ML16256A457
| ML16256A457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2016 |
| From: | Entergy Operations |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16256A115 | List:
|
| References | |
| W3F1-2016-0053 | |
| Download: ML16256A457 (168) | |
Text
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-1 Revision 307 (07/13) 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES
9.3.1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM
9.3.1.1 Design Bases (EC-41355, R307)
The compressed air system, consisting of the Instrum ent and Service Air Systems, is designed to provide a reliable supply of dry, oil-free air for pneumatic instruments and controls, pneum atically operated valves and the necessary service air for normal plant operati on and maintenance. The system serves no safety function since it is not required to achieve safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Air accumulators are provided on valves where instrument air is required for operation during the safe shutdown of the plant following an accident or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Air
accumulators required for containment isolation are provided with safety related remote makeup capability to ensure long term operability of the valves following loss of the plant instrument air system.
Other safety-related air accumulators are capable of providing motive air to pneumatically operated valves for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Procedures are established for operating manual handwheel overrides or lining up
backup air supplies for continued safety function a fter 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Safety-related valves with air accumulators are listed in Table 9.3-1a and with nitrogen accumulators in Table 9.3-1b. (EC-41355, R307) 9.3.1.2 System Description
The compressed air system is shown schematically in Figure 9.3-1 (for Figure 9.3-1, Sheet 3, refer to Drawing G152, Sheet 3 and for Figure 9.3-1, S heet 4, refer to Drawing G152, Sheet 4).
The compressed air system consists of the following:
a) two nonlubricated rotary instrument air compressors
b) one vertical instrument air receiver
c) two instrument air dryers with pre- and after-filters
d) three nonlubricated rotary station air compressors
e) one vertical station air receiver
f) piping, valves and instrumentation
Each instrument air compressor package consists of an inlet filter, compressor, moisture separator, heat exchanger and discharge filter. Water used in the li quid ring of the compressor is cooled in the heat exchanger by water from the Turbine Closed Cooling Water System. Air from these packages is
discharged into the instrument air receiver by a common header. This compressed air is then passed through one of the instrument air dryers and filters a ssemblies. The compressed air system then divides into various branches. Two in. lines supply instrument air to the demineralizer plant, yard area, Turbine Building, Reactor Auxiliary Building, Reactor Build ing, Fuel Handling Building, Service Building, and intake structure. In the Turbine, Reactor Auxilia ry and Reactor Buildings, thes e branches are divided into several sub-branches located at various elevat ions. The various air operated valves, pneumatic instruments and controls are supplied from these lines.
(DRN 01-692, R11-A)
During normal operation, both instrument air compresso rs operate to maintain receiver pressure between 112-120 psig. The compressor designated as "standby" starts automatically if the in strument air receiver pressure fall below 105 psig, and continues to operate in a load/unload mode until manually stopped. (DRN 01-692, R11-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-2Revision 9 (12/97)Station air compressor packages also consist of an inlet filter, compressor, moisture separator, heatexchanger and discharge filter. Compressed air from these packages is discharged into the station air receiver by a common header. Downstream of the receiver, the system is divided into various branches.
Two inch lines supply service air to demineralizer plant, yard area, Turbine Building, Reactor Auxiliary Building, Reactor Building, Service Building, hot machine shop and decontamination room, Fuel Handling Building and intake structure. These branches are divided into several subbranches in all of these buildings and are located at various elevations. Service air is used for the operation of pneumatic tools, equipment used for plant maintenance, and for occasional air lancing of the wet cooling tower basin water to control microbiological growth.A station air compressor maintains a pressure of 112-120 psig in the station air receiver. If the receiverpressure falls below 105 psig, the second station air compressor starts automatically. The Instrument Air and Service Air Systems are cross connected through a self actuated pressure control valve through which the Service Air System can feed the Instrument Air System.The instrument air dryers are provided with a bypass so that when the dryer outlet pressure falls below 95psig the bypass is automatically opened, thereby maintaining the pressure in the system. A strainer isinstalled in this line to coarse filter the air.The instrument air dryers and filters are expected to remove 99% of particulate matter (oil and dust) over0.3 microns in size, and reduce the moisture content to a dew point of -40
°F at 100 psig. The equipmentis subjected to the manufacturer's required maintenance procedures to assure this cleanliness level.Some safety-related valves which are air operated are equipped with air filters. Normal operatingprocedures will assure that the filters are maintained clean. Unlikely clogging of the filter would result in loss of air to the valve, putting the valve to its fail safe position, thereby not interfering in its performance of safety-related function.Design data for the compressed air system components is given in Table 9.3-2.9.3.1.3Safety EvaluationComplete loss of instrument or service air during full power operation or under accident conditions doesnot reduce the ability of the reactor protective system or the engineered safety features and their supporting systems. to safely shut down the reactor or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.Since the compressed air system serves no safety function, this system is not designed to any safetyclass or seismic requirements. The portion of instrument air and service air piping and valves penetrating the containment is designed to safety class 2 and seismic Category I requirements (refer to Subsection 6.2.4). The containment instrument air header outer isolation valve is designed to fail closed. The containment service air outer isolation valve is locked closed because no compressed service air is required in the containment during normal plant operation.Instrument Air System redundancy is provided by the two sets of instrument air compressor units plus theback up from the Service Air System. A total loss of instrument air is highly unlikely during normal operation.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-3Revision 9 (12/97)Failure of compressed air equipment, including air receivers does not have any detrimental effect onsafety related equipment, even if the failure produces missiles. Other than process lines, the compressed air equipment is located in the Turbine Building which does not house any safety related equipment.The power supply for the station air compressor motors is from the Plant Auxiliary Power DistributionSystem. The power supply for the instrument air compressors is from the engineered safety features buses. If a loss of offsite power occurs, the instrument air compressors are tripped and manually reconnected to the emergency diesel generators for main control room operators convenience in plant shutdown.Accumulators are provided on those valves where instrument air is required for operation during the safeshutdown of the plant following an accident or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The accumulators are designed to seismic Category I requirements.9.3.1.4Testing and InspectionThe compressor packages are performance tested at the manufacturer's plant. The systems areinspected, cleaned and tested prior to service. Instruments are calibrated during testing and automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper set points. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during plant operational testing. The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.The compressed air system is in service during normal plant operation. System performance willtherefore be checked by the performance of the components utilizing instrument or service air.9.3.1.5Instrument ApplicationThe running station or instrument air compressors are loaded and unloaded between 112 and 120 psig inthe air receivers. If the pressure falls below 105 psig, the standby compressor starts and runs in a loading/unloading fashion between 112 and 120 psig until manually stopped. The controls are locatedlocally. If the air pressure in the instrument air receiver falls below the preset limit, a self actuatedpressure control valve is opened, admitting service air into this system. Annunciation is provided in the main control room for the Instrument and Service Air Systems for the following conditions:a)low air receiver pressure b)high and low moisture separator level, and Local instruments are provided to indicate pressure in the air receivers. In addition, the service andinstrument air header pressures, are indicated in the main control room.9.3.2PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEMProcess sampling is accomplished by a Primary Sampling System (PSL), a Secondary Sampling System(SSL), and an automatic gas analyzer panel (WGAP).
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-4Revision 11-B (06/02)9.3.2.1Design BasesThe PSL is designed to collect fluid and gaseous samples contained in the Reactor Coolant System(RCS) and associated auxiliary system process streams during all modes of operation from full power to cold shutdown without requiring access to the containment.The SSL is designed to collect water and steam samples from the secondary cycle, makeup demineralizerand Steam Generator.(DRN 00-695)The Waste Gas Analyzer Panel (WGAP) can be programmed to sample gas from the following locations:Holdup Tanks, Volume Control Tank, Gas Decay Tanks, Gas Surge Tank, Vent Gas Collection Header, Waste Gas Compressor Discharge, and Equipment Drain Tank.(DRN 00-695)9.3.2.2System DescriptionFigure 9.3-2 (for Figure 9.3-2, Sheet 3, refer to Drawing G162, Sheet 3) shows the flow diagrams for thePSL, SSL, and WGAP.Provisions are made to assure that representative samples are obtained from well mixed streams orvolumes of effluent by the selection of proper sampling equipment and location of sampling points as well as the proper sampling procedures.The throttling valves in the sampling system have a limited flow coefficient (C v) range. This range isbased on the flow required and the differential head available under operating conditions. This limits the sample flow rate to the required value and prevents excessively high flow.9.3.2.2.1Primary Sampling System The PSL takes samples from the RCS and auxiliary systems, as listed in Table 9.3-3, and brings them toa common location in the primary sampling room PSL panel in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (elevation -
4ft. MSL) for analysis by the plant operating staff. The analyses performed on the samples determine fission and corrosion product activity levels, boron concentration, residual hydrazine, silica, lithium, pH and conductivity levels, crud concentration, dissolved gas concentration and chloride. The results of the analyses are used to regulate boron concentration, and monitor fuel rod integrity, to evaluate the performance of ion exchanger and filters, specify chemical additions to the various systems, and maintain the proper hydrogen and nitrogen overpressure in the volume control tank.Table 9.3-3 includes the pressure and temperature for each primary sample point, as well as indicatingwhether the sample passes through the sample coolers.The requirements for the PSL water chemistry are given in Subsection 9.3.4 for the reactor coolant andSubsection 10.3.5 for the steam generators.The samples taken from the RCS pass through a run of piping long enough to ensure a minimum decaytime of 90 seconds for short-lived radioactivity, including N-16, before the fluid leaves the containment.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-5Revision 9 (12/97)The samples are cooled by individual heat exchangers to a maximum temperature of 120
°F in the primarysampling room's PSL panel sample coolers and then reduced in pressure by pressure reducing valves.The reactor coolant and pressurizer steam space samples may be collected in detachable samplecylinders for gas analysis.Samples taken from the Safety Injection System, the CVCS, the RCS, and the Pressurizer are reduced inpressure by means of manually set throttling valves in the primary sampling room's PSL panel.Low temperature and low pressure liquid samples from the Primary Water Storage System are routeddirectly to the primary sampling room's PSL panel.Temperature, pressure and flow rate indication of all the above samples is provided in the PSL panel.To obtain representative samples, the stagnant lines are purged for several volumes. If there is anindication of crud buildup, there is also the capability to use the system pressure to provide the motive force to achieve a higher purge rate.All liquid samples of the PSL are connected to a common header and discharged to the BMS holdup tankor the Volume Control Tank.The sample sink is of stainless steel construction with a raised edge to retain any splashed fluid. The sinkarea is provided with a hood equipped with an exhaust to the plant vent system. Demineralizer water is provided to flush and clean the sink. The sink drains by gravity through a water trap to the WMS chemical waste tank.9.3.2.2.2Secondary Sampling SystemThe SSL takes water and steam samples from the secondary cycle, makeup demineralizer andcondensate transfer pump discharge, and Steam Generator as listed in Table 9.3-4 and brings them to a common location in the secondary Lab & sampling room SSL panel in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (elevation - 4 ft MSL) for analysis by the plant operating staff. Water quality analyses are performed to provide a basis for the control of the secondary cycle water chemistry, and Steam Generator integrity.
The analyses performed on the samples are appropriate to determine pH, specific and cation conductivity levels, silica, sodium, dissolved oxygen and residual hydrazine concentrations.Steam generator are monitored on a continuous basis. The steam generator samples are drawn from thelower portion of the steam generators. The samples are used for chemistry control. Solenoid valves are operated from the sampling room to allow the operator to select the desired steam generator sample source.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-6Revision 9 (12/97)The steam generator samples are analyzed for radioactivity with one combined steam generator radiationmonitor. Should the radiation level rise above a set limit, an alarm is activated in the main control room (see Subsection 11.5.2.4).Each steam generator sample is automatically monitored for specific and cation conductivity, pH, silicaand sodium. Should any of these parameters rise above operating limits, a local alarm is activated. Inaddition, cation conductivity, pH and sodium are also alarmed in the main control room. Grab sample provisions are also provided.Table 9.3-4 includes the pressure and temperature for each sample point, as well as indicating whetherthe sample passes through a multi-tube heat exchanger, as well as the chiller-bath cooling coils.The temperature control of the samples having a temperature of 141
°F or above is accomplished by amulti-tube heat exchanger and an integrated automatic sample temperature control system (chiller-bathcooling coils) to maintain sample temperatures at 77
°F + 1°F, as required for the analyzers. Thetemperature control of the low temperature (below 141
°F) samples is accomplished by using only theintegrated automatic sample temperature control system.The multi-tube heat exchanger is a compact, single shell unit designed to cool and condense severalindividual samples concurrently. The coils are internally baffled so that each coil is thermally insulated from one another allowing the adjustment of cooling water flow over each individual coil. The Component Cooling Water System removes heat from the heat exchanger.The analyzers drain header is routed to the sample recovery tank and pumped to the industrial wastesump.9.3.2.2.3Waste Gas Analyzer PanelGas samples from the locations listed in 9.3.2.1 can be analyzed by the gas analyzer for potentiallyhazardous concentrations of oxygen and hydrogen. Samples may be collected in a sample vessel and taken to the radio-chemistry laboratory for further analysis. The gas analyzer is part of the WMS and is discussed in Section 11.3.9.3.2.2.4Metal Transport Sampling SystemThe Metal Transport Sampling System continuously obtains a representative sample of approximately1,100 ml/min from the Feedwater (FW), Main Steam (MS), and Blowdown (BD) systems. This is accomplished by the use of sample probes which extend into the process piping approximately 1/3 of thepipe diameter. The samples are cooled below 120
°F and approximately 100 ml/min is routed through aMillipore filter and the balance (1000 ml/min) is diverted through a bypass. The bypass flow is maintained continuously to reduce mineral depositing on the sample tubing which could be sloughed off by flow surges, water hammers and thermal expansion. The millipore filter is periodically isolated, removed andanalyzed to monitor the accumulation of corrosion products.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-7Revision 9 (12/97)9.3.2.3Safety EvaluationThe Process Sampling System is not essential for safe plant shutdown. Safety features are provided toprotect plant personnel and to prevent the spread of contamination from the primary/secondary lab sampling rooms when samples are being collected. The system is designed to limit radioactivity releases below the 10CFR20 limits under normal and failure conditions. The temperature and pressure of the various samples are reduced to minimize the possibility of local airborne activity. Instrumentation is provided in the sampling rooms to monitor the temperature and pressure of the samples before they are collected. Samples are normally taken only when the hood fan is operating. The Reactor Auxiliary Building Normal Ventilation System provides a backup means of maintaining the low airborne activity levels.The sample lines penetrating the containment are each equipped with two pneumatically operatedisolation valves which close upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal. The penetration piping and isolation valves are safety class 2 and seismic Category 1. The containment isolation valves are also designed to fail closed on loss of air supply (refer to Subsection 6.2.4). Remote control of these valves is provided to isolate any line failure which might occur outside of the containment. Should any of the remotely operated valves in the sampling system fail to close after a sample has been taken, backup manual valves in the sampling room may be closed.9.3.2.4Testing and InspectionThe system is inspected and cleaned prior to service. Demineralized water is used to flush each part ofthe system. The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow rate, thermal capacity and mechanical operability. Instruments are calibrated during plant hot functional testing. The set points of the relief valves are also checked at this time.All automatic analyzers are calibrated and their output results verified. Proper sequencing of the WGAPsolenoid valves are verified. The proper operation and availability of the Process Sampling System is proved inservice by its daily use during normal plant operation.The sequencing operation of the WGAP is tested by observing proper solenoid valve operation andappropriate sample flow through the analyzer. The analyzer is calibrated against known hydrogen and oxygen sources.The sampling systems are inspected during normal operation by observing proper operation of thecomponents while samples are being drawn. The malfunction of automatic analyzers will be observed by inappropriate readouts on the recorders or by alarms.9.3.2.5Instrument ApplicationThe PSL and SSL use local pressure, temperature and flow indicators to facilitate manual operation and todetermine sample conditions before samples are drawn. The radiation monitor and microprocessor is housed in its own panel.The plant monitoring computer records the sample parameters from the steam generator.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-89.3.3EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEMS9.3.3.1Design BasisThe Equipment and Floor Drain Systems collect waste liquids from the various plant operational systemsand convey them from their points of origin by gravity, by pumps, or a combination thereof, to the appropriate Waste Management System collection tank. Gravity flow paths for the movement of waste water directly to the Waste Management System tanks are utilized whenever such design can be accomplished. When total gravity flow is precluded by abnormal or unusual conditions, liquids are routed by gravity to intermediate collection sumps or tanks and subsequently pumped to the Waste Management System collection tanks.The radioactive drainage systems and non-radioactive drainage systems are designed to be totallyisolated from each other. Therefore there is no potential for inadvertent transfer of radioactive contaminated fluids to a non-radioactive drainage system. Each area housing safety related equipment is provided with an independent drainage system and attendant sump to preclude the flooding of such areas from other drainage systems.The Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems do not serve any safety function and are classified as non-nuclear safety. Therefore, they are not required to withstand the effects of adverse environmental phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, or the effects of high and moderate pipebreaks.A Storm Water Drainage System is provided and sized for the design rain intensity storm condition of 5-1/2 in./hr.Equipment and floor drainage piping in areas of potential or actual radioactive discharges are constructedin accordance with ANSI B31.1-0, Power Piping Specification, Winter 1975.9.3.3.2System DescriptionThe drainage systems are divided into two major classifications; radioactive drainage systems and non-radioactive drainage systems. These classifications are further defined into subsystems for the purpose of identifications, isolation, routing and processing.Radioactive Drainage Systems a)Equipment Drain System b)Floor Drain System c)Detergent Waste System d)Chemical Waste System Non-Radioactive Drainage Systems a)Storm Water Drainage System b)Acid Waste and Vent System WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-9Revision 10 (10/99)c)Acid and Caustic Waste Systemd)Oil Drainage Systems e)Industrial Waste System f)Sprinkler Discharge Drainage SystemEquipment and Floor Drainage Systems are shown on Figures 9.3-3, 4 and 5 (for Figure 9.3-3, Sheet 1,refer to Drawing G173, Sheet 1).The drainage system components consist of drain fittings specifically selected for a planned or anticipatedliquid discharge, and a network of pipe, fittings, valves, sumps, and pumps to achieve rapid and unobstructed flow paths from the point of liquid influent to the point of treatment or disposal.Table 9.3-5 lists construction materials and the type of joint for each subsystem. Each system componentis engineered so as to be capable of conveying the designed volume of leakage expected. Uncontrolled large volumes of liquids released by pipe or equipment failure, or by tank overflow will spill upon the floor.
All floors are pitched approximately 1/8 in. per ft. to a floor drain for rapid carry-off of such spillage.Each gravity drainage system is designed using the normal anticipated maximum discharge in gallons perminute through an enclosed pipe flowing a maximum of 75 percent full. Horizontal drainage piping is sloped at a uniform rate of 1/4 in. per ft. as standard practice. Where conditions are such that standard pitch cannot be maintained, a pitch of 1/8 in. per ft. minimum is used. Fittings are drainage pattern whenever possible and are installed so as to provide a continuous extension of piping runs. Discharge headers from pumps are routed as true as possible to their final destination, keeping to a minimum turns and traps.Cleanouts are provided on each drainage system to permit cleaning in the event a blockage occurs. Thesize of cleanouts are in direct proportion to the size of the pipe it serves, up to four in. Thereafter four in.cleanouts are standard for all larger pipes. Cleanouts are located where the change of direction inhorizontal runs is 90 degrees or greater, at maximum intervals of 50 ft. on straight runs and at the base of all stacks. Piping runs encased or embedded in concrete or located in inaccessible areas have cleanouts extended to accessible locations.9.3.3.2.1Radioactive Drainage Systems The radioactive drainage systems provide the interface between the RCS, reactor auxiliaries equipment,and the waste management treatment facilities. They provide for the drainage of equipment, tanks, and wetted surfaces during normal plant operation as well as anticipated large volume flow associated with abnormal or accident conditions.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-10Revision 11-B (06/02)9.3.3.2.1.1Equipment Drain SystemReactor Auxiliary BuildingLiquid discharges of reactor grade fluids from equipment, tanks, and miscellaneous leak-off points locatedat elevation -35 ft. MSL are collected by drain fittings located at the equipment discharge points and routed by gravity through piping buried in the mat to the equipment drain sump no. 1. Two sump pumps discharge the sump contents to the equipment drain tank through the recycle drain header.(DRN 00-695)Liquid discharges of reactor grade fluids from equipment, tanks, and miscellaneous leak-off points locatedat elevation -4 ft. MSL and above are collected by the recycle drain header and routed by gravity to the equipment drain tank located on elevation -35 ft. MSL. The tank liquids are drained by means of the equipment drain tank pump through the reactor drain tank pump discharge header to the holdup tanks in the Boron Management System.Reactor BuildingLiquid discharges of reactor grade fluids from equipment and miscellaneous leak-off points are collectedby the containment drain header and routed by gravity to the reactor drain tank. The reactor drain tank pump discharges the tank liquids to the holdup tanks in the Boron Management System.(DRN 00-695)9.3.3.2.1.2Floor Drain SystemReactor BuildingLiquid discharges of low purity (non-reactor grade) wastes from equipment, tanks, miscellaneous leak-offpoints, and floor drainage are collected by drain fittings located at the equipment discharge point and by floor drains located at low points in the floors, and routed by gravity to the containment sump which islocated at the lowest point within the reactor cavity. In entering the sump, all liquids pass through a leak detection tank which is located within the sump. This tank is equipped with a triangular weir. Liquids from the tank drain into the sump through the weir. Two sump pumps discharge the sump contents to thewaste tanks through a radiation monitor located outside the containment.Alternate flow paths are provided on the containment sump discharge header for decontaminationwashdown (see Subsection 9.3.3.2.1.3).Reactor Auxiliary BuildingLiquid discharges of low purity wastes from equipment, tanks, miscellaneous leak-off points, and floordrainage, are collected by drain fittings located at the equipment discharge points and by floor drains located at low points in the floors and routed by gravity to floor drain sumps at elevation -35 ft. MSL.
Each sump is provided with two pumps which discharge the sump contents to the waste tanks.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-11 Revision 11-A (02/02)
Fuel Handling Building Liquid discharges of low purity wastes from equipment, tanks, miscellaneous leak-off points, and floor drainage are collected by drain fittings located at the equipment discharge points and by floor drains located at low points in the floors and routed by gravity to the floor drain sump no. 1 at elevation -35 ft. MSL. Two
pumps discharge the sump contents to the waste tanks.
9.3.3.2.1.3 Detergent Waste System Reactor BuildingFor those periods when the reactor head laydown and wash area will be used for decontamination, the containment sump discharge header provides an alternate discharge path for removal of liquids containing those chemicals used for decontamination procedures. The flow path is directly to the laundry tanks.
Reactor Auxiliary Building Liquid discharges containing chemical cleaning compounds from those areas and associated equipmentlisted on Table 9.3-6 are routed by gravity to the laundry tanks located on elevation -35 ft. MSL. All fixtures, equipment drains, and floor drains are provided with traps and are vented to the vent gas collection header.Equipment drains and floor drains serving laundry process equipment on elevation -35 ft. MSL are routed to the detergent waste sump no. 1. Two sump pumps discharge the sump contents to the laundry tanks via
the laundry tank collection header.
Fuel Handling Building Drainage is provided for the spent fuel cask decontamination pit, refueling canal, and the spent fuel caskstorage area for decontam ination washdown of walls, floors, and fuel casks. Floor drains collect the wastewater and route it to the refueling canal drain pump. The refueling canal drain pump discharge header provides two alternate flow paths. One flow path is provided directly to the laundry tanks for liquid from initial washdown with decontamination chemicals. The second flow path directs subsequent rinse water to the
spent fuel pool.9.3.3.2.1.4Chemical Waste System
Reactor Auxiliary Building(DRN 00-1054)Chemical wastes from the radio-chem laboratory and sampling room located at elevation -4 ft. MSL arerouted by gravity to the chemical waste tank located at elevation -35 ft. MSL. The chemical waste pump
routes the liquids through the waste concentrate storage tank to the waste management drumming station.
Plumbing fixture vents are provided for vapor removal from the system. The vents are connected to the vent
gas collection header.(DRN 00-1054)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-129.3.3.2.1.5Sump OperationSumps have been sized to accommodate all anticipated normal and transient leakage from the equipmentthey serve. All sumps throughout the plant have been provided with duplex full capacity pumps.Level switch and level operated mechanical alternator are provided for controlling the sump level. Thelevel control is delineated in the following steps.a)When the level reaches the predetermined "High", the alternator starts the selectedpump. The mechanical alternator initiates operation of the pumps alternately on successive low level incidences. The pump is also tripped automatically on low level.b)If the level continues to rise and reaches the predetermined "High-High", thealternator will start the second pump.c)An independent level switch is provided to detect that the level in the sump is highenough to necessitate operation of the standby pump and to initiate an alarm in main controlroom.A local control switch is provided for each pump to enable its manual operation when level in the sump isbetween low and high extremes.9.3.3.2.2Non-Radioactive Drain SystemsThe non-radioactive drainage systems provide the interface between various drainage discharge pointsand their respective internal and/or external waste treatment facilities. They provide for the draining ofequipment, tanks, and flooded surfaces during normal plant operation, as well as of anticipated largevolume flow associated with abnormal or accident conditions.9.3.3.2.2.1Storm Water Drainage System The Storm Water Drainage System consists of various types of drain inlets and catch basins for stormwater capture from structure roofs, plant grounds and roads, and an interconnected network of storm water piping for conveyance. It provides the entire plant site with the means to effectively collect accumulations of rainwater, and creates the flow path for offsite disposal.Surfaces exposed and subjected to rainwater are sloped to the collection appurtenance; roof drains, deckdrains, area drains, and catch basins. Drains have been selected so as to fully meet all pertinent requirements of the surface to be drained. Obstructions between high surface points and drain inlets have been minimized so as to affect accelerated and total drainage of the surface.The building systems are designed as gravity systems with a minimum pipe slope of 1/4 in. per ft. formaximum self-cleaning velocity. Additionally, the systems are designed so as to minimize the deposit of solids and clogging, and with adequate cleanouts so arranged that the systems may be readily cleaned.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-13 Revision 301 (09/07)
Total isolation from all other drainage systems preclude flooding due to abnormal weather conditions.
The systems will provide storm wate r collection, conveyance, and offs ite disposal without puddling or flooding of the plant site or structure roofs.
The Louisiana State Construction Code (1963), applicable to plumbing, is used for permissible square
feet of drainage for a given pipe size and pitch, in terms of square feet of projected drainage area.
Reactor Building
Roof drains are provided around the circumferenc e of the dome walkway. Leaders are embedded within the containment walls to points of exit from wher e they run exposed through the dry cooling tower areas to the yard Storm Water Drainage System.
(DRN 01-0073) 9.3.3.2.2.1 Storm Water Drainage System Cooling Tower Areas (DRN 99-0577; EC
-2097, R301)
Area drains are provided to collect and route storm water to two area drain sumps (1&2) located at elevation -35 ft. MSL. Each sump is provided with two 270-gpm minimum capacity pumps, and radiation monitors are provided on the discharge of each sump. Flow can be diverted to one of three discharge paths for offsite disposal. The normal flow path disc harges storm water into the Circulatory Water system for discharge to the Mississippi River. An alternate flow path is provided to allow discharge to the 40
Arpent Canal via the yard Storm Water Drainage Sy stem. Upon detecting high radiation activity, a simultaneous signal will automatically stop the pum ps and alarm the operator who will then manually transfer the flow to the waste tanks in the Reactor Auxiliary Building.
In addition to the 270-gpm motor driven sump pumps, a single diesel powered sump pump with a
minimum capacity of 300-gpm is provided in each c ooling tower area. The pumps are provided with hoses which are used to discharge rainwater directly over the Nuclear Island exterior floodwall. These pumps are used to supplement the motor driven sump pumps during periods of intense rainfall, as described in Subsection 2.4.2.3. (EC-2097, R301)
If a loss of offsite power occurs during a discharge, both the pumps and monitors are de-energized. The operator can manually load the pumps onto the EDGs as described in Table 8.3-1. However, the monitor
contacts remain in the "alarm" state and actuate a si gnal that locks out the pumps. A selector switch on the MCC cubicle of each sump pump allows the operat or to bypass this condition until power is restored to the monitors. (DRN 99-0577; 01-0073) 9.3.3.2.2.2 Acid Wa ste and Vent System
Liquid wastes from battery rooms in the Reactor Auxiliary Building are routed to local neutralizing tanks
for neutralization and then discharged to the Sanitary Drainage System for disposal. Each fixture and floor drain is provided with a local pipe vent which connects to a main vent. The main vent is extended through the roof to the atmosphere.
9.3.3.2.2.3 Acid and Caustic Waste System
Drains receiving intermittent acid and caustic wastes from the blowdown treatment area at elevation -4 ft.
MSL of the Reactor Auxiliary Building are routed to a neut ralizing tank at elevation -35 ft. MSL. The tank discharge is routed to the Oil Drainage System which r outes the neutralized liquids to the oil sump No. 3.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-14Revision 12-B (04/03) 9.3.3.2.2.4 Oil Drainage Systems Diesel Oil Storage Tank CompartmentsEach tank compartment is provided with its own individual sump (oil sump no. 1 and oil sump no. 2). Each sump is provided with two pumps which discharge to the Turbine Building Industrial Waste System (see
Subsection 9.3.3.2.2.5).
Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms, Charging Pumps
, Emergency Diesel Oil Feed Tanks These areas are provided with floor drains and equipment drains to collect oil spills from equipment and surrounding piping. Liquids are routed to the oil sump no. 3 at elevation -35 ft. MSL. Two sump pumps discharge the sump contents to the Turbine Building Industrial Waste System. Provisions for pumping the
sump contents to local oil drums for offsite removal are available.
9.3.3.2.2.5 Industrial Waste System (Turbine Building)The Industrial Waste System consists of floor drains, equipment drains, and curbed area oil collection drains. The system provides the means to collect and convey the various Turbine Building operational waste
liquids from their points of collection to their ultimate disposal.
Floor drains are provided throughout the building to accept normal maintenance washdown as well as abnormal liquid discharges such as from a high or moderate energy piping rupture. Concrete floors are sloped to floor drains which are located at low points on the floors to facilitate drainage and prevent water puddles.Equipment drains are provided for mechanical equipment such as pumps, tanks, and leak-off points. These drains serve to accept continual or intermittent discharge as part of routine operation. They additionally
prov ide the means for equipment drain down in the event of maintenance when required, or for replacement of the equipment when necessary. For equipment requiring flushing on a regular or occasional basis, this
system will provide that capability as well.Floor drains and/or equipment drains are provided in curbed oil areas to service mechanical equipment using oil in their operation. Valves are placed on floor drain outlets to provide the capability of containing substantial oil spills within the curbs. Equ ipment drains are elevated above curbs to preclude their use as overflows. However, when this elevation presents drainage problems to the equipment it serves, closed
equipment drains are utilized.
Concrete containment curbs are provided where hazardous chemicals associated with the Chemical Feed Skids are handled and stored. The volume of the curbed area will accommodate the failure of a single 345 gallon portable chemical shipping container. Drains are not provided in this area to allow for the neutral izingof any spilled chemicals prior to disposal as appropriate.(DRN 99-0480, R11;03-213, R12-B)All Turbine Building drainage is routed to two industrial waste sumps, both located on elevation +15 ft.MSL. Two pumps are provided for each sump. Under normal conditions, industrial waste will be discharged through a radiation monitor to an oil separator located in the yard to affect separation of the oil. The water
will then be pumped by the oil separator discharge pumps to the 40 Arpent Canal or the Circulating Water System discharge. In the event that the radiation monitor on the industrial waste discharge header detects a high radiation level, automatic valves are activated, closing the discharge path to the oil separator and
opening the discharge path to the waste tanks in the Reactor Auxiliary Building. The monitor will also send a signal to sound an alarm in the main control room.(DRN 99-0480, R11;03-213, R12-B)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-15 Revision 11-A (02/02) 9.3.3.2.2.6 Sprinkler Discharge Drainage System (Reactor Auxiliary Building)Floor drains are provided in the electrical penetration and cable vault areas at elevation +35 ft. MSL toaccept sprinkler discharge water in the event of sprinkler system activation. The drainage system is sized to accept a designed flow of 0.3 gpm for any 3000 sq. ft. of space (900 gpm). The Sprinkler Discharge
Drainage System is routed by gravity directly to the yard Storm Water Drainage System for offsite disposal.
9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation Reactor Building sump pump discharge piping penetrating the containment is designed to seismic CategoryI and safety class 2 requirements. All other portions of the Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems are not
designed to either seismic Category I or safety class requirements as they do not perform any safety
function.Each engineered safeguard features room is provided with the independent drainage and sumps to preventflooding and thus assure the integrity of each train operation. The sumps and sump pumps have sufficient
capacity to meet the guidelines of BTP APCSP 3-1 concerning internal plant flooding as a result of
postulated piping failures (see Appendix 3.6A). In addition, the control room operator is alerted to water
accumulation in these areas via Class 1E instrumentation (level indicator with annunciator), to facilitate isolation of the affected system.
The failure of non-safety related Equipment and Floor Drain system components which could affect the operation of safety related equipment, (i.e., mechanical equipment and piping, HVAC ducts, electrical cable
trays and conduits, instrumentation and controls) have been investigated with respect to the area of influence of the failed component. Interactions are eliminated by adherence to criteria stated in Subsection
3.2-1.9.3.3.4 Tests and Inspections All portions of the Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems are subjected to a hydrostatic pressure test of at least 10 ft. head of water.
Welded joints in the radioactive Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems are visually inspected.
9.3.3.5 Instrumentation Applications Level indicators and alarms are provided in the main control room for the monitoring of all sump operation modes.The triangular weir of the leak detection tank located in the Reactor Building sump is precalibrated so thatthe level in the detection tank is transmitted to the main panel of the main control room. A predetermined
high level (leakage rate) will sound an alarm.
9.3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM 9.3.4.1 Design Bases WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-16 Revision 307 (07/13) 9.3.4.1.1 Functional Requirements
The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is designed to perform the following functions:
a) Maintain the chemistry and purity of t he reactor coolant during normal operation and during shutdowns;
b) Maintain the required volume of wate r in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) compensating for reactor coolant contraction or expansion resulting from changes in reactor coolant temperature and for other coolant losses or additions;
c) Provide a controlled path for discharging reactor coolant to the Boron Management System (BMS) and venting gas to the Gaseous Waste Management System (GWMS). The BMS and GWMS are described further in Se ctions 11.2 and 11.3, respectively;
d) Control the boron concentration in the RCS to obtain optimum control element assembly (CEA) positioning, to compensate for reactivity changes associated with major changes in reactor coolant temperature, core burnup, and xenon variations, and to provide shutdown margin for
maintenance and refueling operations;
e) Provide auxiliary pressurizer spray for operat or control of pressure during the final stages of shutdown and to allow pressurizer cooling;
f) Provide a means for functionally testing t he check valves which isolate the Safety Injection System (SIS) from the RCS;
g) Provide continuous measurement of r eactor coolant boron concentration and fission product activity;
h) Collect the controlled bleedoff from the reactor coolant pump seals;
i) Leak test the RCS;
j) Inject concentrated boric acid into the RCS upon a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS);
k) Provide a means for filling the RCS; (EC-8458, R307) l) Provide a means for hydrostatic testing of the RCS. (EC-8458, R307) (EC-4019, R305) m) Inject zinc into the RCS from the Zinc Inje ction Skid, via the charging pumps, to reduce plant radiation dose rates and Primary Water Stress Co rrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in plant materials. (EC-4019, R305)
9.3.4.1.2 Design Criteria
The CVCS is designed in accordance with the following criteria:
a) The CVCS is designed to accept RCS let down when the reactor coolant is heated at the administrative rate of 75 F/hr and to provide the required ma keup using two of three charging pumps when the reactor coolant is cooled at the rate of 75 F/hr; WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-17 Revision 307 (07/13) b) The CVCS is designed to supply makeup water or accept excess reactor coolant as power decreases or increases; c) The CVCS is designed to allow 10 percent step power increases between zero percent and 90 percent of full power and 10 percent st ep power decreases between 100 percent and 10 percent of full power, as well as for ramp c hanges of five percent of full power per minute between 15 and 100 percent power;
d) The volume control tank is sized wi th sufficient capacity to accommodate the inventory change resulting from a full to zero power decrease with no primary makeup water system operation, assuming that the volume control tank level is initially in the normal operating level band;
e) The CVCS provides a means for maintaini ng activity in the RCS within the limits specified in Section 11.1, corresponding to a one percent failed fuel condition and continuous full power operation;
f) The CVCS is designed to maintain the r eactor coolant chemistry within the limits specified in Table 9.3-7;
g) Letdown and charging portions of the syst em are designed to withstand the design transients defined in Table 9.3-8 without any adverse effects, as applicable; (EC-8458, R307) h) Components of the CVCS are designed in a ccordance with applicable codes as shown in Table 9.3-9. Safety classes and seismic categories are as shown in Table 3.2-1;
i) The environmental design conditions of the CVCS are given in Section 3.11;
j) The CVCS is designed to change the reactor coolant boron concentration to the value required for a reactor shutdown, for maintenance and/
or refueling and to bring the reactor coolant to the refueling concentration. The capability of this system for changing the RCS boron concentration is shown in Table 9.3-11. The schedule of waste generation for the various plant
maneuvers is shown in Table 9.3-12;
k) The CVCS is designed to allow for a safe plant shutdown following a loss of CVCS letdown flow. (EC-8458, R307) 9.3.4.2 System Description
9.3.4.2.1 System Functional Description
9.3.4.2.1.1 Plant Startup
Plant startup is the series of operations which bri ngs the plant from a cold shutdown condition to a hot standby condition at normal operating pressure and zero pow er temperature with the reactor critical at a low power level.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-18Revision 10 (10/99)The charging pumps and letdown backpressure valves are used during initial phases of RCS heatup tomaintain the RCS pressure until the pressurizer steam bubble is established. One charging pump will normally operate during plant startup to cool the letdown fluid in order to establish a controlled heatup rate of the RCS within prescribed limitations and to maintain proper RCS pressure during this period.Oxygen scavenging during plant startup is discussed in Subsection 9.3.4.2.1.4.
