ML17266A420

Requests Exemption from 10CFR50.48 & App R to 10CFR50 Schedule Dates for Compliance W/Fire Protection Requirements Per 10CFR50.12(a) & 10CFR50.48(c)(6)

ML17266A420
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	03/19/1981
From:	Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
L-81-122, NUDOCS 8103260602
Download: ML17266A420 (38)

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.RSSULAT( INFORMATION OISTRISUTIONSTEM (BIOS)

ACCESSION NBR:8103260602". DOC ~ DATE,: 81/03/21 NOTARIZED;"'O DOCKET" 0 FACIL:50 335 St", Lucie Pla'ntF Unit 1~ Florida Powep 8 Light'o< 05000335 AUTH ~ NAME'UTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIG~R,E, , Florida Power, 8 Light Co.

REC IP ~ NAME< RECIPIENT AFFILIATION HENDRIE<J ~ MD Commissioners SUBJECT! Requests exemption from 10CFR50 ~ 48 L App.R 'to 10CFR50 schedule dates for compliance w/fire protection requirements per 10CFR50 ~ 12(a) 8 10CFR50 ~ 48(c)(6).

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FLORIOA POWER II LIGHT COMPANY March 19,1981 L-81-122 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-335 Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and A endix R to 10 CFR Part 50

Dear Dr. Hendrie:

Florida Power 6 Light Company (FPL), in accordance with 10 CFR 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c)(6), hereby respectfully requests the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to exempt St. Lucie Unit No. 1 from certain requirements set out in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.~/

On November 19, 1980, the NRC promulgated amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, effective February 17, 1981, regarding a new fire protection program for operating nuclear power plants. Those amendments added both a new 550.48 and a new Appendix R to Part 50. In Appendix R, the Commission set out fire protection features which it determined are necessary to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to Part 50. In Section 50.48(c), the Commission ordered schedules for compliance with each of the requirements of Appendix R. Except to the extent specific exemptions are requested in this document, St. Lucie 1 is in full compliance with the requirements of the rule. In those instances in which the rule requires submittal by March 19, 1981 of plans and schedules for proposed modifications, and FPL is not requesting an exemption from such requirement, the plans and schedules are submitted as a part of this document.

+/ By seeking the particular relief requested in this petition and in presenting technical and legal justifications for such relief, FPL is not abandoning or waiving any of its claims or rights asserted in or arising out of the suit pending in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Connecticut Li ht and Power Com an et al v. NRC, No. 81-1050. Any commitments made by FPL in the instant petition are made conditionally, subject to a determination by the Court as to the validity of the provisions of the fire protection rule which are being challenged in that litigation.

PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE

This request will be divided into six parts. Part I will state the specific relief requested. t Part II will discuss the general legal standards governing qualification for exemptions pursuant to the Commission's rules.

Part III will address requests for exemptions from the specific requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

t Part IV will request extensions of time for complying with certain requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R.

Part V will request an extension of time for complying with a requirement of Section III.A of Appendix R. Also, in this part FPL will request exemptions from specific requirements of the NRC Staff's interpretation of Section III.A.

Part VI will address a request for exemption from a specific requirement of Section III.O of 'Appendix R.

Part VII will request an exemption from the specific requirements of Section III.J of Appendix R.

Finally, Part VIII will request extensions of time for complying with certain~specific requirements of Section III.I of Appendix R.

I. S ecific Relief Re uested H

In this request, FPL seeks the following relief from both the schedules set out in Section 50.48(c) and the requirements set out in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50:

1. Pursuant to 5550.12 (a) and 50.48 (c)(6), exempt from the requirements of Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Appendix R: (i) six doors and assemblies located at the entrances to the piping penetration room at the

-0.5 foot elevation and the 1A and 1B emergency core cooling system pump rooms; (ii) the safety-related duct penetrations in the auxiliary building and (iii) those areas of the plant which have been already reviewed and approved by the Commission as shown by the NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for St. Lucie Unit No. 1, as amended.

(a) Should the Commission deny FPL's requests for exemptions for the six doors and assemblies and the safety-related duct penetrations in the auxiliary building, extend pursuant to 5.5 50.12(a) and 50.48 (c) the date for submittal of plans, schedules and/or design descriptions necessary to achieve compliance with the requirements of Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 for a period of six months following the date of such denial.

(b) Should the Commision deny FPL's request for an exemption for all

. areas of the plant which have already been reviewed and approved by the Commission as shown by the NRC's SER for St. Lucie Unit No. 1, extend for a period of twelve months following the date of denial, pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c), the date for submittal of plans, schedules and/or design descriptions necessary to achieve

n'l compliance with the requirements of Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 for all items not currently in the compliance with Sections IXX.G.2 and III.G.3 regardless of whether such items were ever a roved in the SER.

2. For the heavily cabled areas, extend by a period of six months, pursuant to 5550.12(a) and 50.48(c), the date for submittal of plans, schedules and/or design descriptions for any modifications necessary to achieve compliance with, and/or request exemption from Sections III.G(2) and III.G(3) of Appendix R.

(a) Should the Commission deny FPL's request for an exemption for all areas of the plant that have already been reviewed and approvied by the Commission as shown by the NRC's SER for St. Lucie Unit No.l, extend for a period of twelve months from the date of denial, pursuant to 5550.12(a) and 50.48(c), the date for submittal of plans, schedules and/or design descriptions for any modifications necessary to achieve compliance with, and/or request exemptions from Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Appendix R for all items not in compliance with Sections IIX.G.2 and III.G.3 re ardless of whether such items were ever a roved in the SER.

3. Extend for eleven months, pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c) the date for installing twenty-six new fire doors and for installing fire dampers in the non-safety related duct penetrations of the auxiliary building as required by Section XII.G.2 of Appendix R.

4. Pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c)(6), exempt from the requirements of the NRC Staff's interpretation of Section III.A of Appendix R as =provided in Enclosure 2 to NRC letter dated November 24, 1980, the fire pump controllers and the automatic loading of fire pumps onto vital buses in the presence of a safeguards actuation.

(a) Should the Commission deny FPL's reques't for these exemptions, extend pursuant to 550.12'(a) the date for achieving compliance with the supposed intent of these requirements for a period of eighteen months from the date of denial.

