ML20217N098
| ML20217N098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1997 |
| From: | Garvie S, Heider K YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| BYR-97-041, BYR-97-41, LER-97-S02, LER-97-S2, NUDOCS 9708260024 | |
| Download: ML20217N098 (5) | |
Text
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YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY r. .a-. <. ,.,, ,,. s., ,
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. ,E,h I August 21,1997 BYR 97-041
, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Sectirity Event Report 50 29/97.S02
Dear Sir / Madam:
In accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G I.(c), the attached Security Event Report is hereby submitted.
Very tmly yours, Kenneth J. lleider Site Manager
Enclosure:
c: (3) NSARC Chairman (YAEC)
[1] NRC Region I f
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, i l m.c,,.,,..........,.,..,.....-~..--oe, On July 25, 1997, Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS) in Rowe, Massachusetts, which was permanently shutdown in February 1992 and is currently being decommissioned, made a one-hour report in ac.cordance with 10 CFR 73.71 following discovery of uncontrolled safeguards information. Several safeguards documents were found in double-wrapped packages outside of safeguards repositories at both YNPS and the Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) offices in Bolton, Massachucetts. The materials were retrieved and stored in safeguards repositories.
On July 17, 1997, a plant walkdown was conducted at YNPS by Document Control Center (DCC) personnel to determine the quantity of records requiring microfilming. During the walkdown a box of documents regarding the recently completed Control Room Relocation Project (EDCR 96-302) was observed to contain several double-wrapped packages of safeguards information. The engineer involved was cognizant of the presence of the material and believed the material was stored proparly. At that time the method of storing safeguards information was not questioned.
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,e.,.... .,,.... . ...+ .*eo... u..=.a, on July 23 1997, an auditor from the Quality Assurance (QA)
Department at YNSD contacted YNPS to question safeguards material storage practices. The contact resulted from discussions between YNSD DCC and QA personnel followirg the YNPS Visit. Based on the YNSD and YNPS discusnion, the safeguards material was determined to be inappropriately stored. The safeguards material was retrieved immediately and relocated to a safeguards repository in accordance with AP-0011, " Safeguards Information~." The YNPS Security Department reviewed the recovered material to classify the security event. The material included original copies of the security sections of EDCR 96-302 including wiring diagrams and original copies of installation and test procedures.
However, this information would not have significantly assisted an individual to commit radiological sabotage or to gain unautharized or undetected access to the YNPS Protected Area (the only remaining Protected Area at YNPS is the Spent Fuel Building). The incident was recorded in the Safeguards Event Log.
On July 23, 1997 the YNPS Site Manager remosted the YNSD Yankee Decommissioning Project (YDP) Engincoring Manager in the Bolton office to determine if YNSD engineers associated with EDCR 96-302 properly stored safeguards material. On July 24, 1997 the YDP Engineering Manager reported that three engineers had double-wrapped packages of safeguards material improperly stored in their offices. The material was retrieved immediately and stored in the YNSD YDP safeguards repository, on July 25, 1997, the YNPS Security Department reviewed the recovered material to classify the security event. The material included review copies of EDCR 96-302 and a back-up copy of the Security computer system software.
Based on a conservative evaluation, YNPS determined this information to be sufficient to significantly assist an individual to gain unauthorized access to the YNPS Protected Area. Therefore, YNPS initiated a one-hour report to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71.
No unauthorized access to the Protected Area occurred as a result of this event. Unauthorized access to the Protected Area from any unauthorized modifications to the Security computer system is highly unlikely:
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On July 23 1997, an auditor from the Quality Assurance (QA)
Department at YNSD contacted YNPS to question safeguards material storage practices. The contact resulted from discussions between YNSD DCC and QA personnel following the YNPS Visit. Based on the YNSD and YNPS discussion, the safeguards material was determined to be inappropriately stored. The safeguards material was retrieved immediately and relocated to a safeguards repository in accordance with AP-0011, " Safeguards Inf ormation'." The YNPS Security Department reviewed the recovered material to classify the security event. The material included original copies of the security sections of EDCR 96-302 including wiring diagrams and original copies of installation and test procedures.
However, this information would not have significantly assisted an individual to commit radiological sabotage or to gain unauthorized or undetected access to the YNPS Protected Area (the only remaining Protected Area at YNPS is the Spent Fuel Building). The incident was recorded in the Safeguards Event Log.
On July 23, 1997 the YNPS Site Manager requested the YNSD Yankee Decommissioning Project (YDP) Engineering Manager in the Bolton office to determine if YNSD engineers associated with EDCR 96-302 properly stored safeguards material. On July 24, 1997 the YDP Engineering Manager reported that three engineers had double-wrapped packages of safeguards material improperly stored in their offices. The material was retrieved immediately and stored in the YNSD YDP safeguards repository. On July 25, 1997, the YNPS Security Department reviewed the recovered material to clascify the security event. The material included review copies of EDCR 96-302 and a back-up copy of the Security computer system software.
Based on a conservative evaluation, YNPS determined this information to be sufficient to significantly assist an individual to gain unauthorized access to the YNPS Protected Area. Therefore, YNPS initiated a one-hour report to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71.
No unauthorized access to the Protected Area occurred as a result of this event. Unauthorized access to the Protected Area from any unauthorized modifications to the Security computer system is highly unlikely: '
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- The Protected Area is maintained locked and access to the keys is controlled by the Security Department through the YNPS Defueled Security Plan, which requires frequent key inventories.
e The Protected Area is continuously monitored by a camera system which is independent of the Security computer system. The camera system was not described in any of the uncontrolled safeguards information.
Additionally, unauthorized modifications to the Security computer system are highly unlikely. The Security computer system is located in the control Room which is continuously staffed by Security Department personnel. Any maintenance or' s modifications to the system requires permission from the YHPS Shif t Silpervisor and the YNPS Security Shif t Supervisor. The Security computer system is also password protected to limit access to the system. The password is controlled on a "need -
to-know" basj s.
Immediate short term corrective actions at 'lNPS included the followingt e Site-wide review of paper and computer files to ensure safeguards information did not exist outside of safeguards repositories. This review uncovered an additional double-wrapped package of safeguards material. The package contained a draft copy of a Sandia National Laboratory report written in 1992 to aid YNPS in evaluating modifications to the Protected Area for permanent shutdown conditions.
c Site-wide dissemination of information regarding proper storage of safeguards information. This information was presented at a weekly decommissioning planning meeting on July 24, 1997 and a weekly " Tool Box" meeting on August 5, 1997. Weekly Tool Box meetings are used to reinforce practices and procedures.
- Performance of a surveillance test of security system to verify alarm functions. The test indicated no degradation of the security system. Additionally, surveillance tests are completed weekly.
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0 10 0 14 0F 0 l4 Additional corrective actions include the following:
- Revisa Plant Procedure AP-0011, " Safeguards Information." Enhancements included annual refresher training of appropriate personnel and verification of training prior to transferring safeguards information.
The revision of AP-0011 has been completed.
- Complete the 1997 annual safeguards information refresher training by September 30, 1997.
Corrective actions at YNSD included the following:
- YNSD review of paper and computer files to ensure safeguards information does not exist outside of safeguards repositories. The review is essentially complete. No additional documents have been identified during this review.
- Performance of a Root Cause Analysis. The analysis concluded that management failed to assure proficiency, understanding and compliance with regards to control of
, safeguards information. Several contributing causes were identified including failure to follow procedures and inadequate training processes. Corrective actions were identified including the need for additional training regarding the control of safeguards information.
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