During the heatup, the pressurizer water level is controlled manually using the backpressure control valvesand the letdown control valves. The letdown flow is automatically diverted to the BMS when the high level limit is reached in the volume control tank. The volume control tank is initially purged with nitrogen, prior to establishing the hydrogen blanket.The RCS boron concentration may be reduced during heatup in accordance with shutdown marginlimitations. The makeup controller is operated in the dilute mode, as described in Subsection 9.3.4.2.1.2, to inject a predetermined amount of primary makeup water at a preset rate. Technical Specifications are set to define those conditions of the CVCS necessary to assure safe reactor operation and shutdown.9.3.4.2.1.2Normal OperationThe normal reactor coolant flow path through the CVCS is indicated by the heavy lines on the piping andinstrumentation diagram, Figure 9.3-6 (for Figure 9.3-6, Sheet 1, refer to Drawing G168, Sheet 1).Parameters for the CVCS are listed in Table 9.3-11. Equipment design parameters for the majorcomponents are shown in Table 9.3-9. Process flow, temperature and pressure data are given in Table 9.3-13 with locations corresponding to those noted in the ellipses on Figure 9.3-6 (for Figure 9.3-6, Sheet 1, refer to Drawing G168, Sheet 1). The tabulation of the process flow data is for three modes ofpurification loop operation and nine modes of makeup system operation. Basically, a letdown flow of 38gpm is used for normal purification operation, a letdown flow of 82 gpm is used for intermediate purification operation, and a letdown flow of 126 gpm is used for maximum purification operation. Typical operating conditions are given for the various makeup system operating modes.Normal operation includes hot standby operation and power generation when the RCS is at normaloperating pressure and temperature.Letdown flow from one cold leg passes through the tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger for aninitial temperature reduction. The pressure is then reduced by a letdown control valve to the letdown heat exchanger operating pressure. The final reduction to the purification subsystem operating pressure and temperature is made by the letdown heat exchanger and letdown backpressure valve. The flow then passes through the purification filter in order to remove insoluble particulates from the reactor coolant.
Flow is then directed through one or more of the purification ion exchangers. The normal purification ion exchanger contains mixed bed resin which becomes boron and lithium saturated through use and is used forremoval of corrosion and fission WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-19 Revision 304 (06/10) products. The second purification ion exchanger contains mixed bed resin which becomes boron saturated through use and is used as necessary to contro l lithium concentration. The third purification ion exchanger contains anion resin only and is used for boron removal at the end of core cycle life when it is no longer practical to use feed and bleed for boron d ilution because of the quantity of waste generated.
Any of the three purification ion exchangers can be used for any function. Flow continues through a strainer and is sprayed into the volume control tank where hydrogen gas is absorbed by the coolant. Flow also enters the volume control tank from the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff header.
The charging pumps take suction from the volume c ontrol tank and pump the coolant into the RCS. One charging pump is normally in operation and one letdown c ontrol valve is controlled to maintain an exact balance between letdown flow rate plus reactor cool ant pump bleedoff flow rate and charging flow rate.
The charging flow passes through the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger for recovery of heat from the letdown flow before being returned to the RCS.
(EC-13560, R304)
When the Shutdown Cooling System is operational, a flow path through the CVCS can be established to remove fission and activation products. This is accomp lished by diverting a portion of the flow from the shutdown cooling heat exchanger to the letdown line.
The flow then passes through the purification filter, purification ion exchanger, the letdown strainer, and is returned to the suction of the low-pressure safety injection pumps. (EC-13560, R304)
(DRN 00-1054, R11-A;05-332, R14; EC-14241, R303)
A makeup system is provided for changes in reactor coolant boron concentration. Boron is initially added to the CVCS using the boric acid batching tank.
Demineralized water is added to the boric acid batching tank via the primary water pumps, and the fluid is heated by immersion heaters. Boric acid powder is added to the heated fluid while the mixer agitates the flui
- d. A boric acid concentration as high as 12 w/o can be prepared. Electric immersion heaters maintain the temperature of the solution in the boric acid batching tank high enough to preclude precipitation. The boric acid is then drained to the boric acid makeup tanks. Concentrated boric acid solution, pr epared in the batching tank, is then stored in the two boric acid makeup tanks. This boric acid solution is supplied to the volu me control tank via the boric acid pumps, while the primary water stored in the primary water storage tank is supplied to the volume control
tank via the primary water pumps. Four modes of operation by the makeup controller in the makeup subsystem are provided. In the dilute mode, a pr eset quantity of primary wa ter is introduced into the volume control tank at a preset rate. In the borate mode, a preset quantity of boric acid is introduced at a preset rate. In the manual blend mode, the flow ra tes of the primary water and the boric acid can be preset to give any concentration of boric acid solution between zero and the refueling concentration. The manual mode is used to provide makeup to the refue ling water storage pool and the safety injection tanks as well as the volume control tank. In the autom atic mode, a preset blended boric acid solution is automatically introduced into the volume control t ank upon demand from the volume control tank level controller. The concentration setting as adjusted peri odically by the operator to match the boric acid concentration being maintained in the RCS. Pref erred makeup is accomplished in manual mode. (DRN 00-1054, R11-A;05-332, R14; EC-14241, R303)
The Chemical Addition Metering System provides a m eans of controlling the reac tor coolant chemistry. Chemical additives for oxygen scavenging and pH control are prepared in the chemical addition tank and
injected into the charging pump suction header by the chemical WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-20 Revision 305 (11/11) addition metering pump. These chemicals are transpor ted to the charging pump suction with primary water. The tank is sized to hold a sufficient quantity of lithium to allow batch additions to the RCS. It will also hold a sufficient quantity of hydrazine to reduc e the reactor coolant oxygen concentration to below the maximum acceptable level during startup or shutdown.
(EC-4019, R305)
The Zinc Injection system provides a means of inject ing zinc acetate dihydrate to the RCS via the suction side of the Charging Pumps. The Zinc Injection Skid will add zinc into the discharge side of the Chemical Addition Pumps via CVC-6051. The Chemical Additi on discharge line connects to the suction side piping of the Charging Pumps between the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and the Charging Pumps. The Charging Pumps then deliver the zinc to the RCS to reduce radiation levels and Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in plant materials. (EC-4019, R305)
The volume of water in the RCS is automatically cont rolled using pressurizer level instrumentation. The pressurizer level setpoint is programmed to vary as a function of reactor power in order to minimize the transfer of fluid between the RCS and the CVCS during power changes. Th is linear relationship is shown on Figure 5.4-7. Reactor power is determined for th is situation using the average reactor coolant temperature derived from hot and cold leg temperature measurements. A level error signal is obtained by comparing the programmed setpoint with the measur ed pressurizer water level. Volume control is achieved by automatic control of the standby charging pumps and a let down control valve in accordance with the pressurizer level control program shown on Fi gure 5.4-7. Two parallel letdown control valves are provided. The letdown control valve chosen for operation is normally controlled by the pressurizer level
control program to maintain letdown flow equal to t he total charging flow minus the total reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff flow. Normally, one char ging pump is operated, but two or three pump operations can be selected for higher purification flow if desired. Proper level can normally be maintained by valve positioning; large changes in pressurizer level due to power changes or abnormal operations
result in automatic operation of the standby charging pumps and/or m odulation of the operating letdown control valve.
(DRN 05-332, R14)
VCT Level (Hi & Low) is protected. The letdown fl ow is automatically diverted to the BMS when the highest permissible water level is reached in the volume control tank. A low-low level signal automatically closes the outlet valve on the volume control t ank and switches the charging pump suction to the refueling water storage pool (RWSP).
(DRN 05-332, R14) 9.3.4.2.1.3 Plant Shutdown
Plant shutdown is accomplished by a series of operations which bring the reactor plant from a hot
standby condition at normal operating pressure and ze ro power temperature to a cold shutdown for maintenance and/or refueling. The schedule of waste generation for various plant maneuvers is shown in Table 9.3-12. (DRN 00-695, R11-B)
Should degasification be necessary, it is performed prior to plant cooldown by venting the volume control tank hydrogen overpressure and diverting the letdown flow to the holdup tanks in the BMS. Makeup is added to the volume control tank or c harging pump suction in the normal manner. (DRN 00-695, R11-B)
The boron concentration in the reactor coolant is in creased to the cold shutdown value in accordance with the technical specificati ons, primarily through the use of the boric acid makeup tanks.
During the cooldown, the charging pumps, letdown c ontrol valves and the letdown backpressure valves are used to adjust and maintain the pressurizer water level. High charging flow WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-21results in a low level in the volume control tank which initiates automatic makeup at the selected shutdownboron concentration. If the shutdown is for refueling the suction of the charging pumps is connected to the RWSP during plant cooldown. All of the charging flow may be used for auxiliary spray to cool the pressurizer in the event reactor coolant pumps are secured.For a refueling shutdown, after the reactor vessel head is removed, the low pressure safety injectionpumps take the borated water from the refueling water storage pool and inject the water into the reactorcoolant loops via the normal flow paths thereby filling the refueling pool. The resulting concentration of therefueling pool and the RCS is above the lower operating boron concentration limitation of 1720 ppm (first cycle), 2150 ppm (equilibrium cycle) for the refueling water storage pool. Thus, the contents of the refueling pool can be returned directly to the refueling water storage pool prior to plant startup without hindering plant operations due to low boric acid storage concentration.9.3.4.2.1.4Chemistry and Purity ControlDuring normal operations and during plant shutdowns, the chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant arecontrolled to provide the following:a)minimum reactor plant radiation levels to permit ready access for plant maintenanceand operation,b)avoidance of excessive fouling of heat transfer surfaces, and c)minimum corrosion rate of materials in contact with reactor coolant.
The chemistry of the reactor coolant is described in Table 9.3-7.
The oxygen and chloride limits specified in Table 9.3-7 were established from the relationships betweenoxygen and chloride concentrations and the susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel. This relationship is described in References 1 and 2. This indicates that if the chloride ions and oxygen concentrations are maintained below the specified concentrations, chloride stress corrosion will not occur.This data reveals that no chloride stress corrosion occurs at oxygen concentrations below approximately0.8 ppm over the entire range of chloride concentrations. This oxygen limit was reduced by a factor of eight to give the conservative concentration of 0.1 ppm oxygen. The maximum amount of oxygen from airdissolved in water at 25
°C is approximately eight ppm. At this concentration, a chloride concentration ofless than approximately 1.5 ppm would preclude the possibility of chloride stress corrosion. This limit was reduced by a factor of 10 to provide a conservative chloride limit of 0.15 ppm.The fluoride limit of 0.1 ppm for reactor coolant is based on the identification of the fluoride ion as a use ofintergranular corrosion of sensitized austenitic stainless steels.
(3) Based on this data, it is essential tominimize fluoride ions in the reactor coolant.During the preoperational test period, 30 to 50 ppm of hydrazine is maintained in the reactor coolantwhenever the reactor coolant temperature is below 150
°F. This is done to WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-22 Revision 15 (03/07) prevent halide-induced corrosion attack of stainless steel surfaces which can occur in the presence of significant quantities of fluorides or chlorides and dissolved oxygen. During heatup, any dissolved oxygen is scavenged by hydrazine thus eliminating one necessary ingredient for halide-induced corrosion. Elimination of oxygen on heatup also minimizes the potential for general corrosion. At higher temperatures, the hydrazine decomposes, not necessarily completely, producing ammonia and a high pH which aids in the development of passive oxide films on RCS surfaces that minimize corrosion product release. The corrosion rates of Ni-Cr-Fe alloy-600 and 300 series stainless steels decrease with time when exposed to prescribed reactor coolant chemistry conditions. These rates approach low steady state values within approximately 200 days.The high pH condition produced by high ammonia
concentration (to 50 ppm) minimizes corrosion product release and assists in the rapid development of the passive oxide film. Most of the film is established within seven days at hot, high pH conditions. This is discussed in Reference 4. To aid in maintaining the pH during this passivation period, lithium in the form of lithium hydroxide is added to the coolant and maintained within the limits given in Table 9.3-7. By the end of the preoperational test period, any fluorides or chlorides have been removed from the system and concentrations in the coolant are maintained at low levels by reactor coolant purification and demineralized water addition. High hydrazine concentration is not required to inhibit halide-induced corrosion, but hydrazine, added at 1.5 times the oxygen concentration, (maximum of 20 ppm) is used during heatup to scavenge oxygen. This assures complete removal of oxygen on heatup while
minimizing ammonia and nitrogen generation when hot and at power. When at power, oxygen is controlled to a very low concentration by maintaining excess dissolved hydrogen in the coolant. The
excess hydrogen forces the water decomposition/synthesis reaction in the reactor core to water rather than hydrogen and oxygen. Any oxygen in the makeup water is also removed by this process. (DRN 06-1142, R15)Since operating with a basic pH control agent results in lower general corrosion release rates from the RCS materials, and because the alkali metal lithium is generated in significant quantities by the core neutron flux through the reaction B-10 (n, alpha) Li-7, lithium is selected as the pH control agent. The production rate of lithium from this reaction is approximately 100 ppb per day at the beginning of core life and decreases with core lifetime in proportion to the decrease in boron concentration. However, even though lithium is the choice for pH control, there exists a threshold for accelerated attack on zircaloy at approximately 35 ppm lithium and therefore, the lithium concentration limits are specified as 0.2 to 3.5 ppm to provide a wide margin between the upper operating limit and the threshold for attack in the event any concentrating phenomena exist. The chemistry of the reactor coolant is maintained within specified limits by the purification ion exchangers and by controlling hydrogen and lithium concentration.Hydrogen, controlled in the reactor coolant by maintaining a hydrogen overpressure on the volume control tank is present to scavenge any oxygen which may be introduced into the RCS. Lithium is added in the form of lithium-7 hydroxide via the chemical addition tank and is present due to the B-10 (n. alpha)
Li-7 reaction in the RCS. It is maintained within 0.2 to 3.5 ppm range to reduce the corrosion product solubility, resulting in fewer dissolved corrosion products circulating in the reactor coolant. Thus promoting a condition within the coolant for selective deposition of corrosion products on cooler surfaces (steam generator) rather than hot surfaces (core), and maintains a more tenacious passive oxide layer on out of core system surfaces. Early in core life, lithium production is the greatest and periodic removal by ion exchange is required to control the concentration below the upper limit. (DRN 06-1142, R15)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-23 Revision 305 (11/11)
Various reactions taking place within the reactor duri ng operation result in the production of tritium, which appears in the reactor coolant as tritiated water.
See Section 11.1 for a discussion of tritium. (EC-4019, R305)
Zinc is added to the RCS from the Zinc Injection Skid in low concentrations to reduce plant radiation dose rates and reduce Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracki ng (PWSCC) in plant materials. When zinc is added a chemical reaction occurs that incorporates zinc into the oxide film on all wetted austenitic stainless steel and nickel-based alloy components su rfaces. The fundamental mechanism of zinc addition is a modification of the plant oxide films, ev entually resulting in lowered corrosion rates. Zinc addition results in thinner oxide films and modification of the structure of the corrosi on films. This leads to the preferential release of nickel and cobalt by the substitution of zinc with these elements. The modification of the oxide films results in ma terial (PWSCC) and dose rate reduction benefits. (EC-4019, R305) 9.3.4.2.1.5 Reactivity Control (EC-14241, R303)
The boron concentration is preferentially controlled in manual during normal operation to obtain optimum CEA positioning to compensate for r eactivity changes associated with changes in coolant temperature, core burnup, xenon concentration variations to prov ide shutdown margin for maintenance and refueling operations or emergencies.
(EC-14241, R303)
The normal method of adjusting boron concentration is by the technique of feed and bleed. To change concentration, the makeup system s upplies either demineralized water or concentrated boric acid to the volume control tank, and the letdown stream is diverted to the BMS. Toward the end of a core cycle, the quantities of waste produced due to feed and bleed operations become excessive due to the low boron concentration and at least one purification ion exchanger is used to reduce the RCS boron concentration.
The ion exchanger used for deborating uses an anion resi n initially in the hydroxyl form which is converted to a borate form as boron is removed from the bleed stream. The capability of the CVCS for changing the RCS boron concentration is shown on Table 9.3-11.
9.3.4.2.2 Component Description
The major components of the CVCS are described in this subsection. The principal component data summary including component design codes and materials of construction is given in Table 9.3-9.
a) Regenerative Heat Exchanger - The regenerative heat exchanger, located within the containment, conserves RCS thermal energy by tr ansferring heat from the letdown stream to the charging stream and serves to minimize charging nozzle thermal transients. The heat exchanger is designed to maintain a letdown outlet temperature below 45O F under all normal operating conditions. This component is designed to acco mmodate the transients listed in Table 9.3-8.
b) Letdown Heat Exchanger - The letdown heat exchanger, located within the Reactor Auxiliary Building, uses component cooling water to cool the letdown flow from the outlet
temperature of the regenerative heat exchanger to a temperature suitable for long-term operation of the purification system. The unit is sized to cool the maximum rate of letdown flow from the maximum outlet temperature of the regenerative heat exchanger (450 F) to the maximum allowable temperature of the ion exchange resins (140 F).
To prevent possible damage to the heat exc hanger by excessive component cooling water flow, the flow control valves are preset to limit the flow to 1200 gpm (maximum). The cooling
water flow rate is indicated in the main control room. This component is designed to accommodate the transients listed in Table 9.3-8.
c) Purification Filter - This filter, located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, is designed to remove insoluble particles from the reactor coolant. The unit is designed to pass the maximum letdown flow without exceeding the allowable WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-24 Revision 14 (12/05)differential pressure across the element in the defined maximum fouled condition. Due to the buildup of high activity levels during normal operation, the unit is designed for efficient remote
removal of the contaminated element assembly. d) Purification Ion Exchangers-The three purification ion exchangers, located withinthe Reactor Auxiliary Building, are each sized for the maximum letdown flow rate. One purification ion exchanger is used continuously to remove impurities and radionuclides from the reactor coolant and one is used intermittently to control the lithium concentration in the reactor coolant. The third ion exchanger is used to reduce the reactor coolant boron concentration at the end of a core cycle. Any ion exchanger is capable of either function and operations procedures
control specific usage. (DRN 99-0971)e) Not used.
(DRN 99-0971)f) Volume Control Tank-The volume control tank, located within the Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding, is used to accumulate letdown water from the RCS to provide for control of hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant and to provide a reservoir of reactor coolant for the charging pumps. The tank is sized to store sufficient liquid volume below the normal operating level band to allow a swing from full power to zero power without makeup operation, to provide a volume for in automatic makeup control band of 500 gallons, and to provide sufficient gas volume to prevent exceeding tank design pressure when undergoing an insurge from the RCS during a power increase from 0 to 100 percent power. The tank has hydrogen and nitrogen gas supplies and a vent to the Waste Management System to enable venting of hydrogen, nitrogen, helium, and fission gases. The volume control tank is initially purged with nitrogen to exclude oxygen and a
hydrogen overpressure is then established. g) Charging Pumps - The charging pumps, located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, takesuction from the volume control tank and return the purification flow to the RCS during plant steady state operations. Normally one pump is running to balance the letdown purification flow rate plus the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff flow rate. The second and third pumps are automatically started (stopped) as pressurizer level decreases (increases) due to plant unloading (loading) transients. (DRN 99-0971)The charging pumps are positive displacement type pumps, with an integral leakage collection system. Each charging pump is provided (with discharge pulsation dampeners. These consist of
a stainless steel vessel (volume 2.5 gallons) and an ethylene - propylene rubber bladder charged with nitrogen. The pressure containing portions of the pump and internals are austenitic and/or
17-4PH, Condition H 1100 stainless steel materials for compatibility with pumped fluid chemistry. (DRN 99-0971) (DRN 03-2063, R14) h) Boric Acid Makeup Tanks - Two boric acid makeup tanks, located in the ReactorAuxiliary Building, provide a source of boric acid solution (2.8 w/o minimum) for injection into the RCS. Each tank is insulated, has redundant electrical strip heaters, and is capable of storing boric acid in concentrations up to 12 w/o. However, the tank insulation and strip heaters are not required to be maintained when the maximum boric acid concentration cannot exceed 3.5 w/o by
the technical(DRN 03-2063, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-25 Revision 305 (11/11) specifications. The combination of the BAM tanks and the refueling water storage pool contain sufficient volume to perform a safe shutdown fo llowing a loss of letdown at operation conditions.
The total volume of both tanks is sufficient to bring the RCS to the refueling boron concentration during a cooldown for refueling.
i) Boric Acid Batching Tank - The boric acid batching tank, located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building and above the boric acid ma keup tanks, is used for the preparation of concentrated boric acid which is gravity drained to the makeup tanks. The tank is designed to permit handling of up to 12 w/o boric acid.
The tank is heated and insulated and receives demineralized water for mixing the boric acid solu tion. Sampling provisions, mixer, temperature controller and electric immersion heaters are an integral part of the batching system. (DRN 99-0971) j) Boric Acid Pumps - The two boric acid pumps, loca ted in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, take suction from the overhead boric ac id makeup tanks and provide boric acid to the makeup subsystem and to the charging pump su ction header. The capacity of each pump is greater than the combined capacity of all three charging pumps. The boric acid makeup pumps are also used to recirculate makeup tank content s, to pump from one makeup tank to the other, and to supply makeup to the RWSP. The pumps are single stage centrifugal pumps with mechanical seals and liquid and vapor leakage collection connections. (DRN 99-0971) k) Chemical Addition Tank - The chemical addition tank , located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, provides a means to inject chemicals into the charging pump suction header.
Demineralized water is supplied for chemical dilu tion and flushing operations. The tank size is based on the maximum service requirements of lithi um injection for a batch addition prior to hot functional testing.
l) Chemical Addition Metering Pump - The chemical addition metering pump provides a means of injecting chemicals into the sucti on of the charging pumps at a controlled rate.
-4019, R305) m) The Zinc Injection Skid
- metering pumps provides the means of adding zinc acetate dihydrate to the RCS via the suction side of the Charging Pumps at a controlled rate. (DRN 99-0971; EC
-4019, R305)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-26Revision 11 (05/01)(DRN 99-0971)n)Not Used.(DRN 99-0971)o)Piping, and Valves - The CVCS piping is austenitic stainless steel. The coolingwater side of the letdown heat exchanger is carbon steel. All piping is in accordance with ASMECode Section III, Class 1, 2 or 3, or ANSI B31.1.0, as applicable.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-27Revision 11 (05/01)All CVCS valves have design features to limit stem leakage when in the open position.(DRN 99-0971)p)Electric Heaters - Redundant electrical heat tracing is installed on all piping, valves and other line-mounted components that may potentially contain greater than 3.5 w/o boric acid solutions. Theportions of the system that that are heat traced are indicated on the piping and instrumentation diagrams, Figure 9.3-6 (for Figure 9.3-6, Sheet 1, refer to Drawing G168, Sheet 1).(DRN 99-0971)Two independent full capacity electrical strip heater banks are installed on each boric acid makeuptank. The heaters are sized to compensate for heat loss through the tank insulation to the surroundings and to maintain the tank temperature above the saturation temperature and within the technical specification limits. The strip heaters are only required to be maintained operable whentechnical specifications allow a BAM tank boron concentration above 3.5 w/o. A common alarmwith high and low temperature annunciation is provided for each boric acid makeup tank.(DRN 99-0971)The batching tank is provided with corrosion resistant electrical immersion heaters. The heaters aresized to supply sufficient heat in six hours to increase the temperature of 500 gallons of 12 w/oboric acid solution from 40
°F to 160°F, including the heat of solution required to dissolve the boricacid granules. The boric acid is not added to the tank until the demineralized water temperatureexceeds the final saturation temperature by at least 20
°F.(DRN 99-0971)q)Thermal Insulation - Thermal insulation is required for conservation of heat and toprotect personnel from contact with high temperature piping, valves, and components. Equipmentand sections of the system that are insulated are the regenerative heat exchanger, the charging and auxiliary spray lines downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger and the letdown linefrom the reactor coolant loop to the letdown heat exchanger. Thermal insulation on these sectionsis designed to limit heat losses to 65 Btu/hr/ft 2 (80 Btu/hr/ft 2 for reflective insulation), based on themaximum expected piping and component temperatures. Insulation on all stainless steel surfaces is limited to 20 ppm chloride content (200 ppm chloride content if stress corrosion inhibitor is used) to ensure that it will not cause stress corrosion oil stainless steel surfaces.9.3.4.3Safety Evaluation9.3.4.3.1Performance Requirements Capabilities and ReliabilitiesThe minimum amount of boric acid solution (allowed by technical specifications) stored in the boric acidmakeup tank is sufficient to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-28Revision 11 (05/01)following loss of letdown at any time during plant life with the highest worth CEA stuck out of the core, andwith additional core shrinkage volume made up with refueling water storage pool water. Gravity feed lines from each boric acid makeup tank to the charging pump suction are provided to assure makeup and boron injection.The charging pumps are used to inject concentrated boric acid into the RCS. With one pump normally inoperation, the other charging pumps are automatically started by the pressurizer level control. The safetyinjection actuation signal (SIAS) will start pumps A and B, or pump AB, if it was assigned to replace pumpA or B. The SIAS also causes the charging pump suction to be switched from the volume control tank to the boric acid pump discharge. Should the pumped boric acid supply be unavailable, the charging pumps are also lined up for gravity feed from the boric acid makeup tanks. Should the charging line inside the containment be inoperative for any reason, the line may be isolated outside of the containment, and thecharging flow may be injected via the SIS. The malfunction or failure of one active component does notreduce the ability to borate the RCS since an alternate flow path is always available for emergency boration.The capability of the CVCS to borate is not compromised by stopping letdown flow. Because safeshutdown can be achieved without letdown flow, this portion of the CVCS, which includes the letdown heat exchanger, has no specific requirement to function for post-accident operation. It is for this reason that the Component Cooling Water System serving the letdown heat exchanger is not Safety Class 2. Further, for accidents which involve a SIAS or CIAS, the letdown line is automatically isolated.If the letdown temperature exceeds the maximum operating temperature of the resin in the ionexchangers (140
°F) the flow will automatically bypass the ion exchangers.The charging pumps, boric acid makeup pumps, and all related automatic control valves are connected toan emergency bus should the normal power supply system fail. There are two emergency diesel generator sets available for this service and the components are aligned to the diesels as designated in Table 9.3-14.(DRN 99-0971)The boric acid solution is stored in heated and insulated tanks. Automatic temperature controls andindependent alarm circuits are included in the heating system. The tank heaters and associated instrumentation are not Class-1E.(DRN 99-0971)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-29Revision 8 (5/26)Frequently used, manually operated valves located in high radiation or inaccessible areas are providedwith extention stem handwheels terminating in low radiation and accessible control areas. Manually operated valves are provided with locking provisions if unauthorized operation of the valve is considered a potential hazard to plant operation or personnel safety.A high degree of functional reliability is assured by providing standby components and by assuring fail-safe responses to the most probable modes of failure. Redundancy is provided as follows: Component RedundancyPurificationThree identical componentsIon ExchangersCharging PumpsTwo standby, one operating pumpCharging Isolation ValveOne parallel, redundant valve Letdown Control ValveOne parallel, standby valveLetdown BackpressureOne parallel, standby valveControl Valve Auxiliary Spray valveOne parallel, redundant valve Boric Acid PumpOne parallel, standby pumpBoric Acid Makeup TankOne standby tankIn addition to the component redundancy it is possible to operate the CVCS in a manner such that somecomponents are bypassed. While the normal charging path is through the regenerative heat exchanger, itis also possible to charge through the high pressure safety injection header. It is possible to transfer boric acid to the charging pump suction header bypassing the volume control tank or by bypassing the makeup flow controls and the volume control tank. The purification filter and purification ion exchangers can bebypassed. Controls bleedoff flow can be routed to the quench tank rather than the volume control tank via the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff header relief.9.3.4.3.2Overpressure ProtectionIn order to provide for safe operation of the CVCS, relief valve protection is provided throughout thesystem. The following is a description of the relief valves that are located in the CVCS:a) Intermediate Pressure Letdown Relief Valve - The relief valve down stream of the letdown control valves protects the intermediate pressure letdown piping and letdown heatexchanger from overpressure. The valve capacity is equal to the capacity of both letdown control valves in the wide open position during startup operation. The relief valve is set to protect the intermediate pressure letdown piping and letdown heat exchanger.b) Low Pressure Letdown Relief Valve - The relief valve downstream of the letdownbackpressure control valves protects the low pressure piping, purification filters, ion exchangers,and letdown strainer from overpressure. The valve capacity is WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-30Revision 13 (04/04)slightly greater than the capacity of the intermediate pressure letdown relief valve. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the low pressure piping and components.(DRN 00-364, R11)b) 1) Letdown Line Thermal Relief Valve- A thermal relief valve is provided for the Letdown piping which passes through containment penetration number 26. The function of the thermal relief valve is to provide overpressure protection, due to the thermal expansion of water, for the portion of Letdown piping between containment isolation valves CVC-103 and CVC-109, during post-LOCA conditions.
The thermal relief valve is located inside the primary containment, and discharges directly to the primary containment atmosphere. Operation of the thermal relief valve is only required during faulted
plant conditions.(DRN 00-364, R11)c)Charging Pump Discharge Relief Valve- The relief valve on the discharge side of the charging pumps are sized to pass the maximum rated flow of the associated pump with maximum backpressure, without exceeding the maximum rated total head for the pump assembly. The valves
are set to open when the discharge pressure exceed the RCS design pressure by 10 percent.d)Charging Pump Suction Relief Valve- The relief valve on the charging pump common suction header is sized to pass the maximum expected fluid thermal expansion r ate that would occur if all pumps were operating with the discharge isolation valves closed. The set pressure is
equal to the design pressure of the charging pump suction piping.e)Volume Control Tank Relief Valve- The relief valve on the volume control t ank is sized to pass a liquid flow rate equal to the sum of the following flow rates: the maximum operating
flow rate from the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff line, the maximum letdown flow rate
possible without actuating the high flow alarm on t he letdown flow indicator, the design purge flow rate of the Process Sampling System, and the maximum flow rate that the boric acid makeup set
pressure is equal to the design pressure of the volume control tank.f)Volume Control Tank Gas Supply Relief Valve- The relief valve is sized to exceed the combined maximum capacity of the nitrogen and hydrogen gas regulators. The set pressure is
lower than the volume control tank design pressure.(DRN 03-760, R13)g)Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff Header Relief Valve- The relief valve at the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff header allows the controlled bleedoff flow to continue to
the quench tank in the event that a valve in the line to the volume control tank is closed.
It serves as an overpres sure relief device for the portion of the Controlled Bleedoff piping between valvesCVC-403, CVC-4061 and CVC-4064.The valve is sized to pass the flow rate required to assure closure of one excess flow check valve in the event of failure of the seals in one reactor coolant pump plus the normal bleedoff from the other reactor coolant pumps. The maximum relief valve opening pressure is less than the controlled bleedoff high-high pressure alarm pressure.(DRN 03-760, R13)(DRN 00-364, R11)h)Reactor Co olant Pump Thermal Relief Valve- A thermal relief valve is provided for the Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff piping which passes through containment penetration number 44.
The function of the thermal relief valve is to provide overpressure protec tion, due to the thermal expansion of water, for the portion of Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff piping between containment isolation valves CVC-401 and RC-606, during post-LOCA conditions. The thermal relief valve is located inside the primary co ntainment, and discharges directly to the primary containment atmosphere. Operation of the thermal relief valve is only required during faulted plant conditions.(DRN 00-364, R11)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-31Revision 11 (05/01)i) Heat Traced Piping Relief Valves - Relief valves are provided for those portions ofthe boric acid system that are heat traced and which can be individually isolated. The setpressure is equal to the design pressure of the corresponding portion of the system piping. Each valve is sized to relieve the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that would occur if maximum duplicate heat tracing power were inadvertently applied to the isolated line.Charging Line Thermal Relief Valve - The relief valve on the charging line downstream of theregenerative heat exchanger is sized to relieve the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate thatwould occur if hot letdown flow continued after charging flow was stopped by closing both charging line distribution valves with both auxiliary spray valves shut. The valve is a spring-loaded check valve.9.3.4.3.3Isolation of System The letdown line and the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff line penetrate the containment with flowin the outward direction. The letdown line contains three pneumatically operated valves, two inside containment and one outside containment. The two pneumatically operated valves inside containment are automatically closed on a SIAS. One of the valves inside containment and the valve outside containmentin the letdown line are automatically closed on a CIAS. The controlled bleedoff line contains two pneumatically operated valves, one inside and one outside the containment, which close automatically on a CIAS.The charging pump discharge line carries flow in the containment. Within the containment this linebranches into three lines. Two lines direct charging flow to reactor coolant loops 1A and 2A and the other line diverts flow as auxiliary spray to the pressurizer during a plant shutdown. All these lines are providedwith check valves that preclude back flow from the reactor coolant loop. Each line to the loops has anormally open, fail-close solenoid operated isolation valve. The solenoid operated isolation valves for auxiliary spray are normally closed and fail closed. A fail open, locked open pneumatically operated valve with a handwheel is provided on the charging line just outside the containment. This valve remains open upon actuation of CIAS or SIAS to allow a path for makeup and boron injection, if necessary.9.3.4.3.4Leakage Detection and ControlThe components in the CVCS are provided with welded connections wherever possible to minimizeleakage to the atmosphere. However, flanged connections are provided on all pump suction anddischarge lines, on relief valve inlet and outlet connections, on the volume control tank spray nozzle, and on the flow meters to permit removal for maintenance. Leakage from CVCS valves inside containment is monitored by the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection System described in Subsection
5.2.5.One charging pump is used to pressurize the RCS to operating pressure for the leakage test during plantstartup operations.The CVCS can also monitor the total RCS water inventory. If there is no leakage throughout the plant, thelevel in the volume control tank should remain constant during steady-state operation. Therefore, adecreasing level in the volume control tank alerts the operator to a possible leak somewhere in the system.9.3.4.3.5Natural PhenomenaThe CVCS components are located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building and the containment and, therefore,would not be subject to the natural phenomena described in Chapter 3 other than seismic.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-32Revision 11 (05/01)9.3.4.3.6Radiological Evaluation(DRN 00-364)The CVCS is designed to limit radioactive releases to the environment to allowable limits for both normaloperation and accident conditions. During normal operation, reactor coolant is diverted through the CVCS. As the coolant passes through the CVCS purification line, the temperature of the fluid is reduced.
The coolant passes through the purification filter and reduces the concentrations of solid corrosion products. In addition, the concentration of selected soluble isotopes are reduced by the purification ion exchangers. Coolant is then normally returned to the RCS via the charging pumps. However, diversion of letdown flow to the BMS is performed where changes in coolant inventory or boron concentration is necessitated by startups, shutdown, fuel depletion, etc., or on the high volume control tank liquid level. A further discussion of this system is presented in Section 11.2. Appropriate CVCS equipment drains, vents, leakage, valve stem leakoffs, and relief valve discharges are routed to the BMS, with the exception of the CVCS system thermal relief valves discussed in Section 9.3.4.3.2. Sources containing fission gases, such as the volume control tank, have provisions for venting to the GWMS for storage and decay (see Section 11.3 for a further description).(DRN 00-364)Since the CVCS letdown line penetrates the containment, it is isolated at the containment wall duringaccident conditions. Radioactive releases to the environment are negligible as sufficient isolation and containment shielding exists to provide the necessary boundary for retaining the harmful radiation.9.3.4.3.7Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Table 9.3-15 shows a failure mode and effects analysis for the CVCS. At least one failure is postulatedfor each major component. Additionally, various component leaks throughout the safety-relatedsubsystems are considered. In each case the possible cause of such a failure is presented as well as the local effects, detection methods and compensating provisions.9.3.4.3.8Compliance with Applicable General Design Criteria Conformance with the NRC General Design Criteria is discussed in Section 3.1.
9.3.4.4Testing and Inspection RequirementsEach component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the CVCS. A high velocity flush usinginhibited water used to flush particulate material and other potential contamination from all lines in this system.Instrumentation calibration is verified during preoperational testing. Automatic controls are tested foractuation at the proper set points and alarm functions are checked for operability and proper set points.
