ML042890416
ML042890416 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Catawba ![]() |
Issue date: | 10/15/2004 |
From: | Haag R NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
To: | Jamil D Duke Energy Corp |
References | |
IR-04-005 | |
Download: ML042890416 (29) | |
See also: IR 05000413/2004005
Text
October 15, 2004
Duke Energy Corporation
ATTN: Mr. D. M. Jamil
Site Vice President
Catawba Nuclear Station
4800 Concord Road
York, SC 29745
SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000413/2004005 AND 05000414/2004005
Dear Mr. Jamil:
On September 18, 2004, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report
documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on September 28, 2004, with you and
members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your
licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert Haag, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414
Enclosure: Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2004005 and 05000414/2004005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
DEC 2
cc w/encl:
Lee Keller (CNS) County Manager of York County, SC
Regulatory Compliance Manager Electronic Mail Distribution
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution Piedmont Municipal Power Agency
Electronic Mail Distribution
Lisa Vaughn
Legal Department (PB05E) R. L. Gill, Jr., Manager
Duke Energy Corporation Regulatory Issues & Affairs
422 South Church Street Duke Energy Corporation
P. O. Box 1244 526 S. Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28201-1244 Charlotte, NC 28201-0006
Anne Cottingham
Winston and Strawn
Electronic Mail Distribution
North Carolina MPA-1
Electronic Mail Distribution
Henry J. Porter, Assistant Director
Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health
and Environmental Control
Electronic Mail Distribution
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Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health and
Environmental Control
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Assistant Attorney General
S. C. Attorney General's Office
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Federal Emergency Management Agency
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DEC 3
Distribution w/encl:
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T. Sullivan, NRR
RIDSRIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS
SIGNATURE GXG ATS1 GXG for GTH1 GWL1 REC MXM3
NAME EGuthrie ASabisch MShannon GHopper GLaska RCortes MMaymi
DATE 10/15/2004 10/15/2004 10/15/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
PUBLIC YES NO
OFFICE RII:DRS
SIGNATURE REC1 for
NAME SVias
DATE 10/15/2004
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PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML042890416.wpd
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414
Report No: 05000413/2004005, 05000414/2004005
Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation
Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: 4800 Concord Road
York, SC 29745
Dates: June 20, 2004 - September 18, 2004
Inspectors: E. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Sabisch, Resident Inspector
M. Shannon, Senior Resident Inspector - Oconee
G. Hopper, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)
G. Laska, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)
R. Cortes, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)
M. Maymi, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)
S. Vias, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)
Approved by: R. Haag, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000413/2004005, IR 05000414/2004005; 6/20/2004 - 9/18/2004; Catawba Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2; Quarterly Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by two resident inspectors, one
operations engineer, one senior operations engineer, one visiting senior resident inspector, two
reactor inspectors, and one senior reactor inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None
B. Licensee-identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP). On
August 26, 2004, power was reduced to 40 percent to repair a leak in the 'B' low pressure
service water supply header and the 1A1 low pressure feedwater heater relief valve that lifted
spuriously and failed to reseat. The Unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on August 28, 2004,
and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On September 7, 2004, power was
gradually reduced in accordance with Reactor Engineering instructions as part of the reactor
coolant average temperature coastdown associated with the Unit 2 end-of-cycle (EOC) 13
refueling outage. The Unit was removed from service on September 11, 2004, for refueling and
maintenance activities.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Adverse Weather Condition
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed two separate reviews of the effectiveness of the licensees
severe weather protection program pertaining to the actual and projected adverse
weather conditions associated with the following two adverse weather conditions:
- Hurricane Charley during the period of August 13 - 14, 2004
- Hurricane Frances during the period of September 3 - 6, 2004
These reviews included field walkdowns to identify items that could become potential
missiles and the status of drainage measures in outside locations, including the areas
surrounding the main transformers, the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings, cooling
towers, and main switchyard. The inspectors discussed with licensed operators, the
specific measures to be taken during the periods when high winds and flooding were
experienced and conducted a walkdown of control room and in-plant equipment related
to protection from these conditions. The inspectors met with Emergency Planning
personnel to discuss activities taken to ensure the site was prepared for the expected
wind and rain conditions and reviewed the completed attachments to the station
Response Procedure to Severe Weather. Documents reviewed/generated during this
inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2
1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected samples of evaluations to confirm that the licensee
had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility or
procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The
inspectors reviewed evaluations for various design and procedure changes. The
inspectors reviewed additional information, such as calculations, supporting analyses
and drawings to determine if the licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes
could be accomplished without obtaining a license amendment. The eight evaluations
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
The inspectors also reviewed samples of design/engineering packages and procedure
changes for which the licensee had determined that evaluations were not required, to
verify that the licensees conclusions to screen out these changes were correct and
consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The fourteen screened out changes reviewed are listed
in the Attachment to this report.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program and self-assessments
of the 50.59 process to confirm that the licensee was identifying 10 CFR 50.59 issues,
entering issues into the corrective action program, and resolving concerns.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified the critical portions of equipment alignments for selected trains
that remained operable while the redundant trains were inoperable. The inspectors
reviewed plant documents to determine the correct system and power alignments, and
the required positions of select valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that the
licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could
cause initiating events or impact mitigating system availability. The inspectors verified
the following five partial system alignments and reviewed the associated listed
documents:
C Unit 1 / 2 B train of nuclear service water (RN) with the Unit 1 / 2 A train of RN
out of service for planned maintenance (Technical Specification Action Item Log
entry C0-0401648 and work orders (WOs) 98633007, 98614943, 986383006,
98650865 and 98668372)
C Unit 1 A control area chilled water (YC) chiller with the Unit 2 B YC chiller out
