ML17213A481
| ML17213A481 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1982 |
| From: | Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR GL-81-07, GL-81-7, L-82-409, NUDOCS 8209270143 | |
| Download: ML17213A481 (57) | |
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REGULATOR NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION . TEM (RIDS)
ACCESSiON NBR;8209270143 DOC ~ DATE: 82/09/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-389 Sts Lucie PlantE Unit 2P Florida Power 5 Light Co. 05000389 AUTH NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGsR,E ~ Florida Power 8 Light Co ~
RECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION EISENHUTiDDG, Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
Forwards clarification 8 supplemental info on facility first part response to NRC 820620 request for addi info re control of heavy loads.
DISTRISUTION CODE: S030S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL J TITLE: Lic Submittal: Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel (USI A"3'6)
SIZE:
NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL A/D LICENSNG 1 0 LIC BR 03 BC 1 0 LIC BR 03 LA 1 0 NRR CLEMENSON01 NERSESPV ~ 1 1 INTERNAL: ELD/HDS2 1 0 NRR REQUAgG 1 1 NRR/DE/CEB 11 1 1 NRR/DE/EQB 13 3 3 NRR/DE/GB 28 1 1 NRR/DE/HGEB 30 2 2 NRR/DE/MEB 18 1 1 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 1 1 NRR/DE/QAB 21 1 1 NRR/DE/SAB 24 1 1 NRR/DE/SEB 25 1 1 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 1 1 NRR/DHFS/LQB 3? 1 1 NRR/DHFS/OLB 34 1 1 NRR/DHFS/PTRB20 1 1 NRR/DS I/AEB 26 1 1 NRR/DSI/ASB 27 1 1 NRR/DSI/CPB 10 1 1 NRR/DSI/CSB 09 1 NRR/DS I/ETSB 12 1 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 1 1 NRR/DS I/PSB 19 1 1 NRR/DSI/RAB 22 1 1 NRR/DSI/RSB 23 1 1 NRR/DST/LGB 33 1 1 04 1 1 RGN2 1 1 /MIB 1 0 EXTERNAL; ACRS 41 6 6 FEMA~REP DI V 39 1 1 LPDR 03 1 1 NRC PDR 02 1 1 NSIC 05 1 1 NTIS 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 50 FNCL 45
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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY September 21, 1982 L-82-409 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations Attention: Hr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Vashington, D. C. 20555
Dear ~ir. Eisenhut:
Re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-389 Control of Heavy Loads Attached please find "Clarification & Supplemental Information on St. Lucie Unit 2 First Part Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads". This information is being submitted in response to your draft Technical Evaluation Report which was published on June 20, 1982 and a supplemental telephone conversation with your Mr. F. Cleminson on August 2, 1982.
Should you have questions please contact us accordingly.
Ro E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems and Technology REU/RS/jea Attachment g~ZD cc: J. P. O'Reilly, Region II Harold F. Reis, Esquire PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE
fe, CLARIFICATION 4 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON ST LUCIE UNIT 2 FIRST PART RESPONSE TO 1RC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS INTRODUCTION On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a generic letter to Florida Power Light Company requesting a review of provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at St. Lucie Unit 2, evaluate these provisions
'with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for a determination of conformance to these guidelines. On August 6, 1981, Florida Power 4 Light Company provided its response to this request (3). On July 20, 1982, the NRC issued a Technical Evaluation Report (TER) on the FPL response (5).
The rep'ort was prepared by the Idaho Engineering Laboratory (INEL) under a technical assistance contract to the NRC. This TER and a subsequent telephone conversation with the NRC and INEL representa-tives indicated some areas where additional information would assist in their evaluation of the FPL response. The intent of the following
.....report..is .to cj a~ify. apd,.supplement ctheinitial response byr FPL;
~
Subsequent to the first part submittal by FPL a second part response has b'een prepared. This addresses Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of En-closure 2 of the NRC generic letter and is attached.
2.1 OVERVIEW-
- a. EGGG+* Comments Florida Power Light review of the facilities does not differ-entiate between the two units so it is assumed that both units S
are of identical design.
- b. FPL Comments The design of both units is similar but there are some differ-ences in the load handling devices and general arrangements.
Where procedures, training and maintenance programs are to be adapted to Unit 2 from Unit 1, the necessary revisions have been made to reflect these differences.
2.2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING SYSTEM
- a. EGSG Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the information provided, EGEG concludes that the Licensee has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their Group I list of handling systems which must comply with the" requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.
- Numbered to correspond with TER format
- EGhG provid ed the s tudy for I NEL
2.2 b. FPL -Positi FPL's first phase response provided safe load paths for the pump room and component cooling water pump monorails. Sub-sequent to this submittal, FPL's Power Plant Engineering De-partment analyzed the consequences of potential load drops from these load handling systems and determined that plant safe
. shutdown capability could not be defeated.,Consequently, the plant safe. load path sketches were revised to exclude these monorails. This is reported along with the justification second phase response(4) which -is attached..
in'he 2.3 GENERAL GUIDELINES 2.3.1 Safe Load Paths [Guideline 1 NUREG-0612 Article 5.'1.1(l)]
EGEG Conclusions 8 Recommendations St. Lucie Unit 2 partially complies with Guideline 1. Records should be available for any subsequent audit and should include data verifying that:
-heavy loads paths follow structural floor members, beams,'tc.
and the capability of potential drop areas to withstand the
.impact .goad .og a/cavy".lg~cj.dg~
-physical markings of load path areas lift ~ill be a'pplied in the plant when making a special
-adaptation of the administrative procedure for Unit 1 and Unit 2 is complete and assures that the deviation approval system involves written changes and approvals.
.b FPL Position FPL intends .to comply with Guideline 1 in general but will take some exceptions.
- 1. Special load paths will be defined and followed only for significant, periodically handled heavy loads. ,The loads are:
Reactor Ve'ssel Head Reactor Upper Internals Reactor .Missile Shield Pressurizer Missile Shield Spent Fuel Cask
- 2. Load handling for all other heavy loads will be covered by a generic procedure using a "safe load area" and "restric-ted zone" approach.