The relief valve settings are checked and adjusted as required. All sections of the CVCS are operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and mechanical operability. Pumps are testedto demonstrate head and capacity.Prior to preoperational testing, the components of the CVCS are tested for operability. The componentsand subsystems checked include the following:a)operation of all automatic and remote controlled valves; b)operation of boric acid pumps; c)operation of nitrogen and hydrogen pressurization systems; WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-33 Revision 11-A (02/02)d)charging pump operational check;e)check of miscellaneous valve function, alarms and interlocks; f)instrumentation on the boric acid makeup tanks, volume control tank and boric acid batching tank; andg)inspection of all valves for proper flow direction.
The charging pumps permit leak testing of the RCS during plant start-up operations.
A charging pump is periodically used to check the operability and leak tightness of the check valves which isolate the RCS from the SIS.(DRN 00-691)(DRN 00-691)
As part of normal plant operation, tests, inspections, data tabulation and instrument calibrations are madeto evaluate the condition and performance of the CVCS equipment and instrumentation. Data is taken
periodically during normal plant operation to confirm heat transfer capabilities and purification efficiency.
Pump and valve leakage is monitored.
Where required, in-service testing of valves and pumps, is performed in accordance with ASME Section XI,Subsections IWV and IWP. Appropriate vents, drains, and test connections are provided for this purpose.
9.3.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.3.4.5.1 Temperature Instrumentationa)Boric Acid Batching Tank Temperature -
The batching tank temperature measurementchannel controls the tank heaters. Local indication is provided to facilitate batching operations.(DRN 00-691)b)Letdown Line Temperature - The regenerative heat exchanger letdown outlet temperature is indicated on the main control panel in the main control room and on the Remote Shutdown Panel,LCP-43. An alarm is provided in the main control room to alert the operator to abnormally high letdown temperature. The instrument provides a signal for closing the letdown stop valve inside containment at a setpoint above the high temperature alarm. The valve must be manually reopened to restore letdown flow.(DRN 00-691)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-34 Revision 11-A (02/02)c)Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature -
This channel is used to control the component cooling water flow through the letdown heat exchanger to maintain the proper letdowntemperature for purification system operation. Temperature is indicated on the main control panel.(DRN 00-691)d)Ion Exchanger Inlet Temperature - This channel actuates isolation valves to bypass flow around the ion exchangers, if the letdown temperature exceeds the highest permissible ionexchanger operating temperature. Temperature indication and a high temperature alarm are provided in the main control room. Also, remote temperature indication is provided on the Remote Shutdown Panel, CP-43 outside the main control room. The flow control valve to the ion exchangers
remains in the open position, on high temperature, if the control switch is in the "open" position.
However, if the control switch is in the "auto" position, the valve will close on high temperature and
then reopen when the temperature decreases.(DRN 00-691)e)Volume Control Temperature - The volume control tank is provided with temperatureindication on the main control panel. A high temperature alarm is provided in the main control roomto alert the operator to abnormally high water temperature in the volume control tank.f)Charging Line Temperature - The regenerative heat exchanger charging outlettemperature is indicated on the main control panel. This indication is used to monitor heat exchanger performance and verify that auxiliary spray initiation conditions are satisfied.g)Boric Acid Makeup Tank Temperature -
Each boric acid makeup tank is provided withredundant temperature measurement channels with local indication. A common high and low alarmprovides annunciation in the main control room. Each measurement channel controls one of the two heater banks on the tank which prevents precipitation of the boric acid, but that are required to
be maintained operable only when technical specifications allow a boron concentration of greater
than 3.5 w/o.
9.3.4.5.2 Pressure Instrumentationa)LetdownBackpressure Controller -
The pressure measurement channel upstream of theletdownbackpressure control valves controls these valves to maintain the proper intermediateletdown pressure. High and low pressure alarms are also provided in the main control room.b)Ion Exchanger and Letdown Strainer Differential Pressures - Differential pressure indicators are provided to indicate the pressure loss across the ion exchangers and across theletdown strainer. The strainer differential pressure indicator has a local readout with a main control room high differential pressure alarm. Local readout only is provided for the ion exchanger
differential pressure indication.
Periodic readings of these instruments will indicate any progressive loading of the units.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-35c)Boric Acid Pump Discharge Pressures - Discharge pressure of each pump is indicatedlocally. A low pressure alarm annunciating in the main control room is provided for bothmeasurement channels.d)Charging Line Pressure - Both indication and an alarm are provided for the chargingline pressure at the main control panel and at the auxiliary control panel. A low charging linepressure alarm during normal operation is indicative of a charging line failure.e)Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff Pressure - A pressure measurement channel isprovided to measure the pressure at the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff header.Indication is provided at the main control panel, and the measuring device provides overpressure protection for RCS design pressure. A high alarm and a high-high alarm are annunciated at the main control panel. The high alarm indicates that a valve in the line to the volume control tank has been closed. The high-high alarm indicates that the controlled bleedoff flow to the volume control tank and the quench tank has stopped.f)Charging Pump Suction Line Pressure Switches - A pressure switch on each chargingpump suction manifold stops the associated charging pump on low suction line pressure in theabsence of an SIAS, thus preventing damage due to cavitation.g)Volume Control Tank Pressure - The volume control tank pressure is indicated at themain control panel. High and low pressure alarms are also provided at the main control panel. Ahigh pressure alarm would indicate one or more of the following:1)the automatic controls for the inlet valve have failed when the volume controltank level was increasing due to excessive letdown,2)the automatic controls for stopping the boric acid makeup pumps have failedwhen the volume control tank level was increasing via automatic makeup,3)the operator was filling the volume control tank in the manual makeup mode anddid not stop at the high level indication, and/or4)the hydrogen gas regulator valve setting was incorrectly adjusted or hasfailed.A low pressure alarm would indicate a failure or improper setting to either the supply or vent gasregulator valve.h)Charging Pump Packing Cooling System Pressure - The seal lubrication system pressureis indicated locally for each charging pump.i)Charging Pump Packing Cooling System Low Pressure Switch - A low pressure switch oneach charging pump seal lubrication system annunciates an alarm in the main control room on alow system pressure.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-36Revision 11-B (06/02)j)Charging Pump Packing Cooling System High Pressure Switch - A high pressure switch oneach charging pump seal lubrication system annunciates an alarm in the main control room on ahigh system pressure.k)Charging-Pump Lubricating Oil Pressure - The lubricating oil pressure for eachcharging pump oil lubrication system is indicated locally.l)Charging Pump Lubricating Oil Low Pressure Switch - A pressure switch on eachcharging pump oil lubrication system precludes the operation of the associated charging pump onlow oil pressure preventing damage to the pump bearings.m)Purification Filter Differential Pressure - A differential pressure measurementchannel is provided to indicate the pressure drop across the purification filter. The channel has alocal readout with a high differential pressure alarm annnunciated in the main control room.9.3.4.5.3Level Instrumentation(DRN 00-695)a)Volume Control Tank Level - One differential pressure level instrument providesvolume control tank level indication at the main control panel in the main control room and on theauxiliary control panel outside the main control room. This instrument controls the starting and stopping of the automatic makeup system. This channel also provides a high level alarm at the main control panel. The alarm is set above the level at which letdown diversion to the BMS would normally occur. A low level alarm at the main control panel is set below the level at which automatic makeup would normally occur.b)Volume Control Tank Level - A second differential pressure level instrument on thevolume control tank automatically diverts letdown flow to the BMS on high level and switchescharging pumps suction from the volume control tank to the refueling water storage pool and actuates a local low-low level alarm.(DRN 00-695)c)Boric Acid Makeup Tank Level - Each boric acid makeup tank is provided with two levelindicators. One readout indication is located at the main control panel, the other is indicatedlocally. High, low and low-low alarms are provided in the main control room to alert the operator to abnormal boric acid levels within the tank.d)Charging Pump Packing Cooling Tank Level - Level indication is provided locally atthe packing cooling tank.e)Charging Pump Packing Cooling Tank Level Switch - A level switch on each packingcooling tank opens or closes the automatic fill valve which regulates the flow of demineralizedwater to the cooling tank. This type of control maintains the tank level within a predetermined operating range.f)Charging Pump Crankcase Oil Level - A sight glass is provided on each Charging pumpin order to monitor the oil level within the pump's crankcase.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 39.3-37 Revision 11-A (02/02) 9.3.4.5.4 Flow Instrumentationa)Letdown Flow - An orifice-type flow meter indicates letdown flowrate. This channelindicates and actuates a high-flow alarm at the main control panel in the main control room. Also, remote flow indication is provided on the auxiliary control panel outside the main control room.b)Deleted c)Concentrated Boric Acid Flow - An electromagnetic flow meter is provided to measurethe concentrated boric acid flow rate to the blending tee. This channel controls the boric acidcontrol valve to obtain a preset flow rate. High and low flow alarms in the main control room are delayed after initiation of the makeup signal to allow the set flow rate to become established. The flow rate is recorded and the total quantity is indicated at the main control panel. In the borate
mode of makeup controller operation, a preset batch quantity of boric acid can be added.d)Primary Makeup Water Flow - A flow meter is provided to measure the primary makeup water flowrate to the blending tee. This channel controls the reactor makeup water control valve to obtain apreset flow rate. High and low flow alarms in the main control room are delayed to allow the set flow rate to become established. The flow is recorded and the total quantity is indicated at the main control panel. In the dilute mode of operation, a preset batch quantity of primary makeup water can be added.e)Charging Flow - Charging flow rate indication and low flow annunciation are provided at the main control panel and at the remote shutdown panel.f)Charging Pump Packing Cooling System Water Flow - The seal lubrication system water flow for each charging pump is indicated locally.g)Volume Control Tank Hydrogen Gas Flow - A rotameter is located downstream of thehydrogen gas regulator to the volume control tank. This channel provides a local readout of hydrogen flow to the volume control tank.h)Volume Control Tank Nitrogen Gas Flow - A rotameter is located downstream of thenitrogen gas regulator to the volume control tank. This channel provides a local readout of nitrogen flow to the volume control tank.(DRN 00-691)(DRN 00-691)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-38 Revision 307 (07/13)
(DRN 00-691, R11-A) (DRN 00-691, R11-A)
9.3.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (BWRs)
This system is not applicable to Waterford 3.
9.3.6 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM)
9.3.6.1 Design Basis
The Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) is shown on the piping and instrumentation diagrams of Figure
6.3-1 (for Figure 6.3-1, Sheet 1, refer to Drawing G 167, Sheet 1) as a subsyste m of the Safety Injection System.
During shutdown cooling operation, a portion of the r eactor coolant is diverted to the SDCS headers via the shutdown cooling nozzles located in the RCS hot l egs. The flow is then cooled by circulating through two shutdown cooling heat exchangers via two low pressure safety injection pumps.
The cooled flow returns to the RCS through four lo w pressure safety injection headers connected to the cold legs. Plant cooldown rate is controlled by two flow control valves which permit proportioning the amount of shutdown cooling flow passing through the heat exchangers and heat exchanger bypass line.
(EC-8458, R307) Pilgrim 2 (Docket 50471) and all CE System 80 plants utilize a similar system. (EC-8458, R307)
9.3.6.1.1 Functional Requirements
The SDCS is used in conjunction with the main Steam Supply and main Feedwater Systems to reduce the temperature of the RCS in post shutdown periods from normal operating temperature to the refueling temperature. The Emergency Feedwater System is not used for normal shutdown except when the main Feedwater System is inoperable. The initial phase of the cooldown is accomplished by heat rejection from the steam generators to the condenser or atmosphere. After the reactor coolant temperature and pressure have been reduced to approximately 350 F and 377 psig, the SDCS is put into operation to reduce the reactor coolant temperature to the refue ling temperature and to maintain this temperature during refueling.
The shutdown cooling heat exchangers (SDCHX) are al so used for containment spray purposes, as discussed in Subsections 6.2.2 and 6.5.2.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-39 Revision 307 (07/13)
The SDCS is used in conjunction with steam generator atmospheric dump and emergency feedwater (assuming loss of main feedwater) to cool down and depressurize the Reactor Coolant System following a small break LOCA (see Section 6.3).
9.3.6.1.2 Design Criteria
In addition to the functional requirements of Subsecti on 9.3.6.1.1, the following design requirements form the design basis for the SDCS:
a) The functional requirements in Subsection 9.3.6.1.1 must be met assuming the failure of a single component.
b) No single active failure will allow overpressurization of the SDCS. Positive isolation from the RCS is provided whenever t he RCS is above the shutdown cooling initiation pressure of 377 psig (pressurizer). Isolation valves with appropriate interlocks are provided on the SDCS suction lines for this purpose. The valves and interlocks are discussed in Subsection 9.3.6.2.2.
Overpressure protection from the safety inject ion tanks is discussed in Subsection 6.3.2.2.1.
The SDCS is provided with appropriate relief valves for overpressure protection. Design basis for pressure relief capacity is discu ssed in Subsection 9.3.6.2.2.
c) No single failure of an active component during residual heat removal results in a loss of core cooling capability or prevents the init iation of shutdown cooling, either during normal plant cooldown or following an accident. A failure modes and effects analysis of the SDCS is
provided in Table 9.3-16.
(DRN 03-2063, R14; EC-8458, R307) d) The shutdown cooling heat exchangers are si zed to remove decay heat at 17 1/2 hours after shutdown based upon a refueling water temperature of 140 F and a component cooling water temperature of 90 F (both trains operable). The system is designed to attain a refueling temperature of 140 F in 24 1/4 hours after shutdown during nor mal conditions with both trains in operation. Further information on the cooldown times is provided in Subsection 9.3.6.3. (DRN 03-2063, R14; EC-8458, R307)
e) The SDCS is placed into operation when t he RCS temperature and pressure are below 350 F and 377 psig, respectively.
f) Materials are selected to preclude syst em performance degradation due to effects of short and long term corrosion.
g) The safety and seismic classifications for the SDCS are given in Table 3.2-1.
h) In the event of a single active failure , and to assure availability of the system when required, redundant components are provi ded. Redundant components are powered from independent emergency power sources (see Section 8.3). Instrumentation to assure proper system operation is described in Subsection 9.
3.6.2.2. Protection of system redundance is covered in Subsection 9.3.6.3.1.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-40 Revision 307 (07/13) i) The SDCS is designed, fabricated, inspect ed, tested and installed in accordance with the appropriate ASME codes (see S ubsection 3.9.6 and 9.3.6.2.4).
9.3.6.2 System Description
9.3.6.2.1 Functional Description
(DRN 00-703, R11-A)
The SDCS is shown in Figure 6.3-1 (for Figure 6.3-1, refer to Drawing G167, Sheets 2 and 3). (DRN 00-703, R11-A)
During shutdown cooling, reactor coolant is circulated by the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers to the LPSI headers and returned to the RCS cold legs
through the four safety injection nozzles.
(DRN 06-898, R15; EC-30976, R307)The initial cooldown rate is maintained at 75 F/hr or less. The cooldown rate is manually controlled by adjusting the flow rate through the heat exchangers with temperature control valves SI-415A and SI-415B on the discharge of the heat exchangers. (DRN 06-898, R15)
(DRN 00-703, R11-A)
With the shutdown cooling flow indicators, the operator maintains the desired total shutdown cooling flow rate by adjusting the amount of coolant which bypa sses the shutdown cooling heat exchangers with flow control valves SI-129A and 129B. During initial cool down the temperature differences for heat transfer are large, thus only a portion of the total shutdow n flow is diverted through the heat exchangers. As cooldown proceeds, the temperatur e differences become less and the flow rate through the heat exchangers is increased. The flow is increased periodically until full shutdown cooling flow is through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. This mode is maintained until the RCS reaches refueling temperatures. (DRN 00-703, R11-A; EC-30976, R307)
A warmup recirculation line is provided in the SDCS to limit thermal stress in the piping and components that would occur if a step change in temperature fr om ambient to reactor coolant temperature were permitted during system lineup. No credit is taken for warmup in equipment selection.
(DRN 03-2063, R14)
The SDCS is designed to cool the RCS from 350 F and 377 psig to 140 F and atmospheric pressure in 24 1/4 hours. The cooldown is assumed to comm ence 3 1/2 hours after shutdown with two shutdown cooling heat exchangers and two LPSI pumps in operation.
The RCS can be brought to refueling temperature using one LPSI and one shutdown cooling heat
exchanger. However, with the design heat load, the cooldown would be considerably longer than the specified 24 1/4 hour time period. One LPSI pump will provide sufficient flow through the core to maintain the core T at a value less than the full power T (60 F). (DRN 03-2063, R14)
(DRN 00-703, R11-A; EC-14765, R305)
SDCS components, where design pressure and temper ature are less than the RCS design limits, are provided with overpressure protection devices.
Each shutdown cooling suction line is equipped with three isolation valves in a series arrangement.
Valves SI-401A and SI-405A / SI-4052A for Train A and SI-401B and SI-405B / SI-4052B for Train B are locat ed inside containment while valves SI-407A (Train A) and SI-407B (Train B) are located outside cont ainment. With this arrangement, a redundant, parallel shutdown cooling path is available should a single failu re preclude the availability of one of the shutdown cooling trains. (DRN 00-703, R11-A; EC-14765, R305)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-41 Revision 305 (11/11)
(EC-14765, R305)
Each valve inside containment is provided with an interlock to prevent opening whenever the RCS pressure exceeds a preset value (see Subsection 9.
3.6.2.2). In addition, during normal operation, the circuit breakers in the power circuits for mo tor operated valves ISI-V1504A and ISI-V1502B and DC power to the solenoids for valves SI-405A / SI
-4052A and SI-405B / SI-4052B are locked in the open position to prevent inadvertent opening. Additional interlocks to prevent SDCS overpressurization are provided on the safety injection tank isolation valves, as described in Subsection 6.3.2.2.1. Both interlocks are discussed further in Section 7.6. (EC-14765, R305)
(EC-935, R302)
To assure availability of the SDCS and positive isol ation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the RCS isolating valves (SI-651 for train A and SI-665 fo r train B) are provided with pneumatic operators. The pneumatic double acting piston operators have a safety related air supply circuit incorporating three (3) accumulators and filled by Instrument Air (IA), wi th Essential Instrument Ai r (EIA) backup, is sized (600 gallons/valve) to accommodate valve strokes nec essary for design basis accidents. The solenoid valve is fail open (vents) when de-energized to ensure that the valve will fail close on loss of power. (EC-935, R302)
(EC-14765, R305)
Each shutdown train is powered from their respective buses to assure that power failure in one train will not jeopardize availability of the other train. (EC-14765, R305)
The containment isolation valves (SI-440 for trai n A and SI-441 for train B) are motor operated and are powered from their respective buses.
A pressure relief valve in each shutdown cooling suction line protects the system from overpressurization
during system operation when the suct ion valves are open and the system is not isolated from the RCS.
The valves are sized considering transients due to inadvertent operation of charging pumps, HPSI pumps, and pressurizer heaters. Additional pressure relief valves are provided to protect isolated sections of piping from thermal over pressure (see Subsection 9.3.6.2.2).
(DRN 00-691, R11-A)
No single failure of an active component during residual heat removal will result in a loss of core cooling capability or prevent the initiation of shutdown cooling. (DRN 00-691, R11-A)
Each train receives power from a separate emergency power source, in the event that offsite power is unavailable during an accident. The two trains are physi cally separated from each other so that a failure and its consequential effects (i.e., fire, flooding, steam impingement, or missiles) in one train will not
result in the failure of the other train.
The design location, arrangement and installation of t he system and its components are such that it will withstand the effects of earthquakes and other nat ural phenomena, without loss of the capability of performing its safety function as specified in General Design Criterion 2 of 1OCFR50 Appendix A.
Operability requirements and analysis of this system and components relative to NRC Regulatory Guides 1.29 and 1.48 are described in Sect ion 3.2 and Subsection 3.9.3.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-42 Revision 307 (07/13) 9.3.6.2.2 Equipment and Component Descriptions a) Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps
The LPSI pumps are used jointly as part of t he SDCS and SIS. During all periods of plant operation, when SIS operability is required, t he LPSI pumps are aligned for emergency core cooling operation.
During shutdown cooling, the LPSI pumps take flow from the reactor (hot leg) pipes and discharge through the shutdown cooling heat exc hangers. The shutdown cooling flow is then returned to the RCS through the LPSI headers to t he reactor inlet (cold leg) pipes. One low pressure safety injection pump is ali gned to each shutdown cooling heat exchanger.
The LPSI pump design flow rate of 4050 gpm is based on maintaining a core T (60 F) at shutdown cooling initiation 3 1/2 hours after shut down. The LPSI pump characteristics and the available NPSH are further discussed in Section 6.3.
b) Shutdown Cooling H eat Exchangers (SDCHXs)
The SDCHXs remove core decay heat, RCS sensible heat, and safeguard pump heat during
plant cooldown and cold shutdown. The SDCHX s are sized to maintain refueling water temperature (DRN 03-2063, R14)
(140 F) with the design component cooling water temperature of 90 F at 24 1/4 hours shutdown. (DRN 03-2063, R14)
A conservative fouling factor is assumed, re sulting in an additional area margin for the heat exchangers. The SDCHX characte ristics for the shutdown cooli ng mode are given in Table 9.3-
- 17.
c) Piping
All SDCS piping is austenitic stainless steel.
All piping joints and connections are welded except for a minimum number of flanged connections that are used to facilitate equipment maintenance or accommodate component design.
d) Valves
Design pressures and temperatures for the S DCS valves are provided in Table 9.3-18.
(DRN 00-703, R11-A; EC-30976, R307)Manual isolation valves are provided to isolate equipment for maintenance. Throttle valves (SI-129A, SI-129B, SI-415A and SI-415B) are provided for remote control of heat exchanger tube side and bypass flows. Position indication for these valves is provided in the main control room. (DRN 00-703, R11-A; EC-30976, R307)
Each shutdown cooling suction line is equipped with three remotely controlled isolation valves in a series arrangement with two valves inside containment and one valve outside containment.
Position indication is provided for each of these valves in the main control room.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-43 Revision 305 (11/11)
In addition to normal offsite power, independent em ergency power supplies are provided for the isolation valve combination, arranged to assure that a single failure of an isolation valve or power supply does not preclude availability of the syst em or preclude positive isolation at the boundary with the RCS.
(EC-14765, R305)
Since the SDCS is not designed to accommodate full RCS pressure, isolation of the system suction lines is assured by interlocks on the four suction line isolation valves inside containment.
An independent interlock, utilizing pressurizer pressu re, is provided for each of the valves. Each interlock is designed to prevent opening of its asso ciated valve whenever pressurizer pressure is
> 392 psia. This pressure is the maximum allowable (including margin) shutdown cooling initiation pressure which will not result in overpr essurization of the LPSI pump seals. An audible alarm sounds in the main control room whenever any of the valves is off the full closed position and pressurizer pressure is >
392 psia. Each of the six suction line isolation valves is equipped with open/close position indication in the main control room. During normal operating conditions, the circuit breakers in the power circuits fo r motor operated valves (ISI-V1504A and ISI-V1502B) and DC power to the solenoids for valves SI-405A / SI-4052A and SI-405B / SI-4052B are locked in the open position to prevent inadvertent opening.
Valve control circuitry and interlocks are discussed further in Section 7.6. Additional inte rlocks are provided on the safety injection tank isolation valves for overpressure protection of the SDCS. The safety injection tank (SIT) interlocks are discussed in Secti on 7.6 and Subsection 6.3.2.2.1. (EC-14765, R305)
(DRN 00-703, R11-A)
Further protection from overpressurization is provided by relief valves SI-406A and SI-406B located in the shutdown cooling suction lines between the inside and outside containment isolation valves. The relief valve protects the system from all inadvertent RCS pressurization during SDCS operation when the suction line isolat ion valves are open. Each relief valve is
designed to protect the system from overpressu rization due to the worst combination of the following incidents: all backup pressurizer heater s energized, all charging pumps actuated, and all HPSI pumps actuated. (DRN 00-703, R11-A)
The SDCS relief valves are a direct-acting, spring-loaded, closed bonnet design with a single outlet. Figure 9.3-10 illustrates the valves. Relief fluid is collected in the containment sump.
Design parameters are given in Table 9.3-22.
(DRN 00-691, R11-A)
An operability evaluation for relief valves SI-486 and SI-487 was submitted to the NRC in W3P84-3491 dated December 14, 1984. The operability ev aluation was based on water test data for a Crosby 6R8 JB-25-3-TD relief valve and steam te st data for a 4P6 JB-56-TD and a 6RIO JB TD relief valve. The operability evaluation corre lated the test data to SDCS valve performance expected for plant transient conditions. The physical geometry, mechanical, materials, and functional characteristics of the Waterford 3 relief valves were evaluated. The operability evaluation demonstrated the operabilit y of the SDCS relief valves at SDCS operating pressure and temperature conditions. (DRN 00-691, R11-A)
The NRC on the basis of the operability evaluation c oncluded in SSER 10, Section 5.4.3, that the Waterford 3 SDCS relief valves can adequately perform their intended function to relieve system
over pressure and subsequently close.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-44 Revision 305 (11/11)
Additional relief valves provided in the system pr otect isolated sections of piping from thermal transient effects. Suitable provisions are made to collect the discharges from these overpressure protection devices. Valves SI-404B and SI-404A have a capacity of five gpm each with a setpoint of 2460 psig. Valves SI-408A and SI-408B have a capacity of five gpm each with a setpoint of 425 psig. (DRN 00-92) 9.3.6.2.3 Interface With Other Systems
a) Reactor Coolant System (DRN 00-691, R11-A; EC-14765, R305)
Temperature control during plant cooldown and ref ueling is accomplished by recirculating reactor coolant through the shutdown cooling heat exc hangers. During normal operation, two valves, one motor operated and one pneumatic operated, in a series arrangement in each shutdown cooling suction line inside the containment provi de isolation of the SDCS from the RCS. These isolation valves are provided with pressure interl ocks, as described in Section 7.6. A third motor operated valve in each SDCS suction line outside c ontainment provides c ontainment isolation. (DRN 00-691, R11-A; EC-14765, R305) b) Safety Injection System
During all periods of plant operation when requi red, the LPSI pumps are aligned for emergency core cooling (see Section 6.3).
c) Containment Spray System
During normal operation, the containment spray pumps are aligned to discharge through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. This is the required alignment for emergency operation (operation following a LOCA). During shutdown cooling, the heat exchangers are isolated from
the Containment Spray System (see Subsection 6.2.2).
d) Chemical and Volume Control System
Piping and valves are provided in the CVCS such that during shutdown cooling a portion of the
flow can be bypassed from the outlet of t he shutdown cooling heat exchangers through the letdown portion of the CVCS and returned to the shutdown cooling suction lines. Flow through this bypass stream provides filtrati on and ion exchange of the reactor coolant.
e) Refueling
The transfer of refueling water from the refue ling water storage pool to the refueling pool may be accomplished using the SDCS at the start of refueling. After t he reactor vessel head is removed, the HPSI pumps are used to transfer borated wate r from the refueling water storage pool to the refueling pool by discharging to the reactor cool ant loops. The LPSI pumps or the containment spray pumps may also be used for this operation. At the end of refueling, the water is returned to the refueling water storage pool using the LPSI pumps. A connection is provided from the WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-45 Revision 307 (07/13) shutdown cooling heat exchangers discharge to the refueling water storage pool for this purpose.
f) Component Cooling Water System The Component Cooling Water System provides the heat sink to which the residual heat is
rejected. Cooling water flows through the s hell side of the shutdown cooling heat exchangers and also functions to cool the shaft seals on the LPSI pumps as they circulate the heated reactor coolant (see Section 9.2).
g) Refueling Water Level Indicating System
The Refueling Water Level Indicating System (R WLIS) allows for the continuous monitoring of the RCS level during draindown (see Subsection 5.4.16).
9.3.6.2.4 Application C odes and Classifications Piping ASME III, Class 1, 2 or 3, as applicable (1971 Edition, up to and including Winter 1972 addenda)
Valves ASME III, Class 1, 2 or 3, as applicable (1971 Edition, up to and including Summer 1973 addenda)
Heat Exchangers Tubular Exchangers Manufac turing Association (TEMA) and ASME III Class C and Section VIB (1968 Edition, up to and including Summer 1970 addenda)
Further information on component classifi cations is given in Section 3.2.
9.3.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.3.6.3.1 System Reliability Considerations The SDCS is designed to perform its design function assuming a single failure, as described in Subsection 9.3.6.1.2, items A through C.
(DRN 03-2063, R14)
To assure availability of the SDCS when required, redundant shutdown cooling trains are provided. The single failure of an active component during residual heat removal operations will not result in a loss of core cooling capability. The RCS can be brought to re fueling temperature using one low pressure safety injection pump and one shutdown cooling heat ex changer, but the cooldown process would be considerably longer than the spec ified 24 1/4 hour time period. (DRN 03-2063, R14) (EC-30976, R307)
A loss of instrument air to the SDCS will not result in a loss of cooling ability. The air operated shutdown cooling heat exchanger bypass valves are equipped wi th a hand wheel, if local dose rates permit, for positioning upon loss of instrument air. A backup safety related control air supply is also available for
valve control in the -15 RAB valve gallery for so me SBLOCA cases that may not permit entry for hand wheel control due to high dose rates. (EC-30976, R307) (EC-935, R302)
The RCS isolating valves (SI-651 for train A and SI-665 for train B) are provided with pneumatic operators which have a safety related air supply circui t incorporating three (3) accumulators and filled by Instrument Air (IA), with Essential Instrument Air (EIA) backup, is sized (600 gallons/valve) to accommodate valve strokes necessa ry for design basis accidents. (EC-935, R302)
Inadvertent overpressurization of the SDCS is precluded by the use of pressure relief valves and
interlocks installed on the shutdown cooling suction line isolation valves and safety injection tank isolation valves (see Section 7.6).
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-46 Revision 307 (07/13)
The instrumentation, control and electric equipment and power supplies pertaining to the SDCS were designed to applicable portions of IEEE Standard 279-1971, as described in Section 7.6 and IEEE Standard 308-1971.
In addition to normal offsite power sources, physically and electrically separated and redundant emergency power supply systems are provided to power safety related components. Refer to Chapter 8 for further discussion.
Since the SDCS is essential for a safe shutdown of the reactor, it is a seismic Category I system and designed to remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake.
For long-term performance of the SDCS without degradation due to corrosion, only materials compatible
with the pumped fluid are used.
Environmental conditions are specified for syst em components to ensure acceptable performance in normal and applicable accident environments (see Section 3.11).
9.3.6.3.2 Manual Actions
The SDCS is a manually aligned and actuated system. Alignment to the shutdown cooling mode is accomplished via manual alignment of valves from t he main control room, except for CS117A(B) which require local manual operation from the RAB-15 level valve gallery. Once system alignment to the shutdown cooling mode is accomplished, the syst em, and hence plant cooldown, can be controlled remotely from the main control room during normal plant conditions.
Valve actuations required for normal SDCS alignment and operation that are accomplished from the main control room are given in Table 9.3-20. In additi on to the valves mentioned above, both low pressure safety injection pumps are activated from the main control room. Each pump may also be started from LCP-43 the remote shutdown panel.
For the most limiting single active failure, wher eby only one SDCHX and one LPSI pump are in operation, the required manual actions are no greater than fo r normal shutdown cooling operation described above with all SDCS components operable. (EC-30976, R307)
For post-LOCA SDCS operation, a loss of air is assu med for flow control valves SI-129A and 129B since the air supplies for these valves are not seismically qualified. Under these circumstances, valves SI-129A and 129B fail open and cannot be remotely controlled from the main control room. The
shutdown cooling process is then controlled by adjus ting the flow rate of reactor coolant through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers remotely from the ma in control room with throttle valves SI-415A and SI-415B and adjusting total shutdown cooling flow loca lly by manually positioning valves SI-129A and SI-129B via hand wheel. If dose rates are too high to access the handwheels, cooldown is controlled by remotely shutting SI-129A and/or SI-129B via seismica lly qualified backup air supplies located in the -15 RAB valve gallery. Air is manually turned on and closes the valves bypassing and v enting the original air volume tank that initially failed the valves open. A ll RCS flow is routed to the SDCHx where cooldown is controlled instead by setting SI-415A and SI-415B at the LPSI design flow rate and the shutdown heat exchanger CCW control valves CC-963A and CC-963B fa iled open. Analysis demonstrates that, with CC-963A(B) fully open, CCW piping temperature downs tream of the SDC HX is less than the rated temperature of 270°F for RCS temperatures less t han 350°F and that RCS cooldown limit of 100°F/hr will not be exceeded. (EC-30976, R307) (EC-8458, R307)
For a moderate energy line break during shutdown coo ling the operator, within 20 minutes, will initiate corrective action in accordance with the emergency oper ating procedures. The most limiting break in the SDCS was determined to be a moderate energy critical crack break of 0.98 in 2 in the LPSI pump discharge line, with a maximum leak rate of 484 gpm.
The total RCS water volume above the top of the hot leg is 3,046 ft 3 , or 22,780 gallons (assuming an active tube volume for each steam generator of 1,356 ft 3 ). Given a 484 gpm leak rate the RCS (EC-8458, R307)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-47 Revision 307 (07/13) volume above the top of the hot leg has been decreas ed by 9,680 gallons in 20 minutes. Therefore, because the amount of SDCS fluid leakage over a 20 minute period is less than the RCS volume above the top of the hot leg, the top of the leg will not be uncovered before corrective action can be taken by the operator.
9.3.6.3.3 Performance Evaluation
(DRN 03-2063, R14)
The design point of the SDCS is taken at 17 1/2 hours after plant shutdown. At this point, the heat load design basis is to maintain the 140 F refueling temperature with 90 F component cooling water. Two shutdown cooling heat exchangers plus two LPSI pumps were assumed to be in operation at the design flow of 4000 gpm each. The SDCHX size is determined at this point since it yields the greatest heat transfer area due to the relatively small T between primary fluid and component cooling water.
The design heat load at 17 1/2 hours is based on decay heat at 17 1/2 hours assuming infinite reactor operation. Additional energy input to the RCS from two LPSI pumps running at design flow rate of 4000 gpm each was also included; no credit is taken for component energy losses to the external environment.
For the cooldown process from the shutdow n cooling initiation temperature of 350 F to the refueling temperature of 140 F, the heat load utilized is comprised of the instantaneous decay heat, LPSI pump heat input and sensible heat of the primary and se condary liquid and metal masses. Metal mass is assumed to be steel with a specific heat of 0.12 Btu/lbm F. The temperature of the component cooling
water to the SDCHX is taken as 90 F initially when 140 F refueling temperature is reached.
(EC-8458, R307)
At each time interval in the cooldown, an iterativ e process is utilized to anal yze transient performance whereby the permissible heat removal is establis hed by balancing the available heat load with the SDCHX heat removal capability. Maxi mum cooldown rate is limited to <
75 F/hr throughout the cooldown. For normal cooldown, two shutdown cooli ng trains can bring the RCS temperature to the refueling temperature of 140 F approximately 24 1/4 hours after shutdown.
With the most limiting single active failure in the SDCS, RCS temperature can be brought to the refueling temperature of 140 F in approximately 193 hours0.00223 days <br />0.0536 hours <br />3.191138e-4 weeks <br />7.34365e-5 months <br /> following shutdown using only one LPSI pump and one SDCHX. Design parameters for the SDCHX and for the CCWS are given in Tables 9.2-3, 9.2-9 and 9.3-17. Decay heat loading is defined in Subsection 6.3.1.2. (DRN 03-2063, R14, EC-8458, R307)
A failure modes and effects analysis for the SDCS can be found in Table 9.3-16. The analysis demonstrates the the SDCS can withstand any single active failure and still perform its design function.
The analysis is based on the following assumptions:
a) one active failure of a component or a single operator error is assumed to occur in the system, b) the analysis considers only failures that occur during the time period of SDCS operation, c) relief and check valve failures are not considered credible failures, and
d) failure to respond to an external signal is considered an active failure.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-48 Revision 308A (10/15)
(LBDCR 15-028, R308A) 9.3.6.3.3.1 Natural Circ ulation Cooldown Analysis
The natural circulation cooldown analyses are accomp lished in two phases, the fi rst phase is the initial cooldown to shutdown cooling initiation temperatur e and pressure, then shutdown cooling system (FSAR Section 9.3.6) operation phase to cool to the reactor coolant system temperature of 200°F. For a loss of offsite power and associated natural circulation c ooldown, the initial phase is accomplished through the emergency feedwater system (FSAR Section 10.4.9) and the atmospheric dump valves (FSAR Section 10.3). This equipment is used to r educe the reactor coolant system te mperature and pressure to values that permit operation of the shutdow n cooling system. This analyses utilizes the CENTS code (refer to FSAR Section 15.0.3.1.6 for the code description) to model the nuclear steam supply system transient.
The shutdown cooling system removes core decay heat and provides long-term core cooling following the initial phase of reactor cooldown.
These analyses calculate the time to cooldown the plant to cold shutdown conditions and the emergency feedwater inventory required.
The natural circulation cooldown analyses are used to demonstrate compliance with Branch Technical Position (BTP) 5-4. BTP 5-4 delineates the design r equirements of the residual heat removal system that was formerly BTP Reactor System Branch (RSB) 5-
- 1. These analyses demonstrate that the following BTP 5-4 paragraph B functional requirements are met.
- 1. The design shall be such that the reacto r can be taken from normal operating conditions to cold shutdown using only safety-grade sy stems satisfying General Design Criteria 1 through 5.
- 2. The systems shall have suitable redundanc y in components and features, and suitable interconnections, leak detection, and isolati on capabilities to assure that for onsite electrical power system operation (assuming offs ite power is not available) and for offsite electrical power system operation (assuming ons ite power is not available) the system function can be accomplished assuming a single failure.