5. Extend pursuant to 5 50.12 (a) the date for rerouting the cable for the redundant fire pumps as required by the NRC Staff's interpretation of Section III.A of Appendix R until the earlier of the following events commencing after February 1982: (i) the spring 1983 refueling outage, or (ii) an unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.

6. With respect to Section III.O of Appendix R, if deemed applicable to St. Lucie, FPL requests an exemption from the requirements of that section pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c)(6).

(a) Should the Commission deny FPL's request for an exemption, extend pursuant to 5 50.12 (a) the date for achieving compliance with the requirements of Section XXI.O to the spring 1983 refueling outage.

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7) With respect to Section III.J of Appendix R, if deemed applicable to St. Lucie, FPL requests an exemption from the-requirements of that section pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c)(6).

8) With respect to Section III.I of Appendix R, extend date of compliance with the requirements of two items for a period of sixty days, pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c)(6).

II. General Standards for Relief The Commission's Regulations provide a general provision for exemption from the regulations in 10 CFR Part 50. Section 50.12(a) provides that:

"(a) The Commission may, upon applications by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest."

In addition, the fire protection regulations themselves, 5 50.48 (c)(6), which provides that:

"(6) In the event that a request for exemption from a requirement to comply with one or more of the provisions of Appendix R filed within 30 days of the effective date'of this rule is based on an assertion by the licensee that such required modifications (on the schedule required) may be detrimental to overall facility safety, the schedule requirements of paragraph (c) shall be tolled until final Commission action on the exemption request upon a determination by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation that the licensee has provided a sound technical basis for such assertion that warrants further staff review of the request."

1. Relief Under 5 50.12 In FPL's view, both its requests for exemptions from the scheduling requirements set out in 5 50.48 (c) and its requests for exemptions from the requirements of Appendix R meet the standards for granting exemptions in 5 50.12 (a). FPL believes that such exemptions as it requests from the schedules set out in 5 50.48 and the requirements of Appendix R are authorized by law, will not danger life or property or the common defense and security, and are in the, public interest.

To begin, FPL points out that. the scheduling provisions' 50.48 do not effectuate specific statutatory requirements but rather are regulations promulgated pursuant to the NRC's general statutory obligaton regarding public health and safety. Therefore, if the requested extension is not detrimental to the public health and safety, it is not contrary to the 'aw There will be no detrimental effect on the public health and safety if FPL is granted the extensions of time which it seeks. FPL must emphasize that the fire protection measures currently in place at St. Lucie Unit 1 the majority of which have already been approved by the NRC Staff "in its SER are entirely adequate to protect the health and safety of the public."

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Indeed, the Commission only recently so found. As the Commission pointed out on October 29, 1980, in the context of the Fire Protection Schedules for Operating Nuclear Plants, 45 Fed Reg 71569:

"Extensive fire protection measures have already been implemented at all operating plants. . . . No public health and safety interest would be served by forcing only those licensees unable to meet deadlines preceding the effectiveness of the final rule to shut down for the brief interim. To the contrary, the fire rotecton measures alead implemented give reasonable assurance that all o eratin nuclear lants ma continue to o crate safel even thou h the final rule will re uire additional fire rotecton measures at man

~lasts." (emphasis added In short, then, the Commission itself found that continued operation of nuclear power plants (including St. Lucie Unit 1) without any additional action required by 50.48 and Appendix R to Part 50 is not detrimental to the public health and safety.+/ Moreover, in implementing the final rule the Commission did not find that the public health and safety require implementation of the requirements of Appendix R on the dates set in 5 50.48 (c). Therefore, FPL's requests for exemptions which seek only extensions of the schedule for compliance with the final rule cannot be contrary to the public health and safety.

The dates set out in the schedule are in several instances simply insufficient for FPL to complete the design, manufacturing, purchasing and installation of modifications necessary for compliance with Appendix R.

In other instances, the schedule does not permit FPL sufficient time to complete the review and initial design processes required to determine what modifications are necessary. Compliance with the time restrictions is particularly difficult in a number of cases because necessary personnel

+/ Such a finding is buttressed by the "Separate Comments of Commissioners Hendrie and Kennedy" included with the proposed fire protection rule. 45 Fed. Reg. 36082 (May 29, 1980). In those comments, Commissioners Hendrie and Kennedy cautioned specifically against adopting too-restrictive schedule requirements for implementing requirements in the final rule. The Commissioners noted that because of Three Mile Island and other "actions we have required" such schedule requirements were inappropriate, particularly in light of the fact that those factors, taken together, "may make it impossible for licensees to complete all of these measures in a carefully considered and thorough fashion." Id.

Therefore, the. Commissioners concluded:

"Since all operating plants have implemented a number of improvements in their fire safety postures, the remaining improvements to be required under the proposed rule do not seem to us so urgent as to require either shutting down of plants because of inability to complete these requirements on the short schedule proposed or to make those improvements in a hasty fashion."

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and material resources are already in short supply because of this and other current NRC backfitting requirements.

In FPL's view, the grant of the extensions requested is clearly in the public interest. In light of the fact that operation of St. Lucie Unit 1 prior to final compliance with the rule poses no risk to public health and safety, and in light of the fact that the granting of. exemptions from schedule requirements is not contrary to the law, it is the position of FPL that the grant of exemptions from the schedule requirements of 5 50.48 (c) is appropriate under 5 50.12 (a).

FPL contends that the granting of exemptions from the requirements of Appendix R also is authorized under 5 50.12 (a). As in the case of the scheduling provisions, the requirements of Appendix R do not effectuate specific statutory requirements but rather are regulations promulgated pursuant to the NRC's general statutory obligation regarding public health and safety. Therefore, if the requested exemptions are not detrimental to the public health and safety, they are not contrary to the law.

FPL will )ustify its requests for exemptions from specific requirements of Appendix R on the basis that implementation for such requirements either will not enhance fire protection safety at St. Lucie Unit 1 or that it will be detrimental to overall facility safety. In either event, of course, the grant of the requested exemptions would not be detrimental to the public health and safety.

Granting FPL's requests for such exemptions would also clearly be in the public interest. After all, it is hardly in the public interest to make modifications to facilities which are not required to enhance safety and, in fact, might even degrade safety.