- 3. Designation of the safe load path or safe load area will be accomplished by training and included in the procedures rather. than markings on the floor.
"-'.3 ~ 2.3.1 Due to the numerous loads which might be handled by a crane, FPL believes that the designation of safe load paths for these loads could be confusing and difficult to implement. As an alternate, a generic approach utilizing "safe load areas" has been developed for the handling of the many miscellaneous loads. We believe this approach is more simplistic and prac-tical by allowing the operating personnel flexibility from a single load path which is often needed due to unforeseen con-ditions.
The basis for the definition of the "safe load areas" is the result of a study performed by the FPL Power Plant Engineering Department. The study considers the effects of a dropped load to the equipment below and envelopes all possible sizes, weights and configurations of the loads. Sketches depicting the safe load areas are included in FPL's second part response on "Control of Heavy Loads" (4) which j.s attached.
Although the general handling of heavy loads is controlled by the "safe load area" approach, certain significant heavy loads are carried over a predetermined load path. These load paths consider the structural capabilities of floor members below and the'most ctirecK"r'6ute.'wo"a'ttacKed -sketches"depict-these loa8 paths.
The loads are considered significant since they are very heavy and the potential for damage, if they- are dropped, is much greater than other loads and they are handled periodically.
Other heavy loads may be significant (e.g. reactor coolant pump motors, impellers, other plant equipment such as valves, heat exchangers, etc) but they are not handled periodically and may never be handled during a critical period (i.e., plant in oper-ation or fuel in reactor).
be lifted, a special procedure If will however, these loads do need to be prepared at that time which will be approved by the Facility Review Group. These procedures will define the safe load path, comply with Guide-line 2 and pro'vide any requirements for marking the safe load path, if necessary.
From a review of the safe load path drawings for significant periodically handled loads, it can be seen that the load path is short.and direct from the pick-up point to,the laydown area.
Actually, based upon the physical restrictions in these areas, there are no other feasible load paths. Based upon these re-strictions, which make the load path obvious, and the,proce-dures which clearly define the load path, FPL believes that further definition of the safe load path via marking the 'floors is superfluous and unnecessary.
2.3 2.3.1 continued-In general, the marking of safe load paths and safe .load areas presents many difficulties on St. Lucie Unit 2. Often the markings would have to traverse equipment and pools. Also the use of a removable tape is time consuming and present's decon-tamination problems. As an alternate to the markings, FPL proposes to indicate the areas on sketches available to the operators and to indoctrinate the operators of the restricted zones in their formal training program.
All heavy load lifts will be carefully controlled, with per-sonnel trained and experienced in the load handling procedures directing the load movement 'from the operating level ensuring that the proper load path is followed and free from obstruc-tions.
2.3.2 Load Handlin Procedures [Guideline 2 NUREG-0612 Artie'le EGEG Conclusions 8 Recommendations requirement seems to be identified and developmental work
"-The is prog essiag--$ m -St. -Lucre-Unit -l.-with -plans for the- proced---
ures to be readily adaptable to St. Lucie Unit 2; The= Licensee should be prepared to show, in the event of an audit, that all procedures for heavy load handling =have been written and 'ap-proved for Unit 2 and .in addition to defining the safe load path, must:
identify equipment provide inspection and acceptance criteria before moving a load
- include steps and proper sequence
- include any special precautions necessary.
- b. FPL Position Table 2 of FPL's first phase response ~ ) lists those major heavy loads which *are periodically handled in the vicinity of irradiated fuel. The procedures for the handling of thes'e loads have been implemented at Unit 1 and contain the informa-tion specified in NUREG-0612, Guideline 2, i.e., 1) identifica-tion of required equipment; 2) inspections and acceptance cri-teria; 3) steps and proper sequence, and; 4) other special pre-cautions. Implementation of these procedures was reported to the NRC for Unit 1. These procedures have been modified for Unit 2 and will be implemented there at the proper time.
Neither Table 2 of FPL's first phase response nor Table 3.1 of NUREG-0612 provide complete listings of. heavy loads handled in the vicinity of irradiated fuel and safe shutdown equipment.
FPL's tabulation lists significant, periodically handled loads for which special procedures are appropriate. The tabulations include most of the Table 3-1 loads at St. Lucie 2. For those loads not listed, the general load handling Procedure AP 100438 applies. All heavy load handling procedures are available for audit.
2~3 2~3 .2 b. continu~
A completeMisting of all loads handl d in these, areas and the deve'lopment of special procedures'or each load is not practi-cal. Almost every plant component within the operating enve-lope of the crane would be included. However, in'rder to address the NRC concern, FPL's Power Plant Engineering depart-ment has studied the consequences of all potential load drops in these areas an'd developed "safe load areas" as discussed in Section 2.3.1. Plant Administrative Procedure 100438 "Control of Heavy Load Lifts" requires the operators to confine the loads to these areas. Compliance with this procedure assures compliance with NUREG-0612 Guideline 2. Any deviation from the safe load paths shall be approved by the Facility Review Group which will ensure that the necessary precautions= of Guideline 2 are taken.
2 ~3~3 Crane 0 erator Trainin [Guideline 3, NUREG-0612 Article a ~ EGS G Conclusions 8 Recommendations The quality of operators, reflected by their training in safe load handling, is as important as any other phase of the re-quirements for control of heavy loads. Procedure AP 100438 for
- St. Luciw"-Uni< -1= should-be e~nded- to Unit operators:,;-- -The program should be documented so it may be audited;
- b. FPL Position The second phase response (4) attached reports on the imple-mentation of this guideline with exceptions as noted. The program is available for, audit.
2.3.4 S ecial Lifting Devices [Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article
- a. EGSG Conclusions &, Recommendations St. Lucie Unit 1 does not comply with Guideline 4. To comply, all special lifting devices should be evaluated to verify that they satisfy Guideline 4 and ANSI N14 .6-1978. Auditable rec-ords documenting compliance should be maintained.