- 3. The systems shall be capable of being operated from the control room with either only onsite or only offsite power available. In demonstrating that t he systems can perform their function assuming a single failure, limited operator action outside the control room is considered acceptable if suitably justified.
- 4. The systems shall be capable of bringing the reactor to a cold shutdown condition, with only onsite or offsite power available, wi thin a reasonable period of time following shutdown, assuming the most limiting single failure.
The limiting single failure with respect to emergenc y feedwater inventory usage is the failure of an atmospheric dump valve. For this single failure, t he atmospheric dump valve is permanently unavailable, forcing a cooldown on a single steam generator. On ce on the shutdown cooling system, the cooldown proceeds rapidly, as two trains ar e available. The analysis demonstrat es that sufficient safety related emergency feedwater inventory is av ailable to achieve cold shutdown conditions. Figures 9.3-8a and 9.3-8b show the cooldown profile for the natural circulat ion cooldown with a failed atmospheric dump valve.
The atmospheric dump valve actuators (FSAR Section 10.3.1) backup supply of motive gas is provided by Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I accumulators and provides a ten hour minimum supply. For this scenario, shutdown cooling entry c onditions exceed 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, thus proc edural actions are credited for manually operating the remaining atmospheric dump valve handwheel or lining up backup air supplies for continued operation. (LBDCR 15-028, R308A)
(LBDCR 15-028, R308A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-49 Revision 308A (10/15)
The limiting single failure with respect to the longest cooldown time is the loss of a DC bus. The loss of a DC bus causes that train emergency di esel generator and atmospheric dump va lve control logic to fail. In this scenario, only one train of safety related equipm ent is available, and in particular only one shutdown cooling system train is available for cooldown from 350°F to 200°F. The transient credits local manual control of the atmospheric dump valve within the four hour hold period prior to cooldown initiation. Thus, the Waterford 3 plant is capable of being cooled to a cold shutdown condition with only offsite or onsite power available within a reasonable period of time of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />.
CEN-259 (Reference 5) documents the results of a nat ural circulation cooldown test performed at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station that is applicabl e to Waterford 3. This report shows that adequate boron mixing can be achieved with natural circul ation and no letdown and that the cooldown can be achieved without the formation of a void in the upper head. This test was reviewed and approved by the NRC as applicable to Waterford 3 (Reference 6).
Thus, the requirements of BTP RSB 5-4 are met.
The natural circulation cooldown analysis does not credit the operation of t he pressurizer heaters.
Therefore, operator action to energize the pressurize r heaters is not a time critical operator action. (LBDCR 15-028, R308A) 9.3.6.3.4 Loss of SDCS with RCS Partially Filled
In response to Generic Letter 87-12 dated July 9, 1987, a study was conducted to review accident scenarios initiated from the loss of SDC while the RCS was partially fill ed. A response was submitted in letter W3P87-1775 dated September 21, 1987.
If shutdown cooling is lost for an extended period of time, the RCS water temperature will increase. If boiling occurs and the RCS is open, then inventory will be lost. This could result in eventual core uncovery unless makeup flow is provided or SDC is re-established. If the RCS is closed, boiling will increase the pressure in the upper plenum causing t he water level in the reactor vessel to be depressed down to the elevation of the RCP suction (e.g., core c ooling is maintained since this level is above the top of the core). Condensation of steam in the RCS by the steam generator s limits the pressure increase.
The study concluded:
- 1. Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) design is such that RCS pressurization of approximately 60 psig is necessary before significant water lo ss could occur when an RCP seal is removed.
(DRN 03-2063, R14) 2. For a closed RCS (including RCP seal repl acement), heat transfer (steam condensation) to a steam generator results in that generator boiling dry (with no makeup) in approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> with a maximum RCS pressure of approximately 35 psig before boiling dry.
- 3. For an open RCS (removal of an RCP or st eam generator manway) at one day after reactor shutdown, core uncovery will not occu r until after 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This is based on the conservative assumption that no primary system steam is condensed in the steam generator(s).
The time for core uncovery increases as the time after reactor shutdown increases. (DRN 03-2063, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-50 Revision 8 (5/96)
- 4. Steam generator heat removal and RCS mak eup capability are the key parameters in extending the time to core uncovery.
- 5. In addition to restoring shutdown cooling, the event may be terminated at any time prior to core damage by high pressure safety injection (HPSI) flow.
The study confirmed that the postu lated core damage scenario is within the Waterford 3 procedural and design basis capability to mitigate without fuel damage or the release of radioactive material.
9.3.6.4 Preoperational Testing
Preoperational tests are conducted to verify proper operation of the SDCS. The preoperational tests include verification of adequate shutdown cooling flow and verification of the operability of all associated valves. In addition, a preoperational hot functional performance test is made on the installed shutdown cooling heat exchangers.
For availability of the SDCS, com ponents of the systems are periodically tested as part of the Safety Injection System testing, as described in Section 6.3. The system and component tests, together with shutdown cooling heat exchanger thermal performance data taken during refueling, are sufficient to demonstrate the continued operability of the SDCS.
In addition to flow tests, the SDCS also undergoes a series of preoperational and inservice pressure tests. Preoperational hydrostatic tests are conduct ed in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code while inservice pressure tests are carried out as required by Section XI of the ASME Code.
Leak testing will also be done on the portions of t he SDCS outside containment as part of a leak reduction program as required by NUREG-0737.
For further discussion of preoperational and inse rvice testing on the S DCS and components, see Sections 3.9.6, 6.6 and 14.2.
9.3.6.5 Instrument ation Applications Operation of the SDCS is controlled and monitored th rough the use of installed instrumentation. The instrumentation provides the capability to determine heat removal, cooldown rate, shutdown cooling flow and the capability to detect degradation in flow or heat removal capacity. The instrumentation provided for the SDCS consists of:
a) Temperature measurements - shutdown cooling heat exchanger inlet and outlet temperature and the temperature of the shutdown cooling flow to the low pressure header. All temperatures are indicated in the main contro l room. The shutdown cooling heat exchanger inlet temperatures and the low pressure header temperatur es are recorded to facilitate control of the RCS cooldown rate.
b) Pressure measurements - LPSI header pr essure and shutdown cooling heat exchanger inlet pressure. These pressures are indicated in the main control room and, when used with the low pressure pump performance curves, provide an alternate means of measuring system flow rate.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-51 Revision 15 (03/07)
(DRN 00-691, R11-A) c) Total shutdown cooling flow rate is measur ed by the shutdown cooling flow indicators F-306 and F-307. With the aid of these flow indi cators, the operator maintains the desired total shutdown cooling flow rate by adjusting the amount of coolant which bypasses the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. Shutdown cooling flow indication is also available at the Remote Shutdown Cooling Panel, CP-43. (DRN 00-691, R11-A)
(DRN 06-886, R15) d) Shutdown Cooling Alarms - One alarm is prov ided on CP-8 for Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Trouble.
The LPSI flow inputs are monitored and will alarm for a low flow condition. The Core Exit
Thermocouples (CET) are monitored for a temperatur e rise in the reactor core. The temperature rise of 2°F or greater per 4 minute average, when compared to the last 4 minute average, will activate the alarm.
The low flow alarm indicates a loss of flow from the LPSI train being used for shutdown cooling.
The two independent CET indicators monitor the core exit conditions in accordance with Generic Letter 88-17. (DRN 06-886, R15)
The only instrumentation necessary following a postulated accident is the inlet temperature measurement of the SDCHXs and t he temperature of the shutdown cooling flow in the low pressure header (TE 351 and TE 352). This instrumentation is designed to Class 1E
requirements.
9.3.7 HYDROGEN SYSTEM
9.3.7.1 Design Bases
The hydrogen system serves no safety function and, therefore, has no safety design bases. The hydrogen system is designed to:
a) Supply the main generator gas cubicle su fficient hydrogen for use as the generator rotor coolant.
b) Supply sufficient hydrogen to the volume cont rol tank of CVCS to control of hydrogen concentrations in the reactor coolant.
9.3.7.2 System Description
a) A completely automatic hydrogen supply syst em is provided with resupply and service coming from a vendor tube trailer. The system includes a tube trailer discharging stanchion, a grounding assembly, a pressure control unit, an excess flow manifold and a preassembled
module of storage vessels with manifolding and interconnecting piping. The overall system and its operation is depicted in Fig. 9.3-9.
b) Specific Equipment Description
- 1) Gaseous Hydrogen Storage Bank
The total storage bank is composed of eight (8) ASME-coded gas storage tubes.
Each tube is a 24 in. O.D., 20 ft. 6 1/2 in. long seamless vessel. The maximum allowable
working pressure is 2,450 psig and the test pre ssure is 3,675 psig. The hydrogen gas capacity of eight tubes together at 2,300 psig is 55,488 st andard cu. ft. The design and materials data for bulk gas storage tubes is listed in Table 9.3-21.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-52 Revision 7 (10/94)
- 2) Pressure Control Unit
The pressure control unit is an automatic pressure-reducing manifold mounted in a shop-fabricated control cabinet complete with accessories designed specifically for this installation. The automatic reducing mani fold has two parallel pressure reducing regulators. The discharge pressure range of these regulators is 0 to 250 psig so that pressures can be adjusted if required. The unit is set to operate in the automatic mode by setting the regulators at 150 psig and va lving PCV-2 regulator off for use as a standby. Other settings could also be selected or changed at any time. Pressure control switches sound an alarm when the active bank pressure is depleted to 200 psig. A pressure transmitter is provided to send sy stem status information to a monitoring computer.
Additional features of the equipment are as listed below. The piping is all industry-standard brass, thus maintenance is virtually e liminated. The cabinet is provided with a support stand so it is free-standing and may t hus be isolated from the storage bank for additional safety. Safety valves are provided and set to 250 psig to protect low pressure downstream piping. Pressure regulators, are designed for manifold-type service and are 2 stage so discharge pressure will be constant with a minimum of physical complexity.
The flow capability of these regulators is in excess of 14,000 scfh. Two gauges are provided on each regulator, with ranges of 0 to 400 psig and 0 to 4,000 psig respectively.
An explosion-proof pressure switch is prov ided set at 200 psig. The switch is located inside the control cabinet. Sufficient hand va lves are provided to insure complete operational flexibility. The cabinet is painted inside and out, and the piping is purged.
- 3) Excess Flow Manifold
The excess flow manifold is included to safeguard the line against rupture between the hydrogen system and the generator. Because there is a great distance between the hydrogen station and the use point at the generator, the line may be damaged. If line damage should occur, then an unprotected hydrogen system will discharge at the maximum capacity of both regulators to t he atmosphere, thus exposing personnel and property to possible fire damage and accumulation of gas which could result in an
explosion. The excess flow manifold has an excess flow valve which is designed to close at 1000 scfh hydrogen flow. Should a line ruptur e occur, the flow would instantly reach 1000 scfh and the valve would close bubble-tight to cut off all hydrogen flow.
For purging initially filling, or other high fl ow requirements, the full flow bypass valve would be manually opened. Thus, full regulator capacity can be utilized.
If the excess flow valve were to fail, it can be bypassed, valved off, and removed without disturbing the hydrogen flow.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-53 The bypass valve also serves as a device for reopening the excess flow valve, as the excess flow valve will remain closed until t he pressure is equalized across it. By opening the bypass after the piping is repaired, t he pressure is equalized and the excess flow valve opens for normal flow to the gener ators. The bypass is then closed.
- 4) Tube Trailer Discharging Stanchion
A stanchion-type tube trailer discharging stanchi on is provided. The stanchion assembly consists of a flexible pigtail, shutoff valve, check valve, bleed valve, overfill regulator and necessary piping. The stanchion is support ed by "L" -shaped aluminum "I" beam. Filling apparatus is thus separated from the cont rol cabinet for safety and convenience.
9.3.7.3 Safety Evaluation
Bulk hydrogen storage system is loca ted approximately 350 ft west of the turbine building in gas storage area as shown in Figure 1.2-1. Malfunction or fa ilure of a component of the hydrogen system has no adverse effect on any safety related system or component.
During filling and purging the generator air content is maintained below 30 percent to ensure that an explosive mixture does not exist in the generator housing. During normal operation hydrogen gas purity is indicated and alarmed by the purity indicating tr ansmitter and by the generator blower pressure gage.
9.3.7.4 Tests and Inspection
The hydrogen system is tested functionally under all ant icipated operating conditions prior to initial plant startup. This verifies that all system units and c ontrols function properly. The system is also tested during normal plant operation to ensure its operability.
9.3.7.5 Instrument ation Applications Local pressure indicators located at the equipment are provided for monitoring the system pressure. A pressure switch will actuate low pressure alarm on the main control room annunciator panel.
9.3.8 POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM
9.3.8.1 Design Basis
The Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) is des igned on the criteria set forth in NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 which deals with the implementat ion of capabilities for sampling reactor coolant and containment atmosphere during post-accident conditions.
The containment atmosphere hydrogen analyzer system is described in detail in section 6.2.5. The following is a description of the primary coolant and the safety injection sump sampling WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-54 Revision 10 (10/99) system referred to as the RC PASS (Reactor Coolant Post-Accident Sampling System). The RC PASS is capable of the following:
a) Obtaining a representative reactor coolant sa mple and a SIS sump sample (via the HPSI pump recirculation line to the RWSP).
b) Cooling the high temperature samples to allow for safe handling
c) Continuously sampling the reactor c oolant for dissolved oxygen content and pH
d) Indication and recording of the dissolv ed oxygen concentration and pH of the liquid
e) Capturing a diluted liquid grab sample to analyze for chloride, boron and radioisotopes
f) Capturing an undiluted grab sample to analyze for chloride, boron and radioisotopes
g) Indication; and recording of t he hydrogen content in the gas phase
h) Capturing a diluted gas grab sample to analyze for hydrogen, noble gases and gaseous radioisotopes
9.3.8.2 System Description
The RC PASS is shown on Figure 9.3-2 (for Figure 9.3-2, Sheet 3, refer to Drawing G162, Sheet 3).
The RC PASS consists of sample coolers selection and st rainer station (Skid No. 1), Liquid Sample Panel (LSP or Skid No. 2), and the Process Control Panel (P CP of Skid No. 4). In addition, there are six auxiliary stations for obtaining dilu ted, undiluted, and full pressure liquid samples, gas grab samples, and for calibrating pH and dissolved oxygen sensors. T he PASS is located in the wing area of the RAB.
Skid No. 1 and 3 are located at El. - 4' O" MSL.
Skids Nos. 2 and 4 are located at El. + 21' O". Skid No. 2 is situated in an accessible shielded room.
The auxiliary stations are also located in an accessibl e shielded room adjacent to the Skid 2 room. Since post-accident radiation levels will be higher than duri ng normal operating conditions, all system valves in direct contact with the reactor c oolant are designed for this environment.
The reactor coolant sample or the SIS sump samp le enters Skid No. 1 of the post accident sampling system (PASS) at a set flow rate. The sample pa sses through heat exchanger no. 2, cooled by train A of CCW, where its temperature is reduced prior to colle ction and analysis. The sample is then strained to remove any undissolved solids.
The sample is then directed to Skid No. 2 which serv es the general purpose of directing sample flow past the necessary instrumentation requir ed to analyze the sample. The multiple flow paths that are possible enable the operator to obtain single or simultaneous measurements. Flow paths are chosen and aligned by input signals to each solenoid valve originating from the Process Control Panel. Within Skid No. 2, the operator is capable of determining the pH and dissolv ed oxygen concentration of the process stream.
Additionally, samples can be isolated, heated and then stripped using an inert gas directed to an in-line WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-55 Revision 9 (12/97) gas chromatograph for determination of the H 2 gas concentration. Also included in this skid are the utility fluids of demineralized water for flushing and sample dilution, argon stripping gas and instrument air.
If desired, alternate flow paths can be aligned to a llow sample to be directed to the various auxiliary stations. The flow path chosen and the existing samp ling conditions determines the type of grab sample that will be obtained.
The Process Control Panel (PCP) or Skid No. 4 is located away from the LSP and grab sample station cubicles in the open area adjacent to the Switchgear Room B on the +21'0" elevation. This panel, designed as a console and contains all of the readout devices for the LSP analyzers and instruments. In addition, the console also houses the remote valve sw itches used to actuate the LSP solenoid valves.
With the exception of individual grab samples, all ot her system operations are performed from the PCP.
The remote controls of the PCP permit operators to obtain sample data without being exposed to large volumes of potentially highly radioactive coolant.
9.3.8.3 Safety Evaluation
The RC PASS is designed in compliance with the requirements set forth in NUREG-0660; NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.97. In-line inst ruments are available to quantify RCS dissolved oxygen, pH and hydrogen. The capability is provided to obtain and analyze reactor coolant samples in 3-hours or less from the time a decision is made to take a sample.
Grab samples are taken to the onsite lab which is c apable of providing, within the 3-hour time frame, quantification of the following:
a) Radionuclides (noble gases, iodi nes, cesiums, and non-volatiles)
c) RCS hydrogen concentration.
Grab sample analysis of RCS chlorides is accomplished within the 4-day time frame.
Design features and capabilities of the PASS t hat comply with NUREG-0660, and NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, are listed below:
a) The system is capable of receiving a continuous sample, thus insuring a representative reactor coolant sample of the core area
b) A flow restriction orifice is provided inside the containment to limit reactor coolant losses from a rupture of the sample line
c) Deionized water and argon are provided to purge sample lines and dilute liquid and gas samples
d) The residues of the gas samples are returned to the containment or to the Gaseous Waste Management System.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-56 Revision 14 (12/05) e) The residues of the liquid samples are direct ed into the waste tanks or containment sump
f) The existing reactor coolant sampling system does not require an isolated auxiliary system to be placed in operation during post-accident conditions (DRN 00-691, R11-A) g) Samples will be analyzed for dissolved gases (H 2). Additionally, the capability of obtaining a pressurized reactor coolant sample under post-accident conditions is available (DRN 00-691, R11-A) h) The grab sample and the in-line calibration stati ons are located near Skid No. 2. The undiluted grab sample receiver and Skid No. 2 are shielded. The shielding requirements are based on the
NUREG-0737 source terms in the reactor cool ant and on the condition of a monthly averaged dose rate of 15 mr/hr at the shield wall
i) The sampling cabinet (Skid No. 2) is located in an enclosure of NEMA 12 classification with a top vent. The vent from Skid No. 2 and the vents from the diluted liquid grab sample ports are connected to the plant HVAC system. Thus, any gaseous effluents from these sources will be filtered through charcoal absorbers and HEPA filters
j) Grab sample chloride analysis will be performed on or off site within 4 days of the sample being taken.
The PASS is not required to assure any of the following conditions:
a) The integrity of the RCPB
b) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition (DRN 04-977, R14) c) The ability to prevent or mitigate the c onsequence of an accident which could result in potential offsite exposures in ex cess of 10CFR50.67 guideline exposures. (DRN 04-977, R14)
The PASS is isolated from the RCPB and the contai nment and therefore is NNS and does not meet seismic Category I requirements.
All lines in the PASS are constructed of corrosion-resistant stainless steel. Each portion of the system is
designed for source pressure and temperature. Over pressure protection is provided through a pressure relief valve which discharges to the waste tanks.
The system is designed to minimize pipe runs and gr ab sample sizes thus minimizing radiation exposure and the effects of equipment failure.
All PASS valves located in an inaccessible pos t-accident area are environmentally qualified.
All electrically powered components associated wi th post-accident sampling are capable of being supplied with power and operated within thirty minutes of an accident in which there is core degradation, assuming loss of offsite power.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-57 Revision 307 (07/13) 9.3.8.4 Testing and Inspection Each component will be inspected and cleaned prior to installation. The system will be operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow and thermal capacity, and mechanical operability.
Instruments will be calibrated during testing.
Data will be taken during normal plant operation to confirm that the sample heat exchangers and pressure reducing valve in the system are properly se t to give the desired conditions for sampling. The PASS will be exercised and parameters tested (as allow ed by normal operation) at least once every six months. 9.3.8.5 Instrumentation Application
All necessary instrumentation and c ontrol for satisfactory operation of the Reactor Coolant Post-Accident Sampling System is provided and loca ted on the Process Control Panel.
All equipment is arranged in a manner conducive to safe ty as well as ease of inspection, maintenance, operation and calibration.
I&C Readout on the Process Control Panel is listed below.
Liquid flow Indicator
pH Indicator-Recorder
Dissolved 0 2 Indicator-Recorder
H 2 Analyzer Recorder
Temperature Indicator
Pressure Indicator 9.3.9 NITROGEN SYSTEM 9.3.9.1 Design Bases (EC-41355, R307)
The nitrogen system is designed to provide a reliabl e supply of nitrogen for the nitrogen accumulators on pneumatically operated valves and the necessary ni trogen for normal plant operation and maintenance.
Nitrogen accumulators are provided as a backup sour ce of compressed gas for various safety-related valves needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident or for the safe shutdown of the plant following an accident. Safety-related valves serviced by nitrogen accumulators are listed in Table 9.3-1b. Safety related Nitrogen accumulators are capable of providi ng motive air to pneumatically operated valves for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Procedures are established for operating manual handwheel overrides or lining up backup air supplies for continued safety function after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. (EC-41355, R307) 9.3.9.2 System Description The completely automatic storage and supply system is resupplied from a vendor tanker/trailer. The system withdraws liquid nitrogen from the storage vessel, compresses and vaporizes it for storage in high pressure storage tubes. The high pressure nitrogen is then withdrawn and regulated for delivery to the system. The pump controls monitor the storage tubes capacity and automatically refill when required.
The pump is in a standby status at all times. The pumping system is protect ed from overpressure by safety switches and relief devices.
Pressure, temperature, and liquid level switches send signals to the pump control panel for start, stop and emergency shutdown.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 9.3-58 Revision 307 (07/13) 9.3.9.2.1 Specific Equipment Description Gaseous Nitrogen Storage Bank The storage bank is composed of three ASME-coded gas storage tubes. Each tube is a 24" O.D., 22' 6-1/2" long seamless vessel. The maximum allowable wo rking pressure is 2,450 psig and the test pressure is 3,675 psig.
High Pressure Control Manifold This manifold maintains constant regulated final line pressure adjustable between 0-1,000 psig. The active regulator controls and the reserve regulator is used as a standby in the event the active regulator fails. Pressure transmitters are inst alled on the inlet side of the manifold for remote monitoring of system pressure.
Tube Trailer Discharging Stanchion A stanchion-type tube trailer discharging station is provided for service from a tube trailer in the event of a liquid system failure. The stanchion assembly consists of a flexible pigtail, shutoff valve, check valve, a bleed valve and necessary piping. Filling apparatus is thus separated from the modular storage bank assembly for safety and convenience. (DRN 99-1082, R11)
High Pressure Nitrogen System Safety Class 2 Relief Valve Relief Valve NG-1523 is installed to protect t he safety related nitrogen accumulators and RCB Penetration No. 14 from over-pressurization should the non-safety related pressure reducing valves NG-147A(B) and the non-safety related pressure relie f valves NG-149 and/or NG-1505 fail to function properly. NG-1523 is located at the (+)46.00' elev ation of the Reactor Auxiliary Building Wing Area, adjacent to nitrogen accumulators V and VI. An exception is taken to ASME Code Subsection NC-7153 in that a locked open isolation valve (NG-1522) is located upstream of relief valve NG-1523. FSAR Section 6.3.2.5.4 reflects that relief valve failu res are not considered credible failures and ANSI N658-1976 specifically exempts active failure of code safety relief valves so single failure is not applicable. (DRN 99-1082, R11) (EC-41095, R307)Backup Air Supply to Accumulators 1 and 2 Backup Air bottles are provided that may be manually aligned to re-pressurize the Nitrogen Accumulators 1 & 2 following a design basis event concurrent with a lo ss of Instrument Air. This feature enables control room operators to realign Essential Chiller cooling wate r valves from the Wet Cooling Towers to the Dry Cooling Towers to preserve Wet C ooling Tower basin water inventory. (EC-41095, R307) 9.3.9.3 Safety Evaluation A complete loss of the nitrogen supply system duri ng full power operation does not reduce the ability of the reactor protective system or the engineered safe ty features and their suppor ting systems to safely shutdown the reactor or to miti gate the consequences of an accident.
The nitrogen supply system exclusive of the nitrogen accumulators is a non-safety-related system, serves no safety function and is not designed to seismic r equirements. The portion of the nitrogen piping and valves penetrating the containment is designed to Sa fety Class 2 and seismic Category I requirements (refer to Subsection 6.2.4). The containment nitr ogen header outer isolation valve is designed to fail closed. (EC-41355, R307)The nitrogen accumulators provide a backup source of compressed gas to operate pneumatic safety-related valves in the event of a loss of instrument air. Table 9.3-lb lis ts all safety-related valves provided with backup nitrogen accumulators. The accumulators are designed to Safety Class 3 and seismic
Category I requirements. They are sized to permit suffici ent stroking of all specified valves in the course (EC-41355, R307)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3
9.3-59 Revision 307 (07/13)
(EC-41355, R307)of performing their safety-related functions. Upon a lo ss of instrument air, a low pressure signal will open the respective nitrogen supply valves. Nitrogen that is stored in the accumulators will then charge the valve operators' supply lines permitting continued valve operation. Safety related nitrogen accumulators are capable of providing motive air to pneumatica lly operated valves for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Procedures are established for operating manual handwheel overrides or lining up backup air supplies for continued safety function after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. (EC-41355, R307) 9.3.9.4 Tests and Inspection
The nitrogen system is tested functionally prior to initial plant startup. These test s verify that all system units and controls function properly. The system is also tested during normal plant operation to ensure its operability.
9.3.9.5 Instrument ation Applications Local pressure indicators located at the equipment are provided for monitoring the system pressure.
Pressure switches will actuate a low pressure alarm on the main control room annunciator panel.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3
9.3-60 Revision 308A (10/15) SECTION
9.3 REFERENCES
1 - Williams, W. L.,. Corrosion, 13539t, 1957.
2 - Proceedings of Conference: Fundamental Aspects of Stress Corrosion Cracking, 1967.
3 - Ward, C. T., Mathis, D. L., and Stachle, R. W., "Intergranular Attack of Sensitized Austenitic Stainless Steels by Wa ter Containing Fluoride Ions", Co rrosion, NACE, Vol. 25, No. 9, September 1969.
4 - Miller, D. A. and Bryant, P.E.C., Corrosi on and Coolant Chemistry Interactions in Pressurized Water Reactors, National Associat ion of Corrosion Engineers Conference, March 1970.
5 - CEN-259, "An Evaluation of the Natural Circ ulation Cooldown Test Performed at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station", January 1984.
(LBDCR 15-028, R308A) 6 - NRC Safety Evaluation for Natura l Circulation Cooldown, April 8, 1988. (LBDCR 15-028, R308A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-1a Revision 302 (12/08)
SAFETY CLASS VALVES WITH AIR ACCUMULATORS
Valve Tag Figure Valve Tag Figure CC MVAAA710 (2CC-F243A/B) 9.2-1
- CC MVAAA807A (2CC-F154A1) 9.2-1
- CC MVAAA808A (2CC-F155A2) 9.2-1
- CC MVAAA808B (2CC-F156B1) 9.2-1
- CVRMVAAA201 (2HV-B156A) 9.2-1
- CC MVAAA807B (2CC-F157B2) 9.2-1
- CVRMVAAA101 (2HV-B157B) 9.2-1
- CC MVAAA823A (2CC-F158A1) 9.2-1
- CS MVAAA125A (2CS-F305A) Dwg. G163 CC MVAAA822A (2CC-F159A2) 9.2-1
- CS MVAAA125B (2CS-F306B) 6.3-35 CC MVAAA822B (2CC-F160B1) 9.2-1 *
(EC-935, R302) SI MVAAA405A (1SI-V1503A) 6.3-1 ** CC MVAAA823B (2CC-F161B2) 9.2-1
- SI MVAAA405B (1SI-V1501B) 6.3-1 ** CC MVAAA963A (3CC-F130A) 9.2-1 * (EC-935, R302)
CC MVAAA636 (3CC-TM169A/B) 9.2-1
- CC MVAAA620 (3CC-FM138A/B) 9.2-1
- For Figure 9.2-1, Sheet 4, refer to Drawing G160, Sheet 4 and for Figure 9.2-1, Sheet 6, refer to Drawing G160, Sheet 6 (EC-935, R302)
- For Figure 6.3-1, Sheet 2, re fer to Drawing G167, Sheet 2. (EC-935, R302)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-1b Revision 10 (10/99)SAFETY CLASS VALVES WITH NITROGEN ACCUMULATORSValve Tag FigureValve Tag FigureACCMVAAA126A (3CC-TM290A9.2-1 *CC MVAAA301A (3CC-F272A)9.2-1 *ACCMVAAA126B (3CC-TM291B)9.2-1 *CC MVAAA301B (3CC-F273B9.2-1 *CC MVAAA114A (3CC-F113A/B)9.2-1 *CC MVAAA322A (3CC-F274A)9.2-1 *CC MVAAA115A (3CC-F114A/B)9.2-1 *CC MVAAA322B (3CC-F275B)9.2-1
- CC MVAAA115B (3CC-F115A/B)9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA224B (2FW-V853A)10.4-2 **CC MVAAA114B (3CC-F116A/B)9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA228B (2FW-V850B)10.4-2 **CC MVAAA126B (3CC-F112A/B)9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA223B (2FW-V854B)10.4-2 **
CC MVAAA126A (3CC-F109A/B9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA229B (2FW-V849A10.4-2 **CC MVAAA127A (3CC-F110A/B)9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA229A (2FW-V84F7B)10.4-2 **CC MVAAA127B (3CC-F111A/B)9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA228A (2FW-V848A)10.4-2 **
ACCMVAAA112A (3CC-F276A)9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA224A (2FW-V851B)10.4-2 **
ACCMVAAA112B (3CC-F277B)9.2-1 *EFWMVAAA223A (2FW-V852A)10.4-2 **ACCMVAAA139A (3CC-F278A)9.2-1 *CC MVAAA727 (3CC-F120A)9.2-1 *ACCMVAAA139B (3CC-F279B)9.2-1 *CC MVAAA563 (3CC-F121B)9.2-1
- MS MVAAA116A (MS-PM629A)10.2-4CC MVAAA200A (3CC-F122A)9.2-1 *MS MVAAA116B (2MS-PM630B)10.2-4CC MVAAA200B (3CC-F123B)9.2-1 *SI MVAAA106A (2SI-L103A6.3-1 (for Fig. 6.3-1 Sht 1, refer toDwg. G167, Sht.
1)SI MVAAA106B (2SI-L104B)6.3-1 (for Fig. 6.3-1, Sht 1, refer to Dwg. G167, Sht.
1)* For Figure 9.2-1, Sheet 4, refer to Drawing G160, Sheet 4 and for Figure 9.2-1, Sheet 6, refer to Drawing G160, Sheet 6.**For Figure 10.4-2, Sheet 1, refer to Drawing G153, Sheet 1.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-2 (Sheet 1 of 3)Revision 11 (05/01)DESIGN DATA FOR COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENTSService and Instrument Air CompressorsTypeHorizontal, nonlubricated, rotary, single stage Quantity5 (2-Instrument air, 3-service air)
Capacity, SCFM280 Operating Pressure, psig112-120 Design Pressure, psig130 Speed, rpm1770(DRN 99-0674)Brake Horsepower, hp130 @ 120 psig (DRN 99-0674)Materials of ConstructionCasingBronzeHeadCast Iron RotorBronze ShaftSteelDriverTypeElectric MotorRating/Speed150 hp/1800 rpmVoltage/Phase/Frequency460 V/3 /60 HzService Factor1.15Intake Filter SilencerTypeDry Type, Air MazeHeat ExchangerTypeShell and Tube Material:ShellRed BrassTubesAdmiralty WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-2 (Sheet 2 of 3) Revision 7 (10/94)DESIGN DATA FOR COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENTSHeat Exchanger(Cont'd)Tube SheetsForged Brass Air ReceiverTypeVertical Quantity2 (1-Instrument air, 1-Service air)Capacity, cu ft100Design Pressure, psig150Design Temperature, °F125Diameter, inches42 Height, feet10 MaterialCarbon SteelPrefilterTypeCartridgeQuantity2Capacity, SCFM300 Filtration99.97% of all particles 0.3 - 0.6 micronsor largerAir DryerQuantityTwo TypeHeatless Capacity, SCFM300 DesiccantActivated AluminaDew Point-40
°F at 100 psigDrying Chambers, Quantity2 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-2 (Sheet 3 of 3)DESIGN DATA FOR COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENTSAfterfilterQuantityTwo TypeCartridge Capacity, SCFM600 Filtration99.985% removal of all particles 0.3microns or larger WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3
TABLE 9.3-3 Revision 15 (03/07)
PRIMARY SAMPLE POINTS Pressure Temperature Analytical Design Operating Design Operating Sample Points Source Components (psig) (psig) F F Coolers P1 Primary Coolant Grab Sample, 2485 2350 650 616 2 Sample Vessel
P2 Pressurizer Surge Grab Sample 2485 2350 700 653 1 Line P3 Pressurizer Steam Grab Sample, 2485 2350 700 653 2 Space Sample Vessel P4A & Shutdown Cooling Grab Sample 440 415 400 350 1 P4B Suction Line P5A & High Pressure Safety Grab Sample 1950 1800 400 350 1 P5B Injection Pump Mini Flow Line
P6 Purification Filter Dissolved Hydrogen 200 100 250 120 1 Inlet Analyzer, Grab Sample, Sample Vessel P7 Purification Filter Grab Sample, 200 100 250 120 1 Outlet - Ion Sample Vessel Exchanger Inlet
P8 Ion Exchanger Outlet Grab Sample 200 100 250 120 1 (DRN 06-901, R15)
P9 Volume Control Tank Sample Vessel 75 50 250 120 1 (DRN 06-901, R15)
P10 Primary Water Grab Sample 150 104 125 92 1 Storage Tank
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-4 (Sheet 1 of 3) Revision 307 (07/13)
SECONDARY SAMPLE POINTS Pressure Temperature Sample Analytical Design Operating Design Operating Sample Chiller Bath Points Source Components (psig) (psig) F F __
Coolers Cooling Coils (DRN 05-251, R14; EC-8465, R307)S1 Main Steam No. 1 Grab Sample,Silica, 1085 945 555 540 1 1 Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S2)
S2 Main Steam No. 2 Grab Sample,Silica, 1085 945 555 540 1 1 Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S1) (EC-8465, R307) S3A Condenser Hotwell Grab Sample, Atmos. 2.26" Hg 125 105 1 1A Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S6)
S3B Condenser Hotwell Grab Sample, Atmos. 2.26" Hg 125 105 1 2A Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S6)
S4A Condenser Hotwell Grab Sample, Atmos. 2.26" Hg 125 105 1 1B Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S6)
S4B Condenser Hotwell Grab Sample, Atmos. 2.26" Hg 125 105 1 2B Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S6)
S5A Condenser Hotwell Grab Sample, Atmos. 2.26" Hg 125 105 1 1C Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S6)
S5B Condenser Hotwell Grab Sample, Atmos. 2.26" Hg 125 105 1 2C Cation Conductivity, (Sodium, S6) (EC-8465, R307) S6 Condensate Pump Grab Sample,Silica, 610 482 150 106 1 Discharge Cation Conductivity, pH, Hydrazine, DO (Sodium, 3A & B, 4A
& B, 5A & B)
(DRN 06-843, R15)S7 Combined Heater Grab Sample 642 634 388 363 1 Drain Pump
Discharge (DRN 05-251, R14;06-843, R15; EC-8465, R307)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-4 (Sheet 2 of 3) Revision 307 (07/13)
Pressure Temperature Sample Analytical Design Operating Design Operating Sample Chiller Bath Points Source Components (psig) (psig) F____ F____ _ Coolers Cooling Coils (DRN 05-251, R14;06-843, R15; EC-8465, R307) S7A Drain Collector Grab Sample 1085 804 550 521 1 Train 1A
S7B Drain COllector Grab Sample 1085 804 550 521 **
Tank 2A
S7C Drain Collector Grab Sample 1085 804 550 521 **
Tank 1B
S7D Drain Collector Grab Sample 1085 804 550 521 **
Tank 2B (DRN 06-843, R15; EC-8465, R307)
S8 Combined Heater Grab Sample,Silica, 1400 1080 480 449 1 1 Outlet Specific Conductivity Cation Conductivity pH, DO, Sodium, (Hydrazine, S8E) (DRN 06-843, R15; EC-8465, R307)
S8A Moisture Separator Grab Sample 265 179 411 379 1 Drain Tank 1A
S8B Moisture Separator Grab Sample 265 179 411 379 ***
Drain Tank 2A
S8C Moisture Separator Grab Sample 265 179 411 379 ***
Drain Tank 1B
S8D Moisture Separator Grab Sample 265 179 411 379 ***
Drain Tank 2B (DRN 06-843, R15)
S8E Feedwater Pumps Grab Sample 610 482 388 370 1 1 Suction (Hydrazine, S8) (EC-8465, R307)
S9A Makeup Demineralizer Grab Sample 125 90 125 92 - 1 Effluent (Sodium, Silica, Spec. Conductivity, S9B) (DRN 06-843, R15)
S9B Condensate Transfer Grab Sample 150 90 120 109 - ****
Pump Discharge (Sodium, Silica, Spec. Conductivity, S9A) (DRN 05-251, R14;06-843, R15)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-4 (Sheet 3 of 3) Revision 307 (07/13)
Pressure Temperature Sample Analytical Design Operating Design Operating Sample Chiller
Bath Points Source Components (psig) (psig) F____ F______ Coolers Cooling Coils (DRN 05-251, R14; EC-8465, R307) S21 A&B Steam Generator Grab Sample 1085 945 555 540 1 1 Blowdown 1 Radiation*,
pH, Silica, Sodium, (S22)
Specific, Cation Conductivity
S22 A&B Steam Generator Grab Sample 1085 945 555 540 1 1 Blowdown 2 Radiation*,
pH Silica, Sodium, (S21)
Specific Cation Conductivity (EC-8465, R307)
S23 Steam Generator Grab Sample 175 150 150 120 1 1 Blowdown Silica, Demineralizer Sodium, Effluent Cation Conductivity (DRN 01-775, R12-A)
Steam Generator Local Grab Sample 175 150 150 120 - -
Blowdown & Composite Sampler Discharge to (Proportional)
CWS & Low Volume Wastewater Basin (DRN 01-775, R12-A)
S24 Feedwater upstream 0.45 micron 1400 1080 480 449 1 -
of the Steam Generators Millipore filter (EC-8465, R307)
S25 Main Steam common 0.45 micron 1085 945 555 540 1 -
header in TGB Millipore filter
S26 Steam Generator 0.45 Micron 1085 945 555 540 1 -
no. 2 Blowdown Millipore filter
(DRN 05-251, R14; EC-8465, R307)
(DRN 06-843, R15) ** Share line with S7A
- Share line with S8A
- Share line with S9A (DRN 06-843, R15)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-5SUB-SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION MATERIALSRadioactive Drainage SystemsSystems Pipe & FittingsType of JointFloor Drain SystemStainless Steel - sch. 40 Buttweld Equipment Drain SystemStainless Steel - sch. 40 Buttweld Detergent Waste SystemStainless Steel - sch. 40 Buttweld Chemical Waste SystemStainless Steel - sch. 40 ButtweldNon-Radioactive Drainage SystemsStore Water Drainage SystemCast-iron/galvanized st.Gasket/mechanical jointAcid Waste & Vent SystemHigh silicon cast ironMechanical joint Acid & Caustic Waste SystemPPL lined carbon steelFlanged Oil Drainage SystemsCast-iron/galvanized st.Gasket/screwed Industrial Waste SystemYoloy galvanized steelScrewed Sprinkler DischargeGalvanized steelMechanical joint Drainage System WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 9.3-66TABLE 9.3-6DECONTAMINATION AREASArea ElevationEquipmenta) Central Decon Facility+21.00 ft. MSLUltrasonic & rinse tanksWork bench sink Spray was booth Turbulator Parts laydown areas Floor drainsb) Health Physics Personnel -4.00 ft. MSLHot showers Decon AreaHot lavatoriesFloor drainsc) Laundry Room -4.00 ft. MSLWashing machinesService sinkFloor drainsd) Radio-chem Lab -4.00 ft. MSLDishwasher WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-7 Revision 305 (11/11)
REACTOR COOLANT AND REACTOR MAKEUP WATER CHEMISTRY
- 1. MAKEUP WATER
Analysis Normal
Chloride (C1) <0.15 ppm Conductivity <2.0 mhos/cm 3 pH 6.0 - 8.0 (1) Fluoride (F) <0.10 ppm
- 2. PRIMARY WATER Cycle One Analysis Hot Functionals (3) Initial Criticality Power Operation (8) pH (77 F) 9.0 - 10.4 4.5 - 10.2 4.5 - 10.2 Conductivity (4) (4) (4)
Hydrazine 30 - 50 ppm 1.5 Oxygen ppm 1.5 x Oxygen ppm (max. 20 ppm)
Ammonia <50 ppm <50 ppm <0.5 ppm Dissolved Gas <10 cc (STP)/kg H 20 - (7) (DRN 06-1142, R15)
Lithium 1 - 2 ppm 1.0 - 2.0 ppm 0.2- 3.5 ppm (DRN 06-1142, R15)
Hydrogen - 25 - 50 cc (STP)H 2/ 25 - 50 cc (STP)H 2/ Kg (H 2 0)(6) Kg (H 2 O) Oxygen <0.1 ppm <0.1 ppm <0.1 ppm Suspended <0.5 ppm, <0.5 ppm, 0.5 ppm, Solids (2 ppm max.) (2 ppm max.) (2 ppm max.)