2. Relief Under 5 50.48 (c) (6)

In FPL's view, both the majority of its requests for exemptions from the scheduling requirements of 5 50.48 (c) and its requests for exemptions from the requirements of Appendix R meet the standards under 5 50.48 (c)

(6). That section provides for filing applications to the Commission for exemption from one or more of the requirements of the rule by March 19, 1981, and so long as specified conditions are met, the schedule for compliance with the rule shall be tolled until final Commission action on the exemption. The conditions are that (i) the request be for exemption from a requirement on the grounds that fire protecton safety will not be enhanced by the requirement or that it would be detrimental to overall facility safety; and (ii) the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determines "that the licensee's request has provided a sound technical basis for such assertion that warrants further staff review of the request."

FPL's requests for extensions of time set out in 5 50.48 (c) to file the plans and schedules and/or design descriptions required by Section III.G of Appendix R fall within the scope of 5 50.48 (c) (6). This is so because in FPL's view adherence to those schedules may in fact be detrimental to overall facility safety. To require FPL to submit such plans and schedules and/or design descriptions in accordance with the

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schedule in 550.48 (c) woul'd require it to short cut many important stages in the review process. The unfortunate consequence could be the choice and implementaton of a plan or design which is less than the optimum from the standpoint of design, construction, operation or safety. / Therefore, it is clear that if FPL is not granted the extensions which result could have an adverse effect on overall facility safety.

it seeks, the In addition to the requests for relief from the schedules in 5 50.48, FPL's requests for exemptions from the requirements of Appendix R also should be considered under 5 50.48 (c) (6). These requests are justified on the grounds that compliance with the rule's requirements will not enhance fire protection safety in the facility and may in fact be detrimental to overall plant safety.

3. Additional Grounds for Relief There is an additional ground which FPL believes supports its requests for relief from the requirements of III.G of Appendix R.

The rule specifically provides that, notwithstanding the earlier approval of certain fire protection features as "satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 reflected in staff fire protection safety evaluation reports issued prior to the effective date of this rule" (10 CFR 5 50.48 (b) (footnote omitted)) all the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J and III.O are applicable to each licensed facility. In short, the rule requires backfitting at St. Lucie Unit 1 of the features required by Section III.G.

As FPL will discuss below, it has been issued a Staff SER for fire portection measures required in certain areas of St. Lucie by Appendix A to BTP APSCB 9.5-1. The SER and Staff approval are evidence that, with respect to the matters covered therein, fire protection is adequate. FPL is aware of no evidence that backfitting St. Lucie to comply with Section III.G in the areas previously reviewed and approved by the staff will substantially enhance the fire prevention capability of the facility. And in the absence of evidence on the issue and a specific finding thereon, the Commission may not require such backfitting.

Section 50.109 (a) allows the Commission to order backfitting of a facility ~onl "if it finds that such action will provide substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety.

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Thus, before the Commission can require, by regulation or otherwise, backfitting of fire protection features required by Section III.G in areas already approved at St. Lucie Unit 1, it is obligated under 5 50.109 to make a record of findings sufficient to support a conclusion that these modifications, if implemented at St. Lucie, would provide "substantial, additional protection." To FPL's knowledge, the Commission has made no

+/ The likelihood that a schedule which does not allow sufficient time for compliance would have such an effect was specifically recognized by Commissioners Hendrie and Kennedy.

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such finding.

III. Requests for Exemptions from Requirements of Section III.G of A endix R to 10 CFR Part 50 FPL is requesting an exemption from the requirements of certain provisions of Section III.G of Appendix R to Part 50 as they apply to St.

Lucie Unit l.

1. Plant Areas That Were Closed Under the SER The requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R apply to licensees not withstanding prior acceptance by the NRC Staff. It is FPL's view that, for each area in the St. Lucie Unit 1 plant to which Section III.G applies and which was closed in the SER, an exemption should be granted.

While there are some fire areas in St Lucie Unit 1 that are not in literal compliance with the standards of Section III.G, they were reviewed and closed in the SER. FPL maintains that for each of these areas the fire prevention measures that already are in place are more than adequate to protect public health and safety. The NRC Staff has reviewed each of the areas on the basis of fire prevention and, by virtue of having closed these review items the SER, has certified that they provide acceptable levels of protection against fires.

FPL maintains that for each of these areas, performing additional modifications that would be necessary to comply with Section III.G would not enhance fire protection 'safety at St. Lucie. The Commission has made no finding that strict compliance with the requirements of Section III.G is necessary to provide substantial additional protection to the public health and safety. Rather than mandatory literal compliance, FPL suggests that the Commission's enforcement of its new regulations should be tempered by consideration of practicality and reasonableness. Where licensees have complied with past fire prevention requirements, sometimes at great cost, backfitting of facilities should not be mandated unless such modifications would significantly enhance fire protection safety.

For St. Lucie Unit 1, the cost of modifying these fire areas that were closed under the SER would be substantial'n terms of dollars, disruption of plant operation and in the diversion of personnel from other important safety-related functions. The additional protection that such modifications would afford to the public health and safety, on the other hand, would be speculative at best. FPL seeks such an exemption for all areas of St. Lucie for which the SER was closed on the ground that undertaking the major modifications called for by Section III. G would not enhance fire protection at the facility.

The burdensome and superfluous nature of Section III.G as it pertains to these areas is best understood in light of FPL's efforts stretching over several years to upgrade and maintain fire protection levels at St.

Lucie. In 1977, FPL compiled a Fire Protection Evaluation entitled "Fire Protection A Reevalution of Existing Plant Design Features and Administrative Controls" which grew out of a thorough evaluation of fire protection provisions at the plant in relation to the guidelines in

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Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. Following the report, FPL undertook a number of modifications designed to improve fire protection levels throughout the plant. A substantial number of these modifications concerned structures, systems and components important to safe shutdown.

Prior to any significant NRC interest in the area of Fire Protection and before the Browns Ferry fire FPL had spent more than $ 1.8 million for fire protection piping and equipment at St. Lucie Unit 1.

