Text

Fax from Kim Locke, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, to Ken O'Brien, USNRC, of Historical Versions of Safety Analysis Report Section Associated with the Auxiliary Feedwater System
	ML030870866
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	11/19/2002
From:	Locke K; Nuclear Management Co
To:	O'Brien K; NRC/RGN-III
References
	FOIA/PA-2003-0094
	Download: ML030870866 (65)
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POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241 PHONE: (920) FAX: (920)

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PBF-0090

Either a high generator level or a safety injection signal will close the feedwater bypass valves.

Manual control is provided for each feedwater controller. This unit consistil 0i" of an auto/manual transfer switch and an analog output control which serves as the valve position signal when in "Manual." The "Automatic" set point is a variable set-point programmed as a function of load but adjustable in the instrument rack.

Other manual control stations are used to position auxiliary feedwater valves.

Auxiliary Feedwater System The Auxiliary Feedwater System supplies high pressure feedwater to the steam generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of heat energy from the Reactor Coolant System by secondary side steam release in the event of inoperability of the main feedwater system. The head generated by the pumps is sufficient to deliver feedwater into the steam generators at safety valve pressure. Redundant supplies are provided by using two pumping systems, using different sources of power for the pumps.

The capacity of each system is set so that the steam generators will not boil dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through the pressurizer relief valve, following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump, with the steam capable of being supplied from either or both steam generators. This system supplies 400 gpm of feedwater or 200 gpm to each steam generator. The drive is a single stage turbine, capable of quick starts from cold standby and is directly connected to the pump. The turbine is started by opening either one or both of the isolation valves between the turbine supply steam header and the main steam lines. The turbine bearings are ring lubricated.

The pump uses ring lubricated, water jacketed, ball bearings.

10.2-11 July 24, 1970

The other system is common to both units and utilizes two similar motor each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the driven pumps, This sy;tem h.i:, a total capacity or 400 plant emergency diese.l generators.

gpm and feedwater can be supplied to either or bntiL units.

(:Ins. I ond is designed to ensure that The Auxiliary Feedwater System is a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

for this system is redundant. The main source is The water supply source by gravity feed from the condensate storage tanks while the backup supply pumps are supplied from is taken from the. plant Service Water System whose the diesel generators if station power is lost.

of any The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of the following signals:

Steam driven feedwaLer pump.

both steam generators in one unit starts the

1) Low-low water level in corresponding pump.

one unit starts

2) Loss of both 4 kv buses supplying the pump motors in the corresponding pump.

Motor driven feedwater pumps.

I) Low-low water level in any steam generator.

2) Trip of both main feedwater pumps in one unit.

3) Safeguards Sequence Signal.

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Auxiliary Feedwater System The auxiliary feedwater system supplies high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of heat energy from the reactor coolant system by secondary side steam release in the event of inoperability of the main feedwater system. The head generated by the pumps is- sufficient to deliver feedwater into the steam generators at safety valve pressure. Redundant supplies are pro vided by using two pumping systems, using different sources of power for the pumps.

The capacity of each system is set so that the steam generators will not boil dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through the pressurizer relief valve, following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump, with the steam capable of being supplied from either or both steam generators. This s.ýtem supplies 400 gpm of feedwater or 200 gpm to each steam generator. The drive is a single-stage turbine, capable of quick starts from cold standby and is directly connected to the pump. The turbine is started by opening either one or both of the isolation valves between the turbine supply steam header and the main steam lines. The turbine bearings are ring lubricated. The pump uses ring lubricated, water jacketed ball bearings.

The other system is common to both units and utilizes two similar motor driven pumps, each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the plant emergency diesel gener,-tors. This sytem has a total capacity of 400 gpm and feedwater can be supplied to either or both units.

The auxiliary feedwater system is Class I and is designed to ensure that a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

The water supply source for this system is redundant. The main source is by gravity feed from the condensate storage tanks while the backup supply is taken from the plant service water system whose pumps are powered from the diesel generators if station power is lost.

10.2-12

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The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Steam-driven feedwater pump

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4 kv buses sz!pplying the pump motors in one unit starts.

the corresponding pump.

-Motor-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in any steam generator.

2. Trip of both main feedwater pumps in one unit.

3. Safeguards sequence signal.

Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each steam generator is provided in the control room. Flow indication is also available locally at the discharge of each pump.

4 Circulatinp Water System.

.... 1$0 The circulating water intake system, common to both units,- is designed to' provide a reliable surply of Lake Michigan water, regardless of weather of lake conditions, to the suction of four circulating water pumps, six" service water pumps and two fire water pumps. The pumphouse is Class I.

The intake structure is located 1750 ft. from the shore in a water depth of 22 ft. The structure consists of two annular rings of 12 in. struc tural steel H pile driven to a minimum depth of 23 ft. below lake bed and [Si reinforced with walers fabricated from 12 in. structural steel H pile.

The annulus is filled with individually placed limestone blocks having 4i two approximately parallel surfaces and weighing between 3 and 12 tons.

Concrete pipes in the lower walls of the intake crib prevent ice block 10.2-13 I'Y

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The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Steam-driven feedwater pump

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4 kv buses supplying the main feedwater pump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater pump.

Motor-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in any steam generator starts its corresponding motor-driven pump.

2. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps in one unit.

3. Safeguards sequence signal.

Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each steam generator is provided in the control room. Flow indication is also available locally at the discharge of each pump.

Circulating Water System The circulating water intake system, ccmmon to both units, is designed to provide a reliable supply of Lake Michigan water, regardless of weather or lake conditions, to the suction of four circulating water pumps, six service water pumps and two fire water pumps. The pumphouse is Class I.

The intake structure is located 1750 ft. from the shore in a water depth of 22 ft. The structure consists of two annular rings of 12 in. struc tural steel H pile driven to a minimum depth of 23 ft. below lake bed and reinforced with walers fabricated from 12 in. structural steel H pile.

The annulus is filled with individually placed limestone blocks having tUo approximately parallel surfaces and weighing between 3 and 12 tons.

L*(ie concrele pipes in the lower walls of the south half of the intake Revision I June 1983 10.2-13

The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Steam-driven feedwater pump

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4 kv buses supplying the'main feedwater. pump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater.pump.

Motor-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in any steam generator.l

2. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps in one unit.

3. Safeguards sequence signal.

S The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge motor operated valves (MOV) are configured to operate automatically, based upon the same signals that start the motor-driven pumps. This ensures automatic delivery of auxiliary feedwater flow to an affected unit's steam generators without operator action.

Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each steam generator is provided in the control room. Flow indication is also availablc locally at the discharge of each pump.

Circulating Water System The circulating water intake system, common to both units, is designed to provide a reliable supply of Lake Michigan water, regardless of weather or lake conditions, to the suction of four circulating water pumps, six service water pumps and twn fire water pumps. The pumphouse is Class I.

The intake structure is located 1750 ft. from the shore in a water depth

) of 22 ft. The structure consists of two annular rings of 12 in. struc tural steel H pile driven to a mirnimum depth of 23 ft. below lake bed and reinforced with walers fabricated from 12 in. structural steel H pile.

Revision 2 10.2-13 Ju:,e 1985

In anticipation of a loss of the condensate storage tank water supply,"each auxiliary feedwater pump is configured.'toa*uitoiaftically trip'n a"low suction pressure to preven~t :possibl. .pump mage-A: inual ,overri'de capability exists so that the motor driven;p um .eakers.,can be-. reshut and/or the turbine driven pump 'steam supply, motor operated"valves can be .

reopened which will restart thepumps, so that any remaini§ Pdterjrom the condensate storage tanks orthe backupserce water gesupply.

cantberusedh The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically, started:on.'receipt.of an' of the following si.nals;.-.. . - .. .*

Steam-driven feedwater .pump,*., ..

1. Low-low waterglevel in both steam generators in- one- unit starts the corresponding pump. . - ;.

2. Loss of both 4 kv buses supplying the main feedwaterpump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary-feedwater' pump.

Motor-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in any steam generator.

2. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps in one unit.

3. Safeguards sequence signal.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge motor operated valves (MOV) are configured to operate automatically, based upon the same signals that start the motor-driven pumps. This ensures automatic delivery of auxiliary feedwater flow to an affected unit's steam generators without operator action.

- Auxiliary feedwater pump flow arid direct flow indication for each steam gcueritor is provided in the control room. Flow indication is also

,ivailable locally at the discharge of each pump.

Revision 3 10.2-13 June 1986

AUYILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Figure 10.2-5 Revision 3 June 1986

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the Either a high generator level or a safety injection signal will close feedwater bypass valves.

unit consists Manual control is provided for each feedwater controller. This serves as of an auto/manual transfer switch and an analog output control which is a the valves position signal when in "Manual." The "Automatic" setpoint in the variable setpoint programmed as a function of load but adjustable instrument rack.

valves.

Other manual control stations are used to position auxiliary feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater System to the steam The auxiliary feedwater system supplies high-pressure feedwater heat energy generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of in the event from the reactor coolant system by secondary side steam release by the of inoperability of the main feedwater system. The head generated at safety pumps is sufficient to deliver feedwater into the steam generators pumping systems, valve pressure. Redundant supplies are provided by using two using different sources of power for the pumps.

will not.boil The capacity of each system is set so that the steam generators relief dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through the pressurizer valve, following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

capable ol One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump, with the steam supplies being supplied from either or both steam generators. This system drive is a 400 gpm of feedwater or 200 gpm to each steam generator. The and is single-stage turbine, capable of quick starts from cold standby either one directly connected to the pump. The turbine is started'by opening steam header and or both of the isolation valves between the turbine supply The pump the main steam lines. The turbine bearings are ring lubricated.

uses ring lubricated, water jacketed ball bearings.

motor-driven The other system is common to both units and utilizes two similar plant emergency "pumps, each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the 10.2-11 June ]

diesel generators. This sytem has a total capacity of 400 gpm and feedwater can be supplied to either or both units.