Chloride <0.15 ppm <0.15 ppm < 0.15 ppm Fluoride <0.1 ppm <0.1 ppm < 0.1 ppm Boron -- 1720-2300 ppm 2050-2900 ppm (5) (EC-4019, R305)
Zinc -- -- 40 ppb (Max Target) Acetate 80 ppb (Plant Transient) Dihydrate (EC-4019, R305)
Notes: (1) May be as low as 5.8 if proven due to CO 2 absorption.
(2) Deleted
(3) Special hot conditioning limits:
Temperature: <350 F Time: 7-10 days
(4) Consistent with concentration of additives.
(5) As needed for reactivity control
(6) Not applicable during core load.
(7) Prior to shutdown and depressurization, reduce hydrogen concentration to <5 cc/Kg (H 2O) to limit the possibility of explosive mixtures.
(8) These limits are minimum requirem ents. Plant specific procedures may impose more restrictive limits than specified in this Table.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-8CVCS DESIGN TRANSIENTSThe components and piping in the CVCS are designed to accommodate, without adverse effect, the flowand thermal transient responses which result from the following plant evolutions:1.Plant Startup - It is assumed that the plant is started 500 times during the 40 year design life of the plant.2.Ramp Power Change (15 Percent to 100 Percent at 5 Percent/Min.) - It is assumed that a rampchange in power from 15 to 100 percent at the rate of 5 percent/minute with a step increase of 10percent occurs 17,000 times during the life of the plant.3.Ramp Power Change (100 percent to 15 Percent at -5 Percent/Min.) - It is assumed that a rampchange in power from 100 percent to 15 percent at the rate of -5 percent/minute with a stepdecrease of 10 percent occurs 17,000 times during the life of the plant.4.Reactor Trip - It is assumed that the reactor is tripped from 100 percent power 500 times duringthe 40 year design life of the plant.5.Maximum Purification - It is assumed that the CVCS is switched from the normal purificationmode to the maximum purification mode 11,000 times during the life of the plant.6.Loss of Charging - It is assumed that the charging flow is stopped 100 times during the life of the plant.7.Loss of Letdown - It is assumed that the letdown flow is stopped 100 times during the life of the plant.8.Plant Cooldown - It is assumed that the plant is cooled down 500 times during the 40 year designlife of the plant.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-9 (Sheet 1 of 7) Revision 15 (03/07)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DESIGN DATA
SUMMARY
Design Parameters Operating Parameters
Component Parameter Description Parameter Normal Min Letdown/
Max Charging Max Letdown/ Max Charging Max Letdown/ Min Charging Regenerative heat
exchanger
(DRN 06-843, R15)
(DRN 06-843, R15)
Quantity Type Code Tube side, letdown
Fluid Design pressure, psig Design temperature, F Materials
Pressure lost at
128 gpm, psi Normal flow gpm
Design flow gpm
Shell side, charging Fluid Design pressure, psig Design temperature, F Materials Pressure loss at 132 gpm, psi Normal flow, gpm Design flow, gpm 1 Shell and tube, vertical
ASME Section III, Class 2(1971)
Reactor Coolant 2,485 650 Austenitic stainless steel
(seamless tubes) 25 38
128 Reactor coolant, boric acid 12 wt% 3,025 650 Austenitic stainless steel
24.6 44 132 Tube side, letdown Flow (gpm @ 120 F) Inlet temp. F Outlet temp. F Shell side, Charging
Flow gpm @ 120F Inlet temp F Outlet temp F 38 550 254
44 120 393 30 550 152
132 120 223 126 550 362
132 120
320 126 550 439
44 120 476 Letdown heat Exchanger
(DRN 06-843, R15)
(DRN 06-843, R15)
Quantity Type Tube side, letdown
Code Fluid Design pressure, psig Design temperature, F Pressure loss at
128 gpm psi Normal flow, gpm
Design, gpm
Materials 1 Shell and tube horizontal ASME Section III, Class2(1971)
650 550 42.1
38 128 Austenitic stainless steel (seamless tubes) Tube side, letdown Flow, gpm @ 120F Inlet temp. F Outlet temp. F Shell side, cooling water
Flow, gpm @ 120F Inlet temp F Outlet temp. F 38 254 120
176.6 100 141.2 30 152 120
34.6
100 128.6 126 362 120
1197.6 100
130 126 439 130
1176.4
100 144.3 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-9 (Sheet 2 of 7) Revision 304 (06/10)
Design Parameters
Component Parameter Description
Letdown heat Shell side, cooling water exchanger (Cont'd) Code ASME Section III, Class 3 (1971)
Fluid Inhibited water Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 250 Materials Carbon steel Normal flow, gpm 176.6 Design flow, gpm 1,200 Pressure loss at 1197.6 gpm, psi 15
Purification Quantity 1 filter Type Resin bonded glass fiber and polyster (DRN 99-0971; EC
-13560, R304)
Design temperature, F 250 Design pressure, psig 200 Design flow, gpm 250 Normal temperature, F 120 Normal pressure, psig 60-110 Normal flow, gpm 37 Clean P at 250 gpm, psi 10 Loaded P at 250 gpm, psi 25 Removal Rating Absolute (Beta Method) 20 microns Fluid Reactor coolant Code ASME III, Class C (1968/Summer 1970) (EC-13560, R304)
Shell materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel
Purification Quantity 3 ion exchangers Type Flushable Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 250 Normal operating temperature, F 120 Normal operating pressure, psig 40-75 Resin volume, total, ft 3 each 36.2 Resin volume, useful, ft 3 each 32.0 Normal flow, gpm 38 Design flow, gpm 128 Code for vessel ASME III, Class 2 (1968/Summer 1970) (DRN 99-0971)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-9 (Sheet 3 of 7) Revision 11 (05/01)Design Parameters ComponentParameter DescriptionMaximum P at 128 gpm psi5Purification ionRetention screen size80 U.S. meshexchangers (Cont'd)MaterialAustenitic stainless steelFluidReactor coolantResin typeCation/anion mixed bed forpurification, anion bed fordeborating(DRN 99-0971)Volume controlQuantity1 tankTypeVertical, cylin dricalInternal volume, gal4,780Design pressure, internal, psig75Design pressure, external, psig15Design temperature, °F250Normal operating pressure, psig25-50Normal operating temperature, °F120Normal spray flow, gpm38Blanket gas, during plant operationHydrogen FluidReactor coolant, boric acid, <12 w/oMaterialASME SA-240, Type 304 CodeASME III, Class C(1968/Summer 1970)Charging pumpsQuantity3TypeHorizontal, positiveDisplacement, triplexDesign pressure, psig2,735Design temperature, °F250Capacity per pump, gpm44Normal discharge pressure, psig2,350Normal suction pressure, psig40-65 Normal temperature of pumped fluid, °F120NPSH available, psia6.5 Pump rating (hp)100(DRN 99-0971)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-9 (Sheet 4 of 7) Revision 11 (05/01)Design Parameters ComponentParameterDescriptionCharging pumpsMaterials in contract with (Cont'd) with pumped fluidAustenitic and/or 17-4PH,Condition H 1100stainless steelFluidReactor coolant, boric acid12 w/oCodeASME III, Class 2 (1968/March 1970)(DRN 99-0971)Pulsation DampenersQuantity3 (discharge of pumps only)Vessel materialSA-240 SS 304Vessel volume, gallons (Nominal)2.5 Design pressure, psig3,125Design temperature, °F250Design flowrate, gpm44Maximum operating pressure, psig2735Normal temperature, °F120Bladder materialEthylene propylene rubberPrecharge pressure, psig1,606Outlet pressure pulsation, psi Full amplitude92 Half amplitude46CodeASME III, Class 2 (1974/Winter 1976)(DRN 99-0971)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-9 (Sheet 5 of 7) Revision 9 (12/97)Design Parameters ComponentParameter DescriptionBoric acidQuantity2pumpsTypeCentrifugal, horizontalDesign pressure, psig150Design temperature, °F250Design head, ft231Design flow, gpm143Normal operating temperature, °F100° F to 110° FNormal suction pressure psig available9NPSH at the design flow, ft20Motor, hp25 Fluid, boric acid maximum, w/o3.5Material in contact withliquidAustenitic stainless steelCodeASME III, Class 3(1971/Summer 1972)Boric acidQuantity2makeup tanksTypeVertical, cylindricalVolume, ea. gal.11,800Design pressure, internal, psig15 Design pressure, external, psig0Design temperature, °F200Normal operating temperature, °F100° F to 110° FNumber heaters6*Type heaterElectrical strip*Heater capacity, KW ea2.25 KW (2 banks of 3 ea)Fluid, boric acid, maximum wt%3.5MaterialASME SA-240, Type 304CodeASME III, Class 3 (1968/Summer 1970)*Heater operability is only required when technical specifications allow a boric acid makeup tank boronconcentration in excess of 3.5 w/o.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-9 (Sheet 6 of 7) Revision 15 (03/07)
Design Parameters
Component Parameter Description
Boric acid Quantity 1 batching tank Type Vertical, cylindrical Internal volume, gal 630 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, F 200 Normal operating temperature, F 150-155 Type heater Electrical immersion Number of heaters 3 Heater capacity, kW ea 15 Fluid, boric acid, maximum w/o 12 Material ASME SA-240, Type 304 Code None Mixer type One 1/2 hp portable, single blade propeller mixer; 42 in. long shaft; wetted parts are stainless steel
Chemical Quantity 1 addition Internal volume, gal 18 tank Design and normal operating pressure, psig 150/100 Design temperature, F 150 Normal operating temperature, F 40-120 Material Austenitic stainless steel Code None
Chemical Quantity 1 addition Type Positive displacement metering (variable capacity) pump (DRN 06-843, R15)
Design pressure, psig 165 (DRN 06-843, R15)
Design temperature, F 150 Capacity, gph, max 40 (DRN 06-843, R15)
Normal discharge pressure, psig 15-20 (DRN 06-843, R15)
Normal suction pressure, psig Atmospheric Normal temperature of pumped fluid, F 40-120 Pump rating (hp) 1/2 Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid N 2 H 4, (max 35 wt%) LiOH-H 2 O (max 37,167 ppm Li)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-9 (Sheet 7 of 7)Revision 12 (10/02)
Design Parameters Component Parameter DescriptionCodeNone(DRN 99-1031)
Process (Note 1)Quantity1radiationDetection principle Gamma-ray scintillation monitor Vessel Design pressure,(DRN 99-1031)psig200 Internals Design
temperature, °F150 Normal operating temperat ure,°F110 Normalflowrate, (gpm)3-5 Normal operating pressure (psig)53 Instrument range (µci/cc)10-4 to 10+2 Rb 88 gammaCodeASME VIII, Div. 1 (1974)
Fluid Reactor coolant(DRN 99-1031)
Boronometer (Note 1)Quantity1(DRN 99-1031)
Vessel design
temperature, °F250 Internals design
temperature, °F150 Vessel design pressure,psig200 Normal operating
temperature, °F120 Normalflowrate, gpm0.5 Normal operating pressure,psig60-110 Instrument range, ppm boron0-5000
Accuracy, sample
+/- 1% +/- 5 ppm Code for vessel ASME VIII, Div. 1 (1974/Summer 1976)
FluidReactorC oolant(DRN 99-1031)
Note 1: These devices have been functionally Abandoned-in-place by DC 3432.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 9.3-10 has been deleted.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-11 Revision 307 (07/13)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS PARAMETERS
Item Value
Normal letdown and purification flow, gpm 38
Maximum letdown and purification flow, gpm 126
Normal charging flow, gpm 44
Maximum charging flow, gpm 132
Reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff, 4 pumps gpm 6
(DRN 03-2063, R14) Normal letdown temperature from RCS loop, F 543 (DRN 03-2063, R14)
Normal charging temperature to RCS loop, F 410
Normal ion exchanger operating temperature, F 120
(DRN 03-2063, R14)
Boric acid makeup tank boron concentration, boric acid, minimum weight % 2.8 (DRN 03-2063, R14)
(EC-8458, R307)
Refueling water storage pool boron concentration, boric acid, minimum weight % 1.173 (EC-8458, R307)
(EC-8458, R307) (EC-8458, R307)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-12SCHEDULE OF WASTE GENERATION Quantity(a)Source (gal/yr at 120 F)Refueling shutdown and startup (refueling at theend of core life)106,507Cold shutdowns and startups (to 5% subcritical)At 30% core life 57,651 At 60% core life 80,909At 90% core life154,111Hot critical shutdowns and startupsAt 55% core life 58,200 At 65% core life 72,800Boron dilution (fuel burnup waste to 30 ppm boron)252,300Back-to-back cold shutdowns and startups (to 5%183,857subcritical at 85% core life)(a)For a UO 2 core.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3(DRN 99-0971)TABLE 9.3-13(c)(e) (Sheet 1 of 4)Revision 11 (05/01)(DRN 99-0971)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATACVCS NORMAL PURIFICATION OPERATION (One Charging Pump in Operation)(a)CVCSLocation:11a22a33a44a566a77a7b7c7d899aFlow (gpm)3838383838383838383737111/21/21383838Press (psig)22152206220321974694674624606363606363636331313030Temp. (F)550550254254254254120120120120120120120120120120120120120CVCS INTERMEDIATE PURIFICATION OPERATION (Two Charging Pumps in Operation)(a)CVCSLocation:11a22a33a44a566a77a7b7c7d899aFlow (gpm)8282828282828282828181111/21/21828282Press (psig)22152176216421414964884684607575717777777745454343Temp. (F)550550320320320320120120120120120120120120120120120120120CVCS MAXIMUM PURIFICATION OPERATION (Three Charging Pumps in Operation)(a)CVCSLocation:11a22a33a44a566a77a7b7c7d899aFlow (gpm)126126126126126126126126126125125111/21/21126126126Press (psig)22152124209920545365194774601021019610610610610674736968Temp. (F)550550362362362362120120120120120120120120120120120120120CVCS NORMAL PURIFICATION OPERATION (One Charging Pump in Operation)(a)CVCS Location:1010a10b10c11121313a13b13c14a,b,c,d14e14f14g14hFlow (gpm)383838444444444444441.50666Press (psig)2928252940232223042301229122916262393028Temp. (F)120120120120120120120393550550150150150150150CVCS INTERMEDIATE PURIFICATION OPERATION (Two Charging Pumps in Operation)(a)CVCS Location:1010a10b10c11121313a13b13c14a,b,c,d14e14f14g14hFlow (gpm)828282888888888888881.50666Press (psig)4038252940240823402329229122916262393028Temp. (F)120120120120120120120354550550150150150150150 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-13 (Sheet 2 of 4)Revision 11 (05/01)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATACVCS MAXIMUM PURIFICATION OPERATION (Three Charging Pumps in Operation)(a)CVCS Location:1010a10b10c11121313a13b13c14a,b,c,d14e14f14g14hFlow (gpm)1261261261321321321321321321321.50666Press (psig)6359252940255024012376229122916262393028Temp. (F)120120120120120120120320550550150150150150150CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION - AUTOMATIC MODE (Blended Boric Acid Concentration - 900 PPM)(b)CVCSLocation:1515a16171819202122232425262728293030a313233(DRN 99-0971)Flow (gpm)1431431439*9*09*123*123*132000134*126*8*8*134*000(DRN 99-0971)Press (psig)1191091091083036100363630109301098080170303030Temp. (F)160*160*160*160*160*160*160*104104120120160*160*160*160*160*160*160*160*160*160*CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION - AUTOMATIC MODE (Blended Boric Acid Concentration - 900 PPM)(b)CVCSLocation:1515a16171819202122232425262728293030a313233Flow (gpm)1431431432222220000002212111388121000Press (psig)1191091091073137100151530109301098080170303030 Temp. (F)160*160*160*160*160*160*160*104104120120160160160160160160160160160160CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION - DILUTE MODE (Three Charging Pumps Operating)(b)CVCSLocation:1515a16171819202122232425262728293030a313233Flow (gpm)1431430000012612612600014313677136000Press (psig)1191091091093036100363630109301097878300303030 Temp. (F)160*160*160*160*160*160*160*104104170170160*160*160*160*160160160160160160CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION - MANUAL MODE (Blended Boric Acid Concentration - 2150 PPM)(b)CVCSLocation:1515a16171819202122232425262728293030a313233Flow (gpm)14314314322*22*022*110*110*132000121*113*8*8*121*000Press (psig)1191091091073036100353530106301098080170303030 Temp. (F)160*160*160*160*160*160*160*104104120120120160*160*160*160*160*160*160*160*160*
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-13 (Sheet 3 of 4) Revision 305 (11/11)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA
CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION - EMERGENCY BORA TION (SIAS) (Via Boric Acid Makeup Pumps - One Pump is Operating; Three Charging P umps Operating)(b)(d)
CVCS Location: 15 15a 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 30a 31 32 33 Flow (gpm) 142 142 142 132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 132 132 10 0 10 10 10 0 0 0 Press (psig) 11 9 110 110 110 108 15 100 15 15 30 108 109 110 110 110 0 0 30 30 30 Temp. (F) 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 104 104 160* 120 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160*
CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION - EMERGENCY BORATION (SIAS) (Via Gravity Feed)(b)
CVCS Location: 15 15a 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 30a 31 32 33 Flow (gpm) 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 66 132 Press (psig) 11 11 11 11 11 6 15 100 15 15 6 11 6 11 0 0 0 0 11 11 6 Temp. (F) 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 104 104 160* 120 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160*
CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION - SHUTDOWN BORATION (b)
CVCS Location: 15 15a 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 30a 31 32 33 Flow (gpm) 143 143 143 22 22 0 22 22 22 44 0 0 0 121 113 8 8 121 0 0 0 Press (psig) 11 9 109 109 107 30 31 100 31 31 30 109 30 109 80 80 17 0 30 30 30 Temp. (F) 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 104 104 160* 120 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160* 160*
CVCS Makeup System Operation - Boric Acid Batching
CVCS Location: 34 35 36 37 38 Flow (gpm) 50 50 70 70 70 Pressure (psig) 92 0 0 0 0 Temperature (F) 104 104 150 150 150 (EC-4019, R305)
CVCS Makeup System Operation - C hemical Addition / Zinc Injection (EC-4019, R305)
CVCS Location: 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Flow (gpm) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Pressure (psig) 100 30 30 30 30 30 30 Temperature (F) 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-13 (Sheet 4 of 4)Revision 12-B (04/03)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA Notes:a.The pressure drop across the purification filter, ion exchanger and letdown strainer varies with loading. The pressure drops as shown are given with minimal crud deposition. The pressure in the volume control tank varies and affects the pressures at locations 3 and 14a through 14g, 20, 2 2 and 23 proportionally.b.The data shown for the various modes of operation is typical.
The pressure in the isolated piping of the CVCS makeup system will normally be 0 psig but may be as high as 200 psig before the relief valve lifts.c.Since line pressure drops are dependent on piping and equipment elevations and assumed pipe lengths were used for calculation purposes, the pressure values are approximate.d.Value shown for three pump operation. Following SIAS, two or three pumps may be operating.(DRN 99-0971, R11;03-275, R12-B)e.Deleted.(DRN 03-275, R12-B)*Temperature values and flow values will chan ge depending on the actual Boric Acid Makeup Tank concentration. With a concentra tion < 3.5 weight % Boric Acid, the tank will be maintained at 100 degrees Fahrenheit.(DRN 99-0971, R11)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-14 Revision 9 (12/97)CVCS COMPONENT DIESEL LOADINGPlease refer to FSAR Table 8.3-1.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 1 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (BORON ADDITION PORTION)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 1.Demineralized water supply to
PMU-134 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failureUnable to add makeup water to boric acid batching tank to makeup a batch of boric acid
solution.OperatorNone Required
- b. Fails partially open Seat leakage, contamination Possible makeup water leakage into tank when makeup water
pumps are operating.(water in tank)OperatorNone Required 2.Boric acid batching mixer
BAM-EMTR-64AB-9
- a. Fails to start or mix Motor failure, broken agitatorUnable to mix boric acidsolution properly. Possible stratification in solution.
Possible boron precipitation
in lines connecting batch
tank to B/A make-up tanks.
Operator Batch can be mixed using paddle if necessary SUfficient reserve in BAMT
until fault is
corrected. 3.Boric acid batching tank
local sample
- valve, 7CH-V610-8 (CH-120)
BAM-102 a. Fails closed (unable
to open)Mechanical failure Unable to obtain a local sample when making up a
batch of boric acid
solution.Operator detectionNoneBoric acid batchingtank is generally
empty, except during
boric acid solution
batching.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails partially open Seat leakage, contamination Local boric acid solution spill when making up a
batch of boric acid
solution.OperatorNone Sufficient reserve in BAMT 4.Boric acid batching tank
immersion heater, H-213 a. Fails off Electrical failure, open
circuit.Unable to heat boric acidsolution. Possible
precipitation of boric acid in the batching tank when making up a batch of boric
acid solution.Temperatureindica-tor-controller, TIC-213.None Sufficient reserve in BAMT until fault
is corrected.
- b. Fails full on Electrical failure-short circuit Boric acid solution overheated while making up the batch.
Possible heater damageTemperatureindica-tor controller, TIC-213 Manual power breaker Same as 4 a.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 2 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks 5.Temperature indicator-
controller, TIC-213 a. Erroneous high temperature
indication or
controls temp. low Electrical or mechanical
failures The heater would be continu-ously off resulting in under-
heating of the boric acid
solution and possible boric
acid precipitation.OperatorNone Operator should be able to keep the
boric acid in
solution by mixing.
Then the batch can be drained, the
controller repaired
and a new batch made
up.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Erroneous low temperature indica-tions or controls
temp. high.
Electrical or mechanical
failure The heater would be continu-ously on resulting in the boric
acid solution being overheated.
None while solution Hand switch to turn off heater in batching tank if detected. 6.Boric acid batching tank
drain valve, 7CH-V610-9 (CH-121)
BAM-101 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure Uable to drain and flushboric acid batching tank
after making up a batch of
boric acid solution.OperatorNone requiredSame as 4 a.
- b. Fails partly openSeat leak, contamination Leakage from batching tank to the waste management
system.Visual, decrease in batch tank level.
None 7.Boric acid batching tank
outlet valve
BAM-103 a. Fails in closed position
- b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Seat Leakage contamination Unable to add boric acid solution to boric acid
makeup tanks.Loss of boric acid solution (possibly of low concentra-tion) to the discharge
header while making up a
batch of concentrated boric
solution.Operator Operator NoneSeries normally closed valve downstream of
7CH-V616 Same as 4 a.
All failure modes which could result inbatching errors
significantly
affecting make-up
tank concentration
are detectable by
periodic local
sampling.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 3 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 8.Boric acid batching tank
outlet relief
BAM-104 a. Opens spuriously Spring failure, set point drift Flow back to batching tank from outlet linePossible increaseinbatching tank
level.NoneThis is a thermal relief valve, designed to
relieve back to thebatching tank.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails to open Mechanical failure Possible excessive damage to batching tank discharge lines
due to heat up of liquid
trapped in lines.Periodic testNone
- c. Fails to reseatContaminationSeat leak. Same as 7 b.
Same as 8 a.None(DRN 99-1031) 9.Boric acid batching strainer BAM-MSTRN-0001
- a. Fails to strain Perforated strainer element Possible introduction of particulate matter to boric
acid make-up tanks when adding
boric acid from boric acid
batching tank.Periodic inspectionReplacement(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Plugged Particle build-up Slow boric acid solution add-ition rate to boric acid make-up tanks. Possibly unable
to add boric acid solution to
the make-up tanks from the
batching tank.OperatorReplacement(DRN 99-1031)10.Boric acid batching tank
BAM-MTNK-0003
- a. External leakage Mfg. Defect, corrosionSome loss of boric acid solution while making-up
a batch.OperatorNone11.Boric acid batching tank
stop valve to:
BAMT "A" 7CH-V616-2 (CH-124)
BAM-105A BAMT "B" 7CH-V616-3 (CH-135)
BAM-105B a. Fails inclosedposi-
tion b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Seat leakage, contamination Unable to add boric acid solution to one boric acid
make-up tank.
Possible overfilling of one make-up tank while trans-ferring boric acid from the
batching tank to the other
make-up tank.
OperatorBoric acid makeup tank level indicators
and high level
alarms from
LIT-206 or LIT-205 Two redundant 100%
capacity boric acid
make-up tanks.
Each make-up tank has an overflow line
which drains to the WMS(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 4 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks12.Boric acid batching tank
discharge line
heat tracing
circuit A & B Fails offOpen circuits, Elect.Malf.Possible boron precipitation if there was boric acid solu-tion left in the lines.
Decrease in temp. in heat
traced lines.
Malfunction of heat tracing annunciated
by alarm.Redundant heat tracing circuits 13.DELETED14.Boric acid make-up tank
level transmit-
ters LIT-206
and LIT-208 (for tanks A
and B respec-tively).a. Erroneous low level indications
and/or Low
or Low-Low
level alarms.Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system.
Possible overfilling of boric
acid make-up tank when
transferring boric acid from thebatching tank.
Local level indica-tors LI-CH-0240 &
LI-CH-0241 for tanks
A & B respectively
would provide veri-fication of actual
tank level. Operator
detects overfilling.
Each tank has an overflow line to protect it against
overpressurization.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Indicates high Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Possible undetected low level condition in make-up
tank.Local level indica-tors LI-CH-0240 &
LI-CH-0241 for tanks
A & B respectively
would provide veri-fication of actual
tank level. Boric
acid pump pressure
indicators
PIS-206 or PIS-208
should alarm on low
pressure if a tank
actually drains
down.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 5 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)15.Boric acid make-up tank
A heaters H-206, H-207 a. Fails low or off Electrical failureCooldown of boric acid solu-tion. Possible precipitation
of boric acid in tank, possible deboration incident of tank A is being used for
boron addition.Temperatureindica-tor controllers
TIC-206, TIC-207
alarm on low temp-
erature.Two redundant full capacity heaters. Two
redundant make-up tanks.
Boron concentration levelin the tank 3.5 weight percent does not require heat tracing. Heaters
could be eliminated.
- b. Fails full on Electrical failure Excessive heatup of boric acid solution. Possible to increase boric acid concen-tration if water is "boiled" away. Ultimately leads to
boric acid precipitation in
tank.Temperatureindica-tors controllers;
TIC-206, and
TIC-207 alarm on
high temperature.
Periodic local
sample.Fully redundant make-up tank can be used
while heater is being
repaired.Manual power breakers for the
heaters would
allow the failed
heater to be
removed from service, and the redundant heater could assume
temperature control.(DRN 99-1031)16.Boric acid make-up tank
A temperature
indicators-
controllers;
TIC-206 &
TIC-207 a. Controls temperature low or erroneous
high temp.
indication Mechanical or electrical
malfunctionCooldown of boric acid solu-tion. Possible boric acid
precipitation in tank.
Redundant tempera-ture indicator-
controller with low
temperature alarm.
Fully redundant tempera-ture indicator-controller
with heater is capable
of maintaining required
temperature.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Controls temperature
high or erroneous low
temp. indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Excessive heatup of boricacid solution. Possible
boiling and boric acid
concentration increase.
Possible eventual boric
acid precipitation.
Redundant tempera-ture indicator-
controller with
high temperature
alarm.Peridic local sample.
Redundant boric acid make-up tank to supply
boric acid solution at
required temperature
and concentration.(DRN 99-1031)17.Boric acid make-up tank
B heaters, H-208 and H-209Same as 15Same as 15Same as 15Temp. Indicator/
controllers TIC-208, TIC-209 alarm on
low/high temp.
Same as 1518.Boric acid make-up tank
B, temperature
indicators-
controllers, TIC-208 and
TIC-209.Same as 16 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 6 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)19.Boric acid make-up tank
drain valves;
BAM-110B a. Fails in closed position
- b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Seat leakage contamination No impact on normal system operation, unable to drain
make-up tank.Loss of boric acid solution from make-up tank to the
WMS Operator Level indicators with low and low-
low level alarms, level sensor with
low level alarms.None Required 2 redundant full capacityboric acid make-up tanks.20.Boric acid make-up tanks
outlet manual
BAM-112B a. Fails open
- b. Fails closed Mechanical failure Mechanical failure No impact on normal system operation. Unable to isolate
a boric acid make-up tank
for repair.
Unable to re-establish boron addition from affected tank.
Operator Operator Make-up tanks can be isolated using other
valves.2 redundant make-up tanks.In general, make-up tanks will not
be isolated while plant is in operation.
Valves are normally locked open.21.Boric acid make-up tanks
local sample
BAM-111B a. Fails in closed position
- b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Seat leakage, contamination Unable to obtain local sample of boric acid solution Local spill of boric acid solution from make-up tank.
Loss of boric acid solution
inventory from one tank.
Operator Low level alarms on make-up tank, level
indicators and
sensors if tank drains
down.None Two redundant full capa-city boric acid make-up
tanks.22.BAMT Gravity feed motor-
operated valves, 3CH-V106A (CH-509)
BAM-113B a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, valve
operator mal-
function. Loss
of power.Loss of one of two gravity feed boron addition lines
used for boron addition
during safety injection.
Valve position indicator in control
room.Two redundant gravityfeed, boron addition
lines, one for each B.A.
Make-up tank. Also boric
acid pumps are used for
boron addition.
Handwheel on valve.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 7 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)22.BAMT Gravity feed motor-
operated valves
BAM-113B (Cont'd)b. Fails to open position or partly
open Valve operator malfunction, spurious signal Unwanted an uncontrolled add-ition of boric acid solution
to primary coolant. Increased
boron concentration in primary coolant. Possibly one boric acid make-up tank drained.
Valve position in-dicator in control
room, low level alarms
from make-up tank
level indicator and
sensor. Increased
RCS boron level.Affected boric acid make-up tank can be isolated for
valve repair.
Redun-dant make-up tank avail-
able for controlled boron addition and shutdown
requirements.23.BAMT Gravity feed header
check valve, 2CH-V128A/B (CH-190)
BAM-115 a. Fails closed Mechanical failure, blockage Loss of both gravity feed boron injection lines. (These lines are
used for boron addition during
safety injection.)NoneRedundant paths for boron addition through boric acid pumps and valve 3CH-V112 A/B. (CH-514) BAM-133(DRN 01-193)b. Fails openMechanical failureSome back leakage of primary coolant into gravity
feed boron injection lines or
possible BAM pump runout.None Gravity feed boration flow path available.(DRN 01-193)24.BAMT Gravity feed header
sample isolation
- valve, 3CH-V615-7 (CH-189)
BAM-114 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Contamination No impact on normal system operation. Unable to take
local sample.
Seat leakage. Boric acid solution will drain from part of gravity feed
boron addition line. Some loss of
boric acid solution during safety
injection.
Operator OperatorNone Required None Manually operated one inch valve-normally
closed.25.Boric acid pump suction isolation
manual valves, 3CH-V102A (CH-145),
BAM-118Ba. Fails openMechanical failure Unable to isolate affected boric acid pump for repair.
Operator Discharge isolation valve for appropriate boric acid make-
up tank can be closed.
Closing the BAMT discharge isolation valve
will remove one of the
redundant boron addition
trains.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 8 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)25.Boric acid pump isolation suction
manual valves, 3CH-V102A (CH-145),
BAM-118B (Cont'd)b. Fails in the closed positionMechanical failureUnable to re-establish boric acid solution flow through affected
pump. Loss of one normal boron
addition path.OperatorRedundant pump and boron addition path Appropriate only after pump maintenance. Valve
is normally open during
operation.26.Boric acid make-up tank
outlet manual
cross-connect
BAM-117 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly openMechanical failure Contamination No impact on normal operation.
Unable to establish cross-flow from
one BAMT to opposite boric acid
pump.Seat leakage. The operating boric acid pump will tend to draw down
the redundant BAMT Operator Level indicators in the redundant boric acid
make-up tank (BAMT).None RequiredNone Required27.Boric acid pump casing vent
(CH-367)a. Fails open
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on system operation.
Possible trapped air pocket in pump after maintenance. Pump
cavitation.
Operator OperatorNone Required Redundant boric acid pump can be used.
Valves normally open-manually operated.28.Boric acid pump cavity seal
drain valves, 7CH-V612 (CH-368),
(CH-388)a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Contamination No impact on normal operation.
Unable to drain affected pump for
maintenance.
Seat leakage. Minor amount of boric acid make-up flow discharged
to waste management system
rather than to volume control tank
or primary system.
Operator NoneNone RequiredNone Required(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 9 of 60)Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)29.Boric acid pumps A and B BAM-MPMP-0001A
BAM-MPMP-0001B
- a. Operating pump fails Shaft shear, shaft seizure, motor
failure, electrical
failure.Loss of normal boron addition.Low pressure alarm from pump discharge
pressure indicator, PI-
206 or PI-208 low flow
alarm from boron
addition flow "indicator,"
FRC-210Y.Redundant pump on standbystarted manually.