In December 1978, the Staff visited the plant and communicated a number of concerns to FPL with regard to fire prevention measures. FPL, in response to the Staff's comments, took action with regard to forty-three different items designed to increase fire protection. For example, FPL provided an automatic fire suppression system for each emergency diesel generator room, various three-hour and one-and-one-half-hour rated fire doors and barriers, early warning detectors above the HPSI,LPSI and containment spray pumps, identified all flammable gas supply lines, installed fire ladders in the cable spreading room for fire brigade"use, modified fire pump control circuits to provide for automatic start upon loss of offsite power and a drop in system pressure and other additional protective measures. As the above description indicates, many of the modifications involved structures, systems and components important to safe shutdown. A substantial number involved areas eventually closed under the SER.

By the end of 1980, FPL had completely implemented 42 major fire protection modifications which were specifically called for in the SER issued as Amendment 33 in August 1979. These included upgrading fire protection features and/or modifications in the control room, switchgear rooms, battery rooms, reactor auxiliary building, reactor building, diesel generator building in essence, every major area of the plant. Again, many of the modifications involved safe shutdown structures, systems and components in areas that were ultimately closed under the SER.

To satisfy the NRC's concerns and to close out the SER, FPL spent an additional $ 1.1 million at St. Lucie Unit 1 in capital'osts alone since 1978. Now, to comply with Section III.G., FPL would have to pay out substantial additional sums of money to undo part of what has been accomplished, and to comply with new fire protection standards without any reasoned basis for concluding that the plant, as modified, would provide any significant additional protection against fires.

The safe shutdown capability of St. Lucie Unit 1 is well protected from fire. In addition, all cable tray systems in the plant are coated with a proven fire retardant coating which further assures cable protection and precludes fire spread along cable systems. No combustibles are stored in areas of cable concentration, nor is there any equipment which requires combustibles for operation or maintenance in such areas.

FPL maintains that items previously closed under the SER provide an acceptable level of fire prevention for the safe shutdown capability of St. Lucie Unit 1. The NRC Staff concurred with this assessment at the time that they agreed to close the items in the SER. FPL is aware of no supervening developments or practical evidence of any kind that indicates that the previously approved fire prevention items under the SER are

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10 1nadequate. All that has apparently changed 1s the NRC's promulgation of a new rule adopting different fire prevention standards without any evidence in the record which demonstrates that the. criteria of Section III.G. will provide substantially greater protect1on to the public health and safety than presently. exists at St. Lucie l.

FPL believes that it was never the intent of the Commission to require the backfitting of items previously closed under the SER. As the Commission is well aware, the proposed rule called for the complete retrofitting of plants if necessary to achieve compliance with Sections III.A-O. In numerous communications with" members of the NRC Staff: FPL was repeatedly assured that the Commission had no intent to require the backfitting of prev1ously closed items.

Although the final rule does not require backfitting to the extent called for in the proposed rule, no'netheless, requiring licensees to modify their units to comply with Section III.G still places a substantial burden on licensees that was not anticipated. FPL was quite perplexed when it learned that the final rule retained the requirement that licensees backfit their units for items prev1ously closed under the SER.

In light of the repeated assurances of the Staff that the Commission did not intend to impose backfitting requirements upon licensees, FPL believes that it is not the intent of the rule to require substantial modifications to a facility such as St. Lucie Unit 1 where adequate levels of fire protection already exist.

FPL therefore requests an exemption pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c)(6) from Section III.G for those items previously closed under the SER. In view of the present design of St. Lucie, 1ncluding the many modifications implemented in the recent past to increase the level of protection against fire, FPL is confident that literal compliance with Sect1on III.G with respect to the closed SER items would not enhance fire protection at the facility. The speculative nature of any safety benefits as compared to the substantial additional cost and burdens that compliance would impose upon FPL weighs heavily in favor of the issuance of an exemption in this case. This is particularly true in light of FPL's understanding that it was not the 1ntent of the Commission to requ1re that licensees retrofit items previously closed under the SER. The previously discussed standard for an exemption under 550.12(a) 1s also satisfied 1n this instance. Accordingly, FPL requests that the Commission grant an exemption for St. Lucie 1 pursuant to 5550.12(a) and 50.48(c)(6).

Should the Commision deny FPL's request for an exemption, FPL requests in the alternative that the Commission extend the date for submittal of plans and schedules and/or design descriptions necessary to achieve compliance with Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 for a period of twelve months. The den1al of the exemption request would mean that FPL would have to 1dentify the modifications that would be necessary to provide literal compliance with Section III.G.2, assess the costs of proceeding under both Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 choose the optimum alternative, and prepare plans and schedules and/or design descriptions for submittal to the NRC. An additional twelve months would be necessary to>permit FPL to proceed in a manner that maximizes protection against fires'ithout degrading overall plant safety in other respects. FPL therefore seeks an

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11 exemption from the time schedule in the rule'pursuant to 5 50.48 (c)(6).

FPL further notes that this exemption request also satisfies the st'andards for an exemption under 5 50.12 of the Commission's rules.

2. Fire Doors Frames and Assemblies To meet the standards of Section III.G.2; a licensee must install fire-rated doors, frames and assemblies in all areas important to safe shutdown. In response to these requirements and Enclosure 2 to NRC letter dated November 24, 1980, FPL will install twenty-six new fire doors in St.

Lucie Unit 1 at a cost of $ 170,000.

Besides the twenty-six fire doors which FPL is committing to" install, a strict interpretation of Section III.G would also mandate that six additional fire doors be installed at the entrances to the following plant areas: the piping penetration room at the -0.5 foot elevation (two single doors); the lA emergency core cooling system pump room (one single door);

and the 1B emergency core cooling system pump room (one double and two single doors).

The existing six door and assembly units at these locations are custom manufactured flood barriers that serve important safety related functions in the event of a pipe break or tank rupture. The doors at the entrance to the piping penetration room were specially designed to be leak-tight so as to contain a flood in the event of a pipe break in the piping penetration area. The door at the entrance to the ECCS pump rooms are also specially designed to prevent flooding in the event of a large tank rupture.

All six of the doors are solid steel, a minimum of one-quarter inch thick, and have up to eight bolting points in the door assembly in order to assure leak tightness. This provides for an extremely strong door-to-assembly seal which would not allow the door to bow or to spring out the door assembly. The assemblies are mounted in reinforced concrete walls.

