ML091310333
| ML091310333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/2009 |
| From: | Brandi Hamilton Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| DUK091200036 | |
| Download: ML091310333 (29) | |
Text
DISPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WILL BE TO Normal THE TRANSMITTAL SIGNATURE UNLESS RECIPIENT IS Date: 04/30/09 PRIORITY OTHERWISE IDENTIFIED BELOW Document Transmittal #: DUK091200036
- 1) 01749 LC GIBBY - MG01VP
- No
- 3) 02388 DAVID DZIADOSZ LYNCHBG, VA OTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED N Yes DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM
- 5) 02546 WC LIBRARY - MG01WC ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY RETURNING THIS FORM TO:
REFERENCE
- 6) 03044 MCG DOC CNTRL MISC MAN MG05DM
- 7) 03283 P R TUCKER MG01RP MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Duke Energy
- 10) 03744 OPS TRNG MGR. MG03OT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS) Huntersville, N.C. 28078 I1) 03759 U S NUC REG WASHINGTON, DC
- 12) 03796 SCIENTECH DUNEDIN, FL AND
- 13) 04698 D E BORTZ EC08G TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES
- 14) 04809 MCG PLANT ENG. LIBR. MG05SE (TSB)
I5) 05162 MCG SHIFT WORK MGRS MG010P Rec'd By Page 2 of 3 Date
____ 1 1 T r F T 1 1 T F T. 1~ T r L 1.... 1.....~.
I U I AL '4 DOCUMENT NO QA COND REV #/ DATE DISTR CODE 1 2 3 14 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 TOTAL I. I 4 -P 4 4 ~ 4 4 4 4 +/- i 1 4 ~ I I TS & TSB MEMORANDUM (1 PAGE) NA --- 04/22/09 MADM-04B V1 V1 vi V1 x V1 V1 V8 V1 V1 Vi 47 TSB LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (4 PAGES) NA 095 04/22/09 TBS 3.3.3 (15 PAGES) NA 100 04/13/09 TBS 3.8.4 (8 PAGES) NA 100 04/13/09
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____________________________________________ ________ A - L ______________ L ___ .1____ 1 ____ L ____ - - ___ -~____ .- ___ .'. ___ - ____ - ___ ________
REMARKS: PLEASE UPDATE ACCORDINGLY B H HAMILTON RECIPIENT #00422 PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED VICE PRESIDENT MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION BY:
B C BEAVER MG01RC BCBiTLC 4caIl
April 22, 2009 MEMORANDUM To: All McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification, and Technical Specification Bases (TSB)
Manual Holders
Subject:
McGuire Technical Specifications Bases REMOVE INSERT TS Bases List of Effected Sections Rev 94 TS Bases List of Effected Sections Rev 95 Tech Spec Bases: 3.3.3 Rev 71 (Entire Bases) Tech Spec Bases: 3.3.3 Rev 100 (Entire Bases)
Tech Spec Bases: 3.8.4 Rev 94 (Entire Bases) Tech Spec Bases: 3.8.4 Rev 100 (Entire Bases)
Revision numbers may skip numbers due to Regulatory Compliance Filing System.
Please call me if you have questions.