of service for cooler cleaning and inspection (WO 98688168 and
MP/0/A/7450/021, Cleaning condenser or cooling tubes for YC chiller)
3
C 1A containment spray (NS) with the 1B train of NS out of service for
maintenance and testing (PT/1/A/4400/006B, NS heat exchanger (HX) 1B heat
capacity test and PT/1/A/4200/004C, Pump Inservice Test (IWP) NS pump 1B)
C 2A diesel generator (DG) with the 2B DG out of service (WO 98677560, 2B
diesel generator slow to stop)
C 2B RN with the 2A RN train out of service for unplanned maintenance (WO 98659925, Replace Relays In 2EATC10 and WO 98678682, Perform Complete
Limitorque Preventive Maintenance and Motor Operated Valve Test)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted one detailed walkdown/review of the alignment and condition
of the Unit 2 residual heat removal (ND) system. The inspectors utilized licensee
procedures, as well as licensing and design documents to verify that the system
(i.e., pump, valve, and electrical) alignment was correct. During the walkdowns, the
inspectors also verified that: valves and pumps did not exhibit leakage that would impact
their function; major portions of the system and components were correctly labeled;
hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional; and essential support
systems were operational. In addition, pending design and equipment issues were
reviewed to determine if the identified deficiencies significantly impacted the systems
functions. Items included in this review were the operator workaround list, the
temporary modification list, system Health Reports, and outstanding maintenance work
requests/WOs. A review of open Problem Identification Process reports (PIPs) was also
performed to verify that the licensee had appropriately characterized and prioritized ND
related equipment problems for resolution in the corrective action program. Documents
reviewed/generated during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Fire Protection Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant to assess the licensees
control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and
suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The
inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to
determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the
4
operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of
the licensees safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment, based on sensitivity
studies for fire related core damage accident sequences, and summary statements
related to the licensees 1992 Initial Plant Examination for External Events submittal to
the NRC. Documents reviewed/generated during this inspection are listed in the
Attachment to this report. The inspectors toured the following eight areas important to
reactor safety:
- Unit 1, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit
- Unit 2, switchgear room, auxiliary building, 594 foot elevation
- Unit 2, interior doghouse
- Unit 2, exterior doghouse
- Unit 2, A ND pump room
- Unit 2, B ND pump room
- Unit 2, mechanical penetration room, auxiliary building, 543 foot elevation
- standby shutdown facility (SSF)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an inspection of the heat sink performance for the 1A diesel
generator jacket water cooler (KD) heat exchanger. The inspectors observed
PT/1/A/4400/006E, Diesel Generator Cooling KD HX 1A Heat Capacity Test, and
evaluated test data for acceptable performance. The inspectors also conducted
discussions with engineering personnel concerning system configuration and heat load
requirements, the methodology used in calculating heat exchanger performance, and
the method for tracking the status of tube plugging used in the computer calculation
program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
.1 Observed Simulator Session
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a simulator session conducted on July 7, 2004, to assess the
performance of licensed operators. The session utilized Task Requirement Guide OP-
CN-PTRQ-S-04, which included three scenarios involving a loss of residual heat
removal capabilities with the unit shutdown under various configurations and decay heat
loads. The inspection focused on high-risk operator actions performed during
implementation of the abnormal operating procedures, emergency plan implementation
5
and classification, and the incorporation of lessons learned from previous plant events
and simulator sessions. Through observations of the critique conducted by training
instructors following the exam session, the inspectors assessed whether appropriate
feedback was provided to the licensed operators regarding identified weaknesses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Program Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in
preparation for this inspection. During the week of August 30 - September 3, 2004, the
inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the
administration of operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification
program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the
effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in
10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to
determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines
established in NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power
Reactors, and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification
Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy
for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1998. The inspectors
observed four crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation
reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator
scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, licensed operator qualification records,
watchstanding and medical records, simulator modification request records and
performance test records, the feedback process, and remediation plans. The records
were inspected using the criteria listed in Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed
during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
Following the completion of the annual operating tests, which ended on September 3,
2004, the inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the biennial written
examination, the individual JPM operating tests, and the simulator operating tests
administered by the licensee during the operator licensing requalification cycle. These
results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 609, Appendix I,
Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees effectiveness in performing routine maintenance
activities. This review included an assessment of the licensees practices pertaining to
6
the identification, scope, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as
common cause failure evaluations and the resolution of historical equipment problems.
For those systems, structures, and components scoped in the maintenance rule per 10
CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability and unavailability were properly
monitored, and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications were justified in light
of the reviewed degraded equipment condition. The inspectors conducted this
inspection for the degraded equipment conditions associated with the two items listed
below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
C Monitoring of boron deposition in the Unit 2 lower containment ventilation unit
enclosures. It was subsequently determined that boron deposits in the
ventilation unit were not accumulating but remained at the same levels.
C Troubleshooting activities associated with 1B diesel generator lube oil heater
control circuit
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessments concerning the risk impact of
removing from service those components associated with the five emergent and
planned work items listed below. This review primarily focused on activities determined
to be risk significant within the maintenance rule. The inspectors also assessed the
adequacy of the licensees identification and resolution of problems associated with
maintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities. The inspectors reviewed
Nuclear System Directive 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), for
appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4).
