ML030870056

Compilation of AFW Corrective Actions, Taken in Response to Potential Common Mode Failure Due to a Loss of Station Air and Operator Actions, Volume 3 of 4 (Provided by Licensee in Response to a Question from Ken Obrien, Usnrc), Design Descr

ML030870056
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	02/06/2003
From:	Nuclear Management Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0094
Download: ML030870056 (119)

Text

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLAINT MR 01-144 DESIGN DESCR.TION January 24, 2002 AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP MINI FLOW RECIRC CONTROL VALVE MODIFICATION COMMON Design Scope and

Purpose:

This modification will provide a backup nitrogen system to the Auxiliary Feedwater motor driven pump minimum flow recirculation control valves so the valves function on loss of Instrument Air. This modification will install stainless steel tubing jumpers from the air system for the Auxiliary Feedwater motor-driven pump minimum flow recirculation control valves, AF 4007 and AF-4014, to the air system for the Auxiliary Feedwater motor-driven pump discharge control valves, AF-4012 and AF-4019, respectively, which currently have separate backup nitrogen supplies.

Design Inputs:

Background.

This modification affects the operation of the minimum flow recirculation valves for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, AF-4007 and AF-4014. These valves perform several designf functions. They isolate the minimum flow recirculation line to ensure that the auxiliary "feedwater pumps deliver the required flow to the steam generators as needed to support the following accidents or events: LONF, LOAC, MSLB, SGTR, ATWS, Appendix R, and SBO.

These valves open to provide flow through the auxiliary feedwater pumps to prevent hydraulic instabilities and to dissipate pump heat. They also maintain the pressure boundary integrity of the auxiliary feedwater system.

Permanent Drawings:

"* M-217 SH. 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System P&ID "1 M-209 SH. 4 Instrument Air P&ID

"* M-217 SH. 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System P&ID

References:

• CR 01-2278

• CR01-3595 LER266/2001-005-00 Page I of 5

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT MR 01-144 DESIGN DESCRIPTION January 24, 2002 AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP MINI FLOW RECIRC CONTROL VALVE MODIFICATION COMMON Design DescriDtion and Analysis:

CR 01-2278, CR 01-3595, and LER 266/2001-005-00 identified an issue that could cause a common mode failure of all auxiliary feedwater pumps. If an accident or event has occurred that has led to the loss of instrument air, then the auxiliary feedwater pump minimum flow recirculation control valves 1/2A.F-4002 for 1/2P-29, AF-4007 for P-38A, and AF-4014 for P 38B will all fail closed. During this event, it may become necessary for operations to throttle back auxiliary feedwater flow to control steam generator level. If care is not taken to ensure that the minimum recirculation valves are open, and the pump discharge valves are shut with no minimum flow path, then the pumps will dead head and fail in a very short time due to overheating. Currently, there is guidance in EOP 0, EOP 0.1, ECA 0.0, and AOP-5B to direct operations to verify adequate pump flow if instrument air has been lost before reducing flow to the steam generators, or to stop the pump.

To provide additional assurance that the auxiliary feedwater pumps will not be damaged on a loss of instrument air, backup pneumatic sources will be supplied to all minimum flow recirculation valves. These modifications are an enhancement that will reduce the core damage probability from a loss of instrument air and increase the time that is required for an operator to take manual action to open the valves. This modification (MR 01-144) will supply the P-38A1B valves (AF-4007, AF-4014) with backup nitrogen, while a separate modification (MR 02-001) will install instrument air accumulator tanks for the 1/2P-29 valves (I/2AF-4002).

The auxiliary feedwater minimum flow recirculation valves do not have a safety function in the open position, however this function is a design function described in FSAR Section 10.2 and Technical Specification Bases B3.7.5. The basis for no safety function is that all of the auxiliary feedwater pumps will have open discharge valves upon auto start (even with a loss of instrument air); the minimum flow recirculation line is not needed early in the accident or event. These valves will be given an augmented quality function to open to ensure adequate flow though the associated auxiliary feedwater pump during an Appendix R fire for at least 45 minutes (per Calculation WE-0005-06), and the backup systems will support this function.

This modification will provide a sufficient secondary source of nitrogen such that AF-4007 and AF-4014 are able to operate for at least two hours stroking 10 times per hour if the regular instrument air system is disabled due to a seismic event, tornado, fire, or loss of offsite power.

No changes will be made to the control circuitry of the valves, and they will still open automatically when the auxiliary feedwater pump flow drops below the setpoint. when the pumps are started, and when the pumps are secured.

The existing nitrogen supply system for the AF-4012 and.AF-10 19, NIDAFP Discharge Control Valves will be used to supply the AF-4007 and AF-401.4 MDAFP Minimum Recirculation Control Valves. The existing instrument air isolation check valves AF-131/133 (for AF-4012) and AF-151/153 (for AF-4019) and nitrogen tubing and tanks will be used for the AF-4007 and AF--014 valves New tubing will be installed to connect the nitrogen supply tubing near the AF Page 2 of 5

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT MR 01-144 DESIGN DESCRIPTION January 24, 2002 AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP MINI FLOW RECIRC CONTROL VALVE MODIFICATION COMMON 4012/4019 valves downstream of the check valves to the AF-4007/4014 minimum recirculation valves. Also, a bypass line will be installed around the AF-133/153 check valves to allow the AF-131/15 1 check valves to be tested using system pressure, if necessary.

Calculation 2002-0002 was performed to show that the existing nitrogen bottles are adequate to supply nitrogen to stroke the minimum flow recirculation valves and the discharge valves for two hours. The existing nitrogen supply system installed by MR 97-038 consists of two nitrogen bottles, with one valved in and the other bottle maintained full in standby mode. As the aligned bottle pressure drops over time, it will be replaced with a full bottle. Currently, the online nitrogen bottle is changed out when it drops to a pressure of 1850 psig. At this pressure, there is currently 90 minutes of supply for the AF-4012 valve, and 60 minutes of supply for the AF-4019 valve. The difference is due to MR 01-077, which replaced the AF-4019 trim. Calculation 2002 0002 determined a new changeout pressure for the bottle that will supply 90 minutes of nitrogen to the discharge and minimum recirculation valves (AF-4012/4007 and AF-4019/4014).

Therefore, there is always greater than three hours of capacity available in the system at any given time, although operator action is required to switch bottles.

Although the AF-4007/4014 valves do not have a safety function to open, all components in the air supply line to the valve will be installed as safety related, since it will be part of the pressure "boundary for the existing discharge valve backup system, which was installed safety-related by MR 97-038. Several existing instrument air components upstream of the solenoid valve that are not safety related will be reclassified as safety related. This can be done on the basis that these components have demonstrated adequate functionality over time, and these components will also be leak tested by MR 01-144. This is equivalent to qualification testing, and therefore these components may be dedicated. The dimensions of these components have been verified to be appropriate for the installation, and the material acceptability has been evaluated based on a detailed walkdown.

All new tubing and valves installed for this modification will be stainless steel and have design ratings that are the same as or greater than the existing components. All new components will be installed using ASME B31.1 - 1992. Currently there is no tubing class to cover SS tubing in an air system. Therefore, a new class will be created to cover SS tubing installations. The new class will be a Bechtel class JN with a primary rating 4000 psi @ 100°F. Tubing installed will have a design pressure of 125 psi @ 100 'F (Pipe Class JN-2). The tubing to be used for this modification is 3/8" stainless steel with a 0.065" wall thickness, ASTM A-213 TP 316.

All new tubing and valves will be analyzed as seismic Class 1. The new valves are WHITEY SS-IVS6-PK-W20 rated for 5000 psi at 100°F with 3/8" Swagelok connections. The GIP (Generic Implementation Procedure), rev. 2A considers manual valves to be seismically rugged (ref. pg 3-18, section 3.3.5 of the GIP rev. 2A). Therefore, the manual valves being added by this modification do not require seismic qualification Standard wall mounted tube supports will be used and supported with Hilti bolts into the walls of the auxiliary feedwater pump room Calculation S&W 14-410 1 1-NP(B)-001-XE Rev 0 and Addendum A provide a seismic basis for the use of tubing supports and a required spacing.

Page 3 of 5

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT MR 01-144 DESIGN DESCRIPTION January 24, 2002 AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP MINI FLOW RECIRC CONTROL VALVE MODIFICATION COMMON This modification will necessitate a revision to FSAR Section 9 7 (Instrument Air), Section 10.2 (Auxiliary Feedwater), and Technical Specification Basis B3.7.5 to clearly reflect the design function of the minimum recirculation valves in the open position and to describe the backup pneumatic supplies. Appendix R SSAR Section 2.3.2.4.2 needs to be revised to include a description of minimum recirculation operation. A change to SSAMS will also be required to address the survivability of AF-4007 and AF-4014 for Fire Area A23.

MR 0 1-144, AFW Motor Driven Pump Mini Flow Recirc Control Valve Modification, will install stainless steel tubing jumpers that will tie in downstream of AF-133/153 The tubing will be routed to the pressure regulators of AF-4007 and AF-4014. Approximately 3 feet of the tubing to the regulators will be flexible tubing. This will separate the systems and isolate any interactions due to seismic induced loads. New isolation valves AF-1841185 will be installed on these tubing runs as well. The existing pressure regulators will not need to be replaced as a result of this modification; however, CHAMPS ID numbers were obtained for them since they will be reclassified as safety related.

Small jumpers containing new bypass valves AF-1 82/183 will be installed in parallel to AF 133/153 to allow system pressure to be used for the testing of AF-131/151, which may be required in the future. Check valves AF-133/153 will continue to be tested quarterly by IT-10, IT-10A, and IT-10B. The acceptance criteria for leakage past these check valves is a 3 psi drop in 15 minutes.

The remnant copper instrument air supply lines along with their unistrut supports will remain intact but the tees just downstream of IA-353/358 will be removed, eliminating the need for soldering.

The nitrogen system pressure regulators (AF-4053/4058) are currently set to 60 psig, and will be re-set to 65 psig. This will increase the margin for stroking the minimum flow recirculation valves shut, although this is still less than the normal valve regulator setting of 100 psig.

Calculation 2002-0002 has verified that these valves will pass full flow when only 20% open, since the flow restricting orifices RO-4008/4015 govern the flow rate and have the lowest flow coefficient in the recirculation line Installation will occur in the auxiliary feedwater pump room P-38A/B cubicles. The approach of this installation is to first layout the locations of the supports to prepare for the installation of the Girard tubing clamps with Hilti bolts. The tubing runs will then be fabricated as shown in Sketches SK-MNR-01-144 Sheets 1 & 2. When routing the tubing for AF-4007, it may be necessary to remove a piece of welded rod that is currently installed between two supports This rod performs no structural function. When it comes time to take the affected portion of the system out of service, TSAC 3.7.5 will be entered. Proper FME precautions will be taken to avoid foreign material introduction into the system during installation. After all tie-ins are complete. testing will commence. Post-modification testing for the piping will consist of an initial service leak test and AOV Flowscan. IT-10, IT-10A. and IT-10B will then be used to Page 4 of 5

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT DESIGN DESCRIPTION MR0I-144 January 24, 2002 AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP MINI FLOW RECIRC CONTROL VALVE MODIFICATION COMMON perform the necessary open/shut tests on the check valves, pressure drop tests, and valve stroke tests The valves will also be stroked with nitrogen before the system is returned to service.

Design Output Documents:

"* Construction Sketches SK-MR-01-144 Sheets I & 2

"* Bill of Material Work Orders WO 9950688 & WO 9950689 0

10CFR50.59 Safety Screening (New Rule), PBF-1515c, SCR 2002-0010 0

WO Work Plans for WO 9950688 & WO 9950689 0

Calculation 2002-0002 Page 5 of 5

IM-*

INTERNAL Comm*r,,, to Nucle*jr E

CORRESPONDENCE NPM 2002-0030 To:

Jeff Novak Stewart Wietholter From: Paul Knoespel Date:

January 17, 2002

Subject:

Risk Reduction From Modifications to AFW Mini-Recirculation Valves Air Supply Copy To:

File

References:

Modification Requests MvlR-01-144 and MvR-02-001.

A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA.) study was done to estimate overall risk reduction that would be achieved by providing a backup motive air supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater pump mini-recirculation valves. These valves fail closed on a loss of instrument air to ensure sufficient forward flow is available to feed the steam generators. This feature creates a problem if injection flow needs to be reduced or stopped entirely to control steam generator level early in events where instrument air is not available. Without a minimum amount of flow, the pumps will rapidly overheat and fail.

The modifications referenced above will provide a backup supply of motive power for the mini recirculation valves that will allow time either for instrument air to be restored or for manual control of the valves to be established locally. For the turbine-driven pumps 1(2)-P-029, an accumulator with dual check valves for isolation will be installed in the instrument air supply line for the valves. For the motor-driven pumps 0-P-038A and 0-P-038B, a backup supply will be provided from the existing nitrogen bottles that were installed several years ago for the injection flow control valves.

These modifications were factored into the PRA model by 1) building in failure of the new (or repositioned) air supply check valves and 2) removing the loss of offsite power and station blackout events from those requiring eventual manual control of the mini-recirculation valves These two events already factor in the failure to restart instrument air compressors when power is restored, so manual control is not necessary. Additional credit to the human error probability for having more time available to complete the manual control action correctly was not given for this study.

The results of the study show that installing these two modifications is estimated to result in a reduction of the overall core damage frequency from 1.2E-04/vr to 5.OE-05/yr, or a 58%

reduction. When procedure changes are developed and included in the PRA model, the resulting overall core damage frequency should be even lower.

Point Beach Nuclear Plant DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST "NMt..ication or Temporary Modification Number:

MR 01-144

Title:

AFW Motor Driven Pump Mini Flow Recirc Control Valve Modification INSTRUCTIONS: Consider the basic functions of each structure, system, and component, (SSC), when answering the questions. The desiener shall check the appropriate box for each design input or section. All inputs that apply to the design shall be explained. The explanation may be documented on this checklist or in the design summary. The reviewer shall review the checklist, and any differences between the designer and the reviewer should be addressed. This checklist addresses most design concerns, but is not all encompassing Any additional concerns should be addressed in the design summary (Updates to this form covered by SCR 97-411.)

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO A. General codes, standards, regulatory requirements, and design criteria.

1. Are any of the PBNP FSAR general design criteria applicable? (Reference FSAR, Section 1 3 Identify and address design cnteria as appropriate.)

GDC 1. Quality Standards - All new tubing and valves installed will be QA scope and safety related GDC 2, Performance Standards - The subject valves isolate the minimum recirculation line to ensure that the auxiliary feedwater pumps deliver the required flow to the steam generators as needed to mitigate several accidents or events.

GDC 5, Records Requirement - The modification package will satisfy the record keeping "requirements specified.

2. Are any design requirements contained in commitments affected? (Reference CLB database and the E

Safety Evaluation/Screening associated with this change.)

Details are provided in the Safety Screening associated with this modification 3

Meet State of Wisconsin Administrative Code requirements? (Refer to ILHR 41.42, PSC 114, and LI other sections as appropriate for requirements.)

4. Meet existing DNR permits or require DNR approval? (Contact WE Environmental Department.)

LI

5. Consider the effect of design and accident conditions, such as pressure, temperature, fiuid chemistry, and radiation on components, including internal elastomers and material coaing compatibility LI (Changes in design parameters may impact Environmental Qualification.)

The new tubing will function dunng a design basis accident to ensure AFW is available All new tubing and valves installed will be stainless steel and have design ratings that 2re the same as or treater than the existing components.

6 Incorporate new types/models of equipment not presently used at PBNP?

LI Affect accessibility of any equipment Consider interim conditions, future maintenan,.e. and in-service inspection. (Reference ChvIs and drawings for manufacturers clearance requirements Future maintenance and inspections will be taken into account when new tubing is routed and new PBF-L534 o.,,

t 13 Rcicrnnc NP 7 2

,1nl*

Jil.

APPLIES TO DESIGN DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST YES NO valves are positioned.

"-o. Require breaching a High Energy Line Break (HELB) barrier? (Reference NP 8 4.16) If yes, EQ engineer review required.

9. Consider operating experience from PBNP and industry events (Reference DG-G04 for operating experience reviews and NPRDS, NODIL, CHA.MPS, INPO Keywords, or other databases.)

10. Consider failure effects on structures, systems, and components: (Failure analysis is only required for maintenance rule systems Contact the NSA-PSA group for guidance and scope.)

a.

The design discusses those events/accidents which the system/components are to withstand?

E This modification will provide a sufficient secondary source of nitrogen such that the subject valves are able to operate for at least two hours if the regular instrument air system is disabled due to a seismic event, tornado, fire, or loss of offsite power.

b.

The failure effect of the system/components: (Reference the NSA-PSA Group, Operating E

Experience, & IEEE-352-1975.)

"* How components may fail, and the effect of the failure on the system and related systems?

"* What mechanisms might produce failures?

"* How a failure would be detected?

"* What provisions are included to compensate for the failure?

Reference NPM 2002-0030 for PRA analysis.

Does the design add or remove components in containment?

a.

Change the amount of exposed aluminum in containment? (Reference DG-G07 and FSAR u

E Section 5.6.)

b.

Change the amount of exposed zinc in containment? (Reference DG-G07.)

E E

c.

Introduce materials into containment that could affect sump performance or lead to equipment E

degradation? (Reference DG-G07.)

d.

Decrease free volume of containment)

El

e.

Require addition or modification of a containment penetration boundary' (Consult the El

[]

containment system engineer )

f.

Require painting in containment'9 (Reference MI 36.3 )

E E

12. Consider potential for fuel failure'

a.

Affect fuel handling equipment?

E b

Present the potential for introducing foreign material/debris into the RCS or connected systems?

E E

'BF-158J Reference NP 72 P

32e U

I

APPLIES TO DESIGN DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST YES NO "c. Affect core barrel flow patterns? ("Baffle jetting" concerns) l]

E1

13. Meet requirements to abandon equipment if applicable (Reference NP 7.1.5)

E B.

Myechanical requirements. (Contact Mechanical Design Engineering for guidance.)

1. Have applicable ASMvIE Boiler & Pressure Vessel codes or other standards been identified?

(Reference the applicable spe'cification. In addition, safety-related components should be reconciled E

with DG-M16, and QA components should be reconciled with ANSI N45.2.)

All new components will be installed using ASME B31.1 - 1992.

2. Affect or add components/systems to ASME Section XI class 1,2, or 3 equipment? (Reference PBNP CHAMPS, CBD drawings, and IST Coordinator. If YES, follow NP 7.2.5, Repair/Replacement El Progam.)

AF-4007 and AF-4014 are ASME Section XI Class 3, but the air supply to the AOVs is not ASME class.

3. Require State of Wisconsin Administrative Code permits/approvals? (Reference NP 7.4.9, Wisconsin El Administrative Code for Boilers and Pressure Vessels or the Authorized Inspector.)

4. Consider component performance requirements such as capacity, rating, output?

Calculation 2002-0002 has been performed to ensure that the existing nitrogen bottles will be capable of supplying both the discharge and minimum flow recirculation valves.

5. Consider hydraulic requirements such as pump net positive suction heads, allowable pressure drops, allowable fluid velocities and pressures, valve trim requirements. packing/seal requirements?

By ensuring that the minimum recirculation valves remain open, the pumps will not dead head and fail when the pump discharge valves are shut.

6. Provide vents, drains, and sample points to accommodate operational, maintenance and testing needs?

E The design accommodates the above groups' needs.

7. Require service water? (Both essential and nonessential service water loads are modeled, and load El changes must be evaluated. Contact the SWAP Coordinator.)

S. Require the addition of check valves? (Reference DG-M13 for selection guidance.)

El No new check valves are required Existing check valves will be used

9. Require and evaluate any additional loading on instrument or service air, circ, fire protection, or dernineralized water, or other system" Calculation 2002-0002 was performed to ensure that the existing nitrogen bottles will be capable of supplying both the discharge and minimum flow recirculation valves.

10 Evaluate any additional loading on HVAC systems or affect ventilation flow during or after El installation? (This will require an EQ review for potential updates to EQSS, EQML & EQMR.)

11 Affect ventilation barriers, including containment, primary auxiliary building. or control room?

PBF-I53SP4 Paqe 3 ot 13 Rcterence NP 2 2

APPLIES TO DESIGN DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST YES NO

12. Require insulation') (Reference WE specification PB-485 for insulation, and NP 1.9.10 for asbestos control.)

13. Require lubrication? (Reference Lubncation Manual) 0

14. Require an independent means of pressure relief' (Reference B31 1.)

11

15. Affect the assigned system design pressure or temperature?

El

16. Involve cobalt-laden materials into the RCS or into systems that supply the RCS9 (Reference NP 4 2.29. "Source Term Reduction Program.")

17. Are new materials and their coatings/plating compatible with system chemistry and disposal systems E

(NP 8.4.15)?

IS. Affect embedded or buried piping?

C. Electrical requirements. (Contact Electrical Design Engineering for guidance.)

1. Consider design conditions such as ampacity, voltage drop?

2 Consider component and system performance requirements, such as current, voltage, or power' E]

3. Consider redundancy, diversity and separation requirements of structures, systems and components')

(Reference DG-E07 for separation of electrical circuits.)

4 Comply with protective relaying requirements of equipment and systems?

El

5. Selection of overcurrent devices for proper protection and coordination? (Reference DG-E04 for selection of molded case circuit breakers.)

6. Affect available fault current at any bus?

E]

z 7

Assure that all added cables meet fire retardancy requirements? (Reference FPER Section 4 1.S.

El z

IEEE 383 )

S. Be compatible with existing electrical insulation and wirin2?

D PBF-1583 2"2

9.

10.

11.

12 13 14 Ic 1

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST Affect ampacity of existing cables?

Maintain UL (or equivalent) listings?

Alter the voltage harmonic distortion content or change the non-linear loading (i.e, the addition of switching power supplies, the alteration of the circuit's power factor, etc.) on a ',ital or sensitive instrument bus?

• Add new raceways? (Reference DG-E03 for electrical raceway sizing and DG-E02.)

Add cables to existing electrical raceways?

. Be routed through fire wrapped raceways?

5. Affect the station grounding or lightning protection system?

6. Make any vital circuit susceptible to ground?

7. Affect emergency diesel loading? (Reference DG-E06 for diesel load change evaluation)

8. Add more station battery loading?

19. Add load to a vital bus?

20. Add load to a non-vital bus?

21. Be compatible with service transformer capacity?

22. Consider electromagnetic interference between new/existing equipment and electromagnetic coupling interactions between circuits" 23 Affect embedded conduits or buried cables. including the station.rounding system-El El El El El El El El El El El El P l,,

4, o f 1 It,,.cr e nm N P 7 2 2 APPLIES TO DESIGN YES N__O E]

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[

El 21 PBF-t584

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST 2,

.strumentation and control requirements. (Contact I&C Design Engineering for guidance.)

1. Consider design conditions such as pressure, temperature, fluid chemistry, amperage, voltage?

The existing pressure regulators on valves AF-4007 and AF-4014 will not need to be replaced as a result of this modification.

2. Have the instruments been properly selected for the application?

3. Have sufficient instruments for operators to monitor the process?

4. Have appropriate instrument scales?

5. Have the instruments, control switches, and indicating devices been appropriately located for human factors (both for operations and maintenance)7 (Reference DG-GO 1.)

6. Have alarms for off-normal conditions?

7. Be capable of or require remote and/or local operation?

Be capable of or require manual and/or automatic operation?

9. Require calibration and maintenance requirements for the instruments to be specified?

10. Have specified the instruments with proper range and accuracy?

11. Address solid state vulnerability to RFI?

12. Consider software and pro rammrnng/programrnable settings of digital or electronic equipment?

13. Affect logic circuits or associated GL 96-01 review/required testing9 Contact I&C System Engineering group.

PBF-1584 APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO El El El El El El El E3 El E3 Reieatne NP " 2 2

[]

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z]

Paqoe h I-)( I 3-

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST Structural requirements. (Contact Civil Design Engineering for guidance.)

I. Affect or scope seismically qualified equipment (Class I or 2) and therefore require a seismic qualification evaluation? (Reference NP 7.7.2, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment.")

All new tubing and valves will be analyzed as seismic Class I.

2 Affect seismic boundaries'

3. Affect stress calculations of pipe) (Reference DG-M09

4. Affect the loading or require changes to existing equipment foundations 9

5. Affect wall stress calculations for pressurized concrete cubicles or structures?

"6. Require analysis of non-seismic components placed over or adjacent to seismic components?

7. Add items which span between two separate seismic areas/buildings 9 (The effect of the relative movement must be addressed.)

8. Require clearance review for seismic movement or thermal expansion considerations?

9. Require a floor or wall loading analysis? (Reference Bechtel C-dwgs.)

10. Require the addition of new supports, hangers, or foundations or add weight to or between existing supports, hangers, embeds, or foundations during installation or post-installation? (Reference DG-M09 and DG-M10 for pipe support.)

New tubing will be supported by Gtrard clamps using guidance from CALC S&W 14410.1 l-NP(B) 001-XE and Addendum A

11. Add new or add load to seismically qualified raceways? (Reference NP 7.7.2, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment ")

12 Modify, attach to, or locate within the proximity of masonry block walls? (Reference IEB 80-11 Block Wall Program)

13. Require core drills, expansion anchors, or re-bar cuts9 (Reference DG-CO I for expansion anchor design and installation.)

,/4" Hilti bolts will be used to support the Girard clamps 1-4 Create an cxternal or internal missile hazard?

15 Consider wind and storm loading on external structures?

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO Z

El E]

11 11 Rcierencre NP 7-Paqe 7 ot 13 PBF-15S-4 El 19 Z]

APPLIES TO DESIGN DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST YE__S NO "16. Require protection from high energy line break jet? (Refer to FSAR Appendix A.2.)

E

17. Consider dynamic requirements such as live loading, vibration, and shock/impact9 El F. Programs

1. ASME Section XI and QA considerations:

a.

Affect IST acceptance criteria or calculations? (Contact Component Engineering.)

D Acceptance criteria for leakage past the check valves (3 psi drop in 15 minutes) will not change.

b.

Require classification of new components? (Reference DG-G06 for system. component, and E

part classification.)

All new tubing and valves will be installed under QA scope.

c.

Affect QA-scope systems or boundaries? (Contact Site Programs Engineering Support for m

Q-List.)

Existing IA tubing downstream of the valve regulators will be classified as QA/SR

d.

Require special personnel/equipment qualifications not proceduralized at PBNP (i e.,

underwater welding))

e Require material certification or other certification to ensure quality equal to or better than the affected SSC? (These requirements need to be specified in the specification or purchase El requisition.)

All parts will be certified QA.

f.

Have all design requirements, such as pressure or current rating, been reviewed against lot descriptions or been specified on purchase requisitions/specifications?

Refer to Bill of Material.

2. Fire protection considerations:

a.

Affect access to a fire zone, fire protection equipment or Appendix R safe shutdown equipment, El including manual fire fighting activities? (Reference Section 5.2.1 of Design Guide DG-F01)

b.

Affect a fire barrier? (Reference NP 8 4.11 and Fire Barrier Drawings WE PBC-21S Sheets 1-20, Secuon 5.2.2 of Design Guide DG-F01)

"c.

