Text

IR 05000413-04-005, IR 05000414-04-005; 6/20/2004 - 9/18/2004; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Quarterly Integrated Inspection Report
	ML042890416
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/15/2004
From:	Haag R; NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To:	Jamil D; Duke Energy Corp
References
	IR-04-005
	Download: ML042890416 (29)
	v • d • e

October 15, 2004

Duke Energy Corporation

ATTN: Mr. D. M. Jamil

Site Vice President

Catawba Nuclear Station

4800 Concord Road

York, SC 29745

SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

05000413/2004005 AND 05000414/2004005

Dear Mr. Jamil:

On September 18, 2004, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report

documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on September 28, 2004, with you and

members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your

licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and

interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert Haag, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414

License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure: Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2004005 and 05000414/2004005

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

DEC 2

cc w/encl:

Lee Keller (CNS) County Manager of York County, SC

Regulatory Compliance Manager Electronic Mail Distribution

Duke Energy Corporation

Electronic Mail Distribution Piedmont Municipal Power Agency

Electronic Mail Distribution

Lisa Vaughn

Legal Department (PB05E) R. L. Gill, Jr., Manager

Duke Energy Corporation Regulatory Issues & Affairs

422 South Church Street Duke Energy Corporation

P. O. Box 1244 526 S. Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28201-1244 Charlotte, NC 28201-0006

Anne Cottingham

Winston and Strawn

Electronic Mail Distribution

North Carolina MPA-1

Electronic Mail Distribution

Henry J. Porter, Assistant Director

Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

S. C. Department of Health

and Environmental Control

Electronic Mail Distribution

R. Mike Gandy

Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

S. C. Department of Health and

Environmental Control

Electronic Mail Distribution

Elizabeth McMahon

Assistant Attorney General

S. C. Attorney General's Office

Electronic Mail Distribution

Vanessa Quinn

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Electronic Mail Distribution

North Carolina Electric

Membership Corporation

Electronic Mail Distribution

Peggy Force

Assistant Attorney General

N. C. Department of Justice

Electronic Mail Distribution

DEC 3

Distribution w/encl:

S. Peters, NRR

L. Slack, RII

T. Sullivan, NRR

RIDSRIDSNRRDIPMLIPB

PUBLIC

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS

SIGNATURE GXG ATS1 GXG for GTH1 GWL1 REC MXM3

NAME EGuthrie ASabisch MShannon GHopper GLaska RCortes MMaymi

DATE 10/15/2004 10/15/2004 10/15/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

PUBLIC YES NO

OFFICE RII:DRS

SIGNATURE REC1 for

NAME SVias

DATE 10/15/2004

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML042890416.wpd

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414

License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52

Report No: 05000413/2004005, 05000414/2004005

Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: 4800 Concord Road

York, SC 29745

Dates: June 20, 2004 - September 18, 2004

Inspectors: E. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector

A. Sabisch, Resident Inspector

M. Shannon, Senior Resident Inspector - Oconee

G. Hopper, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)

G. Laska, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)

R. Cortes, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)

M. Maymi, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)

S. Vias, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)

Approved by: R. Haag, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000413/2004005, IR 05000414/2004005; 6/20/2004 - 9/18/2004; Catawba Nuclear

Station, Units 1 and 2; Quarterly Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by two resident inspectors, one

operations engineer, one senior operations engineer, one visiting senior resident inspector, two

reactor inspectors, and one senior reactor inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the

safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor

Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

B. Licensee-identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status:

Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP). On

August 26, 2004, power was reduced to 40 percent to repair a leak in the 'B' low pressure

service water supply header and the 1A1 low pressure feedwater heater relief valve that lifted

spuriously and failed to reseat. The Unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on August 28, 2004,

and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On September 7, 2004, power was

gradually reduced in accordance with Reactor Engineering instructions as part of the reactor

coolant average temperature coastdown associated with the Unit 2 end-of-cycle (EOC) 13

refueling outage. The Unit was removed from service on September 11, 2004, for refueling and

maintenance activities.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Adverse Weather Condition

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed two separate reviews of the effectiveness of the licensees

severe weather protection program pertaining to the actual and projected adverse

weather conditions associated with the following two adverse weather conditions:

Hurricane Charley during the period of August 13 - 14, 2004

Hurricane Frances during the period of September 3 - 6, 2004

These reviews included field walkdowns to identify items that could become potential

missiles and the status of drainage measures in outside locations, including the areas

surrounding the main transformers, the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings, cooling

towers, and main switchyard. The inspectors discussed with licensed operators, the

specific measures to be taken during the periods when high winds and flooding were

experienced and conducted a walkdown of control room and in-plant equipment related

to protection from these conditions. The inspectors met with Emergency Planning

personnel to discuss activities taken to ensure the site was prepared for the expected

wind and rain conditions and reviewed the completed attachments to the station

Response Procedure to Severe Weather. Documents reviewed/generated during this

inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected samples of evaluations to confirm that the licensee

had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility or

procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The

inspectors reviewed evaluations for various design and procedure changes. The

inspectors reviewed additional information, such as calculations, supporting analyses

and drawings to determine if the licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes

could be accomplished without obtaining a license amendment. The eight evaluations