- Unit 1 / 2 A RN train removed from service for planned maintenance activities
- Assessment of work week 31 planned maintenance and surveillance activities at
Catawba with Orange grid status due to Oconee station switchyard issues
- Assessment of work week 34 planned maintenance and surveillance activities at
Catawba with Orange grid status due to unexpected trip of Belews Creek Unit 1
- Repair activities associated with valve 1RN-004B (RN suction from the nuclear
service water pond pit) - (WO 98685878)
- 2B DG work - (WO 98677560, Inspect and Repair 2B Diesel Generator Slow to
Stop)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions
a. Inspection Scope
On September 10 and 11, 2004, the inspectors observed operator performance during
the shutdown of Unit 2 for the 2EOC-13 Refueling Outage. The inspectors observed
licensed operators use of procedures, control room pre-evolution briefings, and plant
equipment manipulations during the power reduction, manual reactor trip, and portions
of the subsequent plant cooldown.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations to verify that the operability of systems
important to safety were properly established, that the affected components or systems
remained capable of performing their intended safety function, and that no unrecognized
increase in plant or public risk occurred. Operability evaluations were reviewed for the
twelve issues listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this
report.
- Valve body on Unit 2 A component cooling water (KC) HX outlet throttle valve
2RN291 found to have three locations where wall thickness was below the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers code minimum required wall
thickness (PIP C-04-02965)
- 10 CFR Part 21 Notification pertaining to Rotork valve actuator switch
mechanisms (PIP C-04-02668)
- Required boration flow from the standby makeup pump to account for xenon
decay following a reactor trip during a postulated event requiring the use of the
SSF (PIP C-04-03179)
- Stem leakage on valve 2NS-018A, NS pump A suction from emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) containment sump valve (PIP C-04-4234)
- Unit 1 and 2 RN response to a low low B train RN pit level signal generated
during installation of temporary modification CNTM-0158 (PIP C-04-04060)
- Inactive through-wall leak on Unit 2 boric acid tank number 2 (PIP C-04-4262)
- Unit 1 main turbine valve movement test obtained unexpected response with
temporary station modification CNTM-0157 in place (PIP C-04-03849)
- Units 1 and 2 accident analysis when main steam isolation valve poppet valve
remains open after closure of MSIV (PIP C-04-03801)
- Unit 1 RN through-wall leak in circumferential weld 0RN57-8 (PIP C-04-03420)
- Valve 2ND-61 would not open when aligning the system for auxiliary safeguards
testing (PIP C-04-3396)
- Fluctuations on Unit 2 refueling water storage tank channel 3 level instrument
(PIP C-04-03380)
8
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following operator workaround. This
review assessed: (1) the impact on the reliability, availability and potential for mis-
operation of the identified system(s); (2) potential for increased initiating event
frequency; and (3) impact on the ability of the operator to respond in a correct and
timely manner to a plant transient and accident. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
- Manual reactor coolant system background leakage calculations required due to
internal leakage of 2NV172A, 3-way divert valve to the Volume Control
Tank/Recycle Holdup Tank
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated design change packages for 11 modifications, in two
cornerstone areas, to verify that the modifications did not affect system availability,
reliability, or functional capability. The inspectors reviewed inspection procedure
attributes, such as: energy requirements could be supplied by supporting systems;
materials and replacement components were compatible with physical interfaces;
replacement components were seismically qualified for application; Code and safety
classification of replacement system, structures, and components were consistent with
design bases; modification design assumptions were appropriate; post-modification
testing established operability; failure modes introduced by the modification were
bounded by existing analyses; and appropriate procedures or procedure changes had
been initiated. For selected modification packages, the inspectors verified that the
as-built configuration accurately reflected the design documentation.
Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modifications, work
orders, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), supporting analyses, Technical Specifications
(TSs), and design basis documentation. Applicable documents are listed in the report
attachment. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the licensees recent self-
assessments of the design change process.