Affect a fire protection system or its performance? (Reference Section 5.2.3 of Design Guide E

DG-F01 )

d Increase or decrease permanent combustible loading in a room) (Referent.e Section 5.2 4 of Design Guide DG-F01; PBF-1584 P-

,-0 Page 8 of 13 Rc:ercnc,.

NP 7 2 2

APPLIES TO DESIGN DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST YES NO

e.

Based on Section 2 and Appendix A of the SSAR, will the change add to, delete from, or affect the performance of safe shutdown systems or equipment9 (Reference Section 5.2.5.1 of Design ED El Guide DG-FOl)

Auxiliary Feedwater is a Safe Shutdown system A Fire Protection Conformance Checklist has been completed for this modification.

f.

Based on Sections 3, 4, and Appendix C of the SSAR, will the change affect a cable associated with safe shutdown equipment, a safe shutdown power supply, or the physical location of a safe shutdown cable9 (Reference Section 5.2 5 2 of Design Guide DG-F01)

Sg.

Based on Table 1-1, Section 5 and Appendix D of the SSAR, will the change affect fire area analysis and compliance with Appendix R separation criteria or the conditions of an approved Appendix R exemption for any PBNP Fire Area? (Reference Section 5.2.5.3 of Design Guide DG-F01, Table 3 2-2 of DBD T-40)

h.

Will the change add, remove, or affect the performance of any emergency lighting required for compliance with Section III.J of Appendix R? (Reference Section 5.2.6 of Design Guide DG-E FF01)

i.

Will the change add, remove, or affect the performance of any plant communications system relied upon for fire fighting or safe plant shutdown? (Reference Section 5 2.7 of Design Guide El DG-F01)

j.

Will the change affect the Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System? (Reference Section 5.2.8 of Design Guide DG-FOI)

k.

Will the change affect the Fire Protection Manual9

1.

Will the change affect any of the Supporting Documents listed in the SSAR (Section 6.0) or the E

FHAR (Section 4.0))

If any of the questions a through j are answered "yes", an evaluation must be performed using the applicable sections of the FPCC checklist, PBF-2060 per Section 5 of Design Guide DG-FO0.

3. Flooding protection considerations:

A flooding analysis should be performed if any of the following questions are applicable and answered yes. (Reference Section 4 3 of DG-C02.)

a.

Modify potential flooding sources or add new potential flooding sources to a flood zone and thereby increase the direct and/or indirect flooding vulnerability of essential equipment, b

Decrade existing flood barriers or flood miiation teatures providing unanalyzed pathway tor m

flooding to propagate' (Reference Section 3 2 of DG-C02.)

PBF-134Pf P202e 9ot 13 Referen NP 7::

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

c.

Involve the opening of potential flood sources anywhere at the station? (Installation procedures need to address inadvertent flooding Reference DG-C02, Section 4 4.)

d.

Reduce the capacity to isolate or cope with flooding? (Reference Sect 4.2 of DG-C02.)

e.

Change plant drainage/backfill requirements?

f.

Locate essential equipment or supporting systems where it would be susceptible to flooding?

(Flooding conditions may also impact Environmental Qualification.)

4. Environmental considerations

a.

Be subject to adverse environmental conditions during storage or construction? (Reference NP 9.5.2.)

b Require freeze protection or affect existing freeze protection?

c.

Locate safety-related or post accident monitoring equipment in a HARSH environment?

(Reference NP 7 7.1.)

d.

Require Environmental Qualification (EQ)9 (Reference NP 7.7.1 for EQ qualification)

e.

Be attached to an EQ system/component? (This will require an EQ review for potential updates to EQSS, EQML & EQMR. Reference EQ master list.)

f.

Change environmental parameters (e.g, pressure, temperature, radiation, hurmdity)? (Reference NP 7.7.1, "Environmental Qualification of Electmcal Equipment."

5 Radiation Protection (RP) and ALARA considerations- (Reference DG-G03, "ALARA Consideration Guideline for Design & Installation.)

The areas mentioned below are normally within the RCA, but radiological concerns should be considered for SSC outside the RCA also

a.

Affect any SSC in an RWP required area. a contaminated area, or a radiation area, including opening of a system that may be a radiological concern?

b Will the change generate excessive radwaste or highly radioactive/contaminated waste"

c.

Remove any plant equipment trom a potentially Lontaminated system (including BOP systerrm)"

PBF. 1584 Pac,,e 10 of 13 APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO El 0]

[

0 19 E]

E]

Riet'ence NP 7 2 i1

APPLIES TO DESIGN DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST YES NO

d.

Result in an anticipated increase in operational or maintenance exposures?

E (Consider equipment rearrangement to reduce plant life dose?)

e.

Result in an expected exposure of greater than I Rem for any individual during installation of the change"

f.

Result in an anticipated collective exposure of greater than 2 Rem for the installation of the E

change?

If questions d, e. or f apply and are answered yes, then an ALARA review shall be performed.

(Reference NP 4.2.3, "ALARA Review Procedure.")

6. Chemistry considerations:

a.

Require or affect established chemistry limits? (Contact system engineer and review chemistry procedures.)

b.

Require any routine chemical analyses? (Contact system engineer and review chemistry procedures.)

c.

Require chemical additives? (Contact PBNP Chemistry.)

LI

d.

Do new fluids/chemicals need to be evaluated for TRI (Toxic Release Inventory), CHES.

critical applications, or special disposal requirements? (Contact Chemistry/Chemical El Engineering.)

G. Installations

1. Installation requirements/plant conditions have been determined?

0 El As specified in Work Order Work Plan.

2. Consider test and inspection requirements, including the conditions under which they will be performed? (Reference NP 7.4.1 for pressure test requirements, NP 7 4.3 for post-maintenance and modification NDE requirements, NP 1.2.5 for special test procedures, and OM 4 2.2 for in-service tests.)

As specified in Work Order Work Plan.

3. Have post-installation acceptance cntena been properly specified to test the intended function of the z

El component(s)/system?

As specified in Work Order Work Plan.

4 Comply with all WE lifting and rigging requirements*' (Reference WE Safety Manual. PBNP Safe Load Path procedures, and NP 8 -4 7

5. Consider AI..ARA for installation activities
9 0.e. shielding, monitoring water level, etc.)

Rcierenc:

"FP 2 2' PBF-158-4

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST Require special handling, shipping, or environmental conditions for storage or construcuon' (Reference NP 9.5.2 for material storage.)

7. Consider transportability requirements such as size and shipping weight limitations 8

Require spare parts or special non-standard items or tools'?

9. Will any added components introduce chemical contaminants to the system? (i.e., preservative coating on valves, coatings on weld rod can also introduce contaminants)

10. Consider personnel requirements and limitations, including the qualification and number of personnel available for plant operation, maintenance, testing and inspection, and permissible personnel radiation exposures?

11. Operational requirements under various conditions, such as plant startup, normal plant shutdown, plant emergency operation, special or infrequent operation, and system abnormal or emergency operation.

a.

Require new procedures or procedure changes? (Reference NP 1 2 5.)

As specified on Document Update Checklist.

b.

Potentially impact other systems, components, or structures during installation?

The installation of this modification will affect the Instrument Air and Auxdliary Feedwater systems

c.

Present installation impacts on plant operations (i.e., fire watches, etc.)?

12. Access and adrmnistrative requirements for plant security-If any security requirements are applicable, notify Security.

a.

Create an opening >96 in. 2 in any wall, ceiling, or other barrier?

b.

Require work within 20' of fence"

c.

Affect security equipment and documents, including those containing safeguards information?

(Contact Security for design development requirements and design concurrence )

d.

Affect access controls?

13 Safety requirements.

a.

Affect safety equipment and thereby create personnel hazards (0 e. :emoý,a! of handrails)"

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO El E]

El El El b

Introduce hazardous material into the plant? (Relerence NP 1 9 1 )

PBF-158.4 Ielcemr-nt NP 7 2 2 Pa*,e I _of 13

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST c

Affect evacuation routes or escape provisions from enclosures?

d Meet OSHA regulations? (Reference Wisc. Electric Safety Manual and OSHA 29 CFR 1910)

Work will be performed in accordance with the WE Safety Manual.

e.

Move any energy sources? If yes, verify installation document covers move, including transferring danger tags.

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO E]

[

[]

[

ID Stewart A. Wietholter 2

/?t P12Ce 13ot 13 Date:

Date.

/

Reference NP 7 2 2 Designed by Reviewed by-P8F.1584-

DOCUMENT UPDATE CHECKLIST Plant Modification/Minor Plant Change No. _MR 01-1-4 Work Order No.:

9950688 / 99506S9 DOCUMEN'TATION UPDATE SHEET AND CLOSEOUT CHECKLIST Required For Release Acceptance Closeout N/A (Completion)

(Submittal)

X

1.

Copy Submitted to Training (Design Description)

-XI

2.

TWR Generated (TWR # TWR 02-032

) Ref SIMGL CI.A I

~

~~X 3 Simulator Changes Initiated (SDR#_______)

X4.

Plant Status Update/'Just In Time Trairning B. FINAL DESIGN ORGAN'IZATION

1.

Drawings X

a.

Design Change In Progress DCN's initiated X

b Construction sketches Issued

- --c. Revised Drawings Issued for Priority 1 and 2 Control Room Drawings - Logics, P&IDs, 499 series elementaries.

x

d.

Revised Drawings Issued for Work Control Center Drawings P&IDs x

e.

Revised Drawings Iss"'-d for I&C Drawings - Reactor Protection and Safega.. 7ds Elementaries.

X

f.

Master Data Book - Control Room, Work Control Center. and Local Panel - PBF-2093 X

a g DCN's released for incorporation X.

h.

Sketches Voided - PBF-1592 X

2.

Specifications (Conformed at Closeout, ref NP 9.2.1)

X

3.

Component Instruction Manuals (for issue, revision, deletion)

PBF-1586 x

4.

Cable and Raceway Data Schedule Revisions - PBF-0091 x

5.

Environmental Qualification Documentation Updates - Ref. NP

- -7.7.1 I X

[7-f-2

6. Seismic Qualification Updates NP 7.7 2 "X

7.

Calculations or engineering evaluations added/deleted / revised x X PBF-1608 I

x 8

DBD Revisions - PBF-1653

[

X 9

PSA Models anc Documentation - PBF-1626 10 EPIU< Update - report Equipment changes/addations to the EPIX t

Coordinator

---.1

DOCUMENT UPDATE CHECKLIST Plant tvModification/Minor Plant Change No. -MR 01-14 Work Order No.:

9950688 / 99506S9 DOCLUMENTATION UPDATE SHEET AND CLOSEOUT CHECKLIST Required For Release Acceptance Closeout N/A (Completion)

(Subrruttal)

C. LICENSING (Conformed at Acceptance)

1.

Technical Specification - change; specify secuon(s) affected and I

I I

Sx 9~

Tech.Snec Basis/Technical Requirements Manual

3.

FSAR - change; NP 5.2.6 Report major changes to the containment aluminum inventory list with FSAR update.

4 FPER - FHAR - SSAR Revnsions - N? 5 2.11 x

I

1.

--4

a.

Safe Shutdown Analysis Management System Revisions - NP 7 7 0 Pl*F.lQ17 1

nfe;,

Donse Calculation Manual (ODC0M!)

A]

r4

~

-'S...-.

X

7.

Emergency Plan and EPIPs II I-U.

0 0.LUA I

I I

x

_______i.

I x

I I.

9.

Report major changes to radwaste treatment systems with annual FSAR update per RECM 1.6 3 D. CHAMPS DATABASE

1.

Equipment Identification - additions assitned from CHAMPS X

2.

Permanent Labeling - labels on new equipment: PBF-9900

3.

Temporary Labeling - labels on new equipment, PBF-2074 x

T*equpmnReordr La pdtbteHAPlcodiaorsegt X

4.

Equipment Record - update to CHAMPS coordinator specify chanoe(s); PBF-9922

5.

Spare parts stocking and scrapping inputs into CHAMPS; PB P-9925, PBF-1023 X

6.

Unused material removed from modification bin E. OPERATIONS x

1.

Abnormal Operating, Normal Operating, System Operating, and "Refuelin, Procedures - PBF-0026a Op 0erating Instructions and Checklists - ?BF-0026a x- "-~-*---

3 Alarm Response and RIMS Alarm Setpoint and Response Books PBF-0026a T

-4 4

Testng - TS, IT. ORT. other-PBF-0026a X

I I

I 5

EOPs. ECAs. CSPs. SAMG's - PBF-0026a X

I I

I 6

Periodic Surveillances - PBF-9920 X

1 7

Fire Protection Procedures - PBF-0026a x

I8 EOP Setpoints. EOP Instrument Uncertainty Calculations XI I

PBF-8001 XI I

9 Tank Level Book - PBF-0026a x

I I

4

-,n C -.'"

v A

V*dinlngical Effluent Control Manual (RECM-)

v

?" *,a^;-.r~, tri-Secr~tv for Sqecuntv Dian update I

I I

I l

C UPDATE CHECKLIST 1

Plant Modification/Minor Plant Change No. MR 01.14 Work Order No.:

99506S8 / 99506S9

)ATE SHEET AND CLOSEOUT CHECKLIST Required For Acceptance Closeout (Completion)

(Submittal)

F. MAI-NTENAINCE-I&C

1.

Maintenance Procedures/instructions - PBF-0026a

2.

ICPs - PBF-0026a X

3 Setoint Document - PBF-8001 x

4.

Preventatixe Maintenance - initiate/revise CHAIMPS callups:

PBF-992119920

5.

Ensure station batteries' load profile changes are incorporated into the aoorooriate dischar2e test RMPs

6.

Lubrication M (NP 7.3 '1)

SECURITY

1.

Security Procedures H. EINGVNEERING1MISC.

I ISi Program

2.

IST Program I3. Miscellaneous HX ECT/Cleanin2 program 4

Reactor Engineering Instructions - change, specify section(s) affected 5 Reactor Engineering Procedures - chance. specify secuon(s) affected.

6.

Software Control - specifyi system affected and software change request number.

S 7

Comoonent maintenance programs.

3 Governing calculations and models (e.g, SW model, DC loading, EDG loading. piping analysis, structural loadin2. etc.)

I 9

Design Guidelines (ref. NP 7.1.2)

I. OTHER (CHEM, HIP, ETC.)

I Otýer (Misc. Procedures. etc J ECRs x/

I ECR F:.-al.Resolution cornleved and avproved by Design DORF. 1606 I. -

"D - I I

Pric

,:_non Specific Updates Required Rel A.I.

Copy to Training A.2.

T',VR Generated A.3 Simulator Changes Initiated

[

A 4 Plant Status Update B 1 a.

Design Change in Progress DCNs M-217 Sh. 2, M-209 Sh 4 B.l.b.

Issue Construction Sketches SK-MR-0I-144 Sheets 1 &2 B.1.c.

Control Room Drawings B I.d.

Work Control Center Drawings B.1.g.

Release DCNs for Incorporation B.1.h.

Void Sketches B.6.

Update Seismic Qualification B.7.

Calculation 2002-0002 B.8.

DBD-01 Revision B.9.

PSA Model Updated C 2 Tech Spec Basis B3.7.5 C 3 FSAR Section 9.7 C 3 FSAR Section 10.2 C.4 SSAR Section 2 3.2.4 2 C.4.a.

SSAMS Change D 1.

Equipment IDs from CHALMPS D.2.

Permanent Labeling D 3 Temporary Labeling D 4.

Equipment Record Updates D 6 Empty Mod Bin E. I

• ,OP-5B E.2.

CL-13E PART 2 SE.'.

IT-10 J

El El3 El El El El El El E-l El El El El El El Prior to Change No.

Prior to Closeout El El El Change'NDo.

('if Applicable) fBv/ Date Tw eL~-O6Z32

~j~~d,

-510 or to Prior to ease LAcceptance s El

]

El D

D

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El J PW 2zCOZ-o072 DCAJ Z.-Vl-v3 El El ]I F-1

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(']jf 5 El LIZ LI

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El

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2---o-0 A'ýf 97,1 0,18'q, W

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zS.

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. K till tJ*l c-,o

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• *6f...

7c,,/.,A:22-

Prior to Prior to r

11 Prior to Acceptance Closeout ction Specific Updates Required R el ease "E.4.

IT-10A E.4.

IT-I OB E.4 O-TS-AFW-002 E

E.7.

Revise FOP 1.2 D

F.3 STPT 1-.11 D

F.4 Call-up to Flowscan valves Hl ).J(-!JP(* )-ob -K'E-ao-A E

£7.___

foo-oo*

Lu.÷:o El

- _-L I~

~I~-Cc~ a Qoj pF-0 T o

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El El LI El El El LI EL 1z El EJ (z

[2 El rq El D3 ED rq El ElI ElI El LEl El

,0) zJ-i Prior to

-I I-A1

• ,ILs" Change No.

(if Applicable)/ By! Date Tý It o,- y

• .,.* d.'7',<k.*

-o

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT DESIGN VERIFICATION NOTICE of Document AFW Motor Driven Pump Mini Flow Recirc Control Valve Modification Document No MR 01-144 Rev.

D Design Verification Method

[

Design Review UPDATES TO THIS FORM COVERED BY EXISTING SCR 97-410

' Alternate Calcs ate 1/15/02 D Qualification Testing REVIEWER CHECKLIST CONSIDERATIONS.

1.

Were the inputs correctly selected and incorporated into design?

2.

Are assumptions necessary to perform the design activity adequately described and reasonable? Where necessary, are the assumptions identified for subsequent reverifications when the detailed design activities are completed?

3.

Are the appropriate quality and quality assurance requirements specified?

4.

Are the applicable codes, standards, and regulatory requirements including issue and addends properly identified and are their requirements for design met?

5.

Have applicable construction and operating experience been considered?

6.

Have the design interface requirements been satisfied?

7.

Was an appropriate design method used?

S.

Is the output reasonable compared to inputs'

9.

Are the specified parts, equipment and processes suitable for the required application'

).

Are the specified materials compatible with each other and the design environmental conditions to which the material will be exposed?

11.

Have adequate maintenance features and requirements been specified?

12.

Are accessibility and other design provisions adequate for performance of needed maintenance and repair?

13.

Has adequate accessibility been provided to perform the in-service inspection expected to be required during the plant life?

14.

Has the design properly considered radiation exposure to the public and plant personnel?

15.

Are the acceptance criteria incorporated in the design documents sufficient to allow verification that design requirements have been satisfactorily accomplished' 16 Have adequate pre-operational (IST, PMT, 1SI, snubber, etc ), subsequent periodic test, and inspection requirements been appropriately specified, including acceptance criteria?

17.

Are adequate handling, storage, cleaning, and shipping requirements specified?

is Are adequate identification requirements specified?

19.

Are requirements for records adequately specified"

20.

Will the chance remain within the analyzed or specified capabilities of any affected equipment"

21.

Has a field inspection been done?

22 Have impacts on other systems been identified?

CONIMENTS 1ý3 None E

Attached (Use Form PBF-1633) gn Prepoaed By :

Stewart -

Wietholter

/ t.5 11 t

-;viewed By:

ji r -J~~

K E

Approval By:

I'-E PBF-i5883 Yes el

-7 V.A 7

V.

..-7

-7

)ate

)ate

)ate No N/A i

/

f

_& I 1?r

, NP-

Work Control Document:

Equipment ID:

Equipment

Description:

Work Plan Originator:

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN 9950688 AF-04007 P-38A AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002

-- ;--,-WORK SCOPE:':

WORK SCOPE Modification MR 01 -144 will provide a safety-related backup nitrogen system to the AFW motor-driven and pump mini flow recirc control valves so the valves function on loss of Instrument Air.

PURPOSE This work plan has been generated to implement the AF-4007 portion of MR 01-144.

Install OA/safety-related stainless steel tubing jumpers from the air system for the AFW motor-driven pump mini flow recirc control valve, AF-4007, to the air system for the AFW motor-driven pump discharge control valve, AF-4012, which currently has a backup nitrogen supply.

INITIAL Appropriate TSAC (3.7.5.C) entered when system is taken out of service.

CONDITIONS DANGER TAG Recommended Tag Series:

SCOPE Danger Tag P-38A Breaker RACK OUT P-38A Control Switch PULL OUT IA-353 SHUT IA-354 SHUT AF-135 SHUT AF-136 SHUT DANGER TAG M-217 SH. 2 REFERENCES M-209 SH. 4 M-217 SH. 1 CHAMPS LIMITATIONS Ignition Control Permit AND PRECAUTIONS TOOLS Obtain tubing, valves, clamps, and other components as listed on the Bill of Matenal and shown on AND Sketch SK-MR-01-144 Sheet 1. Note that the BOM covers the parts needed for both this WO and the MATERIALS work plan for WO 9950689.

EQUALITY CONTROL CC REVIEW OF WORK PLAN (independent QC review required on QA classified work order only) NA if non-QA work order CC Date Any change in scope requires WO WP review by QC inspector.

INSP.

Page 1 of 7 PBF.9169 Revision 3 01112/01 I

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950688 Eauioment ID:

AF-04007 Equipment

Description:

P-38A AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Work Plan Originator:

Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002 SUPPORT7 SUPPORT U

Chemistry

[]

Engineering C]

Radiation Protection

[]

I&C Maintenance U]

NDE

[]

Operations

[

QOC U]

Security U

Crane UITB U PAB U Polar U Other U]

Other

..PRE-JOBBRIEF

,._.,,rvisor/Job Leader to conduct pre-job brief using PBF-9217 (Mtn and I&C) or OM 3.29 (OPs).

NOTE: Pre-job brief may require attendance of other workgroups involved in the work activity.

PRE-JOB BRIEF COMPLETED Supervisor or Job Leader Date Page 2 of 7 PBF-9169

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950688 Equipment ID:

AF-04007 Equipment

Description:

P-38A AFI Work Plan Originator:

Stewart W P MINI RECIRC CONTROL

/ietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002 Page 3 of 7 PBF-9169 Pevision 3 01/12'01

"-N OTES NOTE:

The steps in this work plan may be performed in any logical order.

FME:

Tools and equipment shall be checked for loose parts and debris and temporary covers should be installed for foreign material exclusion (FME) of system/components per Exclusion of Foreign Material from Plant components and Systems, NP 8 4.10.

NOTE:

IF inspections or discrepancies require modifications to Work Scope THEN STOP work, place equipment in SAFE condition, and NOTIFY Supervision.

NOTE:

The Control Room / the Work Control Center / and the watchstander (as appropriate) shall be informed of the status of jobs which:

bring in alarms, affect indications, and other work being performed on operating equipment.

NOTE:

All workers shall perform all Danger Tagging requirements as defined in NP 1.9.15 NOTE:

When replacing parts, compare the old part to the new part to verify it is an acceptable replacement.

"TE:

If work scope changes, an R/R/M form may be required for parts replacement or repair.

"rE:

Any pen and ink change to work plan requires initial and date by the change.

NOTE:

Write WO number on top/header of any supplemental pages added to work package, i.e., torms, procedures, checklists...

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950688 Equipment ID:

AF-04007 Equipment

Description:

P-38A AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Work Plan Originator:

Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002 Hold Po-n Step Work Plan Description Worker Date NO&

NOTE:

STEPS 1-2 AND 6-9 DO NOT REQUIRE DSS APPROVAL.

FME

1.

Perform Pre-System Opening Area FME Inspection/Cleanup Document on PBF-9158 MT/I&C DATE

2.

Layout support locations using Sketch SK-MR-01 -144 Sheet 1 as guidance.

MT DATE

3.

Notify DSS prior to drilling and grinding in AFP room.

MT DATE Qc

4.

Inspect installation of Hilti anchors using Hilti Anchor Data Checklist, PBF HOLD 7042E.

HOLD0C DATE

5.

Using HOti bolts, mount Gerard Clamps on wall per MI 7.1.

C U

MT DATE 6

Initiate an Ignition Control Permit (PBF-0068) to allow grinding in the Auxiliary Feed Pump Room M

VT DATE

7.

In P-38A Auxiliary Feed Pump cubicle, remove candy cane-shaped piece of welded rod that is currently installed between two supports.

NOTE: This rod performs no structural function.

MT DATE

8.

Fabricate tubing runs as shown on Sketch SK-MR-01-144 Sheet 1.

I&C DATE LABELING

9.

Install supplied temporary labels on AF-182. AF-1 84, and AF-4063.

I&C DATE

10.

Obtain DSS approval to continue when the installation is to tMe point where the system needs to be taken out of service.

I&C DATE

11.

Enter TSAC 3.7.5.C.rouns__WO_3.7._

SOPS DATE

12.

Commence fire rounds lAW OM 3.27.1 OPS DATE 13 Remove P-38A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump from Service lnstall danger tags.

Tag Senes:

OPS DATE

14.

Make necessary tie-ins into the system per Sketch SK-MR-01-14d1 Sheet 1.I I&C DATE i-'age DATE PBF-9169 Page A* Or 7

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950688 Equipment ID:

AF-04007 Equipment

Description:

P-38A AFF Work Plan Originator:

Stewart W UNIT: PB_0

) MINI RECIRC CONTROL ietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 Date: January 25, 2002 StDat Hold Point St Work Plan Description Worker Date HoldPoin No 0C

15.

NOTE: QC Inspector to witness torquing of Gerard Clamp Bolts to HOLD 7.5 ft-lbs +/- 0.5 ft-lbs.

Torque all Gerard Clamp Bolts to 7.5 ft-lbs +/- 0 5 ft-lbs.

Torque Wrench M&TE #:

Due Date:

OC Inspector Date I&C DATE

16.

Ensure the following are complete:

"* Installation of the tubing run from downstream of AF-1 33 to AF-4063.

"* Installation of cross-tie bypassing AF-1 33.

"* Removal of tee in IA supply line downstream of IA-353.

"* Installation of all clamps as required.

I&C DATE lOUSE

17.

Remove all debris, tools, and materials from the area. Ensure all work KEEPING areas meet PBNP housekeeping expectations.

l&C DATE FME

18.

Perform Final FME Closeout Inspection. Document on PBF-9158.

I&C DATE

19.

Remove danger tags and align system for normal operations, per CL-13E PART 2 rev. 34.

OPS DATE PMT 20 Perform initial service leak test with valve AF-4007 open. Snoop for leakage. Test boundary should encompass both newly installed tubing and existing copper tubing leading up to AF-4007. Acceptance criteria is no visible leakage.

I&C DATE PMT

21.

Perform Flowscan of AF-4007. Adjust AF-4007 instrument air pressure regulator to 65 psig and re-perform Flowscan of AF-4007. Verify valve is nearly full open at 65 psig Return AF-4007 instrument air pressure regulator to 100 psig.

Flowscan of AF-4007 verifies satisfactory performance of valve under both operating pressure conditions.

,AOV Engineer Date I&C DATE

PENDENT

22.

Independently verify that AF-4007 instrument air regulator is returned to AIFICATION 100 psig IV DATE Page 5 of 7 S PBF-9169 Revision 3 01/12/01

Work Control Document:

Equipment ID:

Equipment

Description:

Work Plan Originator:

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN 9950688 AF-04007 P-38A AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB 0 Date. January 25, 2002

-OPERATIONS PMT

23.

Perform stroke test of AF-4007 with nitrogen as follows A.

Shut IA-354.

PMT 24.

B Open and uncap IA-355 to vent.