The auxiliary feedwater system is Class I and is designed to ensure that a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

The water supply source for this system is redundant. The main source is by gravity feed from the condensate storage tanks while the backup supply is I

I taken from the plant service water system whose pumps are powered from the diesel generators if station power is lost.

In anticipation of a loss of the condensate storage tank water supply, each auxiliary feedwater pump is configured to automatically trip on a low suction pressure to prevent possible pump damage. A manual override capability exists so that the motor driven pump breake7S can be reshut and/or the turbine driven pump steam supply motor operated valves can be reopened which will restart the pumps so that any remaining water from the condensate storage tanks or the backup service water supply can be used.

The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Steam-driven feedwater pump

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4 kv buses supplying the main feedwater pump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater pump.

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PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page 10.2-1L 10.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AF)

One turbine (per unit) and two electric-driven (shared by the two units) auxiliary feedwater pumps are provided to ensure that adequate feedwater is supplied to the steam generators fo, heat removal under all circums!ances, including loss of power and normal heat sink. Feedwate flow can be maintained until power is restored or reactor decay heat removal can be accomplished by other systems. The auxitiary feedwater system is designed as a Class I system.

A backup supply of auxiliary, feedwater can be provided from the Class I portion of the service water system by positioning remotely-operated valves from the control room. See Figurel0.2-1.

10.2.1 DESIGN BASIS The auxii.ary feedwater system is designed to supply high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of heat energy from the reactor coolant system by secondary side steam release in the event of inoperability or unavailability of the main feedwater system. The system is capable of delivering feedwater into the steam generators of a unit at a flowrate of at least 200 gpm at the pressure of the lowest safety valve (1085 psig) within 60 sec:,rids of initiation.Redundant supplies are provided by two pumping systems using different sources of power ior the pumps. The design capacity of each system is set so that the steam generators will not boil dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through thc pressurizer relief valves, following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

The AF system performs the following safety-related functions:

The AF system shall automatically start and deliver adequate AF system flow to maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents v..nich may result in main steam safety valve opening. Such accidents include: LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER (LONF) and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES (LOAC) events. LONF and LOAC ore time-sensitive to AF system start-up (References I and 2).

The AF system shall auTcmaticaliy start and deliver sufficient AF system flow to maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents which require rapid reactor coolant system

oodown to achieve Ihe cold shutdown condition within the limits of the analysis. Such c.'ccdenls include. SIEA.M GENERATOR 1UcE RUPTURE (SGTR) and MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSL3.

'References 1 and 2).

I PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater PagePag lO0.-2

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The AF system shall be capable of isolating the AF steam and feedwater supply lines from the. L ruptured steam generator following a SGTR event (Reference 2).

The AF system also performs the following functions related to regulato.y commitments:

In the event of a station blackout (prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power) affecting.

both units, the AF system shall be capable of automatically supplying sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat from both units without any reliance on AC power for one hour (References 3 and 4). I _'_

In the event of plant fires, including those requiring evacuation of the control room, the AF system shall be capable of manual initiation to provide feedwater to a minimum of one steam generator per unit at sufficient flow and pressure to remove decay and sensible heat from the reactor coolant system over the range from hot shutdown to cold shutdown conditions. The AF system shall support achieving cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (Refe*rences 5, 6, and 7).

10.2.2 SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATION The auxiliary feedwater system consists of two electric motor-driven pumps, two steam tuirbine driven pumps, pump suction and discharge piping, and the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the system. Redundancy is provided by utilizing two pumping systems, two different sources of power for the pumps, and two sources of water supply to the pumps. The system is categorized as seismic Class I and is designed to ensure that a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump for each unit (I1/2P-29}wiith the steam capable of being supplied frorn-either or both steam generators. This system is capable of supplying 400 gpm of feedwoter to a unit, or 200 gpm to each steam generator throughormally throttled MOVs AF-4000 and AF-4001. The feedwater flowrate from the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump depends on the throttle position of these MOVs. Check valves are provided to help prevent backflow when the pumps are not in service. Each pump has an AOV (AF 4002) controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks to ensure minimum Hlow to dissipate pump heat. The pump drive is a single-stage turbine, capable of quick starts from cold standby und is directly connected to the pump. The turbine is started by opening either .3ne or both of the isolation valves (MS-2019 and MS-2020) between the turbine supply steam header and the main steam lines upstream of the main sieam isolation valves. The

PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page 10.2-3 PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page 10.2-3 turbine bearing oil is normally cooled by service water with an alternate source of cooling water from the firewater system.

The other system is common to both units and utilizes two similar motor-driven pumps (P-38A and P-38B). each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the plant emergency diesel generators. Each pump has a capacity of 200 gpm with pump P-38A capable of supplying the A steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4012 and normally closed MOVs, AF-4022 and AF-4023, and with pump P-38B capable of supplying the B steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF 4019 and normally closed MOVs AF-4020 and AF-4021. Both back-pressure cor.*rol valves fail open when instrument air to the valves is lost. The valves are provided with a backup nitrogen supply to provide pneumatic pressure in the event of a loss of instrument air. This backup suppi assures that the valves do not move to the full open position which combined with low steam generator pressures may cause the pump motor to trip on time overcurrent due to high flow conditions. Each pump has an AOV, AF-4007 for P-38A and AF-401 4 for P-38B, controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks to ensure minimum flow to dissipate pump heat. The discharge headers also provide piping, valves, and tanks for chemical additions to any steam generator. The pump bearings are ring lubricated and bearing oil is cooled by service water.

The vatir supply source for the auxiliary feedwater system is redundant. The normal source is by gravity feed from two nominal capacity 45,000 gallon condensate storage tanks while the safety-related supply is taken from the plant service water system whose pumps a'e powered from the diesel generators if station power is lost.

It is possible that a loss of normal feedwcter initiated by a seismic event could also result in the interruption of the normol source of auxiliary feedwater from the condensate storage tanks because the condensate storage tanks are not classified as seismic Class 1. The plant operators would be alerted to this problem by receipt of low suction pressure alarms on the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Pump protection is ensured by providing a low suction pressure trip. This trips the motor-driven pump breakersond the turbine-driven pump trip/throttle valves to ensure It-at the pumps are available, after a loss of condensate suction, to be switched to the safety related water supply. Switchover to the alternate source of seismicall)' qualified auxiliary feedwater, the service water system, can be accomplished by the operators in five minutes or less.

PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page 10.2-4 *4;i-J The auxiliary feedwater system has no functional requirements during normal, at power, plant operation. It is used during plant startup and shutdown and during hot shutdown or hot standby conditions when chemical additions or sma.l feedwater flow requirements do not' warrant the operation of the main feedwater and condensate systems.

During normal plant operations, the auxiliary feedwater s,, -tem is maintained in a standby.

condition ready to be placed in operation automatically when conditions require. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of an / of the following signals:

Turbine-driven feedwater oumps

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4.16 kv buses supplying the main feedwater pump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater pump.

"3. Trip or st.utdown of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit starts the correspor.ding pump. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

Motor-driven feedwater pumps I. Low-low water level in either associated steam generator.

2. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

3. Safeguards sequence signal.

The Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuit (AMSAC) is furtherj discussed in Appendix A.3.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge motor operated valves ore configured to open automatically, based upon the same signals that start the motor-driven pumps. This ensures automatic delivery of auxiliary feedwater flow to on offected unit's steam generators wilhout operator action. Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each

-,team generator is provided ;n the control room. Flow indication is also available locally at the discharge of each pump.

PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page.O12-5Y.,,

10.2.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION ... ,-.'* ..

In the event of complete loss of offsite electrical power to the station, decay heat remova.

would continue to be assured for each unit by the availability of either the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and discharge to the atmosphere via the main steam safety valves or atmospheric relief valves.

One motor-driven pump is capable of supplying sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from a unit. In this case, feedwater is ava;lable from the condensate storage tanks by-.

gravity feed to the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks (13.000 gallons per operating unit) ensures the ability to maintain each unit in a hot shutdown condition for at least one hour. When the water in the condensate storage tanks is depleted, suction for the pumps can be shifted to the service water system via remotely operated MOVs from the control room to provide makeup water from the lake for an indefinite time period.

During a Station Blackout (SBO) event, only the turbine-driven pumps would be available for decay heat removal. The turbine-driven pumps are capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators without an AC power source. The steam supply and auxiliary feedwater discharge valves are powered from diverse sources of vital 125V DC. Cooling water for the pump and turbine bearings can be supplied from the diesel driven firewater pump. The Technical Specification minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks, 13.000 gallons per operating unit, provides adequate makeup to tha steam generators to maintain each unit in a hot shutdown condition for at least one hour. Further information on the SBO event is provided in Appendix A.1.

In order to meet the design basis, the limiting accident analysis of LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER and LOSS OF ALL AC-PD-WER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES. assume that the auxiliary feedwater system provides 200 gpm per unit at 1085 psig within 60 seconcds.

These minimum parameters are met or exceeded by system des:gn and verified by required testing. The three other accident analysis which assume auxiliary feedwater initiation for mitigalion are LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD, RUFTURE OF A STEAM PIPE, and STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE . For these accidents minimum auxiliary feedwater assumptions cre not specified and in the later, auxiliary feedwoter isolation to the affected steam generator is assumed. Although Ihe auxiliary feedwater system may be initiated during a SMALL BREAK LOCA, the event has been analyzed with no credit for afixiliar'i feedwater.

PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwaler Page 10.2-6 .

PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page 10.2-6 Based on the operating characteristics of the minimum recirculation flow control scheme, a portion of each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump's discharge flow will be automatically recirculated to the condensate storage lank for approximately forty-five seconds after the" pump starts. The forty-five second time delay in closing the mini-flow recirculation control valves is incorporated in the design to provide for pump cooling during coastdown.