Bonnie Beaver Regulatory Compliance 875-4180
McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification Bases LOES TS Bases are revised by section Page Number Revision Revision Date BASES (Revised per section) i Revision 63 4/4/05 ii Revision 63 4/4/05 iii Revision 63 5/25/05 B 2.1..1 Revision 51 1/14/04 B 2.1.2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.0 Revision 81 3/29/07 B 3.1.1 Revision 73 3/6/06 B 3.1.2 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.1.3 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.1.4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.1.5 Revision 19 1/10/02 B 3.1.6 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.1.7 Revision 58 06/23/04 B 3.1.8 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.2.1 Revision 74 5/3/06 B 3.2.2 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.2.3 Revision 34 10/1/02 B 3.2.4 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.3.1 Revision 99 3/9/09 B 3.3.2 Revision 99 3/9/09 B 3.3.3 Revision 100 4/13/09 B 3.3.4 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.3.5 Revision 11 9/18/00 B 3.3.6 Not Used - Revision 87 6/29/06 B 3.4.1 Revision 51 1/14/04 B 3.4.2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.3 Revision 44 7/3/03 B 3.4.4 Revision 86 6/25/07 B 3.4.5 Revision 86 6/25/07 McGuire Units I and 2 Page I Revision 95
Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 3.4.6 Revision 86 6/25/07 B 3.4.7 Revision 86 6/25/07 B 3.4.8 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.4.9 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.10 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.11 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.4.12 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.4.13 Revision 86 6/25/07 B 3.4.14 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.14-2 Revision 5 8/3/99 B 3.4.14-6 Revision 5 8/3/99 B 3.4.15 Revision 82 9/30/06 B 3.4.16 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.4.17 Revision .0 9/30/98 B 3.4.18 Revision 86 6/25/07 B 3.5.1 Revision 70 10/5/05 B 3.5.2 Revision 89 9/10/07 B 3.5.3 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.5.4 Revision 70 10/5/04 B 3.5.5 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.1 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.6.2 Revision 98 3/24/09 B 3.6.3 Revision 87 6/29/06 B 3.6.4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.5 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.5-2 Revision 6 10/6/99 B 3.6.6 Revision 93 04/30/07 B 3.6.7 Not Used - Revision 63 4/4/05 B 3.6.8 Revision 63 4/4/05 B 3.6.9 Revision 63 4/4/05 B 3.6.10 Revision 43 5/28/03 B 3.6;11 Revision 78 9/25/06 B 3.6.12 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.6.13 Revision 96 9/26/08 8 3.6.14 Revision 64 4/23/05 McGuire Units I and 2 Page 2 Revision-95
Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 3.6.15 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.16 Revision 40 5/8/03 B 3.7.1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.2 Revision 79 10/17/06 B 3.7.3 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.4 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.7.5 Revision 60 10/12/04 B 3.7.6 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.7 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.8 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.9 Revision 97 1/30/09 B 3.7.10 Revision 75 6/12/06 B 3.7.11 Revision 65 6/2/05 B 3.7.12 Revision 28 5/17/02 B 3.7.13 Revision 85 2/26/07 B 3.7.14 Revision 66 6/30/05 B 3.7.15 Revision 66 6/30/05 B 3.7.16 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.1 Revision 92 1/28/08 B 3.8.2 Revision 92 1/28/08 B 3.8.3 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.8.4 Revision 100 4/13/09 B 3.8.5 Revision 41) 7/29/03 B 3.8.6 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.7 Revision 20 1/10/02 B 3.8.8 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.8.9 Revision 24 2/4/02 B 3.8.10 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.9.1 Revision 68 9/1/05 B 3.9.2 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.9.3 Revision 91 11/7/07 B 3.9.4 Revision 84 2/20/07 B 3.9.5 Revision 59 7/29/04 B 3.9.6 Revision 41 7/29/03 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 3 Revision 95
Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 3.9.7 Revision 88 9/5/07 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 4 Revision 95
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the PAM instrumentation is to display unit variables that provide information required by the control room operators during accident situations. This information provides the necessary support for the operator to take the manual actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are. required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).
The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to monitor and to assess unit status and behavior following an accident.
The availability of accident monitoring instrumentation is important so that responses to corrective actions can be observed and the need for, and magnitude of, further actions can be determined.
These essential instruments are identified by unit specific documents (Ref. 1) addressing the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Ref. 2) as required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (Ref. 3).
The instrument channels required to be OPERABLE by this LCO include two classes of parameters identified during unit specific implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 as Type A and Category I variables.
Type A variables are included in this LCO because they provide the primary information required for the control room operator to take specific manually controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided, and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for DBAs.
Category I variables are the key variables deemed risk significant b,ecause they are needed to:
Determine whether other systems important to safety are performing their intended functions; Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release; and McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-1 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Provide information regarding the release of radioactive materials to allow for early indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect the public, and to estimate the magnitude of any impending threat.