- b. FPL Position FPL is presently undergoing discussions with suppliers of our special lifting rigs to determine if the intent of Guide-line 4 is met at St. Lucie Unit 2. FPL will notify the':NRC of suppliers'he the schedule for resolution of this issue when it is made available to us from, the
- 2. 3. 5 Liftin D ces (not s eciall desi d) [Guideline 5 NUREG-rtx e
- a. EGSG Conclusions E Recommendations Insufficient reporting has been given to the selection of "not specially designed."
lift-ing devices The Licensee should maintain auditable records that give; suitable data on slings (not specially designed) to show that they are adequate to meet the requirements of'NSI B30.9 and Guideline 5
-information that assures suitable markings on any sling that is restricted for a specific crane or cranes information that each sling and its components are properly tagged to show its safe working load (static plus dynamic).
- b. FPL Position The program for sling use and maintenance at St. Lucie Unit 1 meets the requirements of ANSI B30.9. A description of the program is attached. This program will be extended to Unit 2 at the proper time.
In addition"-+o.=the-- requi.remend of -AN% -B30 ..9,,.NUR$ 9-6612---
Guideline 5 requires that; 1) the rated capacity be marked on the sling and; 2) that the maximum working load be based upon static plus dynamic loads.
The program in effect at St. Lucie Unit 1 which will be used at Unit 2 does require the rated capacity to be marked on the sling. The maximum working load (rated capacity) marked on the sling will be based upon the static load multiplied by a safety factor of five as required by ANSI B30.9. This safety factor is considered adequate to account for any dynamic effects.
Hoisting speeds at St. Lucie Unit 2 do not exceed 30 fpm at rated load. If a hoisting speed of 50 fpm is considered and the dynamic contribution assumed to be 1/2% per foot per minute of hoisting speed .(per CMAA 70), the dynamic contribution would be 25%. This would still result in a safety factor of 4. ~
2.3.6 Cranes (Ins ection, Testin and Maintenance) [Guideline 6 NUREG- , Artcc e 5.
- a. EGEG Conclusions E.Recommendations Compliance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2 requires important inspections, tests, adjustments and measurements before opera-tion. These actions cannot be deferred until the plant is ready to operate and the equipment is needed. Prior to the "in operation" program the following preoperational actions'must be taken:
2.3 2.3.6 a. continue
- establish d document the adequacy each hoisting unit for all of the ANSI B30.2 specified preoperational requirements
- 'establish and record to what extent, been used during plant construction.
if any, each hoist has
- b. FPL Position All preoperational inspections, tests, adjustments and measure-ments as required by Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30-2-1976 have been performed and documented on the St. Lucie Unit 2 cranes prior to their initial use. Subsequent frequent and periodic inspec-tions in accordance with this standard with required mainten-ance, adjustments and repairs have likewise been. performed and documented during the period in which these cranes have been used for construction. The cranes have been subjected to "normal" service conditions during construction use (i.e.,
operating at 85 percent rated capacity and not more than 10 lifts per hour except for isolated instances) . The same pro-gram for crane inspection, testing and maintenance will be extended when the plant becomes operational since there will be no reinstallation, alterations, modifications or extensive repairs to the cranes. This program will likewise comply with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 with the exception 'that
...tests aug ..ins~ecti,gnq. asap yezQrmed prior to use where.':~ ig not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30;2 for peri-odic inspection and testing, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g.,
the polar crane is used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power o'pera-tion) .
2 3 7. Crane Desi n [Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(7) ]
a ~ EGGG Conclusions S Recommendations The basic guideline may be met. Those hoists using CHAA //74 (ANSI'30.17) design criteria are acceptable where they apply, in lieu of ANSI B30.2. The design criteria should be clearly stated . Adequate records should be'aintained on crane design to verify upon audit that the applicable design requirements were complied with.
- b. FPL Position The St. Lucie Unit 2 cranes comply with the applicable design requirements of ANSI B30.2, CMAA 70 a'nd CMAA 74 'dequate records are being maintained for audit.
2.4 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that six meas-ures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final imple-mentation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is corn
2.4 continued-
~ . ~
plete. Four of these six interim measures consist of general Guide-line 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guide-line 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). FPL's position on these interim measures is given in the preceeding Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.6.
The two remaining interim measures cover the following cxiteria:
- heavy load technical specifications special review for heavy loads handled over the core .
2.4.1 Interim Protection Measure 1 Technical S ecification
- a. EGE G Conclusions 4 Recommendations The Licensee must have eiher single failure proof hoist or meet acceptable alternate standard technical specifications.
- b. FPL Position The St. Lucie Unit 2 technical specification will be similar to the Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.9.7 which prohibits travel of lozjs. ig exceeds...qf 2900 .@~ups over ~radiated, fuel..ig .tQq .
fuel storage pool. The Technical Spec<ficationd "@re available for audit.
2.4.2 Interim Protectin Measures 2, 3, 4 and 5 - Administrative Contro s a ~ EGGG Conclusions E Recommendations EGEG evaluations, conclusions and recommendations on these measures are contained in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2'nd 2.3.3 and 2.3.6 ~
- b. FPL Position The FPL position on these measures is contained in the respec-tive sections of this report. FPL commits to comply with these interim measures, as well as interim measuxes 1 and 6 before St. Lucie Unit .2 becomes operational.
2.4.3 Interim Protection Measure 6 - S ecial Review fox Hea Loads over t e ore
- a. EGEG Conclusions 8 Recommendations The non-operational plant requires no interim measures.
- b. FPL Position FPL's review of heavy load handling over the core at St. Lucie Unit 1 included all of the items given in Interim Protection Measure 6. As a result of this review some revisions to. spe-cific load handling procedures were made and have been imple-mented. These procedures will be implemented at Unit 2 at the proper, time and are presently available for audit.
r
REFERENCES:
NUREG-0612 "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plant", NRC, July 1980
- 2. NRC Letter to all Licensees
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads, December 22, 1980
- 3. R . E. Uhrig (FPL) letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads, August 6, 1982
- 4. FPL Report "St. Lucie Unit 2 Response to hRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 Specific Requirements"
- 5. NRC letter F. J. Miraglia to Dr. Robert E. Uhrig (FPL) dated July 20, 1982
" Attachmen'ts
- 1. Safe Load Paths for Significant Loads
- 2. Slin g Maintenan c e Pr ogr a m
- 3. FPL Report "St. Lucie Unit 2 R'esponse to DEC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4
'pecific Requirements"
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SPECIAL SAFE LOAD PATHS .