During a postulated failure of the control systems for the AOVs jAF-4007 or AF-4014) that control recirculation flow for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, it is assumed that they fail in a non-conservative manner. i.e. full open. In this case, with t he pump supplying 200 gpm approximately 89 gpm is diverted back to ihe condensate storage tank and in exces of 100 gpm is supplied to the steam generator. Assuming the most limiting safety grade failure of one of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, the remaining turbine-driven pump and the two motor-driven pumps would be capable of supplying greater than the design basis 200 gpm per unit within 60 seconds.

A failure analysis has been made and the results for the auxiliary feedwater pumps show that the failure or malfunction of any single active component will not prevent the system from performing its emergency function. Results are presented below.

Malfunction Comments and Consequences One AFW pump fails to Four AFW pumps provided; each steam-driven pump start (following loss of is dedicated to one unit and each motor-driven pump main feedwater) is shared between units. Any three of the four AFW pumps provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat from both units.

Two AFW pumps fail to Each AFW pump is provided with low suction pressure stop (trip) when required protection following a seismic event. Evaluations for a and subsequently rur,. ino se;smic-induced LONF event show that any two AFW failure (following a seismic pumps provide the required feedwater flow to induced loss of main remove sufficient decay heat from both units.

feedwater event) 10.2.4 REQUIRED PROCEDURES AND TEST i

The AF system components are tested and inspected in accordance with Technical Specification surveillance cr,;eria and frequencies. Testing verifies motor-driven pump operability turbine-driven puma operability including a cold start, and operability of all

PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page 102 required MOVs. Control circuits, starting logic, and indicators are verified operable bytheir.

respective functional test.

10.2.5 CORRESPONDENCE/COMMITMENTS

1. 10CFR5O.48, Fire Protection. The AFW System is required to remove decay heat in the.

event of a fire. ..

2. 10CFR.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety f'-j Nuclear Power Plants. Some AFW System electrical equipment is required to be environmentally qualified.

3. .10CFR50.55a, Codes and Standards. The inservice inspection of the AFW System is governed by this regulation.

4. 10CFR50.63, Loss of all Alternating Current Power. The AFW System must be capable of providing feedwater to the steam generators in the event of the loss of all AC power (Station Blackout).

5. IOCFR50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants. The safety-related portions of the AFW System are governed by this regulation because the AFW System is required to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents.

6. 10UFR, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1 1976, Section Ill.L, Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability.

The AFW System is required to remove decay heat in the event of a fire.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, dated December 1980 with Errata through July 981, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Coo!ed Nuc;ear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident. These requirements are applicable to AFW System instrumentation used to monitor AFW flow and Condensate Storage Tank level.

8. NUREG-0578, Lessons Learned Task Force: Status Report and Short Term Recommendations. These requirements are applicable to AFW System upgrades to improve reliability as a result of TM!-2 lessons.

9. NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMi Ac- on Plan Requirements. These requirements are applicable to AFW System upgrad- i to improve reliability as a resul 'f TMI-2 lessons.

10. Generic Letter No. 81-14, Seismic C. clification of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. This generic letter cddresses concerns --_-garding the seismic qualification of AFW Systems.

11. Generic Letter No. 81-21, Natural C -culation Cooldown. This generic letter addresses thE requirement that sufficient condensate grade AFW be available to perform a natural circulation cooldown.

PBNP FSAR (6/98) Auxiliary Feedwater Page 10.2-8

12. Generic Letter No. 88-03, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 93, Steam Bindinq of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. This generic letter addresses the affects of steam binding on the AFW System operability. This issue should be considered as the system is modified.

13. Generic Leiter No. 89-10, Safety-Related Motor Operated Valve Testing a nd Surveillance with Supplements 1. 2, and 3. This generic letter addresses the operability of safety-related motor-operated valves under design basis conditions and requests that licensees establish programs to ensure operability.

14. IE Bulletin No. 80-04, Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition. This bulletin addresses the affects of feedwater being added to a depressurized steam generator after a steam line break.

15. IE Bulletin No. 85-01, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. This bulletin addresses the steam binding of AFW pumps due to backleakage of feedwater through check valves. WE committed to check the AFW System piping temperature once per shift.

16. IE Bulletin No. 85-03, Motor-Operaled Valve Switch Settinas. This bulletin addresses the operability of motor-operated valves with improper switch settings.

10.

2.6 REFERENCES

1. WE letter to NRC, "AFW Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication", dated 9/16/81.

2. FSAR, Chapter 14.

3. IOCFR50.63

4. NRC lettlr to WE, "SER on Station Blackout", dated 10/3/90.

5. U( "FR50.48

6. I OCFR50 Appendix R.

7. PBNP Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER).

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PBNP FSAR (6/99) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-1 10.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AF)

One turbine (per unit) and two electric-driven (shared by the two units) auxiliary feedwater pumps are provided to ensure that adequate feedwater is supplied to the steam generators for heat removal under all circumstances, including loss of power and normal heat sink. Feedwater fow can be maintained until power isrestored or reactor decay heat removal can be accomplished by other systems. The auxiliary feedwater system is designed as a Class I system.

A backup supply of auxiliary feedwater can be provided from the Class I portion of the service water system by positioning remotely-operated valves from the control room. See Figurel0.2-i.

10.2.1 DESIGN BASIS The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to supply high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of heat energy from the reactor coolant system by secondary side steam release in the event of inoperability or unavailablity of the main feedwater system. In order to meet the design bask required in the Loss of Normal Feedwater/Loss of All AC analysis, one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump provides 200 gpm of flow to one steam generator within 5 minutes following receipt of a low-low steam generator waler level setpoint signal. Redundant supplies are provided by two pumping systems using different sources of power for the pumps. The design capacity of each system isset so that the steam generators will not boil dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through the pressurizer relief valves, following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

The AF system performs the following safety-related functions:

The AF system shall automatically start and deliver adequate AF system flow to maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents which may result in main steom safety valve opening. Such accidents include; LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER (LONF) and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES (LOAC) events. LONF and LOAC are time-sensilive to AF system start-up (References I and 2).

The AF system shall automafcaly start and deliver sufficient AF system flow 1o maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents which require rap~d reactor coolant system cooldown to achieve the cold shutdown condition within the limits of the analyzis. Such

PBNP FSAIR (6199) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-2 accidents include; STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (SGTR) and MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSLB)

(References 1 and 2).

The AF system shall be capable of isolating the AF steam and feedwater supply lines from the ruptured steam generator following a SGTR event (Reference 2).

The AF system also performs the following functions related to regulatory commitments:

In the event of a station blackout 'prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power) affecting both units. the AF system shall be capable of automatically supplying sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat from both units without any reliance on AC power for one hour (References 3 and 4).

In the event of plant fires, including those requiring evacuation of the control room, the AF system shall be capable of manual initiation to provide feedwater to a minimum of one steam generator per unit at sufficient flow and pressure to remove decay and sensible heat from the reactor coo!ant system over the range from hot shutdown to cold shutdown conditions. The AF system shall support achieving cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (References 5,6, and 7).

10.2.2 SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATION The auxiliary feedwater system consists of two eleciric motor-driven pumps, two steam turbine driven pumps, pump suction and discharge piping, and the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the system. Redundancy is provided by utilizing two pumping systems, two different sources of power for the pumps, and two sources of water supply to the pumps. The system is categorized as seismic C!ass I and is designed to ensure that a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump for each unit (1/2P-29)with the steam capable of being supplied from either or both steam generators. Tnis system is capable of supplying 400 gpm of feedwaler to a unit, or 200 gpm to each steam generator through normally throttled MOVs AF-4000 and AF-.401. The fecdwater flowrate from the turbine-driven auxi!ia.'y feedwaler pump depends on the ihrottl*e position of these MOVs. Check valves are provided to help prevent backflow when the pumps are not in service. Each pump has an AOV (AF-4002) conirolled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tantzs to ensure minimum flow to dissipate pump heal. The pump drive is a single-stage turbine, caoable of quick starts from

PBNP FSAR (6/99) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-3.

cold standby and is directly connected to the pump. The turbine is soarted by opening either one or both of the isolation valves (MS-2019 and MS-2020) between the. turbine supply steam header and the main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The turbine bearing oil is normally cooled by service water with an alternate source of cooling water from the firewater system.

The other system is common to both units and utilizes two sirmilar motor-driven pumps (P-38A and P-38B), each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the plant emergency diesel generators. Each pump has a capacity of 200 gpm with pump P-38A capable of supplying the A steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4012 and normally closed MOVs, AF-4022 and AF-4023, and with pump P-38B capable of supplying the B steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF 4019 and normally closed MOVs AF-4020 and AF-4021. Both back-pressure control valves fail open when instrument air to the valves is lost. The valves are provided with a backup nitrogen supply to provide pneumatic pressure in the event of a loss of instrument air. This backup supply assures that the valves do not move to the full open position which combined with low steam generator pressures may cause the pump motor to trip on time overcurrent due to high flow conditions. Each pump has an AOV, AF-4007 for P-38A and AF-4014 for P-381, controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks to ensure minimum flow to dissipate pump heat. The discharge headers also provide piping, valves, and tanks for chemical additions to any steam generator. The pump bearings are ring lubricated and bearing oil is cooled by service water.

The water supply source for the auxiliary feedwater system is redundant. The normal source is by gravity feed from two nominal capacity 45,000 gallon condensate storage tanks while the safety-related supply is taken from the plant service water system whose pumps are powered from the diesel generators if station power is lost.

It is possible that a loss of normal feedwater initiated by a seismic event could also result in the interruption of the normal source of auxiliary feedwater from the condensate storage tanks because the condensate storage tanks are not classified as seismic Class I. The plant operators would be alerted to this problem by receipt of low suction pressure alarms on the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Pump proteclion is ensured by providing a low suction pressure trip. This trips the motor-driven pump breakers and the turbine-driven pump trip/throttle valves to ensure that the pumps are available, after a loss of condensate suction, to be switched to the safety related water supply. Switchover to the alternate source of seismically qualified auxiliary

PBNP FSAR (6/99) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 102-4" Ž feedwater, the service water system, can be accomplished by the operators in five minutes or less.