By virtue of these sealing mechanisms, the strength of the materials used and the solid construction, FPL maintains that the existing doors are s'ignificant fire barriers in themselves.

The six doors guard the entry to compartments that have extremely low combustible loadings. Excluding the paint on the walls, the combustible loadings for the three areas are as follows:

piping penetration room 221 BTU/ft 1A ECCS pump room 1676 BTU/ft 1B ECCS pump room 1454 BTU/ft These small amounts of combustibles are associated with pump lubricating oil, small amounts of grease and some minor concentrations of transient combustibles such as Tygon tubing, rubber gloves and shoe rubbers. No cable trays or heavy concentrations of cables are located in these compartments.

In light of the high fire barrier capability of these six doors and the low content of combustibles in the affected areas, FPL believes that

12 substituting doors that conform with the requirements of Section III.G would not enhance fire protection safety at the facility. The cost of six new doors and assemblies that comply with Section III.G could be as high as $ 60,000; a figure which does not even include the cost of individual fire tests for each door/assembly unit or their installation. Moreover, after expending such a substantial sum of money, FPL is confident that fire protection safety would not be enhanced over that which presently exists. FPL therefore requests an exemption pursuant to 55 50.12(a) and 50.48(c)(6) such that these six doors and assemblies need not be replaced.

3. Dampers in the Safety-Related Duct Penetrations of the Auxiliary Literal compliance with Section III.G and Enclosure 2 to NRC letter dated November 24, 1980, requires that FPL install fire-rated dampers in the duct penetrations of the Auxiliary Building. FPL is committing to install dampers in the non-safety related duct penetrations at a cost of approximately $ 250,000. However, FPL seeks an exemption from having to put dampers in the safety-related supply and exhaust duct penetrations on the grounds that to do so would be detrimental to overall facility safety and would not enhance fire protection safety at the facility.

A single failure of one damper in a safety-related duct penetration could violate the HVAC radiological boundary of the Auxiliary Building.

Also, a failure could interfere with the actuation of or continued operation of vital emergency safeguard equipment. Thus, the installation of dampers as required by Section III.G would reduce overall plant safety and violate the plant's licensing criteria for single active failures.

The currently installed HVAC ductwork provides a significant level of fire pro'tection capability. Also, these areas have very low concentrations of combustibles and as demonstrated in the Fire Protection Evaluation, the St. Lucie Unit 1 duckwork can withstand temperatures far above those possible from a Design Basis Fire. Hence, installation of the fire dampers in these safety-related ducts would not significantly enhance fire protection.

Accordingly, FPL seeks an exemption pursuant to Sections 50.12(a) and 50.38(c)(6) from the requirement of installing dampers in the safety-related duct penetrations.

4. Alternative Request for an Exemption for the Fire Doors and the Dampers in the Safety-Related Duct Penetrations If the Commission decides to deny any of the requests for exemptions that FPL has made in the previous two sections concerning the installation of six additional fire doors or the installation of fire dampers in the safety- related duct penetrations, FPL requests in the alternative that the Commission extend the date for submittal of plans and schedules and/or design descriptions necessary to achieve compliance with Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 for a period of six months from the date of denial. The denial of any one of the exemptions requests would mean that, as to that

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13 particular it'em, FPL would have to assess the costs and safety-related effects of installing an alternate shutdown capability under Section III.G.3, compare the costs and safety effects of proceeding under Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3, choose the optimum agternative, and prepare plans and schedules and/or des1gn descriptions for submittal to the NRC. The additional six months would be necessary to permit FPL to proceed in a manner that maximizes protection against fires without degrading overall plant safety. FPL therefore seeks an exemption from the time schedule in the rule pursuant to 5 50.48(c)(6). FPL notes that this exemption request satisfies the standards for obtaining an exemption pursuant to 5 50.12 (a) of the Commission's rules.

If, however, the Commission denies FPL's request for an exemption for structures, systems and components important to safe shutdown that were previously closed under the SER and also denies one or both of the requests for an exemption made in the two previous sections, FPL submits that six additional months would not be sufficient time to develop plans and schedules and/or design descriptions necessary to achieve compliance with Section IXI.G. In that situation, FPL would have to perform design and engineering analysis sufficient to assess the costs and safety related effects of installing a single alternative or dedicated shutdown capability affecting all areas of the plant not in compliance with Sect1on III.G. That approach'to attaining compliance would then have to be compared with the approach of remedying each plant area individuagly, the

'ptimum means would have to be chosen, and the plans and schedules and/or design descriptions would have to be prepared for submittal to the NRC.

FPL estimates that an additional twelve months from the date of denial would be necessary to permit FPL to perform these tasks so as to maximize f1re protect1on safety without degrading overall plant safety. Thus, the Commission denies FPL's request for an exemption for the items if previously closed under the SER, FPL seeks an exemption from the time schedule in the rule pursuant to 55 50.12(a) and 50.48(c)(6) so that may have an additional twelve months from the date of denial to submit it plans and schedules and/or design descriptions for all fire areas not in compliance with Section III.G, re ardless of whether the were reviousl

~oen or closed under the SER.

IV. Requests for Extensions of Time for Compliance with the Requirements of Section IIX.G of

~Aigiendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 FPL requests an exemption from those schedules set out in Section 50.48(c) of Part 50 as they apply to certain requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R. In each instance, FPL will suggest schedules for compliance to be substituted for those in the rule.

1. Heavil Cabled Areas Containing Redundant Safe Shutdown Functions In order to provide literal compliance witht'Section III.G;. PPL

~ve to undertake certain modifications to the heavily cabled areas

'ould containing redundant safe shutdown functions of the plant or 'install alternative shutdown capability for those areas. Under 5 50.48(c)(5), FPL is required to submit by March 19, 1981, the plans and schedules and/or

14 design descriptions for attaining compliance with Section III.G.

FPL is proceeding on a course of action which will allow it to make a reasoned determination with respect to the modifications to the plant required to achieve compliance with the requirements of Section III.G.

Upon reaching a conclusion with respect to the necessary modifications, FPL will be in a position to determine whether to implement such modifications or whether, in its best judgment, a request for exemption from those requirements is justified.