C. Set nitrogen pressure regulator AF-4053, AF-4012 AFP DISCHARGE CONTROL NITROGEN BACKUP REGULATOR, to 65 psig Use calibration sticker to mark position.

D.

Record pressures on pressure indicators PI-4051 and PI-4054:

PI-4051:

PI-4054:

E.

Stroke valve AF-4007.

F.

Record pressures on pressure indicators PI-4051 and PI-4054:

PI-4051:

PI-4054" G. Return system to normal lineup.

Perform IT-10 rev. 44, IT-1OA rev. 12, and IT-bOB rev 11 as required to compete the following:

Stroke tests of AF-4007 and AF-4012 with Instrument Air.

Shut test for AF-133.

Open tests for AF-142 and AF-145.

Pressure drop tests PMT and return to service testing have been completed OPS DATE OPS OPS DATE DATE OPS DATE OPS DATE OPS DATE OPS DATE OPS DATE OPS DATE DATE DATE Page 6 of 7 PBF-9169 I

I I

I i

i i

i 25.

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950688 Equipment ID:

AF-04007 Equipment

Description:

P-38A AFI Work Plan Originator:

Stewart W P MINI RECIRC CONTROL

'ietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0 Date: January 25, 2002

28.

The work can be accepted as complete (Reference PBF-1606).

RE Date DSS Date

29.

MAKE A COPY OF THE COMPLETED WORK PLAN AND SEND TO RESPONSIBLE ENGINEER (STEW WIETHOLTER).

OPS

[DATE 4

POST-JOB BRIEF" Conduct post-job debnef using PBF-9218 (Mtn and I&C) or OM 3.29 (OPs). Document lessons learned, good practices, problems encountered, etc. on feedback form. Debrief should include all applicable work groups.

POST-JOB DEBRIEF COMPLETED Supervisor or Job Leader Date

'. FEEDBACK`::-

Fill out feedback form attached to work package (maintenance group use PBF-9929)

MT/I&C DATE Page 7 of 7 PSF-g169 n_--*

I 0111'tO1

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950689 Equipment ID:

AF-04014 Equipment

Description:

P-38B AFF Work Plan Originator:

Stewart W P MINI RECIRC CONTROL ietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002 1K>.1.

WORKSCOPE~.~~

WORK SCOPE Modification MR 01-144 will provide a safety-related backup nitrogen system to the AFW motor-driven and pump mini flow recirc control valves so the valves function on loss of Instrument Air.

PURPOSE This work plan has been generated to implement the AF-4014 portion of MR 01 -144.

Install QA/safety-related stainless steel tubing jumpers from the air system for the AFW motor-driven pump mini flow recirc control valve, AF-4014, to the air system for the AFW motor-driven pump discharge control valve, AF-4019, which currently has a backup nitrogen supply INITIAL Appropriate TSAC (3.7.5.C) entered when system is taken out of service.

CONDITIONS DANGER TAG Recommended Tag Series:

SCOPE Danger Tag P-38B Breaker RACK OUT P-38B Control Switch PULL OUT IA-358 SHUT IA-356 SHUT AF-155 SHUT AF-156 SHUT DANGER TAG M-217 SH. 2 REFERENCES M-209 SH. 4 M-217 SH. 1 CHAMPS LIMITATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS TOOLS Obtain tubing, valves, clamps, and other components as listed on the Bill of Material and shown on AND Sketch SK-MR-01-144 Sheet 2. Note that the BOM covers the parts needed for both this WO and the MATERIALS work plan for WO 9950688

'---T tý-

--,.-QUALITY. CONTROL-OC REVIEW OF WORK PLAN (independent QC review required on CA classified work order only) NA if non-GA work order

_CDate Any change in scope requires WO WP review by CC inspector.

INSP.

00C.,*ra Page 1 of 7

__ 1) r14. -fl

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950689 Equipment ID:

AF-04014 Equipment

Description:

P-38B AFF Work Plan Originator:

Stewart W P MINI RECIRC CONTROL lietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002

-SUPPORT-SUPPORT El Chemistry Z

Engineering El Radiation Protection Z

I&C

[]

Maintenance LI NDE

[]

Operations

[

0 QC El Security El Crane ET-TB PAB [I Polar El Other El Other N--

-ii:

J0,BR1F:r*

,ervisor /Job Leader to conduct pre-job brief using PBF-9217 (Mtn and I&C) or OM 3.29 (OPs).

NOTE: Pre-job brief may require attendance of other workgroups involved in the work acti-vity.

PRE-JOB BRIEF COMPLETED Supervisor or Job Leader Date Page 2 of 7 PBF-9169

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950689 UNIT: PB 0 Equipment ID:

AF-04014 Equipment

Description:

P-38B AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Work Plan Originator:'

Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 Date: January 25, 2002 NOTES NOTE:

The steps in this work plan may be performed in any logical order.

FME:

Tools and equipment shall be checked for loose parts and debris and temporary covers should be installed for foreicn material exclusion (FME) of system/components per Exclusion of Foreign Material from Plant components and Systems, NP 8.4.10.

NOTE:

IF inspections or discrepancies require modifications to Work Scope:

THEN STOP work, place equipment in SAFE condition, and NOTIFY Supervision.

NOTE:

The Control Room / the Work Control Center / and the watchstander (as appropriate) shall be informed of the status of jobs which:

bring in alarms, affect indications, and other work being performed on operating equipment.

NOTE:

All workers shall perform all Danger Tagging requirements as defined in NP 1.9.15 NOTE:

When replacing parts, compare the old part to the new part to verify it is an acceptable replacement.

'E:

If work scope changes, an R/R/M form may be required for parts replacement or repair.

NOTE:

Any pen and ink change to work plan requires initial and date by the change.

NOTE:

Write WO number on top/header of any supplemental pages added to work package, i.e., forms, procedures, checklists r,,'.

£,ua Page 3 of 7 I.

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950689 Equipment ID:

AF-04014 Equipment

Description:

P-38B AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Work Plan Originator:

Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_Q_

Date: January 25, 2002 Hold Point "

Step.. -

Work Plan Description Worker Date NOTE:

STEPS 1-2 AND 6-7 DO NOT REQUIRE DSS APPROVAL.

FME 1

Perform Pre-System Opening Area FME Inspection/Cleanup. Document on PBF-9158.

MTII&C DATE

2.

Layout support locations using Sketch SK-MR-01-144 Sheet 2 as guidance.

MT DATE

3.

Notify DSS prior to drilling in AFP room.

MT DATE 0C

4.

Inspect installation of Hilti anchors using Hilti Anchor Data Checklist, PBF HOLD 7042E.

QC DATE

5.

Using Hilti bolts, mount Gerard Clamps on wall per MI 7.1.

MT DATE

6.

Fabricate tubing runs as shown on Sketch SK-MR-01-144 Sheet 2.

I&C DATE LABELING

7.

Install supplied temporary labels on AF-1 83, AF-1 85, and AF-4064.

I&C DATE 8

Obtain DSS approval to continue when the installation is to the point where the system needs to be taken out of service.

I&C DATE

9.

Enter TSAC 3.7.5.C OPS DATE

10.

Commence fire rounds lAW OM 3.27.

OPS DATE

11.

Remove P-38B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump from Service. Install danger tags Tag Senes-OPS DATE

12.

Make necessary tie-ins into the system per Sketcn SK.MR-01-14A Sheet 2.

II&

DATE Page 4 of 7 PBF-9169

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN Work Control Document:

9950689 Equipment ID:

AF-04014 Equipment

Description:

P-38B AFI Work Plan Originator:

Stewart W P MINI RECIRC CONTROL jetholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002

-HoStep:

Work Plan Description ---

Worker

-. Date Hold Po-nt:

-No-OC

13.

NOTE: QC Inspector to witness torquing of Gerard Clamp Bolts to HOLD 7.5 ft-lbs +/- 0.5 ft-lbs.

Torque all Gerard Clamp Bolts to 7.5 ft-lbs +/- 0.5 It-lbs.

Torque Wrench M&TE #:

Due Date:.

QC Inspector Date i&C DATE

14.

Ensure the following are complete:

"* Installation of the tubing run from downstream of AF-153 to AF-4064.

"* Installation of cross-tie bypassing AF-153.

"* Removal of tee in IA supply line downstream of IA-358.

"* Installation of all clamps as required.

I&C DATE IOUSE

15.

Remove all debris, tools, and materials from the area. Ensure all work KEEPING areas meet PBNP housekeeping expectations.

l&C DATE FME

16.

Perform Final FME Closeout Inspection. Document on PBF-9158 I&C DATE

17.

Remove danger tags and align system for normal operations, per CL-13E PART 2 rev. 34.

OPS DATE PMT

18.

Perform initial service leak test with valve AF-4014 open. Snoop for leakage. Test boundary should encompass both newly installed tubing and existing copper tubing leading up to AF-4014. Acceptance cnteria is no visible leakage.

I&C DATE 19 20.

Perform Flowscan of AF-4014. Adjust AF-4014 instrument air pressure regulator to 65 psig and re-perform Flowscan of AF-4014. Verify valve is nearly full open at 65 psig. Return AF-4014 instrument air pressure regulator to 100 psig.

Flowscan of AF-4014 verifies satisfactory performance of valve under both operating pressure conditions AOV Engineer Date Independently verify that AF-4014 instrument air regulator is returned to 100 psig.

-a I&C IV DATE DATE Page 5 of 7 PSF-9169 PMT

=PENDENT I vrRlFlCATION I

Work Control Document:

Equipment ID:

Equipment

Description:

Work Plan Originator:

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN 9950689 AF-04014 P-38B AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002

-OPERATIONS PMT

21.

Perform stroke test of AF-4014 with nitrogen as follows A. Shut IA-356 OPS DATE B. Open and uncap IA-357 to vent.

OPS DATE C. Set nitrogen pressure regulator AF-4058, AF-4019 AFP DISCHARGE CONTROL NITROGEN BACKUP REGULATOR, to 65 psig. Use calibration sticker to mark position.

OPS DATE D. Record pressures on pressure indicators PI-4056 and PI-4059:

PI-4056:

PI-4059:

OPS DATE E. Stroke valve AF-4014.

OPS DATE F. Record pressures on pressure indicators PI-4056 and P1-4059:

PI-4056:

PI-4059:

OPS DATE G. Return system to normal lineup.

OPS DATE PMT

22.

Perform IT-10 rev. 44, IT-10A rev. 12, and IT-10B rev. 11 as required to compete the following:

"* Stroke tests of AF-4014 and AF-4019 with Instrument Air.

"* Shut test for AF-1 53.

"* Open tests for AF-162 and AF-1 65.

"* Pressure drop tests.

OPS DATE

23.

PMT and return to service testing have been completed.

OPS DATE

24.

Exit TSAC 3 7.5 C.

OPS DATE 25 I.

Secure fire rounds.

OPS DATE PBF-9169 Page 6 of 7

Work Control Document:

Equipment ID:

Equipment

Description:

Work Plan Originator:

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT WO WORK PLAN 9950689 AF-04014 P-38B AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL Stewart Wietholter X7409, Pgr #5424 UNIT: PB_0_

Date: January 25, 2002

26.

The work can be accepted as complete (Reference PBF-1606).

RE_

Date DSS Date

27.

MAKE A COPY OF THE COMPLETED WORK PLAN AND SEND TO RESPONSIBLE ENGINEER (STEW WIETHOLTER).

OPS DATE 7,-'-

Cr:

,'hPOST-JOB BRIEF "

Conduct post-job debnef using PBF-921 8 (Mtn and I&C) or OM 3.29 (OPs). Document lessons learned, good practices, problems encountered, etc. on feedback form. Debrief should include all applicable work groups.

POST-JOB DEBRIEF COMPLETED Fill out feedback form attached to work package (maintenance group use PBF-9929)

Page 7 of 7 PBF-9169 Supervisor or Job Leader Date I

I I

PARTS LIST / BILL OF MATERIALS FOR

[viOD REQUEST MR 01-144

/ DRAWING / SKETCH NO.

SK-MR-01-144 Sheets 1 & 2 STOCK ISSUE REgQUIST NU. r3U02-.*3I 5Y1LkwI 0

fuoo%,

___01-150 (WO 99506.

ITEM QUAN.

MATERIAL DESCRIPTION/

VENDOR/

QA LOT NO. i MOD NO.

R-QD SERVICE RATING CATALOG NO.

(Y/N)

P.O. NO.

BIN (YIN).

I 50 I't.

TUBING, 3/8" OD, 065" WALL, SS, ASTM A-213 TP 316 y

9020756 2

8 CLAMP, TUBE, GIRARD 3/8-I/2T-500SS-3D Y

9027041 3

6 CLAMP, TUBE, GIRARD 3/8-1/2T-5003S-2D y

9027033 4

[it BOLT, KWIK BOLT H 14-412, #0045378, 1/4" DIA.,

Y 9032667 4-1/2" LENGTH 5

4 VALVE, REGULATING AND SHUT-OFF, 3/8" Y

9041664 SWAGELOK ENDS 6

2 HOSE, TEFLON, SWAGELOK, 3/8" X 36" LONG, 304 SS Y

REQ OVERBRAID, TUBE ADAPTER ENDS, PN SS-6BHT-36 7

6 TEE, UNION, TUBING, 3/8" T, SS-600-3 Y

9021230 8

2 CONNECTOR, PORT, TUBING, 3/8", SS-601-PC Y

9014349 9

2 CONNECTOR, TUBING, 3/8" TTO 1/1" MPT, SS-600-1-4 Y

9013318 Fo in DG-G02.1 Rev 3 I

j

Point Beach Nuclear Plant 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

.de of Proposed Activity:

Associated Reference(s) #:

Prepared by:

Reviewed by:

SCR 2002-0010 Venfy SCR number on all pages Page I Backup Air Systems for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Minimum Flow Recirculation Valves MR 02-001, MR 01-144, CR 01-2278, CR 01-3595, Calculation 2001-0056, Calculation 2002-0002, Calculation 2002-0001, Calculation M-09334-266-IA.1 Rev 0- Nitrogen Backup System to AFW Pump Discharge Valve, Calculation S-09334-266-IA.2 Rev 2 - 3D Restraint with Girard Tube Clamp, Calculation 14410.1 1-NP(B)-001-XE Rev 0 - Qualification of 6 Foot Spans for 318 inch Tubing at PBNP, ASME Section VIII - Pressure Vessels, ASME B3 1I - Power Piping, IT 10, IT 10A, IT 10B, EOP 0, EOP 0.1, ECA 0.0, AOP 5B, MR 97-038, NPM 2002-0030, Calculation WE 0005-06 Date:

Rob Chapman Name ( Print)

Dave Black Name ( Print)

jnture Date:

Signature PART 1 (50.59172.48) - DESCRIBE THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY AND SEARCH THE PLANT AND ISFSI LICENSING BASIS (Resource Manual 5.3.1)

NOTE: The "NNMIC 10 CFR 50.59 Resource Manunl" (Resource Manual) and NEI 96-07. Appendix B. Guidelines for 10 CFR 72.48 Implementation should be used for guidance to determine the proper responses for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 screenings.

"I1 Describe the proposed activity and the scope of the activity being covered by this screening. (The 10 CFR 50.59 /72.48 review of other portions of the proposed activity may be documented via the applicability and pre-screening process requirements in NP 5.1.8.) Appropriate descriptive material may be attached.

CR 01-2278, CR 01-3595 and LER 266/2001-005-00 identified an issue that could cause a common mode failure of all auxiliary feedwater pumps. If an accident or event has occurred that has led to the loss of instrument air, then the auxiliary feedwater pump minimum recirculation control valves 1/2AF-4002 for 112P-29, AF-4007 for P 38A, and AF-4014 for P-38B will all fail closed. Dunng this event, it will become necessary for operations to throttle back auxiliary feedwater flow to control steam generator level, especially if all four auxiliary feedwater pumps auto start as designed. If care is not taken to ensure that the minimum recirculation valves are open, and the pump discharge valves are shut with no minimum flow path, then the pumps will dead head and fail in a very short time due to overheating. Currently, there is guidance in EOP 0, EOP 0 1, ECA 0.0, and AOP 5B to direct operations to verify adequate pump flow if instrument air has been lost before reducing flow to the steam generators, or to stop the pump.

To provide additional assurance that the auxiliary feedwater pumps will not be damaged on a loss of instrument air, backup air sources will be supplied to all minimum flow recirculation valves. These modifications are an enhancement that will reduce the core damage probability from a loss of instrument air and increase the time for an operator to take manual action to ovemde the valves open Instrument air accumulator tanks will be installed by MR 02-001 for the 112P-29 valves (IP-AF-4002), and the existing nitrogen backup system for the MDAFP discharge valves will be tied in by MR 01-144 for the P-38A/B valves (AF-4007, AF-4014)

Currently, the auxiliary feedwater minimum flow recirculation valves do not have a safety function in the open position, however this function is a design function described in FSAR Section 10 2 and Technical Specification Bases B3.7 5. The basis for the recirculation valves not having a safety functon in the open position is that all of the auxiliary feedwater pumps will have open discharge valves upon auto-start (even with a loss of instrument air), and thus the minimum flow recirculation line is not needed early in the accident or event. These minimum recirculation valves currently have an augmented quality function to open (by manual override) to ensure adequate flow though the associated auxiliary feedwater pump during an Appendix R fire within 45 minutes (per PBF-1515c

/-.Z-- fZ-0 Refe-rence" NP 5 1.-8

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Venfy SCR number on alt pag=

Page 2 Calculation 'WE-0005-06), and the backup systems installed by these modifications may be credited to support this function.

These modifications will provide a sufficient secondary source of air or nitrogen such that these valves are able to operate for at least two hours stroking 10 times per hour if the regular instrument air system is disabled due to a seismic event, tornado, fire, or loss of offsite power. No changes will be made to the control circuitry of the valves, and they will still open automatically when the auxiliary feedwater pump flow drops below the setpoint, when the pumps are started, and when the pumps are secured MR 02-001 - 1I2AF-4002 - TDAFP Mini Recirc Valves For 1/2AF-4002, a stainless steel accumulator tank will be installed in each of the instrument air lines to the mini recirc valves. Upstream of these tanks will be two check valves in senes that will isolate the tank from the rest of the instrument air system. These check valves will be spring loaded and will shut on a very small differential pressure to ensure that the tank pressure will remain as high as possible when the instrument air pressure drops. The volume of the tanks will be approximately 150 gallons, which is greater than the required minimum volume determined by Calculation 2001-0056 to be needed to stroke each valve 10 times per hour for two hours. In order to reduce the amount of air required to stroke the valve and thus the tank size, the pressure regulator for the AF-4002 valves which is currently set at 85 psig, and will be re-set to 65 psig. The valve will still stroke full open at this pressure. Calculation 2001-0056 has also verified that these valves will pass full flow even when less than 20% open, since the flow restricting orifices 1/2RO-4003 govern the flow rate in the recirculation line and have the lowest flow coefficient.

The accumulator tanks will be ASME code vessels, designed to Section VII, and will be rated to 200 psig.

These tanks will be installed in the north and south sections of the auxiliary feedwater pump room (not in the pump cubicles).

The tank locations were chosen based on the best possible tubing run, and to limit obstructions to plant equipment. Isolation valves will be installed to permit replacement of the check valves should leakage or failure occur. The tubing will be configured such that system pressure can be used to test each the check valves, if necessary.

The new tubing will be routed through the wall that separates the I P-29 cubicle from the south sectiori of the auxiliary feedwater pump room (Fire Zone 304S). This is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire wall that is considered a partition within a fire zone. The penetration will be filled and the wall will maintain its 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating MIR 01-144 - AF-4007 and AF-4014 - MDAFP Mini Recirc Valves The existing nitrogen supply systems for the AF-4012 and AF-4019 MDAFP Discharge Control Valves (one independent system for each valve) will be used to supply the AF-4007 and AF-4014 MDAFP Minimum Recirculation Control Valves. The existing instrument air isolation check valves AF-131/133 (for AF-4012) and AF-151/153 (AF-4019) and nitrogen tubing and tanks will be used for the AF-4007 and AF-4014 valves.

New tubing will be installed to connect the nitrogen supply tubing near the AF-401214019 valves downstream of the check valves to the AF-4007/4014 minimum recirculation valves Also, a bypass line will be installed around the AF-133/153 check valves to allow the AF-131/151 check valves to be tested using system pressure, if necessary The existing instrument air connections to the AF-4007/4014 valves will be capped.

The nitrogen system pressure regulators (PCV-4053/4058) are currently set to 60 psig, and will be re-set to 65 psig. This will increase the margin for stroking the recirculation valves open, although this is still less than the normal valve regulator setting of 100 psig. Calculation 2002-0002 has verified that these valves are full open at this pressure, and that they will pass full flow even when less than 20% open. since the flow restricting orifices RO-4008/4015 govern the flow rate and have the lowest flow coefficient in the recirculation line This increase in pressure regulator setting will not affect the discharge valve positioners, since they normally operate with 100 psig instrument air, but only require 45 psig The existing nitrogen supply system installed by MR 97-038 consists of two nitrogen bottles, with one valved in and the other bottle maintained full in standby mode.

When the aligned bottle pressure drops to the changeout point, the standby bottle is aligned, and the drain bottle is replaced with a full bottle. Calculation PBF-15,15c Reference NqP 5 1 8

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Venfy SCR number on all pages Page 3 2002-0002 determruned the changeout pressure for the bottle that will supply 90 minutes of nitrogen to the discharge and rmnimum recirculation valves Therefore, there is always greater than three hours of capacity available in the system at any given time, although operator action is required to align the standby bottle.

Although the AF-400714014 valves do not have a safety function to open, all components in the air supply line to the valve will be installed as safety related, since it will be part of the pressure boundary for the existing discharge valve backup system, which was installed safety-related by MR 97-038. Several existing instrument air components upstream of the solenoid valve that are not safety related will be reclassified as safety related. This can be done on the basis that these components have demonstrated adequate functionality over time, and these components will also be leak tested by MR 01-144 This is equivalent to qualification testing, and therefore these components may be dedicated. Furthermore, the dimensions of these components have been verified to be appropriate for the installation Finally, the material acceptability will be evaluated based on a detailed walkdown.

Common Issues All new tubing and valves installed for both modifications will be stainless steel and have design ratings that are the same as or greater than the existing components All new components will be installed using ASME B31.1.

All new tubing, valves, and accumulators will be analyzed as seismic Class 1. Standard wall mounted tube supports will be used and supported with Hilti bolts into the walls of the auxiliary feedwater pump room Calculation 14410.11-NP(B)-O0I-XE Rev 0 (including Addendum A) provides a seismic basis for the use of tubing supports and a required spacing, and the limitations of this calculation shall apply toall tubing installation.

Supports for the pressure gauges for MR 02-001 will be designed in accordance with Calculation S-09334-266 IA.2 Rev 2. The floor supports for the accumulator tanks were seismically analyzed by Calculation 2001-0001.

Portions of the system not covered by any calculation will receive a SQUG walkdown to ensure seismic adequacy.

Currently the nitrogen system AF-133/153 check valves are safety-related and in the IST program. They are leak tested quarterly by IT 10, and are also tested by IT 1OA and IT lOB. The upstream check valves AF-131/151 will not be tested periodically, but a bypass line is being installed to facilitate testing, should it be necessary in the future The check valves for the instrument air accumulator will not be part of the IST program, nor will they be periodically tested. They will be tested as PMT for the modification. Since the accumulators are not supporting a safety function of the AF-4002 recirculation valves, then there is no need to periodically test these check valves.

The specified two hour time duration on the backup systems is not a licensing basis requirement. There is a one hour required coping duration for the Station Blackout event (FSAR Appendix A.1), and a 45 minute requirement for Appendix R (Calculation WE-0005-06), but no other time requirements are specified. Two hours was chosen conservatively to be enough time to allow an operator to be dispatched to the auxiliary feedwater pump room to take manual action if necessary, and to bound current and future requirements. The sizing of these systems with a two hour capability does not imply a new licensing basis requirement to supply these valve for two hours The minimum recirculation valves were assumed in each of the calculations to stroke 10 times per hour. This is a conservative estimate that was also used in the original calculation for the MIDAFP discharge valve nitrogen backup system (Calculation M-09334-266-IA.1)

Simulator runs have confirmed that this is very conservatve since operations personnel will typically attempt to maintain the steam generator levels steady by balancing auxiliary feedwater flow with steam flow. See Calculations 2001-0056 and 2002-0002 for more details on this assumption Modifications MR 01-144 and MR 02-001 and the issue documented in LER 2001-005-00 will necessitate a revision to FSAR Sections 9.7 (Instrument Air) and 10.2 (Auxiliary Feedwater) and to Technical Specification Bases 3.7.5 to clearly reflect the design function of the minimum recirculation valves to open and to describe the backup air supplies installed by these modifications Necessary updates to Appendix R documents to take credit for the backup systems will be evaluated by a separate 50.59. However. this 50.59 can provide the basis for the backup systems to perform this function Reicrencr NP 5 1 S PBF-1 515c

Point Beach Nuclear Plant 10 CFR 50.59172.48 SCREENING (NEW RU-LE)

SCR 2002-0010 Verify SCR number on all palges Page 4 1k R CI-ertn c. N P 5 1 8 Search the PBNP Current Licensing Basis (CLB) as follows: Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), FSAR Change Requests (FCRs) with assigned numbers, the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER), the CLB (Regulatory) Commitment Database, the Technical Specifications (both Custom and Improved), the Technical Specifications Bases, and the Technical Requirements Manual. Search the ISFSI licensing basis as follows: VSC-24 Safety Analysis Report. the VSC-24 Certificate of Compliance, the CLB (Regulatory) Commitment Database, and the VSC-24 10 CFR 72.212 Site Evaluation Report.

Describe the pertinent design function(s), performance requirements, and methods of evaluation for both the plant and for the cask/ISFSI as appropriate Identify where the pertinent information is described in the above documents (by document section number and title). (Resource Manual 5.3 1 and NEI 96-07, App B, B.2)

FSAR Section 7.4.1 - AMSAC FSAR Section 9.7 - Instrument Air / Service Air FSAR Section 10 2 - Auxiliary Feedwater FSAR Figure 10.2-1 Sheet 1 - Bech M-217 Sh. I - Auxiliary Feedwater System FSAR Figure 10 2-1 Sheet 2 - Bech M-217 Sh. 2 - Auxiliary Feedwater System FSAR Section 14.1.10- Loss of Normal Feedwater FSAR Section 14.1 11 - Loss of All AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries FSAR Section 14 2.4 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture FSAR Section 14.2.5 - Rupture of a Steam Pipe FSAR Appendix A.1 - Station Blackout FPER 5.2.2 - Safe Shutdown Systems and Equipment FPER 5.2.5.2.3 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room SSAR 2.3.1 4 - Reactor Heat Removal Function SSAR 2.3.2.4 - Auxiliary Feedwater System Tech Spec 3.7.5 - Auxiliary Feedwater Tech Spec Bases B 3.7.5 - Auxiliary Feedwater LER 266/2001-005-00 See Part II for the description of the design functions and performance requirements.

PBF-1515c

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENLNG (NEW RULE)

Venfy SCR number on al pages Page 5 Does the proposed activity involve a change to any Custom or Improved Technical Specification (ITS)' Changes to "Technical Specifications require a License Amendment Request (Resource Manual Section 5.3 1.2).

