIES OF FVENTS WHICH RESULTED IN A REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH RCS PRESSURE ~ THE CAUSE MAS THE USE OF A GROUNDED OSCILLOSCOPE BY IKC PERSONNEL TO RECORD INPUT VOLTAGE WAVEFORMS AT THE STEAM AND FEEDMATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM CH. 2 CABINET. THE GROUND F ED BACK TO THE YV2 INVERTER INPUT FUSE WHICH TOOK OUT THE Y2 BUS WHICH CAUSED THE LOSS OF RPS CH 2 THE FUSE MAS REPLACED AND ESSENTIAL 120 VAC POMER RESTORED TO Y2 AT 1530 HOURS
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 119 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +***************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 346 1981 037 2 8202160365 172065 06/24/81
- 4'*********************************A************************
DOCKET:346 DAVIS-BESSE 1 TYPL:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:BW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: TOLEDO EDISON CO ~
SYMBOL: TEC COHHENTS STEP 1: CAUSE XX - DE-ENERGIZED AS PART OF TEST. STEP 15: COHP HSC SPINDLE STEP 3: COHP RLX GROUND FAULT RELAY.
ABSTRACT CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL CAUSED A HECHANICAI SHOCK TO A SENSITIVE ITH RELAYr CAUSING A LOSS OF E2 BUS AND BUSSES YAR AND YAU THIS LOSS OF POWER CAUSED THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T-SAT NETERS AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW INDICATION TO BE LOSTr AND THE 1 1 NAKEUP PUNP TO TRIP ~
THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUtlP 1-2 OIO NOT OPERATE PROPERLY DUF TO A DEFECTIVE GOVERNOR ~ t<AIN STEAN SAFETY VALVE SP17B4 FAILED TO PROPERLY RESEAT
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 120 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 346 1982 029 0 8207190259 175395 06/08/82 DOCKET:346 DAVIS-BESSE 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 3 NSSS:BW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPiRATOR: TOLEDO EDISON CO.
SYMBOL: TEC ABSTRACT THi ESSENTIAL INVERTER YV2 FAILiO WHICH DEENERGIZEO 120VAC iSSENTIAL BUS Y2 AND SUBSEQUENTLY SOURCE RANGE OETiCTOR NI-1. SINCE NI-2 HAD ALREADY BE EN OEENE RGI Z ED FOR DETECTOR RE P LAC EflENTr THE STATION WAS LEFT 'WITHOUT AN OPERABLE SOURCE RANGi DETECTOR THE STATION ENTERED THE ACTION STATE( lENT OF TECH SPEC 3 3 1 THE SHUTDOWN MARGIN ilAS CALCULATED AND FOUND TO STILL BE WITHIN ACCiPTABLE LIHITS. THE CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE MAS A CONPONENT FAILURE WITHIN THE REGULATEO RECTIFIER YRF2 WHICH NORMALLY SUPPLICS DC POWER TO INVERTER YV2 ~ Y2 WAS ENERGIZED FROM ITS ALTERNATE SOURCE ANO NI1 MAS RETURNED TO OPERABILITY BY 1500 HOURS MORK REVEALED THAT THE VOLTAGE CONTROL NODULE YRF2 HAO FAILiD IN SUCH A MAY THAT THE RECTIFIER COULD ONLY CARRY THE LOADED INVERTER METH THE AID OF THE Al TERNATE OC SUPPLY
o o e e e o o o i e o o e o e e o o e o I
L ' t 4
0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 121 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91
- ~***********************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 346 1986 008 1 86061 80003 1 99804 01/08/86 DOCKET:346 DAVIS-BESSE 1 TYPE :PMR 0 REGION: 3 NSSS .BW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: TOLEDO EDISON CO.
SYHBOL: TEC COMMENTS STEP 1 CAUSE AX - FOR l'lODIFICATION. STEP 9 COflP RLX FOR SEAL-IN CIRCUITRY.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATEO WITH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 346/85"002 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON JANUARY 8s 1986 AT 1055 HOURSr WHILE IN HODE 5 (COLO SHUTDOWN)r THE STATION EXPERIENCED A FULL SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEN (SFAS) ACTUATION PRIOR TO THE ACTUATION SFAS CHANNEL 1 HAO BEEN OE-ENERGIZED TO PERtiIT A CABINET MODIFICATION AT THE TINE OF THE ACTUATION TESTING WAS BEING CONDUCTEO IN INVERTER YV3 MHICH SUPPLIES AC POWER TO SFAS CHANNEL 3. ALTHOUGH THE TESTING.
SHOULD NOT HAVE INTERRUPTEO YV3 POWERr AN ERROR IN PERFORMING A STEP IN HAINTENANCE PROCEDURE MP 1410 71 OPENED THE WRONG SWITCH WHICH 0 RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF 120 VAC VITAL BUS Y3 MHXCH DE-ENERGIZED SFAS CHANNEL 3 's'tITH BOTH CHANNELS 1 AND 3 DE ENERGIZE Dr A FULL 5FAS ACTUATION OCCURRED PER DESIGN ~ BY 1110 HOURS THE SANE OAYi THE SFAS CHANNELS MERE RESET ANO ACTUATED EQUIPMENT RETURNED TO NORMAL. AT 1210 HOURS'OTIFICATION WAS HADE UNDFR 10CFR50-72 TO THE NRC VIA THE Et'lERGENCY NOTXFICATION SYSTEH (RED PHONE) . THIS REPORT XS BEING SUBNITTED PER 10CFR50.73 AS THE AUTOf'1ATXC ACTUATION OF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FCATURE (ESF).
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e e 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORN 122 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- ******** **g *******************************
DOCKET YEAR LiR NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 348 1 986 010 0 8608220275 200824 07/16/86
- 4***********************************************************
DOCKET:348 FARLEY 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: ALABANA POWER CO.
SYHBOL: APC COllHENTS STEP 4: EFF IX-VOLTAGE TRANSIENT WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
e 900 POST EVENT DATA AVAXLABILITY REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): iSF actuations REFERENCE LERS-1 348/86-009 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 099K ~ AT 1415 ON 7 16 86r AN INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF ENGINEERcO SAFETY FEATURi (ESF) EQUIPHENT OCCURRED WHEN THE PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION (PRF) SYSTEN STARTED AUTOHATICALLY. - AN INSTRUHENT SERVICEHAN MAS ADJUSTING THE THERi4lOSTAT THAT CONTROLS THE CABINET HEATERS ON THE 1A POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN ANALYZ R THE TOOL WITH MHICH HE MAS WORKING TOUCHED ONE OF THE POSTS FOR THi HEATER POWER SUPPLY AND CAUSED AN ARCe THE ARC PRODUCED A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT ON THE 1F INVERTER WHICH SUPPLIES POWER TO THE IA POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER~ THE VOLTAGE TRANSIENT CAUSED RADIATION MONITORS R 24A (CONTAINMENT PURGE) AND R 25A (FUEL STORAGE POOL AREA) r WHICH RECEIVE POMiR FROM THE 1F INVERTERr TO TRIP TRIPPING OF R 24A RESULTED IN CLOSURE OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI PURGE DAHPERSS TRIPPING OF R-25A CAUSED THE SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) VENTILATION SYSTEM TO TRIP THE TRIPPING OF THE SFP VF NTILATION SYSTEN CAUSED THE PRF SYSTEM TO START AUTONATICALLY THE CONTAINllENT MINI-PURGE SYSTEMS THE SFP VENTILATION SYSTEHi AND THE PRF SYSTEN WERE RETURNED TO NORNAL BY 1419. THIS EVENT MAS CAUSED BY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY IN ORDER TO PREVENT RECURRENCc OF THIS EVENTr THE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES WILL BE REVXSED TO REQUIRE DEENERGIZING THE HEATERS ON THE POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN ANALYZERS DURING THE TINE THAT THE CABINET HEATER THERMOSTAT XS BEING ADJUSTEO
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 It II
~ It -0 I
I
~ 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 123 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4**************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMB ER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 352 1984 039 0 8502010074 192700 12/21/84 DOCKET: 352 LIMERICK 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL EiNGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO ~
SYNBOL: PEC CONHENTS STEP 1: CAUSE AX FOR TESTING.
REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-REFERENCE LERS:
1 352/84-005 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000K~ ON 12 21 84r A TEMPORARY LOSS OF POWER TO AN UNINTERRUPTIBLE AC ELECTRICAL PANEL CAUSED THE REACTOR WATER CLcANUP SYSTEM AND THE REACTOR ENCLOSURE AND REFUEL FLOOR VENTILATION SYSTEt'lS TO ISOLATE ~ THE LOSS OF POWER ( B RPS LOGIC) s COHBINED WITH CONCURRENT SURVEILLANCE TESTING ON THE 'A'PS LOGICS ALSO RESULTED XN THE GENERATION OF A FULL SCRAM SIGNAL. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS AN OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION FROM THE 'B'PS STATIC INVERTER. AFTER THE EVENTr THE SCRAH SIGNAL WAS RESET AND ALL AFFECTED SYSTEHS WERE RETURNED TO NORNAL OPERATION.
~~ fI FORN 124 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 352 1985 007 0 85021 501 64 1 93468 01/10/85 DOCKET:352 LINERICK 1 REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO SYHBOL: PEC REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actoations-REFERENCE LERS:
1 352/84-005 2 352/84-039 ABSTRACT POWER LFVEL 003% ~ ON 1 10 85'T 8.21 AMr WITH UNIT 1 AT LESS THAN 5% POWER/ A HALF SCRAN SIGNAL ON THE B RPS CHANNEL MAS INITIATED THE RWCU SYSTEH THE DRYMELL CHILLEO WATER SYSTEN ANO REFUEL FLOOR VcNT ILATION SYSTEl'1 ISOLATEDr AND BOTH REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUHPS TRIPPED AT 8 58 ANr A SIMILAR EVENT OCCURRED THE EVENTS OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF A TEl1PORARY LOSS OF POWER TO THE 1B RPS AND UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SYSTEH 120V AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL NO. 1BY160.
THE RPS AND NSSSS SYSTENS PERFORHEO AS DESIGNED DURING THE LOSS OF POMER TRANSIFNTS~ IN EACH EVENTS A FAULTY VOLTAGE REGULATOR CARD IN THE 1B STATIC INVERTER CAUSED AN OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION RESULTiNG IN THE TRIP OF THE ELECTRICAL SUPPLY BRLAKERS TO THE 1BY160 PANEL THE HALF-SCRAH SIGNALS AND NSSSS ISOLATION SIGNALS WERF RESET THE FAULTY VOLTAGE REGULATOR CARD WAS REPI ACED AFTER THE SECOND HALF-SCRAM~
SIHILAR EVENTS 352/84-005 ANO 352/84-039 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 1 i 0 ;::
lg 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ~ l 0 l 0
FORH 125 LER SCSS DATA 09-23 ********************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUt1BER REVISION DCS NUtkBER NSIC EVENT DATE 352 1 985 024 0 8503220159 193569 02/08/85
- 4******************************
DOCKET: 352 LIMERICK 1 TYPE:BMR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHXTECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO ~
S YHBOL: PiC RiPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
RiFERFNCE LERS:
1 352/84-005 2 352/84-039 3 352/85-007 4 352/85-026 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON 2 8 85/ AT 1 ~ 45 AHr WITH UNIT 1 IN COLD SHUTDOMllr A SPURIOUS HALF SCRAtl SIGNAL ON THE B RPS CHANNEL OCCURRiD ALONG WITH THE OUTBOARD ISOLATION OF VARIOUS NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF SYSTEH SUBSYSTEHS THE EVENT OCCURRED 'AS THE RESULT OF A TENPORARY LOSS OF POMER TO THE 1B RPS AND UNINTERRUPTIBLE POMER SYSTEM 120V AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL NO. 1BY160 THE RPS AND NSSSS SYSTEHS PERFORt1ED AS DESIGNED DURING THE LOSS OF POWER TRANSIENT ~ VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS FROM A VOLTAGi REGULATOR BOARD IN THE STATIC INVERTER.
CAUSED AN OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION R SULTING IN THE TRIP OF THE ELECTRICAL SUPPLY BREAKERS TO THE 1BY160 PANEL. THE VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS WERE CAUSED BY HIGH A'18IENT TEMPERATURES IN THE STATIC INVERTER CABINET. THE HALF-SCRAM SIGNAL AND NSSSS ISOLATXONS MERE RESET. HOODS AND FANS MERE INSTALLED IN THE TOP OF THE INVERTER CABINETS TO CIRCULATE THE AIR AND REDUCE THE TEHPERATURE IN THE CABINET.
0 e e e o e e e o e e o o o e e o o e e 0 e o e o e e o e o e e o o e o e e e e e
FORN 126 LER SCSS DATA 09-23" 91 DOCKET YiAR LER NUMBER REViSION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 352 1985 026 0 8503220378 1 93570 02/28/85 DOCKET:352 LIHERICK 1 REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACXLXTY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA iLECTRIC CO.
SYMBOL: PEC REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): iSF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 352/84-005 2 352/84-039 3 3 52/85-00? 4 352/85-024 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON 2 12 85r AT 7 23 AHr WITH UNIT 1 IN COLO SHUTOOWNr A SPURIOUS HALF SCRAH SIGNAL ON THE A RPS CHANNEL OCCURRED ALONG WITH THE OUTBOARD ISOLATION OF VARIOUS NUCLEAR STEAN SUPPLY SHUTOFF SYSTEH SUBSYSTEMS THE EVENT OCCURRED AS THE RESULT OF A TEMPORARY LOSS OF POWER TO THE 1A RPS AND UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SYSTEM 120V AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL NO. 1AY160. THE RPS AND NSSSS SYSTEMS PERFORMED AS DESIGNiD DURING THE LOSS OF POWER TRANSIENT VOLTAGE FLUCTUATiONS FROM A VOLTAGE REGULATOR BOARD IN THE STATIC INVERTER CAUSED AN OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION RESULTING IN THE TRIP OF THE ELiCTRICAL SUPPLY BRiAKERS TO THE 1AY160 PANEL THE VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS WERE CAUSED BY HIGH AMBIENT TEMPERATURES IN THE STATIC INVERTER CABINET THE HALF-SCRAH SiGNAL AND NSSSS ISOLATIONS MERE RESET. HOODS AND FANS MERE INSTALLED IN THE TOP OF THE INVERTER CABINETS TO CIRCULATE THE AXR AND REDUCE THE TEHPERATURE IN THE CABINET.
0 e e e e o e o e e e o o e e e e e e o ,
(
~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 N 0, i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 127 LER SCSS DATA 0 9-23-91
- A****************A************************************m************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER -REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 352 1987 027 0 8707220388 205459 06/15/87 DOCKET:352 LIHERICK 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 NSSS: GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO.
SYMBOL: PEC WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
60 SPURIOUS/ UNKNOWN CAUSE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 352/85-007 2 352/85-024 3 352/85-026 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON JUNE 15'987'HILE PREPARING TO TEST A MODIFICATION MHICH UPGRADED THE 'B'EACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEH (RPS)
ELECTRIC POWER HONITORING UNDERVOLTAGE ANO OVERVOLTAGE RELAYS'HE e B a AND 'D'UCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF SYSTEM (NSSSS) CHANNELS GENERATED ISOLATION SIGNALS FOR SEVERAL SYSTENS. THE MODIFICATION ACCEPTANCE TEST REQUIRED THE RELAYS'OWER SOURCE TO BE SUPPLIED FRON THE PREFERRED SOURCE RATHER THAN THE ALTERNATE S'OURCE WHEN THE POWER SUPPLY WAS TRANSFERREO~ BOTH THE RCS SERIES BREAKERS SHUNT TRIPPED ON A TRANSIENT OVERVOLTAGE CONDITIONr RESULTING IN DE-ENERGIZATION OF THE ASSOCIATED NSSSS LOGIC. THE CAUSE FOR THE OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION IS UNKNOWN AND EFFORTS TO RECREATE THE EVENT COULD NOT DETERMINE A PROBABLE CAUSE. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT WERE HINIHAL BECAUSE THE SYSTEMS WHICH WERE AFFECTED BY THE ISOLATIONS WERE NOT REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BUT MERE ONLY IN SERVICE FOR HABITABILXTY CONCERNS. THE RPS POWER SUPPLY WAS RESTORED WITHXN TEN MINUTES OF THE EVENT ANO THE NSSSS ISOLATIONS MERE RESET SHORTLY AFTERWARD
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 It
'I
~ N o e e o o e o e e ~ o e e e e e o e e
FORM 128 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4***************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 352 1990 021. 0 9011010180 219883 10/11/90 DOCKET: 352 LitlERECK 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO SYMBOL: PEC COHHENTS OTHER REPORTABILETY SPECEAL REPORT PER T.S. 3 3 7.2 STEP 2: COMP MEE tlAGiMET XC TAP E PLAY BACK SYSTEM. STEP 3: COMP HEI TRE AXIAL RESPONSE SPFCTRUM ANALYZER.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THES LER ARE:
20 EQUEPHENT FAXLURE REPORTABELETY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
21 OTHER: Voluntary r eportr special repor tr Part 21 reportr etc.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON SEPTEt'lBER 11r 1990 AT 0841 HOURSr THE SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM (SMS) WAS DECLARED IilOPERABLE IN PREPARATION FOR PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TEST (ST) PROCEDURE THIS PARTICULAR ST PROCEDURE REQUIRES APPROXEHATELY 30 DAYS TO COMPLETE. WHILE THE ST PROCFDURE IS IN PROGRESSr THE PORTIONS OF THE SMS THAT HEASURE AND RECORD SEISMIC EVENT DATA ARE UNAVAILABLE HOWEVERr THE COMPONENTS OF THE SMS THAT ALERT HAIN CONTROL ROOM (HCR) PERSONNEL OF AN OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE ARE AVAILABLE ON SEPTEMBER 21r 1990r WHILE PERFORMING THE ST PROCEOUREr INSTRUHENTATZON AND CONTROl S (ISC)
PERSOt'1NEL DISCOVERED THAT THE INVERTER BOARD IN THE HAGNETEC TAPE PLAYBACK SYSTEM FAILEO TO CALIBRATE TO THE REQUXRED SPEClFICATIONS I8C PERSONNEL THEN INITIATED A PURCHASE REQUISITION FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE INVERTER BOARD ~ ON OCTOBER 11r 1990r AT 0841 HOURSr THE REPLACEMENT INVERTER BOARD HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AND THE SHS BECAME 1NOPERABLE FOR MORE THAN 30 OAYSr THEREFORE REQUIRING THE SUBMISSION OF A SPECIAL REPORT EN ACCORDANCE METH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 3 ~ 3 ~ 7.2 . THERE HAVE BEFN NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ASSOCEATEO WITH THlS EVENT. NO SEISt'IZC EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED TO DATE SINCE THE SMS WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE. THE CAUSC OF THE MALFUNCTION WAS A FAULTY INVERTER BOARDS
~'
~ ~ f
~ I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, ~ 0
FORH 129 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A****************%******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER -NUMBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 353 1989 015 0 9001300417 216608 12/23/89 DOCKET: 353 LIMERICK 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO SYi~fBOL: PEC CONHENTS STEPS 1-2'l: EVENT OCCURRED ON 12-23-89. STEPS 22-39: EVENT OCCURRED ON 12"24-89.
MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50.72 20 EQUIPHENT FAILURE REPORTABILZTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-REFERENCE LERS:
1 352/84-030 2 352/84-040 3 352/85-007 4 352/85-008 5
9 352/85-011 352/85-074 6 352/85-024 10 352/87-021 '1 7 352/85-026 352/87-027 8
12 352/85-.048 352/87-029 13 352/87-038 14 352/89-055 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOO ON DECEMBER 23r 1989r DURING STARTUP FROM AN OUTAGE AND ON DECEMBER 24r 1989 DURING LOW POWER OPERATIONs A PROBLEH WITH THE STATIC INVERTER CAUSED A LOSS OF POWER TO THE '2B'EACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEH (RPS)/UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY STATIC INVERTER CAUSED A LOSS OF POWER TO THE '2B'PS DISTRIBUTION PANELr 2BY160 ~ AS A RESULT r VARIOUS AUTONATIC PRIilARY CONTAINNENT REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION CONTROL SYSTEN ISOLATIONSr ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF)
ACTUATIONSr OCCURRED IN ADDITIONr REACTOR ENCLOSURE AND REFUEL FLOOR VENTILATION SYSTEMS ISOLATED AND THE REACTOR ENCLOSURE-RECIRCULATION SYSTEH AND THE STANDBY GAS TREATHENT SYSTEH STARTEDr ALSO ESF ACTUATIONS ~ BOTH REACTOR RECIRCULATiON PUMPS TRIPPED. ALL SYSTENS RESPONDED AS OESIGNFD. ALL ISOLATXONS WERE RESET AND SYSTEMS WERE RETURNED TO SERVICE PRONPTLY AND THERE WAS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PLAiNT OPERATIONS ~ THE CAUSE OF THE LOSS OF POWER F ROll THE IN VERT ER MAS TRACED TO A PROBLEH IN THF GATE DRIVE BOOST CARD ON THE STATIC INVERTER ~ THE FAILED CARO WAS REPLACED ON DECEHBER 26r 1 989 ~
RELIABILITY OF THE STATIC INVERTERS IS BEING EVALUATED
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
FORM 130 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +****4******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISXON DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 354 '986 074 0 861118040? 201835 10/02/86 DOCKET:354 HOPE CREEK 1 REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILiTY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 5 GAS CO.
SYNBOL. PEG CONNENTS STEP 2: PSYS ZX- RECORDING EQUIPllENT FOR LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TEST.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THZS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50 ~ 73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX. ON OCTOBER 2 1986 THE CONTROL ROOH EHERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM ACTUATED ON A SPURIOUS INITIATION SIGNAL THE EVENT OCCURRED WHEN AiV XSC TECHNICIAN INCORRECTLY INSTALLED A RECORDER CAUSXNG A CIRCUIT BREAKER FEEDiNG AN IiVVERTER WHICH POWERS THE CONTROL ROON RADIATION NONITORS TO TRIP ~ THE "B" CRFF UNIT STARTED WHEN THE RADIATION HONITOR LOST POMER. UPON COHPl ETION OF AN INVESTIGATIONr THE TRIP SIGNAL RESET AND THE XNDICATiON RETURNED TO NORHAL THE NORNAL VENTILATION WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AND THE ENERGENCY SUPPLY WAS PLACED IN STANDBY THIS EVENT Wil L BE REVIEWED MZTH IKC PERSONNEL TO EMPHASIZE THE IHPORTANCE OF PROPERLY INSTALLING TENPORARY LEADS FOR DATA ACQUISITION EQUIPNENT ~
I
.0 o o e o e e e e e o e e o o a o o e
~ 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORH- 131 ~ LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A****************%**************************************+***
DOCKET YEAR LiR NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 354 1987 036 1 8805050199 209211 08/04/87 DOCKET:354 HOPE CREEK 1 TYPE:BMR RcGIO N 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILXTY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 8 GAS CO ~
SYMBOL: PEG C 0 Nl'l E N T S PREVIOUS SINILAR EVENT IN 1986 LER NUHBER NOT GIVEN HATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
60 SPURIOUS/ UNKNOMN CAUSE REPORTABXLXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100'N AUGUST 4r 1987 AT 2030 HOURSr THE PLANT MAS IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION (POMER OPERATXON) AT 100% POWER GENERATING 1067 MME WHEN SEVERAL "A" CHANNEL CLASS 1E 125 VOC LOADS FROll THE "A" DISTRIBUTION PANEL MERE DE-ENERGIZED THE BREAKERS FOR THE AFFECTED SYSTEMS MERi THFN OPENED ANO RESET THESE ACTIONS RESTORED POWER TO ALL SYSTEMS THAT HAO LOST 125 VDC ~ TESTING PERFORNED DURING THE FIRST BIOCYCLE OUTAGE OID NOT DETERMINE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE ~
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCl UDE PROCEDURE REVISIONS TO PRECLUDE SXNILAR RECURRENC iS 0
~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 I ~ ~~
FORH 132 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91, DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 354 1988 016 0 88072601 20 209968 06/16/88
%************************************************************4**0***
DOCKET:354 HOPE CREEK 1 TYPi: BMR REGION: 1 NSSS GE ARCHXTECT URAL ENGZNEiR: BiCH FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 5 GAS CO SYNBOL: PEG CONNENTS
$ 0/0/1 N/E/5 HATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUIPMENT FAILURE 34 DiSIGN iRROR OR INADEQUACY 941 REPORT ASSOCIATED MITH 10 CFR 50.72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations REFERENCE LERS:
1 354/86-006 2 354/86-055 3 354/87-046 ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 100%. THE HIGH VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY (HVPS) FOR THE "B" REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST (RBE) RAD MONITOR FAILCD ON '6/1 2/88r AND THE RAO MONITOR WAS PLACED IN TRIPPED CONDITION AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC.