9
The following plant modifications and associated attributes were reviewed:
C CNTM 0093 - Install temporary pump in Aux. Bldg. at 577' elev. that will be
connected to take suction from the RN nonessential header and connect to
nearby fire protection piping at valve 1RFA056 (Mitigating Systems):
- Electrical Energy Needs
- Seismic Consideration
- Appendix R Considerations
- Flowpaths
- Process Medium - fluid flowrates & pressures
C CNCE 21410 - Boric acid tank (BAT) transfer pumps mini-flow line installation &
discharge line reroute (Mitigating Systems):
- Seismic Consideration
- Functionality Properties
- Fluid Flowrates
- Licensing Basis & Testing Review
- Updating Review
C CNCE 61688 - Addition of drain connection to the 2A safety injection (NI) pump
oil system (Mitigating Systems):
- Testing Review
- Updating Review
- Functional Properties
- Licensing Basis
- Seismic Consideration
- PIP Review
C CNCE 72911 - Revise supports 1-R-SC-2047, 1-R-SP-2053, 1-R-SP-2054, and
1-R-SP-2055 to add bolted splice plates (Barrier Integrity):
- Seismic Consideration
- Structural Integrity Consideration
C CNCE 70974 - Install current limiting resistor in 1LCCP1 (Mitigating Systems):
- Electrical Energy Needs
- Functional Properties
- Currents
- Licensing basis
- Failure modes
C CNCE 72848 - Add interposing relay to energize main contractor (M coil) for 1D
SSF pressurizer heater control circuit (Mitigating Systems):
- Electrical Energy Needs
- Functional Properties
- Currents
- Licensing basis
- Testing documents
C CNCE 72137 - Replace SMB-000-2, 3400 rpm motor in valve 2RN40B with
available SMB-000-2, 1800 rpm motor (Mitigating Systems):
10
- Electrical Energy Needs
- Functional Properties
- Voltage
- Licensing basis
- Response time
C CNCE 71779 - Remove MOV's 1/2 VY015B, 017A and 018B (containment
isolation valves) from the GL89-10 program (Barrier Integrity):
- Engineering justification for removal
- Licensee Commitments
C CNCE 71765 - Redesign support 1-C-WC-7070 so it will not wear the pipe
surface due to system vibration and movement. Redesign supports
1-R-CS-2024 and -2025 to eliminate contact with WP pipe (Barrier Integrity):
- Seismic Consideration
- Structural Integrity Consideration
C CNCE 62047 - Revise valve arrangement to resolve issue of hydrogen bubbles
interfering with flow management (Barrier Integrity):
- Material Functional Properties
- Timing Sequence
- Control Signals
C CN 21417 - Rewire relay logic in the AFWP Turbine Control Panel to fail
(de-energize) to the Remote mode of control (Mitigating Systems):
- Electrical Energy Needs
- Control Signals Initiation and Control
- Operations
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed post-maintenance testing procedures and/or
test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk significant systems to verify whether:
(1) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (2) acceptance criteria were
clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and
licensing basis documents; (3) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and
accuracy consistent with the application; (4) tests were performed as written with
applicable prerequisites satisfied; and (5) equipment was returned to the status required
to perform its safety function. The five tests reviewed are listed below. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- IP/1/A/3222/076D, Calibration Procedure for Delta T/Tavg Protection Circuitry
(failure of the Unit 1 reactor coolant system (NC) loop D delta-temperature
transmitter)
11
- PT/1/A/4200/007C; Unit 1 Standby Makeup Pump Performance Test (performed
following preventive maintenance and inspection activities)
- PT/2/A/4350/002B, 2B Diesel Generator Operability Test (repair of shutdown
cylinder shuttle valve)
- IP/1/A/3222/078C, 1C Steam Generator Steam Line Pressure Protection
Channel 1 Loop Calibration (replacement of 7300 series protection cabinet card
C1-621)
- PT/0/A/4200/13, 1RN-004B Valve Performance Test (repair of valve due to
binding)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 outage activities to ensure that the licensee: considered
risk in developing outage schedules; adhered to administrative risk reduction
methodologies developed to control plant configuration; developed mitigation strategies
for losses of key safety functions; and adhered to operating license and TS
requirements that ensure defense-in-depth. The following specific areas were reviewed:
- Review of Outage Plan - Prior to the outage, the inspectors reviewed the
licensees outage risk control plan, attended risk briefings, and verified that the
licensee appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site
specific problems. The inspectors reviewed the licensees contingency actions
for losses of key safety functions, and verified that the licensee maintained key
safety function status and controls throughout the portion of the outage in this
inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 outage risk assessment
CN-04-049, 2EOC-13-IRT Pre-Outage Review Shutdown Risk Assessment.
- Outage Configuration Management - The inspectors assessed the licensees
management of configuration control and the risk associated with outage
activities by reviewing the licensees implementation of Site Directive 3.1.30, Unit
Shutdown Configuration Control (Modes 4, 5, 6 or No Mode), and NSD 403,
Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6 or No Mode) against the
requirements of 10CFR50.65(a)(4). This assessment included verification that
the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk
control plan for key safety functions and applicable TS when risk significant
equipment was removed from service. The inspectors also assessed whether
configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected conditions were
controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan, and if control room
operators were cognizant of plant configuration.
- Monitoring of Shutdown Activities - The inspectors reviewed NSD 304, Reactivity
Management, and the implementation of OP/2/A/6100/003, Controlling
Procedure for Unit Operations, and OP/2/A/6100/002, Controlling Procedure For
Unit Shutdown, through control room observations during unit shutdown.
12
PT/2/A/4600/017, Surveillance Requirements For Unit 2 Shutdown, was
reviewed to ensure cool down rates while cooling down the reactor coolant
system were in accordance with TS 3.4.3, Reactor Coolant System Pressure and
Temperature Limits. Plant Engineering Procedure 2.5, Operational Guidance for
the Unit 2 EOC Shutdown was reviewed and its implementation observed during
the power reduction and reactor shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the
following documents and their implementation:
- OP/2/B/6300/001, Turbine-Generator; Enclosure 4.4, Turbine Generator
Shutdown
- IP/2/A/3240/011, Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Calibration
at Power
- Electrical Power - The inspectors reviewed the status and configurations of
electrical systems for compliance with TS requirements and the licensees
outage risk control plan. The inspectors verified that switchyard activities were
controlled commensurate with safety and were consistent with the licensees
outage risk control plan. The inspectors reviewed Site Directive 3.1.30, Unit
Shutdown, and CN-04-049, 2EOC-13-IRT Pre-Outage Review Shutdown Risk
Assessment.
- Reactivity Control - The inspectors reviewed reactivity control to verify that
proper control was maintained in accordance with the TS and Site Directive
3.1.30, Unit Shutdown Configuration Control (Modes 4,5,6 or No Mode), and
NSD 403, Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6 or No Mode). Potential
reactivity changes were identified in the outage risk plan, CN-04-049, 2EOC-13-
IRT Pre-Outage Review Shutdown Risk Assessment, and were reviewed to
verify proper controls.