Technical Specification Change El Yes 0 No If a Technical Specification change is required, explain what the change should be and why it is required 1 4 Does the proposed activity involve a change to the terms, conditions or spec-fications incorporated in any VSC-24 cask Certificate of Compliance (CoC)? Changes to a VSC-24 cask Certificate of Compliance require a CoC amendment request.

[]Yes Z No If a storage cask Certificate of Compliance change is required, explain what the change should be and why it is required S----------------------------------------------

10 CFR 50.59 SCREENING ---------------------------------------------------

PART 11 (50.59) - DETERM-NIE IF THE CHANGE LNVOLVES A DESIGN FUNCTION (Resource Manual 5.3.2)

Compare the proposed activity to the relevant CLB descriptions, and answer the following questions:

YES NO QUESTION E]

Does the proposed activity involve Safety Analyses or structures, systems and components (SSCs) credited in the Safety Analyses97

[

5]

Does the proposed activity involve SSCs that support SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses?

E]

Does the proposed activity involve SSCs whose failure could initiate a transient (e g., reactor trip, loss of feedwater.

etc.) or accident, OR whose failure could impact SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses?

5]

Does the proposed activity involve CLB-descnbed SSCs or procedural controls that perform functions that are required by, or otherwise necessary to comply with. regulations, license conditions, orders or technical specifications?

E]

Z Does the activity involve a method of evaluation described in the FSAR?

5

[

Is the activity a test or e.rpertment? (i.e, a non-passive activity which gathers data) 5]

[]

Does the activity exceed or potentially affect a design basis lbmit for afission product barrier (DBLFPB)?

(NOTE. If THIS questions is answered YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required.)

If the answers to ALL of these questions are NO, mark Part III as not applicable, document the 10 CFR 50.59 screening in the conclusion section (Part IV), then proceed directly to Part V - 10 CFR 72.43 Pre-screening Questions.

If any of the above questions are marked YES, identify below the specific design function(s), method of evaluation(s) or DBLFPB(s) involved.

These modifications affect the operation of the minimum recirculation valves for the auxiliary feedwater pumps (1/2AF 4002, AF-4007, AF-4014). These valves have the following design functions A.1.

To isolate the minimum recirculation line to ensure that the auxil,ary teecwater pumps deliver the required flow to the steam generators as needed to support the following acc-cents or events: LONF, LOAC. MSLB. SGTR.

ATWS, Appendix R. and SBO.

A.2.

To open to provide flow through the auxiliary feedwater pumps to pre'ent hydraulic instabilities and to dissipate pump heat A.3.

To maintain the pressure boundary integrity of the auxiliary feedwater s~stem.

PBF-1515c Referent.

NP5 I S Oý...lc~

ý

'ýn 0 1r401RecrnL N

51

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Venfy SCR number on al] pa-gs Page 6 These modificauons affect the auxiliary feedwater system, which has the following design functions B.1.

To automatically start and ensure that adequate feedwater is supplied to the steam generators for heat removal during accidents which may result in a main steam safety valve opening (LONF - including ATWS, and LOAC)

B 2.

To automatically start and provide flow to maintain steam generator levels during accidents,which require or result in rapid reactor coolant system cooldown (SGTR, MSLB).

B 3.

To allow the isolation of all lines to the ruptured steam generator in the SGTR event.

B 4.

To provide sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat for one hour during a station blackout event (TDAFP only)

B.5.

To provide sufficient flow to the steam generators to remove decay heat to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a plant fire (Appendix R).

B 6.

To withstand a seismic event (designed as seismic Class 1) and to ensure that steam generator levels are maintained during a seismic event.

B.7.

To provide flow to the steam generators during plant startup and shutdown, and during hot shutdown or hot standby conditions for chemical additions and when operation of the main feedwater and condensate systems is not warranted.

These modifications also affect the instrument air system, which has the following design functions:

C.I.

To provide dry, oil-free air to pneumatic controllers and control valves required for the normal operation of both units C.2.

To isolate instrument air lines inside containment on a containment isolation signal to maintain containment integrity.

C.3.

To ensure that the purge supply and exhaust valve boot seals are inflated to maintain containment integrity.

C.4 To supply nitrogen to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge control valves.

C.5.

To supply nitrogen to the power operated relief valves (PORVs) when LTOP is functional.

C.6.

To ensure that the instrument air headers inside containment can be depressurized to preclude the chance of a circuit fault causing a PORV or CVCS seal return valve to open.

These modifications are being installed in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room, which has the following design functions:

D.I.

The walls act as 3-hour rated fire barriers D 2.

The walls are designed to withstand a seismic event without failing R e - cr n c c

'4p 5 i 8 PBF-1515c

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59n72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Venfy SCR numb*r anal pages Pace 7 III (50.59) - DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACTIVITY INVOLVES ADVERSE EFFECTS (Resource Manual 5.3 3)

If ALL the questions in Part II are answered NO, then Part III is R NOT APPLICABLE.

Answer the following questions to determine if the actvity has an adverse effect on a design function Any YES answer means that a I0 CFR 50 59 Evaluation is required; EXCEPT where noted in Part 111.3.

1II.1 CHANGES TO THE FACILITY OR PROCEDURES YES NO QUESTION El Z

Does the activity adversely affect the designfiuzction of an SSC credited in safety analyses?

E[

Z Does the activity adversely affect the method of performing or controlling the designfunction of an SSC credited in the safety analyses?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required. If both answers are NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion as necessary):

The modifications will improve the ability for the minimum flow recirculation valves to perform their non safety related design function in the open position (A.2). Currently, this design function is completely provided by either the instrument air system or by manual operator action. These modifications will install backup systems to perform this design function after instrument air is lost before operator action is taken. These backup systems (nitrogen bottles and air accumulators) will always be available if the instrument air system fails, and will be isolated from the instrument air system with two check valves in series. The backup systems for the recirculation valves will be installed using safety-related components, even though they are not supporting a safety function for the minimum recirculation valves The components for the MDAFP recirculation valves will be classified as safety-related since they are part of the nitrogen system pressure boundary required for the AF-4012/4019 valves The components for the TDAFP recirculation valves will be installed as augmented quality, seismic Class 1. There will not be an adverse effect on the existing non safety-related instrument air system that currently supports this design function. The recirculation valves will need to operate at a lower air pressure of 65 psig, but the valves will still fully open at this pressure, and Calculations 2001-0056 and 2002-0002 has shown that the valves will pass adequate flow to perform this design function when they are only approximately 20% open. The net effect of these modifications is an improvement that results in a lower core damage probability (see NPM 2002-0030), and will ensure that the minimum flow recirculation valves have the capability to open and that the auxiliary feedwater pumps will not be damaged by operating at low flows. Therefore, design function A.2 is not adversely affected, and is actually enhanced. This will provide the operators with additional time to diagnose the loss of instrument air and take action to properly control auxiliary feedwater flow and secure pumps if required.

Under most conditions when the auxiliary feedwater system is needed, the recirculation valves must be closed (design function A.1)

The addition of these backup systems will not create a new failure mode that will fail the valve in the open position when it is needed to be shut. The source of the air is independent of the circuitry that would open and close the valve. The solenoid valves and associated circuitry that supply the air to the actuator are being not being affected, and are currently qualified as safety-related The rmnimum recirculation valves will still fail closed on loss of air, although this failure is less likely to occur with the installation of these backup systems.

Therefore, these modifications will not have an adverse effect on design function A. 1, and the likelihood that the valves will fail open has not been affected.

These modifications will not affect the auxiliary feedwater pressure boundary in any way, and thus design function A.3 is not adversely affected. The modifications will only involve the instrument air and nitrogen systems that actuate the minimum recirculation valves and the MDAFP discharge valves.

The air accumulators for the TDAFP recirc valves installed in the instrument air lines will not adversely affect any of the design tunctions of the instrument air system (C I through C.6). Once the accumulators have been pressurized.

there is no additional long-term loading on the system required by installing accumulator tanks The tank will not affect the operation of the other safety related accumulators or nitrogen bottles anywhere in the instrument air system.

The accumulator tanks and all new tubing will be installed and anchored as seismic Class 1, which will preclude interactions with other plant equipment.

PBF-151l5c R'ý'"-Ct NP 5 1 1

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.39/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

V-f. SCR number on all pag.es Page 8 The nitrogen tie in for the MDAFP recirc valves will utilize the existing nitrogen backup system for the MDAFP discharge control valves Calculation 2002-0002 was performed to show that the existing nitrogen bottles are adequate to supply nitrogen to stroke the minimum recirculation valves and the discharge valves, with no additional bottles necessary, for two hours. Nitrogen bottle changeout at a pressure that ensures 90 rmnutes from one bottle with a second full bottle available will not change from current practice, other than the changeout pressure will be reduced, which is an improvement. There will be a negligible effect on the discharge valves stroke time to close by opening the recirculation valve with the same system Furthermore, there are currently no stroke time acceptance criteria for the discharge valves opening and the recirculation valves closing Since the calculation has shown that the existing system can handle the additional demand, there is no adverse affect on the discharge valves, and there is therefore no adverse effect on design function C 4. The backup nitrogen systems for the MDAFP discharge valves will still be fully capable of supporting the design functions of the MDAFPs and the auxiliary feedwater system (functions B.A through B 7).

All new components, including the new tubing, valves, and accumulator tanks will be designed as seismic Class 1 Therefore, the components installed by MR 01-144 and MR 02-001 will not adversely affect the seismic design functions of any components or systems in the auxiliary feedwater pump room (design function D 2) and the auxiliary feedwater system (design function B.6)

The new components will not affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater pump room walls to act as 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers (design function D.I). No additional combustible loading is being added to the auxiliary feedwater pump room (Fire Zones 304N, 304M, 304S).

1H1.2 CHANGES TO A METHOD OF EVALUATION (If the activity does not involve a method of evaluation, these questions are Z NOT APPLICABLE.)

YES NO QUESTION fl [

Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for performing safety analyses than that descnbed in the CLB?

[

[

Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for evaluating SSCs credited in safety analyses than that described in the CLB?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required If both answers are NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion, as necessary).

S 1113 TESTS OR EXPERIMENTS If the activity is not a test or experiment, the questions in III.3.a and III.3.b are CE NOT APPLICABLE.

a. Answer these two questions first YES NO QUESTION E

E]

Is the proposed test or experiment bounded by other tests or experiments that are described in the CLB?

[

[

Are the SSCs affected by the proposed test or experiment isolated from the facility?

If the answer to BOTH questions in V.3.a is NO continue to III 3 b If the answer to EITHER ques:non iN YES. then describe the basis.

b Answer these additional questions ONLY for tests or experiments which do NOT meet the criteria given in III 3 a above It the answer to either question in 111.3 a is YES then these three questions are [D NOT APPLICABLE PBF-I515c Necea:XP 5 1 3

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 S CREENING (NEW RULE)

Venfy SCR number on all paes Page 9 YES NO QUESTION E

E]

Does the activity utilize or control an SSC in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design bases as described in the CLB?

]

fl Does the activity utilize or control an SSC in a manner that is inconsistent with the analyses or descriptions in the CLB?

E E

Does the activity place the facility in a condition not previously evaluated or that could affect the capability of an SSC to perform,ts intended functionsi If any answer in III.3.b is YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required If the answers in III.3.b are ALL No, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion as necessary):

Part IV - 10 CFR 50.59 SCREENING CONCLUSION (Resource Manual 5.3.4)

Check all that apply.

A 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is C] required or Z NOT required A Point Beach FSAR change is Z required or M NOT required. If an FSAR change is required, then initiate an FSAR Change Request (FCR) per NP 52.6.

A Regulatory Commitment (CLB Commitment Database) change is [] required or [E NOT required. If a Regulatory Commitment Change is required, initiate a commitment change per NP 5 1.7.

A Technical Specification Bases change is Z required or [] NOT required. If a change to the Technical Specification Bases is required, then initiate a Technical Specification Bases change per NP 5.2.15 A Technical Requirements Manual change is 11 required or [D NOT required. If a change to the Technical Requirements Manual is required, then initiate a Technical Requirements Manual change per NP 5.2.15 10 CFR 72.4, SCREENING -------------------------------

NOTE: NEI 96-07. Appendix B. Guidelines for 10 CFR 72.48 Implementation should be used for guidance to determine the proper responses for 72.48 screenings.

PART V (72.4S) - 10 CFR 72.4S INITIAL SCREENING QUESTIONS Part V deterrmunes if a full 10 CFR 72.48 screening is required to be completed (Parts VI and VII) for the proposed activity.

YES NO QUESTION El z]

Does the proposed activity involve TN ANY MANNER the dry fuel storage cask(s), the cask transfer/transport equipment, any ISFSI facility SSC(s), or any ISFSI facility monitoring as follows: Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket (MSB), MSB Transfer Cask (MTC), MTC Lifting Yoke, Ventilated Concrete Cask (VCC), Ventilated Storage Cask (VSC), VSC Transporter (VCST), ISFSI Storage Pad Facility, ISFSI Storage Pad Data/Communication Links, or PPCS/ISFSI Continuous Temperature Monitoring System?

El 1z Does the proposed activity involve IN -kNY,MANNER SSC(s) installed in the plant specifically added to support cask loading/unloadin2 activities, as tollows Cask Dewatering System jCDW), Cask Reflood System (CRF), or Hydrogen Monitoring System" D]

z]

Does the proposed activity involve IN ANY MANNER SSC(s) needed tor plant operation which are also used to support cask loading/unloading activities, as follows Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), SFP Cooling and Filtration (SF),

Primary Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (VNPAB),. Drumming Area Ventilation System (VNDRM).

PBF-1515c l 111.

Ird Reicrence NP 5 1 8

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Venfv SCR number on all pages Page 10 RE-105 (SFP Low Range Monitor), RE-135 (SFP High Range Monitor), RE-221 (Drumming Area Vent Gas Monitor), RE-325 (Drumming Area Exhaust Low-Range Gas Monitor), PAB Crane, SFP Platform Bridge, Truck Access Area, or Decon Area?

E

[]

Does the proposed activity involve a change to Point Beach CLB design criteria for external events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, high winds, flooding, etc.?

0 Z]

Does the activity involve plant heavy load requirements or procedures for areas of the plant used to support cask loadinmlunloading activities?

EZ l Does the activity involve any potential for fire or explosion where casks are loaded, unloaded, transported or stored')

If ANY of the Part V questions are answered YES, then a full 10 CFR 72 4S screening is required and answers to the questions in Part VI and Part VII are to be provided. If ALL the questions in Part V are answered NO, then check Parts VI and VII as not applicable Complete Part VIII to document the conclusion that no 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation is required PART VI (72.48) - DETERMI-NE IF THE CHANGE INVOLVES A ISFSI LICENSING BASIS DESIGN FUNCTION (If ALL the questions in Part V are NO, then Part VI is 0 NOT APPLICABLE )

Compare the proposed activity to the relevant portions of the ISFSI licensing basis and answer the following questions:

YES NO QUESTION E

]

Does the proposed activity involve cask/ISFSI Safety Analyses or plant/cask/ISFSI structures, systems and components (SSCs) credited in the Safety Analyses?

E]

El Does the proposed activity involve plant, cask or ISFSI SSCs that support SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses9

- J [

Does the proposed activity involve plant, cask or ISFSI SSCs whose function is relied upon for prevention of a radioactive release, OR whose failure could impact SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses?

El Eli Does the proposed activity involve cask/ISFSI described SSCs or procedural controls that perform functions that are required by, or otherwise necessary to comply with, regulations, license conditions, CoC conditions, or orders?

U

[

Does the activity involve a method of evaluation described in the ISFSI licensing basis'

[]

[

Is the activity a test or experiment? (i e., a non-passive activity which gathers data)

[]

[]

Does the activity exceed or potentially affect a cask design basis limit for a fission product barrier (DBLFPB)?

(NOTE. If THIS questions is answered YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required.)

If the answers to ALL of these questions are NO, mark Parts VII as not applicable, and document the 10 CFR 72 48 screening in the conclusion section (Part VIII).

If any of the above questions are marked YES, identify below the specific design function(s), method of evaluation(s) or DBLFPB(s) involved.

PART VII (72.4S) - DETERMI-NE WHETHER THE ACTIVITY INVOLVES ADVERSE EFFECTS (NEI 96-07, Appendix B, Section B 4.2.1)

(If ALL the questions in Part V or Pan VI are answered NO, then Part VII is ED NOT APPLICABLE.)

Answer ine following questions to determine it the activity has an adverse effec: on a design function Any YES answer means that a 10 CFR 72 "8 Evaluation is required. EXCEPT wnere noted in Part VII 3 I

Changes to the Facility or Procedures YES NO QUESTION PBF-15 ISL5

.0 11

- '1 11¶r Rteference: NP 4 1 S',

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Ven*y SCR number on all pages Page 11

[

El Does the activity adversely affect the designfiunction of a plant, cask, or ISFSI SSC credited in safety analyses?

El El Does the activity adversely affect the method of performing or controlling the design fimnction of a plant, cask, or ISFSI SSC credited in the safety analyses?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required. If both answers are NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion, as necessary):

VII.2 Changes to a Method of Evaluation (If the activity does not involve a method of evaluation, these questions are [] NOT APPLICABLE.)

YES NO QUESTION E ]

Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for performing safety analyses than that described in a cask SAR?

El El Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for evaluating SSCs credited in safety analyses than that described in a cask SAR?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required. If both answers are NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion, as necessary):

... *3 Tests or Experiments (If the activity is not a test or experiment, the questions in VII.3.a and VI.3.b are 5] NOT APPLICABLE.)

a. Answer these two questions first:

YES NO QUESTION El El Is the proposed test or experiment bounded by other tests or experiments that are described in the cask ISFSI licensing basis?

El El Are the SSCs affected by the proposed test or experiment isolated from the cask(s) or ISFSI facility?

If the answer to both questions is NO, continue to VII.3.b. If the answer to EITHER question is YES, then briefly describe the basis.

b. Answer these additional questions ONLY for tests or experiments which do not meet the criteria given in VII.3.a above.

If the answer to either question in VII.3.a is YES, then these three questions are [] NOT APPLICABLE:

YES NO QUESTION El El Does the activity utilize or control an SSC in a manner that is outside tne reference bounds of the design bases as described in the ISFSI licensinc basis?

El El Does the activity utilize or control a plant, cask or ISFSI facility SSC in a manner that is inconsistent with the analyses or descriptions in the ISFSI licensing basis" El El Does the activity place the cask or ISFS1 facility in a condition not previously evaluated or that could affect the capability of a plant. cask. or ISFSI SSC to perform its intended functions"'

PBF-1515c 0*,-

(I I (1Pl"0 R-teren".-

NP 5 1 S

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59172.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Verfy SCR number on all pages Page 12 If any answer in VII.3.b is YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required. If the answers are all NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion as necessary):

PART VIII - DOCUMENT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 10 CFR 72.48 SCREENING Check all that apply:

A 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is [] required or [D NOT required. Obtain a screening number and provide the onginal to Records Management regardless of the conclusion of the 50.59 or 72.48 screening.

A VSC-24 cask Safety Analysis Report change is [] required or Z NOT required. If a VSC-24 cask SAR change is required, then contact the Point Beach Dry Fuel Storage group supervisor A Regulatory Commitment (CLB Commitment Database) change is [] required or E] NOT required. If a Regulatory Commitment Change is required, initiate a commitment change per NP 5.1.7.

A change to the VSC-24 10 CFR 72.212 Site Evaluation Report is 51 required or Z NOT required. If a VSC-24 10 CFR 72.212 Site Evaluation Report change is required, then contact the Point Beach Dry Fuel Storage group supervisor.

PBF-1515c Rcr.etenee N-P 3* 1

Point Beach Nuclear Plant FIRE PROTECTION CONFORIMANCE CHECKLIST

,,, Number MR 01-144 Unit 1 Unit 2 Common Facilities X

System AF Location SICB/AFP RM P-3SA(B) CUB AFFECTED FIRE ZONE(S)-FIRE AREAS (see FPER Sect. 9)

Zones 304S(N). Areas A23S(N)

PURPOSE The Fire Protection Conformance Checklist (FPCC) was developed to help evaluate the impact of plant modifications, procedural changes. and tests on the plant fire protection program and safe shutdown capability for compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and other plant fire protection license commitments.

The FPCC also provides the screening criteria to ensure that a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation is performed on activities that affect the design basis of fire protection equipment or plant's capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for any design basis fire. If the FPCC screening indicates the plant fire protection or safe shutdown design basis will be affected, a 10 CFR 5059 screening shall be performed per NP 10.3.1, Authorization of Changes. Tests, and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59), with consideration of the FPCC information, to determine if an unreviewed safety question is involved. The design basis fire is the accident to be considered in the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The FPCC becomes part of the documentation supporting the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluation.

The FPCC is comprised of this main form, PBF-2060 and sub-forms, PBF-2060a through h that address different topical areas of the PBNP fire protection program. The intent of multiple sub-forms is to eliminate unnecessary burden in completing forms for areas of

"-t protection clearly not affected by a particular change. Based upon the nature of the change (as identified by answers to the

tions on the Design Input Checklist PBF-1584), the applicable sections on the FPCC will be filled out. The appropriate sections

,he FPCC to be filled out shall be indicated below on the FPCC Applicability Matrix. The applicable sections that are completed will be attached to the main form PBF-2060 and included with the plant change package.

INSTRUCTIONS

1.

Complete the FPCC Applicability Matrix below, based on the nature of the change and answers to questions on the Design Input Checklist PBF-1534 for the applicable change.

2.

Complete the appropriate sub-forms, based upon the nature of the change as defined on the FPCC applicability matrix. It is not necessary to complete sub-forms for areas of fire protection that are clearly not affected by the subject change.

3.

Use the paragraphs in Section 5 of Design Guide DG-F01 that correspond to the FPCC sections for additional information and guidance when answering the questions in the checklist.

4.

Consider requirements for a 10 CFR 50.59 screening by reviewing the RESULTS section below.

5.

Ensure that the appropriate documents required for update (i.e., FPER, FHA, SSAR, SSAMS, FPDS, Calculations, FPEEs, etc.) are properly identified for future revision in the governing document update procedures. This includes documents that must be updated for changes that could potentially adversely affect fire protection conformance, as well as changes that are determined by the checklist not to adversely affect fire protection conformance (but still require document updates).

6 Sign and date the FPCC If the NPBU Fire Protection Engineer is not the preparer of the FPCC. then the Fire Protection Engineer shall review, sign and date. the FPCC.

PBF-2060 Rcvlston 3 ONOSIf" Page I at 2

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST RESULTS If the completion of any FPCC screening from Sections 1.0 - 10.0 on forms PBF-2060a through 2060h indicates the modification has potential adverse impact, then the plant fire protection or safe shutdown design basis may be affected. A 10 CFR 50.59 screening must be performed per NP 10.3.1, Authorization of Changes, Tests. and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59),

with consideration of the FPCC information to determine if an unreviewed safety question is involved, the design basis fire is the accident to be considered in the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The FPCC becomes part of the documentation supporting the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluation.

Inform the NPBU Fire Protection Engineer if fire protection program commitments or compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R will be affected.

Fire Protection Conformance Checklist Applicability Matrix Applicable?

Yes No ElO

[] [

[] [

[] [

[] [

Section 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0

[Dl 6.0 F1 7.0 El El El 0]

0]

0]

8.0 9.0 10.0 Plant Access Fire Barriers Fire Protection Systems Combustible Loading*Fire Hazards Safe Shutdown Systems and Equipment Safe Shutdown Cables, Including Associated Circuits Fire Area Analysis, Including Exemptions/Evaluations Emergency Lighting Plant Communications Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System Design Input Checklist Section F.2.a F.2.b F.2 c F.2.d F.2.e F.2.f F.2.g F.2.h F.2.i F.2.j Action Complete & attach PBF-2060a Complete & attach PBF-2060b Complete & attach PBF-2060c Complete & attach PBF-2060d Complete & attach PBF-2060e Complete & attach PBF-2060e Complete & attach PBF-2060e Complete & attach PBF-2060f Complete & attach PBF-2060g Complete & attach PBF-2060h Conformance checklist (including all applicable attachments) completed.

Comments: The addition of separate nitrogen backup air supplies for AF-4007 and AF-4014 will not change the method of operation of these valves and will not atfect any of their control logic.

By: Stewart A. Wietholter /

• ¢t-a.

, t';J

/

Date.

(/ - /S" 2 0-1 S-7c o

PBF-2064)

Revision 3 06I0:M;01 k

Point Beach Nuclear Plant FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5,6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION C.omplete the evaluation (Sections 5.0, 6.0, and 7.0) and attach to form PBF-2060.

APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 5.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (Ref. Section 5.2.5.1 of Design Guide DG-FO1) 5.1 Does the modification require addition of a safe shutdown component? Is the new component located within the Appendix R flowpath boundaries shown in the Appendix R Highlighted P&IDs, SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, or the SSAR Section 2, Safe Shutdown Logic Diagrams in Appendix B of SSAR.

Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.2

.No.

go to5 3 Comments:

5.2 Will the new component support other safe shutdown systems or component(s)? (Refer to SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2, Safe Shutdown Logic Diagrams in Appendix B of SSAR)

Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.3 D No, go to 5.3 Comments:

5.3 Does the modification require deletion of a safe shutdown component? (SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2)

Fj Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.4.

":F.,No, go to 5.4 Comments:

5.4 Does the modification require a design change to a safe shutdown component? (SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2)

Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.5 No, go to 5.5 Comments:

AF-qoo07.

lqiý-qOlt PBF-2060d Revision 0i I)6A/I1/I Pag~e I ot 6

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 5.5 Does the modification add/delete/revise safe shutdown equipment to the system flow path or boundary isolation from interconnecting systems? (the Appendix R Highlighted P&IDs, SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, and the SSAR Section 2)

Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.6 No, go to 5.6 Comments:

5.6 Does the modification affect the operation of a system relied upon for post-fire safe shutdown (e.g.. changes in system flow rate, change in normal positions,'etc. See SSAMS, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2)'?

3z Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.7

[" No, go to 5.7 Comments:

z3cA AP.-1-4oo7 an,,t Aý-'tot'I q

,'l(

5ye p V

,e,<

t

(

M(~tr; l~ /O;',SfrU,1-AMf 'Cr, 5.7 Does the modification violate the safe shutdown systems performance goals as presented in FPER Section 7.2 and SSAR Section 2?

n Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.8

ýErNo ago to 5.8 Comments:

5.8 Does the modification affect any mechanical sub-or support components of safe shutdown components not listed on the safe shutdown equipment list? (e.g., SOVs, check valves, etc.) (See CHAMPS Appendix R listing)(. If it is a support component for safe shutdown equipment, then it should be considered a safe shutdown component for the purposes of review for impact.

Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions, resume at 5.9

[-

No, go to 5.9 Comments:

an4 g *&',' ei4

~

-/y Ac-leoo7 I

-geql 5.9 Does the modification to the sub-or support component affect the operability of its associated safe shutdown equipment? (i.e, Failure of a support component that results in failure of a safe shutdown component)

-' Yes, go to 5.1 1, complete actions, resume at 5.10 Sgo to 5.10 Comments:

PBF-2tkec Pae 2 of 6

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 5.10 Does the modification add/delete/re vise any electrical sub or support components which support the identified safe shutdown component(s) (e.g., power supplies, relays, switches, motor operators)? (Ref. Associated Circuit Analysis

- SSAR Section 3)

Yes, go to 5.11 No, go to 6.1 Comments:

5.11 The addition/deletionlrevision of safe shutdown components, sub-or support components affects the safe shutdown analysis and must be evaluated for impact on Appendix R compliance and documentation impacts in Sections 6.0 and 7.0 List the equipment and the affected systems and refer to Section 5.2 5 1 of Design Guide DG-F01.

RESUME checklist completion.

Safe Shutdown System(s), Components, Sub-or Support Component(s):

Az:

0

'/007 A'- q oi

.-.3 84-.

5-Y3 6.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES, INCLUDING ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS (Ref. Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01) 6.1 Does the modification require addition of a safe shutdown cable, including cables which could spurious operation of safe shutdown equipment (i.e., through interlocks and interfacing relays and contacts)? (Ref. Section 3 of the SSAR, Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01)

[

Yes, go to 6.10, complete actions and resume at 6.2 S

No, go to 6.2 Comments:

6.2 Does the modification require deletion of a safe shutdown cable? (Ref. SSAMS Circuit Analysis Module, SSAR Sections 3, 4, and 5)

E-Yes, go to 6.10, complete actions and resume at 6.3

ý,No, go to 6.3 Comments:

PBF.2060C Revision O t)6/OSlO I Page 3 of 6

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5,6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 6.3 Does the modification revise an existing safe shutdown cable, such that safe shutdown equipment functionality, either during normal/emergency equipment operation, or when subjected to a fire-induced circuit failure, could be impacted? This includes changes that could impact the ability to transfer equipment control from one operating location to another and changes which affect circuit protective device performance.

F"'

Yes, go to 6.10, complete actions and resume at 6 4 No, go to 6.4 Comments:

6.4 Does the modification require a change to the routing of an existing safe shutdown cable? This includes actual physical routing changes and changes in CARDS/SSAMS to correct routing discrepancies. This may in,,olve changes to the cable endpoint, changes to the cable endpoint location, changes to the raceways in which a cable is routed, or changes to the fire zones through which a raceway is routed. (Ref. SSAMS Cable and Raceway Module, CARDS)

E' Yes, go to 6. 10, complete actions and resume at 6.5 No, go to 6.5 Comments:

6.5 Does the modification require addition or revision of a circuit connected or to be connected to safe shutdown power supply? (Ref. Section 5.2.5 2 of Design Guide DG-F01, Appendix R Highlighted Single Line Drawings, SSAR Section 3)

" Yes, go to 6 6 2

No, go to 6.7 Comments:

6 6 Will adequate electrical coordination between the safe shutdown power supply feeder breaker and the added or revised component breaker or fuse exist? (Ref. Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-FOland SSAR Section 3)

Yes, go to 6.7

-- No, go to 6.10, complete actions and resume at 6 7 Comments:

PBFR 260i:

Re'vision 0 061=01'O Pace _' of 6

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7; APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 6.7 Does the modification require addition or revision of any non-safe shutdown circuits?

'- Yes, go to 6.8 No, Safe Shutdown Cables Section Complete, go to 7.1 Comments:

6.8 Will the new or revised cables be equipped with properly designed circuit breakers, fuses or some kind of current limiting device? (Ref. SSAR Section 3)

E] Yes, Safe Shutdown Cables Section Complete, go to 7.1

-] No, go to 6.9 Comments:

6.9 Will the new or revised cables share a common enclosure (raceway, panel etc.) with safe shutdown cables? (Ref.

Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01and SSAR Section 3)

Yes, go to 6.10, complete actions LI No, Safe Shutdown Cables Section Complete, go to 7.1 Comments:

6.10 The modification impacts the safe shutdown circuit analysis and must be evaluated further in Section 7.0 for impact on Appendix R compliance and documentation updates. List the safe shutdown circuits and associated components and refer to Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01. RESUME checklist completion.

Comments:

7.0 FIRE AREA ANALYSIS INCLUDING EXEMPTIONSIEVALUATIONS (Ref. Section 5.2.5.3 of Design Guide DG-F01) 7 1 Do the changes to the safe shutdown systems/equipment (from Section 5.0 of the FPCC), safe shutdown circuits or the physical routing of the cables (from Section 6.0 of the FPCC) result in a change to the potential consequences of a fire in any plant fire area? This includes changes that could result in the addiuon/deletion/moddihcation ot a compliance strategy for a piece of safe shutdown equipment for any fire area (such as availability of redundant equipment outside of the fire area, separation in accordance with Section III G 2 of Appendix R of Appendix R.

local manual actions, repairs. etc.). (Ref. SSAR, Section 5)

.Yes, go to 7.5, complete actions and resume at 7.2 ON 0. 2o to 7 3 Comments:

PBF-2060e Rcvsion I) (ISluJI Page 5 of 6

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 7.2 Is comhliance with the separation criteria for redundant safe shutdown capability in Section III.G of Appendix R affected by the change? (Ref. SSAR Table DBD T-40, Table 3-2.2)

ED Yes. go to 7.5, complete actions and resume at 7.3 0

No. go to 7.3 Comments:

7.3 Is the modification proposed to be implemented in a fire zone/area for which an Appendix R Exemption or FPEE is in place (Ref. DBD T-40, Table 3-2.2. FHA, Table 1-1 of the SSAR)

'Yes, go to 7.4 L

No. Fire Area Analysis Section is complete, go to Section 8 or next applicable Section Comments:

7.4 Does the modification violate or potentially change the basis for the Appendix R exemption or FPEE? (Ref.: DBD T-40, Table 3.2-2, FHA, Table I-I of the SSAR)?

R Yes, go to 7.5 "I

No, Section 5, 6, and 7 checklists complete Comments:

-'A;5 rd,--t' i/'tY( Ite-4&ý'o-r.cd 7.5 The modificaton impacts the Fire Area Analysis and potentially violates the basis for compliance with the separation requirements of Appendix R, the basis for an Approved Appendix R exemption, or technical evaluation such as a Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation. List the basis affected and refer to Section 5.2.5.3 of Design Guide DG-FO1. RESUME checklist completion.

Bases:

Page 6 of 6 PBF-.:(6(o:

Revision 0 (bio)-/VI

Point Beach Nuclear Plant PLANT CHANGE INITIATION PLANT M0DIFICATION/MINOR PLANT CHANGE NO.:

02-001 NvO#

INITIATION

Title:

TDAFP MINI RECIRC VALVE (l/AF-4002) INSTRUMENT AIR ACCUMIULATOR ADDITION Z QA [] AQ [I Non-QA (Z SR El Non-SR Unit 1 [

Unit2 [

Common []

CHAMPS System Code:

IA/AF EWR:

CR:

01-3595 Project Objectives:

PROVIDE A BACKUP SOURCE OF AIR FOR EACH TURBINE DRIVEN AUX-FEED PUMIP.

Proposed Scope:

INSTALL AN AIR TANK THAT SUPPLIES A SOURCE OF AIR TO 112AF-4002 IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF AIR.

Initiated By:

Jeff Novak CHANGE DETERMINATION Is the change Temporary?

Is this a Setpoint Only change?

Is this an Equivalent change?

Document change only?

Does previous evaluation encompass change?

Commercial Facility Change?

For Commercial Facility Change Only:

Document Updates?

YES x

Is this small scope?

NO X

If YES go to NP 7.3.1 Temp Mod X

If YES go to NP 7.3.8 Setpoints X

If YES go to NP 9.3.3 SPEED X

If YES determine if previously evaluated X

If YES proceed with document changes X

If YES, determine if document updates are required.

X If YES contact design supervisor. If NO proceed outside of Engineering process controls.

Document below.

If YES perform Minor Plant Change If NO, it is a Plant Modification. Go to EAC for review and approval (NP 7.2.1)

If it is determined that this is not a Plant Change or Modification, document and/or attach justification. Also, attach document update checklist if necessary.

ENGINEERING CHANGE PROCESS TO USE:

MINOR PLANT CHANGE Jeff Novak B Ege-(Goped 32a Prepared By:

Date Enginee'r'i~g Group Le.id:

/Date Temporary Modification - See NP 7.3.1.

PBF-1605a

o.

n

, wn-"

Pa,,e I of 2 l--T Ir 112P2_002 Initiated By:

Date:

YES

Point Beach Nuclear Plant PLANT DESIGN CHANGE CHECKLIST PLANT MODIFICATION/NUNOR PLANr CHANGE NO.:

02-001

Title:

TDAFP MINI RECIRC VALVE (1I2AF-4002) INSTRUIENT AIR ACCUMULATOR ADDITION DESIGN SUPERVISOR Design Controls and Project Controls: (Ref. NP 7.2.1, Commentary, for completion of this section.)

Check Applicable Design Controls:

Clarifications/Basis:

Design Input Checklist (PBF-1584)

[]

DUC (PBF-1606)

[]

Design Verification Notice (PBF-1583)

[]

Calculations

[]

Design Documentation (PBF-1585), or equivalent

[]

Design Change In Progress DCN's

[*

Engineering Change Requests

[]

Specifications iQ Check Applicable Project Controls:

[]

Modification Team Required (indicate minimum groups to request) "

E]

Conceptual Design Package Required El Budget Design Project (Impact) Number M

Detailed Project Schedule El IWP Required Assigned Modification Engineer:

Design Supervisor:

I \\J Clarifications/Basis:

Clc0 O/ tqn/

-asts:

O Date:

/!

PSiF-1605 Revision 0 1002/01 Reference(s) NP 7.2 I. PBF-1533 PBF-1534 A'

Pa!!e 1 of -t 0

i \\i

Point Beach Nuclear Plant PLANT DESIGN CHANGE CHECKLIST PLANT MODIFICATION/MINOR PLANT CH--NGE NO.:

02-001 CONCEPTUAL DESCRIPTION/REFERENCE INFORMATION (IF APPLICABLE)

GROUP HEAD CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REVIEW AND ACCEPTANCE

[Check here if not required: 91 Review conceptual design. Attach comments on NPBU Document Review Comment Sheet (PBF-1622 or equivalent)

Group Acceptance S,2nature Date Comments Radiation Protection

[-_ None

[]

Attached Fire Protection None E] Attached Instalhine Or2anization

_-']

None E] Attached

-- None Dl Attached LI None D-Attached LI None 0- Attached

-'--I None M Attached Design Supervisor

-_________-__None LI Attached PBF-i605 Revision 6 10102/01 Reference(s) NP7'2 1.PBF-1533. PBF-15S..

NP 722. PBF-1535 PBF-I(b6

/.,

S. I W

Pagec 2 of-4

Point Beach Nuclear Plant PLANT DESIGN CHANGE CHECKLIST PLANT MODtFICATIONMIMNOR PLANT CHANGE NO.:

02-001 FINAL DESIGN REVIEWS FINAL DESIGN RE'VIEWS Review final design. Attach comments on Document Review Comment Sheet (PBF-1622 or equivalent)

Group Acceptance Signature Date Radiation Protection Fire Protection Engineer Installing Organization oTeS Tech. Review Z-f

-______o VC-A, 4

0 6 r L

None ["-

Attached

[]

-N -- ine A ttached

[L] None

-- Attached

"' None [I] Attached L None E] Attached None L-i Attached E] None L-" Attached

[Wgone [- Attached 4DEPENDENT REVIEW OF INSTALLATION DOCUMENTS (IWP or Work Order Plan) List all IWP's and WO's used for installation IWP's/WO#(s) 1W0 OZQO35"/

wO ozo 35"2 All design and licensing requirements have been incorporated in the installation and testing document(s).

Reviewer:

Date:

-Zf21 02.

RELEASE FOR INSTALLATION All design controls have been properly implemented and the project has been appropriately reviewed. All necessary documents are approved. This design is released for installation. Comments regarding release, of this design are noted below:

Design Supervisor:

Date:

/

0/2-COMMENTS PBF-1605 Revismn 6 10/)2101 Page 30t -1 Referenccsi NP721.PBF-1583. PBF-15S4 Comments

-4i 72 PB

-1 8

P BI

Point Beach Nuclear Plant PLANT DESIGN CHANGE CHECKLIST PLANT MODI-ICATION/M-NOR PLANT CHANGE NO.:

02-001 ACCEPTANCE Plant modification is installed, tested, and all documents required for acceptance are complete.

CLOSEOUT Plant modification is complete. including submittal of all document updates in the Document Update Checklist (PBF-1606).

Reference change tracking numbers on PBF-1606 where appropriate (DCN numbers, FCR numbers. etc.).

Modification Engineer:

Date:

Design Supervisor.

Date:

NUCLEAR INFORNIATION MANAGEMENT Microfilm the entire modification package.

I PBF-1605 Revision 6 10/02/01 Page 4 of 4 Refmencels) NP 7 2 1 PBF.1533. PBF-ISS4

'-' PBF.1535 PBF-1606

"Design Summary "for Modification 02-001 "TDAFP Mini Recirc Valve (1/2AF-4002) Instrument Air Accumulator addition"

Purpose:

The purpose of this modification is provide a backup source of air to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) minimum flow recirculation control valves (l/2AF-4002).

Currently, the valves have a design function in the open position to prevent damage to the 1/2P 29 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps that could be caused by operation at low flow rates. However, this function currently relies on instrument air to open the valves, which is a non-safety related system that cannot be relied on during many accident scenarios. This backup air system, although not safety-related, will reduce the core damage frequency (CDF) significantly, and will address the issues identified in LER 266/2001-005-00 and CR 01-3595.

Scope:

A 150 gallon air accumulator will be installed in each of the instrument air supply lines to the AF-4002 valves. Dual upstream check valves will separate the accumulator tanks from the rest of the instrument air system. Sufficient test valves will be installed to test for check valve seat leakage. The accumulator tanks will be installed in the north and south sections of the auxiliary feedwater pump room, and tubing will be routed around and through the walls to the valves.

All new components will be stainless steel. The existing copper instrument air tubing, isolation valves, solenoid valves, and pressure regulators will be replaced with safety-related stainless steel components. The AF-4002 pressure regulator setpoint will be reduced to 65 psig (from the current setting 85 psig) as required by Calculation 2001-0056.

The AF-4002 valves are safety related and seismic Class 1. All portions of this modification will be installed as non-safety related, seismic Class 1, augmented quality. All components installed will be safety-related except for the relief valve to facilitate a possible future safety upgrade.

Design Inputs:

Calculations:

• S&W 14410.1 1-NP(B)-001-XE Rev 0 and Addendum A

• M-09334-266-LA.2. Rev 3

• 2001-0056 Rev 0

- -.*{

Codes:

• Wisconsin Admin Code Chapter Comm 41 BOILERS AND PRESSURE VESSELS

• ASME VIII-1989-1998

• ASMEB31.1 - 1992 PBNP Licensing Basis:

• FSAR Section 7.4.1 - AMSAC

• FSAR Section 9.7 - Instrument Air / Service Air a FSAR Section 10.2 - Auxiliary Feedwater 0 FSAR Section 14.1.10 - Loss of Normal Feedwater a FSAR Section 14.1.11 -Loss of All AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries a FSAR Section 14.2.4 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture

• FSAR Section 14.2.5 - Rupture of a Steam Pipe

• FSAR Appendix A.1 - Station Blackout

• FPER 5.2.2 - Safe Shutdown Systems and Equipment

• SSAR 2.3.2.4.2 a Tech Spec 3.7.5 - Auxiliary Feedwater 0 Tech Spec Bases B3.7.5 - Auxiliary Feedwater a LER 266/2001-005-00 Permanent Drawings:

0 BECH M-217 Sh. 1, Auxiliary Feedwater System

• BECH M-209 Sh. 4, Instrument Air

Affected Procedures CL 1"3E Part 1 - Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Turbine-Driven Unit 1

• CL 13E Part 1 - Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Turbine-Driven Unit 2 Vendor Documents:

Copes-VulcanDrawingE-336528

Background

The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Minimum Recirculation Control Valves (1//2AF-4002) open when the pump discharge flow drops below 110 gpm to ensure that there is adequate flow though the pump to dissipate pump heat and to prevent hydraulic instabilities.

However, these mini-recirc valves fail in the closed position, because when they are open the total flow to the steam generators is reduced. Therefore, the primary safety function of these valves is to isolate to ensure that there is adequate auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators to remove decay heat. The auxiliary feedwater system is required to support the following accidents and events: LONF, LOAC, SGTR, MSLB, SBO, ATWS, Appendix R fire, seismic event, tornado, and loss of instrument air. In many of these scenarios, the instrument air system will not'be available.

CR 01-2278, CR 01-3595 and LER 266/2001-005-00 identified an issue that could cause a common mode failure of all auxiliary feedwater pumps. If one of the accident or events listed above occurred that has led to the loss of instrument air, then the auxiliary feedwater pump minimum recirculation control valves l/2AF-4002 for I/2P-29 will fail closed.

During this event, it may become necessary for operations to throttle back auxiliary feedwater flow to control steam generator level. If care is not taken to ensure that the minimum recirculation valves are open, and the pump discharge valves are shut with no minimum flow path, then the pumps will dead head and fail in a short time. This scenario, when inserted into the PRA analysis, results in a significant increase in CDF.

The initial resolution to this issue was to update AOP 5B, EOP 0, EOP 0.1, and ECA 0.0 to direct operations to verify that there is always a minimum flow of 75 gpm through the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. To further reduce the likelihood of auxiliary feedwater pump damage and to reduce the CDF, a backup air source will be installed to ensure that the valves will open if necessary, even if the instrument air system is not available. This system will also increase the time for operator action to gag the valves open.

The system will be designed to provide enough air to stroke the valves 10 times per hour for two hours. There is no current explicit licensing basis requirement for a required duration before manual operator action is required, other than the one hour coping duration for the Station Blackout event and a 45 minute requirement for an Appendix R fire. The time duration of two hours was chosen to be an adequate duration before an auxiliary operator is needed in the

auxiliary feedwater pump room. Stroking the valves 10 times per hour was an assumption used for the nitrogen backup system for the MDAFP discharge valves, and was therefore used for these minimum recirculation valves. (See Calculation 2001-0056 assumptions.)

Design Description and Analysis:

To provide additional assurance that the auxiliary feedwater pumps will not be damaged on a loss of instrument air, backup pneumatic sources will be supplied to all minimum flow recirculation valves. This modification (MR 02-001) will install instrument air accumulator tanks for the 1_P-29 valves (1/2AF-4002). A separate modification (MR 01-144) will supply the P-38A/B valves (AF-4007, AF-4014) with backup nitrogen using the existing nitrogen system installed for the MDAFP discharge valves.

This modification will be installed QA, Seismic class 1, augmented quality. However all parts will be procured SR or from QA, SR stocked parts except for the relief valve. The Relief Valve will be LT # 9031670. This relief valve could be upgraded to SR with the proper dedication.

The set point will be checked prior to installation. The check valves will be installed with test connections to allow for future testing if desired. This will allow for the possibility of a future upgrade to a Safety Related system.

The auxiliary feedwater minimum flow recirculation valves do not have a safety function in the open position, however this function is a design function described in FSAR "Section 10.2 and Technical Specification Bases B3.7.5. The basis for no safety function is that all of the auxiliary feedwater pumps will have open discharge valves upon auto start (even with a loss of instrument air), and the minimum flow recirculation line is not needed early in the accident or event. The issue arises after the initial transient, when operators will take manual action to reduce auxiliary feedwater flow.

The AF-4002 valves currently have an augmented quality function to be gagged open during an Appendix R fire. These valves will be given an augmented quality function to automatically open to ensure adequate flow though the associated auxiliary feedwater pump during an Appendix R fire for at least 45 minutes (per Calculation WE-0005-06).

The backup systems are installed augmented quality, and will support this function.

This modification will necessitate a revision to FSAR Section 9.7 (Instrument Air), Section 10.2 (Auxiliary Feedwater), and Technical Specification Basis B3.7.5 to clearly reflect the design function of the minimum recirculation valves in the open position and to describe the backup pneumatic supplies. Updates to the SSAR Safe Shutdown Analysis Report 2.3.2.4.1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pumps section will be completed to describe the new modification.

Tank:

The new tanks have been sized to stroke the valve a minimum of 20 times. Simulator runs were performed and the 1/2AF-4002 valves were stroked 2-4 times for normal accident scenarios in the first hour. The most limiting case for stroking of 1/2AF-4002 would be a situation where SG level was controlled manually with 1/2P-29. See Calculation 2001-0056 for more details on tank sizing. The actual tank volume is 150 Gal (20 FT3), which is greater than the minimum volume determined by the calculation. The tank is of sufficient volume to account for leakage, and also was oversized to allow future expansion of the system. Any additional loads shall be captured in the mod process.

The new tanks will be QA, Seismic class I,augmented quality. The tanks will have a design function to maintain a volume of air to 1/2AF-4002-0 in the event of loss of lA.

The tanks will be fabricated by Phillips Getschow Co. in accordance with their ASME Section VIII program. PBNP will apply our QA program on top of Phillips Getschow's ASME VIII program QA program\\ (See PO 4500373998 for more details). PBNP will supply all material to Philips Getschow. All material will be QA and controlled IAW our QA program. Material supplied to Phillips Getschow will be complete with our Quality Assurance Records (QAR) to comply with requirements of ASME VIII. Phillips Getschow's NDE program will be supplemented by PBNP NDE program to ensure compliance with our QA program.

The new tanks will be a ASME Section VIII vessels designed to the 1998 edition of the code.

The tanks will also meet the 1989 edition of the code. The vessels will be registered by the national board.

The design ratings of the tanks are 200 psig at 150 'F. The tanks are fabricated from 24" Schedule 5s ASME SA-312 TP 304 stainless steel pipe with SA-403 TP 304L pipe caps on each end. Tubing connections will be facilitated by 1/2" x 24" SA-403 TP 304L thread-o-lets (4 per tank). Also, two 2" x 24" SA-403 TP 304L thread-o-lets are installed for inspection ports.

The air receiver tanks (CHAMPS ID IT-212 and 2T-212) will be seismically qualified by use of the GIP (Generic Implementation Procedure). The qualification will be documented on SEWS (Screening Evaluation Work Sheet) numbers SQ-002028 and 2029, respectively. The anchorage for the tanks, including tank legs, baseplates, anchor bolts and welds have been qualified by calculation 2002-0001, rev. 0.

Tubing:

The new tubing will be QA. Seismic class 1.

The tubing will be installed IAW B31 1-1992. Currently there is no tubing class to cover SS tubing in an air system. Therefore a new class will be created to cover SS tubing installations.

The'new class will be a Bechtel class Jfi with a primary rating 4000 psi 100°F. Tubing installed will have a design pressure of 200 psi @ 100 'F (Pipe Class IN-1).

The tubing used in will be 318".065" WALL, SS, ASTM A-213 TP 316.

Calculation 14410.11 -NP(B)-001-XE Rev 0 and Addendum A provides a seismic basis for the use of tubing supports and a recommended spacing. The rules of this calculation shall apply to all tubing installation, The run from the U2 tank location will need to be attached to the "I" Beam on the North East comer of the auxiliary feed pump room. The Gerard clamps will be attached to the center of the web and through bolted. Attaching the tubing and Gerard clamps with a small 1/4/" hole will have an insignificant affect to structural integrity and seismic qualification of the "I" beam.

Relief Valve The relief valve will be QA, Seismic class I. The relief will have a design function to remain closed and maintain pressure boundary of the tank.

The pressure relief valve will be qualified by use of GIP, rev. 2A and the NARE (New And Replacement Equipment) process. After the equipment has been installed, a walkdown will be performed by a minimum of two SQUG qualified engineers. The qualification of the equipment will be included on the SEWS forms for the air receiver tanks, SQ-002028 and 2029.

The relief valve is a 1/2" MNPT X I" FNPT, Crosby Valve Series 900, Style 951610MD, 0.074 Sq. In. Effective Area. Gas Service, Set Pressure 200 Psig, Capacity 310 SCFM, ASME UV Stamped. Material: 316 Stainless Steel, TFE "O-Ring" Seat.

This relief valve will be installed to comply with ASME VIII UG-125. The relieving capacity of the relief valve was chosen to protect the tank primarily from external sources of heat (UG 125(c)(2)). With an initial pressure of 100 psi the tank temperature can rise to 580 °F before the relief valves lifts. The tank has a capacity of approximately 140 SCF. The relief valve has sufficient capacity to relieve any reasonable temperature rise.

The Tank will be supplied with Plant Instrument Air which has a nominal air pressure of 100 psi. Relief valves on Air receivers T-33C/B (design pressure 125) are set at 125 psi. Therefore the maximum pressure that can be supplied to the new Tanks l/2T-212 is 137.5 or 151.25. This maximum pressure cannot cause the new tanks to exceed the design pressure. Therefore any relieving capacity would be sufficient to comply with UG-133(a).

S-Valves:

The new valves installed downstream of and including check valve AF-1 72 will be QA, Seismic class 1.

The new valves installed upstream check of valve AF-172 will be Non-QA. Non-SR, Seismic class 3.

The new check valves are NUPRO SS-CHS6-C5-1/3 rated for 6000 psi at 100 *F with 3/8" swagelok connections.

The new manual valves are WHITEY SS-1VS6-PK-W20 rated for 5000 psi at 100'F with 3/8" swagelok connections.

The GIP (Generic Implementation Procedure), rev. 2A considers both self-actuating check valves with out external actuators and manual valves to be seismically rugged (ref. pg 3-18, section 3.3.5 of the GIP rev. 2A). Therefore, the check valves and manual valves being added by this modification do not require seismic qualification.

Pressure Gauge:

"The 1/2PI-4060 pressure gauges will be QA, Seismic class 1. The Pressure Gauges will have a design function to maintain pressure boundary.

Seismic qualification of pressure indicators 1/2PI-04060 will be documented on SEWS SQ 002030 and 002031, respectively. The pressure gauges are Perma-Cal, model number 121NIB06A21C. This type of gauge was evaluated using the NARE process and documented on SQ-001626. The gauges were qualified for use in both Facades, up to e]. 85', and the PAB North Wing, el. 66'. The seismic accelerations for these areas exceed that experienced -at the Control building 8'. This will be documented on the SEWS forms. The pressure indicators will be supported as shown on page 8 of S&L calculation S-09334-266-IA.2.

The pressure gage will have 0-200 psig range, with a 4-1/2" face. This gage is identical to the gage (OPI-4056) installed in the back-up N2 supply to OAF-4019. The new gage will be utilized in a similar manner as OPI-4056.

Existing Equipment on the Air Operator:

The regulator will be QA, AQ, Seismic class 1. A champs ID will be obtained for the existing regulator (1/2AF-04062). These regulators will be re-set to 65 psig. see Calculation 2001-0056 All other Equipment on the operator is currently scoped QA, SR. Seismic class 1.

"Seismic qualification of air operated valves 1AF-4002 and 2AF-04002 is documented on SEWS SQ-000094 and 000095, respectively. These valves were previously seismically qualified as part of the response to the NRC's USI (Unresolved Safety Issue) A-46. Associated equipment. such as regulators 1 AF-04062 and 2AF-04062, are considered rule of the box. Therefore, qualification of valves IAF-4002 and 2AF-04002 will automatically cover the qualification of existing regulators 1 AF-04062 and 2AF-04062. The SEWS forms for I AF-4002 and 2AF-04002 will be revised to include the CHAMPS ID for the regulators. The revised SEWS forms wVill be SQ-002032 and 002033.