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The inspectors also reviewed samples of design/engineering packages and procedure

changes for which the licensee had determined that evaluations were not required, to

verify that the licensees conclusions to screen out these changes were correct and

consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The fourteen screened out changes reviewed are listed

in the Attachment to this report.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program and self-assessments

of the 50.59 process to confirm that the licensee was identifying 10 CFR 50.59 issues,

entering issues into the corrective action program, and resolving concerns.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the critical portions of equipment alignments for selected trains

that remained operable while the redundant trains were inoperable. The inspectors

reviewed plant documents to determine the correct system and power alignments, and

the required positions of select valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that the

licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could

cause initiating events or impact mitigating system availability. The inspectors verified

the following five partial system alignments and reviewed the associated listed

documents:

C Unit 1 / 2 B train of nuclear service water (RN) with the Unit 1 / 2 A train of RN

out of service for planned maintenance (Technical Specification Action Item Log

entry C0-0401648 and work orders (WOs) 98633007, 98614943, 986383006,

98650865 and 98668372)

C Unit 1 A control area chilled water (YC) chiller with the Unit 2 B YC chiller out

of service for cooler cleaning and inspection (WO 98688168 and

MP/0/A/7450/021, Cleaning condenser or cooling tubes for YC chiller)

3

C 1A containment spray (NS) with the 1B train of NS out of service for

maintenance and testing (PT/1/A/4400/006B, NS heat exchanger (HX) 1B heat

capacity test and PT/1/A/4200/004C, Pump Inservice Test (IWP) NS pump 1B)

C 2A diesel generator (DG) with the 2B DG out of service (WO 98677560, 2B

diesel generator slow to stop)

C 2B RN with the 2A RN train out of service for unplanned maintenance (WO 98659925, Replace Relays In 2EATC10 and WO 98678682, Perform Complete

Limitorque Preventive Maintenance and Motor Operated Valve Test)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one detailed walkdown/review of the alignment and condition

of the Unit 2 residual heat removal (ND) system. The inspectors utilized licensee

procedures, as well as licensing and design documents to verify that the system

(i.e., pump, valve, and electrical) alignment was correct. During the walkdowns, the

inspectors also verified that: valves and pumps did not exhibit leakage that would impact

their function; major portions of the system and components were correctly labeled;

hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional; and essential support

systems were operational. In addition, pending design and equipment issues were

reviewed to determine if the identified deficiencies significantly impacted the systems

functions. Items included in this review were the operator workaround list, the

temporary modification list, system Health Reports, and outstanding maintenance work

requests/WOs. A review of open Problem Identification Process reports (PIPs) was also

performed to verify that the licensee had appropriately characterized and prioritized ND

related equipment problems for resolution in the corrective action program. Documents

reviewed/generated during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Fire Protection Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant to assess the licensees

control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and

suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The

inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to

determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the

4

operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of

the licensees safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment, based on sensitivity

studies for fire related core damage accident sequences, and summary statements

related to the licensees 1992 Initial Plant Examination for External Events submittal to

the NRC. Documents reviewed/generated during this inspection are listed in the

Attachment to this report. The inspectors toured the following eight areas important to

reactor safety:

Unit 1, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit

Unit 2, switchgear room, auxiliary building, 594 foot elevation

Unit 2, interior doghouse

Unit 2, exterior doghouse

Unit 2, A ND pump room

Unit 2, B ND pump room

Unit 2, mechanical penetration room, auxiliary building, 543 foot elevation

standby shutdown facility (SSF)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an inspection of the heat sink performance for the 1A diesel

generator jacket water cooler (KD) heat exchanger. The inspectors observed

PT/1/A/4400/006E, Diesel Generator Cooling KD HX 1A Heat Capacity Test, and

evaluated test data for acceptable performance. The inspectors also conducted

discussions with engineering personnel concerning system configuration and heat load

requirements, the methodology used in calculating heat exchanger performance, and

the method for tracking the status of tube plugging used in the computer calculation

program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

.1 Observed Simulator Session

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a simulator session conducted on July 7, 2004, to assess the

performance of licensed operators. The session utilized Task Requirement Guide OP-

CN-PTRQ-S-04, which included three scenarios involving a loss of residual heat

removal capabilities with the unit shutdown under various configurations and decay heat

loads. The inspection focused on high-risk operator actions performed during

implementation of the abnormal operating procedures, emergency plan implementation

5

and classification, and the incorporation of lessons learned from previous plant events

and simulator sessions. Through observations of the critique conducted by training

instructors following the exam session, the inspectors assessed whether appropriate

feedback was provided to the licensed operators regarding identified weaknesses.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Program Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in

preparation for this inspection. During the week of August 30 - September 3, 2004, the

inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the

administration of operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification

program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the

effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in

10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to

determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines

established in NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power

Reactors, and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification

Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy

for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1998. The inspectors

observed four crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation

reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator

scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, licensed operator qualification records,

watchstanding and medical records, simulator modification request records and

performance test records, the feedback process, and remediation plans. The records

were inspected using the criteria listed in Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed

during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

Following the completion of the annual operating tests, which ended on September 3,

2004, the inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the biennial written

examination, the individual JPM operating tests, and the simulator operating tests

administered by the licensee during the operator licensing requalification cycle. These

results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 609, Appendix I,

Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees effectiveness in performing routine maintenance

activities. This review included an assessment of the licensees practices pertaining to

6

the identification, scope, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as

common cause failure evaluations and the resolution of historical equipment problems.