- Containment Closure - The inspectors verified that the licensee controlled
containment penetrations in accordance with the refueling operations TS, and
that containment closure could be achieved when needed. The inspectors
reviewed the following documents and their implementation:
- PT/2/A/4200/002C, Containment Closure Verification (Part I)
- PT/2/A/4200/002I, Containment Closure Verification (Part II)
- PT/2/A/4200/002J, Containment Closure Verification Penetration Status
Change
- OP/0/A/6100/014, Penetration Control for Modes 5 and 6
- Refueling Activities - The inspectors reviewed fuel handling operations to verify
they were performed in accordance with fuel handling procedures. Specifically,
the inspectors observed new fuel receipt inspection, verified the positions of
randomly selected new fuel assemblies, and verified that these assemblies were
tracked and placed in the correct position and orientation during movement from
the new fuel vault area into the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also observed
the coordination and movement of several fuel assemblies from the reactor
vessel to the spent fuel pool during core offload. The inspectors reviewed the
following documents and their implementation:
13
-
-
- MP/0/B/7150/012, Refueling Canal Cleanliness
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the surveillance tests listed below to verify
that TS surveillance requirements and/or Selected Licensee Commitment requirements
were properly complied with, and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified.
The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the
procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance
criteria had been met. Additionally, the inspectors also verified that equipment was
properly returned to service and that proper testing was specified and conducted to
ensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function following
maintenance or as part of surveillance testing. Additional documents reviewed during
this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. The following four activities
were reviewed:
In-Service Test:
- PT/1/A/4200/021A, 1KC-C37A, Train A Miniflow Valve Inservice Test
Surveillance Tests:
- PT/1/A/4400/003A, Unit 1 A1 KC pump performance test
- IP/1/A/3222/000H, Unit 1 Fueling Water Storage Tank Channel 3 Operability
Test
- IP/1/A/3222/078C, 1C Steam Generator Steam Line Pressure, Protection
Channel 1, Loop 1SMPT5140 (PT-534) Calibration
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
14
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four selected temporary station modifications to determine
whether: the modification was properly installed; the modification did not affect system
operability, drawings and procedures were appropriately updated; and post-modification
testing was satisfactorily performed. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment
to this report. The following four temporary station modifications were reviewed:
- Unit 1 stop valve number 2 fast acting solenoid
- Removal of test switch from Solid State Protection System circuitry
- Nuclear Service Water Pond pit level instrumentation
- 1RN-004B Removal and Repair
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed
below for the period from June 2003 through May 2004. To verify the accuracy of the PI
data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.
- Auxiliary Feedwater System Safety System Unavailability, Unit 1
- Auxiliary Feedwater System Safety System Unavailability, Unit 2
The inspectors reviewed a selection of Licensee Event Reports, portions of Unit 1 and
Unit 2 operator log entries, PIP descriptions, monthly operating reports, and PI data
sheets to verify that the licensee had adequately identified the number of unavailability
hours and safety system functional failures. These numbers were compared to the
numbers reported for the PIs.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
15
.2 Barrier Integrity Cornerstone
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the PI listed below for the period from
June 2003 through May 2004. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that
period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for
each data element.
- Reactor Coolant System Identified Leakage, Unit 1
- Reactor Coolant System Identified Leakage, Unit 2
The inspectors reviewed a selection of Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries compiled
from the reactor coolant leakage calculation performed on a daily basis. The inspectors
verified that the reported reactor coolant leakage performance indicator data was
conservative and accurate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Daily Screening of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing
copies of PIPs, attending some daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensees
computerized database.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected two PIP documents for detailed review. PIP C-03-6458
identified an adverse trend associated with foreign material exclusion. The second PIP,
C-03-6007, involved a seal failure on the 1A ND pump. Both documents involved root
cause investigations that were reviewed to ensure that the full extent of the issues were
identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions
were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the PIP documents against the
requirements of the licensees corrective action program, Nuclear System Directive 208,
Problem Investigation Process, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
16
4OA5 Other Activities
(Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/152, Inspection of Reactor Pressure Vessel
Lower Head Penetration Nozzles
The inspectors verified that qualified and knowledgeable licensee individuals performed