- b. Spurious start of standby pump Spurious signal.
Possible excessive boron addition.Pump discharge pressure indicators; PI-206 or PI-208 flow
rate controller: FRC-
210Y, high flow rate
alarm; pump status
lights in control room.
Make-up controller will close flow control valve, CH-21OY.
Pump min. flow lines will take
rest of flow.
Manual power breakers for pumps would allow pumps to be stopped in event of this type of
failure.c. Standby pumps fails to start.
Mechanical binding,motor failure, "air
binding." Unable to bring pump on line for boron addition. Loss of one path
for shutdown boron addition.
Pump discharge pressure indicator low
pressure alarm, pump
status indicators in
control.For normal boron addition, redundant pump. For
shutdown, each BAMT is
capable of meeting the
shutdown boron addition
requirements through its
pump or its gravity feed line.30.Boric acid pump discharge indicators;
PI-206, PI-208 a. Erroneous low pressure indication or
alarm.b. Erroneous high pressure indication.
Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation.
No direct impact on system operation.
Flow rate indicator-controller, FRC-21OY, if boration in progress.
Flow rate indicator-controller, FRC-21OY, if boration in progress.None RequiredNone Required These pressure indicatorsDO NOT have a control
function.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 10 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)31.Boric acid pump discharge check
valves.
BAM-129B a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical binding, blockage Seat leakage, contamination Unable to establish normal boron addition flow through
affected pump. Effective loss of
one pump for shutdown boron
addition.Possible small reduction in boron addition flow due to leakage into
standby pump discharge lines.
Gradual level increase in standby
BAMT. No effect with both Boric
Acid Pumps working.
Pump discharge pressure indicator.
BAMT level indicators, on standby BAMT, low
flow indications and
possibly alarm from
flow rate control-ler, FRC-21OY.Redundant boric acid pump for normal boron addition, plus gravity feed path for
safety injection boron
addition.Standby pumps dischargeisolation valve can be closed
until check valve is repaired.
Applies only to valves for standby boric acid make-
up pump while normal
boration is in progress.32.Boric acid pump discharge manual
isolation valves;
BAM-131B a. Fails in open or partly open position
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, contamination Mechanical failure Unable to isolate affected pumpfor repair, seat leakage.Unable to establish boration flow through affected pump
Effective loss of one make-up
pump for boron addition.
Operator Operator Appropriate discharge check valve & a blind flange
can be used for isolation if
needed.Redundant pump availableforboration. Gravity feed line
available for boron addition.
Safety injection.Applies only if the pump has been down for repair, valve normally open.33.Boric acid pump discharge header
manual stop valve
3CH-V606-1 (CH-161),
BAM-136 a. Fails in open or partly open position Mechanical failure, contamination Unable to isolate flow rate controller, FRC-21OY for repair, seat leakage.
Operator Upstream isolation can be achieved by closing valves (3CH-V109A), BAM-131A and (3CH-V111B), BAM-131B and
downstream isolation can be achieved using valve CH-
21OY, BAM-141.
BAM-139 b. Fails in closed position.Mechanical failureUnable to re-establish normal boration flow path.OperatorNone Applies only after flow rate controller, FRC-
21OY has been down for
repair.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 11 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)34.Boric acid make-up flow rate
controller, FRC-210Y a. Controls boration flow too low Electrical or mechanical
malfunctionPossibledeboration of primary coolant during automatic boration.Possibly see high pressure indication
on Boric Acid pump
discharge pressure
indicator.
None b. Controls boration flow too high Electrical or mechanical
malfunctionGradual over-boration of primary coolant. Slow reactor power
decrease.Reactor power indicators.
None35.Boric acid make-up flow
control valve, 3CH-FM172A/B (CH-21OY)
(Air Operated)
BAM-141 a. Excessive flow restriction (closed
too much)Shaft binding, valve operator
malfunction Low boric acid solution flow rate.Possibledeboration of primary coolant.Low flow alarm from flow rate control-
ler, FRC-21OY.NoneMake-up controller can be switched to manual
to add the proper boric acid make-up flow.
- b. Insufficient flow restriction (open too much)
Shaft binding, valve operator
failure Excessive boric acid flow rate,over-bor ation of primary coolant system.High flow rate alarmfrom flow controller, FRC-21OY, low
discharge pressure
indications from B.A.
pump discharge
pressure indicator.
Make-up controller can be adjusted to increase make-up water flow rate to attain proper blend. When
required level is achieved in
VCT, the Boric Acid pump
can be stopped.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 12 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)36.Boric acid makeup discharge
check valve, 3CH-V617 (CH-186)
BAM-146 a. Fails partly open Contamination seat leakage Possible backflow of make-upwater into the boration lines
when make-up water being added to
VCT.NoneNone Required
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, blockage Unable to establish normal boration flow. Possible de-
boration of primary system.
Flow rate control-ler, FRC 21OY, low
flow alarm, make-up
pump high discharge
pressure indications on
PI-206, PI-208NoneWhenboration makeup flow not in progress
makeup controller can be
switched to "Borated Mode" to add
proper boric acid makeup
flow to primary system37.Primary make-up water flow rate
controller, FRC-210X a. Controls make-up water flow too low Electrical or mechanical
malfunction (senses flow too
high)Low make-up water mix ratio for boration flow. Excess boric acid
added to primary coolant system.
Reactor power decrease.
Reactor power indicators, possibly high discharge pres-
sure from RMW
pumps.None b. Controls make-up water flow too high Low flow sensor output, electrical or
mechanical failure Too much make-up water mixed with boric acid solution.
Gradual deboration of primary coolant system.Possibly low discharge pressure indications from RMW pumps.
None38.Primary make-up line manual
isolation valves, 7CH-V114 (CH-183),
PMU-136 a. Fails in open position or partly open
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical
- failure, contamination Mechanical failure Seat leakage, unable to isolate flow rate transmitter
PMU-1FT-210X for repair.
Unable to re-establish make-up water flow to VCT Operator OperatorIsolation can be achieved by closing other valves.None RequiredThese manual valves are closed only to
repair flow rate controller.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 13 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)39.Primary make-up flow control
PMU-144 a. Fails to allow flow increase on signal (doesn't open wider)
Shaft binding, valve operator
malfunction Low Primary make-up water flow rate. Possible over-borationof primary coolant system.
Low flow alarm from flow rate control-ler, FRC-210X pos-
sible high discharge
pressure indications
from RMW pump(s).
Make-up flow rate controller FRC 210X can be adjusted to throttle back boric acid flow
to attain proper mix ratio. Can
stop pumps and close valve
510 to terminate makeup.
- b. Fails to close on signal Shaft binding, valve operator
malfunction High Primary make-up water flow rate. Possible deboration of primary system.
High flow alarm from flow rate
controller, FRC-210X. Possible
low discharge pressure
indications from RMW
pump.Make-up controller can be adjusted to increase boric
flow to attain proper mix ratio.
Can stop pumps and close
valve 3CH-F117A/B (CH-
512) CVC-510 to
terminate makeup.40.Primary makeup water supply
PMU-146 a. Fails closed Mechanical failure, blockage Unable to establish Primary make-up water flow. Possible
over boration of primary system.Low flow alarm from flow rate controller
FRC-210X. Possible high discharge pres-
sure indications from
RMW pump(s).
None b. Fails partly openMechanical failure or contamination Possible back leakage of boric acid solution into make-
up water lines. Possible
precipitation of boric acid in
make-up water lines.NoneNoneApplies only when Primary makeup is not in
progress.41.Make-up control air operated stop valve to the VCT
CVC-510 a. Fails to open Mechanical failure, valve
operator malfunction Unable to establish make-up flow to VCT.Valve position indicator in control room. Low
flow alarms from
make-up flow
controllers.
Boration flow can be routeddirectly to the charging pump
suction through gravity feed
line, or through 3CH-V112A/B, (CH-514) BAM-133.
Make-up flow can be manually directed to
charging pump suction.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 14 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)41.Make-up control air operated stop valve to the VCT
CVC-510 (Cont.)b. Spurious closure during make-up Valve operator malfunction, spurious signal.Sudden termination of make-up flow.Valve position indicator in con-
trol room, low flow
alarms from flow rate
controllers, FRC-210X, and
FRC-21OY.Same as 41 a. If spurious signal, can clear and reopen
valve.Same as 41 a.
- c. Fails to close on SIAS signal.
Valve operator malfunction, mechanical failure.
Portion of boric acid solution diverted to VCT during shutdown
boron addition. Reduced amount of
boron addition to primary system.
Valve position indicatorin control room.None requiredIt would take several unusual
conditions before this
failure would cause less than the contents of one
BAMT to be injected i.e.,
VCT at low level, borationin progress at moderate
to high rate, and one BAMT drawn down close
to low level and an SIAS.42.Make-up header to the VCT
check valve, 2CH-V118A/B (CH-188)
CVC-511 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical
- failure, contamination Unable to establish make-up flow to Volume Control Tank.
Low flow alarms from flow rate controllers, FRC-210X and
FRC-210Y.Make-up flow can be routeddirectly to the charging pump
suction through manual valve
CVC-502 & air operated valve 3CH-V121A/B (CH-
504) CVC-507
- b. Fails partly open Seat leakage, contamination Possibly some back leakage of primary coolant into make-up line
downstream of valve
3CH-F117A/B.NoneNone Required43.Make-up header local sample
valve, (Manual)
CVC-501 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Contamination Unable to obtain local sample from make-up line. No impact
on system operation.
Seat leakage. Local spill of boric acid solution. Minor
reduction of make-up flow possible.
Operator Local leak detectors None None Normally closed-manually operated
valve.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 15 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)44.Boric acid make-up to the
RWSP isolation
manual valve.
CVC-502 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Contamination Unable to route make-up flow directly to charging pump suction.
Seat leakage. Refueling water storage pool discharge lines
contaminated with boric acid
solution. Possible boric acid
precipitation at valve 3CH-V121A/B (CH-504) CVC-507 Operator None Normal make-up path to VCT.None This is an alternate make-up path. Manual
valve.The refueling water tank discharge line
to charging pump suction
is filled so boric acid
solution contamination
would be a slow process.45.Boric acid make-up to the
RWSP check
CVC-503 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure, contamination Contamination Unable to route make-up flow directly to charging pump suction.
Seat leakage. Possible dilu-tion of boric acid solution
with RWT water.
Low flow alarms from flow rate control
lers FRC-210X and
FRC-21OY.None Normal make-up path to VCT available.
Valve 3CH-V119A/B provides required isolation.46.Primary make-up water supply to
charging pump
suction.
PMU-140 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure Unable to dilute primary system coolant directly
through charging pump(s).
Operator Normal dilution path through VCT.
This is an alternate dilution path and is used
only with caution
because it bypasses the
control system.
- b. Fails partly open Seat leakage, contamination Unwanted direct dilution ofprimary coolant system.
Flow indications from flow rate controller
FRC-210X.NoneValve is normally locked closed.47.Primary make-up water supply to
charging pump
suction check
valve.
PMU-141 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical
- failure, blockage Contamination Unable to dilute primary system coolant directly
through charging pump(s).
Seat leakage. Contamination of reactor make-up water with
primary coolant.
Operator None Normal dilution path through VCT.
PMU-140 provides required
isolation.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 16 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)48.Boric acid makeup manual
bypass of 3CH-V112A/B.
(CH-514) BAM-133
BAM-138 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly openMechanical failure Seat leakage, contamination Unable to establish "alternatepath" safety injection boron
injection if primary path is
unavailable.
Gradual over boration ofprimary coolant system.
Operator Gravity feed boron injection lines.
None49.Make-up control bypass to charging pump
suction check
BAM-135 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure -
blockage Unable to establish "pumped" safety injection boron
injection flow path.High discharge pressure indications
from boric acid
make-up pumps Gravity feed boron injection lines.b. Fails partly open Seat leakage, contamination Possible dilution of boration lines with primary coolant.
None Valves 3CH-V112A/B (CH-514) BAM-133 and
3CH-V606-3 (CH-174) BAM-
138 provide isolation.50.Make-up controls bypass to charging pump
air operated
suction valve
BAM-133 a. Fails in closed position or fails to
open on SIAS Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction.
Loss of "pumped" boron injec-tion capability during safety
injection.
Valve position indicator in control
room, high discharge
pressure indications
from B.A. make-up
pumps.Gravity feed boron injection linesThere is an alternate"pumped" boron injection
path through
valve 3CH-V606-3 (CH-174 BAM-138, a
manually operated valve.
- b. Fails open or partly open Spurious signal, valve operator
malfunction or seat
leakage.Overboration of primary coolant if boric acid pumps are running.
Possibly low flow alarms from flow rate
controller FRC-21OY.
Can stop boric acid make-up pumps.51.Make-up control bypass header
to charging
suction sample
valve 3CH-V615-5 (CH-176)
BAM-134 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure Unable to obtain local sample of boron injection
line contents to determine
boron concentration.OperatorNone(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 17 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)51.Make-up controls bypass header
to charging pumps
suction sample valve
BAM-134 (Cont'd)b. Fails partly open Seat leakage, contamination Possible gradual drainage of boron injection line. Some loss of boric
acid solution during shutdown
boration.Possibly high level alarm from drain sump
level detectors None52.Primary make-up water line
relief valve, 7CH-R180 (CH-376)
PMU-145 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, setpoint drift Loss of make-up water line over pressure protection in
the event that valve
is tripped closed while RMW pumps
are operating.Periodic testNone
- b. Spuriously opens Setpoint drift Some diversion of make-up water flow during boration/dilution. Possible over-
boration due to improper mix ratio.
Possibly a high flow alarm or short term
high flow indication
from flow rate
controller FRC-210X.
None c. Failure to reseatContaminationSeat leakage (see 52 b).NoneNone53.Boric acid make-up tank
air operated
recirculation
isolation valves, 3CH-F170A (CH-510),
BAM-126B a. Fails in closed position b. Fails in the open position Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction. Loss
of air power Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction.
Possible boric acid concentration stratification in tank.
Unable to t erminate recirculation flow especially on SIAS.
Decreased boron injection rate during safety injection. However
total amount not affected because other paths available.
Valve position indicator in control room. High
discharge pressure indication
from associated boric
acid pump.
Valve position indicator in control room. Low
discharge pressure
indications from
associated Boric Acid
pump.Somerecirculation is possible through associated Boric Acid pump's mini-flow
bypass line.Gravity feed injectionline, plus pumping will continue until BAMT is empty.
These valves are normally open and continuousrecircu-
lation is in progress if
pumps are on.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 18 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)54.Boric acid make-up tank
recirculation
line manual
isolation valves, 3CH-V613-2 (CH-158),
BAM-122A 3CH-V613-1 (CH-151),
BAM-122B 3CH-V131A, BAM-127A 3CH-V653B BAM-127B a. Fail in open position
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure Mechanical failure Unable to isolate BAMT recirc.line for Boric Acid pump orrecirc. line repair. Un-
able to establish tank to tank
transfer of boric acid solu-tion while boration in progress.
Unable to re-establish normal recirc. flow for affected BAMT.
Isolates thermal relief valves (see 57) from BAMTs Operator OperatorNone RequiredSame as 53 a. and thermal reliefs discharge to both
BAMT's simultaneously.
Normally open manual valves55.Boric acid pump make-up
recirculation
line manual cross-
connect valve, 3CH-V613-3 (CH-159)
BAM-123 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure Contamination Unable to make tank to tank transfer of boric acid solu-tion.Seat leakage. Some cross flow between BAMTS during recircu-lation of one or both tanks.
Operator Level indications in BAMTs if only one
tank being recirculated, other-wise none.None RequiredNone Required56.Boric acid pumps min-flow manual
BAM-125B a. Fails in open position b. Fails in closed positionMechanical failure Mechanical failure Unable to isolate Boric Acidpump min-flow bypass line for
pump maintenance. Unable to
throttle pump bypass flow.
Unable to establish Boric Acid pump bypass flow on start-
up. Possible damage to pump if
started against a closed system.
Operator OperatorNone Required Valve 3CH-F170A (CH-510) BAM-126A
3CH-F171B (CH-511) BAM-126B can be
used by operator.
Manually operated normally throttled needle
valve.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 19 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)57.Deleted(DRN 99-1031)(DRN 99-0971)58.Concentrated boric acid
lines heat
tracing a. Fails off or low Electrical malfunction control
malfunction Cooldown of concentrated boric acid in static line segments.
Precipitation of boric acid
and potential plugging of lines
where boric acid concentration
exceeds 3.5 w/o.
Malfunction of heat tracing annunciates an
alarm.
.Two independent and reduncant heat tracing
circuits.(DRN 99-0971)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 20 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks58.b. Fails to high output Electrical or control mal-
function Excessive heating of boric acid solution.
All boric acid line sections that can be
restricted have thermal
relief valves that
relieve to the BAMTs.59.Boric acid make-up tanks
1 and 2 a. Leakage Corrosion mfg.
defect Loss of all or part of the contents of one BAMT.
Low level alarms from level indicator
and level sensor in
affected BAMT.
2 fully redundant BAMTs.(DRN 99-1031)60.Boration bypass air operated control
BAM-143 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, loss of air or power Loss of direct boration capability.
Valve position in-dicator in control
room, flow rate
controller, FRC-210Y, low flow
indications.
Direct boration can be accomplished manually via
valves 3CH-V119A/B (CH-196) CVC-502 and
3CH-V121A/B (CH-504) CVC-507.b. Fails openSpurious signal, seat leakage Concentrated boric acid diverted to charging pump suction during
make-up. Over boration of RCS.
Flow rate controller FRC-21OY, For spurious signal, clear signal and close valve, for seat leakage close isolation
vale 3CH-V606-4 (CH-175) BAM-145.61.3CH-F175A/B (CH-522) BAM-143
outlet stop valve (manual) 3CH-V606-4 (CH-175)
BAM-145 a. Fails open Mechanical failure No impact on normal system operation. Unable to isolate direct
boration control valve for maint.OperatorNone Required Normally open, manual valveb. Fails closedMechanical failureUnable to establish direct boration flowOperatorNone Required62.Boric acid make-up tank vent valves; 7CH-V614-1
BAM-106B 7CH-V614-2
BAM-106A a. Fails open
- b. Fails closed Mechanical failure Mechanical failure No impact on system operation Loss of tank venting, possible pressure differential between tanks. Possible overpressuri-
zation.Operator OperatorNone Required None required, tanks are not pressurized.
Normally open manual valves.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 21 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 1.Letdown stop air operated valve
inside containment
1CH-F1516A/B (CH-515)
CVC-101 a. Fails open Mechanical binding Unable to automatically term-inate letdown flow on high
temperature. Possible damage
to downstream components.
Loss of double isolation of
letdown line on SIAS.
Position indicationin control room.
Temperature alarm, TIC-221. Flow
indicator, FI-202Remote manual closure of redundant valve for hi
temp. condition. Series
redundant valve closes
on SIAS.Potential compensation- CCW flow through
letdown HX increased by
TIC-224. Problem
only if regenerative
HX discharge temp.
exceeds 450
°F.b. Fails closed Air or Power failure or
spurious signal Loss of letdown flow. Possible overcharging of RCS.
Low flow alarm, FI-203. Position
indicator in con-
trol room, flow
indicator, FI-202.
None Letdown not required for safe shutdown of
plant. 2.Letdown con-tainment air
operated isolation
valve inside
containment
1CH-F2501A/B (CH-516)
CVC-103 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closed Mechanical binding Air or power failure, mechanical
failure or
spurious signal Unable to automatically iso-late letdown lines on SIAS or
CIAS.Same as 1 b.
Position indicatorin control room.
Flow indicator, FI-202.Series redundant valve, 1CH-F1516A/B (CH-515)
CVC-101, closes on SIAS, 1CH-1518A/B (CH-523)
CVC-109, closes on CIAS. 3.Regenerative heat exchanger
- a. Plugged tubes Corrosion buildup, boron
buildup, foreign material in RCS.Reduced letdown flow.Flow indicator, FI-202 or FI-203NoneComp lete plugging of all tubes is unlikely.
Flow deterioration should
be detected long before
complete plugging occurs.
- b. Insufficient heat transfer Scale buildup on tubes Letdown temperature from regenerative HX may exceed
450°F. Possible damage to downstream components.
Temperature indicator and alarm, TIC-221.Temp. indicator/control-ler, TIC-221 will close valve 1CH-F1516A/B (CH-
515) CVC-101, if
temp. exceeds 470
°F, thus terminating letdown.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 22 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 3.Regenerative heat exchanger (Cont'd)c. External leakage Casing crack, seat leakage
on vent valve, 2CH-V1503 (CH-443)
CVC-213 Reduction to letdown flow, primary coolant released in-
side containment.
Eventually contain-ment radiation mon-
itors, possibly flow indicator FI-202, excessive make-up
rate.NoneIf HX leak is serious, it will be readily de-
tected, and the heat
exchanger can be isolated
- d. Flow path cross leakage Corrosion, vibration were, Mfg. defect.
Possible contaminant buildup in primary coolant, reduced ability
to change boron con-
centration, reduced effective-
ness of charging pumps.
Possible effect on temp., boron levels
and radiation.NoneIf leak is large, CVCS letdown samples will not
be consistent with RCS
samples. 4.Temperature indicator-
controller, TIC-221.a. False indication of high temp.
Electro-mechanical failure, set-point drift.
Valve 1CH-F1516A/B (CH-515)
CVC-101 closed, loss of letdown
flow.Low flow alarm, FI-203, flow indicator, FIC-202, 1CH-F1516A/B (CH-515) CVC-101
position indicator in control room.
None b. False indi-cation of low or
normal temp.
Electro-mechanical failure.
Possible loss of detection for high temp. letdown flow.
Temp. Indicator, TIC-223, TIC-224.
None. (TIC-223 will tend to increase CCW flow thru letdown HX to compensate for hi temp. flow. On hi
temp., TIC-224 will divert flow to protect components.
This failure causes no problem unless there is a
coexistent hi temp. will
cause alarm from TIC-
224. 5.Letdown con-tainment isola-tion air operated
valve outside con-
- tainment, 2CH-F1518A/B (CH-523)
CVC-109 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closed Mechanical binding Air or power failure, mechanical failure, or spurious signal.
Loss of redundant isolation of letdown line on CIAS.
Same as 1 b.
Position indicator in control room.
Series redundant valve, 1CH-F2501A/B (CH-516)
CVC-103, close on CIAS(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 23 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 6.Letdown control air operated valve, 2CH-FM1536A/B (CH-110P)
CVC-113A 2CH-FM1535A/B (CH-110Q)
CVC-113B a. Regulates low
- b. Regulates hi Valve operator failure, mech.
failure, false
signal Valve operator failure, spurious
signal Reduced letdown flow.
Increased letdown flow.Low flow indication on flow indicator, FI-202. Low pres-
sure indication on
PIC-201. Possible PZR
level increase.
Charging pumps may cycle more than
normal.Flow indicator,FI-202, pressure
indication PIC-201, possible PZR level
decrease.Parallel redundant con-trol valve can be placed
in operation by opening
isolation valves.
Parallel redundant control valve.One of two parallel redundant control
valves is normally
isolated by manual
isolation valves while
other valve controls flow.
Flow control can be
switched by opening
isolation valves for
standby control valve, and closing isolation
valves for "operating" control valve.(DRN 99-1031)
- c. Fails closed Air or Power failure, spurious signal Loss of letdown flow, possible overcharging of RCS. Possible
overpressurization of RCS during
Flow indicator,FI-202, pressure
indication from
PIC-201. Valve
position indication in
control room.
Parallel redundant controlvalve can be valved in.Rapidoverpressuriza-tion of RCS if this failure
occurs during shutdown
cooling.(DRN 99-1031) 7.Letdown control valve isolation
manual valves;
CVC-111A 2CH-V1523-2 (CH-343),
CVC-111B 2CH-V1505-1 (CH-342),
CVC-113A 2CH-V1505-2 (CH-344)
CVC-113B a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on system function.
Unable to isolate one control valve
for standby or maintenance.
Unable to transfer letdown flowcontrol to standby control valve.
Operator Operator Two series redundant isolation valves for each control
valve.None if the operating flow control valve has
malfunctioned.One set of isolation valves normally closed (for standby control
valve) other set is open (for operating control
valve.)(DRN 99-1031)c. Seat leakageContamination Possible boron precipitation on standby control valve due to
primary coolant leaking into the
space betwseen the isolation valve and the standby control valve, and
cooling.OperatorNone WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 24 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 8.Letdown line relief valves, 2CH-R626A/B (CH-345)
CVC-126 a. Fails closed Mechanical failure, setpoint drift No direct impact on system operation. Loss of overpressure
protection for potentially closed line
section.Periodic testNone(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails open Setpoint drift, mechanical failure Primary coolant discharged to holdup tanks.
Excessive use of makeup water, possible low flow
indications on flow
indicator, FI-202.
Possible low pres-sure indications on
PIC-201.None(DRN 00-1638)8a.Letdown line thermal relief
valve CVC-1081a. Fails closedb. Fails open Mechanical failure.
Setpoint drift.
Mechanical failure.
Setpoint drift.
No direct impact on systemoperation. Loss of overpressure
protection for portion of Letdown
line bounded by containment
isolation valves CVC-103 and
CVC-109 following a LOCA.
Primary Coolant discharged inside primary containment.
Periodic test Excessive use of makeup water.
Radiation detectors.
Possibly low flow
indication on FI 202.
Possibly low pressure
Indications on PIC-
201.NoneNoneLetdown line must be isolated until relief valve
can be repaired or
replaced.(DRN 00-1638)(DRN 99-1031) 9.Shutdown cooling manual
isolation to LHX
SI-423 a. Fails closedMechanical failure Unable to use CVCS for puri-fication of shutdown cooling flow.
Operator Purification of the primary coolant during shutdown cooling can be
accomplished via normal
letdown and charging.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 25 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks 9.Shutdowncoolingisola-tion
to LHX 2CH-V644A/B (CH-463)b. Seat leakageContaminationPrimary coolant diverted to shutdown cooling system during
normal letdown.
Possibly flow indicator FI-202.Series redundant check valve and isolation valve in
shutdown cooling system.10.Letdown heat exchanger a. Tube leak Corrosion, mfg.
defect Contamination of component cooling water with primary coolant.
CCW radiation moni-tors, possibly low
flow indication on
FI-202, CCW surge tank level increase, excessive use of
make-up water.
Noneb. Tubes pluggedCorrosion buildup, boron buildup, contaminant
buildupReduced letdown flow.Flow indicator, FI-202 and FI-203 None(DRN 99-1031)c. Insufficient heat transfer Scale buildup, malfunction of
CCW flow control
valve.High temp. discharge from HX, possible damage to downstream
components.
Temperature indicator-controller, TIC-224, alarms on high temp.
Temp. Indicator-controller, TIC-223, will sense hi temp.
and increase CCW flow through HX Temp. Indicator-controller, TIC-224, will divert hi
temp. letdown flow past
Ion Exchangers.(DRN 99-1031)d. External leakageCasing crack, Seat leakage on vent
valve, CH-444.
Primary coolant released outside containment Area radiation monitors, Local leak
detection, flow
indication from FI-202, excessive use of
make-up water.NoneWhen leak is located, letdown flow can be
terminated and HX can be
isolated for repair.11.Letdown line vent valves (6 valves)
- a. Fails closed
- b. Seat leakageMechanical failure Contamination No impact on system operation.
Primary coolant released, either inside containment or
outside containment.
Operator Radiation monitors, local leak monitors.None Required Vent valves are capped.
When leak is located, letdown flow can be
terminated, and
appropriate line section isolated to repair valve.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 26 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks12.Letdown line drain valves
(13 valves)
- a. Fails closed
- b. Seat leakageMechanical failure Contamination No impact on system operation.
Primary coolant diverted to drain header and BMS during letdown.
Operation Equip. drain tank level indication, possibly low
flow indication from
FI-202.None RequiredNone Required(DRN 99-1031)13.Temperature Indicator-controller, TIC-223 a. False low temperature indication Electro-mechanical malfunction Letdown HX CCW control valve will be throttled back, resulting in
decreased heat removal in letdown
HX. High temp. discharge from
letdown HX and possible damage to
downstream components.
Temp. indicator-controller, TIC-224
alarms on high temp.
TIC-224 will divert letdown flow past the ion exchangers.(DRN 99-1031)b. False high temperature indication Electro-mechanical malfunction Letdown HX CCW control valve will be opened, resulting in increased heat removal in letdown HX. Low
temperature discharge from
letdown HX not considered a
problem.Low temp. indication from TIC-224None Required(DRN 99-1031)14.Temperature indicator-
controller, TIC-224 a. False low temperature indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Failure to bypass ion exchanger.Temperatureindica-tor TIC-223.None Required
- b. False high temperature indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Ion exchanger bypass valve opened. Buildup of corrosion
products in primary coolant. Loss
of boron and radiation monitoring.
TIC-224 alarms on hi temp. Also use TIC-
223 or TIC-221 to
assess temp. Position
indication on (CH-520)
CVC-140 and
2CH-W136A/B.NoneThis condition drives valves 2CH-W136A/B (CH-520) CVC-140 to
their safe position.15.Pressure indicator-controller, PIC-201 a. False low pressure indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Letdown pressure control valve will start to close, thus reducing
letdown flow. Letdown
flow control valve will open to counteract. May lift relief valve, 2CH-R626A/B (CH-345) CVC-115.
Flow indicator, FI-201, PIC-201
will alarm on low
pressure None(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 27 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks15.Pressure indicator-controller, PIC-201 (Cont'd)b. False high pressure indication Electrical mechanical
malfunction Letdown pressure control valve willopen, increasing letdown
flow. Letdown flow control valve
will close to counteract.
Possible hi level alarm on VCT. Low level
alarm on PZR. High
letdown flow alarm
before letdown valve
reduces flow.As PZR level drops, the letdown flow control valve will
close.Possible PIC-201 hi.
Pressure alarm.(DRN 99-1031)16.Letdown Back-Pressure control air
operated valve;
2CH-PM627A/B (CH-201Q),
CVC-123A 2CH-PM628A/B (CH-201P)
CVC-123B a. Fails to close properly on decreased
upstream pressure Valve operator malfunction, mechanical binding Some pressure decrease down-stream. Possible flashing in
letdown HX may result in
excessive letdown temp.
Pressure indicator controller, PIC-201, alarms on lo press.hi temp. alarm from
TIC-224.Parallel redundant control valve can be manually
valved in and activated.Two pressure control valves, one active and
other on standby.
Standby valve is isolated
by manual valves.b. Fails to open properly on increased
upstream pressure Valve operator malfunction, mechanical binding Pressure increase upstream inletdown HX. May lift 2CH-R626A/B (relief valve). Possible reduced
letdown flow.
Pressure Indicator-controller PIC-201
alarms on high
pressure.Same as above.
Relief valve 2CH-R626A/B (CH-345)
CVC-115 protects against
overpressure.c. Fails closed Air or power failure, spurious signalLoss of letdown flow. Possible overpressurization of RCS, especially during shutdown cooling.
CVC-115. PZR level increase.
Pressure indicator /
controller, PIC-201 alarms on hi press.
valve position
indication control room, Flow indicator, FI-201, PZR HI. LVL alarm.
Parallel redundant valve can be manually valved in and activated during normal operation. PZR level controls
will stop backup charging
pumps.If this occurs during shutdown cooling, RCS
over-pressurization will
happen very rapidly as
system is solid.17.Letdown Back-pressure control
valve isolation
manual valves;
CVC-125A 2CH-V605-2 (CH-348)
CVC-125B a. Fails open
- b. Fails closed Mechanical binding Mechanical binding No impact on system perfor-mance. Unable to isolate one
pressure control valve for
standby status or maintenance.
Unable to transfer letdown pressure control to standby
pressure control valve.
Operator OperatorSeries redundant isolation valve.None if operating pressure control valve has
malfunctioned.
Two sets of isolation valves, one set normally
closed for standby
pressure control valve, other set normally open
for pressure control valve
in operation.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 28 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)17.Letdown Back-pressure control
valve isolation
manual valves;
2CH-V605-1 (CH-347),
CVC-125A 2CH-V605-2 (CH-348),
CVC-121B 2CH-V641A/B (CH-350),
CVC-125B (Cont'd)c. Seat leakageContamination Possible boron precipitation on standby pressure control valve due
to primary coolant leaking into the
space between the isolation valve
and the control valve and cooling.OperatorNone18.Letdown line air operated sample
CVC-139 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failure Mechanical failure No impact on system performance Unable to use valve to isolate
letdown sample line.
No direct impact on system operation. Unable to obtain letdown
sample Operator Unable to establish sample flow.
Series redundant valves (normally closed) in sampling
system.None Required Valves normally closed manually operated.
Same as above.19.Boronometer and process radiation
monitor line
isolation valve, 2CH-V608 (2 valves)
- a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on system operation.
Unable to isolate boronometer and PRM line for maintenance.Unable to establish flow thru boronometer and PRM. Loss of
boron and radiation monitoring.
Operator Operator Series redundant isola-tion valves for borono-meter and PRM.None Required These valves are closed by DC 3432 to
functionally abandon-in-place the Boronometer
and Process Radiation
Monitor.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 29 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks20.Letdown flowindicator FI-202
- a. False low flow indications
- b. False high flow indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation.
No direct impact on system operation.
Letdown Pressure PIC-201 and tempera-
ture TIC-223, or
TIC-224 indications.
FI-202 alarms on hi flow indications.
Letdown pressure
indicators should allow
assessment of false
flow indication.None RequiredNone Required(DRN 99-1031)21.Boronometer and process radiation
monitor inlet
control valve;
2CH-F195A/B (CH-521)a. Fails open
- b. Fails closed Mechanical malfunction, valve
operator malfunction Mechanical failure, valve operator
failure, spurious
signal No impact on normal operation.
Possible damage to boronometer and PRM if hi temp. letdown
condition develops.Loss of boronometer and pro-cess radiation monitor (PRM)
effectiveness.
Testing. Valve position indication
in control room if
hi temp. condition
exists.Flow indicator, FI-203, alarms on low
flow.None unless temp. is high enough to cause TIC-221 to
close valve 1CH-F1516A/B
and terminate letdown.
None This valve is functionally Abandoned-in-place by
DC 3432.22.Boronometer and process radia-tion monitor iso
lation valves;
- a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failure Mechanical failure No impact on system operation.Unable to isolate boronometer or PRM for maintenance.
Unable to establish flow through either boronometer
or PRM.Operator OperatorSeries redundant isolationvalves on bor onometer/PRM line.None Required These valves are closed by DC 3432 to
functionally Abandoned-in-place the Boronometer
and Process Radiation
Monitor.23.BoronometerA. False low boron concentration indi-cation Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation.
Boronometer low con-centration alarm and
cross-check with
sampling system.
Sampling system provides a backup method of determin-ing boron concentration.TheBoronometer has been functionally
Abandoned-in-place by DC 3432. Chemistry sampling is now the primary means of
determining boron
concentration.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 30 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISNo.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks23.BoronometerFalse indications of high boron con-
centration Electrical or mechanical
malfunction NO direct impact on system operation.
Boronometer high concentration alarm
and cross-check with
sampling system Sampling System backup.(DRN 99-1031)24.Process radiation monitor a. False high radiationlevel indications
- b. False low radiation level in-dication Electrical malfunction Electrical malfunction No direct impact on system operation.
No direct impact on system operation. May not detect a fuel
element failure if one occurs.PRM high level alarm, iodine analysis.
Iodine analysis.
Sampling System backup.
Sampling System backup.
The Process Radiation Monitor has been
functionally Abandoned-
in-place by DC 3432.
Chemistry sampling and
Area Radiation Monitors
are now the primary means of detecting high
activity in the letdown
piping.25.Flow indicator FI-203 a. False low flow alarms Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation.Periodic testNone The letdown flow indicator has been functionally
Abandoned-in-place by
DC 3432.b. False high flow indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation.Periodic testNone26.Boronometer/pro-cess radiation
monitor outlet
2CH-V676 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failure Mechanical failure, blockage No impact on system operation.
Same as 21 b.NoneNone Required This valve has been functionally Abandoned-
in-place by DC 3432.27.Process radiation monitor local
sample vale
- a. Fails closed
- b. Seat leakageMechanical failure Contamination No impact on system operation.Unable to sample PRM or to flush
PRM.Release of primary coolant outside containment.
Operator Local leak detectors, local radiation
monitors, flow
indicator FI-203None RequiredNone Required This valve has been functionally Abandoned-
in-place by DC 3432.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 31 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)28.Process radiationmonitor primary
water flush valve, 7DW-V690 a. Fails closed
- b. Seat leakageMechanical failure Contamination No impact on system operation.
Unable to flush PRM with
demineralized water.
Primary coolant diverted to demineralized water system.
OperatorLow flow indication from flow indicator
FI-203None Required Series redundant isola-tion valves in deminer-alized water system.
This valve has been functionally Abandoned-
in-place by DC 3432.29.Deleted(DRN 99-1031)30.Purification filter bypass
- b. Seat leakage
- c. Fails openMechanical failure ContaminationMechanical failure No impact on normal system operation. Unable to bypass
filter for maintenance.
Minor letdown flow diverted past filter. Reduced filter efficiency.
Reduced filter efficiency, reducedflow to PRM and boronometer.