For those systems, structures, and components scoped in the maintenance rule per 10

CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability and unavailability were properly

monitored, and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications were justified in light

of the reviewed degraded equipment condition. The inspectors conducted this

inspection for the degraded equipment conditions associated with the two items listed

below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

C Monitoring of boron deposition in the Unit 2 lower containment ventilation unit

enclosures. It was subsequently determined that boron deposits in the

ventilation unit were not accumulating but remained at the same levels.

C Troubleshooting activities associated with 1B diesel generator lube oil heater

control circuit

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessments concerning the risk impact of

removing from service those components associated with the five emergent and

planned work items listed below. This review primarily focused on activities determined

to be risk significant within the maintenance rule. The inspectors also assessed the

adequacy of the licensees identification and resolution of problems associated with

maintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities. The inspectors reviewed

Nuclear System Directive 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), for

appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4).

Unit 1 / 2 A RN train removed from service for planned maintenance activities

Assessment of work week 31 planned maintenance and surveillance activities at

Catawba with Orange grid status due to Oconee station switchyard issues

Assessment of work week 34 planned maintenance and surveillance activities at

Catawba with Orange grid status due to unexpected trip of Belews Creek Unit 1

Repair activities associated with valve 1RN-004B (RN suction from the nuclear

service water pond pit) - (WO 98685878)

2B DG work - (WO 98677560, Inspect and Repair 2B Diesel Generator Slow to

Stop)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

7

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

On September 10 and 11, 2004, the inspectors observed operator performance during

the shutdown of Unit 2 for the 2EOC-13 Refueling Outage. The inspectors observed

licensed operators use of procedures, control room pre-evolution briefings, and plant

equipment manipulations during the power reduction, manual reactor trip, and portions

of the subsequent plant cooldown.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations to verify that the operability of systems

important to safety were properly established, that the affected components or systems

remained capable of performing their intended safety function, and that no unrecognized

increase in plant or public risk occurred. Operability evaluations were reviewed for the

twelve issues listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this

report.

Valve body on Unit 2 A component cooling water (KC) HX outlet throttle valve

2RN291 found to have three locations where wall thickness was below the

American Society of Mechanical Engineers code minimum required wall

thickness (PIP C-04-02965)

10 CFR Part 21 Notification pertaining to Rotork valve actuator switch

mechanisms (PIP C-04-02668)

Required boration flow from the standby makeup pump to account for xenon

decay following a reactor trip during a postulated event requiring the use of the

SSF (PIP C-04-03179)

Stem leakage on valve 2NS-018A, NS pump A suction from emergency core

cooling system (ECCS) containment sump valve (PIP C-04-4234)

Unit 1 and 2 RN response to a low low B train RN pit level signal generated

during installation of temporary modification CNTM-0158 (PIP C-04-04060)

Inactive through-wall leak on Unit 2 boric acid tank number 2 (PIP C-04-4262)

Unit 1 main turbine valve movement test obtained unexpected response with

temporary station modification CNTM-0157 in place (PIP C-04-03849)

Units 1 and 2 accident analysis when main steam isolation valve poppet valve

remains open after closure of MSIV (PIP C-04-03801)

Unit 1 RN through-wall leak in circumferential weld 0RN57-8 (PIP C-04-03420)

2B DG did not stop as expected during operability test (PIP C-04-03409)

Valve 2ND-61 would not open when aligning the system for auxiliary safeguards

testing (PIP C-04-3396)

Fluctuations on Unit 2 refueling water storage tank channel 3 level instrument

(PIP C-04-03380)

8

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following operator workaround. This

review assessed: (1) the impact on the reliability, availability and potential for mis-

operation of the identified system(s); (2) potential for increased initiating event

frequency; and (3) impact on the ability of the operator to respond in a correct and

timely manner to a plant transient and accident. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

Manual reactor coolant system background leakage calculations required due to

internal leakage of 2NV172A, 3-way divert valve to the Volume Control

Tank/Recycle Holdup Tank

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated design change packages for 11 modifications, in two

cornerstone areas, to verify that the modifications did not affect system availability,

reliability, or functional capability. The inspectors reviewed inspection procedure

attributes, such as: energy requirements could be supplied by supporting systems;

materials and replacement components were compatible with physical interfaces;

replacement components were seismically qualified for application; Code and safety

classification of replacement system, structures, and components were consistent with

design bases; modification design assumptions were appropriate; post-modification

testing established operability; failure modes introduced by the modification were

bounded by existing analyses; and appropriate procedures or procedure changes had

been initiated. For selected modification packages, the inspectors verified that the

as-built configuration accurately reflected the design documentation.

Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modifications, work

orders, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the Updated

Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), supporting analyses, Technical Specifications

(TSs), and design basis documentation. Applicable documents are listed in the report

attachment. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the licensees recent self-

assessments of the design change process.

9

The following plant modifications and associated attributes were reviewed:

C CNTM 0093 - Install temporary pump in Aux. Bldg. at 577' elev. that will be

connected to take suction from the RN nonessential header and connect to

nearby fire protection piping at valve 1RFA056 (Mitigating Systems):

- Electrical Energy Needs

- Seismic Consideration

- Appendix R Considerations

- Flowpaths

- Process Medium - fluid flowrates & pressures

C CNCE 21410 - Boric acid tank (BAT) transfer pumps mini-flow line installation &

discharge line reroute (Mitigating Systems):

- Seismic Consideration

- Functionality Properties

- Fluid Flowrates

- Licensing Basis & Testing Review

- Updating Review

C CNCE 61688 - Addition of drain connection to the 2A safety injection (NI) pump

oil system (Mitigating Systems):

- Testing Review

- Updating Review

- Functional Properties

- Licensing Basis

- Seismic Consideration

- PIP Review

C CNCE 72911 - Revise supports 1-R-SC-2047, 1-R-SP-2053, 1-R-SP-2054, and

1-R-SP-2055 to add bolted splice plates (Barrier Integrity):

- Seismic Consideration

- Structural Integrity Consideration

C CNCE 70974 - Install current limiting resistor in 1LCCP1 (Mitigating Systems):

- Electrical Energy Needs

- Functional Properties

- Currents

- Licensing basis

- Failure modes

C CNCE 72848 - Add interposing relay to energize main contractor (M coil) for 1D

SSF pressurizer heater control circuit (Mitigating Systems):

- Electrical Energy Needs

- Functional Properties

- Currents

- Licensing basis

- Testing documents

C CNCE 72137 - Replace SMB-000-2, 3400 rpm motor in valve 2RN40B with

available SMB-000-2, 1800 rpm motor (Mitigating Systems):

10

- Electrical Energy Needs

- Functional Properties

- Voltage

- Licensing basis

- Response time

C CNCE 71779 - Remove MOV's 1/2 VY015B, 017A and 018B (containment

isolation valves) from the GL89-10 program (Barrier Integrity):

- Engineering justification for removal

- Licensee Commitments

C CNCE 71765 - Redesign support 1-C-WC-7070 so it will not wear the pipe

surface due to system vibration and movement. Redesign supports

1-R-CS-2024 and -2025 to eliminate contact with WP pipe (Barrier Integrity):

- Seismic Consideration

- Structural Integrity Consideration

C CNCE 62047 - Revise valve arrangement to resolve issue of hydrogen bubbles

interfering with flow management (Barrier Integrity):

- Material Functional Properties

- Timing Sequence

- Control Signals

C CN 21417 - Rewire relay logic in the AFWP Turbine Control Panel to fail

(de-energize) to the Remote mode of control (Mitigating Systems):

- Electrical Energy Needs

- Control Signals Initiation and Control

- Operations

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed post-maintenance testing procedures and/or

test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk significant systems to verify whether:

(1) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (2) acceptance criteria were

clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and

licensing basis documents; (3) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and

accuracy consistent with the application; (4) tests were performed as written with

applicable prerequisites satisfied; and (5) equipment was returned to the status required

to perform its safety function. The five tests reviewed are listed below. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

IP/1/A/3222/076D, Calibration Procedure for Delta T/Tavg Protection Circuitry

(failure of the Unit 1 reactor coolant system (NC) loop D delta-temperature

transmitter)

11

PT/1/A/4200/007C; Unit 1 Standby Makeup Pump Performance Test (performed

following preventive maintenance and inspection activities)

PT/2/A/4350/002B, 2B Diesel Generator Operability Test (repair of shutdown

cylinder shuttle valve)

IP/1/A/3222/078C, 1C Steam Generator Steam Line Pressure Protection

Channel 1 Loop Calibration (replacement of 7300 series protection cabinet card

C1-621)

PT/0/A/4200/13, 1RN-004B Valve Performance Test (repair of valve due to

binding)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 outage activities to ensure that the licensee: considered

risk in developing outage schedules; adhered to administrative risk reduction

methodologies developed to control plant configuration; developed mitigation strategies

for losses of key safety functions; and adhered to operating license and TS

requirements that ensure defense-in-depth. The following specific areas were reviewed:

Review of Outage Plan - Prior to the outage, the inspectors reviewed the

licensees outage risk control plan, attended risk briefings, and verified that the

licensee appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site

specific problems. The inspectors reviewed the licensees contingency actions

for losses of key safety functions, and verified that the licensee maintained key

safety function status and controls throughout the portion of the outage in this

inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 outage risk assessment

CN-04-049, 2EOC-13-IRT Pre-Outage Review Shutdown Risk Assessment.