These key variables are identified by the unit specific Regulatory Guide 1.97 analyses (Ref. 1). These analyses identify the unit specific Type A and Category I variables and provide justification for deviating from the NRC proposed list of Category I variables.
The specific instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3-1 are discussed in the LCO section.
APPLICABLE The PAM instrumentation ensures the operability of Regulatory Guide SAFETY ANALYSES 1.97 Type A and Category I variables so that the control room operating staff can:
Perform the diagnosis specified in the emergency operating procedures (these variables are restricted to preplanned actions for the primary success path of DBAs), e.g., loss of coolant accident (LOCA);
- Take the specified, pre-planned, manually controlled actions, for which no automatic control is provided, and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety function; 0 Determine whether systems important to safety are performing their intended functions;
- Determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release; 0 Determine if a gross breach of a barrier has occurred; and Initiate action necessary to protect the public and to estimate the magnitude of any impending threat.
PAM instrumentation that meets the definition of Type A in Regulatory Guide 1.97 satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4). Category I, non-Type A, instrumentation must be retained in TS because it is intended to assist operators in minimizing the consequences of accidents.
Therefore, Category I, non-Type A, variables are important for reducing public risk.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-2 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO The PAM instrumentation LCO provides OPERABILITY requirements for Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type A monitors, which provide information required by the control room operators to perform certain manual actions specified in the unit Emergency Operating Procedures. These manual actions ensure that a system can accomplish its safety function, and are credited in the safety analyses. Additionally, this LCO addresses Regulatory Guide 1.97 instruments that have been designated Category I, non-Type A.
The OPERABILITY of the PAM instrumentation ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to monitor and assess unit status following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 1.
LCO 3.3.3 requires two OPERABLE channels for most Functions. Two OPERABLE channels ensure no single failure prevents operators from getting the information necessary for them to determine the safety status of the unit, and to bring the unit to and maintain it in a safe condition following an accident.
Furthermore, OPERABILITY of two channels allows a CHANNEL CHECK during the post accident phase to confirm the validity of displayed information.
In some cases, the total number of channels exceeds the number of required channels, e.g., pressurizer level has a total of three channels, however only two channels are required OPERABLE. This provides additional redundancy beyond that required by this LCO, i.e., when one channel of pressurizer level is inoperable, the required number of two channels can still be met. The ACTIONS of this LCO are only entered when the required number of channels cannot be met.
Category I variables are required to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category I (Ref. 2) design and qualification requirements for seismic and environmental qualification, single failure criterion, utilization of emergency standby power, immediately accessible display, continuous readout, and recording of display.
Listed below are discussions of the specified instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3-1.
- 1. Neutron Flux - (Wide Range)
Wide Range Neutron Flux indication is provided to verify reactor shutdown.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-3 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)
Neutron flux is used for accident diagnosis, verification of subcriticality, and diagnosis of positive reactivity insertion.
Two channels of wide range neutron flux are required OPERABLE.
2, 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot and Cold Leq Temperatures RCS Hot and Cold Leg Temperatures are Category I variables provided for verification of core cooling and long term surveillance.
RCS hot and cold leg temperatures are used to determine RCS subcooling margin. RCS subcooling margin will allow termination of safety injection (SI), if still in progress, or reinitiation of SI if it has been stopped. RCS subcooling margin is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.
In addition, RCS cold leg temperature is used in conjunction with RCS hot leg temperature to verify the unit conditions necessary to establish natural circulation in the RCS.
Reactor coolant hot and cold leg temperature inputs are provided by fast response resistance elements and associated transmitters in each loop.
Two channels of RCS Hot Leg Temperature and two channels of RCS Cold Leg Temperature are required OPERABLE by the LCO.
RCS Hot Leg and Cold Leg Temperature are diverse indications of RCS temperature. Core exit thermocouples also provide diverse indication of RCS temperature.
- 4. Reactor Coolant System Pressure (Wide Range)
RCS wide range pressure is a Category I variable provided for verification of core cooling and RCS integrity long term surveillance.
