ML20210H099
| ML20210H099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1997 |
| From: | Garvie S, Heider K YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| BYR-97-037, BYR-97-37, LER-97-S01, LER-97-S1, NUDOCS 9708110238 | |
| Download: ML20210H099 (3) | |
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YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY
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August 7, 1997 BYR 9'/-037 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 1
Subject:
Security Event Report 50-29/97-S01
Dear Sir:
In accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G I.(c), the attached Security Event Report is hereby submitted.
Very truly yours, c-Kenneth J. Heider Site Manager
Enclosure:
cc:
(3) NSARC Chairman (YAEC)
[1] NRC Region 1
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On July 9, 1997, a potential comprouise of safeguards information was reported to the Yankee Nuclear Power Station Sscurity Supervisor by corporate office personnel of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company.
Safeguards information was inadvertently-electronically transmitted from the-corporate office in Bolton,-MA, to a printer at the Vermont Yankes Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, VT.
The mistake was immediately recognized and the hardcopy printout retrieved by VY management as it finished printing and was controlled at
-the VY site.
The information in question involved numbers from SECY 166, "Staf f Recommendations for Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at-Nuclear Power Plants."
This information was generic in nature and not specific to a particular nuclear plant.
This information had previously been sent to Yankee Atomic by the NRC and,<as labeled as Safeguards Information.
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.a... - n ae r... ma n n This incident was initially considered to be a Security loggable event per 10 CFR 73 Appendix G II.(a) since appropriate compensatory measures were immediately implemented.
However, upon further review it was determined that the information had been transmitted over an unprotected telecommunications circuit which is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(g) (3) and therefore could have been compromised without appropriate compensatory measureb The root cause of this event has been attributed to human error as Safeguards Information was inadvertently sent to a remote printer at the VY site.
The Security Manager at the corporate office in Bolton, MA, instituted the rollowing corrective actions to ensure this type of incident does not occur in the future:
1.
A stand-alone personal computer and printer, not connected to a network, havo been located within Text Graphics Services (TGS) Department.
All safeguards information work submitted to TGS is required to be performed on this stand-alone work station.
2.
Procedures, including training for all TGS staff have been developed, approved and implemented to ensure that use of the stand-alone work station and positive control of safeguards information are understood by TGS staff.
As of July 18, 1997 the above corrective actions have been implemented and the above event has been closed.
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