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REACTOR BUILDING %.L (
REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND REACTOR MISSILE SHIELDS
- 2. UPPER GUIDE STRUCTURE
- 3. PRESSURIZER MISSILE SHIELD rgl (Z laa~~~.
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l WIRE )ZOPF.
The, ware rope .s 1 >nrs s cover<<'d shall bc as .,pccificd in accordance with E~XSI B30.9. Ot)ter grades, types, si"-es, and construction may e u cd.~
uM l'hcn such slings are used, the slip manufacturer shall bc consulted .for specific data.
- l. Factor of Safety The factor of safety for rope, slings lf all grades'hall be a nininum of f ive (5) .
- 2. Proof Load Slings of all grades terninatcd by m<<chanical splices, sockets, and pressed,or swaged terminals shall be proof loaded hy the sling nanufacturcr wnen specifietl by purchaser.
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- 3. Effects of'emperature Fiber core wire rope 11n s"o'5"a'13. grades 61al aor.-b.c. c..'posed,.to temperatures in c.,cess of 200 0.F.
4'hen wir<<rope slin;;s of any grade arc to bc used at: temper tures above 400 F or below ninus -60 F thc sling manufactu1 cr should be consul.tcd.
1lininum Siin<L<<ng,ths 6 x 19, 6 x 37 and cable laid slings shall }tave a mininua c3.ear length of rope ten (10) times the rope diameter between splices.
Braided slings shal1 have a nininu.".: clc,.r length of rope forty (40) tines the..component rope di1metcr bct:ween t)1c loops or cnd fittint-;s.
- 5. Storage Wire rope slirr's of all graders shou1d be stored in an ar'ca hh>r
'Mh cy '4'i 1 1 not be damaged by:
a~ Hois turc
- b. Hatt.cme heat C~ Cor?.osioll
- d. Being run over C. Bexure )tink<<J I
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- 6. Inspect io )
All slings ..hall be visually inspcctccl each day they.avc used. A periodic inspection shoi)ld alsn bc. pevformc.d oo a regular basis wit)L frequency of inspection basecl on:
8 ~ Frequency of sling use
- b. Severity of,. rvice ron()itions C~ )iatL)rc of lif ts being r)ade E):pcrience gained on the service of nf slings used io imila r c ircums t anc cs.
~ 6 Periodic inspections should be perforr.".ed by an appointed or authorized person. !Lny detc.'iorat:ion which could result in an appreci..ble Eorm of original strcngt:h shall bc carefully not:cd a!)d determinatio)L made whet.her further use of 'the sling wo)ilc) const:itute a safe.ty hazard.
- 7. Pcplac(;~ent
))o precise rules cao be given for (tetermination of t))e exact
-'- ti,e for replaccmc)nt af a..s3,jng s'oce L!ao~ variable factors are involved. Safety i)i thi respect depencis largeTy u))o)) t3)e use of good jL)dgmc;)t by an appointed or authorized person in evaluating vc maini:):, stren~ th in a used sling after allo)"ance for det:c.riorat:ioo c)!isclvsed i)y-'i>>spection. Safe.t.y of sling operation dcpcncls upon this remaining strength.
Condition"-. such as t;he following s'hot!ld be sufficient reason for quest:ion:ng sling safet:y and for considc.ration of replacement.
- l. Sii ) andomly distributed broken wicre'in one rope lay.,
o). three broken !.ives it) onc strand in one rope lay.
- 2. liear or scraping of one-thivd the original diameter of outsice iod 'iduiil wires.
- 3. )'inking, crushing, 'bird caging or any other. dan)age rc ult:iog io distortion of the rope st:vucture.
- 4. Evidence of heat: cla::)age.
5.,Fod attachment . tl)at are cracked, deformed, or wovn.
~
6.')ooks that )!ave bei.n opened more than 1S pc-.rcent of the>>ovmal throat opcoi!)g measL)red at the oavvowest point or t)"istcci more.'t:-ha:1 10 dervec,s from t:hc plane of t: he unbent hook.
- 7. Covrosioo of the rope or. eod attachments,
~ iso Safe Op(!roti))g ) tact.'icii
)'Qvsoo'lel LLsio)', Miv(1 l'o)>c sliogs sl)all bc! -'o.',tv))ct cd io a),d coofo).r) to thc foll()wio"., pr!)L)tiecs!
iL ~ DL t'ev)!i))e )(Liight of 3naL)
- b. S(:lect () slio~; ot st) lt:)blc vatcLI e()p:reit;y ~
C~ Use tl)( p:.)p( v )) i t c))
do CL)iL)e )o;)L).: wit.h:) t:)t, lioe L.i)e!) )))!)L)tiea).
)i))c')) L)1 in!;')))L) t. ilile )L')', ol,in)i!) !!e) L ct. t h(o'.)!;(>>) t .". l in!~
p(!::::ibli! '!:o;):: to vL L)L)eL t ))u th)) i)>>1 io t:hL! !'Lli)))', . i t',!'.
~
~ ~
~
~
- 8. Safe Opcrati>>g Practice (cotttinuct))
F..'.amittc t.hc sling for damaged or. worn area go httaclt t)tc sling .",ccurcly to thc load the ling is in contact with
)t. Pad or p.otcct an> :ltarp corners
- i. Center t)tc load in the 'base (bowl) of tltc book to pi.event hook point loadin.
Avoid any. kinks loops> or twist. in t)te legs
~
~
1' sling and thc load
- k. Keep )tan~)s and fi>>< ers frnn between the 3 ~
- l. Stand clear slowly of. t:h<<attacltcd load
- m. Start lift to avoid s)tock loading t)te ling is wltcn the load
- n. Do not pull a sling from uttder a load to rc;.tovc the sling.
resting on the.s3ing. Block the load upwire rope clips,
- o. Do not .,horten a ling by knott:ing, by or b> any other nc.ins.. bare ltands over t)te body.
- p. Do not inspect a sling by pa sing Broken .wires, if present, nay punct:urc t.lte >>ands. corrosion.