RCS pressure is used to verify delivery of SI flow to RCS from at least one train when the RCS pressure is below the pump shutoff head. RCS pressure is also used to verify closure of manually closed spray line valves and pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs).
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-4 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)
In addition to these verifications, RCS pressure is used for determining RCS subcooling margin. RCS pressure can also be used:
- to manually restart low head SI;
- as reactor coolant pump (RCP) trip criteria; and to make a determination on the nature of the accident in progress and where to go next in the procedure.
RCS pressure is also related to three decisions about depressurization. They are:
to determine whether to proceed with primary system depressurization; to verify termination of depressurization; and to determine whether to close accumulator isolation valves during a controlled cooldown/depressurization.
A final use of RCS pressure is to determine whether to operate the pressurizer heaters.
RCS pressure is a Type A variable because the operator uses this indication to monitor the cooldown of the RCS following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) or small break LOCA. Operator actions to maintain a controlled cooldown, such as adjusting steam generator (SG) pressure or level, would use this indication.
Furthermore, RCS pressure is one factor that may be used in decisions to terminate RCP operation.
Two channels of wide range RCS pressure are required OPERABLE.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-5 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued) 5, 6. Reactor Vessel Water Level Reactor Vessel Water Level is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling. It is also used for accident diagnosis and to determine reactor coolant inventory adequacy.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level Monitoring System provides a direct measurement of the collapsed liquid level above the fuel alignment plate. The collapsed level represents the amount of liquid mass that is in the reactor vessel above the core.
Measurement of the collapsed water level is selected because it is a direct indication of the water inventory.
Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level are provided in both the core region (lower range) and the head region (wide range) with indication in the unit control room. Each channel uses differential pressure transmitters and a microprocessor to calculate true vessel level or relative void content of the primary coolant.
- 7. Containment Sump Water Level (Wide Range)
Containment Sump Water Level is provided for verification and long term surveillance of RCS integrity.
Containment Sump Water Level is used to determine:
- containment sump level accident diagnosis; and
- when to continue the recirculation procedure.
Two channels of wide range level are required OPERABLE. Each channel consists of wide range level indication and two level switches.
- 8. Containment Pressure (Wide Range)
Containment Pressure (Wide Range) is provided for verification of RCS and containment OPERABILITY.
Containment pressure is used to verify closure of main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), and containment spray Phase B isolation when Containment Pressure - High High is reached.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-6 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)
Two channels of wide range containment pressure are required OPERABLE.
- 9. Containment Atmosphere Radiation (High Range)
Containment Atmosphere Radiation is provided to monitor for the potential of significant radiation releases and to provide release assessment for use by operators in determining the need to invoke site emergency plans. Containment radiation level is used to determine if a high energy line break (HELB) has occurred, and whether the event is inside or outside of containment.
Two channels of high range containment atmosphere radiation are provided. One channel is required OPERABLE. Diversity is provided by portable instrumentation or by sampling and analysis.
- 10. Not Used
- 11. Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Level is used to determine whether to terminate SI, if still in progress, or to reinitiate SI if it has been stopped.
Knowledge of pressurizer water level is also used to verify the unit conditions necessary to establish natural circulation in the RCS and to verify that the unit is maintained in a safe shutdown condition.
Three channels of pressurizer level are provided. Two channels are required OPERABLE.
- 12. Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Ranqe)
SG Water Level is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs. The Category I indication of SG level is the narrow range level instrumentation.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-7 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)
SG Water Level (Narrow Range) is used to:
- identify the faulted SG following a tube rupture;
- verify that the intact SGs are an adequate heat sink for the reactor;
- determine the nature of the accident in progress (e.g., verify an SGTR); and
Four channels per SG of narrow range water level are provided.
Only two channels are required OPERABLE by the LCO.
13, 14, 15, 16. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term:
surveillance of core cooling.