the inspection of the Unit 2 lower vessel head penetration nozzles. These individuals
were qualified VT-2 Level II examiners. The inspectors verified that the inspection was
performed in accordance with the licensees approved procedure. This procedure was
written to be able to identify, disposition, and resolve deficiencies and any pressure
boundary leakage. The inspection of the vessel penetrations was performed by 360
degree visual inspection with the appropriate lighting and mirrors. The inspection did
not identify any deficiencies or pressure boundary leakage. There were slight boric
acid deposits at the interface of the vessel and nozzle penetrations at six (6)
penetrations. In addition, there was some surface streaming boric acid residue on the
reactor vessel outer surface. Samples were taken from all six penetrations with
surrounding boric acid deposits, as well as some of the surface residue, and analyzed
by the licensee to confirm the origination of the boric acid. The licensee analysis
followed the Electric Power Research Institute boric acid aging recommendations and
compared the ratio of cobalt 58 and cobalt 60. The analysis indicated that the boric acid
deposits and residue were the result of previous reactor cavity seal leakage. The
inspectors independent review of the lower vessel head penetrations and licensee
documentation of surface samples found no evidence of material deficiencies. The
inspectors verified through a review of the 2EOC-13 refueling outage schedule that
washing of the bottom head area and documentation of the as-left condition will be
completed prior to the Unit 2 restart. Bare metal examinations have been performed
for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 lower vessels and penetration nozzles and the inspections
associated with this TI have been completed. Documents reviewed during this
inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On September 28, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to
Mr. D. Jamil, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management, who
acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was
not provided or examined during the inspection.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
K. Adams, Human Performance Manager
E. Beadle, Emergency Planning Manager
W. Byers, Security Manager
T. Daniels, Emergency Planning/Fire Protection
B. Dolan, Engineering Manager
J. Foster, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Glover, Station Manager
W. Green, Reactor and Electrical Systems Manager
G. Hamilton, Operations Training Manager
G. Hamrick, Mechanical, Civil Engineering Manager
P. Ivey, Human Resources Manager
D. Jamil, Catawba Site Vice President
L. Keller, Regulatory Compliance Manager
R. Kimray, LOR Training Supervisor
A. Lindsay, Training Manager
P. McIntyre, Acting Safety Assurance Manager
M. Patrick, Work Control Superintendent
J. Pitesa, Operations Superintendent
F. Smith, Chemistry Manager
G. Strickland, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
J. Thrasher, Modifications Manager
C. Trezise, Maintenance Superintendent
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None
Previous Items Closed
2515/152 TI Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower
Head Penetration Nozzles - Units 1
and 2 (Section 40A5)
Items Discussed
None
Attachment
2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
(Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection)
RP/0/B/5000/030, Severe Weather Preparations (Procedure and completed attachments)
PIP C-04-3918; During performance of RP/0/B/5000/030, all four turbine building ground water
drainage sump pumps (two per unit) were found with overload circuits tripped.
Operator Aid Computer points:
C1A0017; Lower wind speed (mph)
C1A1040; Lower wind direction (degrees)
C1A1034; Upper wind speed (mph)
C1A0022; Upper wind direction (degrees)
C2A1380; Lower wind speed (mph)
C2A1386; Lower wind direction (degrees)
C2A1368; Upper wind speed (mph)
C2A1374; Upper wind direction (degrees)
Duke Energy Weather Server updates and reports (August 12 - 14, 2004)
Duke Energy Weather Server updates and reports (September 3 - 6, 2004)
PIPs generated as a result of this inspection
PIP C-04-4028; Review of procedure and actions taken during the implementation of
RP/0/B/5000/030, Severe Weather Preparations
PIP C-04-4245; Large amount of standing water noted near the north end of the Unit 2 turbine
building indicating the storm drain basin was not functioning properly
PIP C-04-4326; Temporary power cables laying in yard with bare conductors exposed and no
markings to say they are de-energized
PIP C-04-4327; RP/30, Severe Weather Preparations, needs criteria to define potential hazards
in severe weather and what actions are required
(Section 1R02: Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments)
10CFR50.59 Evaluations
SLC 16.9-7 & 16.9-9, Boration Systems Flow Paths Shutdown
Nuclear Station Modification CN-I 1415/00, Addition of Vital Swing Inverters.
Nuclear Station Modification CN 11392/00, Abandon Positive Displacement Pump No. 1
Nuclear Station Modification CN-11413/00, De-energize the hydraulic solenoids on the Main
Feedwater Isolation Valves
Procedure OP/0/A/6400/006F Revision 36C "Nuclear Service Water System Flush Procedure,
Enclosure 4.22
Minor Modification CE-61594 (Revision I), Add Switches in Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinets to
Bypass P-12 Interlock in Mode 4 for Extended Cooldown on Condenser Steam Dump Valves
Nuclear Station Modification CN-21417/0, Rewire relay logic in CA System AFWP Turbine
Control Panel to fail to the Remote mode of control
SLC 16.7-13, Change to UFSAR Section 10.3.2 and 10.4.9.2 to address AFW Pump Turbine