Probabilistic risk assessment:

See NPM 2002-0030 (Risk Reduction From Modifications to AFW Mini-Recirculation Valves Air Supply) dated 01-17-2002 Installation:

This modification will tie into the existing air supply to AF-4002 while AFW pumps are OOS.

Installation will occur in the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms see Drawings SK-MR-02-001 Sh.

1-6. The approach of this installation is to first layout the locations of the supports to prepare for "the installation of the Girard tubing clamps with Hilti bolts. The tubing runs will then be fabricated as shown in Sketches SK-MR-02-001 Sheets 1-6. When it comes time to take the affected portion of the system out of service, the applicable TSAC Will be entered. Proper FME precautions will be taken to avoid foreign material introduction into the system during installation. After all tie-ins are complete, testing will commence. Post-modification testing for the piping will consist of an initial service leak test, AOV Flowscans and tests on the check valves. IT-SA will then be used to perform the necessary open/shut valve stroke tests for 1/2AF 4002.

See also WOWP 0200355 and 0200356 Design Outputs:

SCR 2002-0010 FCR WOWP 0200355, 0200356 WE calc 2002-0001, Rev 0 PG drawing job no. 2029011 no. 2 SK-MR-02-001 sh. 1-6

o !

PARTS LIST / BILL OF MATERIALS FOR MOD REQUEST MR 02-001

/ DRAWING / SKETC1H NO.

SK-MR 02-001_

ITENi" QUAN.

MATERIAL DESCRIPTION/

VENDOR/

QA LOT NO. /

MOD NO.

RE Q'D SERVICE RATING CATALOG NO.

(Y/N)

P.O. NO.

BIN I

J(Y/N) 1 20 ft Pipe 24" Sch 5s SA-312 TP 304L seamless, Supplied in 10 y

450045,1602 Y

ft sections 2

Cap 24" Sch 5s SA-312 TP304L y

4500454602 Y

3 8

Tlu end 0 Let

,/2" X 24" TP 304L y

4500454602 Y

it 10 ft Angle SS 3 X 3 X 3/8" TP 304L Y

4500454602 Y

5 2

COUPLING, PIPE, 2", 3000 LB., TI-IRD, SS, PIPE Y

LN 9012770 Y

FITTINGS-ASTM A-182 TP316 6

2 0 L.b ROD, WELD FILLER, 1/8" ER-308. SFA-5.9 Y

LN 9033006 N

7 20 Lb ROD, WELD FILLER, 3/32" ER-308, SFA-5.9 Y

LN 9033005 N

8 I ft X 2 ft PLATE STAINLESS STEEL, 1/2" THICKNESS, ASTM Y

LN 9017429 Y

A-240 TYPE 30"4 9

.1 VALVE, CI1ECK, NUPRO SS-CHS6-C5-I/3 Y

LN 9030917 N

IC) 60 ft TUBING, 3/8" OD,.065" WALL, SS, ASTM A-213 TP Y

LN 9020756 N

316 QAR 13831 Jas iequiled CLAMP, TUBE, GIRARD 3/8-1/2T-50OSS-3D Y

LN 902704,1 N

12 as eqitiIed CLAMP, TUBE, GIRARD 3/8-1/2T-500SS-2D Y

LN 9027033 N

13 as letilited BOLT, K.\\\\IK BOLT 11 14-412,110045378 1/4" DIA.,

Y LN 9032667 N

4-1/2" LENGTH Form DG-G02.1 Rev. 3 Page 1 of3

I I

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I Y I LN9031551 I N 14 15 16 17 18 19 2(0 21 "1)"

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-is meqined as rtlid*1ed BOLT, KWIK BOLT 1134-7, /100045376 3A" DIA.,

7" LENGTH UNION, DIELECTRIC, 3/8" SWAGE TO SWAGE VALVE, REGULATING AND SHUT-OFF, 3/8" SWAGELOK ENDS, SS-I VS6-PK-W20 I lOSE, TEFLON, SWAGELOK 3/8" X 36" LONG 304 SS OVERBRAID TUBE ADAPTER ENDS, PN SS-6B1-IT-36 PLUG, TUBING, 3/8", SS-600-P UNO, TUBING, 3/8", SS-600-6 TEE, UNION, TUBING, 3/8" T, SS-600..3 Additional Swagelok fittings Shall be QA, SR.

Use brass on copper tube and stainless steel on SS tube VALVE, RELIEF, 1/2" X 1" CROSBY 951610MD 2" NPT SS TP 304 PIPE PLUG CONNECTOR, TUBING, 3/8" T TO 1/2" MPTr,ss I

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LN 9015604 N

28 1

SCREW, I1EX HEAD CAP (STD), 1/4"-20 Y

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31 Y

LN N

32 Y

LN N

33 Y

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34 Y

LN N

35 Y

LN N

36 Y

LN N

37 Y

LN N

38 Y

LN N

39 Y

LN N

40 Y

LN N

S11 Y

LN N

42 Y

LN N

43 Y

LN N

,14 Y

LN N

,15 Y

LN N

Form DG-G02.1 Rev. 3 Page 3 of 3 I i f 1 4

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT DESIGN VERIFICATION NOTICE

--of Document TDAFP Mini Recirc Valve (I12AF-4002) I Document No.

MR 02-001 Design Verification Method:

N Design Review

[

UPDATES TO THIS FORM COVERED BY EXISTING SCR 97-410 nstrument Air Accumulator addition Rev.

Date Rev.

I Alternate Calcs Qualification Testing REVIEWER CHECKLIST CONSIDERATIONS:

L.

Were the inputs correctly selected and incorporated into design?

2.

Are assumptions necessary to perform the design activity adequately described and reasonable? Where necessary, are the assumptions identified for subsequent reverifications when the detailed design activities are completed"

3.

Are the appropriate quality and quality assurance requirements specified?

4.

Are the applicable codes, standards, and regulatory requirements including issue and addends properly identified and are their requirements for design met?

5.

Have applicable construction and operating experience been considered?

6.

Have the design interface requirements been satisfied?

7.

Was an appropriate design method used?

8.

Is the output reasonable compared to inputs?

Are the specified parts, equipment and processes suitable for the required application?

Are the specified materials compatible with each other and the design environmental conditions to which the material will be exposed?

1I.

Have adequate maintenance features and requirements been specified?

12.

Are accessibility and other design provisions adequate for performance of needed maintenance and repair?

13.

Has adequate accessibility been provided to perform the in-service inspection expected to be required during the plant life?

14.

Has the design properly considered radiation exposure to the public and plant personnel?

15.

Are the acceptance criteria incorporated in the design documents sufficient to allow verification that design requirements have been satisfactorily accomplished?

16.

Have adequate pre-operational (IST, PMT, ISI, snubber, etc.), subsequent periodic test, and inspection requirements been appropriately specified, including acceptance criteria?

17.

Are adequate handling, storage, cleaning, and shipping requirements specified?

18.

Are adequate identification requirements specified?

19.

Are requirements for records adequately specified?

20.

Will the change remain within the analyzed or specified capabilities of any affected equipment?

21.

Has a field inspection been done?

22.

Have impacts on other systems been identified?

"-)1vfMENTS

-"None Attached (Use Form PBF-l ".3) sign Prepared By:

~'Y Reviewed By:

/.

Approval By:

Yes 51 7

,7/

I/

No N/A J

J

77/

-it 2._ý /Iý/0 p-/L1 I' I Date

Point Beach Nuclear Plant DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

%-ification or Temporary Modification Number:

MR 02-001

Title:

TDAFP Mini Recirc Valve (I2AF-4002) Instrument Air Accumulator addition INSTRUCTIONS: Consider the basic functions of each structure, system, and component. (SSC), when answering the questions. The designer shall check the appropriate box for each design input or section. All inputs that apply to the design shall be explained. The explanation may be documented on this checklist or in the design summary. The reviewer shall review the checklist, and any differences between the designer and the reviewer should be addressed This checklist addresses most design concerns, but is not all encompassing. Any additional concerns should be addressed in the design summary.

(Updates to this form covered by SCR 97-411.)

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO A. General codes, standards, regulatory requirements, and design criteria.

I. Are any of the PBNP FSAR general design criteria applicable? (Reference FSAR, Section 1.3.

Identify and address design criteria as appropriate.)

GDC 1,2,5

2. Are any design requirements contained in commitments affected? (Reference CLB database and the Safety Evaluation/Screening associated with this change.)

See associated 50.59

".: Meet State of Wisconsin Administrative Code requirements? (Refer to ILHR 41.42. PSC 114, and other sections as appropriate for requirements.)

New tank will be installed IAW Comm 41

4. Meet existing DNR permits or require DNR approval? (Contact WE Environmental Department.)

E5 ED

5. Consider the effect of design and accident conditions, such as pressure, temperature, fluid chemistry, and radiation on components, including internal elastomers and material coating compatibility.

5 (Changes in design parameters may impact Environmental Qualification.)

6. Incorporate new types/models of equipment not presently used at PBNP9 S

7. Affect accessibility of any equipment? Consider interim conditions, future maintenance, and in-service inspection. (Reference CIfvs and drawings for manufacturer's clearance requirements.)

All new equipment will be installed to allow future maintenance and ISI.

8. Require breaching a High Energy Line Break (HELB) barrier? (Reference NP 3.4 16) If yes. EQ engineer review required.

Consider operating experience from PBNP and industry events. (Reference DG-G04 for operating experience reviews and NPRDS. NODIL. CHAMPS, INPO Keywords, or other catabases.)

PBF-15384

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST Consider failure effects on structures, systems, and components: (Failure analysis is only reqiuired for maintenance rule systems. Contact the NSA-PSA group for guidance and scope.)

"a.

The design discusses those events/accidents which the system/components are to withstand?

b.

The failure effect of the system/components: (Reference the NSA-PSA Group, Operating Experience, & IEEE-352-1975.)

e How components may fail, and the effect of the failure on the system and related systems?

• What mechanisms might produce failures?

• How a failure would be detected?

- What provisions are included to compensate for the failure?

See NPM 2002-003 for PRA 1I. Does the design add or remove components in containment?

a.

Change the amount of exposed aluminum in containment? (Reference DG-G07 and FSAR Section 5.6.)

b.

Change the amount of exposed zinc in containment? (Reference DG-G07.)

c.

Introduce materials into containment that could affect sump performance or lead to equipment degradation? (Reference DG-G07.)

d.

Decrease free volume of containment?

e.

Require addition or modification of a containment penetration boundary? (Consult the containment system engineer.)

f.

Require painting in containment? (Reference MI 36.3.)

12. Consider potential for fuel failure?

a Affect fuel handling equipment?

b Present the potential for introducing foreign material/debris into the RCS or connected systems?

c.

Affect core barrel flow patterns? ("Baffle jetting" concerns) 13 Meet requirements to abandon equipment if applicable (Reference NP 7.1.5)

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO El

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APPLIES TO DESIGN DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST YES NO

'-_;iechanical requirements. (Contact Mechanical Design Engineering ror guidance.)

1. Have applicable ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel codes or other standards been identified?

(Reference the applicable specification. In addition, safety-related components should be reconciled El with DG-M16, and QA components should be reconciled with ANSI N45.2.)

ASME VIII, B31.1

2. Affect or add components/systems to ASME Section XI class 1, 2, or 3 equipment? (Reference PBNP CHAMPS, CBD drawings, and IST Coordinator. If YES, follow NP 7.2.5, Repair/Replacementi Program.)

3. Require State of Wisconsin Administrative Code permits/approvals? (Reference NP 7.4.9, Wisconsin E

Administrative Code for Boilers and Pressure Vessels or the Authorized Inspector.)

Installation Per Comm 41, Tank Fabrication per ASME VIII

4. Consider component performance requirements such as capacity, rating, output?

5. Consider hydraulic requirements such as pump net positive suction heads, allowable pressure drops, E

allowable fluid velocities and pressures, valve trim requirements, packing/seal requirements?

Provide vents, drains, and sample points to accommodate operational, maintenance and testing needs?

El

.j Provided for in design

7. Require service water? (Both essential and nonessential service water loads are modeled, and load changes must be evaluated. Contact the SWAP Coordinator.)

S. Require the addition of check valves? (Reference DG-Ml3 for selection guidance.)

El Check valve is appropriate for service

9. Require and evaluate any additional loading on instrument or service air, circ, fire protection, or El demineralized water, or other system?

Additional loading only during filling of the tank.

10. Evaluate any additional loading on HVAC systems or affect ventilation flow during or after installation? (This will require an EQ review for potential updates to EQSS. EQML & EQMR.)

II. Affect ventilation barriers, including containment, primary auxiliary building, or control room?

El

12. Require insulation? (Reference WVE specification PB-4S5 for insulation, and NP 1.9.10 for asbestos E]

control.)

Require lubrication? (Reference Lubrication Manual.)

El PBF.i 454

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

(

Require an independent means of pressure relief? (Reference B31.1.)

" -Per ASME VIII for tank overpresuration

15. Affect the assigned system design pressure or temperature)

16. Involve cobalt-laden materials into the RCS or into systems that supply the RCS? (Reference NP 4.2.29, "Source Term Reduction Program")

17. Are new materials and their coatings/plating compatible with system chemistry and disposal systems (NP 8.4.15)?

Insulating union will be used to separate the large SS system from the copper IA system I 8. Affect embedded or buried piping?

C. Electrical requirements. (Contact Electrical Design Engineering for guidance.)

1. Consider design conditions such as ampacity, voltage drop?

2. Consider component and system performance requirements, such as current, voltage, or power?

Consider redundancy, diversity and separation requirements of structures, systems and components?

(Reference DG-E07 for separation of electrical circuits.)

4. Comply with protective relaying requirements of equipment and systems?

5. Selection of overcurrent devices for proper protection and coordination? (Reference DG-E04 for selection of molded case circuit breakers.)

6. Affect available fault current at any bus?

7. Assure that all added cables meet fire retardancy requirements? (Reference FPER Section 4.1.8.

IEEE 383.)

8. Be compatible with existing electrical insulation and wiring?

9. Affect ampacity of existing cables" Maintain UL (or equivalent) listings?

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO 0l Elz

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DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST Alter the voltage harmonic distortion content or change the non-linear loading (i e., the addition of switching power supplies, the alteration of the circuit's power factor, etc.) on a vital or sensitive instrument bus?

12. Add new raceways? (Reference DG-E03 for electrical raceway sizing and DG-E02.)

13. Add cables to existing electrical raceways?

14. Be routed through fire wrapped raceways?

15 Affect the station grounding or lightning protection system?

16. Make any vital circuit susceptible to ground?

17. Affect emergency diesel loading? (Reference DG-E06 for diesel load change evaluation.)

Add more station battery loading?

19. Add load to a vital bus?

20. Add load to a non-vital bus?

21. Be compatible with service transformer capacity?

22. Consider electromagnetic interference between newlexisting equipment and electromagnetic coupling interactions between circuits?

23. Affect embedded conduits or buried cables, including the station grounding system?

D. Instrumentation and control requirements. (Contact I&C Design Engineering for guidance.)

1. Consider design conditions such as pressure, temperature, fluid chemistry. amperage. voltage' A.O-200 psi pressure gage will be installed. The gage is identical to PI-4056 (AF-4019 AFP Discharge Control AF-4058 N2 Backup Reg Outlet PI)

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO 11 z

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DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST Have the instruments been properly selected for the application?

3. Have sufficient instruments for operators to monitor the process?

The pressure gage will provide operators with the pressure in the tank.

4. Have appropriate instrument scales?

The nominal discharge of the IA compressors is 100 Psi. The range was chosen to make all the back up air supply P1 to all the AFP recirculation valves the same.

5. Have the instruments, control switches, and indicating devices been appropriately located for human factors (both for operations and maintenance)? (Reference DG-GO 1.)

The instruments will be installed with proper ergonomics.

6. Have alarms for off-normal conditions9

7. Be capable of or require remote and/or local operation`)

8. Be capable of or require manual and/or automatic operation?

9. Require calibration and maintenance requirements for the instruments to be specified?

New gage and regulator will be incorporated into an ICP

10. Have specified the instruments with proper range and accuracy?

The nominal discharge of the IA compressors is 100 Psi. The range was chosen to make all the back up air supply PI to all the AFP recirculation valves the same.

II. Address solid state vulnerability to RFl?

12. Consider software and programming/programmable settings of digital or electronic equipment?

13. Affect logic circuits or associated GL 96-01 review/required testing? Contact I&C System Engineering group.

E. Structural requirements. (Contact Civil Design Engineering for guidance.)

I. Affect or scope seismically qualified equipment (Class I or 2) and therefore require a seismic qualification evaluation? (Reference NP 7.7.2. "Seismic Qualification of Equipment.")

The new tank, valves, tubing and instruments will be Class 1

2. Affect seismic boundaries9 New seismic boundary Affect stress calculations of pipe? (Reference DG-M09.)

4. Affect the loading or require changes to e\\isting equipment foundations?

PBF-159-1 APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO 9

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-£ DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

5. Affect wall stress calculations for pressurized concrete cubicles or structures?

6. Require analysis of non-seismic components placed over or adjacent to seismic components?

7. Add items which span between two separate seismic areas/buildings? (The effect of the relative movement must be addressed )

S. Require clearance review for seismic movement or thermal expansion considerations?

9. Require a floor or wall loading analysis? (Reference Bechtel C-dwgs.)

10. Require the addition of new supports, hangers, or foundations or add weight to or between existing supports, hangers, embeds, or foundations during installation or post-installation? (Reference DG-M09 and DG-MI0 for pipe support.)

Tubing per CALC S&W 14410.11 -NP(B)-001-XE Tank per CALC 2002-0001 Add new or add load to seismically qualified raceways? (Reference NP 7.72, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment.")

12. Modify, attach to, or locate within the proximity of masonry block walls? (Reference IEB 80-11 Block Wall Program.)

13. Require core drills, expansion anchors, or re-bar cuts? (Reference DG-COI for expansion anchor design and installation.)

Hilti bolts will be used to support the girard clamps

14. Create an external or internal missile hazard?

15. Consider wind and storm loading on external structures?

16. Require protection from high energy line break jet? (Refer to FSAR Appendix A.2.)

17. Consider dynamic requirements such as live loading, vibration, and shocklimpact?

Anchorage of the Tank has been designed for an SSE event. Valves and instruments will be qualified by SQUG walk down APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO El ElZ El

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DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

'ograms I. ASME Section Xl and QA considerations:

a.

Affect IST acceptance criteria or calculations? (Contact Component Engineering.)

b.

Require classification of new components? (Reference DG-G06 for system, component, and part classification.)

See SK-MR-02-00 1

c.

Affect QA-scope systems or boundaries? (Contact Site Programs Engineering Support for Q-List.)

See SK-MR-02-001

d.

Require special personnel/equipment qualifications not proceduralized at PBNP (i.e.,

underwater welding)?

e.

Require material certification or other certification to ensure quality equal to or better than the affected SSC? (These requirements need to be specified in the specification or purchase requisition.)

Per BOM

f.

Have all design requirements, such as pressure or current rating, been reviewed against lot descriptions or been specified on purchase requisitions/specifications?

2. Fire protection considerations:

a Affect access to a fire zone, fire protection equipment or Appendix R safe shutdown equipment, including manual fire fighting activities? (Reference Section 5.2.1 of Design Guide DG-F01)

b.

Affect a fire barrier? (Reference NP 8.4.11 and Fire Barrier Drawings WE PBC-2 1 8 Sheets 1-20, Section 5.2.2 of Design Guide DG-F01)

c.

Affect a fire protection system or its performance? (Reference Section 5.2.3 of Design Guide DG-FOI 1)

d.

Increase or decrease permanent combustible loading in a room? (Reference Section 5.2.4 of Design Guide DG-FO 1)

e.

Based on Section 2 and Appendix A of the SSAR. will the change add to. delete from. or affect the performance of safe shutdown systems or equipment? (Reference Section 5 2 5.1 of Design Guide DG-FO I)

See FPCC APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO El 11 11 11 El 11 El PBF-1S8-

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APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO 0

DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

f.

Based on Sections 3, 4, and Appendix C of the SSAR, will the change affect a cable associated with safe shutdown equipment, a safe shutdown power supply, or the physical location of a safe shutdown cable? (Reference Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01)

g.

Based on Table I-i, Section 5 and Appendix D of the SSAR, will the change affect fire area analysis and compliance with Appendix R separation criteria or the conditions of an approved Appendix R exemption for any PBNP Fire Area? (Reference Section 5.2.5.3 of Design Guide DG-F01, Table 3.2-2 of DBD T-40)

h.

Will the change add, remove, or affect the performance of any emergency lighting required for compliance with Section II.J of Appendix R? (Reference Section 5.2.6 of Design Guide DG FO 1)

i.

Will the change add, remove, or affect the performance of any plant communications system relied upon for fire fighting or safe plant shutdown? (Reference Section 5.2.7 of Design Guide DG-FO i)

j.

Will the change affect the Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System? (Reference Section 5.2.8 of Design Guide DG-FO1) i k.

Will the change affect the Fire Protection Manual?

1.

Will the change affect any of the Supporting Documents listed in the SSAR (Section 6.0) or the FHAR (Section 4.0)?

If any of the questions a through j are answered "yes", an evaluation must be performed using the applicable sections of the FPCC checklist, PBF-2060 per Section 5 of Design Guide DG-F01.

3. Flooding protection considerations:

A flooding analysis should be performed if any of the following questions are applicable and answered yes (Reference Section 4.3 of DG-C02) a Modify potential flooding sources or add new potential flooding sources to a flood zone and thereby increase the direct and/or indirect flooding vulnerability of essential equipment?

b.

Degrade existing flood barriers or flood mitigation features providing unanalyzed pathway for flooding to propagate? (Reference Section 3.2 of DG-C02.)

c.

Involve the opening of potential flood sources anywhere at the station'i (Installation procedures need to address inadvertent flooding. Reference DG-C02. Section - -4.)

d Reduce the capacity to isolate or cope with flooding'9 (Reference Sect. 4 2 of DG-C02.)

PBF-15 8-,

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DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

e.

Change plant drainage/backfill requirements?

f.

Locate essential equipment or supporting systems where it would be susceptible to flooding?

(Flooding conditions may also impact Environmental Qualification.)

4. Environmental considerations:

a Be subject to adverse environmental conditions during storage or construction9 (Reference NP 9 5.2.)

b.

Require freeze protection or affect existing freeze protection?

c.

Locate safety-related or post accident monitoring equipment in a HARSH environment?

(Reference NP 7.7.1.)

d.

Require Environmental Qualification (EQ)? (Reference NP 7.7.1 for EQ qualification.)

e.

Be attached to an EQ system/component? (This will require an EQ review for potential updates to EQSS, EQML & EQM,. Reference EQ master list.)

f.

Change environmental parameters (e.g., pressure, temperature, radiation, humidity)? (Reference NP 7.7. 1, "Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment."

5. Radiation Protection (RP) and ALARA considerations: (Reference DG-G03. "ALARA Consideration Guideline for Design & Installation.)

The areas mentioned below are normally within the RCA, but radiological concerns should be considered for SSC outside the RCA also.

a.

Affect any SSC in an RWP required area, a contaminated area, or a radiation area, including opening of a system that may be a radiological concern?

b Will the change generate excessive radwaste or highly radioactive/contaminated waste" c

Remove any plant equipment from a potentially contaminated system (including BOP systems)?

d.

Result in an anticipated increase in operational or maintenance exposures?

(Consider equipment rearrangement to reduce plant life dose?)

e.

Result in an expected exposure of greater than I Rem for any individual during installation of the change?

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DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST

f.

Result in an anticipated collective exposure of greater than 2 Rem for the installation of the change?

If questions d, e, or f apply and are answered yes. then an ALARA review shall be performed.

(Reference NP 4.2.3, "ALAR.A Review Procedure.")

6. Chemistry considerations:

a.

Require or affect established chemistry limits? (Contact system engineer and review chemistry procedures.)

b.

Require any routine chemical analyses? (Contact system engineer and review chemistry procedures.)

c.

Require chemical additives? (Contact PBNP Chemistry.)

d.

Do new fluids/chemicals need to be evaluated for TRI (Toxic Release Inventory), CHES, critical applications, or special disposal requirements? (Contact Chemistry/Chemical Engineering.)

stallations

1. Installation requirements/plant conditions have been determined?

Per WOWP

2. Consider test and inspection requirements, including the conditions under which they will be performed? (Reference NP 7.4.1 for pressure test requirements, NP 7.4.3 for post-maintenance and modification NDE requirements, NP 12.5 for special test procedures, and OM 4.2.2 for in-service tests.)

Per WOWP

3. Have post-installation acceptance criteria been properly specified to test the intended function of the component(s)/system?

Per WOWP

4. Comply with all WE lifting and rigging requirements? (Reference WE Safety Manual, PBNP Safe Load Path procedures, and NP 8.4:7.)

Per WOWP

5. Consider ALARA for installation activities? (i.e, shielding, monitoring water level, etc.)

6. Require special handling, shipping, or environmental conditions for storage or construction?

(Reference NP 9.5.2 for material storage.)

Consider transportability requirements such as size and shipping weight limitations.

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO E

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DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST Require spare parts or special non-standard items or tools?

9. Will any added components introduce chemical contaminants to the system? (i.e., preservative coating on valves, coatings on weld rod can also introduce contaminants)

10. Consider personnel requirements and limitations, including the qualification and number of personnel available for plant operation. maintenance, testing and inspection, and permissible personnel radiation exposures?

IL. Operational requirements under various conditions, such as plant startup, normal plant shutdown, plant emergency operation. special or infrequent operation, and system abnormal or emergency operation.

a.

Require new procedures or procedure changes? (Reference NP 1.2.5.)

See DUC

b.

Potentially impact other systems, components, or structures during installation?

AF, IA

c.

Present installation impacts on plant operations (i.e., fire watches, etc.)?

'2. Access and administrative requirements for plant security: If any security requirements are applicable, notify Security.

a.

Create an opening >96 in.2 in any wall, ceiling, or other barrier?

b.

Require work within 20' of fence?

c.

Affect security equipment and documents, including those containing safeguards information?

(Contact Security for design development requirements and design concurrence.)

d.

Affect access controls?

13. Safety requirements:

a.

Affect safety equipment and thereby create personnel hazards (i.e., removal of handrails)?

b.

Introduce hazardous material into the plant? (Reference NP 1.9.1.)

c.

Affect evacuation routes or escape provisions from enclosures?

d.

Meet OSHA regulations? (Reference Wisc. Electric Safety Manual and OSHA 29 CFR 1910.)

e.

Move any energy sources? If yes. verify installation document covers move. including transferring danger tags.

APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO

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DESIGN INPUT CHECKLIST New tank will be an energy source after it is pressurized Designed by:

Jeff Novak R

Reviewed by:

Fi.

"i-*iJ APPLIES TO DESIGN YES NO Date Date:

I'LL02-(

I

Point Beach Nuclear Plant FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST

..*R Number MR 02-001 Unit I X

Unit 2 X

Common Facilities System Auxiliary Feedwater - AF Location Aux Feed Pump Room AFFECTED FIRE ZONE(S)-FIRE AREAS (see FPER Sect. 9)

Fire Zone 304N and 304S PURPOSE The Fire Protection Conformance Checklist (FPCC) was developed to help evaluate the impact of plant modifications, procedural changes, and tests on the plant fire protection program and safe shutdown capability for compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and other plant fire protection license commitments.