The auxiliary feedwater system has no functional requirements during normal, at power, plant operation. It is used during plant startup and shutdown and during hot shutdown or hot standby conditions when chemical additions or small feedwater flow requirements do not warrant the operation of !he main feedwater and condensate systems.

During normal plant operations, 'he auxiliary feedwater system is maintained in a standby condition ready to be placed in operation automatically when conditions require. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Turbne-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4.16 kv buses supplying the main feedwater pump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater pump.

3. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps or c!osu;e of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit starts the corresponding pump. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

Motor-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in either associated steam generator.

2. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 407%o.

3. Safeguards sequence signal.

The Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuit (AMSAC) is further discussed in FSAR Section 7.4.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge motor operated valves are configured 1o open automatically, based upon the same signals that start the motor-driven pumps. This ensures automatic delivery of auxiliary feedwater flow to an affected unit's steam generators without operator action. Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each

g Page 10.2-5 steam generator is provided in the control room. Flow indication is also available locally at the discharge of each pump.

10.2.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION In the event of complete loss of offsite electrical power to the station, decay heat removal would continue to be assured for each unit by the availability of either the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and discharge to the atmosphere via the main steam safety valves or atmospheric relief valves.

One motor-driven pump is capable of supplying sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat fcom a unit. In this case, feedwater is available from the condensate storage tanks by gravity feed to the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks (13,000 gallons per operating unit) ensures the ability to maintain each unit in a hot shutdown condition for at least one hour. When the water in the condensate storage tanks is depleted, suction for the pumps can be shifted to the service water system via remotely operated MOVs from the control room to provide makeup water from the lake for an indefinite time period.

During a Station Blackout (SBO) event, only the turbine-driven pumps would be available for decay heat removal. The turbine-driven pumps are capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators without an AC power source. The steam supply and auxiliary feedwater discharge valves are powered from diverse sources of vital 125V DC. Cooling water for the pump and turbine bearings can be supplied from the diesel driven firewater pump. The Technical Specification minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks, 13,000 gallons per operating unit, provides adequate makeup to the steam generators to maintain each unit in a hoi shutdown condition for at least one hour. Further information on the SBO event is provided in Appendix A.].

In order to meet the design basis, the limiting accident analysis of LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES, assumes that one motor driven auxiliary feedv'ater pump provides 200 gpm of flow to one steam generator within 5 minutes following receipt of a low-low steam generator water level setpoint signal.

These minimum parameters are met or exceeded by system design and verified by required testing. The three other accident analysis which assume auxiliary feedwater initiation for mitigation are LOSS CF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD, RUPTURE OF A STEAM PIPE, and STEAM

PBNP FSAR (6/99) Auxiliary Feedwater System fAF) Page 100-6 GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE. For these accidents minimum auxiliary feedwater assumptions are not specified and in the latter, auxiliary feedwater isolation to the affected steam generator Is-i**

assumed. Although the auxiliary feedwater system may be initiated during a SMALL BREAK LOCA, the event has been analyzed with no credit for auxiliary feedwater.

Based on the operating characteristics of the minimum recirculation flow control scheme, a portion of each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump's discharge flow will be automatihalli recirculated to the condensate storage tank for approximately forty-five seconds after the pump starts. The forty-five second time delay in closing the rmini-flow recirculation control valves is incorporated in the design to provide for pump cooling during coastdown.

During a postulated failure of the control systems for the AOVs (AF-4007 or AF-4014) that control recirculation flow for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, it is assumed that they fll In a non-conservative manner, i.e. full open. In this case, with the pump supplying 200 gpm approximately 89 gpm is diverted back to the condensate storage tank and in excess of 100 gpm is supplied to the steam generator.

A failure analysis has been made and the results for the auxiliary feedwater pumps show that the failure or malfunction of any single active component will not prevent the system from performing its emergency function. Results are presented below.

Malfunction Comments and Consequences One AFW pump fails to Four AFW pumps provided; each steam-driven pump start (following loss of is dedicated to one unit and each motor-driven pump main feedwater) is shared between units. Any three of the four AFW pumps provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat from both units.

Two AFW pumps fail to Each AFW pump is provided with low suction pressure stop (trip) when required protection following a seismic event. Evaluations for a and subsequently run to seismic-inducea LONF event show that any two AFW failure (following a seismic- pumps provide the required feedwater flow to induced loss of main remove sufficient decay heat from both units.

feedwater event) 10.2.4 REQUIRED PROCEDURES AND TEST The AF system components are tested and inspected in accordance with Technical Specification surveillance criteria and frequencies. Testing verifies motor-driven pump operability, turbine-driven pump operability includinq a cold start, and operability of all

PBNP FSAR (6199) " Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Pagqe 10.2-7 required MOVs. Control circuits, starting logic, and indicators are verified operable by their respective functional test.

10.2.5 CORRESPONDENCE/COMMITMENTS

1. 10CFR50.48, Fire Protection, The AFW System is required to remove decay heat in the event of a fire.

2. 10CFR.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Impoortant to Safely for Nuclear Power Plants. Some AFW System electrical equipment is required to be environmentally qualified.

3. 10CFR50.55a, Codes and Standards. The inservice inspection of the AFW System is governed by this regulation.

4. 10CFR50.63, Loss of all Alternating Current Power. The AFW System must be capable of providing feedwater to the steam generators in the event of the loss of all AC power (Station Blackout).

5. 10CFR50, App2endix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants. The safety-related portions of the AFW System are governed by this regulation because the AFW System is required to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents.

6. 10CFR, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operatinq Prior to January 1, 1976, Section 1111., Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capabililv.

The AFW System is required to remove decay heat in the event of a fire.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, dated December 1980 with Errata through July 1981, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident. These requirements are applicable to AFW System instrumentation used to monitor AFW flow and Condensate Storage Tank level.

8. NUREG-0578, Lessons Learned Task Force: Status Report and Short Term Recommendations. These requirements are applicable to AFW System upgrades to improve reliability as a result of TMI-2 lessons.

9. NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. These requirements are applicable to AFW System upgrades to improve reliab;lity as a result of TMI-2 lessons.

10. Generic Letter No. 81-14, Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. This generic letter addresses concerns regarding the seismic qualification of AFW Systems.

11. Generic Letter No. 81-21, Natural Circulation Cooldown. This generic le!ter addresses the requirement that sufficient condensate grade AFW be available to perform a natural circulation cooldown.

. " PBNP FSAR (6/99) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-.8

12. Generic Letter No. 88-03 Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 93, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. This generic letter addresses the affects of steam binding on the AFW System operability. This issue should be considered as the system is modified.

i3. Generic Letter No. 89-10, Safety-Related Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance with Supplements 1,2, and 3. This generic letter addresses the operability of safety-related motor-operated valves under design basis conditions and requests that licensees establish programs to ensure operability.

14. IE Bulletin No. 80-04, Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition. This bulletin addresses the affects of feedwater being added to a depressurized steam generator after a steam line break.

15. IE Bulletin No. 85-01, Steam Binding of Auxiliar' Feedwater Pumps. This bulletin addresses the steam binding of AFW pumps due to backleakage of feedwater through check valves. WE committed io check the AFW System piping temperature once per shift.

16. IE Bulletin No. 85-03, Motor-Operated Valve Switch Settings. This bulletin addresses the operabil ty of motor-operated valves with improper switch settings.

10.

2.6 REFERENCES

1. WE letter to NRC, "AFW Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication", dated 9/16/81.

2. FSAR, Chapter 14.

3. 10CFR50.63

4. NRC letter to WE, "SER on Station Blackout", dated 10/3/90.

5. 10CFR50.48

6. 10CFR50 Appendix R.

7. PBNP Fire Protection Evoluotion Report (FPERj.

PBNP FSAR (6100) Auxiliary Feedwater Systent (AF) Page 10.2-1 of 8 10.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AF)

One turbine (per unit) and two electric-driven (shared by the two units) auxiliary feedwater pumps are provided to ensure that adequate feedwater is supplied to the steam generators for heat removal under all circ'umstances, including !oss of power and normal heat sink.

Feedwater flow can be maintained until power is restored or reactor decay heat removal can be accomplished by other systems. The auxiliary feedv,,ater system is designed as a Class I system. A backup supply of auxiliary feedwater can be provided from the Class I portion of the service water system by positioning remotely-operated valves from the control room. See Figure 10.2-1.

10.2.1 DESIGN BASIS The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to supply high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of heat energy from the reactor coolant system by secondary side steam release in the event of inoperability or unavailability of the main feedwater system. In order to meet the design basis required in the Loss of Normal Feedwater/Loss of All AC analysis, one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump provides 200 gpm of flow to one steiam generator within 5 minutes following receipt of a low-low steam generator water level setpoint signal. Redundant supplies are provided by two pumping systems using different sources of power for the pumps. The design capacity of each system is set so that the steam generators will not boil dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through the pressurizer relief valves. following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

The AF system performs the following safety-related functions:

The AF system shall automatically start and deliver adequate AF system flow to maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents which may result in main steam safety valve opening. Such accidents include; LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER (LONF),

FSAR Chapter 14.1.10, and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES (LOAC). FSAR Chapter 14.1.11, events. LONF and LOAC are time-sensitive to AF system start-up.

The AF system shall automatically start and deliver sufficient AF system flow to maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents which require rapid reactor coolant system cooldown to achieve the cold shutdown condition within the limits of the analysis. Such include; STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (SGTR). FSAR Chapter 14.2.4, Saccidents and MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSLB). FSAR Chapter 14.2.5.