Adequate core cooling is ensured with two valid Core Exit Temperature channels per quadrant with two CETs per required channel. Core inlet temperature data is used with core exit temperature to give radial distribution of coolant enthalpy rise across the core. Core Exit Temperature is used to determine whether to terminate SI, if still in progress, or to reinitiate SI if it has been stopped. Core Exit Temperature is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.
Two OPERABLE channels of Core Exit Temperature are required in each quadrant to provide indication of radial distribution of the coolant temperature rise across representative regions of the core.
Two sets of two thermocouples (1 set from each redundant power train) ensure a single failure will not disable the ability to determine the radial temperature gradient.
- 17. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow AFW Flow is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-8 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)
The AFW Flow to each SG is determined by flow indicators, pump operational status indicators, and NSWS and condensate supply valve indicators in the control room. The AFW flow indicators are category 2, type D variables which are used to demonstrate the category 1 variable of AFW assured source.
AFW flow is used three ways:
- to verify delivery of AFW flow to the SGs; to determine whether to terminate SI if still in progress, in conjunction with SG water level (narrow range); and
- 18. RCS Subcoolinq Marqin Monitor RCS subcooling is provided to allow unit stabilization and cooldown control. RCS subcooling will allow termination of SI, if still in progress, or reinitiation of SI if it has been stopped.
The margin to saturation is calculated from RCS pressure and temperature measurements. Display of the RCS subcooling margin values is provided via the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor Subcooling Margin Monitor (ICCM SMM) and the Plant Computer.
The plant computer is the primary indication for RCS subcooling margin. Backup indication of the RCS subcooling margin consists of two qualified redundant channels each consisting of one ICCM plasma display and one ICCM cabinet, with each ICCM cabinet receiving inputs from 20 core exit thermocouples, one wide range RCS pressure transmitter, and two wide range hot leg RTDs all associated with that channel (train) of ICCM SMM. Therefore, a single train of ICCM SMM including the associated RCS subcooling margin field inputs is equivalent to a single channel of the "RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor" technical specifications function.
Each train of ICCM SMM uses the average of the five highest core exit thermocouples and the wide range RCS pressure for that train to determine primary system conditions. The primary system conditions are then compared to saturation curves to calculate and display the margin to subcooling. Each train of ICCM SMM also calculates subcooling values for each of the two wide range hot leg temperature RTDs associated with that train.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-9 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)
Therefore, a single train (channel) of SMM provides three diverse subcooling margin values. The diversity of temperature inputs for a channel (train) of the RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor function minimizes the impact to this function resulting from the failure of a single field input.
A graphic display on the ICCM over the required range gives the operator a representation of primary system conditions compared to various curved of importance (saturation, etc.).
Note: Each train's RCS Subcooling Margin values are displayed on the respective train's ICCM SMM display and the Plant Computer.
In addition to displaying the subcooling values received from the ICCM SMM, the plant computer performs independent RCS Subcooling Margin calculations using the average of the five highest core exit thermocouples and wide range RCS pressure to determine primary system conditions. The plant computer compares the primary system conditions to plant computer saturation curves to calculate and display the core margin to subcooling. The plant computer also calculates and displays subcooling values based on the wide range hot leg and cold leg temperature RTDs.
A graphic display on the plant computer over the required range gives the operator a representation of primary system conditions compared to various curves of importance (saturation, NDT, etc.).
A backup program exists to ensure the capability to accurately monitor RCS subcooling. The program includes training and a procedure to manually calculate subcooling margin, using control room pressure and temperature instruments.
- 19. Steam Line Pressure Steam Line Pressure is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs. Steam line pressure is also used to determine if a high energy secondary line rupture occurred and which SG is faulted.
Two channels of Steam Line Pressure are required OPERABLE.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-10 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)
- 20. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level RWST level monitoring is provided to ensure an adequate supply of water to the safety injection and spray pumps during the switchover to cold leg recirculation.
Three channels of RWST level are provided. Two channels are required OPERABLE by the LCO.
- 21. DG Heat Exchanger NSWS Flow Flow indicators are provided in each of the NSWS trains to indicate cooling water flow through the respective train DG. These indicators are provided for operators to manually control flow to the DG heat exchanger. One flow indicator is required OPERABLE on each train.