The FPCC also provides the screening criteria to ensure that a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation is performed on activities that affect the design basis of fire protection equipment or plant's capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for any design basis fire. If the F;PCC screening indicates the plant fire protection or safe shutdown design basis will be affected, a 10 CFR 50.59 screening shall be performed per NP 10.3.1. Authorization of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59). with consideration of the FPCC information, to determine if an unreviewed safety question is involved. The design basis fire is the accident to be considered in the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The FPCC becomes part of the documentation supporting the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluation.

The FPCC is comprised of this main form, PBF-2060 and sub-forms, PBF-2060a through h that address different topical areas of the

-- NP fire protection program. The intent of multiple sub-forms is to eliminate unnecessary burden in completing forms for areas of

,rotection clearly not affected by a particular change. Based upon the nature of the change (as identified by answers to the

.stions on the Design Input Checklist PBF-1584), the applicable sections on the FPCC will be filled out. The appropriate sections

-- the FPCC to be filled out shall be indicated below on the FPCC Applicability Matrix. The applicable sections that are completed will be attached to the main form PBF-2060 and included with the plant change package.

INSTRUCTIONS

1.

Complete the FPCC Applicability Matrix below, based on the nature of the change and answers to questions on the Design Input Checklist PBF-1584 for the applicable change.

2.

Complete the appropriate sub-forms, based upon the nature of the change as defined on the FPCC applicability matrix. It is not necessary to complete sub-forms for areas of fire protection that are clearly not affected by the subject change

3.

Use the paragraphs in Section 5 ot Design Guide DG-FOI that correspond to the FPCC sections for additional information and guidance when answering the questions in the checklist.

4.

Consider requirements tor a 10 CFR 50.59 screening by reviewing the RESULTS section below.

5 Ensure that the appropriate documents required for update (i e., FPER. FHA, SSAR, SSAMS, FPDS, Calculations, FPEEs, etc.) are properly identified for future revision in the governing document update procedures. This includes documents that must be updated for changes that could potentially adversely affect fire protection conformance, as well as changes that are determined by the checklist not to adversely affect fire protection conformance (but still require document updates)

6.

Sign and date the FPCC. If the NPBU Fire Protection Engineer is not the preparer of the FPCC. then the Fire Protection Engineer shall review, sign and date. the FPCC.

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST RESULTS If the completion of any FPCC screening from Sections 1.0 - 10.0 on forms PBF-2060a through 2060h indicates the modification has potential adverse impact, then the plant fire protection or safe shutdown design basis may be affected. A 10 CFR 50.59 screening must be performed per NP 10.3.1, Authorization of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59),

with consideration of the FPCC information to determine if an unreviewed safety question is involved the design basis fire is the accident to be considered in the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation The FPCC becomes part of the documentation supporting the 10 CFR 50 59 screening and safety evaluation.

Inform the NPBU Fire Protection Engineer if fire protection program commitments or compliance watn 10 CFR 50.

Appendix R will be affected.

Fire Protection Conformance Checklist Applicability Matrix Applicable?

Yes No Section Topic E

[

1.0 Plant Access

[

2.0 Fire Barriers

[

3.0 Fire Protection Systems

(]

[

4.0 Combustible Loading/Fire Hazards l [

5.0 Safe Shutdown Systems and Equipment

[]

6.0 Safe Shutdown Cables, Including Associated Circuits 5

[

7.0 Fire Area Analysis.

Including Exemptions/Evaluations 5

[

8.0 Emergency Lighting E

[]

9.0 Plant Communications 5

[

10.0 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System Design Input Checklist Section F.2.a F.2.b F.2.c F.2.d F.2.e F.2.f F.2.g F.2.h F.2.i F.2.j Action Complete & attach PBF-2060a Complete & attach PBF-2060b Complete & attach PBF-2060c Complete & attach PBF-2060d Complete & attach PBF-2060e Complete & attach PBF-2060e Complete & attach PBF-2060e Complete & attach PBF-2060f Complete & attach PBF-2060g Complete & attach PBF-2060h Conformance checklist (including all applicable attachments) completed.

Comments: Item 5.11 -The modifications to the Ir2AF-4002 mini recirc valves will not affect how they are credited in the Appendix R scenario. They currently must be capable of being gagged open if necessary, and this will still be possible. The modification will ensure that the valves can automatically open if instrument air is lost. This new capability may be credited in the Appendix R scenario in the future.

By:

Date:

2-2.

Z-ZZ-z* oo-?

I.

Point Beach Nuclear Plant FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTION 2.0 - FIRE BARRIERS

,I

"' r'"o.mplete the evaluation and attach to form PBF-2060.

2.0 FIRE BARRIERS (Ref. Section 5.2.2 of Design Guide DG-F01) 2.1 Does the modification delete any fire barriers/area appearing on the PBC-21S Series Drawings?

"- Yes, go to 2.2

- No, go to 2.3 Comments:

2.2 Has a new barrier/area been defined?

Yes, go to 2.3 E] No, go to 2.15, complete actions and resume at 2.3 Comments:

2.3 Does the modification revise any existing fire barriers (e.g.. changes to supporting structural steel barrier thickness or material etc.)?

El Yes, go to 2.15, complete actions and resume at 2.4

[2 No, go to 2.4 Comments:

2.4 Does the modification add/delete/revise any penetrations to fire barriers due to cables or pipes?

[

Yes, go to 2.5 D No, go to 2.6 Comments:

2.5 Are the appropriate barrier penetration procedures specified? (NP 8.4.11)

[7 Yes, go to 2.6 D No, go to 2.15, complete actions and resume at 2.6 Comments: See MR 02-001.

PB9F-"06]b

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTION 2.0 - FIRE BARRIERS 2.6 Does the modification add or replace any fire doors, frames or dampers?

D Yes, go to 2.7

- No. go to 2.8 Comments:

2.7 Do the new/replaced dampers/doors/frames meet requirements for rated fire barriers in the fire area and fire damper installation configurations as discussed in FPER Section 7.1.3? (FHA, Fire Zone Data)

Yes, go to 2.8 No. go to 2.16, complete actions and resume at 2.8 Comments:

2.8 Does the modification add or relocate any cable raceways to a location which presents intervening combustibles between redundant safe shutdown trains? (Review Exemption Requests - Bases for Fire Zone/Area in DBD T-40, Table 3.2-2, SSAR Table 1-I and Section 5.3.4)

Yes, go to 2.9

[

No, go to 2.10 Comments:

2.9 Does the modification include installation of approved fire stops?

-- Yes, go to 2.10

[1 No, go to 2.15, complete actions and resume at 2.10 Comments:

2.10 Does the modification add/delete/revise any cable to an existing raceway which presents intervening combustibles between redundant safe shutdown trains?

M Yes. go to 2.11

[7] No, go to 2.12 Comments:

PBF.2060b Rcvmion 0 ()6/0%101 Pace 2 of "

t-o

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTION 2.0 - FIRE BARRIERS 2.11 Does the modification include installation/reinstallation of approved fire stops?

L-Yes, go to 2.12

'- No, go to 2.16, complete actions and resume at 2.12 Comments:

2.12 Does the modification addldelete/revise any curb, dikes, or drains in the area as described in FPER Section 7.1.12?

[]

Yes, go to 2.15, complete actions and resume at 2.13 SNo. go to 2.13 Comments:

2.13 Does the modification obstruct. remove/revise any suppression system or water spray nozzles or plume impingement shields in the area?

El Yes, go to 2.15, complete actions and resume at 2.14

[2 No. go to 2.14 Comments:

2.14 Does the modification affect any Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System (i.e., fire wrap on a raceway or junction box)? (SSAR, Section 5)

El Yes, go to 2.15

[2 No. Section 2 checklist complete Comments:

2.15 Do the affected barriers/features/fire areas protect safe shutdown components or cables, or are they relied upon as the basis for an approved Appendix R exemption or Fire Protection Engineenring Evaluation (Table 3.2-2 of DBD T-40, FHA. Table I-I of the SSAR)")

r-Yes, 2o to 2.16 F-1 No. go to 2.17 Comments:

Page 3 of -

PBF-.060Jb Revision U 06/0=1t)l

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTION 2.0 - FIRE BARRIERS 2.16 The modification impacts Appendix R compliance. List the affected items and refer to Section 5.2.2 of Design Guide DG-F01. RESUME checklist completion.

Affected Items:

2 17 The modification could impact fire protection commitments and/or codes List the affected item and refer to Section 5.2.2 of Design Guide DG-F01. RESUME checklist completion.

Affected Items:

PBF-2060b Revision ii 06/0)1 Page 4 of -t

Point Beach Nuclear Plant FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5,6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION S..

,omplete the evaluation (Sections 5.0, 6.0, and 7.0) and attach to form PBF-2060.

APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 5.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (Ref. Section 5.2.5.1 of Design Guide DG-FOl) 5.1 Does the modification require addition of a safe shutdown component? Is the new component located within the Appendix R flowpath boundaries shown in the Appendix R Highlighted P&IDs, SSAMS Database. SSEL Module, or the SSAR Section 2, Safe Shutdown Logic Diagrams in Appendix B of SSAR.

] Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.2

[

No, go to 5.3 Comments:

5.2 Will the new component support other safe shutdown systems or component(s)? (Refer to SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2, Safe Shutdown Logic Diagrams in Appendix B of SSAR) l-Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.3 l-No, go to 5.3 Comments:

5.3 Does the modification require deletion of a safe shutdown component? (SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2)

Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.4.

L\\ No, go to 5.4 Comments:

5.4 Does the modification require a design change to a safe shutdown component? (SSAMS Database, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2)

L\\ Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.5 L-No, go to 5.5 Comments:

PBF._t20No

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION S.

5.5 Does the modification add/delete/revise safe shutdown equipment to the system flow path or boundary isolation from interconnecting systems? (the Appendix R Highlighted P&IDs, SSANIS Database, SSEL Module, and the SSAR Section 2)

D] Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.6 No, go to 5.6 Comments:

5.6 Does the modification affect the opeiation of a system relied upon for post-fire safe shutdown (e.g.. changes in system flow rate, change in normal positions. etc. See SSAMS, SSEL Module, SSAR Section 2)?

Dl Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.7

• I No. go to 5.7 Comments: Operation of the mini recirculation control valves will not be affected. They will function identically before and after the modification.

5.7 Does the modification violate the safe shutdown systems performance goals as presented in FPER Section 7.2 and SSAR Section 2?

MZ Yes, go to 5.11, complete actions and resume at 5.8

", No, go to 5.8 Comments:

5.8 Does the modification affect any mechanical sub-or support components of safe shutdown components not listed on the safe shutdown equipment list? (e.g., SOVs, check valves, etc.) (See CHAMPS Appendix R listing)(. If it is a support component for safe shutdown equipment, then it should be considered a safe shutdown component for the purposes of review for impact.

E-Yes, go to 5.11. complete actions, resume at 5.9

[

No, go to 5.10 Comments:

5.9 Does the modification to the sub-or support component affect the operability of its associated sdfe shutdown equipment? (i.e., Failure of a support component that results in tailure of a safe shutdown component)

Fý Yes. go to 5.11, complete actions, resume at 5.10 F-No. go to 5.10 Comments:

PBF-2i)(,"e

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CI-HECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION J

5.10 Does the modification add/delete/revise any electrical sub or support components which support the identified safe "shutdown component(s) (e.g., power supplies, relays, switches, motor operators)? (Ref. Associated Circuit Analysis

- SSAR Section 3) r-Yes. go to5.11 Z

NO, to to6.1 Comments:

5.11 The addition/deletion/re vision of safe shutdown components, sub-or support components affects the safe shutdown analysis and must be evaluated for impact on Appendix R compliance and documentation impacts in Sections 6.0 and 7.0. List the equipment and the affected systems and refer to Section 5.2.5.1 of Design Guide DG-FO0.

RESUME checklist completion.

Safe Shutdown System(s), Components, Sub-or Support Component(s):

IAF-4002 / 2AF-4002 See comment section on PBF-2060 for evaluation.

6.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES. INCLUDING ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS (Ref. Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01) 6.1 Does the modification require addition of a safe shutdown cable, including cables which could spurious operation of safe shutdown equipment (i.e., through interlocks and interfacing relays and contacts)? (Ref. Section 3 of the SSAR, Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01)

El Yes. go to 6.10, complete actions and resume at 6.2 1z No, go to 6.2 Comments:

62 Does the modification require deletion of a safe shutdown cable? (Ref. SSAMS Circuit Analysis Module, SSAR Sections 3, 4, and 5)

El Yes. go to 6.10, complete actions and resume at 6.3

[

No, go to 6.3 Comments:

PBF.O26-),

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5,6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION t,,,,

6.3 Does the modification revise an existing safe shutdown cable, such that safe shutdown equipment functionality, either during normal/emergency equipment operation, or when subjected to a fire-induced circuit failure, could be impacted? This includes changes that could impact the ability to transfer equipment control from one operating location to another and changes which affect circuit protective device performance.

D Yes, go to 6 10. complete actions and resume at 6.4 "7" No, go to 64 Comments:

6 4 Does the modification require a change to the routing of an existing safe shutdown cable? This includes actual physical routing changes and changes in CARDS/SSAIMIS to correct routing discrepancies. This may involve changes to the cable endpoint, changes to the cable endpoint location, changes to the raceways in which a cable is routed, or changes to the fire zones through which a raceway is routed. (Ref. SSAMS Cable and Raceway Module, CARDS)

[

Yes, go to 6.10, complete actions and resume at 6.5

[

No. go to 6.5 Comments:

6.5 Does the modification require addition or revision of a circuit connected or to be connected to safe shutdown power "supply? (Ref. Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F01, Appendix R Highlighted Single Line Drawings, SSAR Section 3)

LI Yes, go to 6.6 V] No, go to 6 7 Comments:

6.6 Will adequate electrical coordination between the safe shutdown power supply feeder breaker and the added or revised component breaker or fuse exist*) (Ref. Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-FOland SSAR Section 3)

F-1 Yes, go to 6.7 Fý No, go to 6.10. complete actions and resume at 67 Comments:

PBF.L)60.!

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 6.7 Does the modification require addition or revision of any non-safe shutdown circuits?

F-1 Yes, go to 6.8

[

No, Safe Shutdown Cables Section Complete, go to 7.1 Comments:

6.8 Will the new or revised cables be equipped with properly designed circuit breakers, fuses or some kind of current limiting device? (Ref. SSAR Section 3)

F-1 Yes, Safe Shutdown Cables Section Complete, go to 7.1 D1 No, go to 6.9 Comments:

6.9 Will the new or revised cables share a common enclosure (raceway, panel etc.) with safe shutdown cables? (Ref.

Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-F0land SSAR Section 3)

Yes, go to 6.10, complete actions

] No, Safe Shutdown Cables Section Complete, go to 7.1 Comments:

6.10 The modification impacts the safe shutdown circuit analysis and must be evaluated further in Section 7.0 for impact on Appendix R compliance and documentation updates. List the safe shutdown circuits and associated components and refer to Section 5.2.5.2 of Design Guide DG-FO1. RESUME checklist completion.

Comments:

7.0 FIRE AREA ANALYSIS INCLUDING EXEMPTIONSIEVALUATIONS (Ref. Section 5.2.5.3 of Design Guide DG-F01) 7.1 Do the changes to the safe shutdown systems/equipment (from Section 5.0 of the FPCC), safe shutdown circuits or the physical routing of the cables (from Section 6.0 of the FPCC) result in a change to the potential consequences of a fire in any plant fire area? This includes changes that could result in the addition/deletion/modification of a compliance strategy for a piece of safe shutdown equipment for any fire area (such as availability of redundant equipment outside of the fire area, separation in accordance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R of Appendix R.

local manual actions, repairs, etc.). (Ref. SSAR, Section 5)

Yes, go to 7.5. complete actions and resume at 7.2

[/] No, go to 7.3 Comments:

PBF-2M36*i Page 5 of 6

FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE CHECKLIST SECTIONS 5, 6, & 7 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION 7.2 Is compliance with the separation criteria for redundant safe shutdown capability in Section III.G of Appendix R affected by the change? (Ref. SSAR Table DBD T-40, Table 3-2.2)

Fl Yes, go to 7.5, complete actions and resume at 7.3 F1 No, go to 7.3 Comments:

7.3 Is the modification proposed to be implemented in a fire zone/area for which an Appendix R Exemption or FPEE is in place (Ref. DBD T-40. Table 3-2.2. FHA, Table 1-I of the SSAR) 1 Yes, go to 7.4 E No, Fire Area Analysis Section is complete, go to Section 8 or next applicable Section.

Comments: Exemptions 6 and 18 for fire zone 304 (aux feed pump room).

7.4 Does the modification violate or potentially change the basis for the Appendix R exemption or FPEE? (Ref.: DBD T-40, Table 3.2-2, FHA, Table i-1 of the SSAR)'

E' Yes, go to 7.5

[

No, Section 5, 6, and 7 checklists complete Comments:

7.5 The modification impacts the Fire Area Analysis and potentially violates the basis for compliance with the separation requirements of Appendix R, the basis for an Approved Appendix R exemption, or technical evaluation such as a Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation. List the basis affected and refer to Section 5.2.5 3 of Design Guide DG-FOI. RESUME checklist completion.

Bases:

PBF-20t(Ai R eviiun I1,Lu6 *./blo Pa-ge 6 of 6

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59172.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Vcnfy SCR number on zil paes Page 1

,,tie of Proposed Activity:

Backup Air Systems for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Minimum Flow Recirculation Valves Associated Reference(s) #:

MR 02-00 1. MR 01-144, CR 01-2278, CR 01-3595. Calculation 2001-0056, Calculation 2002-0002, Calculation 2002-0001. Calculation M-09334-266-L/k.1 Rev 0 - Nitrogen Backup System to AFW Pump Discharge Valve, Calculation S-09334-266-IA.2 Rev 2 - 3D Restraint with Girard Tube Clamp. Calculation 144 0.1 1-NP(B)-001-XE Rev 0 - Qualification of 6 Foot Spans for 3/8 inch Tubing at PBNP. ASME Section VIII - Pressure Vessels, ASME B3 1.1 - Power Piping, IT 10, IT 10A, IT lOB, EOP 0, EOP 0.1, ECA 0.0, AOP 5B, MR 97-038, NPM 2002-0030. Calculauon WE 0005-06 Prepared by:

Rob Chapman z

Date:

/-z.s'-

c" Name ( Print)

Ka1ture Reviewed by:

Dave Black

((~ 1 ( 6Date:

/-o 25 2 Z

Name ( Print)

Signa tu-re PART I (50.59(72.48) - DESCRIBE THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY AND SEARCH THE PLANT AND ISFSI LICENSING BASIS (Resource Manual 5.3.1)

NOTE: The "NMC 10 CFR 50.59 Resource Manual" (Resource Manual) and NEI 96-07. Appendix B, Guidelines for 10 CFR 72.48 Implementation should be used for guidance to determine the proper responses for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 screenings.

• 1 Describe the proposed activity and the scope of the activity being covered by this screening. (The 10 CFR 50.59 / 72.48 review of other portions of the proposed activity may be documented via the applicability and pre-screening process requirements in NP 5.1.8.) Appropriate descriptive material may be attached.

CR 01-2278, CR 01-3595 and LER 26612001-005-00 identified an issue that could cause a common mode failure of all auxiliary feedwater pumps. If an accident or event has occurred that has led to the loss of instrument air, then the auxiliary feedwater pump minimum recirculation control valves 1/2AF-4002 for 112P-29. AF-4007 for P 38A, and AF-4014 for P-38B will all fail closed. During this event, it will become necessary for operations to throttle back auxiliary feedwater flow to control steam generator level, especially if all four auxiliary feedwater pumps auto start as designed. If care is not taken to ensure that the minimum recirculation valves are open, and the pump discharge valves are shut with no minimum flow path, then the pumps will dead head and fail in a very short time due to overheating. Currently, there is guidance in EOP 0, EOP 0.1, ECA 0.0, and AOP 5B to direct operations to verify adequate pump flow if instrument air has been lost before reducing flow to the steam generators, or to stop the pump.

To provide additional assurance that the auxiliary feedwater pumps will not be damaged on a loss of instrument air, backup air sources will be supplied to all minimum flow recirculation valves. These modifications are an enhancement that will reduce the core damage probability from a loss of instrument air and increase the time for an operator to take manual action to override the valves open. Instrument air accumulator tanks will be installed by MR 02-001 for the 1/2P-29 valves (12AF-A002), and the existing nitrogen backup system for the MDAFP discharge valves will be tied in by MR 01-144 for the P-38A/B valves (AF-4007, AF-4014).

Currently, the auxiliary feedwater minimum flow recirculation valves do not have a safety function in the open position, however this function is a design function described in FSAR Section 10.2 and Technical Specification Bases B3.7.5. The basis for the recirculation valves not having a safety function in the open position is that all of the auxiliary feedwater pumps will have open discharge valves upon auto-start (even with a loss of instrument air), and thus the minimum flow recirculation line is not needed early in the accident or event. These m'unimum recirculation valves currently have an augmented quality function to open (by manual override) to ensure adequate flow though the associated auxiliary feedwater pump dunng an Appendix R fire within 45 minutes (per PBF-1 51Sc Reviion0 10l4/J ci'vV i~t%

~r~fflrRrefe-ence NP 5.1 3 Revision 0 10/"-4101 cm-PWR 9 a i I ^ ^ "M(I")

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002.0010 10 CFR 50.59172.48 SCREENhNG (NEW RULE)

Veriy SCUnumber on a ipg Page 2 Calculation WE-0005-06), and the backup systems installed by these modifications may be credited to support this function.

These modifications will provide a sufficient secondary source of air or nitrogen such that these valves are able to operate for at least two hours stroking 10 times per hour if the regular instrument air system is disabled due to a seismic event, tornado, fire, or loss of offsite power. No changes will be made to the control circuitry of the valves, and they will still open automatically when the auxiliary feedwater pump flow drops below the setpoint, when the pumps are started, and when the pumps are secured.

MR 02-001 - 1/2AF-4002 - TDAFP Mini Recire Valves For 1I2AF-4002, a stainless steel accumulator tank will be installed in each of the instrument air lines to the mini recirc valves. Upstream of these tanks will be two check valves in series that will isolate the tank from the rest of the instrument air system. These check valves will be spring loaded and will shut on a very small differential pressure to ensure that the tank pressure will remain as high as possible when the instrument air pressure drops. The volume of the tanks will be approximately 150 gallons, which is greater than the required minimum volume determined by Calculation 2001-0056 to be needed to stroke each valve 10 times per hour for two hours. In order to reduce the amount of air required to stroke the valve and thus the tank size, the pressure regulator for the AF-4002 valves which is currently set at 85 psig, and will be re-set to 65 psig. The valve will still stroke full open at this pressure. Calculation 2001-0056 has also verified that these valves will pass full flow even when less than 20% open, since the flow restricting orifices 1/2RO-4003 govern the flow rate in the recirculation line and have the lowest flow coefficient.

The accumulator tanks will be ASME code vessels, designed to Section VIII, and will be rated to 200 psig.

These tanks will be installed in the north and south sections of the auxiliary feedwater pump room (not in the pump cubicles).

The tank locations were chosen based on the best possible tubing run, and to limit obstructions to plant equipment. Isolation valves will be installed to permit replacement of the check valves should leakage or failure occur. The tubing will be configured such that system pressure can be used to test each the check valves, if necessary.

The new tubing will be routed through the wall that separates the IP-29 cubicle from the south section of the auxiliary feedwater pump room (Fire Zone 304S). This is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire wall that is considered a partition within a fire zone. The penetration will be filled and the wall will maintain its 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating.

MR 01-144 - AF-4007 and AF-4014 - MDAFP Mini Recirc Valves The existing nitrogen supply systems for the AF-4012 and AF-4019 MDAFP Discharge Control Valves (one independent system for each valve) will be used to supply the AF-4007 and AF-4014 MDAFP Minimum Recirculation Control Valves. The existing instrument air isolation check valves AF-131/133 (for AF-4012) and AF-151/153 (AF-4019) and nitrogen tubing and tanks will be used for the AF-4007 and AF-4014 valves.

New tubing will be installed to connect the nitrogen supply tubing near the AF-4012/4019 valves downstream of the check valves to the A.F-4007/4014 minimum recirculation valves. Also, a bypass line will be installed around the AF-133/153 check valves to allow the AF-131/151 check valves to be tested using system pressure, if necessary. The existing instrument air connections to the AF-4007/4014 valves will be capped.

The nitrogen system pressure regulators (PCV-405314058) are currently set to 60 psig, and will be re-set to 65 psig. This will increase the margin for stroking the recirculation valves open, although this is still less than the normal valve regulator setting of 100 psig. Calculation 2002-0002 has verified that these valves are full open at this pressure, and that they will pass full flow even when less than 20% open, since the flow restrcting orifices RO4008/4015 govern the flow rate and have the lowest flow coefficient in the recirculation line. This increase in pressure regulator setting will not affect the discharge valve positioners, since they normally operate with 100 psig instrument air, but only require 45 psig.

The existing nitrogen supply system installed by MR 97-038 consists of two nitrogen bottles, with one valved in and the other bottle maintained full in standby mode. When the aligned bottle pressure drops to the changeout point, the standby bottle is aligned, and the drain bottle i6 replaced with a full bottle. Calculation PBF-tS15c

Reference:

N? S. 18

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Vc(ySCRnuberna1Ipag=

Page 3 2002-0002 determined the changeout pressure for the bottle that will supply 90 minutes of nitrogen to the "discharge and minimum recirculation valves. Therefore, there is always greater than three hours of capacity available in the system at any given time, although operator action is required to align the standby bottle.

Although the AF-4007/4014 valves do not have a safety function to open, all components in the air supply line to the valve will be installed as safety related, since it will be part of the pressure boundary for the existing discharge valve backup system, which was installed safety-related by MR 97-03S. Several existing instrument air components upstream of the solenoid valve that are not safety related will be reclassified as safety related. This can be done on the basis that these components have demonstrated adequate functionality over time, and these components will also be leak tested by MR 01-144. This is equivalent to qualification testing, and therefore these components may be dedicated. Furthermore, the dimensions of these components have been verified to be appropriate for the installation. Finally, the material acceptability will be evaluated based on a detailed walkdown.

Common Issues All new tubing and valves installed for both modifications will be stainless steel and have design ratings that are the same as or greater than the existing components. All new components will be installed using ASME B31.1.

All new tubing, valves, and accumulators will be analyzed as seismic Class I. Standard wall mounted tube supports will be used and supported with Hilti bolts into the walls of the auxiliary feedwater pump room.

Calculation 14410.11-NP(B)-001-XE Rev 0 (including Addendum A) provides a seismic basis for the use of tubing supports and a required spacing, and the limitations of this calculation shall apply to all tubing installation.

Supports for the pressure gauges for MR 02-001 will be designed in accordance with Calculation S-09334-266 IA.2 Rev 2. The floor supports for the accumulator tanks were seismically analyzed by Calculation 2001-0001.