Outage Configuration Management - The inspectors assessed the licensees

management of configuration control and the risk associated with outage

activities by reviewing the licensees implementation of Site Directive 3.1.30, Unit

Shutdown Configuration Control (Modes 4, 5, 6 or No Mode), and NSD 403,

Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6 or No Mode) against the

requirements of 10CFR50.65(a)(4). This assessment included verification that

the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk

control plan for key safety functions and applicable TS when risk significant

equipment was removed from service. The inspectors also assessed whether

configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected conditions were

controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan, and if control room

operators were cognizant of plant configuration.

Monitoring of Shutdown Activities - The inspectors reviewed NSD 304, Reactivity

Management, and the implementation of OP/2/A/6100/003, Controlling

Procedure for Unit Operations, and OP/2/A/6100/002, Controlling Procedure For

Unit Shutdown, through control room observations during unit shutdown.

12

PT/2/A/4600/017, Surveillance Requirements For Unit 2 Shutdown, was

reviewed to ensure cool down rates while cooling down the reactor coolant

system were in accordance with TS 3.4.3, Reactor Coolant System Pressure and

Temperature Limits. Plant Engineering Procedure 2.5, Operational Guidance for

the Unit 2 EOC Shutdown was reviewed and its implementation observed during

the power reduction and reactor shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the

following documents and their implementation:

- OP/2/B/6300/001, Turbine-Generator; Enclosure 4.4, Turbine Generator

Shutdown

- IP/2/A/3240/011, Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Calibration

at Power

Electrical Power - The inspectors reviewed the status and configurations of

electrical systems for compliance with TS requirements and the licensees

outage risk control plan. The inspectors verified that switchyard activities were

controlled commensurate with safety and were consistent with the licensees

outage risk control plan. The inspectors reviewed Site Directive 3.1.30, Unit

Shutdown, and CN-04-049, 2EOC-13-IRT Pre-Outage Review Shutdown Risk

Assessment.

Reactivity Control - The inspectors reviewed reactivity control to verify that

proper control was maintained in accordance with the TS and Site Directive

3.1.30, Unit Shutdown Configuration Control (Modes 4,5,6 or No Mode), and

NSD 403, Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6 or No Mode). Potential

reactivity changes were identified in the outage risk plan, CN-04-049, 2EOC-13-

IRT Pre-Outage Review Shutdown Risk Assessment, and were reviewed to

verify proper controls.

Containment Closure - The inspectors verified that the licensee controlled

containment penetrations in accordance with the refueling operations TS, and

that containment closure could be achieved when needed. The inspectors

reviewed the following documents and their implementation:

- PT/2/A/4200/002C, Containment Closure Verification (Part I)

- PT/2/A/4200/002I, Containment Closure Verification (Part II)

- PT/2/A/4200/002J, Containment Closure Verification Penetration Status

Change

- OP/0/A/6100/014, Penetration Control for Modes 5 and 6

Refueling Activities - The inspectors reviewed fuel handling operations to verify

they were performed in accordance with fuel handling procedures. Specifically,

the inspectors observed new fuel receipt inspection, verified the positions of

randomly selected new fuel assemblies, and verified that these assemblies were

tracked and placed in the correct position and orientation during movement from

the new fuel vault area into the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also observed

the coordination and movement of several fuel assemblies from the reactor

vessel to the spent fuel pool during core offload. The inspectors reviewed the

following documents and their implementation:

13

-

- MP/0/B/7150/012, Refueling Canal Cleanliness

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the surveillance tests listed below to verify

that TS surveillance requirements and/or Selected Licensee Commitment requirements

were properly complied with, and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified.

The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the

procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance

criteria had been met. Additionally, the inspectors also verified that equipment was

properly returned to service and that proper testing was specified and conducted to

ensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function following

maintenance or as part of surveillance testing. Additional documents reviewed during

this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. The following four activities

were reviewed:

In-Service Test:

PT/1/A/4200/021A, 1KC-C37A, Train A Miniflow Valve Inservice Test

Surveillance Tests:

PT/1/A/4400/003A, Unit 1 A1 KC pump performance test

IP/1/A/3222/000H, Unit 1 Fueling Water Storage Tank Channel 3 Operability

Test

IP/1/A/3222/078C, 1C Steam Generator Steam Line Pressure, Protection

Channel 1, Loop 1SMPT5140 (PT-534) Calibration

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

14

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four selected temporary station modifications to determine

whether: the modification was properly installed; the modification did not affect system

operability, drawings and procedures were appropriately updated; and post-modification

testing was satisfactorily performed. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

to this report. The following four temporary station modifications were reviewed:

Unit 1 stop valve number 2 fast acting solenoid

Removal of test switch from Solid State Protection System circuitry

Nuclear Service Water Pond pit level instrumentation

1RN-004B Removal and Repair

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed

below for the period from June 2003 through May 2004. To verify the accuracy of the PI

data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear

Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.