3~3 2 ~ B ~ ON 6/1 6/88 AT 0928 HOURS'HE PLANT MAS IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (POWER OPERATION) AT 100% POWER GENiRATING 1099 NWEs AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE ON THE CHANNEL "C" INSTRUMENT BUS 20 KVA INVERTER MAS ZN PROGRESS. THE "C" REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST (RBE) AND THE CONTROL ROON VENTILATION RAD MONITORS EXPERIENCED TWO i4IOtlENTARY POWER LOSSES WITHIN A TMO NINUTE PFRIOO ~ PRIHARY CONTAINHENT XSOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATED ON A TMO OUT OF THREE RBE "INOP" SIGNAL CAUSED BY THE UNEXPECTED HOtlENTARY POMER LOSSES ~ CONTROL ROOtl EHERGENCY FILTRATION ALSO STARTiD ON THE S'ECOND "INOP" SIGNAL A FOUR-HOUR REPORT WAS HADE TO THE NRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50 72 ANO THE AFF ECTED SYSTEHS MERE RESTORED TO NORHAL CONFIGURATION THE APPARENT CAUSE OF THE MOMENTARY POMcR LOSSES MAS A MALFUNCTION OF THE INVERTER DURING SWITCHING BY OESIGNr THE INVERTER ROTARY SWITCH IS A tlAKE-BEFORi-BREAK OiVXCE WHICH SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED SWITCHING TRANSIENTS. A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE lfAS THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE HVPS WHICH WAS BEING ADDRESSED BY A PLANNED DESIGN CHANGE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE REPLACEHENT OF THE HVPS MXTH ONES OF A NORE RELIABLE DESIGN AND TROUBLESHOOTING OF INVERTER SWITCHING FUNCTXON
('. ~;
i I
0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ >>
I 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 133 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- m*******************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 354 1989 009 0 8905300068 21391 2 04/14/89
- 0*******************************
DOCKET:354 HOPE CREEK 1. TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO SYHBOL: PEG WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY 941, REPORT ASSOCIATED MITH 10 CFR 50.72 RiPORTABILITY CODiS FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50 73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
14 10 CFR 50 73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f vlfillment o f a sa f ety function.
REFERENCE'ERS:
1 354/87-034 2 354/87-036 3 354/88-019 ABSTRACT PO'MER LEVEL 100% ~ ON 4/14/89 AT 0806 AN OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION AFFECTING BOTH CLASS 1E CHANNEL "C" 125VOC BATTERY CHARGERS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF CHANNEL "C" ECCS INSTRUMENTATXON WHEN THE ASSOCIATED XNVERTER TRIPPED. AT 0840 DURING RESTORATION OF POWER TO THE CHANNEL "C" ECCS INSTRUHENTATION (T ~ S 3 ~ 0 3 EXITED AT THXS TIME) r A VOLTAGE SPIKE RiSULTiD IN INITIATION OF AN INVALID CHANNEL "C" ECCS LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) LEViL 1 SIGNAL ~ ALL CHANNEL "C" ECCS ACTUATXONS AND XSOLATIONS OCCURRED AS DESIGNED DURING THIS TRANSIENTS THE "C" REACTOR FEEOPUl'IP TURBINE TRIPPEDr AND WHEN VESSEL LEVEL DECREASED TO +30 XNCHES AS A RESULT OF THIS TRXPr A REACTOR RECIRCULATION RUNBACK OCCURRED. REACTOR PO'WER STABXI IZED AT ABOUT 74% ~ A TER VER IF YING NONE OF THE CHANNEL "C" SYSTEM RES PONS ES WERE
~
NiCESSARYr ALL SYSTEMS WERE RETURNED TO A NORMAL CONFIGURATION AND REACTOR POWER MAS INCRCASED ~ INVESTIGATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT DETERHXNED THAT MULTIPLE FACTORS COMBINED TO CAUSE THE OViRALL TRANSIENT RESPONSE ~ WHILE THE EVENT WAS INITIATED BY A PERSONNEL ERROR RESULTING IN A HIGH VOLTAGE CONDITION AFFECTING BOTH CLASS 1E CHANNEL "C" 125VDC BATTERY CHARGERSi OTHER PERSONNEL ERRORS AND PROCEDURAI INADEQUACIiS SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT.
~ ~
FORM 134 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 354 1990 029 1 9104010348 221437 11/26/90
- A********************************************A'******
DOCKET:354 HOPE CREEK 1 REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAl ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 8 GAS CO SYMBOL: PEG COMMENTS STEP 1: CAUSE AX - TESTING.
NATCH-LiST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUIPMiNT FAILURE 34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY 942 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORTABIl ITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
13 10 CFR 50 73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
RiFERENCE LERS:
1 354/87-036 2 354/88-019 3 354/89-009 ABSTRACT POWER "A"
LEViL 100'N 11/26/90 AT 1119r WHILE ENERGIZING THE CHANNEL 125VDC BATTERY CHARGER DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN 18 MONTH CAPACITY TESTr THE CHARGER OUTPUT VOLTAGE SPIKED HIGH AND INITIATED AN ELECTRICAL SYSTiM RESPONSE THAT RESULTED IN ACTUATION OF THE CHANNEL "A" EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) LOGIC ACTUATION OF THE ECCS LOGIC CAUSED THE FOLLOWING ECCS RESPONSiS: INITIATION OF THE CORE SPRAY (CS) SYSTEMr LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (I PCI) MODE OF THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEMr HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT IN JECTION (HPCX) SYSTEMr "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENcRATOR (EDG)r AND LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) LOAD SHEDDING OF THE "A" VITAL iLECTRICAL BUS DURING THE COURSc OF THE ABOVE ECCS ACTUATXONSr HPCI INJECTED TO THE RiACTOR VESSEL FOR APPROXIMATELY 4 SECONDS PRiOR TO BEING SECURED AN UNUSUAL EVENT (UE) WAS DECLARED AT 1143 DUE TO THE ECCS INJECTION TO THE VESSELr AND WAS IMMEOIATiLY TERMINATED DUE TO THE SHORT DURATION OF THE INJECTION ~ ALL AFFECTED SYSTEMS WERE RETURNED TO A NORMAL STANDBY STATUSr AND THE PLANT RiTURNED TO A NORMAL OPERATING CONFIGURATION~ SUBSiQUENT INViSTIGATION DETERMINED THAT MULTIPLE CAUSES CONTRIBUTEO TO THIS EVENTr INCLUDING FAIURE OF A BATTERY CHARGER CONTROL LOGIC CARDr ANO A LESS THAN OPTIMUM DESIGN OF THE ECCS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION POWER Dl STRIBUTION SCHEMc N POWER DISTRIBUTION SCHEMF.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~ 0 0 0 0 ~ i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0
FORM 135 LFR SCSS DATA 09-23"91
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DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBiR RiVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1982 016 0 8206090035 173922 05/16/82
- 4********************************************
DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACXLXTY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALXFORNIA EDISON CO.
SYMBOL: SCE MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
913 UPDATE NEEDED ABSTRACT LCO 3 8 3 1 REQUIRES EACH OF TH 4 120-VAC VITAL BUSSES TO THE iNERGIZED FROH ITS ASSOCIATED INVERTER ACTION STATEHENT (B) PERMITS ONE OF THESE BUSSES TO BE ENERGIZED FRON ITS ALTERNATE SOURCE FOR UP TO 24 HOURS BEFORE COOL-DOMN MOULD BE REQUIRED'MO INVERTERS MERE SIHULTANEOUSLY DE ENERGIZiDr PLACING THE UNIT IN A LESS CONSERVATIVE OPERATING MODE THAN THE LEAST CONSERVATIVE ASPECT OF THE L ~ C 0 ~ CAUSE MILL SE PROVIDED IN FOI LOM-UP REPORT.
0 e o o o e o e e e e o o e e o o e e o o 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0
FORM 136 LER SCSS DATA 09"23"91
- A****************************A****************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUi~lBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1 983 110 0 8309260476 1 85759 08/21/83
- 4*****************************************************
DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
SYMBOL: SCE REFERENCE LiRS:
1 362/83-048 ABSTRACT WHILE UNIT 2 WAS IN NODE 1 AND UNIT 3 WAS IN fhODE 3r TRAIN B EHERGENCY CHILLER E 335 FAILEO TO START AND MAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 1415.
LOSS OF A CHILLER RENDERS ALL EQUIPMENT INOPERABLE IN ROOMS IN BOTH UNITS WHERE CHILLEO MATER IS PROVIDED TO COOL AMBIENT AIR ~ SINCE LCO 3 8 3 1 REQUIRES ALL FOUR INVERTERS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BUSSES TO BE OPERABLE IN NODE 1 THROUGH 4 IN EACH UNIT AND SINCE THE ASSOCXATiD ACTION STATEHENT ONLY ADDRcSSiS THE LOSS OF ONE SUCH XNVERTiR AND ITS ASSOCIATEO BUSr LCO 3 ~ 0 3 WAS XNVOKED AT 141 5 SEE ALSO LER 83 048 (UNIT 3) ~ THE FAILURE OF THE CHILLER E-335 TO START WAS DUE TO A FUSE FAILURE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE FUSE FAILED AT THE CAP RATHcR THAN THE HIDOLF ~ THIS SUGGESTS THAT A DEFECT EXISTED IN THE FUSE WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO A THERt/AL FATIGUE FAILURE ADOITIONALLYr THE FAXLED FUSE WAS A 2 AMP FUSEr MHEREASr THE DESIGN REQUIRED IT TO BE A 3 AHP FUSE AS A PRECAUTION THE FUSE IN THE OTHER CHILLER E-336 (TRAIN A) MAS CHECKED AND VERIFIEO TO BE OF THc CORRECT SIZE ~ SINCE:
(1) USE OF THE CORRECT FUSE IS PROVIDED BY REPLACENENT OF FAILED FUSES WITH LIKE KIND FUSESr (2) VERIFICATION WITH DESIGN REQUIRENENTS IS PERIODICALLY ACCOMPLISHED WHEN POST NAINTENANCE TESTING (MHICH INCLUDES VALIDATION WITH DESIGN DRAWINGS) IS PERFORHEDr AND (3) THIS IS THE FIRST DISCOVERY OF AN INCORRECTLY SIZED FUSEr NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION IS CONSIDER
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t
f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 137 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REViSION DCS NUMBER. NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1 983 130 0 83111 401 78 1 8681 9 1 0/21 /83 DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS: CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BiCH FACXLITY OPiRATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO SYHBOL- SCE CONNENTS STEP 1: COHPONENT XC CONTROL CIRCUIT.
ABSTRACT MHILE UNITS 2 AND 3 MERE IN NODE 1r TRAIN B EHERGENCY CHILLER E-335 TRIPPED ANO MAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 0130 LOSS OF A CHILLER RENDERS ALL EQUIPHENT INOPERABLE IN ROOHS WHERE CHILLEO MATER IS PROVIDED TO COOL AMBIENT AIR SEVERAL LCO'S GOVERN PLANT OPERATION FOR THE LOSS OF E 335r HOWEVERS THE HOST RESTRICTIVE IS LCO 3 ~ 8 ~ 3 ~ 1 ~
EfliRGENCY CHILLER E-335 MAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AT A?PROXItlATELY 0210.
THE FAILURE OF CHiLLER E-335 MAS INITIALLY BELIEVED TO BE LOW COtlPONENT COOLING WATER (CCM) FLOW AS INDICATED BY THE ALARM MHEN THE CHILLER TRIPPED ~ SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION INDICATED THAT SUFFICIENT CCW FLOW HAD EXISTED PRIOR TO THE CHILLER TRIP AND THAT A SPURIOUS TRIP FROtl THE CONTROL CIRCUIT HAD OCCURRED NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE PLANNED
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I'
q we ee E
0 ~~4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 138 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1984 029 0 8407190435 1 90741 06/14/84 DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
SYMBOL: SCE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
9 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2): Limiting conditions for operation.
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specif ication violations.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ~ ON JUNE 14 1984 AT 0344 WITH UNIT 2 IN lODE 1 AT 100% POWER AND UNIT 3 IN NODE Ss BREAKER 380417 (EIIS COMPONENT IDENTIFIER BKR) WAS INADVERTENTLY TRIPPED DEENERGIZING LOAD CENTER BQr INITIATING THE TOXIC GAS ISOLATION SYSTEH (EIZS SYSTEN IDENTXFXER JE)
AND RENDERING EllERGENCY CHILLER E-336 (EXIS COMPONENT IDENTIFIER CHU)
INOPERABLE LOSS OF AN EMERGENCY CHILLER RENDERS EQUIPNENT INOP ERABLE ON BOTH UNITS IN ROONS WHERE CHILLED MATER IS PROVIDED TO COOL AHBIENT AIR~ THUSr THE LOSS OF E 336 RENDERS TWO INVERTERS INOP ERABLE IN EACH UNITr AND SINCE THE ASSOCIATEO ACTION STATEMENT OF LIHITXNG CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) 3.8.3.1 FOR NODES 1 THROUGH 4 ADDRESSES ONLY THE LOSS OF ONE XNVERTERs LCO 3 0 ~ 3 MAS INVOKED LOAD CENTER BQ WAS IMMEDIATELY REENERGIZED FROM BREAKER 2B0417 RESTORING E 336 TO SERVICE AT 0348r ANO LCO 3 03 WAS EXITED ~ THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS PERSONNEL ERROR IN TRIPPING THE WRONG BREAKER DURING TRANSFER OF CHARGING PUMP POWER SUPPLY FOR ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM SUBGROUP RELAY TESTING THE OPERATOR WAS COUNSELED ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INCIDENT AND THE NECESSITY FOR FOl LOWING PROCEDURES THIS INCIDENT IS AN ISOLATEO OCCURRENCE ANO NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTiON IS PLANNcD THERE ARE NO REASONABl E OR CREDIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THIS EVENT MOULD HAVE BEEN HORE SEVERE-
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~ 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W~lgp Q
FORM 139 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4******************************************************+
DOCKET YEAR LER NUllBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1984 046 1 8411290403 195780 08/15/84 DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO SYMBOL: SCE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
0 9 10 CFR 50.36(c) (2): Limiting conditions for operation.
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdomns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100X ~ ON 8 1 5 84r AT 1 1 30m WITH BOTH UNITS 2 AND 3 IN MODE 1 THE LOCAL READOUT FOR SALTWATER COOLING FLOW TO THE TRAIN COOLING WATER (CCM) HEAT EXCHANGER INDICATED A FAULT '8'OHPONENT CONDITION ~ THE TRAZN 'A'CW HEAT EXCHANGER INOICATEO A FAULT CONDITION THE TRAIN 'A'CM HEAT EXCHANGER WAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR CLEANING. BECAUSE A HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE EXISTED ACROSS THE TRAIN 'B'CW HEAT EXCHANGER'T WAS CONSERVATIVELY ASSUMED THAT TRAIN
'B'ALTWATER COOLING FLOW WAS LESS THAN THE FLOW REQUIRED FOR SYSTEM OPERABILITY. TRAIN CM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLEr AND LCO 3 ~ 0 ~ 3 MAS INVOKED ON UNZT 2. EllERGENCY CHILLER E-335 MAS DECLARED INOPERABLE SINCE TRAiN 'B'CM MAS SUPPLYING ITS COOLING MATER. LOSS OF E 335 RENDERS TMO VITAL INVERTERS INOPERABLE IN EACH UNIT/ AND LCO 3 0 3 WAS ALSO INVOKED FOR UNIT 3 SHUTDOWN OF BOTH UNITS MAS INITIATED A TRAIN ALTWATER COOLING PUMP IN THE UNIT 2 INTAKE MAS STARTEDr AND THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS THE HEAT EXCHANGER DECREASED AT 1230 THE SALTWATER COOLING FLOM INDICATION MAS RESTORED ~ SALTMATER COOLING FLOW WAS DETERMINED TO BE ABOVE THE HINIHUN REQUIRED Fl OMr AND LCO 3 ~ 0 ~ 3 'MAS EXITED ~ THE SALTWATER COOLING FLOW INDICATION MAS RESTORED BY SWITCHING READOUT CHANNELS IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE INITIAL FAULT INDICATION MAS DUE TO READING AN INOPERABLE CHANNEL.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O'0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -.
J Mv'~-p
~f
~ ~
0 4 e o e o o a o o e e o e e e e o e e
FORH 140 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4 ***********************************************************
DOCKFT YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1984 080 0 8501280621 192706 12/19/84 DOCKET: 361 SAN ONOF RE 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE A RCHITECT URAL cMGIR E ER
~l B ECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO ~
SYHBOL: SCE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000'N 12 19-84 AT 0745 WITH UNIT 2 DEFUELEDr A FUNCTIONAL TEST WAS BEING PERFOPllFD ON OC BATTERY CHARGER 2B001 WHICH WAS SUPPLYING THE LOAD MHIL THE OC BATTERY WAS RENOVED FROld SERVICE FOR A ROUTINE SURVEILI ANCE. AS PART OF THE TESTr A HIGH VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN OF THE CHARGER WAS INITIATEO CAUSING THE RENOVAL OF POWcR FROH THE BUS THE TEST AND BATTERY SURVEILLANCE MAS AUTHORIZED AS PART OF AN ELECTRICAL OUTAGE. DOCUMENTATION USED TO PLAN THE OUTAGE DID NOT Cl EARLY INDICATE THAT THE CHARGER WOULD BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE ANO THAT A. LOSS OF AC POWER MOULD OCCUR ~ AS A RESULTr THE CHARGER TEST WAS ALLOMEO TO PROCEED CONCURRENTLY METH THE BATTERY SURVEiLLANCE. MHEN POWER WAS REMOVED FROM THE ASSOCIATEO AC INSTRUNENT BUSr BOTH THE CONTAINHENT PURGE ISOLATION SYSTEH ANO THE FUEL HANDLING ISOLATION SYSTEM TRAIN 'A'CTUATED TRAIN 'A'PIS AND FHIS CONPONENTS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN RENOVED f ROl'l SERVICE AS PART OF A PLANNED OUTAGEr HOWEVER r THE EMERGENCY CHILLER NE 336 UNIT AND PUt'lP MERc ACTUATcO AT 1330 POWER WAS RESTORED TO THE AC BUS AND TRAIN 'A'AS RESET ~ IN ORDER TO FACILITATF PROPER PLANNINGr CORRECTIVE ACTION MiLI 'BE TAKEN TO INCLUDE A PRECAUTION IN THE TEST DOCUMENTATION INDICATING THAT THE CHARGER MiLL BE SHUTDOMN DURING THE TEST AND THE BATTERY SHOULD BE CONNECTED TO THE LOAD
~ ~
~~
FORM 141 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 361 1985 041 0 8509060235 195433 08/01/85 DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE A RC HI TECT URAL ENGINEER: BECH.
FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO SYMBOL: SCE COHHENTS STEP 1: EFFECT IX VOLTAGE TRANSIENTS STEP 2 COHP RLX - AUXILIARY RELAYS REPORTABILITY CODCS FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100'N 8 1 85r AT 1535 THE REACTOR TRIPPED IN RESPONSE TO LOSS OF LOAD TRIP SIGNALS THE LOSS OF LOAD SIGNALS MER'E GENERATED AS RESULT OF A SPURIOUS TURBiNE TRIP ALL SAFETY SYSTEHS MERE VERIFIED TO HAVF FUNCTIONED PROPERLY THE SPURIOUS TURBINE TRIP WAS CAUSED BY A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT ON PHASE 'A'F THE NON-1E UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) (EIIS SYSTEM CODE EE) INVERTER-(EIIS COHPONENT CODE INVT) 2Y012 THIS INVERTER SUPPLIES POWER TO 2 AUX RELAYS (EIXS COMPONENT CODE RLY) ASSOCIATED MXTH THE CONTROL ELEMENT ORiVE MECHANXSH (CEDH) (EXIS COMPONENT CODE DRIV) UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS MHICH HAKE UP PART OF THE TURBINE TRIP CIRCUITRY. THE TRANSIENT OE-ENERGIZED THE AUX RELAYSr CLOSED THEIR CONTACTS AND COMPLETED THE TURBINE TRIP LOGIC. THE TRANSiENT MAS VERIFIED TO HAVE OCCURRED BASED ON ALARMS ON SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS POWERED BY PHASE 'A'ND NO SUCH INDICATIONS ON INSTRUNENTS POWERED BY OTHER PHASES OF THE UPS ~ NO DEFECTS MERE FOUND XN XNVERTER 2Y012. THE CAUSE OF THE VOLTAGE TRANSIENT IS UNKNOWN~ AS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A DESIGN CHANGE HAS BEEN XthPLEMENTED WHICH RE ARRANGED THE AUX RELAYSr SO THAT A SINGLE PHASE VOLTAGE TRANSiENT MiLL NOT CAUSE A TURBINE TRIP
0 0 0 0 0 0 i i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 142 LER SCSS DATA 09" 23-91
- A'******k***************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUBBER NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1986 029 3 8909120059 215156 12/10/86 DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PWR REGION NSSS:CE A RCHITECT URAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO ~
SYMBOL: SCE CONHENTS STEP 2: COMP XS STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH STEP 8: NOOEL NO 14071 B~ STEP 15: GANHA-l'lETRICS NO. 87.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POME R LEVEL 1 00/o ~ ON 1 2/1 0/86 AT 1 037r WITH UNIT 2 AT 93/i POWER r THE TURBINE TRIPPED DURING A POMER INTERRUPTION TO THE TURBINE GOVERNOR CONTROL SYSTEH (TGCS) r CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP THE STEAN BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM (SBCS) OIO NOT INITIALLY ACTUATE AND A HAIN STEAN SAFETY VALVF BRIEFLY ACTUATED THE TRIP RECOVERY PROCEEDED NORHALLYr ALTHOUGH START-UP CHANNEL 'B'AILEOr AND PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM (PPS) CHANNEL 'O'= OID NOT TRIP ~ ALL OTHER REQUIRED SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNEDr AND THERE MERE NO SAFETY CONSEQUENCES THE NON-1E 120 VAC LOAD WAS BEING TRANSFERRED FROM THE NON 1E UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) INVERTER TO THE ALTERNATE SOURCE. A PROCEDURAL STEP TO DEFEAT THE AUTOMATIC RETRANSFER CIRCUIT WAS NOT PERFORHEDr CAUSING THE LOAD TO TRANSFER BACK TO THF PRIHARY SOURCE WHEN THE UPS INVERTER MAS DISCONNECTED UNDER LOAOr THE AUTONATIC TRANSFER TO THE ALTERNATL SOURCE DIO NOT OCCUR IN TINE TO PREVENT THE TRIP ~ THE UPS IS EQUIPPED WITH AN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER SMITCH WHICH AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERS THE LOAD TO THE ALTERNATE SOURCE ON LOSS OF INVERTER OUTPUT VOLTAGE THE TRANSFER SMITCH WAS FOUND TO OPERATE CORRECTLY J HOMEVERr THE ENSUING TRANSIENT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE CAUSED THE TRIP ~ THE EVENT RESULTED FRON THE FAILURE'O FOLLOM THE PROC EOUREr'ODITIONALLYr THE JOB OID NOT RECEIVE THE CORRECT LEVEL OF ATTENTION BY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL.
~O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 If 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
FORM 143 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 362 1983 048 0 8309260479 1 85762 08/21/83
- +********************************************
DOCKET:362 SAN ONOFRE 3 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
S YHBOL: SCE REFERENCE LERS:
1 361/83-110 ABSTRACT WHILE UNIT 2 WAS IN NODE 1. AND UNIT 3 WAS IN NODE 3i TRAIN B EMERGENCY CHILLER E-335 FAILED TO START ANO WAS DECLAREO INOPERABLE AT 1415 LOSS OF A CHILLER RENDERS ALL EQUIPNENT INOPERABLE XN ROOMS IN BOTH UNITS WHERE CHILLED WATER IS PROVIDED TO COOL AHBIENT AIR THE LOSS OF TRAIN B EMERGENCY CHILLER RENDERS TWO INVERTERS INOPERABLE IN EACH UNIT SINCE LCO 3.8.3.1 REQUIRES ALL FOUR INVERTiRS ANO THEIR ASSOCXATiD BUSSES TO BE OPERABLE IN HODE 1 THROUGH 4 IN EACH UNIT AND SINCi THE ASSOCIATEO ACTION STATEMENT ONLY ADDRESSES THE LOSS OF ONE SUCH INVERTER AND ITS ASSOCIATED BUSr l CO 3 ~ 0~3 WAS INVOKED AT 1415>>
SEE ALSO LER 83-110 (UNIT 2) THE FAXLURE OF THE CHILLER E-335 TO START MAS OUE TO A FUSE FAILURE INVESTIGATION REVEALEO THAT THE FUSE FAILiO AT THE CAP RATHER THAN THE NIODLE. THIS SUGGESTS THAT A DEFECT EXISTED IN THE FUSE WHICH EVENTUALLY l ED TO A THERMAL FATIGUE FAILURE ~ ADOITIONALLYr THE FAILEO FUSE WAS A 2 AMP FUSEs WHEREAS THE DESIGN REQUIRED XT TO BE A 3-AHP FUSE. THE CORRECT SIZE FUSE MAS INSTALLED ANO THE CHILLER OECLAREO OPERABLEr AT 1514 RESTORING OPERABILITY TO THE TWO INVERTERS IN EACH UNIT AND ASSOCIATED A.C VITAl. BUSSES. ANO LCO 3.0.3 MAS EXITED.