The AF system shall be capable of isolating the AF stcam and feedwater supply lines from tlhe ruptured steam generator followiing a SGTR event.

The AF system also pcrforms the fbllowing linctions related to regulatory commitments:

In the event ofa station blackout (prolonged loss ofo'fsite and onsite AC power) affecting both units, the AF system shall be capable of automatically" supplying sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat from both units without any reliance on AC power for one hour (Rel'ereice 1).

PBNP FSAR (6100) Auxiliar,, Feedwvater System (AF) Paste 10.2-2 of 8 6t In the event of plant fires, including those requiring evacuation of the control room, the AF system shall be capable ofmai'ual ipitiation to provide feedwater to a minimum of one steam generator per unit at sufficient flow and pressure to remove decay and sensible heat from the reactor coo!ant system over the range from hot shutdown to co!d shutdown conditions. The AF system shall support achieving cold shutdowvn within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (Reference 2).

10.2.2 SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATION The auxiliary feedwater system consists of two electric motor-driven pumps, two steam turbine driven pumps, pump suction and discharge piping, and the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the system. Redundancy is provided by utilizing two pumping systems, two different sources of power for the pr'nps, and two sources of water supply to the pumps. The system is categorized as seibiiic Class I and is designed to ensure that a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump for each unit (l/2P-29)with the steam capable of being supplied from either or both steam generators. This system is capable of supplying 400 gpm of feedwater to a unit, or 200 gpm to each steam generator thrcugh normally throttled MOVs AF-4000 and AF-4001. The feedwater flow-rate from the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump depends on the throttle position of these MOVb. Check valves are provided to help prevent backfiow when the pumps are not in service. Each pump has an AOV (AF-4002) controlled recirculation lir, back to the condensate storage tanks to ensure minimum flow to dissipate pump heat. The pump drive is a single-stage turbine, capable of quick starts from cold standby and is directly connected to the pump. The turbine is started by opening either one or both of the isolation valves (MS-2019 and NIS-2020) between the turbine supply steam header and the main steam lines upstream of tle main steam isolation valves. The turbine and pump are normally cooled by service water with an alternate source of cooling water from the firewater system.

The other system is common to both units and utilizes two si:-:,'ar motor-driven pumps (P-38A and P-38B), each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the plant cnrteigcncy diesel generators. Each pump has a capacity of 200 gpm with pump P-38A capable of supplying the A steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4012 and normally closed MOVs. AF-4022 and AF-4023, and with pump P-38B capable of supplying the B steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4019 and normally closed MOVs AF-4020 and AF-4021. Both back-pressure control valves fail open when instrument air to the valves is lost. The valves are provided with a backup nitrogen supply to provide pneumatic pressure in the event of a loss of instrument air.

This backup supply assures that the valves do not move to the full open position which combined with low steam generator pressures may cause the pump motor to trip on time oxercurrent duc tc, high flov, conditions. :.ach pump has an AOV. A[-4007 for P-38A and AF-4 9 14 for l -3.B. controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storasze ta:nks to ensure iminimum flow to prcvent hx draulic instabilities tand dissipate pump heat. The discharge headers also provide piping. '.alves, and tatnks for chemical additions to any steam generator.

"1lie pump bearings are ring lubricated and bearing oil is coo!ed by serx ice %\ater.

PBNP FSAR (6/00) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-3 of 8 The water supply source for the auxiliary feedwater system is redundant. The normal source is by gravity feed from two nominal capacity 45.000 gallon condensate storage tanks while the safety-related supply is taken from the plant service water system whose pumps are powered from the diesel generators if station power is lost.

It is possible that a loss of normal feedwater initiated by a seismic 'event could also result in the interruption of the normal source of auxiliary feedwater from the condensate storage tanks because the condensate storage tanks are not classified as seismic Class I. The plant operators would be alerted to this problem by receipt of low suction pressure alarms on the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Pump protection is ensured by providing a low suction pressure trip. This trips the motor-driven pump breakers and the turbine-driven pump trip/throttle valves IMS-2082 and 2MS-2082, to ensure that the pumps are available, after a loss of condensate suction, to be switched to the safety-related water supply. Switchover to thc alternate source of seismically qualified auxiliary feedwater, the service water system. can be accomplished by the operators in five minutes or less.

The auxiliary feedwater system has no ftunctional requirements during normal, at power, plant operation. It is used during plant startup and shutdown and during hot shutdown or hot standby conditions wvhen chemical additions or small feedwater flow requirements do not warrant the operation of the main feedwater and condensate systems.

During normal plant operations, the auxiliary feedwater system is maintained in a standby condition ready to be placed in operation automatically when conditions require. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Turbine-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4.16 kv buses supplying the main feedwater pump mcitors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater pump.

3. T~rip or shutdowr of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both fcedwater regulating valv,;s in one unit starts the corresponding pump. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

Motor-driven feedwater pumps I. Low-low water level in either associated steam generator.

2. Trip or shutdown of boflt- main fieedwatcr puLmps or closure of both fecdwater regulating valves in one unit. Thesc signals are processed throuai, AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

3. Safeguards sequence signial.

PBNP FSAR (6100) Auxiliary Feec%,.,.-..r Systemi (AF)

The Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuit (AMSAC) is further discussed in FSAR Section 7.4.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge motor operated valves are configured to open automatically, based upon the same signals that start the motor-driven pumps. This ensures automatic delivery of auxiliary feedwater flow to an affected unit's steam generators without operator action. Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each steam generator is provided in the control room. Flow indication is also available locally at the discharge of each pump.

10.2.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION In the event of complete loss of offsite electrical power to the station, decay heat removal would continue to be assured for each unit by the availability of either the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and discharge to the atmosphere via the main steam safety valves or atmospheric relief valves. One motor-driven pump is capable of supplying sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from a unit. In this case, feedwater is available from the condensate storage tanks by gravity feed to the auxiliary feedwater pumps. When the water in the condensate storage tanks is depleted, suction for the pumps can be shifted to the service water system via remotely operated MOVs from the control room to provide makeup water from tile lake for an indefinite time period.

During a Station Blackout (SBO) event, only the turbine-driven pumps would be available for decay heat removal. The turbine-driven pumps are capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators without an AC power source. The steam supply and auxiliary feedwater discharge valves are powered from diverse sources of vital 125V DC. Cooling water for the pump and turbine bearings can be supplied from the diesel driven firewater pump. The Technical Specification minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks, 13,000 gallons per operating unit, provides adequate makeup to the steam generators to maintain each unit in a hot shutdow~n condition for at least one hour concurrent with a loss of all AC power. Further information on the SBO event is provided in Appendix A.1. (Reference 1)

In order to rnae. the design basis, the limiting accident analysis of LOSS OF NORI\AL FEEDWATER and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES assumes that one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump provides 200 gpm of flo'v to one steam generator wvithi' 5 minutes lbllowing receipt ofa low-low steam generator water level setpoint signal.

These nminimum parameters are met or exceeded by system design and verified by required testing. Thie three other accident analyses \*hich assume auxiliary" feedwater initiation for mitigation are LOSS OF EXTERNAL- ELECTRICAL LOAD. RUPTURE OF A STEAM

!I1P1E. and STEAM GE-NEIRAOIZ TUBI-BE RU PTURE. For these a "cidents, minimum aLixiliary tZ.eddwater assumptions aie not specified and in the lattcr two. auxiliary fcedwater isohation to the affected steam cenvrator is assumed. Althouh the auxiliar% feedwater "'stem may be initiated during a SMALL BRI--\K !LOCA\. the event has been analyzed with no credit for auxiliarv fbed\\ater.

PBNP FSAR (6100) Auixiliary Feedwvater System (AF) Pane 10.2-5 of 8 PBNP FSAR (6/00) Auxiliary Feedvater System (AF) Page 10.2-5ofS Based on the operating characteristics of the minimum recirculation flow control scheme, a portion of each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump's discharge flow will be automatically recirculated to the condensate storage tank for approximately forty-five seconds after the pump starts. The forty-five second time delay in closing the mini. tic w recirculation control valves is incorporated in the design to provide for pump stability and cooling during coastd own.

A postulated control failure causing a single motor-driven AFW pump recirculation valve (AF-4007 or AF-4014) to fail open will divert approximately 89 gpm pump flow back to the associated steam generator. However, the AFW flow to the steam generators from the other motor-driven pump and the unit turbine-driven pump are not affected by this failure. Similarly.

if the control failure causes a single turbine-driven pump recirculation valve (AF-4002) to fail open, the failure will divert approximately 126 gpm of turbine-driven pump flow to the condensate storage tank, but will not affect flowv to the steam generators from either motor-driven pump. For either of these control failures, the AFW system will be capable of supplying greater than the required 200 gpm per unit.

A failure analysis has been made and the results for the auxiliary feedwater pumps shelw that the failure or malfunction of any single active component w,.ill not prevent the system from performing its emergency function. Results are presented below.

Malfunction Comments and Consequences One AFW pump fails to Four AFW pumps provided: each steam-driven pump start (following loss of is dedicated to one unit and each motor-driven pump main feedwater) is shared between units. Any three of the four AFW pumps provide the required feedwater flow to remove sulfficient decay heat from both units.

Two AFW pumps fail to Each AFW pump is provided with low suction stop (trip) when required pressure protection following a seismic event.

and subsequently nin to Evaluations for a seisriic-induced LONW event show failure (following a that any two AFW pumps provide the required seismic- induced loss of feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat from main feedwater event) both units.

1 10.2.4 REQUIREI) PROCEDURES AND TESTS The AF system components are tested and inspected in accordance ,\ ith Technical Specification surveillance criteria and frequencies. Testing x rieics motor-dri; en pump operabilit\.

turbine-driven PLUMP operabilitv including a cold start, and operability o fall required MOVs.

Control circuits. starting loic,. and indicators ate \ erified op,.rable by their respective functional test.