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Despite its best efforts, FPL is unable to meet the March 19, 1981, filing requirements of 5 50.48 (c)(5) with respect to plans and schedules and/or design descriptions for the heavily cabled areas. The magnitude of the design and engineering effort necesary to determine what is necesary for compliance simply makes it impossible to meet the March 19 date for such submittals.

Since November 19, 1980, FPL and its consultants have expended in excess of 1000'manhours on these requirements alone. It is important to understand, that this effort has and will continue to be worked by personnel that are totally familiar with virtually all aspects of the.

plant's electrical design. These types of key personnel are also required to work on other major nuclear tasks such as post TMI Lessons Learned changes, Environmental Qualification of electrical equipment, etc. Hence these fire protection tasks must be integrated into other scheduled NRC commitments. Further, the NRC letter dated February 20, 1981 requests additional evaluations and information which places an ever higher burden on available key manpower. As an example, just the Associated Circuit evaluations will likely require as much as 30 man months of engineering effort.

FPL must carefully assess the respective costs and safety-related effects of implementing the necessary modifications pursuant to Section III.G.2 and installing an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability pursuant to Section III.G.3. A decision will then have to be made regarding the optimum mode for proceeding, and plans and schedules and/or design descriptions developed. FPL will require an additional six months.

to complete this work and thereby put itself in a position to satisfy the filing requirements of 5 50.48(c)(5).

Unless FPL is permitted an additional six months to prepare plans and schedules and/or design descriptions, FPL would have to choose a mode of compliance that, upon proper investigation, might well turn out not to be the optimum mode of proceeding from the perspective of costs or overall plant safety. Thus, compliance with the filing deadline of 5 50.48(c)(5) might actually be detrimental to overall facility safety. FPL therefore requests an exemption pursuant to 5 50.48 (c)(6) so that it may have an additional six months to comply with the filing requirement of the rule.

FPL further notes that this request for an exemption also satisfies the standards of 5 50.12(a).

If, however, the Commission denies this request for an exemption and also denies FPL's request for an exemption for structures, sys'tems and components important to safe shutdown that were previously closed under

CI, the SER, FPL sumbmits that s1x additional months would not be sufficient to develop plans and schedules and/or design descriptions;-necessary to achieve compliance with Section III.G. In that situation, FPL would have to perform design and engineering analysis sufficient to access the costs and safety related effects of installing a single alternative or dedicated shutdown capability affecting all'areas of the plant not in compliance with Section III.G. That approach to attaining'compliance..would have to be compared with the approach of remedying only the heavily cabled areas. The optimum means would then have to be chosen, and the plans and schedules and/or descriptions criteria would have to be prepaxed for submittal to the NRC. FPL estimates that an additional twelve months from the date of denial would be necessary to permit-FPL to perform these tasks so as to maximize fire protection safety without degrading overall plant safety. Thus, if the Commission denies FPL's request for an exemption of the items previously closed in the SER, FPL seeks an exemption from the time schedule in the rule pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50.48 (c) (6) so that it may have an additional twelve months from the date of denial to submit plans and schedules and/or design descr1ption for the heavily cabled areas.

FPL will not be in a position to know whether it will seek a substantive exemption from the requirements of Section III.G for the heavily cabled areas until such time as the optimum means for attaining compliance has been identified and analyzed. This request for a extension of time in which to file plans and schedules and/or design descr1ptions is therefore submitted without prejudice to FPL.'s right to subsequently seek an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.

2. Fire Doors, Frames and Assemblies In order to satisfy the requirements of Section III.G.2 and Enclosure 2 to NRC letter dated November 24, 1980, FPL would have to install fire-rated doors, frames and associated hardware in all areas important to safe shutdown. FPL has completed a fire door reevaluation and has decided to install new fire doors in each of 'the following locations: the aerated waste storage tank room, the shutdown heat exchanger rooms, hallway entrance to charging pumps, the gas decay tank room, the boric acid make-up tank room, outside exit from the main hallway to the containment airlock, the volume control tank room, the outside exit from the cold chemistry laboratory, the class IE"B" switchgear room, the battery 1B and battery lA rooms, the control room, the control room HVAC room, and the west electrical penetration room. In all, twenty-six new fire doors will be 1nstalled at a cost of $ 170,000.

Based on the installation of results of FPL's evauation, it is clear that the these doors w111 prove to be a difficult and time-consuming task. In addition to the fire prevention criteria, some of these doors will have to be designed to meet the plant's Seismic Category I standards. The installation of certain doors will have to be done in a way that maintains proper HVAC radiological boundaries and that does not interfere with pump or active component cooling requirements. In addition, many of the existing door openings will require physical modifications in order to install the new door frames.

16 By virtue of the fact that the doors which FPL will install are located in and around safety related areas, there are certain security measures that will have to be included in the design and planning phases. For example, certain security doors will require card key or special key lock provisions and will have to be designed to be bullet resistant. Furthermore, the potential impact that installation will have on overall plant operations must be examined.

I The work performed to date has made FPL aware of the magnitude of installing the twenty-six fire doors that FPL intends to install in order to satisfy the criteria of Section III.G. The requirements for custom specification, design, analysis, procurement, and manufacture of each door and assembly, coupled with the specialized installation considerations for each door, preclude FPL from completing this task within nine months as required by the schedule in 5 50.48(c)(2). Although some of the doors and assemblies may be completed and installed within the time frame contemplated by the rule, the final portions of this major door upgrade program cannot be completed before October 1, 1982. FPL therefore seeks an exemption pursuant to 5 50.48(c)(6) from the time schedule of the rule in order to permit FPL adequate time to implement these fire protection modifications.

If FPL were required to adhere to the time deadline stated in the rule, proper consideration could not be devoted to the seismic, radiological and other safety concerns that should properly be considered in the design and installation of doors throughout the plant. Hasty action would be detrimental to overall plant safety. FPL requests that the Commission grant an exemption so that the overall safety of St. Lucie 1 will not be compromised.

FPL further notes that this 'request for an exemption also satisfies the standards of 5 50.12(a) of the rules.

3. Dampers in the Non-safety Related Duct Section III.G.2 and Enclosure 2 to NRC letter dated November 24, 1980, requires FPL to install fire-rated dampers in the duct penetrations for the auxiliary building. FPL will install fire dampers in the non-safety related duct penetrations of the auxiliary building corridor as required at a cost of approximately $ 250,000. However, FPL cannot install the fire dampers within nine months, and therefore requests an exemption from, the time restriction in 5 50.48 (c)(2).