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e
It t ~ ~~ F
)
~ t 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORV 144 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 362 1984 040 0 '5011 40036 92747 1 1 2/06/84 DOCKET:362 SAN ONOFRE 3 TYPE:PMR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHiRN CALIFORNIA EOiSON CO SYHBOL: SCE COMMENTS STEP 1: EFFECT IX - VOLTAGE TRANSIENT.
REPORTABILiTY CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ~ ON 12 06 84> AT 1947r WITH UNIT 3 IN t'lODE 1 AT 100% POWERS THE REACTOR TRIPPED. THE CAUSE OF THi TRIP MAS NOT IHHEOIATELY IDENTIFIED SINCE THE PLANT COMPUTER WAS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE TIME HOWEVERr PROPER OPERATXON OF ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS MAS VERIFIED AND HAJOR PLANT PARAMETER RESPONSES WERE SATISFACTORY.
INVESTIGATION HAS OETERNINED THAT A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT OCCURRED ON 1 PHASE OF THE NON-1E UNXNTERRUPTIBLi POWER SUPPLY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM THE CAUSE OF THIS TRANSIENT IS NOT KNOWN ANO CANNOT BE DETERHINED THIS TRANSIENT GENERAT 0 A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO A FAILED POMER SUPPLY ON THE LOAD REJECTION TRiP PANEL. THE REACTOR SUBSEQUENTLY TRIPPEO ON TURBINi LOSS OF LOAD ~ AS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, ALL POWER SUPPLIES AND CIRCUiT CARDS ON THE UNIT 3 LOAD REJECTION TRXP PANEL MERE REPLACED METH UNIT 2 POMER SUPPLIES AND CIRCUXT CARDS THE NON-1E UPS AND THE UNIT 3 LOAD REJECTION TRIP PANEL WERE TESTEO SATISFACTORiLY METH NO TURBINE TRIPS GENiRATEO A REACTOR TRIP FRON 100% POWER IS AN ANALYZED EVENT IN ADDITIONS ALL SAFETY SYSTEHS ACTUATED PROPERLY DURING THE EVENT
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 ",
e e e e o o e o e e e e e e e o e o o e 0
FORM 145 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- k*******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUtdBER NSIC EVENT DATE 362 1986 005 0 8605190310 199317 04/12/86 DOCKET:352 SAN ONOFRE 3 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHiTECT URAL ENGiNEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CAI IFORNXA EDISON CO.
SYMBOL: SCE COt'IMENTS STEP 1 EFF IX VOLTAGE TRANSIENT ~ STEPS 2r 3: COMP RLX AUXILIARY RELAY ~
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 361/85-041 2 362/84-040 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100K ~ ON 4/1 2/86r AT 1 630r WITH UNIT 3 AT 100% POWERs THE REACTOR (EIXS COMPONENT CODE RCT) TRIPPED IN RESPONSi TO LOSS OF LOAD TRIP SIGNALS (EIIS SYSTEM CODE JC) ~ THE LOSS OF LOAD SIGNALS WiRE GENERATED AS A RESULT OF A SPURIOUS TURBINE (EIIS COMPONENT CODE TRB) TRIP ~ ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS MERE VERIFIED TO HAVE FUNCTIONED PROPERLY ~ THE SPURIOUS TURBINi TRIP MAS CAUSED BY A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT ON PHASc ~ A'F THc NON-IE UNINTERRUPTIBLE POMER SUPPLY (UPS) (EIIS SYSTEM CODE EE) INVERTER (EIIS COMPONENT CODE INVT) 3Y012. THIS XNVERTER SUPPLIES POWER TO TMO AUXILIARY RELAYS (EIIS COMPONENT CODE RLY) ASSOCIATEO WITH THE CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM (CEDM) (EIIS SYSTEM CODE AA) UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS WHICH MAKE UP PART OF THE TURBINE TRIP CIRCUITRY ~ THE TRAtlSIENT DE-ENERGIZED THE AUXILXARY RELAYSr CLOSED THEIR CONTACTS AND COMPLETED THE TURBINE TRIP LOGIC THE TRANSIcNT MAS VERIFIEO TO HAVE OCCURRED BASED ON THE RECEIPT ALARMS ON SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS POMEREO BY PHASE 'A'HICH COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO ONLY SUCH A VOLTAGE TRANSIFNT. NO DEFECTS MERE FOUND IN INVERTER 3Y012 THE CAUSE OF THE VOLTAGE TRANSIENT IS UNKNOWN SIMILAR EVENTS MERE REPORTED IN LiR 84 040r DOCKET 50-362 AND LER 85 041r DOCKET 50 361 AS REPORTED IN LER 85 041r A DESIGN CHANGE FOR UNIT 2 WAS IMPLEMENTED WHICH RE-ARRANGED THE AUXILIARY RELAYS SO THAT A SINGLE PHASE VOLTAGE TRANSIENT WILL NOT CAUSE A TURBINE TRIP.
0 e o o e a a o ~ o o e e o o e o e ~
~O 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 146 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 362 1987 008 0 8706110149 204822 02/19/87
- k*****%'********************************A%**
DOCKET:362 SAN ONOFRE 3 TYPE:PMR REGiON: 5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACII ITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
S YMBOL: SCE-MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 RFPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50 72 30 HUMAN ACTION REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX. A REVIEW OF OPERATING RECORDS HAS IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING ESF ACTUATIONS: ON 2/19/87r WITH UNIT 3 IN t10DE 5 FOR THE
~ SCHEDULED REFUELING OUTAGEr THE 18 MONTH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF THE 4KV AC ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY CIRCUITS .,WAS CONDUCTED. THE BACKUP POMER SUPPLY INVERTER HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE~ AS VARIOUS STEPS OF THE TEST PROCEDURE CAUSED INTERRUPTION OF POWERr THE FOLLOMING ACTUATIONS OCCURRED AS DESIGNED AT 0152r TRAIN UEL HANDLING ISOLATION SYSTEM (FHIS) (EIIS SYSTEM CODE VG)r CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION SYSTEM (CPIS) (EIIS SYSTEt< CODE VA) r TOXIC GAS ISOLATiON SYSTEM (TGIS) (EIIS SYSTEM CODE VI)r AND CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION SYSTEM (GRIS) (EIIS SYSTEM CODE VI) r AT 1759r- TRAIN B CPISr TGISr CRISr ANDr AT 1858r TRAIN A TGIS THE MONITORS IN WHICH THE ACTUATIONS OCCURRED ARE CURRENTLY DESIGNED TO ACTUATE UPON DEENERGIZATION OF THEIR POMER SUPPLIES. THE TESTING SEQUENCE NOTED HEREIN IS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EQUIPMENT DESIGN AND THE MOMENTARY DEENERGIZATION OF THE POMER SUPPLIES UPON TRANSFERRING BUSES RESULTS IN ACTUATION OF THE MONITORS. ACCORDINGLY SUCH ACTUATIONS ARE CONSIDERED "EXPECTED" AS THEY OCCUR WHEN THE POWER TRANSFER ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE.
e ~ ~
FORM 147 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A*******************************************************%'*******
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 364 1981 040 0 8110290357 1 70003 09/23/81 DOCKET:364 FARLEY 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: ALABAMA POWER CO.
SYMBOL: APC ABSTRACT THE PLANT STACK EFFLUENT MONITOR (R298) WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO A DATA TRANSMIT ERROR THE 120 VAC VITAL BUS 2A WAS DEcNERGIZED WHEN INVERTER 2A TRIPPED ~ THE CAUSc FOR THE TRANSMIT ERROR ON R298 WAS BEING INVESTIGATEO AT THE TIME THE 2A INVERTER TRIPPED ~ AS A RESULT OF LOSS OF POWER TO THE CONSOLES THE CAUSE FOR THE TRANSMIT ERROR COULD NOT BE DETERMINED THE INVERTER TRIPPEO DUE TO A TRANSIENT VOLTAGE SPIKE AND WAS RESET AND RETURNED TO SERVICF BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF POWER TO THE R298 CONSOLESr THE UNIT REQUIRED COMPLETE REPROGRAMMING FOLLOWING RESTORATION OF POWER R298 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO SERVICc ~
0 e o e o e e e e e e o e e e o e e o e e 6 i ~
0 N e e e o e e o o e o e e e e e e e e o
FORH 148 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUI'1BER NSIC EVENT DATE 364 1982 011 0 8204160449 173252 03/16/82
- A****%*************************A************************+*
DOCKET:364 FARLEY 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: ALABAMA POWER CO SYi4IBOL: APC ABSTRACT THE 120V AC VITAL BUS B WAS DEENERGIZED WHiN INVERTER 28 TRIPPED.
TECH SPEC 3 8 ~ 2 ~ 1s IN PARTr REQUIRES THE B BUS AND INVERTER 2B TO BE OPERABLi AND iNERGIZED. THIS EVENT OCCURRED WHEN INViRTER 2B FAILED DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE IN THE VOLTAGE RFGULATOR CIRCUIT. FOLLOWING REPLACEHENT OF THE FUSir BUS B WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE
-.!0 0 O.O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P l 0 l 0
FORM 149 LER SCSS DATA 09-23" 91
- A*******************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 364 1 982 032 0 8208300320 176542 07/22/82
- A***********************************************************
DOCKET:364 FARLEY 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: ALABAt1A POWER CO.
SYNBOL: APC ABSTRACT REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SUBCOOLING HONITOR CHANNEL 2 AND THE 2B CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER MERE DECLARED INOPERABLE MHEN THE 2G iNVERTER FAILED~ TECH SPEC SECTIONS 3 3 3 ~ 8 AND 3 6 ~ 4 ~ 1 s IN PARTr REQUiRE THE RCS SUBCOOLING MONITOR CHANNEL AND THE 2B CONTAINNENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER TO BE OPERABLE. THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF THE PRINARY POWER SUPPLY. FOLLOWING THE RESTORATION OF POWER WITH AN ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY'CS SUBCOOLING NONITOR CHANNEL 2 ANO THE 2B CONTAINNENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER MERE DECLARED OPERABLE. THE FAULTY POWER SUPPLY MILL BE REPLACED DURING THE NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE
o o o e o e o e a o o o o e e e o e o ql
~o ~ o ~ o o ~ o e e ~ o o o ~ e e ~ e o o
FORN 150 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- is****************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISXON DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 364 1983 062 0 8401030123 188170 11/21/83 DOCKET:364 FARLEY 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: ALABAHA POWER CO ~
SYMBOL: APC ABSTRACT AT 2321 ON 11/21/83i THE 2D INVERTER WAS DECLARED XNOPERABLE DUE TO A FAILED CAPACITOR ~ TECH SPEC 3 8 2 1r IN PARTi R'EQUIRES THIS INVERTER TO BE OPERABLE TECH SPEC 3 8 2 ~ 1 ACTION STATENENT REQUIREMENTS WERE NET. THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY COHPONENT FAXLURE THE CAPACITOR WAS REPLACED AND 20 INVERTER WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AT 0551. ON 11/22/83 '
0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~d e e e e ~ e e o o e e e e e e e.
I',
e e 44 o e
FORN 151 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4***********************************************************
I DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 364 1 989 015 0 891 2280001 21 621 6 11/1 8/89 DOCKET:364 FARLEY 2 TYPE :PWR REGION: 2 NSSS WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILiTY OPERATOR: ALABANA POWER CO.
SYMBOL: APC COHHENTS STEP 2. HODEL NO ~ STI 240 010 3r STS 010 3r HBS 010 3 ~ STEP 3 CAUSE IX VOLTAGE TRANSIENT.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
16 MOISTURE REPORTAB! I ITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ~ AT 0433 ON 11 18 89r WITH THE UNIT OPERATING AT 100% POVERTY THE REACTOR TRIPPED DUE TO A TURBINE TRIP THE TURBINE TRIP IS ATTRIBUTED TO A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT IN THE POWER CIRCUIT TO THE DEHC S YS T E Yi ~ A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT IN THIS CIRCUIT IS SUSP ECT EO TO HAVE CAUSED THE DEHC SYSTEM TO ERRONEOUSLY SENSE A LOSS OF DC POWER. THE VOLTAGE TRANSIENT IS ATTRIBUTEO TO THE FAil URE OF THE DEHC INVERTER.
THE UNIT RETURNED TO POWER OPERATION AT 0455 ON 11-19-89 USING THE ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY THE INVERTER WAS REPAIREO AND RETURNED TO SERVICE
0 e e e e 0 o e o e o o e e o e e e o e e II 1 1
If
~ iO O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
FORIl 1 52 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91.
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 366 1 980 003 0 8002070279 1 53705 01/17/80
- A*************************k*******************A****************
DOCKET: 366 HATCH 2 TYPE-BMR REGXON: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH.
FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POMER CO ~
SYMBOL: GPC COHtlENTS STEP 1: INV-TOPAZ STATIC INVERTER HODEL N250-GWR-125-60-1 15 STEP 2: EFFECT KX-AUTOMATIC CONTROL INOPERABLE ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 099% CAUSE - XNSTRUHENT SET POINT DRIFT. WHILE APPLYING AN EQUALIZING CHARGE TO THE 125/250 VDC STATION SERVICE BATTERIESr THE HPCI AUTOtlATIC FLOW CONTROL POMER INVERTER TRIPPED ~ DUE TO THE TRIPPING OF THE INVERTERr 2E41 K603r THE AUTOMATIC FLOW CONTROL LOOP OF HPCI MAS HADE INOPERATIVE ~ THE tlANUAL NODE OF HPCI WAS STILL OPERABLE RCICr ADSi CS AND LPCI MERE OPERABLE. THE CAUSE HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO INSTRU.'lENT ORXFT THE HIGH VOLTAGE TRIP SETPOINT OF 2E41-K603 IS 147 +(=) 5 VDC. THE INVERTER TRIPPED AT 141 VDC THE INST RUilENT WAS R 'EC ALIBRAT E 0 SATX SFACTORI LY AND PUT ON THE ANNUAL LCO LIST.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 153 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A************%***+*****************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 366 1980 013 0 8002290446 155300 02/03/80
- A'*********************************************************
DOCKET:366 HATCH 2 TYPE :BMR REGION: 2 NSSS :GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO SYMBOL: GPC ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 099/ CAUSE LXCENSED OPERATOR ERROR THE EMERGENCY CONTROL TRANSFER SMiTCH FOR THE REMOTE SHUTOOMN PANEL MAS PLACED XN THE EMERGENCY POSiTION MHILE t1AINTENANCE MAS BEING PERFORMED ON 2C82-K002 STATIC INVERTER. THE CONBINATION OF THE SMITCH POSITION ANO THE FAILEO INVERTER RENDERED RCIC INOPERATIVE THE SYSTEM WAS NOT DECLARED INOPERATIVE DURING THIS PERIOD OF TINE ~ THIS IS A NON-REPETITIVE EVENT THE FAILURE TO DECLARE THE SYSTEN INOPERATIVE MAS CAUSED BY PERSONNEL ERROR. THE POSITION OF THE CONTROL TRANSFER SWITCH WAS CHANGED TO RETURN THE CONTROL TO THE CONTROL ROON THE STATIC INVERTER MAS REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE WHICH HADE THE REHOTE RCIC CONTROLS OPERABLE.
0 e e e e o e o e e e 0 e e e e o e o o o N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 154 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REViSION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 366 1980 071 0 8005130536 156940 04/24/80 DOCKET: 366 HATCH 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO SYMBOL: GPC REFERENCE LERS:
1 366/? 9-135 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ CAUSE INVERTER FAILS- DURING ROUTINE REACTOR STARTUP ACTIVITIES'HE RCIC LEAK DETECTION LOGIC POWER FAILURE ALARM WAS RECEIVED THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS INOPERATIVE AT THE TIME FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE~ HPCIr CORE SPRAY ANO ADS SYSTEMS WERE OPERABLE AT THE TIME ~ THIS IS A REPETITIVE EVENT. AS LAST REPORTED ON REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT NO 50-366/1979"135
0 e e o e o e e e o e o o e e e e e e e e 0 0 0 0 O. 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 155 l ER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- w******A************************************************A'********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 366 1 981 038 0 8105130261 1661 2? 04/21/81 DOCKET: 366 HATCH 2 TYPE :BWR RiGXON: 2 NSSS :GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO SYMBOL: GPC ABSTRACT
'WHXLE REDUCING POWER FOR CONDENSER TUBE REPAIR THE A LPCI XNVERTER (2R44-S002) TRXPPiD. POWER TO ESSENTIAL MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (2R24-5018A) WHICH FEEDS THE LPCI XNJECTXON VALVE ANO SUCTION AND DISCHARGE VALVES FOR A RECIRC WAS LOST MOMENTARILY AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT ~ LOGIC FAILURE CAUSED THi INVERTER TO TRIP THE CAUSE FOR THE INVERTER TRIPPING IN THIS MANNER IS UNKNOWN CONDUIT BRACING WAS OROPPEO ON THE FLOOR ELEVEN FEET FROM THE INVERTER IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TRIPz BUT OID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE TRIP THE INVERTER WAS RESET AND PUT BACK INTO SERVICE.
0 e e e o ~ o e e e o o e e e o o e o e e d
W 0 0 O., ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 156 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4****************+*********************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 366 1 981 085 0 8109290319 169271 09/04/81
- %********************A***
DOCKET: 366 HATCH 2 TYPE:BMR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO.
SYMBOL: GPC ABSTRACT B LPCI INVERTERr 2R44 S003r TRIPPED LPCI INJECTION VALVE 2E11 F017B IS POWERED BY ESSENTIAL HCC 2R24 S018B AND THEREFOREr LOOP B WAS HADE INOPERABLE MHEN THE EVENT CAUSED IT TO BECOME DE-ENERGIZED 2R24-S018B MAS TRANSFERRED TO THE ALTERNATE SUPPLY THE EVENT WAS THE RESULT OF A FAILURE OF THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR ON THE GATE FIRING NODULE LOCATED IN INVERTER LEG NUNBER SEVEN THE INVERTER LEG WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW ONEs PROPER OPERATION OF THE INVERTER VERIFIED AND THE INVERTER RETURNED TO SERVICE
0 e e e e o e e e e e o e e e e a e e e o ';
8 4 IP ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
FORM 157 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +***********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 366 1984 030 3 8507160039 196055 11/15/84 DOCKET: 366 HATCH 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS."GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO.
SYMBOL: GPC REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE 10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdouns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 099/o ON 11"15-84 THE PLANT'S SURVEILLANCE COORDINATOR DiTERMINED THAT THE MONTHLY CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST HAD NOT BEEN PFRFORMEO ON THi MAIN STEAM LINE INSTRUMENTATION FOR THE MONTHS OF SEPT AND OCT ~ THIS MONTHLY TEST IS REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS TABLE 4 3 2 1r ITiM 0 ~ r AS WiLL AS THE 'MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENT FTRC'ROCEDURE (HNP-2-3107) ~ THIS T ST WAS PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED EVERY 18 MONTHS! HOWEVERr TECH SPECS AMENDMENT NUMBER 39 CHANGED THE 18 MONTH INTERVAL TO A 30 OAY INTERVAL THE PLANT'S SURVFILLANCE COORDINATOR DID NOT ADJUST THE SURVEILLANCE THIS EVENT IS THE RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR ON 11 29 84 FREQUENCY'ONSEQUENTLYr DURING A QA AUDITr PLANT PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION AND REACTOR VESSEL SHROUD WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION WERE NOT RECEIVING MONTHLY CHANNEL CHECKS AND QUART Rl Y CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS PER TECH SPECS TABLE 4 3 6 4 1r ITEM 1 AND 4 3 6 4 1r ITEM 2s RESPECTIVELY ON 3 13 85 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE 'RIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER FUNCTIONAL TEST (HEATUP TO 1200 OEG F) SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DID NOT MEiT THE ACCcPTANCE CRITERIA OF TECH SPECS SECTION 4 ~ 6 6 ~ 2 ~ 8 4 REFER TO THE NARRATIVE FOR ADDITIONAL ITEMS ADDED VIA REV 3.
0 o o o o ~ o o o e e o e e e e o o e e e
'I II p,
'4 o o e e ~ o o e e o o o e e e e e e o i
FORH 158 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91
- +************************************************+********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUl'lB E R NSIC EVENT DATi 366 1 987 006 1 8906010268 2'13972 07/26/87
- A**************************************4***********
1 DOCKET:366 HATCH 2 TYPE :BMR RiGION: 2 NSSS :Gi ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO SYMBOL: GPC COtlMENTS OTHER REPORTABILITY TiCH SPEC 3 ~ 5 ~ 1 ~ STEP 2: PSYS HS VITAL AC ROOM ~ STEP 3: tlODEL SV12250. STEP 7: COMP HSC LATCHING ARM ~
MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARi:
34 DcSIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
~ REFERENCE LERS:
1 321/85-010 2 321/87-011 ABSTRACT POWER LcVEL 089K ON 7/26/87r AT APPROXIMATELY 1405 CDTr UNIT 2 WAS IN THE RUN MODE AT AN APPROXIMATE POWER LEVEL OF 2170 HWT (APPROXIMATELY 89 PERCENT OF RATED THERl'1AL POMER) AT THAT TIHEr VITAL AC (EIIS CODE EE) POWER MAS LOST. THIS RESULTED IN A DECREASE IN THE REACTOR FEEDMATiR PUMPS FLOW AND A DiCREASE IN REACTOR WATER IEVEL~ THE REACTOR WATER LEVEL DECREASED TO THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS EIIS CODE JC) ACTUATION SETPOINT AND A REACTOR SCRAM OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT IS ATTRIBUTED TO iQUIPHENT FAILURE DUE TO XNADEQUATE HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) DiSIGN TO ENSURE THE VITAL AC EQUIPMENT (I ~ E ~ r ELiCTRICAL INV-"RTER) IS PROPERLY COOLED. THE ELECTRONIC EQUXPHENT FAILURE IN THE INVERTER IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE HIGH ROOM TEMPERATURiS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THIS EVENT INCLUDE 1 ) REFURBISHING THE INVERTERr 2)
ADDING TEMPORARY COOLING TO THE INVERTER ROOHSr 3) INSTALLING A NFW HVAC SYSTEM FOR COOLING INVERTER ROOMSr 4) DEVELOPXNG A UNIT COMHON PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE FOR BOTH INVERTERS ANOr 5) INSTALLING NEW VITAL AC XNVERTERS FOR BOTH UNITS 1 AND 2.