- 22. Containment Spray Heat Exchanger NSWS Flow Flow indicators are provided in each of the NSWS trains to indicate cooling water flow through the respective train containment spray heat exchangers. These indicators are provided for operators to manually control flow to the heat exchanger. One flow indicator is required OPERABLE on each train.
APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1,2, and 3.
These variables are related to the diagnosis and pre-planned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1, 21 and 3. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, unit conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is low; therefore, the PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.3-1. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.3-1 are specified (e.g., on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate.
The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable channel(s) of a Function will be ACTIONS (continued)
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-11 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.
A.1 Condition A applies to all PAM instrument Functions. Condition A addresses the situation when one or more required channels for one or more Functions are inoperable. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.3-1 and take the appropriate Required Actions for the PAM instrumentation affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.
B._1 Condition B applies when one or more Functions have one required channel that is inoperable. Required Action B.1 requires restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel, the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval. Condition B is not applicable to functions with a single required channel.
C.1 Condition C applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition B are not met. This Required Action specifies initiation of actions in Specification 5.6.7, which requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC immediately. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative actions. This action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the likelihood of unit conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-12 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
D.1 Condition D applies when a single require channel is inoperable.
Required Action D.1 requires restoring the required channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with the required channel inoperable is not acceptable. Therefore, requiring restoration of the required channel to OPERABLE status limits the risk that the PAM function will be in a degraded condition should an event occur.
E.1 Condition E applies when one or more Functions have two inoperable required channels (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same Function).
Required Action E.1 requires restoring one channel in the Function(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the PAM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur.
Condition E does not apply to hydrogen monitor channels and functions with single channels.
F.1 Not Used G.1 and G.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions D or E are not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE where the requirements of this LCO do not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-13 Revision No. 100
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
H..1 Alternate means of monitoring Containment Area Radiation have been developed and tested. These alternate means may be temporarily installed if the normal PAM channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allotted time. If these alternate means are used, the Required Action is not to shut down the unit but rather to follow the directions of Specification 5.6.7, in the Administrative Controls section of the TS. The report provided to the NRC should discuss the alternate means used, describe the degree to which the alternate means are equivalent to the installed PAM channels, justify the areas in which they are not equivalent, and provide a schedule for restoring the normal PAM channels.
SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.3.3 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.3-1.
Performing the Neutron Flux Instrumentation and Containment Atmosphere Radiation (High-Range) surveillances meets the License Renewal Commitments for License Renewal Program for High-Range Radiation and Neutron Flux Instrumentation Circuits per UFSAR Chapter 18, Table 18-1 and License Renewal Commitments Specification MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.44.
SR 3.3.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross instrumentation failure has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The high radiation instrumentation should be compared to similar unit instruments located throughout the unit.
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PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE.
As specified in the SR, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels that are normally energized.
The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.
SR 3.3.3.2 Not Used SR 3.3.3.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. This SR is modified by a Note that excludes neutron detectors. The calibration method for neutron detectors is specified in the Bases of LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation." The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR Section 1.8.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2.
- 3. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, "TMI Action Items."
- 4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
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DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating BASES BACKGROUND The station DC electrical power system provides the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment and preferred AC vital bus power (via inverters). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system also conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).
The 125 VDC electrical power system consists of two independent and redundant safety related Class 1 E DC electrical power subsystems (Train A and Train B). Each subsystem consists of two channels of 125 VDC batteries (each battery 100% capacity), the associated battery charger(s) for each battery, and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling.
Additionally there is one spare battery charger, which provides backup service in the event that the preferred battery charger is out of service. If the spare battery charger is substituted for one of the preferred battery chargers, then the requirements of independence and redundancy between subsystems are maintained.
During normal operation, the 125 VDC load is powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC load is automatically powered from the station batteries.