Steam Supply Piping Heat Trace and Temperature Monitoring Instrumentation
3
Screened Out Safety Evaluations
CNCE 71765, Redesign support 1-C-WC-7070 so it will not wear the pipe surface due to
system vibration and movement. Redesign supports 1-R-CS-2024 and -2025 to eliminate
contact with WP pipe
CNCE 72911, Revise supports 1-R-SC-2047, 1-R-SP-2053, 1-R-SP-2054, and 1-R-SP-2055 to
add bolted splice plates
CNTM 00093, Install temporary pump in Aux. Bldg. at 577' elev. will be connected to take
suction from the RN nonessential header and connect to nearby fire protection piping at valve
1RFA056
CNCE 21410, Boric acid tank (BAT) transfer pumps mini-flow line installation & discharge line
reroute
CNCE 61688, Addition of drain connection to the 2A Safety Injection (NI) pump oil system
CNCE 70974, Install current limiting resistor in 1LCCP1
CNCE 72848, Add interposing relay to energize main contactor (M coil) for 1D SSF pressurizer
heater control circuit
CNCE 72137, Replace SMB-000-2, 3400 rpm motor in 2RN40B with available SMB-000-2,
1800 rpm motor
CNCE 71779, Remove MOV's 1/2 VY015B, 017A and 018B (containment isolation valves) from
the GL89-10 program
CNCE 62047, Revise valve arrangement to resolve issue of hydrogen bubbles interfering with
flow management
CNCE 61727, Replace Selected RL Isolation Valves
CNCE 72855, Revise valve outline drawing for item 02D-227 to allow tack welding the disc nut
pin and hinge pin following installation
CNCE 62108, Provide RN Pumps Driver Stand Drain Lines
CNCE 61710, Modify RN strainer DP Instrumentation
(Section 1R04.2: Equipment Alignment)
CN-2561-1.0, flow diagram of residual heat removal system (ND), A train
CN-2561-1.1, flow diagram of residual heat removal system (ND), B train
OP/2/A/6200/004M, Residual Heat Removal System Drain, Fill and Vent
OP/2/A/6200/004, Residual Heat Removal
PT/2/A/4200/006B, ECCS Valve Lineup Verification
PT/2/A/4200/006D, ECCS Throttle Valve Mechanical Stop Position Verification
PIP C-03-1334; 2B ND pump recirculation valve would not open when required
PIP C-03-1626; 2ND-32A stroke times from open to closed and back were not within allowable
tolerances
PIP C-04-0673; ND, NV, NI and KF pumps have small amounts of boron crystals on them
PIP C-04-1732; 2ND-7 shows locked closed on flow diagram and just closed in the system
procedures
Residual heat removal system health report for periods 2003T3 and 2004T1
PIPs/Work Requests generated as a result of this inspection:
PIP C-04-3568; Configuration management issues with absent pipe caps or, in some cases,
pipe caps installed where drawings to do not show them
WO 98318834 - Boron Residue on 2ND121
WO 98318835 - Boron Residue on 2ND122
WO 98318836 - Boron Residue on 2ND120
4
WO 98318837 - Boron Residue on 2ND124
(Section 1R05: Fire Protection)
Pre-Fire Plan for Area 19, Unit 2 switchgear, Room 563
Pre-Fire Plan for Area 40, Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater turbine driven pump pit, Room 254
Pre-Fire Plan for Area 48, Unit 2 interior doghouse
Pre-Fire Plan for Area 50, Unit 2 exterior doghouse
Pre-Fire Plan AW, Standby Shutdown Facility, 594 foot elevation
Pre-Fire Plan AX, Standby Shutdown Facility, 611 foot elevation
Pre-Fire Plan for Area 1; Auxiliary Building, 522 foot elevation
Pre-Fire Plan for Area 4; Auxiliary Building, 543' elevation
PIPs generated as a result of this inspection
PIP C-04-3809; Doghouse temperature sensors and alarms on Unit 1 do not exist on Unit 2
(Section 1R11.2: Licensed Operator Requalification-Program Review)
2003 Annual LOR Exam Assessment
Scenarios ASE-25, ASE-26, ASE-27
Reactivation Records: Appendix B.512
Badge Access Transaction Reports
Licensed Operator Medical Records
Remedial Training Records: One LOR0415DRO Exam failure remedial, One Scenario failure
remedial, and One JPM (Walk Through) failure remedial
Written Exams:LOR0415ERO, LOR0415DSO, LOR0415DRO
Simulator Fidelity Documents
Simulator Malfunction Periodic Test Procedures:
Transient # 5 Single NC Pump Trip Rev 01/02/03.
Transient # 7 Loss of All Feed Water Rev 01/02/03.
Transient # 9 Load Rejection Rev 01/02/03.
Transient # 13 Feed Water Line Break Rev 01/02/03.
Transient # 14 Loss of CF ATWS Rev 01/02/03.
Transient # 16 Hot Leg LOCA Rev 01/02/03.
Simulator Work Requests
DSG-040
CAS-027
CFW-094
CFW-091
(Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness)
PIP C-04-2955; White powdery substance removed from LCVU-2B
PIP C-04-2904, White powdery substance discovered on the floor of LCVU-2B
PIP C-04-1804; White substance (boron) found in Unit 1 LCVU
PIP C-04-0317; Boron deposits found inside of fan room during Unit 2 semi-annual PM
inspection
5
PIP C-03-3999; Boron deposits found on the floor of the Unit 2 B LCVU in front of the coil
PIP C-03-0364; Light dusting of what appears to be boron on the Unit 1 A LCVU floor and belts
WO 98666953; Inspection of LCVU-2D on July 12, 2004
PIP C-04-3514; 1B diesel generator lube oil temperature dropped below 140 degrees following
operability run
PIP C-04-3512; Work request written on 1B diesel generator lube oil temperature heater control
switch
WR 98319904; Troubleshoot 1B DG lube oil temperature switch
WO 98678837; Replace contacts for 1B DG lube oil heater controller
Catawba Tagout 04-01845, Diesel generator engine lube oil system
(Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation)
WO 98685878 Critical evolution plan for 1RN4B repair
Risk management assessment for 1RN4B removal and replacement plan
Critical maintenance plan for 1RN-4B alignment of operating RN train to lake
(Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations)
PIP C-04-02965; Ultrasonic testing data taken on the valve body of 2RN291 is less than the
minimum required thickness
PIP C-04-02668; Part 21 Notification received from Rotork Controls, Inc. on valve actuator
switch mechanisms