0 e o o e e o e o 0 a e e e e o e o e e
~ 1 4~
i R C 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 159 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A***********A*+*****************************+******************
OOCKFT YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 366 1 987 009 1 8801250292 207902 08/03/87
- k*************+********************+********
DOCKET:366 HATCH 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO S YIRBOL: GP C COHHENTS OTHER REPORTABILITY TECH SPEC 3 5 1 ~ STEPS 15r16 MODEL CAT CJ2-G3-U WATCH LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUIPHENT FAILURE REPORTABILiTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
21 OTHER: Voluntar y reportr special reportr Part 21 reports etc.
0 REFERENCE LERS:
1 321/85-010 2 321/87-011 3 3 66/ 87-006 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 090%~ ON 8/3/87 AT APPROXIMATELY 1152 CDTr UNIT 2 WAS IN THE RUN MODE AT AN APPROXIMATE POWER LEVEL OF 2193 NMT (APPROXINATEl Y 90 PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER) AT THAT TINEr VITAL AC (EIIS CODE EE) POWER WAS LOST. THIS RESULTED IN A DECREASE IN THE REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS FLOM ANO A DECREASE IN REACTOR WATER LEVEL THE REACTOR MATER LEVEI DECREASED TO THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEH (RPS EIIS CODE JC) ACTUATION SETPOINT AND A REACTOR SCRAH OCCURRED THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT lS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT F AXLURE SPECIFICALLY~ CIRCUIT BREAKER CB-4 WOULD OPEN UNDER UNDULY LOW FORCc CONDITIONS IT WAS CONCLUDED AFTER FIELD TESTING ANO CONSULTATION WITH THE iRANUFACTURER THAT THE TRIPPING MECHANISM WAS WEAK CORRECTiVE ACTXONS FOR THIS EVENT INCLUDED: 1) INSTALLING JUNPERS AND REMOVING EQUXPHENT FROH SERVICEg 2) DESIGNING AND INSTALLING BARRIER BOXESr 3)
VERIFYING TRIP INSTRUNENTATION AND LEVEL TRANSMITTERS IN CAI IBRATIONr
- 4) VENTING INSTRUMENT LINES AND TRANSMITTERSr 5) PERFORNING EVALUATiONS OF AIR ENTRAINMENT ANO SPIKING IN INSTRUMENT LINES')
iNITIATiNG PROCEDURE REVISIONS'. AND 7) VERXFYING CERTAIN OTHER SYSTEMS DO NOT HAVE LOW SUCTION TRIPS 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 n t4
~ ~
0 i4 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 160 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER RiVXSXON DCS NUtdBER NSXC EViNT DATE 368 1982 020 0 8207130458 174246 05/29/82 DOCKET:368 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR 2 REGION: 4 ARCHXTiCTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: ARKANSAS POMER ANO LIGHT CO SYMBOL: APL REFERENCE LERS:
1 368/81-.039 ABSTRACT DURING POMER ESCALATION'ATTERY BANK 2D01 VOLTAGE OROPPEO TO 121 V ~ 0 ~ C ~ VERSUS THE REQUIRED 129 V ~ 0 ~ C ~ ALSOr BATTERY CHARGE 2031 BREAKFR MAS FOUND TO Bi OE-ENERGIZED'HIS CAUSED ENTRY INTO ACTION B OF TECH SPEC 3.8 2.3 ~ THIS OCCURRENCE IS REPORTABLE PER TECH SPEC 6 9.1.9.B. APPARENTLY A VOLTAGE DROP CAUSED THE PRINARY VOLTAGE SUPPLY TO THE XNVERTERS 2Y 11r 2Y 13 AND 2Y 25 TO SWITCH TO BATTERY BANK 2001 WHEN THE INVERTERS WERE RETURNED TO THEIR NORMAL POWER SUPPLY'HE ABC FEEDER BREAKER FOR BATTERY CHARG R 2031.WAS FOUND TRIPPED ~ BATTERY CHARGER 2031 WAS RETURNED TO SERVXCEs ANO THE 2D01 VOLTAGE MAS BROUGHT TO TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS ~ TROUBLESHOOTINGr WHICH INCLUDED CHECKS FOR GROUNDS ANO MIRE CHECKS'ERi PERFORHEDi BUT THE FAILURE CAUSE MAS NOT OETERNINED ~ FURTHER INVESTIGATION MILL BE PERFORMED
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 ~
II i
~ 5 '
~1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORtl 1 61 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- a*******
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 368 1 984 019 0 8408300496 191218 07/20/84 DOCKET:368 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR 2 REGiON: 4 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT CO ~
S YtlBOL: APL CONHENTS STEPS 6 AND 7: CAUSE XX ELECTRICAL TRANSXENT ~
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THXS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ON 7 20 84s AT 0118 HRS A HANUAl REACTOR TRIP WAS INITIATED FROtl 100% FULL POWER FOLLOWING A SPURIOUS HAI F-LEG TRIP (1 OF 2 PATHS) CAUSED BY SMITCHING OF INVERTER 2Y11 SUPPLYING POWER TO CORE P ROTiCT ION CALCULATOR (CP C) CHANNEL Ar C Ot'ITROL ELEMENT ASSEt'lBLY CALCULATOR (CEAC) "1 ENGINEERED SAFiTY FEATURES AND PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM CAB INETSr AND THE AB TRIP MATRICES FOR HALF OF THE CONTROL ELEtlENT DRIVE MECHANISM BREAKERS. AT 01PP HRS AN OPERATORS DISPATCHED TO RESET AN INVERTER ALARHr INADVERTENTLY PRiSSFO THE ALTERNATE SOURCE TO LOAD e BUTTON INSTEAD OF THE s RESET s BUTTON. REALIZING- HIS MISTAKEN'E PRESSED THE 'INVERTER TO LOAD'UTTON TO RETURN THE INVERTER TO THE NORtlAL CONFIGURATION. WHEN THE INVERTER MAS SMITCHED BACK TO NOR lALr AN ELECTRICAL TRANSIiNT .APPARENT! Y OCCURRED ~ THIS RESULTED IN TRXPPING OF 4 CEDti BREAKERS AND ALL PPS CHANNEL A TRIP PARAMETERS BASED ON THi DEGRADED PLANT INDICATIONS AND THE BELIEF THAT AN AUTOHATXC TRXP MAS IHthINENTi A CONTROL, ROOM OPERATOR TRIPPED THE REACTOR MANUALLY'EACTOR TRIP RECOVERY PROCEEDED WITH NO UNUSUAL DIFFICULTIESr AND NO SIGNIFICANT POST TRIP ANONALIES WERE NOTED ~
2Y11 MAS SUBSEQUENTLY INSPECTEO AND OPERATEO WXTH NO INVERTER 'NVERTER OUTPUT DiGRADATION DURXNG TESTING.
0 e.o e o e o e e e o o o o o o .e e e e e I
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 162 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4*****************
DOCKET YiAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 368 1988 007 0 8806140564 209648 04/23/88 DOCKET:368 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR 2 TYPE:PMR R EGION 4 NSSS CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINiER: BECH FACELXTY OPERATOR: ARKANSAS POMER AND LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: APL COMMENTS STEPS 7r 8: EFF WX ONE OR HORE ACTUATION SIGNALS OF UNKNOMN TYPE STEPS Br9r10r11r12r13r14r15r16 COMP ABNX ALL ESF ACTUATION SIGNALS ~ SHP/C/5 MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUMAN ERROR 941 RFPORT ASSOCIATED MXTH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS 1 368/80-024 2 368/83-015 3 368/84-003 4 368/85-009 5 368/85-014 6 368/88-003 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000'N 4/23/88 AT 1255 HOURSr AN INADVERTENT PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM (PPS) ACTUATION. OCCURRED MHEN A HAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN DEENERGIZED AT 12 VOLT DC POWER SUPPLY TO THE SYSTEM THi SYSTEH HAD BEEN PARTIALLY DEENERGIZED PRIOR TO THIS OCCURRENCE DUE TO AN UNRELATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY ON A 120 VOLT VXTAL POWER INVERTER.
A REACTOR TRXP SIGNAL AND ALL ENGINEiRiD SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)
ACTUATZON SIGNALS MERE GENERATEO AS A RESULT OF THE PPS ACTUATION THE PLANT WAS EN COLO SHUTDOWN WITH A LIMITED AtlOUNT OF ESF EQUIPMENT ALIGNED FOR AUTOHATIC OPiRATION AT THi TIflE OF OCCURRiNCE. THE OPERATING LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION (LPSE) PUtlP BEING USED FOR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL (DHR) FLOW TRiPPED AUTOMATICALLY CAUSING A TEtlPORARY LOSS OF DHR ~ THE PUfhP WAS RESTARTED AND OHR REESTABl ISHED WiTHEN FIVE MINUTES OF THE INITiATING EVENT NO SIGNIFICANT HEATUP OCCURRED DURING THE TEHE THAT FLOW WAS iNTERRUPTED. THE HERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) STARTED AND OPERATED IN A RUNNING STANDBY CONDITION FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND WERE THEN SECURED OTHER ESF iQUIPtkENT ALIGNED FOR AUTOt'lATIC OPiRATION ACTUATED AS OESEGNED ~ THE PPS POWER SUPPLY MAS REENERGIZED AND THE ACTUATION SIGNALS MERE CLEAREO THE CAUSE OF THE ACTUATION lfAS DETERtliNED TO BE A COGNITIVE PERSONNEL ERROR ON THE PART OF THE HAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN
0 e e o o e o e e e e o e e o e e o e o e
~0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0
FORM 163 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
1 369/82-052 2 369/81-072 3 369/81-1 29 4 369/81-185 ABSTRACT DURING PLANT COOLDOWN AND NODE DEESCALATION'TATIC INVERTER EVIA HALFUNCTIONED CAUSING A RESIDUAL HEAT REi'lOVA L SYSTEM (NO) ISOLATION VALVE TO CLOSE ~ OPERATORS RESTORED ND FLOWi BUT NOT BEFORE THE LOSS OF FLOW EFFiCTED A TRANSITION FROH NODE 5 TO NODE 4. THIS VIOLATES TECH SPEC 3 8 2 1 AND 3 4 1.4 WHICH ARE REPORTABLE PER TECH SPEC 6 9 1 13(B) AND SIHILAR TO PREVIOUS RO-369/82-52. THIS IS ATTRIBUTED TO COMPONENT FAILURE OF THE SOLIOSTATE CONTROl Sr INC ~ STATIC INVERTER ~
THREE CAPACITORS IN THE OUTPUT CVT CAPACITOR BANK FAILiO ANO HAD DEFORMEO CASINGS~ THi FAILED CAPACITORS MERE REPLACEDr AND THE INVERTER RETURNED TO SERVICE. THE INVERTER CORRECTIVE NAINTENANCE PROCEDURE WILI BE MODIFIED TO REFLiCT THE POSSIBILITY OF CVT CAPACITOR FAILURE THE CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT SHUTDOWN WAS NOOIFIED TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT LOSS OF ND FLOW.
0 o o e e o e e e e o e e e o e e ~ e e W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FOR t'l 1 64 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- Sr******************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 369 1984 024 0 8412010048 192511 08/21/84 DOCKET:369 MCGUIRE 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUKE POMER CO.
SYMBOL: DPC COMMENTS STEP 16 CAUS= IX VOLTAGE SPIKE STEP 6 COMP RLX CONTROL OUTPUT RELAY WATCH-LEST. CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety- function.
ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 100% AT 2400 ON 8-20-84r THE MCGUIRE SMITCHYARD COtlP UTER WAS REPORTED INOPERABLE ~ ON 8-21-84r C Qt'lP UTER AND IN VERT ER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL PERFORMED CORRECTIVE tlAINTENANCE ON THE SMITCHYARO COMPUTER AND STATIC INVERTER ~ AT 2114r THE SMXTCHYARD COMPUTER MAS RE-STARTEDr CHECKED FOR OPERABII ITYr AND RETURNED TO SERVICE AT 2148r WHEN THE SWITCHYARD OPERATOR RE ENABLED THE COMPUTER, CONTROL OUTPUTSr 30 POWER CIRCUIT BREAKERS (PCBS) AND ASSOCIATED OXSCONNECTS OPENEDr RESULTING IN MCGUIRE UNIT 1. REACTOR TRIP AND TURBINE TRIPr LOSS OF UNIT 1 OFFSITE AC POWERr AND STARTUP OF UNIT 1 DGS A AND B UNIT 1 MAS IN MODE 1 AT 100X POWER AT THE TIME THIS INCIDENT IS CLASSIFIED AS A COMPONENT MALFUNCTION/FAILURE BECAUSE THE CONTROL. CIRCUITS WERE CHANGED TO AN UNDESIRABLE STATE WITHOUT A COMMAND FROM THE COMPUTERr DURING COMPUTER AND XNVERTER MAINTENANCE~ DESIGN DEFXCIFNCY ALSO COiNTRIBUTED BECAUSE THE COMPUTER PROGRAM DID NOT INCLUDE A FUNCTION TO RESET THE COMPUTER OUTPUT CONTROL CIRCUITS TO A PREDETERMINED STATE WHEN THE COtlPUTER IS RESTARTED ~ THE BEHAVIOR AND CONTROL OF THE TRANSIENT WHICH RESULTED FROM THE REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP MERE AS COULD BE EXPECTED
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 lg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 165 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91
- ie*******************A******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION DCS NUt1BER NSIC EVENT DATE 370 1984 =
034 0 8502010483 1 92823 1 2/21/84 DOCKET: 370 HCGUIRE 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUKE POMER CO.
SYMBOL: DPC COHHENTS STEP 1: MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL MISTOOK UNIT 2 EQUIPHENT FOR UNIT 1 EQUIPNENT REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS I ER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100'N 12-21-85 UNXT 2 TRIPPED FROtl 100% POWER WHEN PREVENTIVE tlAINTENANCE ON UNIT 1 125V AC VITAL XSC POWER RESULTED IN A UtJIT 2 ItlVERTER BEING ERRONEOUSI Y REMOVED FROH SERVICEr INSTiAD OF THE ADJACENT UNIT 1 INV RTER ~ THE RESULTING l OSS OF POWER TO THE ANALOG CONTROLLERS FOR SG LEVELr FEEDMATER FLOWs AND STEAN FLOW RESULTED IN A FEEDWATER TRANSIENTr WHICH WAS CORRECTED BY SWITCHING TO klANUAL CONTROL AND TRANSFiRRING THE CONTROLLERS TO ANOTHER CHANNELS HOWEVERr THE TRANSFER T'0 ANOTHER CHANNEL WAS DONE INCOHPLETELYr IN THAT 1 OF 13 CONTROLLER SWITCHES MAS NOT HOVED TO THE ALTERNATE CHANNEL WHEN CONTROL WAS RETURNED TO THE AUTOMATIC HODEs THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS INOPERABLE INPUT TO AUTOtlATIC CONTROL CAUSED THE LiVEL IN SG C TO FALL TO THE LOM LOM TRIP SETPOINT ~ THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS PiRSONNEL ERROR BECAUSE AN OPERATOR AND AN INDEPENDENT VERIFIER FAILiD TO IDENTIFY PROPERLY THE EQUIPtlENT TO BE REHOVED FROM SERVICE ~ IN ADDITIONr THE TRANSFER OF THE SG PROGRAH TO AN ALTERNATE CHANNEL MAS PERFORHED XNCORRECTLY. CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL INCLUDE A RE El'lPHASIS WITH OPERATORS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING PROCEDURESr AND VERIFICATION~ ALSOr THE SG LOM LOW I- VEL TRIP SETPOINT WILL BE LOWERED TO ALLOM OPERATORS MORE TIflE TO DIAGNOSE AND COMPENSATE FOR SG LEVEL TRANSIENTS
0 e e e e e e o o a o o o . o e e e o o e
>> ~
4 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O. 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0
FOR>1 1 66 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- x**********************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER RiVISION DCS NUNBER NSXC EVENT DATE 370 1985 026 0 8512100425 197373 10/24/85
- %*A*******************************+'*************************
DOCKET: 370 HCGUIRE 2 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACiLITY OPERATOR: DUKi POWER CO SYHBOL: OPC REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS 1 370/84-034 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100X ON OCTOBER 24' 985r A RiACTOR TRIP OCCURRiD AS A RESULT OF LOM LEVEL IN STEAt1 GENERATOR (S/G) "C" THE INADVERTENT OPENING OF THE OUTPUT BREAKER ON THE CHANNEL XX VITAL INSTRUMENTATXON AND CONTROL IiJVERTER INITIATED THE EVENT ~ THE ANALOG CONTROLLERS FOR THE S/G'S ANO PRESSURiZER MERE BEING SUPPI IED BY CHANNEL I POWER SUPPLY AND WERE UNAFFECTED BY THE LOSS OF POWER. THE S/G LEVEL PROGRAH SELECTOR SMITCH FOR THc NUCLEAR POWER CONTRIBUTION WAS IN THE l'J41 N42 (CHANNEL Ir CHANNEL II) POSITION AT THE TillE OF THE INCIDENT THE N42 CHANNEL HAO FAILED DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER ANO WAS CAUSING AN ERRONEOUS S/G LEVEL SIGNAL WHICH WAS CLOSING THE FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES FOR S/G'S "B" AND "C". THE DECREASING S/G LEVELS MERE NOT NOTICED BY THE OPERATORS UNTiL THE LOM LEVEL ALERT WAS RECEIVED AT APPROXIHATELY 45 PERCENT LEVEL. ATTEMPTS TO HANUALLY RECOVER LEVEL WERE UNSUCCESSFUL AND REACTOR TRIP FROM 100 PERCENT POWER OCCURRED THIS INCXDENT IS ATTRIBUTiD TO PERSONNEL ERROR DUE TO THE UNINTENTIONAL TRIPPING OF THE INVERTER BREAKER ~ SYSTENS RESPONDED AS EXPECTED FOR THE TRANSIENT ~ HODIFICATIONS ARE BEING CONSIDERED TO ALLOW OPERATORS llORE TINE TO CORRECT OR PREVENT THIS TYPE OF TRANSIENT
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 167 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91
- A******************%*************************
DOCKET YiAR LER NUHBER REVISION OCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 370 1987 016 1 8712220087 207557 09/06/87
- 4**************************************************************
DOCKET:370 NCGUIRE 2 T YPE:PMR REGION: 2 N SSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUK i POMER CO SYMBOL: DPC
'OMMENTS STEP 10: i~lODEL tt1MA459833-G1-LY ~ STEP 49: COt4P XC - AUTO START CONTROLLER.
HATCH-LIST CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
19 VIBRATION 10 ENVIRONtlENTAL CONDITIONS REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS 1.369/84-024 2 370/85-026 3 370/86-016 4 370/86-021 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100X. AT 100X POWER ON SEPTEtlB R 6r 1987 AT 1035< A UNIT 2 REACTOR/TURBINE TRIP OCCURRED DUE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WHEN HAIN TURBINE GOVERNOR AND INTERCEPT VALVES CLOSED AS DIRECTED BY THi DIGITAL ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC (DEH) TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM. THE GOVERNOR AND INTERCEPT VALVE CLOSE SIGNAL WAS GENERATED BY LOSS OF POWER TO A DEH TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM RELAY MHEN POMER MAS LOST TO KXB POWER WAS LOST ON AUXILIARY POWER PANELBOARD KXB DUE TO AN OVERCURRENT FAULT BREAKER TRIP CAUSED BY A GROUNDED HOTOR LEAD CONNECTOR (INSULATING TAPE HAD MORN ALLOMING CONNECTING LUG TO GROUND TO HOTOR FRAME) ON INSTRUMENT AIR (VI) COHPRESSOR A ~ OPERATIONS IHPLEHENTED THE REACTOR TRIP PROCEDURi. POMiR MAS RESTORED TO AUXILIARY POWER PANELBOARD KXB FRON STATIC INVERTER KXB ~ UNIT 2 RETURNED TO NODE 1 r POMER OPERATIONr ON SEPTEMBER 7 AT 2110. THi CONNECTING LUG MAS REINSULATED IN THE CONNECTION BOX AND THE COtlPRESSOR WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ~ VI COHPRESSOR NOTORS BSC MILL BE INSPECTEO FOR SIHILAR CONDITION~
SitliLAR NOTORS IN OTHER APPLICATIONS MILL BE INSPECTED AND RETAPED AS NECESSARY
0 o e o o o o o 4 e e e o e e e e e o ~ o :
I 'I 0 W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORbl 168 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91
- %****A***********************************************************
OOCKFT YEAR LER NUt'tBER REVISION DCS NU11BER NSIC EVENT DATE 373 1989 009 1 8907110299 214561 03/02/89
- Br************************************Br****************+******
DOCKET:373 LA SALLE 1 REGiON: 3 ARCHITECTURAL ENGiNEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COHMONWEALTH EDISON CO SYMBOL: CWE COt<HENTS STEPS 2r3 MODEL NO 9L11HHA264 NATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LFR ARE:
942 UNUSUAL EVENT 20 EQUIPHENT FAILURE
~ REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARi:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
~ REFERENCE LERS:
1 373/87"003 2 373/87-014 3 374/84-020 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL "C"
086% ON 3/2/89'T 2302 HRS A PHASE TO GROUND FAULT OCCURRED AT PHASE LXGHTNXNG ARRiSTOR ON THE PRINARY SXDE OF THE UNiT 2 SYSTEM AUX. TRANSFORHER ~ FAULT WAS AUTOt1ATICALLY ISOLATED BY THE TRIPPING OF SWITCHYARD OIL CIRCUiT BREAKERS (OCB) 4-6 AND 6 1 AND UNIT 2 FEEDER BREAKERS. ALL LOADS BEING FED ARON THE SAT TRANSFERRED TO UNIT 2 UNIT AUX TRANSFORHER EXCEPT FOR BUS 243 WHICH MAS SUPPLIED BY 2B DIESEL GiNERATOR WHiCH SATISFACTORILY AUTO-STARTED ON UNDERVOLTAGE UNIT 2 REMAINED ON-LINE AFTER THE INCIDENT. AS A RESULT. OF TRANSIENT ON THE 345 KV SYSTEHr UNIT 1 GENiRATOR PROTECTIVE RiLAYING SENSED A HIGH GENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT ON PHASE A AND ISOl ATiD UNIT 1 GENERATOR UNIT 1 TURBINE TRIPPED ON LOAD REJECTION RESULTING IN A REACTOR SCRAt'1 FROM TURBiNE CONTROL VALVE FAST CLOSURE ~
UNIT 1 PROCEEDED INTO NORMAL POST-SCRAt'1 CONDITIONS WITH THE EXCEPTXON OF TEMPORARY LOSS OF THE SERVICE AIR COMPRESSOR AND PLANT PROCESS CONPUTER. PROBLEHS WERE ALSO ENCOUNTERED WITH THE RESETTING OF THE SCRAM LOGIC ~ CAUSi OF THIS EVENT WAS THE PHASE TO GROUND FAULT THAT OCCURRED FROtl THE LIGHTNING ARRESTOR TOP CAP TO A SPARGER HEAD ON THE TRANSFORllER DiLUGE SYSTEM. THIS WAS EVIDENT FROM ARC BURNING IDENTIFIEO AT TOP OF LIGHTNING ARRESTOR AND AT SPARGER HEAD ~ FAULT WAS CAUSED BY DEBRIS THAT HAD BLOWN ONTO THE LIGHTNING ARRESTOR LEAD ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 169 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A*%*******************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 374 1 984 024 0 8406180386 190338 05/31/84 DOCKET:374 LA SALLE 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 3 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
SYHBOL: CME REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f vlfil leent of a sa f ety f unction.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 024% AT 0230 AND AGAIN AT 1650 ON HAY 31'984'HE NORHAL AND REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL CONTROL AND INSTRUNENTATION POWER SUPPI IES FOR THE REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEN (BN) WERE LOST THE REASON FOR THE LOSS WAS THE PROTECTIVE HIGH VOLTAGE TRIP SETPOINTS FOR TH TOPAZ INVERTERS HAD DRIFTED DOMNr AND BATTERY BUS (211Y) VOLTAGE MAS HIGHER THAN NORNAL DUE TO A BATTERY CHARGE ~ WHEN BUS VOLTAG- EXCEEDED THE TRIP SETPOINT< THE INVERTERS TURNED OFF ~ THE BUS VOLTAGE WAS LOMEREO AND THE INVERTER TRIP SETPOINTS MERE RESET TO 147V DC AS REQUIRED. LASALLE UNIT 2 WAS MAINTAINED IN A SAFE OPERATING CONDITION BECAUSE HPCS ANO THE OTHER ECCS SYSTENS MERE MA INTA INEO OPERABLE
0 e o e e e e e -o e e e e e e e e e ~ e e A
(
~V 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 l 0
FORM 170 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YiAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUHBFR NSIC EVENT DATE 382 1985 042 8511070012 197229 10/02/85 DOCKET:382 WATERFORD TYPE:PMR REGION: 4 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: LOUISIANA POWER 8 LIGHT CO.
SYNBOL: LPL COlNENTS STEP 1: COi~lP HOT DIESEL GENERATOR AIR DRYER MOTORS STEP 2: EFFECT IX VOLTAGE SPIKE.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actvations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 003% AT 2032 HRS ON 10-2-85r THE MATER LEVEL IN SG g2 INCREASED TO THE HIGH LEVEL REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT JUST PRIOR TO THE TRIP CONTROL ROON OPERATORS RECEIVED NUNEROUS ALARMS/ANNUNCIATIONS WHEN A SHORT IN THE EMERGENCY DG AIR DRYER NOTOR (NON-SAFETY) CAUSiD A SPIKE ON THE STATIC UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY 'A'SAFETY) SINCE THE FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM MAS IN THE MANUAL MODE OF OPERATIONS THE ALARNS/ANNUNCIATIQNS DISTRACTED THE CONTROL BOARD OPERATOR'S ATTENTION LONG ENOUGH FOR THE MATER LEVEL IN SG 02 TO INCRiASE TO THE REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT THE AIR DRYER i4iOTOR HAS BEEN REPLACED. A STATION MODIFICATION HAS BEEN INITIATED TO CHANGE THE POWER SUPPLY FOR ALL 4 l'lERGENCY DG AIR ORYERS ~ UNTIL THIS YiODIFICATION IS COHPLETEr POWER FOR ALL 4 AIR DRYERS IS BEING TENPORARILY SUPPLIED FROM A NON-SAFiTY SOURCE.