1 order to pcevcnt
- q. Keep the sling .:ell lubricated in a
~ ~
~ 1 ~ ~
Construction P
4'c)>!)in~
)t'ebbing s)loll possess tile follol:ing qualities:
- a. Sllf Eicicnt strength to rlcet the sling manufacturer's require.".)e>>t s.
- b. 'niform t.hickness and l,idth.
- c. )lave selvage edges and not be split from the 1:oven width.
T))read The t.hread used in the manufacture of a sling shall be of- the.
same type mat:crial as the webbing.
Fxttxn~s Fittin< s shall be
- a. Of sufficient strength to sustain twice the rated capacity
'without permanent deformation.
- b. Of a minimum brea);inr strength equal to that of the sling.
- c. Free of all sllarp edges that 1"ould in any ay d,.mage thc 1 webbing.
httac);ment of')nd Fittil)r,s to 4ehbin't, and 1'ol-,.l:ltion nf ))yes T)le stitch pattern ..h:ill contain a sllfficiellt number of stit:ches to develop 't)le full brea)~ing stre))gth o')lc sling.
Coatinrs Sl nca may i4a coato4i uirh cl-"stoncrs or other suit" blc motorial that will ir)part desirable characteristic, such as:
- a. hbrasion resistance.
- b. Sealin of porc
- c. Increased cocf Ficient of friction.
- 2. Safety Factor 4 4,
Fact'or of safet;y For synthetic web slings shall be a minir)ur) of five.
3~ Har);ing 4 Each slins'hall be mar) cd or coded to shol~
a~ Na le cl tr:lde.".)ark. of m:lnl.lf;lctlller ~
- b. )tat " capacitie>> for thc type nf hite)1.
c ~ T) pc of 1:1:lt:cri'll.
4, Piatcsl Cat)4tc'y cap;lc'tic>> arc aft.ected l.y t)f hit:ch us i, ui
)'ates) Lhc t.y))e a>>d by t;ll>>
angle from the vertical 1;hell used:1>> r)l)lti-leg.;cd sling>> nl in
'1'at>>)'et hitch', 'l'hc . 1 i>>., manufa.:t:urer sllall supply data nn thc>>..
effects.
~ ~
50 Safe Operating Practices Hechanical Consicl rat:ions a ~ 1)ctormino.t:eight of load.
- b. Select sling having suitable characteristics for the typo of 3oad hitch and environment.
Cr Slinos .,hall not be loaclcd in excess of tho rated capacity recommended by the sling nlanuiacturor.
- d. Slings I:ith fittings 1'hich are used in a el!oker hitch shall be of !ifficient length to assure that the choking action is on the vebbing.
- e. Slinused in a basket hitch shall have the load balanced to prevent slipparo.
Slings shall not be dragged on the floor or over any abrasive surface.
gi Slings shall not be tl:istod or. tied into knot
- h. Slings shall not: be pulled f1om under loads when load is resting on sling.
Sling shall always be protected from being cut: by sharp corners, sllarp ci3~ L5'hd'hW)lip-abrasivo uMaces.
Do not drop slings.
Env ironmental Consideration Slin"-c) shall be torocl in an area t:o prevent mecnanical or
\
chemical damage.
- b. )ceylon slin) ) s shall not bc used i~here acid condit:ions, crcist.
C~ Polyest:cr and polypropylene sli.ngs shall not bo used 1'here caustic conditions exist.
d ~ Polyest:er ancl nylon 'slings shall not bc used at temperatures in excess of 'SO 1'or polypropylone in excess of 200 F.
Aluminum fittings sha-1 not be usecl 1"here caustic conditions exist.
- 6. Inspection
~T' of Xl.. ection
- a. Xnitial Inspection. Before usi..g any new or repaired sling't sh:lll bo inspected to insure that tho c'orrect sling is being
~ ~
used as 1:ell as to.detolainc that the sling moots the rcquir~-.,ants of this code ~
- b. FIorucnt I>>spectian. This inspection should bo r!ade by the person llandling t: he sling each ti.".! the sling is used.
I
- c. Pcricdic I!!spec ti.on. Thi., inspection should bo conductcci by a~nointcd pcr:onn 1. Xf at all possible, it should. alt:ays be
~ ~
macle by tho:lme person. Free,uency of inspection should\ be .iase<
'i on
)-'ruq<<ency nf sl in:. u:;c.
b ~ Sc!vo! ity of service cond,it io'.ls ~
ci );xpe1.!ence gil:1nei! on the sclvice 1 ifc.'f sli.ngs
'Llficd in siml.),a!'lrci:::1 it'ilnccs ~
Periodic i>>.",pret:ic us .:houli) bc conc!uct:ccl at lccnst 'annu:ll. ) ~
~~
)'o'er 1>) r l)ef ec h sli>>g l>all be removed from ervice if any defect:, such as the following, are visible.
- a. Acid or. caustic burns.
- b. ))elting or charring of any part of the surface.
4
- c. Snags, puncturcs, tears or cuts.
- d. Broken or worn sLitches.
- e. )lear or elongation cnceeding the amount recommended by manufacturer.'.
Distortion of fittings.
- g. .Other apparent defects which cause doubt as to the strength of the slin); should be referred to the r>anufacturer for d et ermine t ion.
=.: inspection Records.
'written inspection records, utilizinl, the identif ication for each sli>>g as established 1>y the user> should be kept on all lings.
These records shoi>ld s)>ow a description of the new slin); and its condition on each su)>seq>>nnt inspection.
~RC '1 l.l .
Slings shall be repaired only by a sling manufacturer.
The sling manuf;>cturer shall certify the rented capacity of repaired slings.
Temporary repairs of either the ~;ebhing or the fittings shall not be perr itLed.