PBNP FSAR (6100) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-6 of 8 10.

2.5 REFERENCES

1. FSAR Appendix A.1, Station Blackout

2. PBNP Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER)

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PBN'P FSAR (6101) Descritotion of Chan%!es Pa~e 32 of of 47 47

- I PBNP ESAR (6/01) Description of Changes Pare 32 Pa_ e Description of Changes Figure 10.1-1 Updated figure to reflect P&ID revision of record in Mar:h 2001.

(Sheets 1-3)

Figure 10.1-1A (Sheets 1-2)

Figure 10.1-2 (Sheets 1-2)

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Figure 10.1-6 Figure 10.1-6A Figure 10.1-6B (Sheet 2)

Figure 10.1-7 Figure 10.1-7A Figure 10.1-8 Figure 10.1-8A 10.2-1 Licensing Basis Change. Clarified text to reflect that the 200 g-pm flow can be to a "either" a single steam generator or "split between two steam generators".

SE 2000-0(70. FCR 00-081 (R. Chapman) 10.2-3 Licensing Basis Change. Added text, "Chemicals may be added using the tanks installed in the discharge headers or via a cart built to carry the chemicals ane. inject them into the suction headers. The use of the cart is preferred for reasons of personnel safety and ease of addition." SE 2000-0112, FCR 01-002 (J. Hawman)

Editorial. Added reference for operator action of five minutes for switchover of AFW source to service water. FCR-00-048 (I. Netzel) 10.2-5 Licensing Basis Change. Clarified to state the application to a unit operating at 1518.5 MWt. SE 2000-0070. FCR 00-081 (R. Chapman)

Licensing Basis Change. Clarified text to reflect :hat the 200 gpm flow can be to a

"'either"' a single steam generator or "split between two steam generators".

SE 2000-0070. FCR 00-081 (R. Chapman) 10.2-6 Licensing Basis Change. Clarified to state the application to a unit operating at 1513.5 MWt. SE 2000-0070. FCR 00-081 (R. Chapman) .

Editorial. Added reference to reference section regarding operator action of five minutes for svi:cho\cr of AFW source to service Nxater. FCR 00-04S (I. Netzel)

Licensing Basis Change. Add new reference. NRC SER on USI A-46. SE 2000-0070.

FCR 00,:-OS 1 (R. Chapman)

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Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-1 of 8 10.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AF)

One turbine (per unit) and two electric-driven (shared by the two units) auxiliary feedwater pumps are provided to ensure that adequate feedwater is supplied to the steam generators for heat removal under all circumstances, including loss of power and normal heat sink.

Feedwater flow can be maintained until power is restored or reactor decay heat removal can be accomplished by other systems. The auxiliary feedwater system is designed as a seismic Class I system. A backup supply of auxiliary feedwater can be provided from the seismic Class I portion of the service water system by positioning remotely-operated valves from the control room. See Figure 10.2-1.

10.2.1 DESIGN BASIS The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to supply high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of heat energy from the reactor coolant system by secondary side steam release in the event of inoperability or unavailability of the main feedwater system. In order to meet the design basis required in the Loss of Normal Feedwater/Loss of All AC analysis, one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump provides 200 gpm of flow either to one steam generator or split between two steam generators within 5 minutes following receipt of a low-low steam generator water level setpoint signal.

Redundant supplies are provided by two pumping systems using different sources of power for the pumps. The design capacity of each system is set so that the steam generators will not boil dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through the pressurizer relief valves, following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

The AF system performs the following safety-related functions:

The AF system shall automatically start and deliver adequate AF system flow to maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents which may result in main steam safety valve opening. Such accidents include; LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER (LONF).

FSAR Chapter 14.1.10, and LOSS OF ALL-AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES (LOAC). FSAR Chapter 14.1.11, events. LONF and LOAC are time-sensitive to AF system start-up.

The AF system shall automatically start and deliver sufficient AF system flow to maintain adequate steam generator levels during accidents which require rapid reactor coolant system cooldown to achieve the cold shutdown condition within the limits of the analysis. Such accidents include; STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (SGTR), FSAR Chapter 14.2.4, and MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSLB). FSAR Chapter 14.2.5.

The AF system shall be capable of isolating the AF steam and feedwater supply lines from the nrptured steam generator follovwing a SGTR event.

PB*NT FSAR (06/02) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-2 of 8 The AF system also performs the following functions related to regulatory commitments:

In the event of a station blackout (prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power) affecting both units, the AF system shall be capable of automatically supplying sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat from both units without any reliance on AC power for one hour (Reference 1).

In the event of plant fires, including those requiring evacuation of the control room, the AF system shall be capable of manual initiation to provide feedwater to a minimum of one stewn generator per unit at sufficient flow and pressure to remove decay and sensible heat from the reactor coolant system over the range from hot shutdown to cold shutdown conditions. The AF system shall support achieving cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (Reference 2).

In the event of an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATIWS), the AF system shall be capable of automatic actuation by use of equipment that is diverse from the reactor trip system. This is accomplished by the AMSAC system described in FSAR Section 7.4. An AFW pump start delay time of less than- equal to 90 seconds is assumed in the ATWS analysis. This delay time consists of a 30 second AMSAC time delay plus a 60 second AF system pump start response time. (Reference 4) 10.2.2 SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATION The auxiliary feedwater system consists of two electric motor-driven pumps, two steam turbine-driven pumps, pump suction and discharge piping. and the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the system. Redundancy is provided by utilizing two pumping systems, two different sources of power for the pumps, and two sources of water supply to the pumps. The system is categorized as seismic Class I and is designed to ensure that a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump for each unit (1/2P-29) with the steam capable of being supplied from either or both steam generators. This system is capable of supplying 400 gpm of feedwater to a unit, or 200 gpm to each steam generator through normally throttled MOVs AF-4000 and AF-4001. The feedwater flowrate from the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump depends on the throttle position of these MOVs.

Check valves are provided to help prevent backflow when the pumps are not in service. Each pump has an AOV (AF-4002) controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks to ensure minimum flow to dissipate pump heat. The pump drive is a single-stage turbine, capable of quick starts from cold standby and is directly connected to the pump. The turbine is started by opening either one or both of the isolation valves (MS-2019 and MS-2020) between the turbine supply steam header and the main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The turbine and pump are normally cooled by service water '*ith an alternate source of cooling %%aterfrom the firewater syszem.

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PBNP FSAR (06/02) Auxiliary Fecedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-3 of 8 The other system is common to both units and utilizes two similar motor-driven pumps (P-38A and P-38B), each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the plant emergency diesel generators. Each pump has a bcapPcity of 200 gpm with pump P-38A capable of supplying the A steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4012 and normally closed MOVs, AF-4022 and AF-4023, and With pump P-38B capable of supplying the B steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4019 and normally closed MOVs AF-4020 and AF-4021.

Both back-pressure control valves fail open when instrument air to the valves is lost. The valves are provided with a backup nitrogen supply to provide pneumatic pressure in the event of a loss of instrument air. This backup supply assures that the valves do not move to the full open position which combined with low steam generator pressures may cause the pump motor to t-p on time overcurrent due to high flow conditions. Each pump has an AOV, AF-4007 for P-38A and AF-4014 fo P-38B, controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks to ensure min!mum flow to prevent hydraulic instabilities and dissipate pump heat. The discharge headers also provide piping, valves, and tanks for chemical additions to any steam generator. The pump bearings are ring lubricated and bearing oil is cooled by service water.

Chemicals may be added using the tanks installed in the discharge headers or via a cart built to carry the chemicals and inject them into the suction headers. The use of the cart is preferred for reasons of personnel safety and ease of add'tion.

The water supply source for the auxiliary feedwater system is redundant. The normal source is by gravity feed from two nominal capacity 45,000 gallon condensate storage tanks while the safety-related supply is taken from the plant service water system whose pumps are powered from the diesel generators if station power is lost.

It is possible that a loss of normal feedwater initiated by a seismic event could also result in the interruption of the normal source of auxiliary feedwater from the condensate storage tanks because the condensate storage tanks are not classified as seismic Class I. The plant operators would be alerted to this problem by receipt of low suction pressure alarms on the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Pump protection is ensured by providing a low suction pressure trip. This trips the motor-driven pump breakers and the turbine-driven pump trip/throtule valves 1MS-2082 and 2MS-2082, to ensure that the pumps are available, after a loss of condensate suction, to be switched to the safety-related water supply. Switchover to the alternate source of .,:ismically qualified auxiliary feedwater, the service water system. can be accomplished by the operators in five minutes or less (Reference 3).

The auxiliary feedwater system has no functional requirements during normal, at power. plant operation. It is used during plant startup and shutdown and during hot shutdown or hot standby conditions when chemical additions or small feedwater flow requirements do not warrant the operation of the main feedwater and condensate systems.

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PBNTP FSAR (06102) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-4 of 8 During normal plant operations, the auxiliary' feedwater system is maintained in a standby condition ready to be placed in operation automatically when conditions require. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Turbine-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4.16 kv buses supplying the main feedwater pump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater pump.

3. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit starts the corresponding pump. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

Motor-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in either associated steam -,-,aerator.

2. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

3. Safeguards sequence signal.

The Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuit (AMSAC) is further discussed in FSAR Section 7.4.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge motor operated valves are configured to open automatically, and the steam generator blowdown isolation valves are configured to close automatically, based upon the same signals that start the motor-driven pumps. This ensures automatic delivery of design basis auxiliary feedwater flow to an affected unit's steam generators without operator action. Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each steam generator is provided in the ccntrol room. Flow indication is also available locally at the discharge of each pump.

PB N-P FSAR (06102) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF') Page 10.2-5 of 8 10.2.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION in the event of complete loss of offsite electrical power to the station, decay heat removal would continue to be assured for each unit by the availability of either the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and discharge to the atmosphere via the main steam safety v"Ives or atmospheric relief valves.