~l 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 I
~ r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 171 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91
- A'*****************%*****************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUf1BER REVXSION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 382 1991 007 0 9106120214 222384 05/10/91
- A******************************%************************%*
OOCKFT:382 WATERFORD 3 TYPE:PMR REGION: 4 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: LOUiSIANA POWER 8 LIGHT CO ~
S YP1 BOL: LPL WATCH-E.IST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
15 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (vii): Single fail'ure criteria.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000X ~ ON 5/10/91r UNIT 3 WAS SHUTOOMN IN NODE 5s WHEN A REVIEW OF CALCULATION EC E89 007/ RELAY S TTINGS ANO COORDINATION CURVES FOR 6 9 KVr 4 ~ 16 KV AND 480 V BUSSES'EVEALEO THAT THE ELECTRONIC CURRENT SENSOR (ECS) CURRENT TRANSFORMER (CT) RATING INSTALLED ON HOTOR CONTROL CENTER BUS (NCC) 3AB311-S MAS 300 ANPS VICE THE REQUIRED 600 AHPS. HCC 3AB311-S SUPPLIES POWER TO EQUZPl1ENT NECESSARY TO RUN THE "AB" ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLER. THE POTENTIAL FOR HCC 3A 8311-S TO EXCEED 300 ANPS EXISTED ZN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER MITH THE HAIN TURBINE TRIPPEO. THE SUBSEQUENT AUTONATIC RESTORATION OF ELECTRICAL LOADS COULD HAVE RESULTEO IN THE NCC 3AB311-S BREAKER OPENiNG DUE TO AN OVERCURRENT CONDITION. THXS EVENT IS REPORTABLE AS A C.ONDITION MHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED ONE TRAIN TO BECONE INOPERABLE FOR SYSTEHS DESIGNED TO RENOVE RESIDUAL HEAT OR SHUTDOWN THE REACTOR AND HAINTAIN ZT IN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION ~
THE ROOT CAUSE OF THiS EVENT WAS A FAILURE OF THE ARCHITECT ENGINEER TO PROPERLY VERIFY CT AMPERAGE RATINGS'N ACCORDANCE WITH DESIGN CALCULATIONSr WHEN THE CTS MERE ORDERED FOR INITIAL INSTAI LATION~
CORRECTIVE ACTION INCLUDED INSTALLING THE PROPER RATED CT AND VERIFYING SAFETY RELATED BUSES FOR CORRECT CT RATING. SINCE ANOTHER TRAIN WOULD HAVE BEEN AVAlLABLE DURING THIS TIMEs THXS EVENT WOULD NOT HAVE THREATENED THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLXC
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
> r I ~
C
~ I 4 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 t 0 ~ 0 0 0
FORINT 172 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4***********************+**********+************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 387 1982 049 0 8212140138 179703 11/03/82 DOCKET:387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 TYPE:BMR REGION: 1. NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PENNSYLVANIA POWER 8 LIGHT CO ~
SYNBOL: PPL ABSTRACT THE HPCI SYSTEM MAS INOPERABLE WHEN THE INPUT VOLTAGE TO THE STATIC INVERTER EXCEEDED THE SETPOINT AND TRIPPED OFF THE INVERTER ~ THIS RENDERED THE HPCI CONTROL CIRCUITS INOPERABLE THE HPCI STATIC INVERTER HIGH LEVEL TRIP SETPOINT MAS EXCEEDED DURING AD JUSTNENT OF THE 125 VDC BATTERY CHAPGER THE INVERTER MAS REWORKED AND THE SETPOINT MAS RAISED ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e e o e e o e o e e e e o e e e o o o e e
FORM 173 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- i'**********************A********************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUt'IBER NSIC EVENT DATE 387 1983 096 DOCKET: 387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 TYPE:BMR REGION 1<< NSSS:GE A RCHITECT URAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PENNSYLVANIA POWER 5 LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: PPL COHHENTS STEP 1: CAUSE XX TRANSFORHER FA LURE DESCRIBEO IN REFERENCE LER STEP 2:
COMPONENT HEI AUTOHATIC RESET 0 REFERENCE LERS 1 387/83-092 ABSTRACT WiTH THE REACTOR IN HOT SHUTDOWN DUE TO THE FAILURE OF A STARTUP TRANSFORtlERi THE "REACTOR COR ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) LEAK DETECTION
'B'OWER FAILURE" ALARt1 MAS RECEIVED IN THE HAIN CONTROL ROON>> THE PROVISIONS OF TECH SPEC 3 3 ~ 2 WERE APPLICABLE~ THE POWER MAS RESTORED WITHIN ONE HOUR LOGIC CHANNEL 'A'ENAINED OPERABLE DURING THE EVENT LOSS OF THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER IS CONSIDERED THE CAUSE OF THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP WHICH CAUSED THE LOSS OF POMER TO THE RCIC LEAK DETECTION LOGIC TRAIN ~ 8 ~ OURIitG INVEST IGAT IONr THE INVERT ER MAS MANUALLY RESET AND THE LOGIC TRAIN RETURNED TO SERVICE FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND TESTING LED TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 o
FORM 174 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVlSION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 387 1 984 009 0 8403260226 189448 02/21/84
- %****A****************************************************
DOCKET:387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 TYPE:BMR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECT URAI ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PENNSYLVANIA POWER 5 LIGHT CO SYHBOL: PPL COHHENTS OPERATORS PROCEEDED WITH STARTUP WITH HPCI INOPERABLE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 001/ ~ AFTER A 79 OAY TIE-IN OUTAGE UNIT 1. MAS BEING RESTARTED ACCORDING TO NORHAL PROCEDURES AT A REACTOR PRESSURE OF 110 PSIGr WARNING OF THE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEN BEGAN AS SCHEDULED. THE OPERATORS RECOGNIEED A PROBLEN IN THAT THE HPCI STEAH SUPPLY LINE PRESSURE INDICATOR WAS NOT RESPONDING TO THE MARH UP. WHILE THE OPERATORS MERE TROUBLESHOOTING THIS PROBLEM THE HEAT UP WAS CONTINUED AND REACTOR PRESSURE EXCEEDED 150 PSIG INVESTIGATION LATER DETERHINED THAT THE INTENT OF THE TECH SPECS IS TO HAVE HPCI OPERABLE AT 150 PSIG HPCI MAS MADE OPERABLE BEFORE REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE EXCEEDED ~
320 PSIG MHICH IS WELI MITHIN THE OPERATING RANGE OF THE LOM PRESSURc SAFETY SYSTEMS. THE PROCEDURES McRE CLARIFIEO ANO THE EVENT MILL BE REVIEWED WITH ALL LICENSED OPERATIONS PERSONNEL'
0 o o i e e e e o e e o e e o e o e ~ e e 4.
II IO
~1 I.l 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 6
FORM 175 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 k***********************************************%*******************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 387 1990 006 0 9003080034 217092 02/03/90
- %************A'**********
DOCKET:387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 TYPE:BMR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PENNSYLVANIA POMER 8 LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: PPL COMMENTS STEP 3 EFF IX TRANSFER TO BATTFRY POWER SUPPLY'TEPS 4r5 POWER BATTERY COHPANYr IN' 6 VDC CELLr HODiL NO PRC 6165 CODES FOR THIS LER ARE: 'ATCH-LEST 20 EQUIPMENT FAILURE 941 REPORT ASSOCIATFD WITH 10 CFR 50 ~ 72 REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 000'T 1332 HOURS ON FEBRUARY 3r 1990 WITH UNIT 1 IN CONDITION 4 COLO SHUTDOWN AN UNPLANNED ESF ACTUATION OCCURRED WHEN THE REACTOR MATER CLEANUP (RWCU) SYSTEH'S CONTAINHENT ISOLATION VALVES AUTOMATICALLY Cl OSED. AS THE 'B'FACTOR RECIRC PUMP HOTOR-GENERATOR SET MAS BEING PLACED XN SERVICE A VOLTAGE PERTURBATION OCCURRED. THE VOLTAGi DROP WAS SENSED ON THE PREFiRRED AND ALTFRNATE 480 VAC PO'WER SUPPLIES TO NON-CLASS 1E INSTRUNENT AC UNXNTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) 1D240 CAUSING THE UPS TO TRANSFER TO ITS BATTERY POWER THE UPS SHUTDOWN WHEN THE BATTERY WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPLY'0243 LOADS AND THE AC SOURCES MERE STILL IN A UNOERVOLTAGE CONDITIONr DE-ENERGIZING NON-CLASS 1E INSTRUMENT AC BUS 1Y218 ~ THE RWCU HiGH DIFFERENTIAL FLOM INSTRUNENTATXON IS AHONG THE LOADS AFFECTED BY THE LOSS OF POME R LOSS OF POWER TO THIS INST RUt'1ENTAT ION INITX ATE D A R WCU SYSTEH ISOLATION SIGNAL ~ SYSTEH RESPONSc TO THE ISOLATION SIGNAL WAS PER DESIGN THE REtlAINING LOADS'SSOCIATED WITH 1 Y218r RCSPONDED AS EXPECTED TO THE EVENT ~ THE ROOT CAUSi OF THE EVENT MAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE FORTY CELLS IN BATTERY ~ 10243. THE BATTERY WAS UNABI E TO MAINTAIN LOAD OUE TO THE CELL BEING IN AN OPEN STAT'E ~ THERE MERE NO SAFETY CONSEQUENCiS OR COHPRONISE TO PUBLIC HEALTH OR SAFETY AS A RESULT. OF THIS INCIDENT ~ THE FAILFD CELL MAS REPLACED AND THE UPS MAS RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS ~
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~ ~
~ ~
,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 176 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBiR RiVISION OCS NUMBiR NSIC EVENT DATE 389 1983 017 0 851107011 9 1 88884 05/27/83
- 4*****************************************
DOCKET: 389 ST. LUG IE 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINcER EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL ABSTRACT DURING PREOPERATIONAL TESTING THE "MB" INSTRUMENT BUS INVERTER WAS BRIEFLY DEENERGIZED- BECAUSE ANOTHER CHANNEL'S CONTAINMENT HIGH RADIATION BISTABLE WAS IN "TRIP"r A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL OCCURRED ~ POWER TO THi INVE RTER WAS IMMEDIATELY RESTORED AND THE CIS WAS RESET ~ THIS IS THE FIRST LER INVOLVING LOSS OF POWER TO AN INSTRUMENT BUS INVERTER ~ AN OPERATOR OPENED THE INVERTER S SUPPLY BREAKER BY MISTAKE.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~~
0 e o o e e o e e e ~ e e e o e e e e o e
FORN 177 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUt'1BER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 389 1983 064 0 8311170438 1 87025 10/13/83 DOCKET389 ST LUCIE 2 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILiTY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY S YNBOL: FPL ABSTRACT WHILE PERFORHING PREVENTATIVE NAINTENANCE ON BATTERY CHARGERSs THE DC INPUT BREAKER TO ND INVERTER TRIPPED OPEN WHEN SHIFTING FROM BB TO 8 CHARGER BY TRiPPING BB. THE ND INVERTER MAS RESTARTED ON THE DC BUS iN 4 tlINUTESi WELL WITHIN LitlITS OF TECH SPEC 3 8 3 1F ACTION 8 ~ THIS IS THE FIRST EVENT OF THIS TYPE- CAUSE OF TRIP IS UNKNOWN BREAKER TRIP SETPOINTS MERE FOUND TO BE MiTHIN SPECIFICATIONS. VOLTAGE AND AHPERAGE INDICATIONS WERE AS EXPECTED FOR THE TEST. THE HIGH DC VOLTAGE TRIP MAS RESET TO THE HIGH SIDE OF SPECIFICATION A SUBSEQUENT TEST REVEALED NO PROBLEtlS.
0 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .
T~ '
4 [o e o e o e e e e o o e o e e e a e e e
FORM 178 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +*****************+*******************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUt1BER REVISXON DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 395 1984 045 0 8411 26055 2 1 92 266 1 0/1 8/84 DOCKET:395 SUHNER 1 TYPE:PMR REGION 2 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINFER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC tt GAS CO ~
SYMBOL: SCC REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.?3(a) (2) (v): Event that could have prevented f ulfillment of a saf ety function.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000/e ~ ON 10 18-84~ THE PLANT WAS IN NODE 5 FOR THE FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE WITH TRAi N A ~ OF THE RHR SYSTEM IN S ERV ICED RHR
~
TRAIN 'B'UT-OF-SERViCE FOR ROUTINE tlAINTENANCEr AND THE RCS VENTED AT A TEHPERATURE OF APPROX -110 F. AT 1605 HRS A POMER LOSS TO 120V AC DiSTRiBUTXON PANEL APN-5901 OE-ENERGIZED SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEN (SSPS) CHANNEL I AND CAUSED THE INSTRUNENT CHANNEL FOR RCS WIDE RANGE PR" SSURE (PT-403) TO INITIATE AN AUTO-CLOSURE OF THE OPERABLE RHR TRAiN'S SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE XVG-8701A. FOLLOWING DETERMINATiON THAT THE POWER LOSS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY PERSONNEI ERROR DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A PLANT t40DIFICATIONr OPERATIONS PERSONNEL RESTORED POWER TO APN 5901 ~ XVG 8701A WAS OPENED AND TRAIN A OF THE=
RHR SYSTEN RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS AT 1630 HRS (TOTAL TINE OF RHR ISOLATION MAS APPROX 25 i4IINS) . RCS TEMPERATURE INCREASED FROM 110 F TO 130 F DURING THE EVENT. THE LOSS OF RHR MET THE CONDITIONS OF AN ALERTr AND THE PROPER NOTIFICATIONS 'WERE HADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EtkERGENC Y PLAN ~
0 a e e o e o o e o o e o e e e a e e e h
P t
~~
ll t II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 179 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91,.
- +*****A***A*******************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE
'97 1 984 015 0 8403280007 189746 03/07/84
- +****************************************
DOCKiT:397 WPPSS 2 TYPE:BMR REGION: 5 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BNRO FACILITY OPERATOR: WASHINGTOtl PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEt<
S YNBOL: MPP COMMENTS STEP 7: COMPONENT CODE XS - STATIC SMITCH STEP 9 COtlP RLX FAZ RELAY.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 000% WHILE ATTEHPTING TO ISOLATE A GROUND ON THE DIVISION 1 DC BUSr THE OPERATOR SECURED THE SOURCE OF DC POWER TO THE DIVISION 1 INVFRTER. THE OPERATOR HAD FIRST TRANSFERRED THE UPS LOAD TO THE ALTERNATE AC SOURCE ~ THi LOSS OF DC TO THE INVERTiR RESULTED IN TRIPPING OF THE DC INPUT CIRCUIT BREAKER AND CLEARING OF THE DC INPUT FUSE ~ THE OPERATOR FAILED TO NOTE THAT THE INVERTER HAD TRIPPED AND PUSHED THE FORWARD TRANSFER PUSHBUTTON ~ THE INVERTER STATIC SMITCH TRANSFERRED TO THE INVERTER SOURCE MHICH RESULTEO IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE DIVISION 1 INSTRUMENT POMER SUPPLY THE FAZ RELAY CABINET RELAYS DEENERGIZEOi RESULTING It'l INADVERTENT ISOLATION~
0 o e o o e o e ~ e o e o o e o e o e o 4~ d'I t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 180 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKLT YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 400 1987 054 0 871 0200569 206693 09/1 5/87
- m**************************
DOCKET:400 SHEARON HARRIS 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS: ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINFER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR. CAROLINA POMER 8 LIGHT CO SYMBOL: CPL CONNENTS WATCH 931 10CFR21 REPORT SUBMITTED FOR THIS EVENT. STEP 1: COMP PX DESIGN RESPONSIBILITIES MERE COMBINED ANONG UTILITY'Er AND REACTOR VENDOR STEP 5: COMP EC - FlELD FLASHING CIRCUIT STFP 10: CONP 52 BUS TIE BREAKERS IN THE EMERGENCY AC SYSTEM ~
HATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
931 REPORTS ASSOCIATED METH PART 21 34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY 241 FAILURES THAT COULD EASILY ESCAPE DETECTION REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
11 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii): Unanalyzed conditions.
ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 100% ON SEPTEHBER 15i 1987'T 2000'ITH THE PLANT IN i~iODE 1 AT 100% POWERS IT WAS DETERHINE THAT A NORE LIMITING SINGLE FAILURE THAN HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ANAI YZEO llIGHT EXIST~ ANO THAT IF VALID'ONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PLANT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED ~ A PLANT SHUTDOWN CONHENCED AT 2015r ANO THE UNIT WAS OFF LINE AT 0040 ON SEPTEMBER 16r 1 987 ~ THE UNANALYZED FAILURE INVOLVEO A LOSS OF '
DC BUS CAUSING A FAILURE OF THE TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY 'ITAL FEEDMATER (AFW) PUMP AND THE "B" HOTOR-DRIVEN AFM PUMP ~ THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR) ACCIDENT ANALYS1S FOR MAIN FEEOMATER LINE BREAK ASSUNES THE AVAILABILITYOF BOTH MOTOR-DRIVEN PUNPS "A" AND "B" ~ THE PLANT MAS COOLED DOWN TO NODE 4 AT 0440 ON SEPTEMBER AUXILIARY FE DWATER IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE BY 16'987'HERE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ON SEPTENBER 16'987'MO ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL FAILURE NODES MERE IDENTIFIED'NE INVOLVED THE SPURIOUS FAILURE OF A RELAY IN THE SOLiD STATE PROTECTION SYSTEtl (SSPS) CAUSING INADVERTENT ISOLATION OF AFM TO ONE STEAH GENERATOR ~ THE SECOND WAS THAT FAILURE OF "B" VITAL DC BUS COINCIDENT WITH A LOSS OF OFF- SITE POWER MOULD 1SOLATE AFM TO ALL THREE STE AH GENERATORS. REANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS MITH A REDUCED AFW CAPABILITY WAS DONE ~
a~
s ~ I 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i
FORt4 181 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 .
DOCKET YEAR LER NUYiBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NS1C EVENT DATE 409 1984 011 0 84081601 86 1 91 230 07/1 6/84 DOCKET: 409 LACROSSE TYPE:BMR REGION: 3 NSSS:AC ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACXLZTY OPERATOR DAXRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE SYMBOL: DLP CON51ENTS STEPS 11r16t ANO 18 CAUSE IX ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT STEP 7 CAUSE LX SUSTAINED CLOSURE SIGNAL STEP 10: COMP 52 MODEL LA1600A. STEP 9- COHPONENT NSC TOGGLE ROLLNUT ~ STEP 21: CAUSE SE PRIORITY TO ACHIEVE STABLE PLANT CONDITION STEP 2: COfdP RLX DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTIVE RELAY ~
WATCH- IST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdomns or technical specification violations.
12 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iii):ESFExternal 50.73(a) (2) (iv):
threat.
actuations.
13 10 CFR ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ DURING A STORNr THE POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER IN THE LACBWR SWITCHYARD SHORTED OUT DUE TO THE ACCUMULATION OF METr DEAD NAYFLIES ON IT. A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER RESULTED. THE REACTOR MAS IN THE HOT SHUTDOMN CONDITION AT THE TXHEr WITH PRIMARY COOLANT AT 395 F BOTH EMERGENCY DG'S (EDG) STARTED BUT THE 1B EOG'S OUTPUT BREAKER DID NOT CLOSE OFFSITE POMER WAS REGAINED IN 20 NXNS. TECH SPEC TESTING REQUiRED WHEN AN EOG IS INOPERABLE WERE PERFORHFD APPROX 6 ~ 5 HRS AFTER THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWERS RATHER THAN 4 HRS THE 1 A EOG AND ITS BREAKER LINEUP HAO DENONSTRATED THLIR OPERABILITY DURING THE EVENT PRIORITY WAS PLACED ON ACHIEVING A STABLEr KNOWLEOGABLE PLANT CONDITION RATHER THAN PERFORMING THE OFFICiAL SURVEILLANCE TESTS ~
EXTENSIVE TROUBLESHOOTING WAS PERFOR>~1EO ON THE 1 B EDG OUTPUT BREAKER ANO ITS CLOSlNG CIRCUIT ~ AFTER THE BREAKER TOGGLE ROLLNUT WAS LUBRICATED~ THE BREAKER TESTED SATiSFACTORILY- THE POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER MAS REPLACED
E A
~ ~
oe
~ ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i
FORN 182 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A *0 ********************************************4 ********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER RcVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 409 1986 021. 0 8608190726 200725 07/16/86
- A*******9<***********************************
DOCKET: 409 LACROSSE TYPE:BWR REGION: 3 NSSS:AC ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE SYMBOL: DLP CONHENTS STEP 3: CONP RLX-MECHANICAL TRANSFER RELAY STEP 4: ADVANCE CONVERSION DEVICES CO. HODEL A66-1/118 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1.409/74-003 2 409/79-017 3 409/80-011 4 409/83-007 5 409/86-016 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 098% ~ REACTOR SCRAHblED WHEN 1A STATIC INVERTER TRANSFERRED TO ITS ALTERNATE SOURCEr NONENTARILY, DE ENERGIZING ONE OF THE SCRAH TRAINS'FTER XNVERTER WAS CHECKEDY THE 1A NON-XNT RRUPTIBLE BUS WAS TRANSFERRED BACK TO THE INVERTED LATER<
THE INVERTER LOAD TRANSFERRED AGAIN AND TWO FUSES BLEWr OE ENERGIZING SOt'lE INSTRUMENTATION ~ HIGH P RES SUR E CORE SPRAY (HP CS ) PUNP 5 START E Dr THE 1A SHUTDOWN CONDENSER (SOC) TRAIN INITIATED AND CONTAINNENT BUILDING XSOLATED THE HPCS PUMPS CONTROL SWITCHES WERE PLACED IN "PULLOUT" TO PREVENT THE PUHPS FRON RUNNING THE 1A SOC STEAN INLET VALVE WAS MANUALLY ISOLATED THE FUSES WERE REPLACED AND EQUIPHENT RETURNED TO NORNAL WHILE THE SDC WAS IN SERVICEi THE REACTOR VESSELS COOLED DOWN AT A RATE IN EXCESS OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LINIT THE STRESSES EXPERIENCED WERE NOT IN EXCESS OF ALLO'WABLE LIMITS~
0 0 0 0 e 0 0 O.O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(;
e e ~ 0 0 0 0 0 O,O ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ S
FORM 183 LER-SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4*************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUBBER NSIC EVENT DATE 410 1986 014 0 8701060209 202413 12/03/86 DOCKET410 NINE tlILE POINT 2 REGiON: 1.
ARCHITECTURAL Et'JGINEER: SMXX FACILITY OPERATOR: NIAGARA NOHAMK POWER CORPORATION SYMBOL: NHP MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATEO WITH 10 CFR 50.72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THiS I ER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS.
1 410/86-010 2 41 0/ 86-01 5 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000'N OECENBER 3i 1986 WHILE RECOVERING FROtl A SCRAH AND CONTAINtlENT ISOLATION THAT OCCURRED EARLIER IN THE DAY (REF LER i
86-15) iJINE MILE POXNT UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A SECOND SCRAH TO ONE QUARTER OF THE CONTROL RODS (1/4 CORE SCRAM) . COINCIDENT WITH THIS SECOND SCRAH WAS A DISCHARGE OF PRItlARY COOLANT FROtl THE SCRAt<NED CONTROL RODS THROUGH THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SOV) OPEN DRAIN VALVES TO THE REACTOR BUILDING EQUIPtlENT DRAINS. THERE MFRE NO RADIOACTiVE RcLEAScS TO THE ENVIRONNENT CORRECTiVE ACTIONS TAKEN:
(1) ADDITiONAL LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING ON THE REACTOR PROTECTiON SYSTEN HAS BEEN REQUESTED. (2) THIS LER MILL BE ADDED TO THE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING CURRICULUN ~ (3) OPERATING PROCEDURE N2-OP-96 ANO N2-OP-LOLC HAS BEEN tlODIFIEO TO REQUiRE THE OPERATOR TO INITIATE A HANUAL REACTOR SCRAH UPON THE CONDITION THAT SEVERAL CONTROL RODS BECOHE NXSPOSITIONED AS IN A QUARTER CORE SCRAtl EVENT
0 e e e e ~ e e o e e o e o e. e e-o e e e I
~ I
'8 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 184 LER SCSS DATA 09" 23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVESEON DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 410 1986 015 0 8612300319 202301 12/03/86 DOCKET: 410 NINE MILE POINT 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER- SWXX FACILITY OPiRATOR: NXAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION S YHBOL: NHP COHHEiVTS STEP 1 LOGIC CIRCUITS DESIGNED BY GENERAl ELECTRIC (G080) STEPS 3r4 COMP CBL TEHPORARY JUMPER~ STEP 4 CAUSE AX JUHPER REHOVED STEPS 7<8 IE CROSS-CONNECTED WITH POWER SUPPLEES OUT OF PHASE STEPS 5r6 P COL TR HSEVS LOGIC CIRCUITS DESIGN WAS CHANGED.
NATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
942 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 410/86-014 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON DECEMBER 3r 1986 WITH THE REACTOR AT 0% POWER AND THE MODE SWITCH IN "SHUTDOWN"s NINE HILE POINT UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A SCRAH DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER TO BOTH RiACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) CHANNELS'HC RPS POWER SUPPLIES WiRE INADVERTENTLY CROSS CONNECTEDr RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ALL RPS POWER ~ COINCIDENT WXTH THiS iVENT WAS A CONTAINMFNT ISOLATION AiVO A STANDBY GAS SYSTEM AUTOMATIC INITIATION. NO RCACTOR TRANSIENTS WERE EXPiRliNCEO DURING THIS EVENT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN: 1. A DESIGN CHANGE HAS BEEN BUILT INTO THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) LOGIC CERCUITS THAT WILL AVOID CROSS CONNECTING RPS CHANNELS A AND B AS DESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT. 2. A FURTHER INVESTIGATION ES BEiNG CONOUCTEO ON THE l.OSS OF ALL ANNUNCIATORS.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O. 0 0 e ~ ~ o ~ o ~
f
~ ~ o e e ~ e
~ I
~ e ~ ~
4
~ o e~
FORM 185 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 .
- %*****A*****************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUBBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 413 1985 012 0 8503180242 195251 02/09/85
- it*********************************************
DOCKET: 413 CATAWBA 1 TYPE:PMR RiGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACILiTY OPiRATOR: OUK E POWER CO.
SYNBOL: DPC COMMENTS OTHER REPORTABILITY 50 ~ 72 (B) (2) (II)t STEP 3 NOD EL SV1 250/TSNBS STEP
- 8 CAUSE IX UNDER FREQUENCY'TEP 21: CONPONENT XR EVENT RECORDER MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 RiPORT ASSOCXATEO MXTH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARi:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
21 OTHER: Voluntary r epor tr special reportr Part 21 reports etc.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 012%>> ON FEBRUARY 9r 1985r AT 0245 45 HOURS' LOW STEANLINE PRESSURE SIGNAL CAUSED A SAFiTY INJECTION AND REACTOR TRIP ON CATAWBA UNIT 1 THIS SIGNAL WAS CAUSED BY A TEMPORARY LOSS OF VOLTAGE ON A POWER PANELBOARD OF THi VITAL INSTRUHENTATION AND CONTROL POMER SYSTEH THIS POWER PANELBOARD SUPPLIES POMER TO ONE CHANNEL OF THF PROCESS CONTROL SYSTEM THE LOSS OFVOLTAGE LASTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 SECONDS. EHERGENCY PROCEDURES EP/1/A/5000/01 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) s RP/0/A/5000/01 (CLASSXFICATION OF ENERGENCYr ANO EP/1/A/5000/02 (CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS STATUS TREE)
MFRE IHPLEHENTEO. ONCE THE SAFETY INJECTION MAS DETERNINED TO BE SPURIOUSr PROCEDURE EP/1/A/5000/01 B (S/I TERNINATION FOLLOWING SPURIOUS S/I) WAS INPLENENTED THIS INCIDENT XS CLASSIFIED AS A CONPONENT NALFUNCTION. THF TEHPORARY LOSS OF VOLTAGE MAS APPARENTLY CAUSED BY A tlALFUNCTION OF THE STATIC INVERTER FEEDING THE AFFECTED POWER PANELBOARD. UNiT 1 MAS IN MODE 1. AT 12% RiACTOR POWER BEFORE THE TRIP>> THIS INCIDENT IS REPORTABI E PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50 ~ 72r-SECT ION (B) (2) (XI) r ANO 10 CFR 50 73r SECTION (A) (2) (IV) ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a e ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ o e ~ e e e e
FORM 186 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER RFVISION DCS NUMBcR NSIC EVENT DATE 413 1985 030 0 8506170571 197934 05/09/85
- %*********************************A*******
DOCKET:413 CATAWBA 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGiNEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUKE POWER CO SYMBOL: OPC COMMENTS OTHER REPORTABXLXTY 10CFR50 72r SECTION(B) (2) (II) r STiP 2 COMP MSC MECHANICAL LINKAGE ACTUATING BREAKER RELAYr STEP 11: COMP MEI 6900V SMITCHGEARr STEP 17 ISYS SP SERVICE WATER PUMP HOUSE INTAKE PIT Br STEP 18: T-CODE X UNIT 2 IN CONSTRUCTION PHASEr'TEP 14: COMP MEX 120 VAC REGULATED DISTRIBUTION CENTER WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE 941 REPORT ASSOCIATED METH 10 CFR 50.72 REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE 13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations 21 OTHER: Voluntary reportr special reportr Part 21 reportr etc.
REFERcNCE l ERS:
1 413/85-031 2 41 3/85-032 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% MAY 9r 1985r AT 1547 31 HOURSr THE NUCLEAR SERVICi MATiR SYSTEM (NSWS) AUTOMATICALLY ALIGNED TO THE STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE MATER POND (SNSMP) AND ALL IDLE NSWS PUMPS STARTiD DUE TO A FALSE LOM-LOM LEVEL SIGNAL XN NSMS PUMPHOUSE PIT B. THE FALSE LOM-LOM LEVEL MAS CAUSED BY A LOSS OF VOLTAGE ON ONE OF THE NSMS SMAPOVER CIRCUITS A TECHNICIAN ACCIDENTALLY ACTUATED RELAY AE52S WHICH CAUSED THE TRIP OF THE TXE BREAKER ON 6900V SMITCHGiAR 2TC. SINCE THE B TRAIN FEEDER ON 2TC MAS RACKED OUTr THE B TRAIN SIDE OF 2TC LOST VOLTAGc ~ THE NSWS PiT B LOW-LOM LEVEL SMAPOVER CIRCUITRY WAS ONE LOAD THAT MAS ULT It'lATEL Y 8 EXNG F ED F ROM THE B TRAIN SID E OF 2TC ~ AT THE TIME OF THE INCXOiNTr UNIT 1 MAS IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) ~ UNIT 2 IS XN THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE. BECAUSE OF THE ACCIDiNTAL ACTUATION OF RELAY AE52Sr THIS INCIDENT HAS BE N CLASSIFIED AS A PERSONNEL ERROR RECOViRY FROM THE INCIDENT BEGAN IMtliDIATELY 'tlHEN THE AUTOtlATIC SWAPPING OF A MOTOR CONTROL CENTER TO ITS ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE RESTORED NORMAL VOLTAGE TO THi NSWS SWAPOVER CiRCUITRY. THE NSMS PUMPS NOT NEEDEO TO SUPPORT PLANT OPERATION WERE SUBSEQUENTl Y SHUTDOWN AND THE NSMS SUCTION AND DISCHARGEMERE REALIGNED TO LAKE WYLIE~
THIS INCiOENT IS REPORTABLF PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.73 SECTION (A) (3) (IV) AND 10 CFR 50 72r SECTION (B) (2) (II)
iO o o e e e e o o a o e e e e a o o e o 0 0 0 0 0 0' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORN 187 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A******************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 413 1985 032 0 8506240019 197936 05/12/85 DOCKET:413 CATAMBA 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHXTECTURAL ENGlNEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR- OUK E POWER CO SYHBOL: OPC CONNENTS OTHER REPORTABILiTY 10CFR 50 ~ 72r SECTEON (B) (2) (II) -
r STEP 7 COHP NEI 120 VAC REGULATEO DISTRIBUTION CENTERr STEP 9: ISYS SP SERVICE MATER PUNP HOUSE INTAKE PIT Br STEP 10 T CODE X UNIT 2 IN CONSTRUCTION PHASE ~
MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
941 etch' REPORT ASSOCIATED METH 10 CFR 50.72 REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
21 OTHER: Voluntar y repor tr special reportr Part 21 reportr REFERENCE LERS 1 413/85-030 2 413/85-031 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000%~ ON HAY 12r 1985r AT 2035 42 HOURSr THE NUCLEAR SERVICi MATER SYSTiH (NSMS) AUTOHATICALLY SWAPPED TO THE STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE MATER POND (SNSWP) AND ALL IDLE NSWS PUHPS STARTED OUE TO A FALSE LOM-LOW LEVEL SIGNAL IN NSMS PUHPHOUSE PET B THE FALSE 10M-LOM LEVEL MAS CAUSED BY A LOSS OF VOLTAGE ON ONE OF THF NSMS SMAPOVER CIRCUITS ~ A NUCLEAR EQUIPHENT OPiRATOR (NEO) MAS RETURNING NOTOR CONTROL CENTER 2HXtl FRON ETS ALTERNATE POMER SOURCE TO ITS NORNAL POWER SOURCEs AtlD USED A DEAD BUS TRANSFER ENSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED HOT BUS TRANSFER. THEREFORi ALL LOADS FED BY 2HXH WERE DE ENERGIZED FOR A SHORT TEHEr ENCLUOING NSMS PET B SWAPOVER CIRCUITRY AT THE TINE OF THE INCIOENTr UNIT 1 MAS IN NODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) r ANO UNIT 2 MAS iN THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE ~ BECAUSE A PROCEDURE MAS NOT UTILIZEO WHEN TRANSFERRING 2NXN FROM ITS ALTERNATE TO ITS NORHAL POWER SOURCEr THIS INCIDENT HAS BEEN CLASSIFIEO AS A PERSONNEL ERROR. RECOVERY FROM THE INCIDENT BEGAN WHEN THE NEO RETURNED tlORNAL POWER TO 2HXN RiSTORENG POMER TO NSWS PIT B SWAPOVER CIRCUITRY THE NSMS PUHPS NOT NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANT OPERATION MiRE SUBSEQUENTLY SHUTDOWN AND THE NSWS PUthP SUCTION AND DISCHARGE MAS REALIGNiO TO LAKE WYLIE. THIS INCIDENT IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50 ~ 73r SECTION (A) (2) ( EV) r ANO 1 0 CFR 50 ~ 72r 5 iCT ID'B) (2) (II)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~ ~ 1
~ ~
~ 1
- I r r 0 0 t t 0 ~ 0 0 t t 0 0 ~ 0 0
FORM 188 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 413 1988 026 1 8906020314 214075 11/26/88 A**************************************************+****************
DOCKET:413 CATAWBA 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUKE POWER CO.
SYHBOL: DPC COHNENTS OTHER REPORTABILITY: 10 CFR 50.72(B) (2) (II).
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUIPMENT FAILURE 941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABZLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
21 OTHER: Voluntary reports special reports Part 21 reports etc.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX ~ ON 11/26/88r AT 1805 07 HOURSr STATIC INVERTER 1EID AND 120 VAC POWER PANELBOARD 1ERPD EXPERIENCED AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION FOR APPROXINATELY TWO SECONDS ~ AS A RESULTS MULTIPLE ALARMS ASSOCIATEO WITH ENGINEEREO SAFEGUARDS FEATURES WERE DISPLAYED IN THE CONTROL ROON. THE NUCLEAR SERVICE MATER (RN) PIT B ENERGENCY LO LEViL ALARM OCCURRED AND CLEARED WHEN IT MAS ACKNOWLEDGED ALL IDLE RN PUMPS STARTED AS EXPECTED ANO THE SUCTION VALViS ANO DISCHARGE VALVES fOR THE SYSTEM AUTONATICALLY SWAPPcD TO THE STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER POND THiRE MAS A FALSE RiACTOR COOLANT (NC) SYSTEN WIDE RANGE PRESSURE SiGNAL WHICH CAUSED RESIDUAL HEAT RENOVAL (ND) SYSTEM SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES 1ND1 B ANO 1ND36B TO CLOSE AS EXPECTED IN AODITIONr CONTAINNiNT PURGE (VP) SYSTEM TRAIN Br WHICH WAS IN SERVICEr AUTOMATICALLY SHUTDOWN THE UNIT 1 CONTROL ROON AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM TRAIN 8 FILTiR INLET VALVE CLOSED OUE TO A FALSE CHLORINE DETECTION ALARN~ UNIT 1 MAS IN NODE 5r COLO SHUTDOWNr AT THE TIHE OF THIS INCIDENT UNIT 2 WAS IN NODE 1r POWER OPERATIONr AT 48X REACTOR POMcR AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT A WORK REQUEST MAS CLOSED OUT FOLLOMING THE UNOERVOLTAGE CONDITIONS OPERATIONS PcRSONNEL NOTED A GROUND ON 125 VDC DISTRIBUTION CENTER 1EDD. THIS CONDITION IS BEING XNVESTIGATEO THE ROOT CAUSE FOR THIS INCIDENT COULD NOT DETERMINED ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 s'
0 i 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORH 189 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91
- A'*********************************4*********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSXC EVENT DATE 414 1986 036 0 8609150178 200921 08/07/86 DOCKET:414 CATAWBA 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME A RCHITECT URAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACXLXTY OPERATOR: DUKE POMER CO ~
SYMBOL: DPC CONTENTS OTHER REPORTABXLITY 50.72(B) (2) (II).
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LcR ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATFO WITH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
21 OTHER: Voluntary reports special reports Par t 21 reports e tc ~
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 413/85-001 2 413/85"019 3 414/86-007 ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 000'N AUGUST 7r 1986r AT APPROXIMATELY 1230 HOURSr TECHNICIANS MiRE ADJUSTING THE OUTPUT FREQUENCY ON A 125 VDC/120 VAC VITAL INVERTER MHEN THEY INADVERTENTLY CAUSED THE INVERTiR TO TRIP THIS RESULTED IN REACTOR TRIP SIGNALS BEING GENERATED BECAUSE OF LOSS OF POWER TO THE SOURCE AND XNTERHEDIATE RANGc EXCORE NEUTRON DETECTORS THE REACTOR TRIP SiGNALS RESULTED XN A TURBINE TRXP SIGNAL AND HAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION~ .ALSOr LETDOWN ISOLATION OCCURRED DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO A PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUMENT CHANNEL~ LETDOWN ANO FEEOMATER FLOWS WERE QUICKLY RE-ESTABLISHED THE INVERTER WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AT 1312:07 HOURS. THE UNIT MAS IN NODE 3r HOT STANDBYr AT THE TINE OF THIS INCIDENT ~ THIS INCIDENT IS ASSIGNED CAUSc CODE Ar'ERSONNEL ERROR ~ THE RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE TECHNICIANS TO PROPERLY INVESTIGATE ANO REVIEW THE PROBLEH MITH THE INVERTER BEFORE PERFORNING CORRECTIVE HAINTENANCE ALSOr THE TECHNICIANS FAILEO TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS THEY HAD RECEIVED MERE INCORRECT FOR THE CONDITIONS THEY HAD OBSERVED ~ THIS INCIDENT IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50 73r SECTION (A) (2) (XV) AND 10 CFR 50~72r SECTION (B) (2) (II)~
0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 C
i4 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
FORM 190 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +***************************************%***********
DOCKET YEAR LER NUllBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 414 1988 019 1 8809290344 210568 05/27/88
- 4*******************************
DOCKET:414 CATAWBA 2 TYPi:PWR REGiON: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINE ER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUKE POWER CO.
SYNBOL: DPC MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
34 DESIGN ERROR OR INADEQUACY 36 INADEQUATE TRAINING REPORTABZLZTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 413/87-006 2 414/86-022 3 41 4/87-007 ABSTRACT POWiR LEVEL 000% ON NAY 27r 1988r AT 1403:21 HOURSr AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION OCCURRED ON THE 240/120 VAC AUXILIARY CONTROl POMER SYSTEH DISTRIBUTION PANEL 2KXPB THIS UNDFRVOLTAGE CONDITION OCCURRED WHILE CYCLING THE ALTERNATE SOURCE TO KXPB BREAKER IN AN ATTEHPT TO CLEAR AN INDICATED ALTERNATi SOURCE UNOERVOLTAGi THE INDICATED UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION MAS NOTXCEO WHILE XSOLATZNG THE 2KXPB INVERTER FOR CORRECTIVE NAINTENANC . THE PANEL'S POWER SUPPLY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SWAPPED TO THE ALTERNATE SOURCE TO KXPB SUPPLY FROYi REGULATEO AC POMER SOURCEr 2RDB. UPON NOT CZNG THE LOM ALTERNATE SOURCE VOLTAGE INDICAT XON ON THE NANUAL BYPASS SWZTCHr 2KXblBr THE INVOLVED NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SPECIALIST (NOS) REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM CONTROL ROON PERSONNEL A CONTROl ROOiR OPERATOR (CRO) UTILZZEO THE OPERATOR AIO COMPUTER (OAC) GRAPHICS TO VERIFY THAT A LOM VOLTAGE WAS INDICATED THE CRO RECOtlHENDED THAT THE NOS CYCLE THE ALTERNATE SOURCE TO KXPB BREAKER TO CLEAR THE UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION~ CYCLING THE BREAKER CAUSED AN APPROXIMATE 5 SECOND LOSS OF POWER TO THE LOADS SUPPLIED BY THE KXPB DISTRIBUTION PANELs ONE OF WHICH MAS THE CONTROL PO'WER TO NAZN FEEDMATER PUtriP TURBINi (CFPT) 2B. THIS RESULTEO IN A DECREASE IN CFPT 2B SPEEDr LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVELSr AND A SUBSEQUENT AUTOHATIC REACTOR TRIP. THE UNIT MAS AT 100% POWER AT THE TINE OF THIS INCIDENT
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 d
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 e 0 ~ 0 e 0 e 0 e 0
FORM 191 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUt1BER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 416 1983 084 1 8310070305 1 86734 07/1 8/83 DOCKET:416 GRANO GULF 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHiTECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCESr INC SYNBOL: SER REFERENCE LERS:
1 416/83-083 ABSTRACT ON JULY 18r 1983r AN UNANTICIPATED ACTIVATION OF THE DIVISION II LOCA LOGIC OCCURRED ALL AUTO ACTIONS EXPECTED TO OCCUR DID IN FACT OCCURr EXCEPT FOR THE AUTO START OF RHR "C" PUMP ~ THIS IS REPORTED PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9 1.13.B. THE EVENT blAS ALSO REPORTED PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.72. THE CAUSE OF THE LOCA SIGNAL WAS A NALFUNCTIONING INVERTER. THE FAILURE OF THE RHR "C" PUMP TO START IS BELIEVED TO STEN FROM THE LSS (LOAD SHED SEQUENCE) PANEL ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED (SEE LER 83-083) ~ THE INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING AND AN UPDATE REPORT SHOULD BE EXPECTED BY SEPTEHBER 15r 1983 ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 e o ~ o e e e e e e o o o e e e e e e
FORN 192 LER SCSS DATA 09" 23-91
- +*****%**********A********+*********************************
DOCKiT YEAR LER NUflBER REVISXON DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 416 1984 001 1 8504090099 197190 01/03/84
- A***i************************************************
DOCKET:416 GRAND GULF 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGXNEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR SYSTEN ENERGY RESOURCESr INC SYNBOL: SER REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCi LERS:
1 416/85-010 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000'N 1 3 84r WHILE IN COLO SHUTDOWN AT 0920 HRS AND WHILE PLACING A DIV 2 BATTERY CHARGER ON EQUALIZEr THE DIV 2 POWER SUPPI Y TRIPPED ON HIGH VOLTAGE RESULTING IN THE FOLLOMING AUTOMATIC ACTIONS INITIATION OF CONTROL ROON FRESH AIR UNIT Br SGTS Br ORYWELL PURGE COt~iPRESSOR Br SSW Br DIV 2 HYDROGEN ANALYZERSr LPCI 8 AND Cr AllO ISOLATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLINGr RWCUr THE AUX 8 LDG AND CONTAINMENT BLDG THi DIV 2 DG MAS OUT OF SERVICE AT THE TIME. THE LPCI iNJECTION RAISED THE WATER LEVEL TO GREATER THAN 400 INCHES. WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING THE PROBLEM ON 1 6 84r CRFAU B ACTUATED WHEN THE CHLORXNE DETECTOR MAS DEENERGiZED FROtl A REPEAT OF THE TRIP OTHER SYSTEHS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROfl SERVICE FOR THE TEST THE EQUALIZING POTENTIOHETER ON THE BATTERY CHARGER MAS SET HIGHER THAN ITS NORMAL EQUALIZING VOLTAGE OF 140V DC. THE INVERTER TRIPPED AT 147V DC THE CHARGER THEN TRiPPED AT 152V OC ALLOMING THE INVERTER TO RESET AND INiTIATE THE ECCS ACTUATION A PERNANENT DESIGN ENHANCEMENT IS BEING PURSUED TD PREVENT THE INADVERTENT ESF INXTIATIONS FOLLOWING THc LOSS OF POMER TO THE INSTRUYiENTS
o ~ e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e e e ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ e e 0 FORM 193 LER SCSS DATA 09"23-91
- 4*********************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUBBER NSIC EVENT DATE 416 1984 003 0 8403130464 1 89324 02/10/84 DOCKET:416 GRAND GULF 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE A RCHITECT URAI ENGINEER: B ECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SYSTEH ENERGY RESOURCES'NC ~
SYMBOL: SER REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% AS PART OF A NAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS POWER WAS REHOVEO FRON THE 'B'ONTROL ROON FRESH AIR UNIT CHLORINE DETECTOR DUE TO INCOHPLETE WORK INSTRUCTIONSr THIS CAUSED THE B CONTROL ROON FRESH AIR UNIT TO START UP AUTOMATICALLY IN THE ISOLATION NODE
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ t 0 0 t ~ 0 0 0 O. t
FORM 194 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4*****+***************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 416 1985 009 0 8503260018 193643 02/14/85
- it***************************************+******************
DOCKET:416 GRANO GULF 1 REGION: 2 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCESr INC S YMBOL: SER REPORTABILITY CODiS FOR THIS LER ARi:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 397/85-016 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOO MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS RESTORING A VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENT TO SERVICE CAUSED A PRESSURE DISTURBANCE ON THE INSTRUMENT RiFERENCE L G RESULTING IN A DIV 2 ESF ACTUATION. THE CAUSE WAS DUE TO THE PARTICULAR CALIBRATION PROCEDURE NOT SPECIFYING THE VALVING SEQUENC TO BE USiD TO RiTURN REACTOR VESS" L LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION TO SERVICE WHENEVER THE RESTORATION SEQUENCE IS NOT SPECIFIEO BY THE PARTICULAR CALIBRATION PROCEOUREr A GENERIC PROCEDURE IS UTILIZED TO RESTORE THE INSTRUMENT ~ HOWEVER THE SEQUENCE SPECIFXED IN THE GENERIC PROCEDURE WAS THE REVERSE OF THE DESIRED SEQUENCE FOR RESTORING THIS INSTRUMENT THE LOAD SHEDDING ANO SEQUENCE SYSTEM ACTUATION CAUSED A LOSS OF DRYWELL COOLING AND INSTRUMENT AIR SERViCE AIR WAS LOST WHEN THE P43F289 VAI VE FAILED CLOSED CAUSING LOSS OF COOLING WATER TO THE AIR COMPRESSORS ~ THE SCRAM VALVES DRIFTED OPEN DUE TO THE TOTAL LOSS OF AIRr FILLING THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME ANO CAUSING THE REACTOR TO SCRAM ON HIGH SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LEVEL.