~ ~
F~V' l.nli9 Wl,";r.':.',~t'CLI l ."-! I'U'-i l<iW p .~
I I'L'li 1 1)NI q >I l)>>>I '1" I>':">l>>r I.Q M>>>n) I.li II) A(l 1>)>>) I 1 > )I l)ln> )
~ ~ I ~ ) II I PSI I 1 I LJ" roi) t)l ~LI)II>TIGII l i [>> inn c] jI!r~ OAl I./IILVIT>>IONNO,
.'lulv 1982
).1 Arel) I'ACT UI1 t II I:OOVL . VII \ I T T I: N IIY NA F. Gross l/>'z.j(r7 r T /cci j~'J J>li goo ~ AF'PRO I~~Q V y )Ll I: /
QTIartcrly 41 11 If
- 1. Instruct ons: Inspection: Per ANSI Standard B 30.9-1971 Conditions such as the following should be sufficient reason for questioning sling safety and for consideration of replacement.
. 1.1 Six randomly distributed broken wires in one rope lay, or three broken wires'n nne strand in one rope lay.
1.2 Hear or craping oi one-third the original. diameter of outside individual wires.
1.3 Kinking, crushing, bird caging or'ny other damage resulting in distortion of the rope structure.
3..4 Evidence of heat damage.
1.5 ...End attaclLmenl,S'.tJlLt are. g~cked. BCfg~ed, OX >"oman) .
1.G liooks that have been opened rlore than 15 percent of the normal throat openi:!g measured at the narrowest point or twisted nore than 10 degrees from the plane of the unbent hook.
1.7 Co!Irosion oi the rope or end attachments.
1.8 Note under reT)!arks as to any slings dn sposed of so repl cements can be made.
1.9 Slings that need lube use ensiln 3S3.
1.10 Notify your f'oreman to,deterIIIine disposition slings. of'nsatisfactory
- 2. " l,ocations: See Hap. Di"position Cut Kinked . Badly Lorn 2.2 Secondary sling storage turbine bldg South 19.5 elev.
'23 . Secondary side warehouse...
- 2. /I Pri".!ary rigging cage personal hatch.
2.5 )New Fu cl Bld>g Storage callt 19.5 elev.
In>)I>ccc'1 by: Date:
rI: arl;:- ~
I'n>)>l 11,)I (Nn>) II>>().>>l) II>'v,, /)11
I ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 RESPONSE TO NRC RE UEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS SECTIONS" 2-.2 3 2-. and'-2'A-SPECIFIC RE UIREMENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title ~Pa e Introduction Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools (Section 2.2)
Overhead Handling Syst'ems Operating in the Containment (Section 2.3)
IV Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Section 2.4}
Summary and Clarification of Response to General Requirements (Section 2.1)
~ j I 4 .M
- VI Re erences '8
~Aend fx List of Fi ures
~Pi use 1 General Arrangement Fuel Handling Building Plans 2 General Arrangement - Fuel Handling Building Sections 3 General Arrangement Reactor Building Plans 4 General Arrangement Reactor Building Sections 5 General Arrangement Reactor Auxiliary Building Plan 6 General Arrangement Component Cooling Water Area and Diesel Generator Building Plans 7 - General Arrangement Intake Structure Plan and Sections 8 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Drop Study 9 Study of Load Drop on Intake Cooling Water Pipes 10 Safe Load Path Turbine Gantry Crane
ll Safe Load Path Turbine Gantry Crane Detail at ICW Pipes
- 12. Safe Load Path Reactor Building Cranes 13 Safe L'oad Path Fuel Cask Crane 14 Safe Load Path Intake Structure Bridge Crane 15 General Arrangement Enlarged Site Plot Plan ~ +
list of Tables Table 1 Heavy loads handled in the Containment Attachment
Introduction This report is submitted in response to the NRC generic letter "Control of Heavy Loads" dated December 22, 1980, The NRC letter requests a two part response to the "Request for Additional Information" (Enclosure 3 of the letter). The first part of the response concerning the general requirements for overhead load hand-ling systems has been previously submitted. This report contains the second response providing information on the specific requirements.
Section II, III and. IV of this report provides the information corresponding to sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of the "Request for Additional Information."Section V provides a summary with a clarification of the previous response based upon findings in this report.
S ecific Re uirements for Overhead Handlin S stems 0 eratin in the Vicinit of Fuel Stora e Pools Section 2.2 of Enclosure 3 of the December 22, 1980 NRC generic letter requests specific information concerning the design and operation of load-handling- systems.en--the wciai<y of- stored ~-spent -f uel.--It-requests that the information provided should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area,'ither the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612,. Section 5.1. The following discussion demonstrates how the above requirements are met in this area.
The following is a list of heavy load handling systems physically capable (i.e. ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped', land or fall into the spent fuel pool.
Equipment h'arne ~Ca acitv Desionator Fuel Cask Bridge Crane 150 tons-Main hook Vhiting-Corp.
15 tons-'Aux. hook Refueling Canal Bulkhead 3 tons Call-Saber Monorail Cask Storage Pool Bulk- 3 tons Call-Saber:.>
head Monorail The Spent Fuel Handling Machine and the New Fuel Bridge Crane monorail spur are not 'included above since these devices do not handle "heavy" loads, i.e. loads weighing more than the weight of a spent fuel assembly with lifting tool. This exclusion is based upon section 2.2.2 of Enclosure 3 of the NRC generic letter.
~ . ~
>The principal function of the Fuel Cask Brid e Crane is the lifting of the 100 ton spent fuel cask into the Fuel Handling Building.. The cask is the heaviest load carried by this crane into the building.
The cask is lifted. through an L-shaped opening in the Fuel Handling Building roof and north wall and lowered into the fuel cask storage pool (refer to Figures 1 6 2). The cask storage pool'is adjacent to the spent'. fuel storage pool and is separated from it by a 5.5 ft.
thick reinforced concrete wall. Protection against dropping the cask into the spent fuel pool is provided by the basic layout of the Fuel Handling Building (roof opening vs. pool location) which makes it physically impossible to pass the cask over the spent fuel pool. In addition, fully redundant limit switches are provided which confine the hook center line within a two foot wide corridor centered over the cask storage pool. The cask yoke design eliminates the possibility of a double pendulum type of drop, so that the cask could drop only vertically. The walls and cask storage are slab have the been designed for the impact load of a dropped cask.