One motor-driven pump is capable of supplying sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from a unit operating at a power of 1518.5 MWt. In this case. feedwater is available from til, condensate storage tanks by gravity feed to the auxiliary feedwater pumps. When the water in the condensate storage tanks is depleted, suction for thtr. pumps can be shifted to the service water system via remotely operated MOVs from the control room to provide makeup water from the lake for an indefinite time period.

During a Station Blackout (SBO) event, only the turbine-driven pumps would be available for decay heat removal. The turbine-driven pumps are capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators without an AC power source. The steam supply and auxiliary feedwater discharge valves are powered from diverse sources of vital 125V DC. Cooling water for the pump and turbine bearings can be supplied from the diesel driven firewater pump. The Technical Specification minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks, 13,000 gallons per operating unit, provides adequate makeup to the steam generators to maintain each unit in a hot shutdown condition for at least one hour concurrent with a loss of all AC power. Further information on the SBO event is provided in Appendix A. 1.

(Reference 1)

In order to meet the design basis, the limiting accident analysis of LOSS OF NORM..AL FEEDWATER and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES assumes either that one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump provides 200 gpm of flow to one steam generator or split between two steam generators within 5 minutes following receipt of a low-low steam generator water level setpoint signal.

These minimum parameters are met or exceeded by system design and verified by required testing. The three other accident analyses which assume auxiliary feedwater initiation for mitigation are LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD, RUPTURE OF A STEAM PIFE, and STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE. For these accidents, minimum auxiliary feedwater assumptions are not specified and in the latter two, auxiliary feedwater isolation to the affected steam generator is assumed. Although the auxiliary feedwater system may be initiated during a SMALL BREAK LOCA, the event has been analyzed with no credit for auxiliary feedwater.

Based on the operating characteristics of the minimum recirculation flow control scheme, a portion of each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump's discharge floy will be automatically recirculatcd to the condensate storage tank for approximately forty-five seconds after the pump start,. The forty-fi%e second time delay in closing the mini-flow recirculation control valves is incorporated in the design to provide for pump stabilh) and cooling during coastdo%%n.

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Auxiliary Feed-water System (AF) Page !0.2-6 of 8 A portulated control failure causing a single motor-driven AFW pump recirculation valve I(AF-4007 or AF-4014) to fail open will divert approximately 89 gpm pump flow from the associated steam generator back to the Condensate Storage Tank. However, the AFW flow to the steam generators from the other motor-driven pump and the unit turbine-driven pump are not affected by this failure. Similarly, if the control failure causes a single turbine-driven pump recirculation valve (AF-4002) to fail open, the failure will divert approximately 126 gpm of turbine-driven pump flow to the condensate storage tank, but will not affect flow to the steam generators from either motor-driven pump. For either of these control failures, the AFW system will be capable of supplying greater than the required 200 gpm per unit.

A failure analysis has been made and the results for the auxiliary feedwater pumps show that the failure or malfunction of any single active component will not prevent the system from performing its emergency function. Results are presented bclow.

Malfunction Comments and Consequences One AFWV pump fails to Four AFWV pumps provided; each steam-driven start (following loss of pump is dedicated to one unit and each motor-driven main feed%ater) pump is shared between units. Any three of the four AFV pumps provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat from both units.

Two AFW pumps fail to Each AFW pump is provided with low suction stop (trip) when required pressure protection following a seismic event.

and subsequently run to Evaluations for a seismic-induced LONF event show failure (following a that any two AFW pumps provide the required seismic- induced loss of feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat from main feedwater event) both units operating at 1518.5 MVt.

10.2.4 REQUIRED PROCEDURES AND TESTS The AF system components are tested and inspected in accordance with Technical Specification surveillance criteria and frequencies. Testing verifies motor-driven pump operability, turbine-driven pump operability including a cold start, and operability of all required MOVs. Control circuits, starting logic, and indicators are verified operable by their respective functional test.

10.

2.5 REFERENCES

1. FSAR Appendix A. 1. Station Blackout

2. PBNP Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER)

3. NRC SER "Safety E\ aluation on the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 at Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit; i and 2 ([AC Nos. N169472 and M69473)".

Enclosur, page 3 of If). dated Jul\y 7. 1998 W,.

4-. NRC SER "A'W\S RUI,' LE (10 CFR 50.6? iTACS 5912S and 59129." ,\uust -1. 19S8.

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PB NP FSARI (06!0!l) Auxiliary,. Feedwater System 'AP) Pap,- 10.2-1 of 8 10.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (A-)

One turbine (per unit) and two electric-driven (shared by the two units) auxiliary feedwater pumps are provided to ensure that adequate feedwater is supplied to the steam generators for heat removal under all circumstances, including loss of power and normal l.eat sink.

Feedwater flow can be maintained until power is restored or reactor decay heat removal can be accomplished by other systems. The auxiliary feedwater system is designed as a Class I system. A backup supply of auxiliary feedwater can be provided from the Class I portion of the service water system by positioning remotely-operated valves from the control room.

See Figure 10.2-1.

10.2.1 DESIGN BASIS The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to supply high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators in order to maintain a water inventory for removal of heat energy from the reactor coolant system by secondary side steam release in the event of inoperability or unavailability of the main feedwater system. In order to meet the design basis required in the Loss of Normal Feedwater/Loss of All AC analysis, one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump provides 200 gpm of flow either to one st-;am generator or split between two steam generators Ilk within 5 n...,utes following receipt of a low-low steam generator water level setpoint signal.

Redundant supplies are provided by two pumping systems using different sources of power for the pumps. The design capacity of each system is set so that the steam generators will rot boil dry nor will the primary side relieve fluid through the pressurizer relief valves. following a loss of main feedwater flow with a reactor trip.

The AF system performs the following safety-related functions:

--ZT, The AF system shall automatically start and deliver adequate AF system flow to maintain

L rj adequate steam generator levels during accidents which may result in main steam safety valve opening. Such accidents include; LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER (LONF),

FSAR Chapter 14. 1. 10, and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES (LOAC), FSAR Chapter 14.1.11, events. LONF and LOAC are time-sensitive to AF system start-up.

The AF system shall automatically start and deliver sufficient AF system flow to maintain t'r adequate steam generator levels during accidents which require rapid reactor coolant system cooldown to achieve the cold shutdown condition within the limtits of the analysis. Such accidents include: STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (SGTR). FSAR Chaptert11.2.J.

and MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSLB). FSAR Chapter I-!.2 5.

The A.F system shall be capable of isolating the AF steam and feedv ater supply lines from, the ruptured steun generator followmng a SGTR event.

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PBNP FSAR (06/01) Auxiliary Feedwater Syvstem (.k&z) Page 10.2-2 of18 The AF system also performs the following functions related to regulatory comrmitments:

in the event of a station blackout (prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power) affecting both units, the AF system shall be capable of automatically supplying sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat from both units without any reliance on AC power for one hour

,Reference 1).

Ln the event of plant fires, including those requiring evacuation of the control room, the AF system shall be capable of manual initiation to provide feedwater to a minimum of one steam generator per unit zot sufficient flow and pressure to remove decay and sensible heat from the reac:or coolant system over the range from hot shutdown to cold shutdown conditions. The AF system shall support achieving cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (Reference 2).

10.2.2 SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATION The auxiliary feedwater system consists of two electric motor-driven pumps, two steam turbine-driven pumps, pump suction and discharge piping, and the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the system. Redundancy is provided by utilizing two pumping systems, two different sources of power for the pumps, and two sources of water supply to the pumps. The system is categorized as seismic Class I and is designed to ensure that a single fault will not obstruct the system function.

One system utilizes a steam turbine-driven pump for each unit (1/2P-29) with the steam capable of being supplied from either or both steam generators. This system is capable of supplying 400 gpm of feedwater to a unit, or 200 gpm to each steamn generator through no-,-mally throttled MOVs AF-4000 znd AF-4001. The feedwater flowrate from the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump depends on the throttle po.,ition of these MOVs.

Check valves are provided to help prevent backflow when the punms are not in service. Each pump has an AOV (AF-4002) controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks tc. ensure minimum flow to dissipate pump heat. The pump dri e is a single-stage turbine, capable of quick starts from cold standby and is directly connected to the pump. The turbine is started by opening either one or both of the isolation valves (MS-2019 and MS-2020) between the turbine supply steam header and the main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The turbine and pump are normally cooled by service water with an alternate sou :ce of cooling water from the firewater system.

- 7 -7 .77 . .

PBNP FSAR (06GI1) Auxih_:,) Fecedwater System (.A-F) Paee 10.2-3 of 8 The other system is common to both units and utilizes two similar motor-driven pumps (P-3SA and P-30B), each capable of obtaining its electrical power from the plant emergency diesel g.,er-rators. Each pump has a capacity of 200 gpm with pump P-38A capable of supplying the A steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4012 and normally closed MOVs, AF-4022 and AF-4023. and with pump P-38B capable of supplying the B steam generator in either or both units through an AOV back-pressure control valve AF-4019 and normally closed MOVs AF-4020 and AF-4021.

Both back-pressure control valves fail open whern instrument air to the valves is lost. The valves are provided with a backup nitrogen supply to provide pneumatic pressure in the event of a loss of instrument air. This backup supply assures that the valves do not move to the full open position which combined with low steam generator pressures may cause the pump motor to trip on time overcurrent due to high flow conditions. Each pump has an AOV. AF-4007 for P-38A and AF-40i4 for P-38B, controlled recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks to ensure minimum flow to prevent hydraulic instabilities and eissipate pump heat. The discharge headers also provide piping, valves, and tanks for chemical additions to any steam generator. The pump bearings are ring lubricated and bearing oil is cooled by service water.

Chemicals may be added using the tanks installed in the discharge headers or via a cart built to carry the chemicals and inject them into the suction headers. The use of the cart is preferred for reasons of personnel safety and ease of addition.