0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 I ~ 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 195 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LiR NUNBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 416 1985 010 2 851 2100705 197504 02/23/85 DOCKET:416 GRANO GULF 1, TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINiER: BECH FACILITY OPiRATOR: SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCESr INC SYNBOL: SER REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 416/84-001 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% WHILE PLACiNG A SECOND DXV 2 BATTERY CHARGER ON EQUALIZEr THE OIV 2 INVERTER TRIPPEO ON HIGH VOLTAGE CAUSING A LOSS OF POWER TO SEVERAL REACTOR VESSEL LEViL INSTRUMENTS. WHEN THE INVERTER AUTOMATICALLY RESETs A DIV 2 ESF INITIATION OCCURRED A RELAY POWERED FROH THE INVERTER REENERGIZED BEFORE LEVEL INSTRUNENTSr WHiCH FAILED LOM ON THE LOSS OF POWERr COULD RECOVER THE RELAY INITXATiD ESF SYSTEYiS ON AN ERRONEOUS REACTOR LOW MATER LEVEL SIGNAL. THE ESF INITIATXONS INCLUDED THE ISOLATION OF THE CONTROL ROON FRESH AIR UNITr THE START OF THE 8 SGTSr AN INJECTION BY LPCI SUBSYSTEHS 8 ANO
~C~r THE START OF THE STANDBY SERVICE MATER SYSTEHr AND A OXV 2 XSOLATXON. THE DIV 2 DG MAS OUT OF SERVICE AT THE TINE PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISEO TO REQUIRE ONLY 1 CHARGER TO BE PLACED IN SERVICE WHEN EQUALIZING~ A DESIGN CHANGE WHICH INSTALLS TINE DELAY DiVICES IN THE LOGXC CIRCUITRY TO ALLOW INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT RESTORATION PRIOR TO THE TRIP RELAY ACTUATION MILL BE INPLEHENTEO DURING AN AVAILABLE NAINTENANCE OUTAGE. SIHILAR EVENT: 416/84-001
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 196 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +*****
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUtlBER NSIC EVENT DATE 416 1986 032 2 861 2100021 202042 09/1 6/86 DOCKET:416 GRAND GULF 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR. SYSTEtl EiJ ERG Y RESOURCESr INC ~
SYNBOL: SER COHHENTS STEP 1: CAUSE XX - INVERTER SUPPLY POWER LOST AT SOHE PREVIOUS TIHEr COt<P 52 AC INPUT BREAKER INTERNAL TO INVERTER STEPS 13r14r18r19 COMP RLX LOGIC RELAYS iVENTS OCCURRED ON 9/16r 9/17r 10/15r AND 10/1 7/86 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000/e ~ DURING A" REFUELING OUTAGEr THE PLANT EXPERIENCED INADVERTENT SECONDARY CONTAINtlENT ISOLATIONS AND ESF SYSTEH ACTUATIONS DUE TO OUTAGi WORK ACTIVITIES SUCH AS 1 ON SEPTEt'lBER 16r AN OPERATOR OPENED A DIVISION 1 DC BREAKER FOR PLANNED NAINTENANCE ACTIVXTIES~ DIVISION 1. SECOtJOARY CONTAINHiNT VALVES AUTOMATICALLY CLOSEDr THE STANDBY GAS TREATMENT S YSTEN STARTED ANO THE CONTROL ROOtl STANDBY FRESH AIR UNITS INITIATEO TH" ISOLATION LOGIC EXPERIENCED A TOTAL LOSS OF POWiR BECAUSE THE INTERNAL AC INPUT BREAKER ON THE INVERTER HAD PREVIOUSLY TRIPPED AND MAS NOT RESET 2 ON SEPTEMBER 17r A HAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN LIFTED AN ELECTRICAL LEAD TO REflOVE A RELAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN APPROVED WORK DOCUMENT LIFTING THE ELECTRICAL LEAD DE-ENERGIZED ANOTHER RELAY WHICH CAUSED A LOSS OF POMiR TO THE ISOLATiON LOGIC AND RiSULTED ZN THE SANE AUTOHATIC ACTUATIONS AS OCCURRED ON SEPTEt'!BER 1 6 ~ 3 ON OCTOBER 1 Sr SEVERAL ELECTRICAL TAG-OUTS WERE BEING HUNG IN PREPARATION FOR A DIVISION 2 ELECTRICAL OUTAGE AND OTHER DESIGN CHANGE WORK DUE TO A SEQUENCING PROBLEH THE ESF SYSTEl'IS WERE NOT TAGGED OUT BEFORE THEIR ACTUATXON LOGIC MAS OE-ENERGIZEDr RESULTXNG IN THE START OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT AND CONTROL ROON STANDBY FRESH AIR SYSTENS ~ 4. ON OCTOBER 17r 1986 WHILE RESTORING POWER TO THE DIVISION 2 El ECTRICAL BUS AN RHR SHUT DOWN COOLING S YST EH ISOLATION OCCURR iD
0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
~~
C 0 e o e o o e o e ~ e o e e e o e o ~ e
FORM 197 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 423 1986 036 0 8606230475 199813 05/19/86 DOCKET:423 MILLSTONE TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS: WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
S YMBOL: NNE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
' 10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdoens or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ~ ON 5/19/86 AT 141 5 HOURS WHILE OPERATING AT 100%
POWERr IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE PLANT HAD BEEN OPERATING IN THE ACTiON STATEMENT OF PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.2.1.B IN THAT.
BATTERY BANK 301A-2 WAS NOT OPERABLE DUE TO AN UNPERFORMED MODIFICATION TO BATTERY CHARGER 301A-2 TO CORRECT A CONDITION WHICH COULD RESULT iN EQUiPMENT iMPACT DUE TO A SEISMIC EVENT WITHIN 24 HOURS OF DISCOVERYr SEiSMIC BRACING WAS DESIGNED AND INSTALLED ON BATTERY CHARGER 301A-2 RESTORING THE EQUIPMENT TO OPERABILITY. THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED iN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.73 (A) (2) (I)
(B).
o e e e o o a ~ e e o e o e o o e e I
~ [e o e e o e o o o ~ e o e e e e e e e o
FORM 198 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4*****************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUt'lBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATL 423 1987 027 0 8707090095 205195 06/05/87 DOCKET: 423 MILLSTONE 3 TYPE:PWR REGIOtt: 1 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SMXX FACILITY OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO S YtlBOL: NNi MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
31, ACCIDENTAL ACTION 941 REPORT ASSOCIATEO WITH 10 CFR 50 72
'EPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100X AT 1323 ON JUNE 5r 1987r WITH THE PLANT AT 100%
POWERr THE NORMAL SUPPLY BREAKER TO TRAIN A VITAL BUS 34C WAS TRIPPED OPiN. THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES ItlMEDIATELY CLOSED ON LOSS OF 120VAC TO THEIR SOLiNOID TEST CONTROL CIRCUITRY. A REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWED ON LOW LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVELSr WHICH SIGNALED A TURBINE TRIP A TRAIN "A" LOSS OF POMER SIGNAL WAS GENERATEOr THE it'lERGiNCY DIESEL GcNERATOR STARTED ANO SUCCESSFULLY ENERGIZED VITAL l OADS THE MAIN STEAM ATtlOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES AND STEAt'1 GENERATOR CODE SAFETIES OPCNED AS DESIGNED. A TRAIN "A" CONTROL BUILDING I SOL AT IONr AND T RAIN "A" AND "B" F E EDWA TER I SOLA TI ON R ESULT EO FROt'1 THE FVENT ~ THE PLANT WAS IN HOT STANDBY (MOO 3) BY 1600 HOURSr JUNE 5r 1987 THE CAUSE OF BUS 34C TRIP MAS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERRORr DUE TO AN. OPERATOR DROPPING A RACKING MOTOR ONTO THE 4 16KV SWITCHGEAR
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S
f 1 p
0 ~ 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 i i 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
FORht 199 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4******************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUtlBER NSIC EVENT DATE
'990 424 023 0 9101 220420 220828 1 2/1 8/90
- A***********+*********************************************
DOCKET: 424 VOGTLE 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO.
S YNBOL: GPC COHhlENTS STEP 2 CLASS AA/FAr 3 PHASEr DRY TYPE TRANSFORMER STEP 18 HODEL l'lO~
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 EQUIPMENT FAILURE REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): iSF actuations.
REFERcNCE LERS:
1 424/90-01 6 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ON 12 18 90 AT 1 936 CSTz UNIT WAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER MHiN A 4160/480 VOLT NON-1E TRANSFORMER (1NB10X)
EXPERIENCED AN INTERNAL FAULT~ THIS FAILURE RESULTEO IN A LOSS OF POWER FOR THE SPEED CONTROL CiRCUITRY ."OR THE 1B hlAIN FEEOWATER PUhtP (NFP) TURBINE AND CERTAIN SUPPORT SYSTENS FOR Eh!ERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1 Ba FEEDMATER PUMP SPEEDr FEEOWATER FLOW< AND STEAH GENERATOR (SG) LEVELS DECREASEO THE REACTOR OPERATOR INITIATED A htANUAL REACTOR TRIP AT 1937 CST AFTER EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN SG LEVELS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. ALL SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS OCCURRED PER DESIGN FOLLOWING THE REACTOR TRIPi HOMEVERr A NON 1 E 41 60 VOLT BUS FAILEO TO AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFER TO THE RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORNERS CAUSING A TEhtPORARY LOSS OF VARIOUS NON-1E HOUSE LOADS TRANSFER OF THE 4160 VOLT BUS WAS COMPLETED MANUALLY AND NORtlAL PLANT CONDITIONS MERE ESTABLISHED FOR HOT STANDBY BY 1956 CST. THE ROOT CAUSE FOR THE TRANSFORMER FAILURE IS INDETERMINATE'OWEVERr SEVFRAL SIMILAR TRANSFORMER FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED AT VEGP (REFERENCE LER 50-424/1990-016). THE INVOLVED TRANSFORNERS ARE Gi CLASS AA/FA THREE PHASEr ORY TYPE TRANSFORhlERS ~ THE FAIlED TRANSFORNER HAS BEEN REPLACED AND FURTHER STUDY OF POSSIBLE FACTORS MHXCH h1AY HAVE LED TO THE FAILURE IS IN PROGRiSS.
0 0 l 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORN 200 LER SCSS DATA 0,9-23-91
- %*A******A**************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 425 1990 004 0 9005160032 218185 04/11/90 DOCKET:425 VOGTLE 2 TYPE:PMR REGiON: 2 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POMER CO SYMBOL: GPC WATCH-LXST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUHAN ERROR.
REPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
REFERcNCE LERS:
1 424/87-046 2 424/87"077 3 424/87-080 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100X. ON APRIL 11 1990 THE UNIT SHiFT SUPERVISOR s (USS) FOR THE ONCONING NiGHT SHIFT MAS REVIEWING THE UNIT SHIFT SUPERVISOR S LOG AT 1615 COTr HE NOTICED THAT THE POWER RANGE CALORXNETRIC CHANNEL CALIBRATION HAO NOT BEEN PERFORMED SINCE 1045 CDT ON APRIL 1 Os 1 990 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 4 ~ 3 ~ 1 1 s TABLE 4 3 1 i ITEh 2Ai REQUIRES THAT THIS CALIBRATION B E PERFORHED DAILY FOR THE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT THE USS ON DUTY WAS ADVISED ANO PERSONNEL BEGAN TO PERFORM THE NECESSARY CALIBRATION. THE SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL PLUS THE 25X GRACE PERIOD (24 HOURS PLUS 6 HOURS) EXPIRED AT 1645 CDT ANO THE UNIT ENTEREO OPERATION UNDER TS 3 0~ 3 BY 1736 COTE THE CALORXHETRIC CALIBRATION MAS SATISFACTORILY CONPLETEO WITH NO ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED'NO THE UNIT EXITED OPERATION UNDER TS 3 0 3 ~ THE CAUSE OF THIS EVENT MAS A COGNXTIVE PERSONNEL ERROR BY THE USS ON DUTYr RESULTING IN A FAILURE TO COMPLY METH PROCEDURE 14000-Ci "OPERATIONS SHIFT AND DAiLY SURVEILLANCE LOGS " THE USS MAS COUNSELEO REGARDING THE XNPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE METH TS REQUIRE>lENTS
0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 4 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
FORM 201 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +*******************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 440 1986 041 0 8609080270 201010 07/31 /86
- it**********************************************************
DOCKET:440 PERRY 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 3 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER - GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUNINATING CO.
S YHBOL: CEI COHHENTS STEP 4: EFF XX VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS. STEP 4: MODEL 3SD-130-50 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50-73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON JULY 31 r 1986r THE DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR AND THE HiGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) PUMP AUTO-STARTED. VOLTAGE FLUCTUATXONS IN THE OUTPUT OF A REScRVE BATTERY CHARGER CAUSED A MOMENTARY TRIP OF A OC TO AC INVERTER. THIS RESULTED IN TRXP SIGNALS FROM THREE REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL TRIP UNITS THE TRiP SIGNAI S CAUSED THE DIESEL GENERATOR AND HPCS PUNP TO START SINCE THE REACTOR VESSEL MATER LEV"L MAS ALREADY ABOVE THE HIGH LEVEL SETPOINTi THE HPCS INJECTiON VALVE DID NOT OPEN AND NO MATER MAS INJECTED INTO THE REACTOR VESSEL. CONTROL ROON OPERATORS CONFiRMED THAT THE ACTUATIONS MERE SPURiOUS AND SECURED THE DIESEL GENERATOR ANO HPCS PUMP THE NORllAL BATTERY CHARGER WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AND THE RESERVc CHARGER MAS SECURED THE EVENT WAS CAUSED BY FLUCTUATIONS IN THE OUTPUT OF THE RESERVE BATTERY CHARGER AN AMPLIFIER CARD HAS BEEN REPLACED IN THE BATTERY CHARGER ~ ADDITIONALLYr A DESiGN MODIFICATION TO INSTALL A FILTER NETMORK IN THE BATTERY CHARGER OUTPUT CIRCUIT IS BEING PROCESSED ~ ADDXTIONAL CHANGES ARE ALSO BEING EVALUATED~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 .
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 a
FORH 202 l ER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +*************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION DCS NUYiBER NSIC EVENT DATE 443 1987 006 1 9102050186 220851 02/19/87
- 4******************************************************************
DOCKET:443 SEABROOK 1 REGION: 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: UECX FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE OF NEM HAMPSHIRE SYHBOL: PNH HATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERF ERENCE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations ABSTRACT POWER LEVcL 000% ON 2/19/87~ AT 3:20 AH ESTi WHILE SEABROOK STATION MAS IN HODE 3r SEVERAL ALARMS MERE RECEIVED INDICATING A GROUND~ IN ATTENPT TO IDENTIFY THc SOURCE OF THE GROUNDr WHICH APPEARED TO ORIGINATE FROM UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY 1 Er THE SUPPLY FROtl DC BUS 11A MAS VERIFIED TO BE THE SUPPLYING SOURCE TO VITAL INSTRUHENT PANEL 1E THROUGH THE INVERTER ~ THE AC SUPPLY BREAKER TO UPS 1E FROM HOTOR CONTROL CENTER E512 WAS THEN OPENED WHICH RESULTED IN THE INVERTER OUTPUT BEING INTERRUPTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 SECONDS THIS LOSS OF P OWE R RESULT ED IN t'lUL TIP LE ESF ACTUATIONS I ~ E I I r SOL AT ON 0 F THE NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY PORTIONS OF THE PRIHARY COMPONENT COOLING MATER S YST Ether ACTUATION OF THE CONTROL ROOYi Et'l cRGENC Y Cl EAN UP FILTER SYSTEMS AND ISOLATION OF THE CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEH ALL ESF SYSTEHS FUNCTIONEO AS DESIGNED THE ROOT CAUSE 'MAS DETERNXNEO TO BE THE ACTIVATION OF THE UPS 1c TRANSDUCER BOARD DC UNDERVOLTAGE OPTICAL ISOLATOR BY EXTRANEOUS PLANT ELECTRICAL NOISE CAUSED BY AN INTERMITTENT AC SYSTEH GROUND. THE DC UNDERVOLTAGE ISOLATOR IN TURN ACTIVATED THE FAULT PROTECTION CIRCUITRY WHICH INITIATED THE TWO SECOND OUTPUT INTERRUPTION. A DESIGN CHANGE MAS IHPLEHENTED TO CHANGE THE VALUE OF THE BIAS RESISTORS AND REDUCE THE SENSITXVITY OF ALL THE UPS DC UNDERVOLTAGE OPTICAL XSOLATORS ~ THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE AT SEABROOK STATION ~
0 e e o e e e o o e e o o e e e e o o o e 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 203 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4**********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REViSION OCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 443 1988 002 1 8805240112 209342 02/11/88 DOCKET:443 SEABROOK 1 TYPE:PWR REGION NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: UECX FACILITY OPcRATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE OF NEM HAtlPSHIRE SYMBOL: PNH COMMENTS STEPS 1
- 5: EVENT DISCOVERED 2/11/88. STEPS 6 8: EVENT DISCOVERED 4/15/88 SAM/P/1.
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABiLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE 10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL OOOX ON 2/1/88r IT MAS DETERMINED THAT THE SUPPLY BREAKER FOR INVERTER 1-ED-1-2B. WHICH IS SUPPLIED FROtl UNiT SUBSTATION 1 EOE US 51 r HAD NOT BEiN TESTEO iN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREHENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4 8 ~ 4 2 ~ ON JANUARY 7r 1988 ~ DURING A REVIEM OF SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTIVE OiVICES FOR CLASS 1E POMER SOURCES CONNECTED TO NON-CLASS 1E DEVICES iT MAS IDENTXFIEO THAT THIS BRiAKER MAS NOT iNCLUDED. FURTHER REVIEM REVEALEO THAT THIS BREAKER WAS NOT INCLUOEO ON THi LIST OF BREAKERS WHICH REQUIRE TESTING PURSUANT TO TECHNiCAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.4.2. THIS BREAKER HAD BEEN TESTED DURING THE PREOPERATIONAL TEST PROGRAHr AND THEREFORE IT MAS DETERMINED THAT THE SURVLILLANCE INTERVAL HAO NOT BEEN EXCEEDED THE SUBJECT BREAKER MAS FUNCTIONALLY TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREHENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4 8 4. 2 AND WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERABLE ON FEBRUARY 11r 1 988r FURTHER REVIEW INOICATEO THAT THE BREAKER HAO BEEN TcSTED DURING THE PREOPERATIONAL TEST PROGRAM AND DID NOT t1EET THF REQUIREHFNTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4 8 4 ~ 2 ~
FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE TESTING ON TH SUPPLY BREAKER TO UNIT SUBSTATION 1 EDE US 61r IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DETERMINED THAT THS TIE BREAKERS BETWEEN UNIT SUBSTATIONS 1-EOi-US-61 AND 1-EDE-US-63 ANO BETWEEN 1-EDE-US-51 ANO 1-EOE-US-53 HAD ALSO BEEN OtliTTED FROtl THIS TABLE. ACTIONS HAVE BEEN INiTIATED TO AOO THESE BREAKERS TO THE LIST OF BREAKERS RiQUIRING TESTING.
r~q 0
FORM 204 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A***********************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 443 1989 004 0 8904260217 213773 03/21/89
- k*************************************%*******************
DOCKET:443 SEABROOK 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: UECX FACILITY OPERATOR: PUBLIC SERVICE OF NEW HAhtPSHIRE S YMBOL: PNH WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
30 HUMAN ACTION REPORTABZLITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 443/86-003 2 443/87-001 3 443/89-001 4 443/89-003 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON MARCH 21'989 'T 10:49Ah1 EST ~ AN AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF THE CONTROL ROOh) VENTILATION (CBA) SYSTEM OCCURRED WHICH RESULTED IN THE TRANS F ER OF THE SYSTEi~i FROhl ITS NORMAL h10DE OF OPERATION TO THE RECIRCULATION htODE. THE CAUSc OF THE EViNT HAS BEiN ATTRiBUTED TO A MOMENTARY LOSS OF POWER TO THE TRAIN B EAST AND WEST REMOTE AIR INTAKE RADIATION HONiTORS.'T HAS BEEN DiTERMINED THAT THE MOMENTARY LOSS OF POWER WAS THE RESULT OF AN AUTOh1ATXC TRANSFER OF THE INCOMING 345KV STATION POWERFEED FROM THE UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS TO THE RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS ~ THE TRANSFER WAS GENcRATED AS A RESULT OF A HAIN TURBINE GENiRATOR TRIP SIGNAL INITIATED DURitlG THE PERFORMANCE OF A MAINTENANCE ACTiViTY ON THi MAIN GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER. DURING THE TRANSFERS A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT OCCURRED CAUSING THE VOLTAGE TO THE RADXATION MONITORS TO DROP TO LESS THAN 100VAC AND THE MONITORS TO SHUTDOWN. THE MONITORS ARE NORt'IAI LY SUPPLIED BY AN INVERTER WHICH WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE VOLTAGF TRANSIENT: HOWEVERS AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSIENT> THE POWER SUPPLY PANEL WAS SUPPLIED BY ITS MAINTENANCE FEED ~ THiRE WERE NO ADVERSi CONSEQUENCES TO SAFcTY AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. WHEN THE TRAIN B RADIATION MONITORS DEENERGIZEDr ALL EQUIPhlENT OPERATED AS DESIGNED NO CORRECTIVE ACTiON FOR THE AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF THE CBA SYSTEM IS RFQUIRED THE CBA OPERATED AS DESIGNED
FORH 205 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSEC EVENT DATE 445 1990 041 0 9012210183 220559 11/19/90
- %*****A***********************************************************
DOCKET: 445 COHANCHE 1 TYPE:PWR R E. GEON: 4 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GIBB FACILITY OPERATOR: TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING CO.
SYHBOL: TUG COI<HENTS STEP 2: CAUSE IX VOLTAGE TRANSiENTS ~
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LiR ARE:
20 EQUIPHENT FAILURE 942 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORTABELITY CODES FOR THES LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specif cation violations.
0 REFEREttCE LERS:
1 445/90"002 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 045%. ON 11/18/90 COt'lANCHE PEAK STEAH'LECTRIC STATION UNIT 1 WAS IN HODE 1r POWER OPERATIONr OPERATING AT 45% REACTOR POWER ~
PROTECTION SET INVERTER IV1PC3 TREPPEDr CAUSING A LOSS OF POWiR TO 118 VAC INSTRUHENTATEON OISTRIBUTEON PANEL 1PC3 THE TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT MAS ENTERED MHICH REQUIRED THE INVERTER TO BE OPERATING WITHIN 24 HOURS OR A PLANT SHUTDOWN AND COOLDOWN MOULD BE REQUIRED ~
INITIAL TROUBLESHOOTING DID NOT REVEAL THE ROOT CAUScr SO UNIT 1 MAS SHUT DOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACTION STATEMENT TROUBLiSHOOTENG DID REVEAL A FA 'LED SILICON CONTROLLED RiCTEFEERr FAILED RESISTORS AND A LOOSE WIRE ROOT CAUSES MERE DETERHINEO TO BE AC VOLTAGE TRANS E ENTSr INADEQUATE T ERllINATEON ON THE LOOSE MlR Er AND F AILUR TO COHPLETELY IDENTIFY ALL DAHAGEO COHPONENTS FROtl PREVIOUS INVERTER FAILURES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE REVISING PROCEDURESr CREATING AN ENVERTER TROUBLESHOOTIt'lG GUIDEr CHANGING WIRE TERHINATION HETHODS AtlD POMiRING REACTOR PROTECTION ENViRTERS FROH ONLY A DC SOURCi.
0 e e o o o e e o e o o e e e e ~ e o ~ e 4 [0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORM 206 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- +*****k******************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUYiBER REVISION OCS NUMBER NSZC EVENT DATE 455 1987 019 1 8806230261 209583 10/02/87 DOCKET:455 BYRON 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHXTECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: CONrlONMEALTH EDISON CO SYt'1BOL: CME COHHENTS STEP 6: EQUIPHENT OPiRATOR OPENED STATION AUX TRANSFORtlER DISCONNECT INSTEAD OF THE NAXN TRANSFORHER DXSCONNECT.
MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE 35 HUHAN ERROR 942 UNUSUAL EVENT 20 EQUIPHENT FAILURE RiPORTABXLITY CODES FOR THIS LFR ARE:
13 10 CFR 50 73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 013X~ ON OCTOBER 2s 1987r AT 0446r UNIT 2 WAS RETURNING TO SiPVXCE WHEN UNIT 2 WAS SYNCHRONIZED TO THE GRZOr THE STEAN GENERATOR (SG) LEViLS It)CREASED AND CAUSED A HZ-2 S/G LiVEL TRIP THE HX-2 SG LEVEL WAS REACHED ON SG 2C DUE TO EXCESSIVE "LEAK BY" OF THE 2FM530 VALVE THE HiGH S/G LEVEL CAUSFD A TURBINE TRIP AND A SUBSEQUENT RiACTOR TRIP BECAUSE RiACTOR POWER MAS ABOVE 10X AN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR (EO) WAS INSTRUCTED TO REALIGN THE SMITCHYARD RING BUS AFTFR THE TRIP THE EO OPENED THE SYSTEN AUX TRANSFORMER DISCONNECTS INSTEAD OF THE tlAIN POMER TRANSFORMER DXSCONNECTS ~ THE SAFETY RELATED 4KV BUSiS MERE DEENERGIZEO CAUSING THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS TO STARTS REENERGZZE THE BUSESr AND SEQUENCE THE SAFE SHUTDOWN LOADS. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER MAS OUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR ~ THE EO OPENED THE WRONG DISCONNECT. THE CORRiTZVE ACTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS TAKEN WITH THE EOg ADtlZNISTRATIVE PROCEDURES MERE REVISED TO ENSURE THAT NO SMZTCHYARD OPERATIONS ARE PERFORHED MITHOUT A SECOND INDIVIDUAL PRESENTS PERt1ANENTr DESCRIPTIVE LABELS HAVE BEEN PLACED ON HPT 5 SAT SWITCHYARD OISCONNECTSw A WALK THROUGH OF THE SWITCHYARD WITH DZVISXON SUPERINTENDENT OF POWER SUPPLY TO DEMONSTRATE PROPER OPERATIONS AND COtltlUNICATXONS MAS CONOUCTEOi THE SAT OISCONNECTS ARE LOCKED WITH UtJXQUE LOCKS FOR EACH UNITr ETC ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I'
0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORN 207 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- k******+ **************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUtlBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 455 1989 001 1 89083101 38 21 5083 02/11/89 i>****************************************************%******+*******
DOCKET:455 BYRON 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 3 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COMtlONMEALTH EDiSON CO.