Auxiliary Feedwater System Safety System Unavailability, Unit 1

Auxiliary Feedwater System Safety System Unavailability, Unit 2

The inspectors reviewed a selection of Licensee Event Reports, portions of Unit 1 and

Unit 2 operator log entries, PIP descriptions, monthly operating reports, and PI data

sheets to verify that the licensee had adequately identified the number of unavailability

hours and safety system functional failures. These numbers were compared to the

numbers reported for the PIs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

15

.2 Barrier Integrity Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the PI listed below for the period from

June 2003 through May 2004. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that

period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for

each data element.

Reactor Coolant System Identified Leakage, Unit 1

Reactor Coolant System Identified Leakage, Unit 2

The inspectors reviewed a selection of Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries compiled

from the reactor coolant leakage calculation performed on a daily basis. The inspectors

verified that the reported reactor coolant leakage performance indicator data was

conservative and accurate.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Daily Screening of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance

issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the

licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing

copies of PIPs, attending some daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensees

computerized database.

.2 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected two PIP documents for detailed review. PIP C-03-6458

identified an adverse trend associated with foreign material exclusion. The second PIP,

C-03-6007, involved a seal failure on the 1A ND pump. Both documents involved root

cause investigations that were reviewed to ensure that the full extent of the issues were

identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions

were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the PIP documents against the

requirements of the licensees corrective action program, Nuclear System Directive 208,

Problem Investigation Process, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

16

4OA5 Other Activities

(Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/152, Inspection of Reactor Pressure Vessel

Lower Head Penetration Nozzles

The inspectors verified that qualified and knowledgeable licensee individuals performed

the inspection of the Unit 2 lower vessel head penetration nozzles. These individuals

were qualified VT-2 Level II examiners. The inspectors verified that the inspection was

performed in accordance with the licensees approved procedure. This procedure was

written to be able to identify, disposition, and resolve deficiencies and any pressure

boundary leakage. The inspection of the vessel penetrations was performed by 360

degree visual inspection with the appropriate lighting and mirrors. The inspection did

not identify any deficiencies or pressure boundary leakage. There were slight boric

acid deposits at the interface of the vessel and nozzle penetrations at six (6)

penetrations. In addition, there was some surface streaming boric acid residue on the

reactor vessel outer surface. Samples were taken from all six penetrations with

surrounding boric acid deposits, as well as some of the surface residue, and analyzed

by the licensee to confirm the origination of the boric acid. The licensee analysis

followed the Electric Power Research Institute boric acid aging recommendations and

compared the ratio of cobalt 58 and cobalt 60. The analysis indicated that the boric acid

deposits and residue were the result of previous reactor cavity seal leakage. The

inspectors independent review of the lower vessel head penetrations and licensee

documentation of surface samples found no evidence of material deficiencies. The

inspectors verified through a review of the 2EOC-13 refueling outage schedule that

washing of the bottom head area and documentation of the as-left condition will be

completed prior to the Unit 2 restart. Bare metal examinations have been performed

for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 lower vessels and penetration nozzles and the inspections

associated with this TI have been completed. Documents reviewed during this

inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On September 28, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to

Mr. D. Jamil, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management, who

acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was

not provided or examined during the inspection.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

K. Adams, Human Performance Manager

E. Beadle, Emergency Planning Manager

W. Byers, Security Manager

T. Daniels, Emergency Planning/Fire Protection

B. Dolan, Engineering Manager

J. Foster, Radiation Protection Manager

R. Glover, Station Manager

W. Green, Reactor and Electrical Systems Manager

G. Hamilton, Operations Training Manager

G. Hamrick, Mechanical, Civil Engineering Manager

P. Ivey, Human Resources Manager

D. Jamil, Catawba Site Vice President

L. Keller, Regulatory Compliance Manager

R. Kimray, LOR Training Supervisor

A. Lindsay, Training Manager

P. McIntyre, Acting Safety Assurance Manager

M. Patrick, Work Control Superintendent

J. Pitesa, Operations Superintendent

F. Smith, Chemistry Manager

G. Strickland, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

J. Thrasher, Modifications Manager

C. Trezise, Maintenance Superintendent

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

Previous Items Closed

2515/152 TI Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower

Head Penetration Nozzles - Units 1

and 2 (Section 40A5)

Items Discussed

None

Attachment

2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

(Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection)

RP/0/B/5000/030, Severe Weather Preparations (Procedure and completed attachments)

PIP C-04-3918; During performance of RP/0/B/5000/030, all four turbine building ground water

drainage sump pumps (two per unit) were found with overload circuits tripped.

Operator Aid Computer points:

C1A0017; Lower wind speed (mph)

C1A1040; Lower wind direction (degrees)

C1A1034; Upper wind speed (mph)

C1A0022; Upper wind direction (degrees)

C2A1380; Lower wind speed (mph)

C2A1386; Lower wind direction (degrees)

C2A1368; Upper wind speed (mph)

C2A1374; Upper wind direction (degrees)

Duke Energy Weather Server updates and reports (August 12 - 14, 2004)

Duke Energy Weather Server updates and reports (September 3 - 6, 2004)

PIPs generated as a result of this inspection

PIP C-04-4028; Review of procedure and actions taken during the implementation of

RP/0/B/5000/030, Severe Weather Preparations

PIP C-04-4245; Large amount of standing water noted near the north end of the Unit 2 turbine

building indicating the storm drain basin was not functioning properly

PIP C-04-4326; Temporary power cables laying in yard with bare conductors exposed and no

markings to say they are de-energized

PIP C-04-4327; RP/30, Severe Weather Preparations, needs criteria to define potential hazards

in severe weather and what actions are required

(Section 1R02: Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments)

10CFR50.59 Evaluations

SLC 16.9-7 & 16.9-9, Boration Systems Flow Paths Shutdown

Nuclear Station Modification CN-I 1415/00, Addition of Vital Swing Inverters.