The design and installation of the dampers must proceed on a schedule that permits adequate consideration of other important safety-related concerns at both the design and installation stages. For example, the dampers must be designed so as to satisfy the appropriate seismic standards. In addition, since most of the duct work in the plant is custom-designed, the fire dampers may also have to be designed and manufactured according to custom specifications.

The installation of the dampers must be carefully timed. Radiological boundaries must not be violated during installation. It is therefore

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17 essential that installation occur during a plant outage or at a time when HVAC cooling requirements are sufficiently low. Installing dampers at other times simply to satisfy the time schedule set out in 5 50.48(c)(2) would not comply with the NRC's ALARA standard for radiological exposure.

To require that the dampers be designed and installed in a hasty manner would not permit FPL to take full account of these other safety considerations. Adherence to the requirement that these modifications be completed within nine months would be detrimental to overall facility safety. FPL therefore requests an exemption pursuant to 5 50.48(c)(6) such that it may have until September 1, 1982, to complete such modifications.

FPL further notes that the standards for obtaining an exemption pursuant to 5 50.12 (a) also are satisfied in this instance.

V. Request for Exemption from the Requirements of NRC Staff's Interpretation of Section XII.A of Appendix R to 10- CFR..Part-.50,. as:provided."in Enclosure 2-to NRC Letter Dated November 24, 1980 and a Request for Extension of time for Compliance with a Certain Re uirement of Section III.A St. Lucie Unit 1 does not presently satisfy one of the requirements of Section III.A of Appendix R. With respect to this one item, FPL will make the necessary modifications but is unable to do so within the time set out in the rule. Therefore, FPL is rquesting an exemption from the schedule in 5 50.48(c)(3). There are two additional items stated in Enclosure 2 to NRC letter dated November 24, 1980 which, when implemented, would satisfy the NRC Staff that St. Lucie Unit 1 was incompliance with Section III.A. In FPL's view these two would be detrimental to overall facility safety, and FPL is requesting exemptions from these two requirements.

P First, in some instances the cables for the redundant electric motor driven fire pumps are presently located within the same areas of the auxiliary building. FPL interprets Section III.A as requiring that such cables be rerouted so that at no point are cables for redundant fire" pumps located within the same general area. Although FPL intends to comply with this requirement, it is unable to do so within the time specified by 5 50.48,(c)(3),. Accordingly, FPL seeks an exemption from that time limitation pursuant to 5 50.12 (a).

Under the time schedule stated in 5 50.48 (c)(3), FPL is required to complete the required r'erouting of cables by the earliest of the following events commencing after September 19, 1981: the first refueling outage; another planned outage that lasts at least sixty days; or an unplanned outage that la'sts at least 120 days. In accordance with this schedule, FPL would have to complete the rerouting of cables during the fall 1981 refueling

. outage. However, the final design plans will not be complete until February 1982, several months after the refueling outage will have .ended.

The next refueling outage following the fall 1981 outage is scheduled for the spring of 1983. There are no,other planned outages before that time.

Since the cable pulling cannot be conducted while the unit is operating, the

18 spring 1983 refueling outage,'r an unplanned outage that occurs before that date, is the eariiest time that FPL can reasonably achieve compliance.

St. Lucie Unit 1 can continue to operate in the'nterim without undue risk to the public health and safety. Moreover, exempting FPL from the time restriction in 5 50.48 (c)(3) is authorised by law, does not endanger life or property or the common defense or security, and is in the public interest.

Accordingly, FPL requests an exemption pursuant to 5 50.12(a) so as to permit FPL to reroute cables for the redundant fire pumps as is necessary to comply with Section III.A at the earlier of the following events commencing after February 1982:

(i) the spring 1983. refueling outage; 'or (Xi) an unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.

Secondly, it is the NRC Staff's opinion that the fire pump controllers installed at St. Lucie do not satisfy the requirements of Section XII.A in that they do not meet all the requirements of NFPA-20. However, FPL believes that redesigning and backfitting the controllers to comply with 'this interpretation of Section III.A would be detrimental to overall facility safety. Accordingly, FPL seeks an exemption pursuant to 5 50.12(a) and 50.48(c)(6).

FPL maintains that the design of the fire pump controllers and switchgear presently installed at St. Lucie 1 meets or exceeds the intent of NFPA-20.

The design of the current controllers and switchgear is Nuclear Class IE and Seismic Category I. Class IE electrical equipment meets all applicable sections of IEEE-323, IEE-344 and the QA/QC requirements in 10 CFR50, Appendix B. This is the same high quality and high reliability design used in all of FPL's nuclear safeguard pumps.

In accordance with previous. agreements entered into with the NRC Staff, FPL had made changes to its system which allow the fire pumps to auto sequence load onto the vital power buses in the. event of a loss of offsite power and a drop in fire system pressure; If FPL is required to replace the existing controllers so as to satisfy this interpretation of Section III.A, the resulting situation would be inconsistent with FPL's nuclear electrical design criteria which do not allow low quality motor controllers on the vital electrical supply buses. In essence, FPL would lose the current capability to automatically load the fire pumps on the vital buses.

Installation of fire pump controllers that meet the NRC Staff's interpretation of Section III.A would thus be detrimental to overall facility safety. FPL therefore requests an exemption pursuant to 55 50.12(a) 'and 50.48(c)(6) such that the present Nuclear Class lE fire pump motor control system at St. Lucie Unit 1 need not be replaced. This exemption request satisfies the standards for an exemption in 5 50.12(a).

Third, compliance with another NRC Staff interpretation of Section III.A would also. require, a change in the safeguards loading sequence such that the fire pumps would be automatically loaded onto the vital buses in the event of a loss of offsite power and a loss of coolant accident. FPL's position is that the triple coincidence of a fire, a loss of offsite power and a loss of coolant accident is such a highly improbable event that there is no need to

19 automatically load the pumps onto the vital buses. Neither Branch Technical Position, BTP 9.5-1 nor Regulatory Guide 1.120, Revision 1, required that a plant have such a capability, i.e., "Fire protection need not be postulated to be concurrent with non-fire-related failures in safety systems, other plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena." Moreover, the capability to manually load the pumps onto the diesel generator's is always maintained.