SYNBOL: CME COHHENTS STEP 1: CAUSE AX TESTING. STEP 10: MODEL NO. AR2g ST NO. 1456C88A01 WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 000X ON 2/11/89 AT APPROXIMATELY 1240r WITH BYRON UNIT 2 IN MODE 6w A SAFETY INJECTION (SI) ACTUATION OF TRAIN A AND B EQUIPHENT OCCURRED DURING THE PERFORYiANCE OF A DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE. ACTUATION OF B TRAIN EQUIPtlENT WAS EXPECTED DURING THE SURVEILLANCEr BUT THE A TRAIN ACTUATION WAS UNANTICIPATED THE INAOVFPTENT Si SIGNAL WAS GENERATEO WHEN THE REQUIRED 2 OF 3 COINCIDENCE MAS SATISIFEO. FOR CONTAINMENT PRESSURE HIGH ~ ONE HIGH PRESSURE SIGNAL MAS GENCRATED BY INSTRUMENT HAINTENANCE PERSONNEL'HO WERE TESTING PRESSURE CHANNEL 935 CHANNEL 934 GENERATED A HIGH PRESSURE SIGNAL WHEN ITS INSTRUHENT POWER BUS WAS DEENERGIZED DURING THE SURVEILLANCE TEST THIS OCCURRED BECAUSE THE INSTRUMENT BUS WAS SUPP I-I ED 8 Y A CONSTANT VOLTAGE TRANS FORjlE R F ROH A B US THAT MAS INTENTIONALLY DEFNERGIZED DURING THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE. THE ONLY UNEXPECTED AUTOt'1ATIC EQUIPtlENT ACTUATIONS THAT OCCURRED WERE THE 2A CENTRiFUGAL CHARGING PUflP AND THE 2A DiESEL GENERATOR ~ ALL OTHER EQUIPHENT WAS EITHER RUNNING OR IN PULL-TO-LOCK~ THE SURVEILLANCE WAS SUCCESSFULLY COilPLETEO LATER ON 2/11/89 THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE SI WAS It<ADEQUATE PRECAUTIONS IN THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE. BECAUSE OF THIS DEF 'IENCYr OPERATING PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS EVENT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THE It<STRUHENT BUS MOULD BE DEENERGiZED DURING THE SURVEILLANCE TEST ~
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 R
'I
~ 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ I
FORH 208 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 456 1989 001 1 8903290371 213395 02/06/89 DOCKET:456 BRAIDMOOD 1 REGION: 3 A RCHITF CT URAL ENGINEER: SL XX FACILITY OPERATOR: COMYiONMEALTH EDiSON CO SYt!BOL: CME WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARc:
20 EQUIPHENT FAILURE 941 REPORT ASSOCIATEO WITH 10 CFR 50 72 REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50 73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actoations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 000'. AT 1322 ON 2/16/89 UNIT 1 MAS IN NODE 3 WITH ALL THE CONTROL RODS INSERTED AND THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS CLOSED A HOHENTARY LOSS OF OUTPUT VOLTAGE ON INSTRUMENT INVERTER 112 CAUSED A REACTOR TRiP SIGNAL DUc TO INTcRHEDIATE RANGE HIGH FLUX BISTABLE FROM CHANflEL N36 REVERT ING TO ITS ESF SAFE CONF IGURATION~ THE OPENING OF THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS COINCIDENT WITH RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE LESS THAN 364F CAUSED A FEEDMATER ISOLATION SIGNAL AT 1323 THE FEEDWATER ISOLATION SIGNAL WAS RESET AND NORMAL FEED'MATER FLOW MAS ESTABLISHED.
PERSONNEL IN THE AREA AT THE TINE OF THE EVENT MERE INDEPENDENTLY INTERVIEWED'HEIR ACTIVITIES OID NOT PLACE THEll IN CONTACT METH INSTRUNENT INVERTER 112 PHYSICALLY OR ELECTRICALLY~ THc HONENTARY LOSS OF INSTRUNENT INVERTER OUTPUT VOLTAGE IS STILL UNDER INVESTiGATiON~ THE UNIT 1 INSTRUMENT INVERTERS ARE SCHEDULED FOR AN INSPECTION DURING THE NEXT OUTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY ~ THIS REPORT WILL BE SUPPLEHENTED SHOULD THE ROOT CAUSE BE DETERHINED THERE HAVE BEEN PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES OF REACTOR TRIPS INVOLVING INSTRUMENT INVERTERSr HOWEVER THE PREVIOUS EVENTS WERE NOT THE RESULT OF SPURiOUS PERTURBATIONS ON THE INVERTER THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THOS EVENTS MERE IHPLEHENTED ADDRESSING BOTH ROOT AND CONTRIBUTING CAUSES.
PREVIOUS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS EVENT.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0
FORt< 209 LER SCSS DATA 09-23"91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REYISION DCS NUtlBER NSXC EVENT DATE 458 1990 004 2 9102050244 220854 02/11/90 DOCKET: 458 RIVERBENO 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 4 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SMXX FACILITY OPERATOR: GULF STATES UTILITIES SYMBOL: GSU COMMENTS STEP 2: COMP XS FLOAT/ EQUALIZE SWITCH WATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
20 iQUZPMENT FAILURE REPORTABILZTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
RiF ERENCE LERS:
1 458/89-038 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% AT 1009 ON 02/11/90r WITH THE Pl ANT AT 100 PERCENT POWER OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1)r THE DIVISION II EMERGENCY 125 VDC BUS EXPERIENCiD A YOLTAGE SPIKE MHICH CAUSED A TOPAZ ZNVERTER UNIT (1E1 2A PS1 ) TO TRIPr RESULTING IN A LOSS OF POWER TO SPECIF '
INST RUMiENTATION ON CONTROL ROOt'1 PANEL H1 3 P61 8 (DIVISION I I) THIS EYENT OCCURRED COINCIDENT WITH A SCHEDULED PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TASK (PM) ON DIVISION Ii BATTERY CHARGER (ENB*CHGR18) MHEN THE FLOAT/EQUALIZE SMITCH ON THE CHARGER MAS MOVED FROM THE FLOAT POSITION TO THE EQUALIZE POSITION UPON RESTORATION OF THE INVERTERSr MULTIPLi DIVISION Ii ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) ACTUATXONS OCCURRED. THEREFOREr THIS EViNT IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO 10CFR50 ~ 73(A) (2) (IV) ~ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED REVISING THE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TASK FREQUENCXESr DEVEl OPING NEM PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TASKS TO INCLUDE CHECKING OF THE INVERTER TRIP SETPOXNTSr TROUBLESHOOTING OF THE BATTERY CHARGERr AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOAD LISTS FOR THE TOPAZ INYERTERS ~ OPERATIONS PERSONNEL PROPERLY RESPONDED TO THIS EVENT BY LIMITING THE NUMBER OF ESF SYSTEM ACTUATIONS THOSE ESF SYSTEMS WHICH DIO ACTUATE RESPONDED PFR DESIGN ~ THEREFOREr THIS EViNT DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE HEALTH ANO SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0
FORM 210 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSZC EVENT DATE 458 1990 007 0 9004200443 217835 03/11/90 DOCKET: 458 RIVERBENO 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 4 NSSS:GE A RCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: GULF STATES UTILITIES SYMBOL: GSU COMMENTS STEP 1: CAUSE ZX iLECTRICAL TRANSIENT CAUSED BY TRANSFORMER FAILURE AT A LOCAL INDUSTRIAL FACILITY COMP t'IEI SWITCHGEAR. STEP 7: EFF IX TRANSFERRED TO BATTERY POWiR SUPPI Y.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
1g ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCc REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations REF ERENCE LERS:
1 458/86-020 2 458/86-040 3'58/86-052 4 458/86-062 5 458/87-008 6 458/88-008 7 458/89-037 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100%. AT 1248 ON 3/11/90 WITH THE UNIT AT 100 PERCENT POWER THE DIVISION II CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM ISOLATED AND ITS RESPECTIVE FILTRATION UNIT AUTOMATICALLY INITIATED~ THE INITIATION WAS CAUSED SY A SPURIOUS SIGNAL FROM THE CONTROL BUILDXNG INTAKE RADIATION MONITOR 1RtiS*RE13B. THE OPERATORS DETERMINED THAT NO ACTUAL HIGH RADIATION CONDITION EXISTED AND RETURNED THE SYSTEM TO ITS NORMAL CONFIGURATION RADIATION MONITOR 1RMS*RE138 ANO OTHER RADIATION MONITORS HAVE PREVIOUSLY SHOltN SUSCEPTXBZLITY TO ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS THEREFOREr TWO MODIFICATIONS WERE IMPLEMENT iD PRIOR TO THIS EVENT ZN ORDER TO RFDUCE SPURIOUS RADIATION MONITOR TRIPS ON A PROGRAMMATIC BASIS BY REDUCING RADIATION MONITOR/DETECTOR SUSCEPTIBiLITY TO ELECTRICAL NOISE AND TRANSIENTS THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT AND THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WERE NOT AFFECTED AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PLANT WILL HAVE NO It<PACT ON SAFETY SINCE THE SYSTEM WHXCH ACTUATED PLACED THE PLANT ZN A i~lORE CONSERVATIVE CONFIGURAT ZON BY FILTERING THE SUPPLY AZR TO THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 4
FORM 211 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- %**************************************Bc*****+******************
OOCKiT YEAR LER NUt~iB ER REViSION DCS NUtlB ER NSIC EVENT DATE 458 1990 026 0 90091 90263 21 951 8 08/1 0/90
- *********** ******* * ************************* k* ***************
DOCKET:458 REVERBEND 1 TYPE:BMR REGEON: 4 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SMXX FACELXTY OPERATOR: GULF STATES UTILITIES S YH BOL: GSU WATCH-LiST CODcS FOR THIS LER ARE:
31 ACCZOcNTAL ACTXON 38 POOR ERGONOHICS OR HUi~lAN ENVIRONMENT RiPORTABILITY CODES FOR THiS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): iSF actuations.
RiFERENCE LERS:
1 458/85-019 2 458/85-020 3 458/85-022 4 458/85-023 5 458/86-010 ABSTRACT POMER LEVEL 100X AT APPROXIMATELY 0202 ON 08/10/90 WITH THE UNIT AT FULL POWER EN OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1r THE REACTOR MATER CLEANUP SYSTEM (RMCU) XSOLATED ~ MAINTENANCE WAS INSTALLING JUMPERS TO ALLOW REPLACEHENT OF A FAULTY OPTICAL ISOLATOR CARD WHEN A SHORT CIRCUIT OCCURRED. THIS SHORT CAUSED TWO FUSES TO BLOW RESULTING IN A LOSS OF POWER TO SEVERAL BALANCE-OF-PLANT (BOP) OPTICAL ISOLATOR CARDS. LOSS OF THESE ISOLATOR CARDS Oc-ENERGIZED NORMALLY ENERGIZED RELAYS FOR THE HVAC COOLING WATER SYSTEM (HVN) ~ THIS CAUSED AN XSOLATION OF THE COOLiNG MATER TO THE CONTAINMENT UNET COOLERS. WITH COOLING MATER ISOLATEDr AREAS EN THE CONTAENHENT SERViD BY THESE UNITS BEGAN TO HiAT UP ~ WHEN THE RMCU HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM AMBIENT TiHPERATURE REACHEO THE ISOLATION SETPOINTr AN XSOl ATION OF THE SYSTEM OCCURRED THEREFORE THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLF PURSUANT TO 10CFR50 ~ 73 (A) (2) (IV) AS ESF ACTUATION A SHORT CIRCUIT DURING JUMPER HANEPULATION RESULTED EN THE RWCU ISOLATION. INSTALLATION OF JUMPERS ON THE OPTICAJ ESOLATOR CARDS ZS COMPLICATED BY THE RELATIVE LOCATXONS OF THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TERMINALS'HECH APPROXIMATELY 1/4" APART WITH NO BARRIERS BETMEEN AS CORRECTIVE ACTIONs THIS REPORT MILL BE REQUIRED READiNG FOR APPLICABLE HAINTENANCE PERSONNEL BY 10/31/90 SINCE ALL PLANT SYSTEMS PcRFORMED AS DESIGNED'HIS EVFNT OED NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.
0 a o o o e e e e o o o o o o e o o o o o 0 iO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FORhl 212 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- jc*********************************+**************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 498 1987 005 0 8710060486 206507 09/04/87
- +****4*********************************
DOCKET:498 SOUTH TEXAS 1 TYPE:PMR REGION: 4 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: HOUSTON LIGHTING 8 POWER CO ~
SYhlBOL: HLP NATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
941 REPORT ASSOCIATED WITH 10 CFR 50.72 35 HUMAN ERROR REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000/ AT APPROXIHATELY 1500 HOURS ON SEPTEMBER 4w 1987 WITH THE UNIT 1 IN NODE 5i AN ENPLOYEE ACCIDENTLY TRIPPED AN AC BREAKER ON A NON CLASS 1E VOLTAGE REGULATING TRANSFORNERr CAUSING THE LOSS OF BACKUP POM R TO A NON-CLASS 1E INVERTED INCORRECT OPERATOR RESPONSE TO THE LOSS OF BACKUP POWER THEN RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF CONTROL POMER TO THE CONTROL ROOM TOXIC GAS HONITOR ACTUATION RELAYS THIS CAUSED AN AUTO-ACTUATION OF THE CONTROL ROON VENTILATION SYSTEl'l TO THE RECIRCULATION hlODE ~ THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT IS THE LACK OF OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE IN RESPONDING TO THE LOCAL ALARH ON THE INVERTER. THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL INCLUDE TRAINING OF OPERATORS ON THE PROPER OPERATION OF INVERTER SYSTEHS AND INSTALLING PROTECTIVE GUARDS ON THE BREAKERS IN HIGH TRAFFIC AREAS
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~~
0 0 i 0 0 4 0 0 0 ~ 1 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 i 0
FORM 213 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- A***********************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUHBER NSIC EVENT DATE 498 1 991 006 0 9103280307 221315 02/22/91 DOCKET:498 SOUTH TEXAS TYPE:PMR REGION: 4 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: HOUSTON LIGHTING 8 POWER CO SYNBOL: HLP CONNENTS STEP 6: EFF IX ENERGIZED FROM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY'ATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
35 HUHAN ERROR 40 PROCEDURAL OEFICI ENCY 0 REPORTABZLITY CODcS FOR THIS LER ARE 10 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i): Shutdoens or technical specification violations.
REFERENCE LERS 1 499/90-01 7 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ~ ON FEBRUARY 24r 1991'NIT 1 WAS IN NODE 6 IN ITS THIRD REFUELING OUTAGE AT 0603 HOURS DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TESTs ZT MAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CLASS 1E 120 VOLT DISTRIBUTION PANEL DP002 MAS ENERGIZED FROM XTS ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY IN VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3 8 3 2 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO RESTORE THE DISTRIBUTION PANEL TO ITS PROPER ALIGNMENT THE CAUSES OF THIS EVENT MERE FAILURE TO COORDINATE THE TRANSFER Or POWER TO THE DISTRIBUTION PANEL DUE TO INADEQUATE VERBAL CO( lHUNICATXONS AND FAILURE TO HONITOR THE ASSOCIATED ALARNS MHZCH ANNUNCIATE IN THE CONTROL ROON DURING AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE TRAINING OF LICENSED AND NON-LICENSED OPERATORSr AND AN EVALUATXON OF THE PLANT S NUNBERING SCHEME FOR ELECTRICAL PANELS.
I 1
1 e,o o o o o e o o o e o e e e e e e e
FORM 214 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
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DOCKET YEAR LER NUt'1BER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 499 1 990 01 8 0 9012120170 220509 11/07/90
- kk**********************************************************
DOCKET:499 SOUTH TEXAS 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 4 NSSS:ME ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: HOUSTON LXGHTING tt POWER CO.
S YM BOL: HLP COMMENTS STEPS 2r3 EFF IC VOLTAGE TRANSIENT STFPS 4r5 MODEL NO CSL 38 60010 1r6: TYPE HFBr MODEL NO. EHB3030. STEP 1: CAUSE AX FOR TESTING 'TEPS MATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
60 SPURIOUS/ UNKNOWN CAUSE REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWFR LEVcL 000%~ ON NOVitlBER 7r 1990r UNIT 2 MAS IN MODE 6 ~ AT 0022 HOURSr DURING THE PERFORMANCi OF A SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE TO SATISFY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREHENTSr AN iLECTRICAL TRANSIENT OCCURRED ON THi CLASS 1E 120 VOLT AC VITAL DISTRIBUTION PANELS DP001 AND DP1201 THIS TRAN'SIiNTr MHICH APPARENTLY RESULTED IN A VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION ON A TRAIN POWERED RADIATION HONITORSr CAUSED ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIONS OF CONTROL ROOHr REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDINGr AtlD FUEL HANDLING BUILDING HVAC SYSTEMS ~ THE CAUSE OF THE ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTr WHICH OCCURRED AFTER CLOSURE OF THE AC INPUT BREAKER FOR INVCRTER 1201 THAT SUPPLIES OP1 201 r IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIt1E ~ AFTER THE EVENTr THE AC INPUT BREAKER FOR INVERTER 1201 MAS CYCLEO AND INVERTER/OP001 WAS t10NITOREOr AND NO ABNORMALITIES MERE DETECTED'
4 I
~ ~ I
FORM 215 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91 DOCKcT. YEAR LER NUNBER REVISION OCS NUNBER NSIC EVENT DATE 528 1989 024 1 9003060264 217037 12/12/89
- +***********************
DOCKET:528 PALO VERDE 1 REGION: 5 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILXTY OPERATOR: ARIZONA PUBLiC SERVICE CO SYMBOL: APS MATCH-LEST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
40 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY REPORTABILXTY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations-REFERENCE LERS:
1 528/89-023 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 000% ON DECEilBER 12r 1989 UNIT 1 MAS IN HODE 6 WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEYi AT ATMOSPHERIC P RESSURE AND APP ROXIHATELY 95 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT APPROXIMATELY 1055 NSTr A TEST WAS INITIATEO ON REACTOR COOLANT PU t<P 2A tdOTOR PRIOR TO COUPLING THE IHP ELLE R ~ THE tlOTOR START CAUSED A VOLTAGE PERTURBATION IN THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEH THAT TRIPPEO RAOIATIOt'l HONXTORS AND INXTIATED A CONTAINHENT PURGE ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNALs A FUEL BUILDING ESSENTIAL VENTILATION ACTUATION SIGNALr AND A CONTROL ROON ESSENTIAL FILTRATION ACTUATION SIGNAL ~ ALL SYSTEtlS RESPONDED AS DESIGNED ~ THE RCP MOTOR WAS INtlEDIATELY STOPPED ALL ACTUATIONS MERE RESET BY APPROXIHATELY 1300 HST ~ THE INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT DETERMINED THAT THE EVENT WAS CAUSED BY AN ABNORttAL ELECTRICAL ALIGNHENT AT THE TItlE OF THE EVENT ~
TO PREVENT RECURRENCE THE OPCRATING PROCEDURES FOR 13 8 KV PUtitP NOTORS MILL BE REVISED TO INCLUDE A PRECAUTION ON. THE CONSEQUENCES OF STARTING THE HOTORS WITH A 1 E BATTERY DISCONNECTED
0 o e e o o e e o e o e e e o o o o e e e 4l 0 Po o o e o e o e o o o e e ~ e e e e e e
FORH 216 LER SCSS DATA 09"23"91
- 4******
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUViBER NSIC EVENT DATE 529 1986 023 1 8703160089 203416 12/24/86 DOCKET:529 PALO VERDE 2 REGION: 5 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: ARIZONA PUBLIC S" RVICE CO SYMBOL: APS CONTENTS STEP 2: COHP HEI INDICATION BULB. STEP 17: HODEL "SW12-75.
REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 100% ~ AT ABOUT 2010 HST ON 1 2 24 86r UNIT 2 MAS IN NODE 1 (POWER OPERATION) AT 100% POMER MHEN THE AUTOHATIC ACTUATION OF THE PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEll (PPS) (SC) INITIATED A REACTOR (RCT) TRIP ~ THE REACTOR TRIP MAS ANNUNCIATED (ANN) AND RESPONDED TO BY UTI! ITY LICENSED OPERATORS IN THE CONTROL ROON (CR) . ALL SAFETY SYSTEllS AND CONPONENTS OPERATED AS DESIGNED. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT MAS DETERMINED TO BE AN INTERMITTENT GROUND ON THE 125 VOLT DC BUS (H42) CAUSING A DESIGNED "0" OUTPUT VOI TAGE RESPONSE FROM THE INVERTERr CONCURRENT WITH AN "OUT OF SYNC" CONDITION BETMEEN THE INVERTER AND VOLTAGE REGULATOR (ALTERNATE POWER). THIS PROHIBITED A TRAl'JSFER OF THE 120 VOLT AC BUS (026) TO THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR RESULTING IN A LOSS OF POWER TO D26 ~ THE LOSS OF POMER TO D-26 RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF PPS CHANNEL "B". THIS LOSS COMBINED WITH A DEGRADED VOLTAGE CONDITION ON A PPS CHANNEL "A" POWER SUPPLYr RESULTED IN THE REACTOR TRIP. AS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS THE GROUND WAS REMOVED AND THE POWER SUPPLY MAS REPLACED. FURTHER EVALUATIONS ARE CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS TO OETERHINE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE DEGRADED VOLTAGE CONDITION EXPERIENCED BY THE PPS POWER SUPPLY ~
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
0 e 0 0 e 0 i 0 0 e e e e e e e e o e e
FORH 217 LER SCSS DATA 09-23-91
- 4****************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUHBER REVISION DCS NUhlBER NSIC EVENT DATE 529 1986 034 0 8607150221 199945 06/10/86 DOCKCT:529 PALO VERDE 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: 5 NSSS: CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINiER: SECH FACILITY OPERATOR: ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO SYtlBOL: APS REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL 041X AT 0420 tlST ON JUNE 10r 1986r PALO VERDE UNIT 2 WAS XN tlODE 1 (POWER OPERATION) AT 41 PERCENT POWER MHEN AN ACTUATION OF THE RFACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEhl INITIATED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE FOLLOWING AN UNANTICIPATED HAIiV TURBINE TRIP. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS A hlOhlENTARY DROP IN THE 24 VOLT POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE TO THE HAXN GENERATOR REGULATOR AND EXCITER CUBICLES WHICH RESULTED XN A flAIN TURBINE TRIP. THIS IN TURN RESULTED IN A SUDDEN LOSS OF SECONDARY PLANT HEAT REhlOVAL. REACTOR COOLANT PRCSSURE INCREASiO TO THE HiGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SiTPOINT APPROXXhlATELY TEN SECONDS AFTER THE GENERATOR/TURBINE TRIPi THE AUTOhlATIC ACTUATION OF THE RPS RESULTED XN A REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TO PREVENT RECURRENCE THE OPERATING RANGES ON THE POWER SUPPLY hlONITORING AND ALARM BOARDS HAVE BEiN INCREASiD TO ALLOW GREATER DROPS XN THE 24 VOLT POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE TO BE ACCOhlf~iODATED WITHOUT RESULTING Ihl AN "EXCITER PROT CCTION TRIP" ~ ALL SAFETY SYSTEhlS AND COl'1PONEtlTS OPERATED AS DESIGNED< AND NO FISSION BOUNDARIES WERE CHALLENGEDr THEREFORE THIS EVENT DID NOT ADV ERSELY AFFECT THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT OR THi HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLXC NO SIHILAR EVENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED FOR PALO VERDE UNITS 1 AND 2 THIS SESSION HAS USED 10 75 SECONDS OF CPU TitlE ANO HAS BEEN ACTIVE FOR 175.23 SECONDS THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE RUN IS $ 3 34
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N e o e o e ~ e e e e e o e e e e ~ ~ o
NUHBER OF READ REQUESTS 1811 NUMB ER OF WRITE REQUESTS 13 NUMB ER OF DATA A CC ESS ES 3465 NUMB ER OF CATALOG ACCCSSES 5662 CATALOG DISPLAY DATA SET **141143 IS ONLINE CATEGORY 0 TYPE 4 CATALOG LOCATION 124 CREATED 092391 EXPIRES 092791 BADGE TREE REFERENCE 23 DATA REFERENCE 25 BASE RECORD 661 BASE RECORD 1 RECORDS USED 1 RECORDS USED 13 LAST NODE 12 EXTENT 1 RECORDS ALLOCATEO 10 RECORDS ALLOCATED 500
0 e e e o e e o e e e e o e e e e e e.o 0 0 l 0 0 '
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0