The Train A and Train B DC electrical power subsystems provide the control power for its associated Class 1 E AC power load group, 4.16 kV switchgear, and 600 V load centers. The DC electrical power subsystems also provide DC electrical power to the inverters, which in turn power the AC vital buses.
The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in Bases for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution System-Operating," and LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown."
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.4-1 Revision No. 100
DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Each battery (EVCA, EVCB, EVCC, EVCD) has adequate storage capacity to carry the required duty cycle for one hour after the loss of the battery charger output. In addition, the battery is capable of supplying power for the operation of anticipated momentary loads during the one hour period.
Each 125 VDC battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each channel is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other channel to ensure that a single failure in one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E subsystems, such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels.
The batteries for the channels of DC are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. Battery size is based on 125% of required capacity and, after selection of an available commercial battery, results in a battery capacity in excess of 150% of required capacity. The individual cell voltage limit is 2.13 V per cell. The minimum battery terminal voltage limit is greater than or equal to 125 V while on float charge as discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref.i4).
The criteria for sizing large lead storage batteries are defined in IEEE-485 (Ref. 5).
Each channel of DC has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> while supplying normal steady state loads discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 4).
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient SAFETY ANALYSES analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 6), and in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 7), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE.
The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
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DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
- b. A worst case single failure.
The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 8).
LCO Each DC channel consisting of one battery, battery charger for each battery and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus within the train is required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. Loss of any channel of DC does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).
An OPERABLE channel of DC requires the battery and respective charger to be operating and connected to the associated DC bus.
APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:
- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources- Shutdown."
ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Condition A represents one channel of DC with a loss of ability to fully respond to a DBA with the worst case single failure. Two hours is provided to restore the channel of DC to OPERABLE status and is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable channel of DC distribution system requirement.
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DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
If one of the required channels of DC is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable battery charger(s), or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC channels have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. If the channel of DC cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, Action A.2 must be entered and the DC channel must be energized from an OPERABLE channel, from the same train, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The capacity of the redundant channel is sufficient to supply its normally supplied channel and cross tied channel for the required time, in case of a DBA event. The inoperable channel of DC must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and the cross ties to the other channel open. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable channel of DC and, if the DC channel is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.
B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable channel of DC cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 5 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 9).
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 10).
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.4-4 Revision No. 100
DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.8.4.2 Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each intercell, interrack, intertier, and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.
The Surveillance Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to detecting corrosion trends.
SR 3.8.4.3 Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The presence of physical damage or deterioration does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided an evaluation determines that the physical damage or deterioration does not affect the OPERABILITY of the battery (its ability to perform its design function). Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 Visual inspection and resistance measurements of intercell, interrack, intertier, and terminal connections provide an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anticorrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection. The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of SR 3.8.4.4. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.4-5 Revision No. 100
DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.8.4.6 This SR requires that each battery charger be capable of supplying 400 amps and 125 V for > 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. These requirements are based on the design requirements of the chargers. According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 11), the battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.
The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 18. month intervals.
In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
SR 3.8.4.7 A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> should correspond to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.
The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 11) with the exception that it is allowable to perform the battery service test with a unit in any Mode.
This SR is modified by a Note. The Note allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test.
The modified performance discharge test, as defined by IEEE-450 (Ref.
- 12) is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates; the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated one minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.4-6 Revision No. 100
DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.
A modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test.
SR 3.8.4.8 A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.
A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.7 and in IEEE-450 (Ref. 12). Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.8 while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.7 at the same time.
The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 12). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. A capacity of 80%
shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.
The Surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is < 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity _
100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450 (Ref. 10), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10%
relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is _Ž10%
below the manufacturer's rating. These Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 10).
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.4-7 Revision No. 100
DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES REFERENCES 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.6, March 10, 1971.
- 3. IEEE-308-1971.
- 4. UFSAR, Chapter 8.
- 5. IEEE-485-1983, June 1983.
- 6. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
- 7. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
- 8. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
- 10. IEEE-450-1995.
- 11. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
- 12. IEEE-450-1980.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.4-8 Revision No. 100