Nuclear Station Modification CN 11392/00, Abandon Positive Displacement Pump No. 1

Nuclear Station Modification CN-11413/00, De-energize the hydraulic solenoids on the Main

Feedwater Isolation Valves

Procedure OP/0/A/6400/006F Revision 36C "Nuclear Service Water System Flush Procedure,

Enclosure 4.22

Minor Modification CE-61594 (Revision I), Add Switches in Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinets to

Bypass P-12 Interlock in Mode 4 for Extended Cooldown on Condenser Steam Dump Valves

Nuclear Station Modification CN-21417/0, Rewire relay logic in CA System AFWP Turbine

Control Panel to fail to the Remote mode of control

SLC 16.7-13, Change to UFSAR Section 10.3.2 and 10.4.9.2 to address AFW Pump Turbine

Steam Supply Piping Heat Trace and Temperature Monitoring Instrumentation

3

Screened Out Safety Evaluations

CNCE 71765, Redesign support 1-C-WC-7070 so it will not wear the pipe surface due to

system vibration and movement. Redesign supports 1-R-CS-2024 and -2025 to eliminate

contact with WP pipe

CNCE 72911, Revise supports 1-R-SC-2047, 1-R-SP-2053, 1-R-SP-2054, and 1-R-SP-2055 to

add bolted splice plates

CNTM 00093, Install temporary pump in Aux. Bldg. at 577' elev. will be connected to take

suction from the RN nonessential header and connect to nearby fire protection piping at valve

1RFA056

CNCE 21410, Boric acid tank (BAT) transfer pumps mini-flow line installation & discharge line

reroute

CNCE 61688, Addition of drain connection to the 2A Safety Injection (NI) pump oil system

CNCE 70974, Install current limiting resistor in 1LCCP1

CNCE 72848, Add interposing relay to energize main contactor (M coil) for 1D SSF pressurizer

heater control circuit

CNCE 72137, Replace SMB-000-2, 3400 rpm motor in 2RN40B with available SMB-000-2,

1800 rpm motor

CNCE 71779, Remove MOV's 1/2 VY015B, 017A and 018B (containment isolation valves) from

the GL89-10 program

CNCE 62047, Revise valve arrangement to resolve issue of hydrogen bubbles interfering with

flow management

CNCE 61727, Replace Selected RL Isolation Valves

CNCE 72855, Revise valve outline drawing for item 02D-227 to allow tack welding the disc nut

pin and hinge pin following installation

CNCE 62108, Provide RN Pumps Driver Stand Drain Lines

CNCE 61710, Modify RN strainer DP Instrumentation

(Section 1R04.2: Equipment Alignment)

CN-2561-1.0, flow diagram of residual heat removal system (ND), A train

CN-2561-1.1, flow diagram of residual heat removal system (ND), B train

OP/2/A/6200/004M, Residual Heat Removal System Drain, Fill and Vent

OP/2/A/6200/004, Residual Heat Removal

PT/2/A/4200/006B, ECCS Valve Lineup Verification

PT/2/A/4200/006D, ECCS Throttle Valve Mechanical Stop Position Verification

PIP C-03-1334; 2B ND pump recirculation valve would not open when required

PIP C-03-1626; 2ND-32A stroke times from open to closed and back were not within allowable

tolerances

PIP C-04-0673; ND, NV, NI and KF pumps have small amounts of boron crystals on them

PIP C-04-1732; 2ND-7 shows locked closed on flow diagram and just closed in the system

procedures

Residual heat removal system health report for periods 2003T3 and 2004T1

PIPs/Work Requests generated as a result of this inspection:

PIP C-04-3568; Configuration management issues with absent pipe caps or, in some cases,

pipe caps installed where drawings to do not show them

WO 98318834 - Boron Residue on 2ND121

WO 98318835 - Boron Residue on 2ND122

WO 98318836 - Boron Residue on 2ND120

4

WO 98318837 - Boron Residue on 2ND124

(Section 1R05: Fire Protection)

Pre-Fire Plan for Area 19, Unit 2 switchgear, Room 563

Pre-Fire Plan for Area 40, Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater turbine driven pump pit, Room 254

Pre-Fire Plan for Area 48, Unit 2 interior doghouse

Pre-Fire Plan for Area 50, Unit 2 exterior doghouse

Pre-Fire Plan AW, Standby Shutdown Facility, 594 foot elevation

Pre-Fire Plan AX, Standby Shutdown Facility, 611 foot elevation

Pre-Fire Plan for Area 1; Auxiliary Building, 522 foot elevation

Pre-Fire Plan for Area 4; Auxiliary Building, 543' elevation

PIPs generated as a result of this inspection

PIP C-04-3809; Doghouse temperature sensors and alarms on Unit 1 do not exist on Unit 2