The above mentioned design features of the cask handling system de-monstrate that no single-failure can result in a drop of the spent fuel cask into the spent fuel storage pool. However, in order to provide maximum practicable "defense-in-depth; the general guidelines
- and interim;re'qiir emits--f or wa'f a-C~dWandl'ing. o f-NUREG. 0612 will'be -
implemented for the operation of the Fuel Cask Crane at St. Lucie.
Unit No. 2. This includes the definition of a safe load path (refer to Figure 13).
The Refuelin Canal Bulkhead and Cask Stora e Pool Bulkhead Monorails are used to lift these pool gate bulkheads to and from their normal location in the pool walls and the designated storage locations.
Refer to Figures 1 and 2 for the arrangement of these monorails and bulkheads. A'lthough the weight of the bulkheads is below 1.25 tons, monorail systems with a 3 ton rated capacity have been provided. The following table represents the factors of safety for the various components of the. monorail systems based upon a maximum lifted load of 1.25 tons.
Ca te~o- Condition Hoist and trolley 'parts 10 Ultimate Strength Hoist ropes 12 Ultimate Strength Machinery 10 Ultimate Strength Structural steel 4.3 Yielh Strength Hooks 10 Ultimate Strength Due to the conservative design of these monorails, in conjuction with operators using special procedures, a failure that could result in an uncontrolled descent of the pool bulkheads is extremely unlikely.
III S ecific Re uirements for Overhead Handlin S stems 0 eratin in the Containment Section 2.3 of Enclosure 3 of the December 22, 1980 NRC generic letter requests specific information concerning the design and operation of load-'handling systems in the vicinity of the reactor core. It requests that the information provided should demonstrate C' that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria to NUREG 0612 Section 5.1. The following discussion demonstrates how the above requirements are met in this area.
The following is a list of heavy load handling systems physically capable (i. e. ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel.
Equipment Name ~Ca acit Desi ator Polar Crane 200 tons-Main hook Harnischfeger 50 tons-Aux. hook Auxiliagy telescoping 1 ton Not yet purchased jib crane Refueling Machine hoist 1 ton Harnischfeger The St. Lucie plant administrative procedure AP 100438 "Control of Heavy Loads Lifts" covers heavy load handling operations for these cranes. A safe load path (Figure 12) is defined which prohibits hook..
travel over the reactor vessel without prior special approval. How-ever, during plant maintenance and refueling operations it is sometimes necessary to carry heavy loads over the reactor vessel. Table 1 in the Appendix provides a listing of these loads. Special procedures have been prepared for those loads which are handled periodically over the reactor vessel. These procedures identify the required equipment; inspection and acceptance, criteria required before move-ment of the load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; the load path and any special precuations. Any load lifts not covered by a special procedure are controlled generically by the plant administrative procedure AP100438 previously mentioned.
This procedure requires that Facility Review Group approval be obtained prior to movement of these loads over the reactor vessel. The Facility Review Group will assure that the proper controls are present-
In addition to these procedures, which are available at tPe site for review, safe operation of the cranes is assured by the crane maintenance and operator draining and qualification programs which follow ANSI B30.2-1976 guidelines. Based'pon Florida'ower and Light Company's review of the procedures, equipment and personnel used in load handling operations over the core, we believe that the likelihood of the load drop in the area is extremely small and that no problem exists.
S ecific Re uirements for Overhead Handlin S stems 0 eratin in Plant Areas Containin E ui ment Re'ired for Reactor Shutdown Core Deca Heat Removal or S ent Fuel Pool Coolin Section 2.4 ok Enclosure 3 of the December 22, 3.-980 NRC generic letter requests specific information concerning the design and operation of load-handling system in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.
It requests that the information provided should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited'n order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions. The following discussion de-monstrates how the above'equirements are met.
The following is a list of cranes from which a load drop may result'n damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal, taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures or detailed structural analysis. This list includes those cranes of this type in Group I of Table 1 of the initial response to the NRC generic letter.
~Eni ment Name Ca acit tons Pump room monorails Call-Saber Charging pump monorails Call-Saber Diesel generator monorails Call-Saber Component cooling water pump Call-Saber monorail
~Eni ment Name Ca acit (tons Desi nator Turbine gantry cranes 200 Main hook Reading (Unit 1) 35 Aux. hook Whiting (Unit 2)
Intake structure bridge crane 45 Whiting Reactor polar crane 200 Hain hook Harnischfeger 35 Aux. hook Auxiliary telescoping jib ACECO crane The Pum Room Char in Pum knd Diesel Generator monorails have been listed since a load drop from these monorails could potentially damage a safe shutdown system. In every case, however, the component which could potentially be damaged from a load drop would be inoperative for maintenance purposes. These monorails are used for maintenance only and are physically incapable of carrying heavy loads over other equipment which might be operational and required for plant safe shutdown. There is sufficient physical separation between redundant systems (separate rooms) to preclude damage -te b~h aeaundant-systems-from all.pgterrtial-load drops:--'-
The Technical Specifications require that one redundant system must be operative in order to remove the other train from service from maintenance, therefore, plant safe shutdown capability or decay heat removal could not be defeated by a load drop on a component which is being serviced.
. The Com onent Coolin Water Pum Honorail is centered above the A, B and C Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump motors and passes over a portion of the A & B CCW heat exchangers (refer to Figure 6) ~ A load drop from this monorail could potentially damage these pumps, heat exchangers or associated piping, of which one redundant A or B System is 'required for safe shutdown of the plant or decay heat removal.
A study was performed assuming worst case conditions of dropping the heaviest load (pump motor) and operation of'wo adjacent pumps. The results of this.
study, which is presented on Figure 8, indicate that there is sufficient physical separation to preclude damage to both redundant systems.
The Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 Turbine Gantr Cranes can operate on the Unit No. 2 Turbine Building. The following potenti'al load drops could damage systems required for reactor safe shutdown and decay heat removal at St. Lucie Unit No. 2r
- 1. Load drop fiom Unit No. 1 crane over Steam Trestle.
- 2. Load drop from Unit No. 2 crane over buried Intake Cooling Water pipes.