Operator Delta-P indicator PDI-202 Delta-P indicator, PDI-202, flow
indicator, FI-203.None Required None None31.Purification filter isolation
2CH-V135A/B (CH-360)a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on system operation.
Unable to isolate filter for
maintenance.
Unable to reestablish flowthrough filter after maintenance.
Operator Operator, Delta-P indicator PDI-202.
NoneNoneValves are normally open manually operated.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 32 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks32.Purification filtera. Does not filter"Punch-through"of the element Particle buildup in ion ex-changers.EVentually escessive ion exchanger Delta-P or radiation
levels.Differential pres-sure detector PDI-
202, differntial pressure detector
PDI-203, PDI-205, or
PDI-207. Sampling
system downstream of
filter.Ion exchanger can remove particulate matter. Filter
can be isolated and repaired
while maintaining
letdown flow through bypass
valve , 2CH-V630.
Extremely unlikely failure mode.(DRN 99-1031)CVC-MFLT-0001b.
Blocked Element plugged with particulate
matterReduced letdown flow.PDI-202 high diff.Press. alarm, FI-202 low flow indication.
Letdown flow can bypass the filter through valve
while elements are being
replaced.33.DifferentialPressureindica-
tor PDI-202
- a. Erroneous low differential pres-sure indications Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No impact on system operations.
May fail to detect blocked/dirty
filter.OperatorNone
- b. Erroneous high differential pres-sure indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunctionNo impact on system operation.No improvement when bypass valve is
opened.None34.Ion exchanger air operated bypass
CVC-140 a. Fails in the "IX" position Valve operator malfunction, mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation. Unable to bypass ion
exchangers on high temp. dis-
charge from letdown HX. Pos-
sible damage to ion exchangers
resin.None until demand, then the valve posi-tion indicator and
respective IX diff.pres. indicator, PDI-203, 205 or 207, and hi temp. alarm
from TIC-224.
Alternate bypass flow paths can be manually
aligned.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails to the"bypass IX" position Valve operator malfunction, mechanical failure, spurious signal, loss of air
or power Ion exchangers bypassed, build-up of fission products in primary
coolant.Valve positionindicator,respec-
tive IX diff. press.
indicator, PDI-203, 205, or 207NoneFeed and bleed can be u sed to control RCS
chemistry and
radioactivity.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 33 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)35.Purification Ion Exchanger (IX)
isolation manual
CVC-155A a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No direct impact on system operation. Unable to isolate
IX #A when other IX placed in
service.Unable to reestablish letdown flow through IX #A.
Operator Operator For 2CH-V139A, none.For 2CH-V145A, can close
valve 2CH-V148A/B.
Parallel redundant purification IXB or IXC.
Valves normally open.36.Ion Exchanger inlet check valves;
CVC-146C a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on normal system operation.
Unable to establish letdown flow through affected IX.
None IX differential pressure indicator, PDI-203, 205 or 207 Manual isolation vavle upstream.None37.Ion exchanger manual valves;
CVC-150C a. Fail closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage No impact on system operation.
Unable to vent IX during fill
operations.
Minor leakage of potentially radioactive gas or liquid from
IX to waste management system.
Operator Operator Redundant vent valves to atmosphere.
Redundant normally closed vent isolation valve down-
stream of IX vents to WMS
designed for radioactive
gases.Manual valves normally open when IX is idle, closed when IX is in
operation.38.Ion exchanger atmospheric
manual vent
- valves, 2CH-V669-2
CVC-149A 2CH-V669-1
CVC-149B 2CH-V669-3
CVC-149C a. Fails closed
- b. Seat leakageMechanical failure Contamination No impact on system operation.
Minor leakage of potentially radioactive gas or liquid to
atmosphere.
Operator Local radiation monitors.Redundant vent valves to waste management system.
Valves are capped.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 34 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)39.Ion exchanger resin addition
air operated
CVC-151C a. Fails closed
- b. Fails open Mechanical Failure Seat leakage No impact on system operation.
Unable to add resin to IX.
No impact on system operation.
Operator OperatorNone Required Resin addition lines are blind flanged.Manual, normally closed valves.40.Ion exchanger resin sluice outlet
manual valves;
CVC-152C a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage No impact on system operation.
Unable to flush spent resin from
IX.Leakage of primary coolant and resin to spent resin tank.
Operator OperatorNone Required Normally closed drain valve in series (7WM-V151)
at inlet of spent resin tank.
Manual, normally closed valve.41.Ion exchanger resin sluice
inlet manual
CVC-154C a. Fails closed
- b. Seat leakageMechanical failure Contamination No direct impact on system.
Unable to flush resin from ion
exchangers.
Leakage of primary coolant to resin sluice header.
Operator Excessive use of makeup water.None RequiredNone Required42.Deleted(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 35 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)43.Purification ion exchanger B and C
header inlet valve, 2CH-V137A/B (CH-374)
CVC-141 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to establish "single path" flow through IXB or IXC.
Primary coolant leakage into"Inlet header." Possible boron
precipitation.
Operator None IXB or IXC can be used in series with IXA, which does
not require use of this valve.None Required Normally closed manual valve.44.Purification ion exchanger B inlet
manual valve
CVC-144B a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to establish flow through IXB.No impact.
Operator Operator IXA or IXC can be used.
IXB is isolated from letdown flow by valves 2CH-V137A/B (CH-374) CVC-141 and 2CH-
V138A/B (CH-392) CVC-142.
Only IXB can remove lithium.45.Purification ion exchanger C inlet
manual valve
CVC-144C a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat Leakage Unable to establish flow through IXC.None Operator Operator Use IXA, IXB, or feed and bleed boron removal."Series redundant" valves, 2CH-V138A/B (CH-392) CVC-
CVC-158, 2CH-V146A/B (CH-
398) CVC-155C, closed.
Normally closed-manual valve.46.Purification ion exchanger B and C
manual inlet cross
connect.
CVC-142 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to put PIX C on line.
No impact on normal system operation.
Operator Operator Flow path through valve 2CH-V156A/B (CH-394) CVC-
158.Other isolation valves in header protect ion
exchangers.47.Isolation valve, series purification
flow line manual
CVC-156 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to use PIX A in series.
None unless PIX B or C in use without PIX A, then bypass A.
Operator Ion exchangerdifferentialpres- sure
indicator, PDI-205.PIX B can be used alone.
None Normally closed-manual valve.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 36 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)48.Isolation Valve, series purification
line isolation
manual valve
CVC-158 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to use the three ion exchangers in series.
Possible bypass of PIX C..
Operator PIX C differential pressure indicator PIX A and deborating IX can be used in series.
Isolation valve 2CH-V149A/B.
Normally closed-manual valve.49.Purification ion exchanger B outlet
manual valve
CVC-155B a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to put PIX B on line.
Long term leakage of primary coolant into IX. Possible overfill
thru vent.
Operator None Feed and bleed operations.
None Normally closed-manual valve.50.Purification ion exchanger C
discharge outlet
manual valve
CVC-155C a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to put PIX C on line.
Same as 49 b.
None PIX A and B can be used in series.Normally closed-manual valve.51.Purification ion exchanger A and
B manual outlet
cross-connect 2CH-V148A/B (CH-382)
CVC-157 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure Unable to establish effective series flow through purifica-tion ion exchangers A and B.
Unable to reestablish indepen-dent flow through PIX A.
Operator Operator PIX B can be used independently.
Letdown flow can be diverted past ion exchangers while
valve is repaired.
Normally open-manual valve.52.Purification ion exchanger B and
PIX C manual
outlet cross-
CVC-159 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure Unable to establish series flow through all three ion exchangers.
Unable to reestablish indepen-dent flow through PIX A or B or
series flow through PIX A and B.
Operator Operator None Required Same as 51 b.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 37 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)53.Purification ion exchangers A, B, and C.
CVC-MIX-0001A
CVC-MIX-0001B
CVC-MIX-0001C
- a. Ineffective ion removal b. Plugged Degraded resin Particulate contamination Primary coolant fission products concentration increases.
Decreased boron removal
capability at "end of cycle".
Decreased letdown flow.
Decreased boron removal
capability at "end of cycle".
Ion exchanger differential pressure
indicators, PDI-203, 205, and 207.
Redundant IX or feed and bleed.Redundant IX or feed and bleed.CVC-MIX-0001A CVC-MIX-0001B
CVC-MIX-0001Cc. External leakageCracked container, corrosion, mfg.
defect.Primary coolant released out-side containment.
Local leak rate and radiation monitors, ion
exchanger differential
pressure indicators, PDI-203, 205, and
207.(DRN 99-1031) 54.Deleted55.Ion exchanger differential
pressure indicator
PDI-203, PDI-205, PDI-207 a. Erroneous Low pressure indication
- b. Erroneous high pressure indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation. Unable to detect a
plugged IX.
No direct impact on system operation. May lead to early resin
change.Test Periodic test. No improvement when standby IX placed on
line.None RequiredNone Required(DRN 99-1031)56.Letdown strainer inlet isolation
manual valve
CVC-160 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on normal system operation. Unable to isolate letdown
strainer for maintenance.
Unable to reestablish letdown flow through ion exchangers.
Operator Operator Redundant isolation valve.
Ion exchangers can be bypassed while valve is
repaired.Normally open-manual valve.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 38 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks57.DifferentialPressure indicator
PDI-204 a. Erroneous low pressure indication
- b. Erroneous high pressure indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No impact on system operation.
No direct impact on system operation. May lead to early maintenance on strainer.
Periodic Test Periodic Test Possible Hi diff.Pres. alarmNone RequiredNone Required58.Letdown strainer
- a. Plugged Containment buildup Reduced letdown flow.Diff. pres. ind ica-tor PDI-204, high
dp alarm.Strainer and ion exchangers can be bypassed
while strainer repaired
- b. Fails to strain properly"Ruptured" element Particulates and resin possibly deposited in volume control tank.
Possible contamination of charging
pumps.Same as above.Same as above.
- c. External leakage corrosion, mfg.
defect Primary coolant released out-side containment.
Local leak and radiation monitors.
Same as above.(DRN 99-1031)59.Letdown Strainer Drain valve
CVC-162 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage No impact on system operation.
Unable to drain strainer for
maintenance.
Primary coolant released to spent resin tank.
Operator Diff. press.
indi-cator, PDI-204.
Excessive use of
makeup water.None RequiredNone Required60.Shutdown cooling purification return
line isolation
manual valve, 2CH-V302A/B (CH-439)
CVC-164 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage No impact on normal operation.
Unable to use ion exchangers
for purification of shutdown
cooling flow.
Letdown flow diverted to shut-down cooling header.
Operator None NoneSeries redundant isolation valves in shutdown cooling
system.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 39 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)61.Letdown strainer isolation manual
CVC-166 a. Fails open
- b. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on normal system operation.
Unable to isolate letdown strainer for maintenance.
Same as 56 b.
Operator OperatorNone Required None Normally open-manual valve.
Letdown flow would have to be terminated to repair
valve.62.Volume Control Tank Bypass air
operated valve
CVC-169 a. Fails open to the volume control tank Valve operator malfunction, mechanical failure No impact on normal system operation, but unable to bypass
letdown flow to the boron management system on high level
in VCT or to remove radioactivity
that ion exchangers could not
remove.VCT level detectors, LIC-226, LC-227
position indicator in
Control Room None Letdown flow would have to be terminated to repair
valve(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails to the bypass position Valve operator malfunction, spurious signal Unplanned release of primary coolant to boron management system. Decrease in VCT level.
VCT level detectors LIC-226, LC-227.
Position indicator in
Control Room.
Termination of letdown flow until valve is repaired. During
bypass make-up will maintain
VCT level.(DRN 99-1031)63.Vol. Cont. tank inlet check valve
CVC-172 Fails closed Fails open Corrosion Contamination Inability to establish letdown flow.None during normal system operation.Low level in vol. cont.
tank alarm, LIC-226.
NoneOn low low level in VCT, charging pumps will switch
suction to the refueling water
tank.During VCT bypass mode of operation, potential leakage of the VCT cover gas to the
BMC is prevented by valve
CH-500.(DRN 99-1031)64.Purification ion exchanger outlet
header isolation
valve CVC-1661a. Fails openb. Fails closedMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on normal systemoperation. Primary coolant
diverted to VCT during shutdown
cooling purification causing
possible loss of SDC during mid-
loop operation Unable to reestablish letdown flow.
Operator Operator Non required.
None.Normally open manual valve.Letdown not required for safe shutdown of plant.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 40 of 60)Revision 13 (04/04)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (REACTOR COOLANT PUMP CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN99-1031, R12) 1.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff excess
flow check valves, 2CH-V1519 (CH-301),RC-409A 2CH-V1520 (CH-302),RC-409B 2CH-V1521 (CH-303),RC-509A 2CH-V1522(CH-304)
RC-509B a. Fail closed
- b. Fail open High Tension spring, plugged, mechanical failure Mechanical failure, contamination Loss of controlled seal bleed-off for reactor coolant pump.
Possible damage to RCP seals due
to overheating. Pr essure buildup in bleed-off line.Possible excessive flow of high temperature primary coolant coolant into VCT. Possible thermal
damage to charging system, possible pressure surge in controlled bleed-off line.Flow Temp and pres-sure indicators and alarm on the individual bleedoff lines inside
containment.
VCT temperature indicator, TI-225.Pressure indicator PI-215, high alarm.
Valve 2CH-F1512A/B (CH-505) CVC-401 can be closed terminating all bleed-off to VCT. Bleed-off will be routed to quench tank via relief valve, 2CH-R1515A/B.
(CH-199) RC-603 Associated RCP must be shutdown.This mode most important if ther is also concurrent
RCP seal degradation, because the primary
coolant system pressure
is the driving force for controlled bleed-off.(DRN99-1031, R12)(DRN 03-2021, R13) 2.Pressure indicator PI-215 a. Erroneous low pressur indication
- b. Erroneous high pressure indications
and alarms Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Electrical or mechanical
malfunctionsNo direct impact on system operation.
No direct impact on system operation.
Vapor seal cavity pressure indicators.
Same as 2 a.None RequiredNone Required The pressure indicator is used to verify a minimum
reactor pump seal
controlled bleedoff
backpress ure as recommended by the
RCP seal vendor.
Throttling with the RCP
controlled bleedoff outlet
head isolation valve should not be done
without checking the
individual vapor seal
cavity pressure
indicators.(DRN 03-2021, R13)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 41 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 3.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff relief
- valve, 2CH-R1515A/B (CH-199)
RC-603 a. Spuriously open
- b. Fails closed Setpoint drift, mechanical failure.
Mechanical failure, blockage.Unplanned release of primary coolant to quench tank.
No impact on normal system operation. Loss of bleed-off
header over pressure protection.
Pressure indicator PI-215, quench tank
pressure indicator.
Periodic Test Valve 2CH-F1514A/B (CH-507) RC-602 can be
closed to isolate the relief
valve.NoneFlashing, reduced cooling.(DRN 99-1031) (DRN 00-1638)3a.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleed off thermal
relief valve (RC-
6061)a. Fails closedb. Fails open Mechanical failure.
Set point drift Mechanical failure.
Set point drift No impact on normal systemoperation. Loss of over pressure
protection for the portion of the
bleed off line bounded by
containment isolation valves CVC-
401 and RC-606.
Primary coolant discharged inside primary containment.
Periodic Test Excessive use of makeup water.
Radiation detectors.
NoneNoneControlled bleed off line must be isolated until relief valve is repaired or
replaced. (DRN 00-1638)c. Fails to reseatContaminationSeat leakagePeriodic Test Same as 3 a.
Possible detection via quench tank pressure
indicator(DRN 99-1031) 4.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff relief
air operated valve
stop 2CH-F1514A/B (CH-507)
RC-602 a. Fails open Mechanical failure, operator malfunction.
No impact on normal system operation. Unable to isolate relief
valve on a loss of AC transient
resulting in reduction in primary
coolant inventory.Periodic TestNoneNo serious effect on loss of A/C transient.
- b. Fails closed Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction, spurious signal.
NO direct impact on normal system operation. Loss of bleed-
off header over pressure
protection.
Valve position indicatorin control room.
None(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 42 of 60)Revision 13 (04/04)
FAILURE MODE AND EF FECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN99-1031, R12)5.Reactor coolant pump controlled bleed-off con-
tainment isola-
tion air operated
- b. Fails closed Mechanical failure, operator malfunction.
Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction, loss
of powerPartial loss of containment isoaltion capabaility. No impact on normal
system operation.
Loss of all controlled bleed-off flow to the VCT. Possible
damage to pump seals due to
overheating. Pressure build-
up in the bleed-off line.Valve position indicator in control room, periodic test.
Valve position indicator in control room, pressure indicator, PI-215, bleed-off flow and temp indicators.
Manual throttle valve,2CH-N1511A/B (CH-198)CVC-403, can be closed.
Series redundant
isolation valve.
Controlled bleed-off will be routed to the quench tank.Since bleed-off is to a closed system, cont.
isolation is not solely dependent on the isolation
valve.(DRN 03-2021, R13) 6.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff Outlet Header Isolation manual
- Valve, 2CH-N1511A/B(CH-198)
CVC-403 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails open Mechanical failure, binding Mechanical failure, binding Unable to establish controlled bleed-off flow to VCT on startup.
Unable to throttle controlled bleed-off flow p roperly.Operator Operator Startup delayed until valve repaired.NoneMaintaining the RCP controlled bleedoff outlet
header isolation valve in
the open position should
ensure the back pressure is maintained as
recommended by the
RCP seal vendor.
Throttling of the valve
should not normally be
required.(DRN 03-2021, R13) 7.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff back-flow to the sampling
system check valve
PSL-181 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails open or partly openMechanical failure Seal leakage, contamination Loss of sample system purge capability and heat exchanger
pressure protection.
Unplanned loss of primary coolant to sampling system.None Required NoneNone Required Series redundant check valves in samp ling system.Sampling can not be accomplished until fault is
corrected.(DRN99-1031, R12)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 43 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 8.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff header
drain to the
RDH 2CH-V623-3, CVC-406 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage No impact on normal operation, cannot drain section of pipe
for repair.
Divert part of bleed-off flow to RDH.Operator RDH level indicator Parallel redundant drain valve.None 9.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff header
vent 2CH-V623
CVC-405 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage No impact on system operation.
Divert part of the bleed-off flow Operator None None Capped(DRN 99-1031)(DRN 01-994)10.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleed-off backpressure
control valve (CVC-4063)a. Fails openMechanical failureUnable to throttle controlled bleed-off flow properly.
Operator Valve can be isolated and flow can be manually
throttled in a parallel path.
- b. Fails closedMechanical failure Loss of all controlled bleed-off flowto the VCT. Possible damage to
pump seals due to overheating.
Pressure buildup in the bleed-off
line.Press, bleed-off flow and temp indicators Controlled bleed-off will be routed to the quench tank.11.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleed-off manual
backpressure
control valve (CVC-4061)a. Fails openMechanical failureUnable to throttle controlled bleed-off flow properly.
Operator Manual valve CVC-403 can be adjusted to throttle
controlled bleed-off flow.b. Fails closedMechanical failureNo im pact.NoneControlled bleed-off flow will be maintained through CVC-
4063.12.Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleed-off backpressure
control drain
valves CVC-40621 CVC-40631a. Fails openSeat leakage Divert part of the bleed-off flow.NoneCapped Drain valves normally closed - manual valve(DRN 01-994)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 44 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CHEMICAL ADDITION PORTION)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 1.Primary makeup water supply to
the chemical
addition tank.
PMU-139 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails open Mechanical failure, binding Seat leakageUnable to add makeup water to the chemical addition tank.
Possible leakage of makeup water to the chemical addition tank and
dilution of chemical solution if
make-up pumps are operating.
Pressurization of the chemical
addition tank.
Operator OperatorNone RequiredNone RequiredManually operated valve -
normally closed.
No effect unless chemical addition is in
progress.(DRN 99-1031) 2.Chemical addition tank chemical fill
- b. Fails openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to add chemicals to tank.
No impact Operator OperatorNone RequiredNone RequiredManually operated valve -
normally closed 3.Chemical addition tank vent valve, 7CH-V625 (CH-447)a. Fails closed Mechanical failure, binding.Unable to vent tank when filling or draining. Possible
pressure buildup on fill. Possible to
draw a vacuum on drain.OperatorNone Required
- b. Fails open Seat leak Unable to add chemicalsOperatorNone Required(DRN 99-1031) 4.Chemical addition tank drain valve, 7CH-V625-8 (CH-310)
CVC-602a. Fails closedMechanical failureNo impact on normal operation unable to drain excess chemical
solution, or waste solution when
cleaning tank.OperatorNone Required Drain valve normally closed - manual valve.(DRN 99-1031)b. Fails openSeat leakage Unwanted loss of chemical solution to waste management system
when chemical solution in tank.NoneNone RequiredChemical addition tank is generally empty. Usually
make up a "batch" only
when required.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 45 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 5.Chemical Addition tank CVC-MTNK-0001
- a. External leakage Mfg. defect, corrosion Chemical solution spill. Reduced chemical addition capability (less
volume available).OperatorNone RequiredThe chemical addition is a 18 gal. SS tank.
It is generally empty.
Chemical solution is made up only when it is needed, and is added to
primary coolant at that
time. This is not a storage
tank. 6.Chemical addition strainer and
Metering Pump
isolation valves
CVC-603 7CH-V625-6 (CH-307)
CVC-605 a. Fail closed
- b. Fail openMechanical failure Seat leakage Unable to add chemical solu-tion to primary coolant system No impact OperatorNone RequiredNone Required Series redundant valves The chemical addition tank is generally empty
except when making up a
batch of chemical
solution for addition to the
primary coolant system.
Therefore, both valves
are generally dry. 7.Chemical addition strainer CVC-MSTRN-0002
- a. Plugged Containment buildup Chemical addition rate reduced. If screen completely plugged, unable
to add chemical solution to primary
coolant system.OperatorNone Required
- b. Doesn't strain out contaminants Perforated strainer element.Small amounts of contaminants possibly released to primary
coolant system.Periodic examinationNone Requiredc. External leakageCorrosion, Mfg.
defect.Some loss of chemical solution while adding it to the primary
coolant system.OperatorNone Required(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 46 of 60) Revision 305 (11/11)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
No.
Name Failure Mode
Cause Symptoms and Local Effects
Including Dependent Failures
Method of Detection Inherent Compensating Provision
Remarks (DRN 99-1031, R12)
- 8. VCT liquid backflow to the
chemical addition tank check valve, 2CH-V611 (CH-308)
CVC-606 a. Fails closed
- b. Fails open Mechanical failure, blockage.
Seat leakage Unable to add chemical solu-tion to primary coolant system.
Leakage of primary coolant into
chemical addition line. Possible boron precipitation on valve 7CH-
V625-6 (CH-307) CVC-605 Operator
Operator None Required
None Required
- 9. Chemical addition strainer drain valve
CVC-604 a. Fails open
B. Fails closed Mechanical failure
Mechanical failure Loss of chemical solution to
drain header.
Unable to drain strainer after
chemical addition.
Operator
Operator None Required
Drain valve 7CH-V625-8 (CH-310) CVC-602
- 10. Chemical Addition Metering Pump CVC-MPMP-0002
- a. Pump fails Electrical or Mechanical Unable to add chemical solution to primary coolant system Operator None Required (DRN 99-1031, R12)
(EC-4019, R305)
- 11. Zinc Injection Skid CVC-MINJ0001
- a. Component failure; Pump, Valve, Tank, Power Supply Electrical or
Mechanical Unable to add chemical solution to primary coolant system Operator None required (EC-4019, R305)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 47 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CHARGING AND VOLUME CONTROL)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 1.Volume ControlTank (VCT) vent
line Manual
Isolation Valves;
GWM-118 2CH-V604-1 (CH-102)
CVC-175 a. Fails in open position or partly open
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, contaminationMechanical failure Unable to isolate vent line for Control Valve or pressure regulator
valve maintenance.
Seat leakage.
Unable to vent VCT. Possible overpressurization of VCT.
Operator Operator, High VCTPressure AlarmIf Pressure Regulator Valves maintenance is required, control valve.
2CH-F185A/B, can be used
for partial isolation.
Also, Valves in VGSH.
VCT relief valve 2CH-R182 A/B (CH-115) CVC-182
protects against
overpressure.
This mode applies only if valves have been closed
for vent line
maintenance. 2.VCT vent line control valves, 2CH-F185A/B (CH-513)
GWM-112 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails in open position Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunctionMechanical failure Unable to vent VCT. Possible overpressurization of VCT.
Unable to automatically isolate VCT vent line to terminate venting.
Valve position Indicator in Control
Room. VCT pressure
indicator, PI-225.
Valve position indicator in Control Room. H 2 analysis at gas analyzer.Same as above.
Pressure Regulator Valve 7CH-PM179A/B (CH-414)
GWM-114, manual isolation
CVC-175, if not time
constraint. 3.VCT vent line pressure regulator
7CH-PM179A/B (CH-414)
GWM-114 a. Controls pressure too high Sensor malfunction, valve
operator malfunction, failure.Possibleoverpressurization of VCT.VCT pressure indicator PI-225, High Pressure
Alarm.Relief Valve, 2CH-R182A/B (CH-115) CVC-182 provides
some overpressure protection
for VCT.b. Controls pressure too low Sensor mal-function, valve
operator mal-
- function, mechanical failure.
Possible overpressurization VCT.
Possible excessive releases of
radioactive gases, possible
overpressurization of vent gas
system header. Excessive use of
H 2 blanket gas.
VCT pressure indicator PI-225, H 2 flow indicator FI-225. H 2 analysis of gas.Downstream pressure control valve will close to protect
VGSH. Thereby terminating "Blowdown" of VCT.
Charging pumps may trip on low suction pressure.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 48 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031) 4.VCT vent line"Downstream" pressure regulator
7CH-PM178A/B (CH-406)
GWM-116 a. Controls pressure too high Sensor malfunc-tion, valve operator
mal-
- function, mechanical failure.Possibleoverpressurization of VGSH.Pressure indicator PI-225, alarm.
Relief valve at the waste gassurge tank provides
overpressure protection.
- b. Controls pressure too low Sensor mal-function, valve
operator mal-
function mechanical failure.
VCT venting restricted, possi-ble pressure buildup in VCT.
Pressure indicator PI-225, alarm Relief valve 2CH-R182A/B (CH-115) CVC-182 provides
VCT overpressure
protection.(DRN 99-1031) 5.Pressure indi-cator, PI-225
- a. Erroneous low pressure indications or
alarms Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on normal system operation. Possible undetected high
pressure condition in VCT.TestVCT pressure is auto-matically regulated by vent
valves and the blanket gas
system.b. Erroneous high pressure indications or
alarms Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on normal system operation. Possible undetected low
pressure condition in VCT.TestVCT pressure is auto-matically controlled by vent
line pressure control valves
and the blanket gas system.(DRN 99-1031) 6.VCT to Gas Analyzer stop
CVC-173 a. Fails in open position Mechanical failure, contamination Unable to isolate Gas Analyzer for maintenance.
Operator, periodic testNone Required(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureUnable to analyze gas in VCT.OperatorNone Applies only if valve has been closed for Gas
Analyzer maintenance. 7.VCT temperature indicator TI-225
- a. Erroneous low temperature indication Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on normal system operation. Possible undetected high
temperature condition in VCT.TestNone Required WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 49 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks 7.VCT temperature indicator TI-225 (Cont'd)b Erroneous high temperature indica-tion or alarms Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on normal system operation. Possible undetected low
temperature condition in VCT.TestNone Required(DRN 99-1031) 8.VCT H 2 Regulator Isolation valves;
7CH-V664-1 (CH-107),
HG-202 7CH-V664-2 (CH-108)
HG-204 a. Fails in open position b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, contaminationMechanical failure Unable to isolate pressure regulating valve, 7CH-V654, for
maintenance. No impact on normal
system operation.Unable to provide VCT with H 2 Blanket Gas. Possible low pressure in VCT. Possible low
H 2 concentration in primary coolant.OperatorBlanket gas flow indicator, FI-225. VCT
pressure indicator, PI-
225, low pressure
alarm.None Required None 9.VCT H 2 Pressure regulator 7CH-P654 (CH-502)
HG-203 a. Controls pressure too high Sensor malfunc-tion, valve oper-ator failure, mechanical failurePossibleoverpressurization of VCT with H
- 2. Possible High H 2 concentration in Primary coolant.Blanket Gas flow indicator FI-225. High
Pressure alarm from
Pressure Indicator PI-
225.The VCT pressure regu-lating vent valves will
attempt to maintain VCT at
required pressure after
operator opens valve
GWM-112.Relief Valve 2CH-R182A/B (CH-115)
CVC-182 prevents
overpressure.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Controls pressure too low Sensor malfunc-tion, valve oper-ator failure, mechanical failurePossibleunderpressurecondi-tion in VCT. Possible decrease
in primary coolant H 2 concen-tration. See Remarks.Blanket Gas flow indicator FI-225, Low
Pressure alarm from PressureIndi-
cator, PI-225.
VCT vent line pressure regulating valve
3CH-PM179A/B will close to
prevent further pressure
drop.A spurious low pressure condition in the VCT will cause all charging pumps
to trip on suction
pressure.(DRN 99-1031)10.VCT N 2 Regulator Isolation valves;
7CH-V664-3 (CH-109),
NG-222 7CH-V664-4 (CH-110)
NG-224 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly openMechanical failure system.Contamination No impact on normal systemoperation. Unable to purge VCT to
waste management.
Possible inadvertent release of N 2 to the VCT. Reduced H2 concentration in primary coolant.
Seat leakage.NoneTwo series redundant valves plus a pressure regulating
valve.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 50 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)11.VCT N 2 pressure Regulator 7CH-P655 (CH-503)
NG-223 a. Regulates pressure too high Sensor malfunc-tion, valve operator
failure.No impact on normal system operation. Possible over-
pressurization of VCT during purge.
Flow indicator, FI-225. High pressure
alarm from pressure indicator PI-225.VCT is open to waste man-agement system during
purge. Pressure regulating
valves in vent line will tend to
reduce overpressure.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Regulates pressure too low Sensor malfunc-tion, valve oper-ator failure, mechanical failure.
No impact on normal system operation. Possible incomplete
purge of VCT.
Flow indicator, FI-225. Low Pressure
alarms or indica-tions from pressure indicator
PI-225.None(DRN 99-1031)12.VCT gas relief valve 7CH-R186 (CH-105)
CVC-178 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, Blockage, set
point drift.
No impact on normal system operation. Loss of over-
pressure protection for
Blanket Gas and purge header.Periodic TestNone
- b. Spuriously opens Mechanical failure, set-point drift Loss of H 2 or N 2 to vent gas system header.
Flow indicator FI-225.None Check Valve 2CH-V607 (CH-112) CVC-177 will
prevent blowdown of VCT if this failure
occurs.(DRN 99-1031)c. Fails to reseatContamination Loss of H 2 or N 2 to vent gas system header.
Periodic test, possibly waste gas surge tank
pressure indicator None13.Blanket Gas and purge header flow
indicator, FI-225 a. Erroneous low flow indications.
Electrical or mechanical
malfunctionNo impact on system operation.Possibly Pressure Indicator PI-225NoneRequried FI-225 has no control function. Is indicator
only.b. Erroneous high flow indications Electrical or mechanical
malfunctionNo impact on system operation.Possibly Pressure Indicator, PI-225.None Required(DRN 99-1031)14.VCT gas line liquid backflow check
CVC-177 a. Fails in closed position.Mechanical failure, blockage Unable to add N 2 or H 2 to VCTPossible decrease in VCT pres-
sure. Possible decrease in primary coolant H2 concentra-
tion. Unable to purge VCT.
Flow Indicator FI-225, possibly
pressure indicator
PI-225.None Charging pump, may trip on low suction pressure(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 51 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)14.Blanket Gas and purge header
check valve, 2CH-V607 (CH-112)
CVC-177 (Cont'd)b. Fails open or partly open Contamination Possible back leakage of radioactive gases into blanket gas
and purge header possible
pressurization of header by VCT.NoneThe pressure regulating valves in the header should
prevent contamination of the
H 2 & N 2 supplies. Relief valve, 7CH-R186 (CH-105)
CVC-178, provides over-
pressure protection.(DRN 99-1031)15.VCT level indicator controller, L-226
- a. Erroneous low level indication or alarm Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Potential over-filling of VCTwith Boric Acid solution or makeup
water from boron addition
subsystemNoneOn high VCT level controller LC-227 will switch letdown
flow to waste management
system.b. Erroneous high level indication or
alarm Electrical mechanical
malfunctionEarly termination of makeup flow.
Normal primary coolant system losses not compensated for with
makeup. Possible gradual emptying
of VCT.NoneOn low-low VCT level, level controller, LC-227, will switch
the charging pump suction from the VCT to the refueling
water storage pool (RWSP).(DRN 99-1031)16.VCT level control, LC-227 a. Erroneous low-low level alarm Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Possible Inadvertent Transfer of charging pump suction from
VCT to RWSP and letdown flow to
the waste management system.Comparison with level indicator, LI-226 VCT level indicator LI-226(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Erroneous highlevel indications Electrical or mechanical
malfunction Possible inadvertent diversion of letdown flow to waste management
system. Potential emptying of
VCT.Level indicator, LI-226On low VCT level, level indicator, controller, LIC-226, will initiate makeup
flow.(DRN 99-1031)17.VCT local sample valve, 2CH-V608-2 (CH-116)
CVC-180 a. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureUnable to obtain local sample of VCT contents.OperatorNone Required
- b. Fails partly open Seat leakage, contamination Local spill, outside contain-ment, of radioactive primary
coolant. Gradual loss of inventory
from VCT.Local spill and radiation monitors, possibley VCT level sensor
indication/
actuation LIC-226, LC-227 Valves in sample system act as a backup.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 52 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)18.VCT Drain Valve, 2CH-V608-3 (CH-117)
CVC-181 a. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureNo impact on normal operation, unable to drain VCT.OperatorNone Required(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails partly openContaminationGradual loss of primary coolant inventory to boron management
system.Possibly VCT level sensors indication/
actuation LIC-226, LC-227.Boron addition subsystem compensates for minor
coolant losses.(DRN 99-1031)19.VCT liquid Relief Valve
CVC-182 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, blockage, set-
point drift.
No impacts on normal systemoperation. Loss of VCT, discharge
line overpressure
protection.Periodic TestVCT will act as a Pressure Surge Tank for a short period.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Spuriously opens Setpoint drift,Mechanical failure Minor loss of primary coolant inventory to hold-up tank.
Possibly VCT level sensors indication/
actuation LIC-226, LC-227.Boron addition subsystem will compensate for minor coolant
losses.c. Fails to reseatContaminationMinor loss of coolant to hold-up tank.Same as 19b.Same as 19b.(DRN 99-1031)20.VCT outlet air operated valve
CVC-183 a. Fails in open position on close
signal Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction Possible emptying of VCT.
Possible air aspiration into charging
pumps suction.
Valve position indicatorin control room, possibly VCT level
sensors indication/
actuation LIC-226, LC-227.
Charging pump suction isswitched to RWSP or BAMTs if 2CH-V123A/B (CH-501)
CVC-183 is signaled closed.
These water sources may be
sufficient to prevent air
aspiration into charging
pumps.b. Fails to the closed position Spurious signal, mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction.
Loss of charging flow. Loss of charging pump suction.
Charging pump suction pressure switch shuts
off pumps. Valve
position indicator in
control room. Low
charging flow alarm.
Charging pump suction can be manually switched to
RWSP from control room.
Pumps are protected by low
suction pressure trips.
- c. Fails in closed positionMechanical failure valve operator
malfunction Unable to establish charging flow from VCT.Valve position indi-cator in control room.
Charging pumps can takesuction from the RWT
through valve, 3CH-V121A/B.
(CH-504) CVC-507 Normal charging flow is from the VCT, so this
valve is generally open.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 53 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)21.VCT outlet check vavle 2CH-V124A/B (CH-118)
CVC-184 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, blockage Unable to establish charging flow from VCT.Charging pump suc-tion pressure switch
shuts off pumps. Low
charging flow alarm Charging pump suction can be switched to RWSP from
control room.
Pumps are protected bylow suction pressure trip.
- b. Fails in open position or partly openContaminationPotential back leakage into VCT Discharge Lines when charging
pumps are taking suction from
BAMT or RWSP.
None Valve 2CH-V123A/B (CH-501) CVC-183 provides
positive isolation for line.22.Refueling water storage pool to
charging pump
suction check
CVC-508 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, blockage Unable to switch charging pump suction from VCT to RWSP on low
VCT level. Loss of charging flow.
Low suction pressure switch from charging
pump suction pressure
controllers
shuts off pumps. Low
charging flow alarm
from flow indicator
FI-212.Charging pump suction pressure controllers will stop
charging pumps on low
suction pressure.
In case of emergency charging pump suction
can be switched to
BAMTs from control
room.b. Fails partly openContamination Potential back leakage of primary coolant in RWSP when
charging from VCT.NoneRWSP suction line isolationvalve 3CH-V121A/B (CH-
504) CVC-507 provides
positive isolation for RWSP.23.Refueling water storage pool to
charging pump
suction isolation air
operated valve, 3CH-V121A/B (CH-504)
CVC-507 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open, or fails to the open
position Mechanical failure, operator malfunction Seat leakage orspurious signal, valve operator
malfunction, mechanical failure Same as 22 a.