(Section 1R11.2: Licensed Operator Requalification-Program Review)

2003 Annual LOR Exam Assessment

Scenarios ASE-25, ASE-26, ASE-27

Reactivation Records: Appendix B.512

Badge Access Transaction Reports

Licensed Operator Medical Records

Remedial Training Records: One LOR0415DRO Exam failure remedial, One Scenario failure

remedial, and One JPM (Walk Through) failure remedial

Written Exams:LOR0415ERO, LOR0415DSO, LOR0415DRO

Simulator Fidelity Documents

Simulator Malfunction Periodic Test Procedures:

Transient # 5 Single NC Pump Trip Rev 01/02/03.

Transient # 7 Loss of All Feed Water Rev 01/02/03.

Transient # 9 Load Rejection Rev 01/02/03.

Transient # 13 Feed Water Line Break Rev 01/02/03.

Transient # 14 Loss of CF ATWS Rev 01/02/03.

Transient # 16 Hot Leg LOCA Rev 01/02/03.

Simulator Work Requests

DSG-040

CAS-027

CFW-094

CFW-091

(Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness)

PIP C-04-2955; White powdery substance removed from LCVU-2B

PIP C-04-2904, White powdery substance discovered on the floor of LCVU-2B

PIP C-04-1804; White substance (boron) found in Unit 1 LCVU

PIP C-04-0317; Boron deposits found inside of fan room during Unit 2 semi-annual PM

inspection

5

PIP C-03-3999; Boron deposits found on the floor of the Unit 2 B LCVU in front of the coil

PIP C-03-0364; Light dusting of what appears to be boron on the Unit 1 A LCVU floor and belts

WO 98666953; Inspection of LCVU-2D on July 12, 2004

PIP C-04-3514; 1B diesel generator lube oil temperature dropped below 140 degrees following

operability run

PIP C-04-3512; Work request written on 1B diesel generator lube oil temperature heater control

switch

WR 98319904; Troubleshoot 1B DG lube oil temperature switch

WO 98678837; Replace contacts for 1B DG lube oil heater controller

Catawba Tagout 04-01845, Diesel generator engine lube oil system

(Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation)

WO 98685878 Critical evolution plan for 1RN4B repair

Risk management assessment for 1RN4B removal and replacement plan

Critical maintenance plan for 1RN-4B alignment of operating RN train to lake

(Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations)

PIP C-04-02965; Ultrasonic testing data taken on the valve body of 2RN291 is less than the

minimum required thickness

PIP C-04-02668; Part 21 Notification received from Rotork Controls, Inc. on valve actuator

switch mechanisms

PIP C-04-02568; Part 21 Notification on Rotork valve actuator switch mechanisms

Certificate of Engineering Calculation, CNC-1205.19-00-0170; Operability Evaluation of Rotork

Part 21 for switch mechanisms

PIP C-04-03179; Boration flow from the standby makeup pump during a postulated SSF event

to account for xenon decay following a reactor trip

PIP C-04-4234; Stem leakage on valve 2NS-018A, NS pump A suction from ECCS containment

sump valve

PIP C-04-03420; A through wall leak has developed in the toe of circumferential weld 0RN57-8

PIP C-04-03409; The 2B DG did not stop as quickly as expected during shutdown following

the operability test on 7/13/04

PIP C-04-03396; 2ND-61 would not open while aligning for Auxiliary Safeguards testing

PIP C-04-2965; UT data taken on the valve body of 2RN291 is less than the minimum required

thickness

PIP C-04-03801, Evaluation of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report accident analysis

conclusions to determine if they remain bounding

PIP C-04-03849, WO 98685144-01 to place RPS channels in tripped condition was issued as

an E1 due to an unexpected response while performing TSM CNTM-0157

PIP C-04-04060, RN swapped to the SNSWP during TSM 158 work on WO 98686671

PIP C-04-4262, A through wall leak has been identified on the Unit 2 Boric Acid Tank #2 at a

Weld joint at the base of the tank

PIP C-04-03380, Fluctuations on Unit 2 FWST channel 3, level

(Section 1R16: Operator Workarounds)

PIP C-04-3496; 2NV172A is leaking by affecting background leakage measurements

Nuclear System Directive 506, Operator Workarounds

6

(1R17: Permanent Plant Modifications)

Procedures

NSD 209, 10CFR50.59 Process, Rev. 9

NSD 301, Nuclear Station Modifications, Rev. 12

PT/2/A/4200/011, Emergency Boration Flow Rate Verification, Rev. 9

PT/2/A/4200/005A, Safety Injection Pump 2A Performance Test, Rev. 33

OP/1/A/6350/008, 125VDC/120VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System, Rev. 49

OP/0/A/6400/006F, Nuclear Service Water System Flush Procedure, Rev. 36

Program and Self-Assessment Documents

2003 Engineering Functional Area Assessment SA-03-03

ML042890416

Text

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