PIP C-04-02568; Part 21 Notification on Rotork valve actuator switch mechanisms
Certificate of Engineering Calculation, CNC-1205.19-00-0170; Operability Evaluation of Rotork
Part 21 for switch mechanisms
PIP C-04-03179; Boration flow from the standby makeup pump during a postulated SSF event
to account for xenon decay following a reactor trip
PIP C-04-4234; Stem leakage on valve 2NS-018A, NS pump A suction from ECCS containment
sump valve
PIP C-04-03420; A through wall leak has developed in the toe of circumferential weld 0RN57-8
PIP C-04-03409; The 2B DG did not stop as quickly as expected during shutdown following
the operability test on 7/13/04
PIP C-04-03396; 2ND-61 would not open while aligning for Auxiliary Safeguards testing
PIP C-04-2965; UT data taken on the valve body of 2RN291 is less than the minimum required
thickness
PIP C-04-03801, Evaluation of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report accident analysis
conclusions to determine if they remain bounding
PIP C-04-03849, WO 98685144-01 to place RPS channels in tripped condition was issued as
an E1 due to an unexpected response while performing TSM CNTM-0157
PIP C-04-04060, RN swapped to the SNSWP during TSM 158 work on WO 98686671
PIP C-04-4262, A through wall leak has been identified on the Unit 2 Boric Acid Tank #2 at a
Weld joint at the base of the tank
PIP C-04-03380, Fluctuations on Unit 2 FWST channel 3, level
(Section 1R16: Operator Workarounds)
PIP C-04-3496; 2NV172A is leaking by affecting background leakage measurements
Nuclear System Directive 506, Operator Workarounds
6
(1R17: Permanent Plant Modifications)
Procedures
NSD 209, 10CFR50.59 Process, Rev. 9
NSD 301, Nuclear Station Modifications, Rev. 12
PT/2/A/4200/011, Emergency Boration Flow Rate Verification, Rev. 9
PT/2/A/4200/005A, Safety Injection Pump 2A Performance Test, Rev. 33
OP/1/A/6350/008, 125VDC/120VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System, Rev. 49
OP/0/A/6400/006F, Nuclear Service Water System Flush Procedure, Rev. 36
Program and Self-Assessment Documents
2003 Engineering Functional Area Assessment SA-03-03
Other Documents
2003 10CFR50.59 Report, April 5, 2004
2002 10CFR50.59 Report, April 1, 2003
CN-1705-01.01, One line diagram 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System
(EPL)
CN-1705-01.02, One line diagram 120VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System
(EPG)
GL89-10 Motor Operated List Rev. 4
(Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing)
PIP C-04-03128, Inspect and repair 1NC5540, Unit 1NC loop delta-temperature transmitter
PIP C-04-03129, Unexpected entry into Tech Specs due to 1NCP5540 failing low
Work Order 98674800; Inspect and repair 1NC5540, Unit 1 NC loop delta-temperature
transmitter
IP/1/A/3222/076D, Calibration procedure for Delta T/T-AVG protection circuitry
OP/1/A/6200/001, Placing the standby makeup pump in recirculation
PT/2/A/4350/002B, Diesel Generator 2B operability Test
MOV traces for 1RN1A, 1RN2B, 1RN4B, 1RN5A, and 1RN6B
WO98630889-01, 1NM424, I/R check valve would not pass flow
WO98583581-11, 1NM003A, Evaluate new stroke time
WO98579538, PT/1/A/4200/25, Inservice test for valve 1NM006A
WO98579532, 1NM007B, perform comprehensive limitorque preventive maintenance
(Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing)
PT/1/A/4400/003A; Component Cooling (KC) Train A1 Performance Test
Written Pre-Job Brief for KC pump IWP
PT/1/A/4200/021A, KC Valve Inservice Testing (Quarterly), Enclosure 13.17, 1KC-C37A, Train
A miniflow valve
Written Pre-Job Brief for 1KC-C37A IWV
WO98676954-01, Perform channel operations test for FWST level
WO98674552-01, Calibrate steam pressure loop C Channel 1
(Section 1R23: Temporary Plant Modifications)
PT/1/A/4250/002B, Main Turbine Stop Valve Movement Test
Risk Assessment for I/R test switch S828 in 3ESFA
7
CNTM - 154, Open sliding link T-45 in 2DATC7 to remove test switch S828 from circuit
CNTM - 158, Increase the LO setpoints for RN pump train B intake instruments
CNTM - 159, 1RN-4B; remove 48" BF valve and actuator for repair
PIP C-04-04056, RN swapped to the SNSWP during TSM 158 work on WO 98686671
PIP C-04-04057, An inadvertent pod swap signal was received when a fuse was blown during
work for TSM to change B RN pit pond swap setpoints
(Section 4OA5: Other Activities)
MP/0/A/7150/042E; Reactor Vessel Bottom Head Visual Penetration Inspection
CNM-2201.01-0074-002; Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Penetration Coordinates and
Elevation
Selected Licensee Committment 16.5-8; Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Inspection
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
BAT - Boric Acid Tank
CFR - Code of Federal Regulations
CNS - Catawba Nuclear Station
DG - Diesel Generator
ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System
EOC - End-of-Cycle
FWST - Refueling Water Storage Tank
HX - Heat Exchanger
IRT - Independent Review Team
IWP - Pump Inservice Test
IWV - Valve Inservice Test
JPM - Job Performance Measures
KC - Component Cooling Water
KD - Diesel Generator Cooling
KF - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
NEI - Nuclear Energy Institute
NI - Safety Injection
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR - Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NS - Containment Spray
NSD - Nuclear Site Directive
NV - Chemical and Volume Control
OP - Operating Procedure
PI - Performance Indicator
PIP - Problem Investigation Process (report)
PT - Periodic Test
RN - Nuclear Service Water
RP - Response Procedure
RTP - Rated Thermal Power
SDP - Significance Determination Process
SNSWP - Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond
8
SSF - Standby Shutdown Facility
TS - Technical Specification
TSM - Temporary Station Modification
WO - Work Order
YC - Control Area Chilled Water