Unwanted addition of refueling water to primary system. Loss of
RWSP Inventory. Increase in
boron concentration in primary
system.Same as 22 a, plus valve position indicator in control room.
Eventually - RWT Level Indicators and
alarms, also, for "fails
to open position" -
valve position indicator in control room.
Same as 22 a.
Manual isolation valve.
504 can be closed until valve
507 is repaired.
Same as 22 a.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 54 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)24.RWSP to charging pump isolation
manual valve
CVC-504 a. Fails in open position b. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on normal operation Unable to isolate line for
maintenance.
Same as 22 a.
Operator Operator NoneNoneCH-192 is normally open-manually operated valve.
It is closed only for line
maintenance.25.Charging pump suction header
relief valve, 2CH-R184A/B (CH-311)
CVC-185a. Opens sp uriously Mechanical failure, setpoint drift.
Gradual loss of primary to boron management system.
Equip. drain. Sump #1.
Level 1 The makeup control auto-matically compensates for
minor losses.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, blockage, setpoint drift.No impact on normal operation.
Loss of overpressure protection
for a potentially closed line section.Periodic TestNone
- c. Fails to resetContaminationSame as 25 a.Periodic TestNone(DRN 99-1031)26.Charging pump isolation manual
valve pairs, suction and discharge;
CVC-188A 2CH-V1501-4 (CH-339),
CVC-196A 2CH-V127A/B (CH-319),
CVC-188AB 2CH-V1501-2 (CH-337),
CVC-188B 2CH-V1501-1 (CH-336)
CVC-196B a. Fails in open position b. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureMechanical failure Unable to isolate affected pump for maintenance test.
Unable to establish charging flow through affected pump after
maintenance test.
Operator Operator None None(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 55 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)27.Charging pump drain valve pairs, suction and
discharge;
2CH-V608-4 (CH-317),
CVC-189A 2CH-V1504-9 (CH-329),
CVC-193A 2CH-V608-5 (CH-320)
CVC-189AB 2CH-V1504-10 (CH-332),
CVC-193AB 2CH-V608-6 (CH-323),
CVC-189B 2CH-V1504-11 (CH-335)
CVC-193B a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly openMechanical failure Contamination Unable to drain affected pump for maintenance Gradual loss of primary coolant and reduction of VCT level. Also, fordishcarge drain valve, minor
reduction in charging flow.
Operator Equip. drain. Sump #1 level None Same as 25 a.(DRN 99-1031)28.Charging pump suction pressure
indicator con-
- trollers, PC-224 X, Y, Z
- a. Erroneous high pressure indications Electrical or Mechanical
MalfunctionLoss of protection for the charging pump on low suction pressure.
Suction pressure indicators on other
charging pumps.
Redundant charging pumps.
- b. Erroneous low pressure indications Electrical or Mechanical
Malfunctions Charging pumps shutoff on low suction pressure.
Charging line flowindicator FI-212.
Suction pressure
indicators on other
charging pumps.
Redundant charging pumps -
started by pressurizer level controls.(DRN 99-1031)29.Charging pump discharge check
valves; 2CH-V1502-1 (CH-328),
CVC-194A 2CH-V1502-2 (CH-331),
CVC-194A/B
CVC-194B a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, blockage Unable to establish charging flow through affected pump.
Charging line flow indicator FI-212 Redundant charging pumps, plus discharge safety relief
valve provides overpressure
protection for affected pump.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 56 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)29.Charging pump discharge check
valves; 2CH-V1502-1 (CH-328),
CVC-194A 2CH-V1502-2 (CH-331),
CVC-194A/B
CVC-194B (Cont'd)b. Fails partly openContaminationNo impact on normal operation.
Some back leakage of primary
coolant into standby charging
pumps.None None Required.30.Charging pumpdischargepres-
sure relief
2CH-R1526A (CH-326),
CVC-192A 2CH-R1527A/B (CH-325),
CVC-192AB 2CH-R1528B (CH-324)
CVC-192B Spuriously opens
- b. Fails in closed position Set-point drift Mechanical failure, blockagePart of charging pump dis-charge diverted back to the pump
suction. Reduced charging flow.
No immediate impact on system.
Loss of overpressure protection
for affected pump's discharge line.
Loss of Min-flow by pass
recirculation capability for pump.Low flow indication from charging flow indicator FI-212.
Periodic Test Redundant charging pumpsavailable for use.
Nonec. Fails to reseatContaminationSame as 30 a.Periodic TestNone31.Charging pumps, CP-A, B, A/B
CVC-MPMP-0001A
CVC-MPMP-0001AB CVC-MPMP-0001B
- a. Operating pump fails Electrical or Mechanical seal
failure, low NPSH Loss of charging flow. Low pressurizer level. High letdown
temp.Charging flow indi-cator FI-212, low flow
alarms, low pressure
alarm from PI-212.
Lowpressur-izer level. Abnormal RHX letdown temp.
2 additional redundant pumps.(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Standby pump fails to start Electrical orMechanical failure Unable to meet charging re-quirement in excess of 1 pump
capacity. Unable to establish charging flow from affected pump.
Pump run indicator in control room, flow
indicator, FI-212.Redundant standby pump available WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 57 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks Charging pumps, CP-A, B, A/B
CVC-MPMP-0001A
CVC-MPMP-0001AB CVC-MPMP-0001B (Cont'd)c. Spurious start of standby pump Electrical Malfunction, switching failure Sudden excess charging flow rate. Possible inventory reduction
in VCT. Possible increase in
pressurizer level. Rapid change in
boron concentration in RCS is a
dilution or addition is in progress.Charging flow indicator, FI-212, charging pressure
indicator, PI-212, possibly VCT and
pressurizer level
indicators. Pump "run" indicator in control
room. RHX letdown
temp. decrease.Pressurizer level control will increase letdown flow and/or
turn off one charging pump.(DRN 99-1031)32.Charging pump discharge cross-
connect 2CH-V1501-3 (CH-338)
CVC-203 a. Fails in open position b. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureMechanical failure Unable to pressure test HPSI system while charging is in
progress.Effective loss of one charging pump.Operator Operator None 2 redundant charging pumps.33.Charging pump/HPSI pump header
isolation valve, 2CH-V1501-5 (CH-340)
CVC-199 a. Fails closedMechanical failure Unable to test HPSI system with charging pumps, unable to use
HPSI header for charging with the
charging pumps.OperatorNone
Pressure Indicators on HPSI headers Pressure relief valves on HPSI headers.34.Charging pump to HPSI header
check valve, 2CH-V1502-4 (CH-440)
CVC-202 a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly openMechanical failure Contamination Same as 34 a.
Seat leak. No impact on system Pressure Indicators on HPSI headers None None Line is isolated by valve CH-34035.Charging pressure indicator PI-212 a. Erroneous low pressure indications or
alarms.Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system Flow indicator, FI-212.None b. Erroneous high pressure indications Electrical or mechanical
malfunction NO direct impact on system.
Flow indicator, FI-212.None(DRN 99-1031)36.Charging Line Flow Indicator, FI-212 a. Erroneous low flow indications
or alarms.
Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on system operation or control.
Pressure Indicator PI-212.Pressurizer level indicator and
letdown flow instru-ment, F-202.None Required WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 58 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks Charging Line Flow
Indicator, FI-212 (Cont'd)b. Erroneous high flow indications Electrical or mechanical
malfunctions NO direct impact on system operation or control.
Pressure Indicator, PI-212.Pressurizer level indicator and
letdown flow
instrument, F-202.None Required(DRN 99-1031)37.Charging pump discharge header
manual stop valve;
CVC-208 a. Fails in open position b. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureMechanical failure No impact on normal operation.
Unable to isolate charging line for
maintenance.
Unable to re-establish charging through normal path. Loss of
letdown.Operator Operator Depending on conditions, could use charging pump
manual isolation valves.
Can charge through HPSI headers if required.38.Charging line isolation air
operated valve
outside contain-
ment 2CH-F1529A/B (CH-524)
CVC-209 a. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, spurious signal Unable to establish charging flow through normal path.
Flow indicator FI-212, pressure in-
dicator, PI-212, low
alarms. Valve position
indicator.
Can charge through HPSI headers if required.
- b. Fails open Mechanical failure, loss of air or power Unable to isolate charging line to pressure test HPSI system Valve position indicator Manual isolation valve 2CH-V1506 (CH-429)
CVC-208(DRN 99-1031)39.Charging Line temperature in-
dicator, TI-229
- a. Erroneous low temperatur readings Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on normal system operation or control.Temperatureindica-tor, TI-221.None Required
- b. Erroneous high temperature indica-tions.Electrical or mechanical
malfunction No direct impact on normal system operation or control.Temperatureindica-tor, TI-221.None Required(DRN 99-1031)40.Auxiliary Spray solenoid valves, 1CH-E2505A (CH-517)
CVC-ISV-0216A
CVC-ISV-0216B
- a. Fails in closed position Loss of Power, Mechanical fail-ure, valve oper-ator malfunction.
Loss of one auxiliary spray path Valve position indi-cators in control room.
Two redundant auxiliary spray paths.b. Fails openValve operator malfunction, spurious signal.
Possible inadvertent depress-urization of primary system.
Pressurizer level and pressure indica-tors and alarms.NoneValves are normally locked closed.(DRN 99-1031)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 59 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)41.Auxiliary spray check valves, 1CH-V2502-1 (CH-431)
CVC-217A 1CH-V2502-4
CVC-217B a. Fails closed Mechanical failure, blockage Loss of one auxiliary spray flow path.Possibly flow indi-cator, FI-212, pressure
indicator, PI-212, Temperature
indicator TI-224, or highpressurizer
pressure.Two redundant parallel auxiliary spray valves.
b Fails partly open Contamination Possible back leakage of pres-surizer spray flow into auxiliary
spray line. No impact on system
operation.NoneAux iliary spray valves are normally closed, providing
isolation.42.Chargingisola-tion solenoid
valves; 1CH-E2503A (CH-519),
CVC-ISV-0218A
CVC-ISV-0218Ba. Fails closedLoss of power, Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunctionLoss of one primary charging path.Valve position indicatorin control room, pressure indicator, PI-
212 Two redundant primary charging paths.
- b. Fails open Mechanical failure, valve operator
malfunction.
Unable to terminate charging flow to one charging line. Reduced
aux. spray during cooldown operations when RCP';s are secured.Valve position indi-cator in control room.
Pressure indicator, PI-
212 Terminate total charging flowat some point up-
stream.43.Charging Line check valves;
CVC-221B 1CH-V2502-3 (CH-433)
CVC-221A a. Fails in closed position b. Fails partly open Mechanical failure, blockage ContaminationLoss of one primary charging path.
No impact on normal operation.
Possible back leakage of primary
coolant into charging lines when
charging not in progress.
Pressure indicator, PI-212.None Two redundant primary charging paths.
Charging control valvesprovide positive isolation.44.Charging Line swing-check
CVC-219 a. Fails partly open Contamination No impact on normal system operation. Possible back leakage of
primary coolant into charging lines
when charging not in progress.
NoneCheck valve 1CH-V2502-3 (CH-433) CVC-221A will limit
back leakage through 1CH-
V2506 (CH-435) CVC-219(DRN 99-1031)
- b. Fails in closed position Mechanical failure, blockageLoss of thermal relief protec-tion for charging line when charging
control valves are closed.NoneNone WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-15 (Sheet 60 of 60)
Revision 12 (10/02)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS No.Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of Detection Inherent
Compensating Provision Remarks(DRN 99-1031)45.1CH-E2503A CH-519 CVC-ISV-0218A bypass isolation
CVC-220 a. Fails in open position b. Fails in closed positionMechanical failureMechanical failure Unable to isolate charging line bypass swing-check valve for maintenance.
Same as 44 b.
Operator Operator None NoneOperator ErrorSame as 44 b.46.Charging Line drain valves, 2CH-V1504-14
CVC-210 2CH-V1504-6
CVC-200 2CH-V1547 CVC-204 2CH-V1508-2
CVC-215 a. Fail in closed position b. Seat leakageMechanical failure Contamination No impact on normal system operation. Unable to drain a section
of the charging line for
maintenance.
Primary coolant released to drain headers Operator Excessive use of makeup water. Pos-
sible indications from
charging line flow and
pressure indicators.
None Required.
None47.Charging pumpdischargepulsa-tiondampeners;
CVC-MACC-0001A CVC-MACC-001B
CVC-MACC-0001A/B Fails to damp pressure pulses on
pump startupMechanical failurePressure Pulse transients in chargine line. Possible damage to
downstream equipment.Erratic indications on PI-212 and
FI-212, noise.
None Required.
Problem serious only ifrepeated pump starts are
made with a failed pulsationd ampeners.(DRN 99-1031)48.CVCS CHRG PUMPS RECIRC
& RELIEF LINE
VENT VALVES
CVC-1922A CVC-1922B CVC-1922A/Ba. Fails in closed positionb. Fails partly openMechanical failure Seat leakage No impact on normal operation Unwanted loss of boric acid to waste management system none none None Required.
Line capped downstream Vent valve normally closed manual valve.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 1 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)This FMEA covers failures that impact the function and operation of the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS). Specifically, failures are considered which impact the operator's ability to initiate one or both trains of SDC or which impactcore decay heat removal once the system is in operation. Refer to FSAR Table 6.3-1 for a FMEA of the Safety Injection System.
NoName 1Failure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects1.SDCS suction isolation valve 1SI-V1504A (SI-652),
1SI-V1502B(SI-666),1SI-V1503A (SI-651),
1SI-V1501B (SI-665),
2SI-V327A (SI-440),
2SI-V326A (SI-441)a. Fails to openb. Inadvertently closedMechanicalbinding, operatormalfunction Operator errorCannot initiate one train of SDCLoss of one train of SDCValve position indication in control roomSDC trouble alarm in control roomRedundant flow trainavailable. Operator mustmaintain at least one RCS loop (with SG and RCP) operableRedundant decay heatremoval success paths.
Operator restores SDC flow.Decreasedcooldown rates N/ASee plant TechnicalSpecifications for SDCS/loop operabilityrequirementsTechnical Specificationspermit only one SDC train to be operable in Mode 6provided water level is 23 feet above reactor flange2.Relief valves1SI-R2501A (SI-469),
1SI-R2502B (SI-464),
2SI-R339A(SI-486),2SI-R340B (SI-487),
2SI-R614A (SI-468),
2SI-R612B (SI-478)a. Fails to openb. Fails to reseatMechanicalbinding, blockageSeat leakage,spring failurePossible over-pressurization of SDCSpiping and/or RCSLoss of primary coolant to drain header(or containment sump) during shutdown cooling. Possible loss of
SDC.OperatorRWLIS, RCSLMS, RCS pressureRedundant relief pathavailable for LTOP valvesNone required. One train ofSDC would be degraded, butthe redundant train would beavailable N/A N/A 1Valve tag numbers (SI-XXX) in this Table are CE valve numbers.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 2 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects3.SDCS suction line drainand vent valves to SDC vacuum priming pumps 1SI-V2503-1, -2, -3, -4
- a. Fails in closedpositionb. Inadvertently openedMechanicalbinding Operator errorUnable to vent gases at system high pointLeakage of primary coolant insidecontainment Operator OperatorRedundant decay heatremoval success paths in the event flow cannot be established due to gas bindingTwo series redundant valvesprevent inadvertent flow N/A N/A4.Return cross over valves2SI-V353A (SI-400),2SI-V346B(SI-450)a. Fails to openb. Inadvertently openedMechanicalbinding Operator errorUnable to initiate pre-shutdown coolingwarm-up recirculation cycle for one lineA portion of shutdown cooling flow willshort circuit the core through the warm up lines Operator OperatorRedundant shutdown coolinglineRedundant decay heatremoval success paths.
Operator restores SDC flow N/A N/A5.Manual isolation valves2SI-V303A/B (SI-442),
2SI-V352 (SI-479)a. Fails in openpositionb. Inadvertently closedMechanicalbinding Operator errorUnable to isolate SDCS line formaintenanceLoss of one SDCS suction line OperatorSDC trouble alarm in control roomNone requiredRedundant decay heatremoval success paths.
Operator restores SDC flow.
N/AN/AManual valves, normallylocked open WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 3 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects6.Shutdown coolingsuction line sample
valves 2SI-F624A (SI-443),2SI-F623B a. Fails in closedpositionb. Inadvertently openedMechanicalbinding, valve operator Operator errorNo impact on SDC. Unable to sampleSDC suction line.No impact on SDC functionLocal valve position indicator OperatorNone requiredSeries redundant isolationvalve in sampling system prevents inadvertent flow N/A N/A7.CVCS shutdownpurification line isolation
valves 2SI-V341A, 2SI-V342B a. Fails in closedpositionb. Inadvertently openedMechanicalbinding Operator errorUnable to purify shutdown cooling flowNo impact on SDC function OperatorNoneNone requiredSeries redundant isolationvalves in CVCS prevent inadvertent flow N/A N/A8.LPSI suction lineisolation valves 2SI-B301A (SI-444),
2SI-B302B (SI-432)Fails in openpositionMechanicalbindingPossible to draw partial suction fromRWSP or containment sump duringshutdown coolingOperator, possibly RWSP levelalarmsRedundant isolation valves inRWSP and containment sump lines N/A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 4 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects9.LPSI pump A, BFailsElectrical,mechanical failureLoss of one SDC trainSDC trouble alarm in control roomRedundant decay heatremoval success pathsDecreasedcooldown ratesTechnical Specificationspermit only one SDC train to be operable in Mode 6provided water level is 23 feet above reactor flange10.LPSI pump dischargecheck valves 2SI-V333A (SI-433),
2SI-V334B (SI-423)a. Fails in closedpositionb. Fails in openpositionMechanicalbinding,blockageMechanicalbinding, blockageUnable to establish shutdown cooling flowthrough one LPSI pumpNo impact on shutdown coolingLow flow indication from flowindicator controller SI IFIC0306, -307None requiredRedundant parallel LPSI pumpand shutdown cooling lineNone required N/A N/A11.LPSI pump dischargeisolation valves 2SI-V309A (SI-446),
2SI-V310B (SI-434)a. Fails in openpositionb. Inadvertently closedMechanicalbinding Operator errorNo impact on shutdown cooling. Unableto isolate one LPSI pump for maintenance.Unable to establish shutdown cooling flowthrough one LPSI pump. Loss of one SDC train.
OperatorOperator, SDC trouble alarm incontrol roomNone requiredRedundant decay heatremoval success paths N/AN/AThis is a manual valvethat is normally locked open WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 5 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects12.SDC HX isolation valves(motor) 2SI-V306A (SI-452),
2SI-V305B(SI-453),2SI-V307A (SI-457),
2SI-V308B (SI-456)a. Fails in closedpositionb. Inadvertently closedMechanicalbinding Operator errorUnable to establish shutdown cooling flowthrough one heat exchangerLoss of one SDC train OperatorSDC trouble alarm in control roomRedundant heatExchangerRedundant decay heatremoval paths. Operatorrestores SDC flow.
N/A N/ALocked closed valves13.SDC HXsCS MHX0001A, Ba. Inefficient heatremovalb. Excessive heatremovalc. Cross leakageLow CCW flow,containment
defectsReduced cooldown rateIncreased cooldown rate. Possiblethermal shock to primary coolant system.Contamination of CCW system withprimary coolantDifferential temperature -recorders SI ITR0351, -
352; temperature indicators CS ITI0303X, YDifferential temperaturerecorders SI ITR0351, -
352; temperature indicators CS ITI0303X, YRadiation monitors in CCWsystemFlow through heat exchangercan be increased by operator to compensate for reduced cooldown rateFlow through heat exchangercan be decreased by operator to compensate for high cooldown rateHX can be isolated and SDCcompleted using remaining HX N/A N/A N/A14.Pressure TransmittersCS IPT0303X, YErroneous pressure indicationElectrical ormechanical failureNo impact on SDC. Backup processmonitor onlyOperatorNone requiredN/A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 6 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects15.Temperature indicatorsCS ITI0303X,YErroneoustemperature indicationElectrical ormechanical failureNo impact on SDC. Backup processmonitor onlyOperatorNone requiredN/A16.Isolation valves2SI-V344A, 2SI-V343B a. Fails in closedpositionb. Inadvertently openedMechanicalbinding Operator errorUnable to divert portion of shutdowncooling flow to CVCS for purification. No impact on SDC function.Portion of SDC flow diverted to CVCS.No impact on SDC function.
Operator OperatorFlow can be diverted to CVCSfrom the other SDC lineSeries redundant valve inCVCS prevents inadvertent
flow N/A N/A17.Isolation valves2SI-V345A, 2SI-V319B a. Fails in closedpositionb. Inadvertently openedMechanicalbinding Operator errorNo impact on SDCPortion of SDC flow diverted to RWSP.Loss of primary coolant inventory.None requiredRWLIS/RCSLMS, RCSpressure, flow indication in drain line to RWSPNone requiredRedundant SDC trainavailable. Operator isolates flow path and restores RCS inventory N/AN/ANormally closed, lockedclosed manual valves18.SDC control valves2SI-FM318A (SI-657),
2SI-FM349B (SI-656)(Continued)a. Fails to openb. Controls flow through heat exchanger too lowMechanicalbinding, valve
operator malfunctionErroneousposition indicationUnable to establish SDC flow through oneheat exchangerReduced flow through one heatexchanger. Reduced cooldown rate.Valve position indicator incontrol roomLow differential temperatureindication from SI ITR0351, -
352Redundant decay heatremoval success pathsRedundant SDC line.Operator can throttle valve to get desired differentialtemperature.Decreasedcooldown rates N/A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 7 of 11) Revision 307 (07/13)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)
No Name Failure Mode
Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures
Method of Detection Inherent Compensating Provision Effect Upon Remarks and Other Effects (Continued from previous page) c. Controls flow
through heat exchanger too
high Erroneous
position indication Excessive flow through one heat exchanger. Excessive cooldown rate.
High differential temperature
indication from SI ITR0351, -
352 Redundant SDC line.
Operator can throttle valve to
get desired differential
temperature. N/A 19. Pressure indicators SI IPI0306
- a. Reads high
- b. Reads low Electrical, mechanical
malfunction
Electrical, mechanical
malfunction No impact on SDC
No impact on SDC Operator
Operator None required
None required N/A
N/A (EC-30976, R307) 20. Flow control valves SI MVAAA129A (2SI FM317A/SI-307)
SI MVAAA129B (2SI
FM348B/SI-306)
- a. Fails open
- b. Bypass flow
controlled high
- c. Bypass flow controlled low
- d. Fails open Mechanical
binding
Mechanical binding, valve
operator malfunction
Valve operator
malfunction
Loss of control
air Unable to control SDC flow bypassing one heat exchanger; reduced cooldown
rate on one line
Excessive flow past one heat exchanger, reduced cooldown rate
Insufficient heat exchanger bypass flow in one line, but no impact on SDC ability to perform safety function
Unable to control SDC flow bypassing both heat exchangers; reduced cooldown rate on both lines Low differential temperature
indication from temperature
recorder SI ITR0351, -352
Low differential temperature
indication from temperature
recorder SI ITR0351, -352
High differential temperature
indication from temperature
recorder SI ITR0351, -352
Low differential temperature
indication from temperature
recorder SIITR0351, -0352 Redundant decay heat removal success paths
Redundant decay heat removal success paths
None required. However, operator would override
controller
Operator can manually throttle handwheel of 129 valve on available train or close valve with alternate air supply Decreased cooldown rate Same as above
N/A
N/A (EC-30976, R307)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 8 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects21.Flow indicator controllerSI IFIC0306, -307a. Reads high
- b. Reads lowElectrical ormechanical malfunctionElectrical ormechanical malfunctionFlow control valve in affected line isthrottled back, resulting in low SDCHX bypass flow. Excessive cooldown rate.Flow control valve in affected line isthrottled open, resulting in increased flow past SDCHX. Decreased cooldown rate.High differential temperatureindication from temperature recorder SI ITR0351, -352Low differential temperatureindication from temperature recorder SI ITR0351, -352Redundant decay heatremoval success pathsRedundant decay heatremoval success paths N/A N/A22.Differential temperature recorderSI ITR0351, -352a. Reads high
- b. Reads lowElectrical ormechanicalmalfunctionElectrical ormechanical malfunctionNo direct impact on SDC, but possibleincorrect flow throttling by operatorresulting in reduced cooldown rateNo direct impact on SDC, but possibleincorrect flow throttling by operator resulting in excessive cooldown rate Operator OperatorRedundant decay heatremoval success pathsRedundant decay heatremoval success pathsDecreasedcooldown ratesIncreasedcooldown ratesCooldown can beachieved at "normal" rate using backup temperature indicators for control
referenceCooldown can beachieved at "normal" rate using backup temperature indicators for control
reference23.LPSI header relief valves 2SI-R350B,2SI-R613A/Ba. Fails to open
- b. fails to reseatMechanicalbinding, setpoint driftSeat leakage,spring failure, setpoint driftNo impact on shutdown cooling. Loss ofover-pressure protection for potentially
closed line section.Primary coolant diverted to waste tanksduring shutdown coolingPeriodic testPossibly waste tank levelindicators, RWLIS, RCSLMSNone requiredNone required N/A N/A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 9 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects24.LPSI header isolation valves 2SI-V1549A1 (SI-615),
2SI-V1539B1(SI-625),2SI-V1541A2 (SI-635),
2SI-V1543B2 (SI-645)a. Fails to openb. Fails openMechanicalbinding, valve
operator malfunctionMechanicalbinding, valve
operatormalfunctionCannot establish flow in one of four SDCflow pathsNo impact on SDCValve position indicator incontrol room, pressure andtemperature indicators on affected lineValve position indicators incontrol roomRedundant SDC line, plusother decay heat removal
success pathsNone requiredDecreasedcooldown ratesThe unblocked line on theaffected LPSI header may not pass the full LPSIpump discharge flow25.LPSI header check valves 1SI-V1517RL1A (SI-114),
1SI-V1518RL1B (SI-124),
1SI-V1519RL2A (SI-134),
1SI-V1520RL2B (SI-144)a. Fails in closedpositionb. Fails in openpositionMechanicalbinding, blockageSeat leakage,mechanical bindingLoss of one of four SDC flow paths,reduced cooldown rateNo impact on SDCPressure and flow indicators inaffected lineNoneRedundant SDC line plussecond line on header still useableNone requiredExtendedtime required for SDC N/AIf one of the two lines on aLPSI header is closed off, the other line can take some but not all of the lost
flow26.HPSI header check valves1SI-V1522RL1A(SI-113),
1SI-V1523RL1B (SI-123),
1SI-V1524RL2A (SI-133),
1SI-V1525RL2B (SI-143)a. Fails in closedpositionb. Fails partly openMechanicalbinding, blockageSeat leakageNo impact on SDCDiversion of primary coolant to HPSIheader during SDCNoneNoneNone requiredIsolation valves in HPSI header N/A N/A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 10 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)NoNameFailure ModeCauseSymptoms and Local EffectsIncluding Dependent FailuresMethod of DetectionInherent CompensatingProvisionEffect UponRemarks and OtherEffects27.SIT isolation valves1SI-V1505TK1A (SI-614),
1SI-V1506TK1B (SI-624),1SI-V1507TK2A(SI-634),
1SI-V1508TK2B (SI-644)a. Fails to closeb. Inadvertently openedMechanicalbinding, valve
operator malfunction Operator errorNo impact on SDC. Cannot isolate oneSIT.No effect on SDC function. Possiblyexceed SDCS/RCS pressure limits.Valve position indication incontrol room OperatorOperator action todepressurize SITOperator action to close valveand/or depressurize SIT N/A N/A28.LPSI line pressureindicators SI IPI0319, SI IPI0329, SI IPI0339, SI IPI0349Erroneouspressure alarms(high or low)Electrical ormechanicalmalfunctionNo impact on SDCPossibly pressure indicator CSIPI0303X,YNone requiredN/A29.SI header check valves1SI-V1509RL1A (SI-217),
1SI-V1511RL1B (SI-227),
(SI-V1513RL2A (SI-237),
1SI-V1515RL2B (SI-247)a. Fails in closedpositionb. Fails in openpositionMechanicalbinding, blockageMechanicalbindingLoss of one SDC flow pathNo impact on SDCPressure transmitters SIIPT0319, -329, -339, -349NoneRedundant SDC header, plusother line on affected header still availableNone requiredExtendedtime required for SDC N/A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-16 (Sheet 11 of 11)Revision 12-A (01/03)FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSISSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS)
No Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Local Effects Including Dependent Failures Method of DetectionInherent Compensating Provision Effect UponRemarks and Other Effects30.Safety injection line pressure bleed valves 1SI-F1551TK1A (SI-618),
1SI-F1552TK1B (SI-628),
1SI-F1553TK2A (SI-638),
1SI-F1554TK2B (SI-648)a. Fails in closed positionb. Inadvertently opened Mechanical binding, valve
operator malfunction Operator error No impact on SDC No impact on SDC function None required Operator None required Series redundant valve in line to RWSP prevents
inadvertent flow N/A N/A31.LPSI mini recirc line solenoid valves 2SI-E1587A, 2SI-E1588B Fails in open position Mechanical binding, seat
leakage Radioactive fluid may be introduced into RWSP from LPSI pump. Unable to initiate one train of SDC.Operator, valve position indication Redundant decay heat removal success pathsN/AFail open solenoid valves32.Containment spray header isolation valves 2CS-F305A, 2CS-F306B Inadvertently opened Operator error Possible diversion of a portion of SDC flow through spray header. Possible loss
of SDC flow Spray flow indication, RWLIS, RCSLMS, SDC trouble alarm Redundant decay heat removal flow paths. Operator
takes action to isolate leak
and refill RCS N/A(DRN02-1054, R12)33.LPSI Header Auto Vent Isolation valves SI-ISV-6011SI-ISV-6012 Inadvertently left open or fails open Operator error.
Loss of power
failed solenoid Redundant valve provided, no effect on system Periodic testingNone requiredN/AFail open(DRN 02-1 054, R12)(DRN 02-1636, R12-A)34.LPSI Header Auto Vent Isolation Valves SI ISV
14023A & SI ISV
14024A a. Inadvertently openedb. Fails closed Operator error Loss of power No impact on SDC No impact on SDC Operator, valve position indication locally (SI 14024A) in control room (SI 14023A)
Operator, valve position indication locally (SI 14024A)
in control room (SI 14023A)
None None N/A N/A(DRN02-1636, R12-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-17 (Sheet 1 of 2) Revision 14 (12/05) SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER DATA Parameter Value Quantity 2 Type Shell and tube horizontal U-Tube (DRN 99-1092, R11)Surface transfer rate 299 (Btu/hr F-ft 2 ) (DRN 99-1092, R11)Heat transfer area per heat 7000 exchanger, ft 2Tube side: Fluid Reactor coolant Design pressure, psig 650 Design temperature, F 400 Material Austenitic stainless steel Shell side: Fluid Component cooling water Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 250 Material Carbon steel (DRN 03-2063, R14) At 17 1/2 hours after shutdown: Tube side: (DRN 99-1092, R11) Flow, million lbm/hr 1.969 (DRN 99-1092, R11) Inlet temperature, F 140 (DRN 99-1092, R11) Outlet temperature, F 118.5 (DRN 99-1092, R11; 03-2063, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-17 (Sheet 2 of 2) Revision 14 (12/05) SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER DATA Parameter Value Shell side: (DRN 03-2063, R14) Flow, million lbm/hr - HX 1.495 (DRN 03-2063, R14) Inlet temperature, F 90 (DRN 99-1092, R11) Outlet temperature, F 116 (DRN 03-2063, R14) Heat load (million Btu/hr-HX) 42.24 (DRN 99-1092, R11; 03-2063, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-18SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM VALVESDESIGN PRESSURES AND TEMPERATURESValveValve No.Design Pressure, psig Design Temp. FShutdown Cooling SI-307 650400Flow Control SI-306 650400 SI-657 650400 SI-656 650400Low Pressure SI-6152485650Safety Injection SI-6252485650 Header Isolation SI-6352485650 SI-6452485650 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 9.3-19 has been deleted.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 9.3-20 (Sheet 1 of 2) Revision 305 (11/11)
REQUIRED VALVE ACTUATIONS ACCOMPLI SHED FROM THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM Valve No. Valve Operation SI-452 SDCHX inlet isolation Open
SI-453 SDCHX inlet isolation Open
SI-400 Warmup Bypass Open/Close
SI-450 Warmup Bypass Open/Close
SI-456 SDCHX return line isolation Open
SI-457 SDCHX return line isolation Open
SI-651 Shutdown cooling suction line isolation Open
(EC-14765, R305)
SI-4052A SI-405A Bypass Fill Valve Open/Close (EC-14765, R305)
SI-652 Shutdown cooling suction line isolation Open
SI-665 Shutdown cooling suction line isolation Open
(EC-14765, R305)
SI-4052B SI-405B Bypass Fill Valve Open/Close (EC-14765, R305)
SI-666 Shutdown cooling suction line isolation Open
SI-440 Shutdown cooling suction line isolation Open
SI-441 Shutdown cooling suction line isolation Open
SI-615 LP header injection Open
SI-625 LP header injection Open
SI-635 LP header injection Open
SI-645 LP header injection Open
SI-659 Miniflow isolation Close
SI-660 Miniflow isolation Close
SI-667 Miniflow isolation Close
SI-668 Miniflow isolation Close
SI-306 SDCHX bypass flow control Throttle WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-20 (Sheet 2 of 2)Revision 12 (10/02)Valve No.V alve OperationSI-307SDCHX bypass flow controlThrottleSI-656SDCHX flow control ThrottleSI-657SDCHX flow control ThrottleSI-614SIT isolation CloseSI-624SIT isolation CloseSI-634SIT isolation CloseSI-644SIT isolation CloseSI-611SIT drain (a)Open/CloseSI-621SIT drain (a)Open/CloseSI-631SIT drain (a)Open/CloseSI-641SIT drain (a)Open/CloseSI-682RWST return line containment isolation (a)Open/CloseSI-605SIT vent (b)Open/Close or SI-613SIT vent (b)Open/CloseSI-606SIT vent (b)Open/Close or SI-623SIT vent (b)Open/CloseSI-607SIT vent (b)Open/Close or SI-633SIT vent (b)Open/CloseSI-608SIT vent (b)Open/Close or SI-643SIT vent (b)Open/Close(DRN 02-1040)SI-ISV-6011LPSI Header Open/Close Auto Vent Isolation or SI-ISV-6012LPSI Header Open/Close Auto Vent Isolation(DRN 02-1040)(a)Valves required for reducing pressure in the SIT's under normal operation (see Section 6.3)(b)Valves required for alternate means of SIT pressure reduction under normal operation (see Section 6.3). Valves required for reducing pressure in the SIT's under accident conditions (see Section 6.3).
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-21DESIGN AND MATERIALS DATA FOR BULK GAS STORAGE TUBES1)Design Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ASME BPV Code Section VIII andCode Case 12052)Design Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Minus 20
°F to Plus 200
°F3)Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Noncorrosive Gas, Nonshock4)Vessel Material. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ASME SA-372, Class IVMinimum Tensile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105,000 psi Minimum Yield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65,000 psi Minimum5)Fabrication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Each Vessel Shall beSeamless Type with Swaged Ends6)Heat Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Normalize and Temper 7)Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASME Certified and NationalBoard Commissioned8)Stamping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASME and National Boardper Code Case 12059)Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Registered with NationalBoard10)Exterior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Shot Blast and MagnafluxInspection Paint One (1)Coat Zinc Chromate Primer and One (1) Coat Enamel11)Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Shot Blast Free of LooseScale and Blow Down withDry Oil-Free Air. Purgewith Dry Nitrogen and Plug for Shipment WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-21A Revision 9 (12/97)DESIGN AND MATERIALS DATA FOR ESSENTIAL AIR ACCUMULATORS1)Design StandardDOT 3AA in accordance with CFRSection 49, Part 178.372)Service Pressure/Temperature2400 PSIG at 70 DEFG(10% overfill is allowed)3)ServiceCompressed air, Nonshock 4)Vessel MaterialANSI 4130X chrome-moly steel 5)FabricationSeamless forged construction 6)Heat TreatmentQuench and Temper 7)InspectionCochrane Laboratories as approved bythe Associate Administrator for hazardous Materials Safety, in accordance with CFR49, Part 173.300a, registered in accordance with ISO
9001/EN29001/ANSI8)StampingDOT 3AA-2400Serial Number Manufacturers Symbol Authorized Inspectors Mark Test Date, Overfill Mark9)ExteriorBlasted, buffed, baked enamel10)InteriorBlasted, washed, visually inspected priorto valve installation WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 9.3-22Revision 11 (05/01)SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE PARAMETERSDesign Pressure:440 psigDesign Temperature:400
°FFluid:Reactor Coolant (Water)
Set Pressure:415 psig(DRN 01-369)Capacity:3345 gpm (DRN 01-369)Accumulation:10%Blowdown:10%
Maximum Back Pressure:0-70 psig Materials:Body:SA182 Gr F304 Nozzle:SA479 Type 304 Disc:SA479 Type 304Manufacturer:Crosby Valve & Gage Company ASME Code Date:Section III '71 Editionthrough Winter '73 Addenda