The St. Lucie Unit No. 1 Gantry Crane has a ~tilevered extension on the east ~e of the bridge which enables~ hook to travel over the Steam Treble area (refer to Figure 15) which contains the vital auxiliary feedwater pumps and isolation valves. The St. Lucie Unit No. 2 crane does not have this feature. Interlocks are provided, however, to prohibit crane operation over this area. These interlocks are verified to be operative prior to initial use of the crane for each shift. Plant procedures allow bypassing of these interlocks only during cold shutdown and refueling modes (when the consequences of a load drop would not affect safe shutdown capability) or on special occasions with prior Facility Review Group approval. If and when there should be such an occasion special directions dnd pre-cautions will be given. Upon restoration of the interlocks, plant procedures require that they shall be verified to be functional.
The Steam Trestle Area is identified as a restricted area of the Turbine G~ntry Crane safe load path (refer to Figure 11).
The St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Turbine Building Gantry Crane passes over the buried Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pipes. These two 30" diameter redundant lines run five feet apart just south of the Unit No. 2 Turbine Building in the .laydown area. See Figure 9 for a sketch of this area.
A study was made to determine if both redundant lines could be damaged from any postulated load drop. The results indicate that this is
.conceivable .in. one. area undermrtain cceditions of extremely heavy .-,.-.-- ----
loads and load drop orientations. In order to prevent such an event from occurring the handling of loads in excess of 3 tons in this area will be restricted. This will be accomplished by identifying the restricted area on the safe load path sketch and in paint on the laydown area slab (Refer to Figures 10 and ll). Any deviation from this criteria will require prior Facility Review Group approval at which time Engineering will determine what precautions (cribbing, special slings, optimum load path, etc.) are necessary.
Potential load drops on the buried safety-related conduit in the Turbine Gantry Crane hook envelope were evaluated. It was deter-mined that sufficient separation between A and B redundant systems and/or adequate protection from load drops exists.
In addition to the foregoing requirements, in order to achieve maximum practicable "defense-in-depth", the interim requirements and general guidelines of NUREG 0612 have been adopted for the operation of the Turbine Building Gantry Cranes.
The Intake Structure Brid e Crane could potentially carry heavy loads over the A, B and C Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pumps, one of which is required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
A study was performed to evaluate the consequences of a load drop in this area using "worst case" assumptions of maximum lift height and kinetic heaviest load (Circulating Water Pump motor). The energy from such a load drop was compared with the design missile kinetic .
energy used for the tornado missile protection structure which encloses the ICW pumps. The results indicate that the structure will preserve the integrity of the ICW pumps in the event of such an accident.
Although the ICW pumps are adequately protected physically from potential load handling accidents, in order to 'provide maximum practicable "defense-in-depth", the interim requirements and general guidelines. of NUREG 0612 will be implemented for the operation of thi's crane. This includes a safe load path (Figure 14) which restricts crane operation over the Intake Cooling Water pumps.
The Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliar Telesco in 'Jib Crane are operated during cold shutdown and refueling modes. During these modes the shutdown cooling system is required to.remain functional remove decay heat from the reactor core. Since the piping for C'o this system is within the hook envelopes of the reactor building cranes, heavy load drops are reviewed.
The majority of the shutdown cooling piping in the containment is located inside the secondary shield wall below the 4 ft. thick operating deck or inside an 11 ft. deep pipe trench in the base concrete. The piping in these areas is considered to be adequately protected. In the piping penetration area on the south side the pipes exit the. trench and the confines of the secondary shield wall and penetrate the steel containment vessel. Although there are two"lev'els of struct'uraL st%'e1 f15or'rarhing above the piping, load "
handling will be restricted in this area. This area is indicated on the safe load'path sketch on Figure 12.
As previously stated in Section III of this report, the NUREG 0612 general guidelines and interim requirements have been adopted for the operation of the Reactor Building cranes..
Summar and Clarification of Res onse to General Re uirements This report documents the final phase of Florida Power and Light Company's review of the controls for the handling of heavy loads at the St. Lucie Unit No. 2 plant as requested by the NRC generic letter dated 12/22/80. As a result of the findings in this report, the safe load path sketches presented in the first phase response have been changed. A'omplete set of the new safe load path sketches are presented in Figure 10 through 14.
The results of Florida Power and Light Company's review of NUREG 0612 finds no equipment modifications required to meet the NUREG 0612 specific requirements. New procedures, training programs and other actions necessary to comply with the interim requirements and general guidelines are being implemented and have been addressed in the previous response. A training program in accordance with ANSI B 30.2-1976 has been developed and our standard company physical for new employees meets or exceeds the physical requirements of the ANSI standard. Some minor exceptions to the ANSI standard have been taken and are listed in the attachment at the end of this report.
These training programs and procedures will be available at the site for review.
XV. References
- 1. NUREG 0612 "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."
- 2. NRC Generic Letter "Control of Heavy Loads" dated December 22, 1980.
- 3. Enclosure 2 of Geneiic Letter "Staff Position
. Znterim Actions for Control of Heavy Loads".
- 4. Enclosure 3 of Generic Letter "Request for Additional information on Control of Heavy Loads."
- 5. FPL letter L-81-336 to Mr. Eisenhut of NRC dated August 6, 1981. "Control of Heavy Loads." (First phase response).
- 6. Plant Administrative Procedure AP 100438 "Control of Heavy Load Lifts."
New Procedures not previously referenced:
C r
- 7. Plant Maintenance Procedure "M-0020 "Lifting of the Spent Fuel Gate."
- 8. Plant Maintenance Procedure 11-0021 "Lifting of the Pressurizer Missile Shield."
- 9. Plant Maintenance Procedure M-0022 "Lifting of the Spent Fuel Cask,"
p
APPENDIX TABLE 1 HEAVY LOADS HANDLED IN THE CONTAINMENT APPROX.
HEIGHT LOAD IDENTIFICATION TONS Reactor vessel closure head 191 Reactor missile shields '73 Upper guide structure 64 Pressurizer missile shield Reactor coolant pump motors 43 Reactor coolant pump motor hatch covers 43 Reactor coolant pump driven mount Uppder guide structure'lift rig In-Service-Inspection tool Reactor cavity seal ring with lift ring Reactor coolant pump cover Polar crane main load block Reactor coolant pump shaft journal assembly Reactor coolant pump impeller
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