The water supply source for the auxiliary feedwater system is redundant. The normal source is by gravity feed from two nominal capacity 45.000 gallon condensate storage tanks while the safety-related supply is taken from the plant service water system whose pumps are powered from the diesel generators if station power is lost.

It is possible that a loss of normal feedwater initiated by a seismic event could also result in the interruption of the normal source of auxiliary feedwater from the condensate storage tank because the condensate storage tanks are not classified as seisraic Class i. The plant operators, would be alerted to this problem by receipt of low suction pressure alarms on the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Pump protection is tnsured by providing a low suction pressure trip. This trips the motor-driven pump breakers and the turbine-driven pump trip/throttle valves IMS- 2082 and 2MS-20S2. to ensure that tl-,- pumps are available, after a loss of condensate suction, to be switched to the safety-related v. ater supply. Switcho-' er to the alternate source of seismically qualified auxiliar, feedwater, the service \;ater system. can be accomplished by the operators in five minut-es or less (Reference 3).

The auxiliai-y feedwater s%stem has no functional requirements during normal, a, pwer. plant operation. It is used during plant startup and S.hutdown and during hot shutdown or hot standby conditions v. hen chr::nical additions or small feed:. ter flow requirements do not warrant the operation oi th."nmian feedwa-,er anJ condensat.e s stems.

PB NP FSAR (06/D01) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Pag-e 10.2-4 of 8 PBNP FSAR (06A31) Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Page 10.2-4 of S During normal plant operations, the auxiliary feedwater system is maintained in a standby condition ready to be placed in operation automatically when conditions require. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

Tu*bine-driven feedwater pumps

1. Low-low water level in both steam generators in one unit starts the corresponding pump.

2. Loss of both 4.16 kv buses supplying the main feedwater pump motors in one unit starts the corresponding auxiliary feedwater pump.

3. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit starts the corresponding pump. These signals are processed through AMSAC at power levels above 40%.

Motor-driven feedwater pump.

1. Low-low water level in either associatea steam generator.

2. Trip or shutdown of both main feedwater pumps or closure of both feedwater regulating valves in one unit. These signals are processed through A.MSAC at power levels above 40%.

O 3. Safeguards sequence signal.

The Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuit (.A.MSAC) is further discussed in FSAR Section 7.4.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge motor operated valves are configured to open automatically, based upon the same signals that start the motor-driven pumps. This ensures automatic delivery of auxiliary feedwater flow to an affected unit's steam generators without operator action. Auxiliary feedwater pump flow and direct flow indication for each steam generator is provided in the control room. Flow indication -s also available locally at the discharge of each pump.

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PBNP FSAR (06/01) Auxiliar. Feedwzter Sxstem (AF) Pace 10 2-5 of 8 10.2.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION In the event of complete loss of offsite electrical power to the station, decay heat removal would continue to be assured for each unit by the availability of either the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two mctor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. and discharge to the atmosphere via the main steam safety valves or atmospheric relief valves.

One motor-driven pump is capable of supplying sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from a unit operating at a power of 15 1S.5 MWt. In this case. feedwater is available from the condensate storage tanks by gravity feed to the auxiliary feedwater pumps. When the water in the condensate storage tanks is depleted, suction for the pumps can be shifted to the service water system via remotely operated NMOVs from the control room to provide makeup water from the lake for an indefinite time period.

During a Station Blackout (SBO) eveat, only the turbine-driven pumps would be available for decay heat removal. The turbine-driven pumps are capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators without an AC power source. The steam supply and auxiliary.feedwater discharge valves are powered from diverse sources of vital 125V DC. Cooling water for the pump and turbine bearings can be supplied from the diesel driven firewater pump. The Technical Specification minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks.

13,000 gallons per operating unit, provides adequate makeup to the steam generators to maintain each unit in a hot shutdown condition for at least one hour concurrent with a loss of all AC power. Further information on the SBO evenit is provided in Appendix A. I.

(Reference 1)

In order to meet the design basis. the limiting accident analysis of LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER and LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIA.RIES assun.es either that one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump provrides 200 gpm of flow to one steman generator or split between two steam generators within 5 minutes following receipt of a low-low steam generator water level setpoint signal.

These minimum parameters are met or exceeded by system design and verified by required testing. The three other accident analyses which assume auxiliary feedwater initiation ,or mitigation are LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD. RUPTURE OF A STEA-M PIPE. and STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE. For these accidents, minimum auxiliary feedwater assumptions are not specified and in the latter two, auxiliary feedwater isolation to the affected steam generator is assumed. Although the auxiliary feedwater system may be initiated during a SMALL BREAK LOCA. the event h,,s been analyzed with no credit for au\ili.ay feedwater.

Based on the operating characteriýtics of the minimum rccirculazio:" flow control IcT:e.e. a f<o"v"- I - au..o.

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,ortion of each mnotor-dri%en auxiliary fecdw:ntcr pump'i dischar*e rccircultcd to the conden.-ate stor:ge tank for appr,,inlz :,:v-P e secoinds ai:-: .he

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PBNP F.cAP. (0*t0!) Auii.yFeedwater System (A-F) Page I10.2-6 of 8 A postulated control failure causing a single motor driven AFW pump recirculation valve (AF-4007 or AF-4014) to fail open will divert approximately 89 gpm pump flow back to the associated steam generator. However, the AFW flow to the steam generators from the other motor-driven pump and the unit turbine-driven pump are not affected by this failure.

Similarly, if the control failure causes a single turbine-driven pump recirculation valve (AF-4002) to fail open, the failure will divert approximately 126 gpm of turbine-driven pump flow to the condensate storage tank, but will not affect flow to the steam generators from either motor-driven pump. For either of these control failures, the AFW system will be capable of supplying greater than the required 200 gpm per unit.

A failure analysis has been made and the results for the auxiliary feedwater pumps show that the failure or malfunction of any single active component will not prevent the system from performing its emergency function. Results are presented below.

Malfunction Comments and Consequences One AFW pump fails to I-our AFW pumps provided; each steam-driven start (following loss of pump is dedicated to one unit and each motor-driven main feedwater) pump is shared between units. Any three of the four AFW pumps provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat from both units.

Two AFW pumps fail to Each AFW pump is provided with low suction stop (trip) when required pressure protection following a seismic event.

A and subsequently run to failure (following a Evaluations for a seismic-induced LONF event show that any two AFW pumps provide the required seismic- induced loss of feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat from main feedwater event) both units operating at 1518.5 MWt.

10.2.4 REQUIRED PROCEDURES AND TESTS The AF system components are tested and inspected in accordance with Technical Specification surveillance criteria and frequencies. Testing verifies motor-driven pump operability, turbine-driven pump operability including a cold start, and operability of all required MOVs. Control circuits, starting logic, and indicators are verified operable by their respective functional test.

10.

2.5 REFERENCES

!. FSAR Appendix A.1, Station Blackout

2. PBNP Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER)

3. NRC SER "Safety Evaluation on the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 at Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (TAC Nos. \169472 and M69473)".

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Enclosure page 3 of 10, dated July 7, 1998.

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PBNP FSAR (06102) Description of Changes PaE~e 11 of 17 Pase Description of Changes

. 10.2-2 Licensing Basis Change. Added discussion of the ATWS function for the AF system, including assumed AF system delay times. Although this information is already part of the Point Beach licensing basis, adding it to the FSAR is not considered an editorial change per NP 5.1.8. NRC SER (NPC-37920), "Compliance with ATVS Rule 10 CFR 50 62", FCR 01-052 (J. Olvera).

10.2-4 Licensing Basis Change. Revised description of SG blowdown valve close logic that was modified per MR 01-052. SG blowdown valves close automatically on an auto start of the motor driven AF pumps. SER 2001-0034, FCR 0 1-037 (C. Drescher).

10.2-6 Editorial Change. Revise first sentence to specify that the flow path of the AF recirculation line is to the Condensate Storage tank, not back to the steam generator. FCR 01-039 (J. P. Schroeder) 10.2-6 Licensing Basis Change. Added Reference No. 4, the NRC SER on the PBNP compliance with the ATWS Rule. Although this information is already part of the Point Beach licensing basis, adding it to the FSAR is not considered an editorial change per NP 5.1.8. NRC SER (NPC-37920), "Compliance with ATWS Rule 10 CFR 50.62", FCR 01-052 (J. Olvera).

Figure 10.2-1 Updated figure to reflect approved P&ID changes of record on February 15, 2002.

Sheets 1-2 CHAPTER 11 11.1-6 Licensing Basis Change. Change "Technical Specification 15.7.6" to "Control Manual (RECM)".

The administrative requirements have been moved to the RECM section of the REMCAP. NRC SER 2001-0007, FCR 01-041 (J. Sell).

Figure 11.1-1 Updated figure to reflect approved P&ID changes of record on February 15, 2002.

Figure 11.1-2 Updated figure to reflect approved P&ID changes of record on Fcbruary 15,2002.

Figure 11.2-1 Updated figure to reflect approved P&ID changes of record on February 15, 2002.

Sheets 1-3 Figurc 11.2-4 Updated figure to reflect approved P&ID changes of record on February 15, 2002.

11.8-1 Editorial Change. Revised "Nuclear Power Business Unit" to 'Point Beach Nuclear Plant."

FCR 02-013 (D. Black).

11.8-1 Licensing Basis Change. Revised "Technical Specifications" to "the PBNP Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Section 3.7.4." NRC SER 2001-007. FCR 01-041 (J. Sell).

CIHAPTER 12 12.2-1 Editorial Change. Added text referring to the added References 1 and 2. FCR 02-014 (D. Black).

12.2-1 Licensingz Basis Change. Added discussion that the Site Vice-President is responsible for both Point Beach and the Kewaunce Nucle-ar Power Plant. and that NMC is the authorized licensee for Kcvaunec. NRC SER 2000-007. FCR 02-014 (D. Black).

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