An important additional consideration is that the post LOCA electrical margins on the vital buses are not sufficient to permit the automatic loading of the fire pumps. If the pumps were automatically loaded on the vital bus under these postulated LOCA, conditions, they would degrade bus voltage such that vital system loads would likely be impaired.

Therefore, FPL believes that compliance with the requirement that the fire pumps be automatically loaded onto the vital bus concurrent with a safeguards actuation signal may be detrimental to overall plant safety. Accordingly, FPL requests an exemption pursuant to 5 50.48 (c)(6) from this requirement of Section III.A. This exemption request satisfies the standards for an exemption in 5 50.12 (a).

VI. Request for an Exemption from a Requirement of Section III.O of A~endix R to 10 CFR Part 50 The St., Lucie reactor coolant pump motors are being equipped with an oil collection system which requires modification in one respect to meet the requirements of Section III.O. Most of this system was installed during the 1980 refueling outage. The existing oil collection tank design is of insufficient capacity to meet the requirements of the rule. FPL therefore intends to install a 225 gallon tank capable of holding potential leakage and the entire lube oil system inventory of one reactor coolant pump motor and to complete the remaining portion of the system during the fall 1981 refueling outage.

Section III.O also requires that the oil collection system "shall be so designed, engineered, and installed that the failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that there is reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake."~/

In FPL's view, the oil collection system, with the larger tank installed, meets the requirements of Section III.O. First, with respect to the SSE, the system is designed for the Maximum Hypothetical Earthquake in accordance with Chapter 3 of the St. Lucie Unit 1 FSAR. Second, with respect to design basis accidents, the system, as designed, will withstand the containment environment associated with some design bases accidents, but not those associated with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).

However, FPL does not believe that it is the oil collection system be evaluated intent of the rule that the design of the in the context of a LOCA in

/ Also refer to Regulatory Guide 1.29 "Seismic Design Classification" Paragraph C.2

20 conjunction with a fire. First, the rule specifically states that the system must be designed so that its "failure will not lead to fire during normal or-design basis accident conditions." The containment environmental conditions associated with a LOCA are such that a fire is virtually precluded.

Consequently, failure of the system during a LOCA will not "lead to fire" and

, therefore the rule does not require the system be designed to post LOCA environmental conditions. Second, at no time during the review process which resulted in the final rule was there any indication that any fire protection equipment be designed to withstand design basis loss of coolant accidents.

Indeed, it was specifically stated otherwise in R.G. 1.120 and BTP APCSB 9.5-

"Fire 1, i.e=, protection need not be postulated to be concurrent with non-fire related failures in safety systems, other plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena". Therefore, it is FPL's position the St. Lucie oil collection system, when modified as described above, will satisfy the rule.

However, should FPL's understanding as to intent of the rule be incorrect, that is, should the Commission really intend that the oil collection system be designed to withstand the containment environment associated with a LOCA, then FPL requests an exemption from that provision.

The basis for such request is that upgrading the present oil collection system to the level necessary to withstand such conditions will not enhance fire protection safety in the facility. The containment environment during a LOCA virtually precludes occurrence of a fire, and modifying the facility would not provide increased fire protection.

As shown above, meeting the requirements of III.O by upgrading the oil collection system at St. Lucie Unit 1 will not enhance overall facility safety; therefore, FPL should be exempted from that requirement of the regulations pursuant to 5 50.48(c)(6). Moreover, such exemption is authorized, by law will not endanger life or property or the common defense and secuirity, and is in the public interest. Also, the standards for an exemption pursuant to 5 50.12(a) are satisfied.

Should the Commission not allow FPL's request for an exemption, FPL estimates that the modifications that would be necessary would not be completed prior to the spring 1983 refueling outage. Accordingly, FPL requests an exemption pursuant to 5 50.12(a) from the time schedule in 5 50.48(c)(2) so that FPL may have until the spring 1983 refueling outage.

VII. Re uest for an Exem tion from the Re uirements of Section III.J of A endix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Pursuant to 5 50.48 (b) of the Commission's rules, the requirements of Section III.J are applicable to St. Lucie Unit 1 notwithstanding any prior Staff's acceptance of the emergency lighting system. FPL is completing its engineering evaluation of the emergency lighting capability at the facility.

As required by Section III.J, FPL will upgrade the lighting units to at least an eight hour battery power supply in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes identified by the NRC during their on-site fire team inspections. The engineering work will be completed by April 30, 1981, and the modifications implemented within nine months as required by the rule.

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21 FPL believes that once these modifications are completed St. Lucie 1 will be in compliance with the intent of Section III.J. However, should the Commission not agree with FPL's assessment, FPL requests that it be granted an exemption. Further modifying the emergency lighting system would not, in FPL's view, enhance fire protection safety at the facility. Accordingly, FPL requests that the Commission grant an exemption pursuant to 55 50.12 (a) and 50a48 (c) (6) of the rules.

of Ractfon III.I of~Aanddx R to 10 CPR Part 50.

FPL has adopted a St. Lucie Unit 1 fire brigade training program that fully complies with Section III.I in all respects except two. Pursuant to

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Section III.I.l.a (8), the initial classroom instruction for fire brigade leaders must include the direction and coordination of fire fighting activities.

Also, Section III.I.l.a (9) requires that the initial classroom training-shall include a detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.

Although FPL has previously provided significant training in these areas, a new training procedure which incorporates the results of a detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures has recently been adopted. In addition, a new Fire Protection Coordinator was recently hired. In order to assure that fire brigade leaders receive thorough training in the direction and coordination of fire fighting activities in accordance with the new procedure, FPL requests an additional sixty days to achieve compliance with Section III.I.l.a (8). FPL also requests an additional sixty days to ensure that fire brigade personnel receive thorough training in fire fighting strategies and procedures in accordance with the new procedure, as required by Secton III.I.l.a (9). FPL submits that both these requests fully satisfy the standards for an exemption under 5 50.12 (a) of the Commission's rules.

Respectfully submitted, Robe t E. Uhrig e President Advanced Systems and Technology

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