Portions of the system not covered by any calculation will receive a SQUG walkdown to ensure seismic adequacy.

Currently the nitrogen system AF-133/153 check valves are safety-related and in the IST program. They are leak tested quarterly by IT 10, and are also tested by IT 10A and IT 1OB. The upstream check valves AF-131/151 will not be tested periodically, but a bypass line is being installed to facilitate testing, should it be necessary in the future. The check valves for the instrument air accumulator will not be part of the IST program, nor will they be periodically tested. They will be tested as PMT for the modification. Since the accumulators are not supporting a safety function of the AF-4002 recirculation valves, then there is no need to periodically test these check valves.

The specified two hour time duration on the backup systems is not a licensing basis requirement. There is a one hour required coping duration for the Station Blackout event (FSAR Appendix A.1). and a 45 minute requirement for Appendix R (Calculation WE-0005-06), but no other time requirements are specified. Two hours was chosen conservatively to be enough time to allow an operator to be dispatched to the auxiliary feedwater pump room to take manual action if necessary, and to bound current and future requirements. The sizing of these systems with a two hour capability does not imply a new licensing basis requirement to supply these valve for two hours.

The minimum recirculation valves were assumed in each of the calculations to stroke 10 times per hour. This is a conservative estimate that was also used in the original calculation for the MDAFP discharge valve nitrogen backup system (Calculation M-09334-266-IA.1). Simulator runs have confirmed that this is very conservative since operations personnel will typically attempt to maintain the steam generator levels steady by balancing auxiliary feedwater flow with steam flow. See Calculations 2001-0056 and 2002-0002 for more details on this assumption.

Modifications MR 01-144 and MR 02-001 and the issue documented in LER 2001-005-00 will necessitate a revision to FSAR Sections 9.7 (Instrument Air) and 10.2 (Auxiliary Feedwater) and to Technical Specification Bases 3.7.5 to clearly reflect the design function of the minimum recirculation valves to open and to describe the backup air supplies installed by these modifications Necessary updates to Appendix R documents to take credit for the backup systems will be evaluated by a separate 50.59. However, this 50.59 can provide the basis for the backup systems to perform this function.

PBF-5II3c

Point Beach Nuclear Plant 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

SCR 2002-0010 Verify SCR number on all page Page 4 Search the PBNP Current Licensing Basis (CLB) as follows: Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), FSAR Change Requests (FCRs) with assigned numbers, the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER), the CLB (Regulatory) Commitment Database, the Technical Specifications (both Custom and Improved), the Technical Specifications Bases, and the Technical Requirements Manual. Search the ISFSI licensing basis as follows: VSC-24 Safety Analysis Report, the VSC-24 Certificate of Compliance, the CLB (Regulatory) Commitment Database, and the VSC-24 10 CFR 72.212 Site Evaluation Report.

Describe the pertinent design function(s), performance requirements, and methods of evaluation for both the plant and for the caskfISFSI as appropriate. Identify where the pertinent information is described in the above documents (by document section number and title). (Resource Manual 5.3.1 and NEI 96-07, App. B, B2)

FSAR Section 7.4.1 - AMSAC FSAR Section 9.7 - Instrument Air / Service Air FSAR Section 10.2 - Auxiliary Feedwater FSAR Figure 10.2-1 Sheet I -Bech M-217 Sh. 1 - Auxiliary Feedwater System FSAR Figure 10.2-1 Sheet 2-Bech M-217 Sh. 2 - Auxiliary Feedwater System FSAR Section 14.1.10 -Loss of Normal Feedwater FSAR Section 14.1.11 -Loss of All AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries FSAR Section 14.2.4 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture FSAR Section 14.2.5 -Rupture of a Steam Pipe FSAR Appendix A.1 - Station Blackout FPER 5.2.2 - Safe Shutdown Systems and Equipment FPER 5.2.5.2.3 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room SSAR 2.3.1.4 - Reactor Heat Removal Function SSAR 2.3.2.4 - Auxiliary Feedwater System Tech Spec 3.7.5 - Auxiliary Feedwater Tech Spec Bases B 3.7.5 - Auxiliary Feedwater LER 266/2001=005-00 See Part 1 for the description of the design functions and performance requirements.

I,

\\ -

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.5972.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

V.rify SCR number on al] pages Page 5 Does the proposed activity involve a change to any Custom or Improved Technical Specification (ITS)? Changes to "Technical Specifications require a License Amendment Request (Resource Manual Section 5.3.1.2).

Technical Specification Change:

[]Yes El No If a Technical Specification change is required, explain what the change should be and why it is required.

1.4 Does the proposed activity involve a change to the terms, conditions or specifications incorporated in any VSC-24 cask Certificate of Compliance (CoC)? Changes to a VSC-24 cask Certificate of Compliance require a CoC amendment request.

[] Yes (ENo If a storage cask Certificate of Compliance change is required, explain what the change should be and why it is required.

10 CFR 50-59 SCREENING PART H (50-59) - DETERMINE IF THE CHANGE INVOLVES A DESIGN FUNCJION (Resource Manual 5.3.2)

Compare the proposed activity to the relevant CLB descriptions, and answer the following questions:

"%ES NO QUESTION

.]

5]

Does the proposed activity involve Safety Analyses or structures, systems and components (SSCs) credited in the

-Safety Analyses?

[

5]

Does the proposed activity involve SSCs that support SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses?

[

[]

Does the proposed activity involve SSCs whose failure could initiate a transient (e.g., reactor trip, loss of feedwater.

etc.) or accident. OR whose failure could impact SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses?

[0 E]

Does the proposed activity involve CLB-described SSCs or procedural controls that perform functions that are required by, or otherwise necessary to comply with, regulations, license conditions, orders or technical specifications?

O 0]

Does the activity involve a method of evaluation described in the FSAR?

S 0]

Is the activity a rest or exrperiment? (i.e., a non-passive activity which gathers data) 5]

0]

Does the activity exceed or potentially affect a design basis limit for afission product barrier (DBLFPB)?

(NOTE: If THIS questions is answered YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required.)

If the answers to ALL of these questions are NO, mark Part III as not applicable, document the 10 CFR 50.59 screening in the conclusion section (Part IV). then proceed directly to Part V - 10 CFR 72.48 Pre-screening Questions.

If any of the above questions are marked YES, identify below the specific design function(s), method of evaluation(s) or DBLFPB(s) involved.

These modifications affect the operation of the minimum recirculation valves for the auxiliary feedwater pumps (I12AF 4002. AF-4007, AF,4014). These valves have the following design functions:

A.1.

To isolate the minimum recirculation line to ensure that the auxiliary feedwater pumps deliver the required flow to the steam generators as needed to support the following accidents or events: LONF, LOAC, MSLB. SGTR.

ATWS, Appendix R. and SBO.

A.2.

To open to provide flow through the auxiliary feedwater pumps to prevent hydraulic instabilities and to dissipate pump heat.

A.3.

To maintain the pressure boundary integraity of the auxiliary feedwater system.

PBF-15 15c Reference" NIP 5 1 S

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Vwnry SCR numronb all pages Page 6 These modifications affect the auxiliary feedwater system, which has the following design functions:

B.1.

To automatically start and ensure that adequate feedwater is supplied to the steam generators for heat removal during accidents which may result in a main steam safety valve opening (LONF - including ATWS, and LOAC).

B.2. To automatically start and provide flow to maintain steam generator levels during accidents which require or result in rapid reactor coolant system cooldown (SGTR, MSLB).

B.3.

To allow the isolation of all lines to the ruptured steam generator in the SGTR event.

B.A.

To provide sufficient feedwater to remove decay heat for one hour during a station blackou: event (TDAFP only).

B.5.

To provide sufficient flow to the steam generators to remove decay heat to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a plant fire (Appendix R).

B.6. To withstand a seismic event (designed as seismic Class 1) and to ensure that steam generator levels are maintained during a seismic event.

B.7. To provide flow to the steam generators during plant startup and shutdown, and during hot shutdown or hot standby conditions for chemical additions and when operation of the main feedwater and condensate systems is not warranted.

These modifications also affect the instrument air system, which has the following design functions:

C.1.

To provide dry, oil-free air to pneumatic controllers and control valves required for the normal operation of both units.

C.2. To isolate instrument air lines inside containment on a containment isolation signal to maintain containment integrity.

C.3.

To ensure that the purge supply and exhaust valve boot seals are inflated to maintain containment integrity.

C.4. To supply nitrogen to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge control valves.

C.5.

To supply nitrogen to the power operated relief valves (PORVs) when LTOP is functional.

"C.6. To ensure that the instrument air headers inside containment can be depressurized to preclude the chance of a circuit fault causing a PORV or CVCS seal return valve to open.

These modifications are being installed in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room, which has the following design functions:

D.I.

The walls act as 3-hour rated fire barriers D.2. The walls are designed to withstand a seismic event without failing.

D.C.clc

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

VentySCR number on al pag=

Page 7 T II (50.59) - DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACTIVITY INVOLVES ADVERSE EFFECTS (Resource Manual 5.3.3)

If ALL the questions in Part II are answered NO, then Part IIn is [I NOT APPLICABLE.

Answer the following questions to determine if the activity has an adverse effect on a design function. Any YES answer means that a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required; EXCEPT where noted in Part Il.3.

111.1 CHANGES TO THE FACILITY OR PROCEDURES YES NO QUESTION El

[]

Does the activity adversely affect the designfunction of an SSC credited in safety analyses?

El

[]

Does the activity adversely affect the method of performing or controlling the design function of an SSC credited in the safety analyses?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required. If both answers are NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion as necessary):

The modifications will improve the ability for the minimum flow recirculation valves to perform their non safety related design function in the open position (A.2). Currently, this design function is completely provided by either the instrument air system or by manual operator action. These modifications will install backup systems to perform this design function after instrument air is lost before operator action is taken. These backup systems (nitrogen bottles and air accumulators) will always be available if the instrument air system fails, and will be isolated from the instrument air system with two check valves in series. The backup systems for the recirculation valves will be installed using safety-related components, even though they are not supporting a safety function for the minimum recirculation valves. The components for the MDAFP recirculation valves will be classified as safety-related since they are part of the nitrogen system pressure boundary required for the AF-4012/4019 valves. The components for the TDAFP recirculation valves will be installed as augmented quality, seismic Class 1. There will not be an adverse effect on the existing non safety-related instrument air system that currently supports this design function. The recirculation valves will need to operate at a lower air pressure of 65 psig, but the valves will still fully open at this pressure, and Calculations 2001-0056 and 2002-0002 has shown that the valves will pass adequate flow to perform this design function when they are only approximatcly 20% open. The net effect of these modifications is an improvement that results in a lower core damage probability (see NPM 2002-0030), and will ensure that the minimum flow recirculation valves have the capability to open and that the auxiliary feedwater pumps will not be damaged by operating at low flows. Therefore, design function A.2 is not adversely affected, and is actually enhanced. This will provide the operators with additional time to diagnose the loss of instrument air and take action to properly control auxiliary feedwater flow and secure pumps if required.

Under most conditions when the auxiliary feedwater system is needed, the recirculation valves must be closed (design function A.1). The addition of these backup systems will not create a new failure mode that will fail the valve in the open position when it is needed to be shut. The source of the air is independent of the circuitry that would open and close the valve. The solenoid valves and associated circuitry that supply the air to the actuator are being not being affected, and are currently qualified as safety-related. The minimum recirculation valves will still fail closed on loss of air, although this failure is less likely to occur with the installation of these backup systems. Therefore, these modifications will not have an adverse effect on design function A.1, and the likelihood that the valves will fail open has not been affected.

These modifications will not affect the auxiliary feedwater pressure boundary in any way, and thus design function A.3 is not adversely affected. The modifications will only involve the instrument air and nitrogen systems that actuate the minimum recirculation valves and the MDAFP discharge valves.

The air accumulators for the TDAFP recirc valves installed in the instrument air lines will not adversely affect any of the design functions of the instrument air system (C.1 through C.6). Once the accumulators have been pressurized.

there is no additional long-term loading on the system required by installing accumulator tanks. The tank will not affect the operation of the other safety related accumulators or nitrogen bottles anywhere in the instrument air system.

The accumulator tanks and all new tubing will be installed and anchored as seismic Class 1, which will preclude interactions with other plant equipment.

PBF-1515c Rzrcrencc NP5 IS8

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59n72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Verify SCR nu*.kr on all pages Page 8 The nitrogen tie in for the MDAFP recirc valves will utilize the existing nitrogen backup system for the MDAFP discharge control valves. Calculation 2002-0002 was performed to show that the existing nitrogen bottles are adequate to supply nitrogen to stroke the minimum recirculation valves and the discharge valves, with no additional bottles necessary, for two hours. Nitrogen bottle changeout at a pressure that ensures 90 minutes from one bottle with a second full bottle available will not change from current practice, other than the changeout pressure will be reduced, which is an improvement. There will be a negligible effect on the discharge valves stroke time to close by opening the recirculation valve with the same system. Furthermore, there are currently no stroke time acceptance criteria for the discharge valves opening and the recirculation valves closing.

Since the calculation has shown that the existing system can handle the additional demand, there is no adverse affect on the discharge valves, and there is therefore no adverse effect on design function C.4. The backup nitrogen systems for the MDAFP discharge valves will still be fully capable of supporting the design functions of the MDAFPs and the auxiliary feedwater system (functions B.A through B.7).

All new components, including the new tubing, valves, and accumulator tanks will be designed as seismic Class 1.

Therefore, the components installed by MR 01-144 and MR 02-001 will not adversely affect the seismic design functions of any components or systems in the auxiliary feedwater pump room (design function D.2) and the auxiliary feedwater system (design function B.6).

The new components will not affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater pump room walls to act as 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers (design function D.1). No additional combustible loading is being added to the auxiliary feedwater pump room (Fire Zones 304N, 304M, 304S).

111.2 CHANGES TO A METHOD OF EVALUATION (If the activity does not involve a method of evaluation, these questions are [] NOT APPLICABLE.)

YES NO QUESTION U

Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for performing safety analyses than that described in the CLB?

U

[]

Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for evaluating SSCs credited in safety analyses than that described in the CLB?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required. If both answers are NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion, as necessary).

1"I.3 TESTS OR EXPERIMENTS If the activity is not a test or experiment, the questions in M.3.a and III.3.b are E) NOT APPLICABLE.

a. Answer these two questions first:

YES NO QUESTION El

[I Is the proposed test or experiment bounded by other tests or experiments that are described in the CLB?

D C3 Are the SSCs affected by the proposed test or experiment isolated from the facility?

If the answer to BOTH questions in V.3 a is NO, continue to l1l.3.b If the answer to EITHER question is YES, then describe the basis.

b. Answer these additional questions ONLY for tests or experiments which do NOT meet the criteria given in If.3.a above.

If the answer to either question in III.3.a is YES, then these three questions are F1 NOT APPLICABLE.

PBF-1515c

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE) verify SCR number on 2pg Page 9 YES NO QUESTION El El Does the activity utilize or control an SSC in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design bases as described in the CLB?

El

[

Does the activity utilize or control an SSC in a manner that is inconsistent with the analyses or descriptions in the CLB?

El E]

Does the activity place the facility in a condition not previously evaluated or that could affect the capability of an SSC to perform its intended functions?

If any answer in Ifl.3.b is YES, a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is required. If the answers in IlI.3.b are ALL NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion as necessary):

Part IV - 10 CFR 50.59 SCREENING CONCLUSION (Resource Manual 5.3.4).

Check all that apply:

A 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation is [] required or 0 NOT required.

A Point Beach FSAR change is 0E required or E] NOT required. If an FSAR change is required, then initiate an FSAR Change Request (FCR) per NP 5.2.6.

A Regulatory Commitment (CLB Commitment Database) change is El required or Z NOT required. Ifa Regulatory

• Commitment Change is required, initiate a commitment change per NP 5.1.7.

A Technical Specification Bases change is 0) required or [] NOT required. If a change to the Technical Specification Bases is required, then initiate a Technical Specification Bases change per NP 5.2.15.

A Technical Requirements Manual change is [E required or 0 NOT required. If a change to the Technical Requirements Manual is required, then initiate a Technical Requirements Manual change per NP 5.2.15.

10 CFR 72.48 SCREENING NOTE: NEI 96-07. Appendix B. Guidelines for 10 CFR 72.48 Implementation should be used for guidance to determnine the proper responses for 72.48 screenings.

PART V (72.48) - 10 CFR 72.48 I-NITIAL SCREENING QUESTIONS Part V determines if a full 10 CFR 72.43 screening is required to be completed (Parts VI and VII) for the proposed activity.

YES NO QUESTION El Z

Does the proposed activity involve IN ANY MANNER the dry fuel storage cask(s), the cask transfer/transport equipment, any ISFSI facility SSC(s). or any ISFSI facility monitoring as follows: Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket (MSB), MSB Transfer Cask (MTC), MTC Lifting Yoke, Ventilated Concrete Cask (VCC), Ventilated Storage Cask (VSC), VSC Transporter (VCST). ISFSI Storage Pad Facility. ISFSI Storage Pad Data/Communication Links, or PPCSJISFSI Continuous Temperature Monitoring System?

El Z

Does the proposed activity involve IN ANY M MNNER SSC(s.) installed in the plant specifically added to support cask loadine/unloading activities, as follows: Cask Dewatering System (CDW), Cask Reflood System (CP.F), or Hydrogen Monitoring System?

J. []

Does the proposed activity involve IN kN'Y MANNER SSC(s) needed for plant operation which are also used to support cask loading/unloading activities, as follows: Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), SFP Cooling and Filtration (SF),

Pnmary Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (VNPAB), Drumming Area Ventilation System (VNDRM),

PBF-15l5c R r-re'acc NPF 5 1 S

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010 10 CFR 5059172.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Vensy SCR number onI pages Page 10 RE-105 (SFP Low Range Monitor), RE-135 (SFP High Range Monitor), RE-221 (Drumming Area Vent "Gas Monitor), RE-325 (Drumming Area Exhaust Low-Range Gas Monitor), PAB Crane, SFP Platform Bridge, Truck Access Area, or Decon Area?

El E

Does the proposed activity involve a change to Point Bench CLB design critena for external events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, high winds, flooding, etc.?

Does the activity involve plant heavy load requirements or procedures for areas of the plant used to support cask loading/unloading activities?

Does the activity involve any potential for fire or explosion where casks are loaded, unloaded, transported or stored?

If ANY of the Part V questions are answered YES, then a full 10 CFR 72.48 screening is required and answers to the questions in Part VI and Part VII are to be provided. If ALL the questions in Part V are answered NO, then check Parts VI and VII as not applicable. Complete Part VIII to document the conclusion that no 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation is required.

PART VI (72.48) - DETERyIfLNE IF THE CHANGE INVOLVES A ISFSI LICENSING BASIS DESIGN FUNCTION (If ALL the questions in Part V are NO, then Part VI is [D NOT APPLICABLE.)

Compare the proposed activity to the relevant portions of the ISFSI licensing basis and answer the following questions:

YES NO QUESTION 0]

El Does the proposed activity involve cask/ISFSI Safety Analyses or plant/casklISFSI structures, systems and components (SSCs) credited in the Safety Analyses?

C]

[]

Does the proposed activity involve plant, cask or ISFSI SSCs that support SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses?

S C]

Does the proposed activity involve plant, cask or ISFSI SSCs whose function is relied upon for prevention of a radioactive release, OR whose failure could impact SSC(s) credited in the Safety Analyses?

5]

5]

Does the proposed activity involve cask/ISFSI described SSCs or procedural controls that perform functions that are required by, or otherwise necessary to comply with, regulations, license conditions, CoC conditions, or orders?

E]

5]

Does the activity involve a method of evaluation described in the ISFSI licensing basis?

E]

E]

Is the activity a test or experiment? (i.e., a non-passive activity which gathers data)

[]

1 Does the activity exceed or potentially affect a cask design basis limitfor afission product barrier (DBLFPB)?

(NOTE: If THIS questions is answered YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required.)

If the answers to ALL of these questions are NO. mark Parts VII as not applicable, and document the 10 CFR 72.48 screening in the conclusion section (Part VII).

If any of the above questions are marked YES, identify below the specific design function(s), method of evaluation(s) or DBLFPB(s) involved.

PART VII (72.48) - DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACTIVITY INVOLYES ADVERSE EFFECTS (NEI 96-07.

Appendix B, Section B.4.2.1)

(If ALL the questions in Part V or Part VI are answered NO, then Pan VII is Z NOT APPLICABLE.)

Answer the following questions to determine if the activity has an adverse effect on a design function. Any YES answer means that a

'0 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required; EXCEPT where noted in Part VII.3.

1.1 Changes to the Facility or Procedures YES NO QUESTION PBF N~P.71 PBF-1515 c

Point Beach Nuclear Plant SCR 2002-0010

.10 CFR 50.59172.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

Vnfy SCR numbe on all pagm Page 11 5]

Does the activity adversely affect the design function of a plant, cask, or ISFSI SSC credited in safety analyses?

5]

I]

Does the activity adversely affect the method of performing or controlling the design function of a plant, cask, or ISFSI SSC credited in the safety analyses?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required. If both answers are NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion, as necessary):

VII2 Changes to a Method of Evaluation (If the activity does not involve a method of evaluation, these questions are [I NOT APPLICABLE.)

YES NO QUESTION

[I E]

Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for performing safety analyses than that described in a cask SAR?

5 5]

Does the activity use a revised or different method of evaluation for evaluating SSCs credited in safety analyses than that described in a cask SAR?

If any answer is YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required. If both answers are NO, descnbe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion, as necessary):

11.3 Tests or Experiments (If the activity is not a test or experiment, the questions in VII.3.a and VII.3.b are [I NOT APPLICABLE.)

a. Answer these two questions first:

YES NO QUESTION 5

5]

Is the proposed test or experiment bounded by other tests or experiments that are described in the cask ISFSI licensing basis?

]

5]

Are the SSCs affected by the proposed test or experiment isolated from the cask(s) or ISFSI facility?

If the answer to both questions is NO, continue to VII.3.b. If the answer to EITHER question is YES, then briefly describe the basis

b. Answer these additional questions ONLY for tests or experiments which do not meet the criteria given in VII.3.a above.

If the answer to either question in VII.3.a is YES, then these three questions are [S NOT APPLICABLE.

YES NO QUESTION

[ 5 Does the activity utilize or control an SSC in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design bases as described in the ISFSI licensing basis?

n M

Does the activity utilize or control a plant, cask or ISFSI facility SSC in a manner that is inconsistent with the analyses or descriptions in the ISFSI licensing basis?

51 0

Does the activity place the cask or ISFSI facility in a condition not previously evaluated or that could affect the capability of a plant, cask, or ISFSI SSC to perform its intended functions?

PBF-1515c P Ce.eenc: N F 5 13-

Point Beach Nuclear Plant 10 CFR 50.9172.48 SCREENING (NEW RULE)

SCR 2002-0010 Verify SCR number on all pages Page 12 If any answer in VlI.3.b is YES, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is required. If the answers are all NO, describe the basis for the conclusion (attach additional discussion as necessary):

PART VIUI - DOCUMENT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 10 CFR 72.43 SCREENING Check all that apply:

A 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation is C] required or Z NOT required. Obtain a screening number and provide the original to Records Management regardless of the conclusion of the 50.59 or 72.48 screening.

A VSC-24 cask Safety Analysts Report change is "1 required or Z NOT required. If a VSC-24 cask SAR change is required, then contact the Point Beach Dry Fuel Storage group supervisor.

A Regulatory Commitment (CLB Commitment Database) change is [] required or 2) NOT required. If a Regulatory Commitment Change is required, initiate a commitment change per NP 5.1.7.

A change to the VSC-24 10 CFR 72.212 Site Evaluation Report is [] required or 0 NOT required. If a VSC-24 10 CFR 72.212 Site Evaluation Report change is required, then contact the Point Beach Dry Fuel Storage group supervisor.

PBF-1515c

, P r-r' 1-1x Rele.-ence. INP 5 1 3

DOCUMENT UPDATE CHECKLIST Plant Modification/Minor Plant Change No.

MR 02-001I Work Order No.:__

- OCUMENTATION UPDATE SHEET AND CLOSEOUT CHECKLIST Required For Release Acceptance Closeout N/A (Completion)

(Submittal)

A. TFAINING X

1.

Copy Submitted to Training (Design Description)

2.

TWR Generated (TWR

___ TWR 02-003 _ )Ref.SMGLCI I X

3.

Simulator Changes Initiated (SDR #

)

-x

4.

Plant Status Update/Just In Time Training B. FINAL DESIGN ORGANIZATION I.

Drawings X

a Design Change In Progress DCN's Initiated &

____'____b.

Construction sketches Issued x

c.

Revised Drawings Issued for Priority I and 2 Control Room Drawingss - Logics. P&lDs, 499 series elementaries.

d.

Revised Drawings Issued for Work Control Center Drawings d.P&IDs X

e.

Revised Drawings Issued for I&C Drawings - Reactor Protection and Safeguards Elementaries.

x f

Master Data Book - Control Room, Work Control Center, and Local Panel - PBF-2093 T_ X

_.T__

g.

DCN's released for incorporation

____Ih.

Sketches Voided - PBF-1592 X

2.

Specifications (Conformed at Closeout, ref NP 9.2.1)

X I 3.

Component Instruction Manuals (for issue, revision, deletion)

_ _PBF-1586 XI

4.

Cable and Raceway Data Schedule Revisions - PBF-009 I x

5.

Environmental Qualification Documentation Updates - Ref. NP 7.7.1

_x

6.

Seismic Qualification Updates NP 7.7.2

7.

Calculations or engineering evaluations added/deleted / revised X

PBF-1608

_______ I_______ I x

S DBD Revisions - PBF-1653 I _

I X

I 9

PSA Models and Documentation - PBF-1626 X

10 EPIX Update - report Equipment changes/additions to the EPIX Coordinator.

PBF-1606 Rr.renc-.-15 NP 7 2 1 Pa.ie I of

DOCUMENT UPDATE CHECKLIST A

~)flTitA1' TTmrr lzurcr x..r'ri fVCn AIT ricr~.vi TzT Required For NA Release Acceptance Closeout N/A

~~~(Completion)~ (Submittal)

LIESN(CnomdaAceac) x Plant Modification/rlinor Plant Change No. -MR 02-001 Work Order No.:

1

(

o at Acceptan I.

Technical Specification - change; specify section(s) affected and change reauest number.

_ I X

2 Tech Spec Basis/Technical Requirements Manual x

3.

FSAR - change; NP 5.2.6 Report major changes to the containment aluminum inventory list with FSAR update.

X 4

FPER - FHAR - SSAR Revisions - NP 5.2.11 I

a Safe Shutdown Analysis Management System Revisions - NP

'77 O flffsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)

X

6.

Radiolozical Effluent Control Manual (RECM)

X

7.

Emergency Plan and EPIPs X

8.

Notification to Security for Security plan update

9.

Report major changes to radwaste treatment systems with annual FSAR update per RECM 1.6.3 D. CHAMPS DATABASE X

I.

Equipment Identification - additions assigned from CHAMPS X

2.

Permanent Labeline - labels on new equipment: PBF-9900 X

3.

Temporary Labeling - labels on new equipment; PBF-2074 x

4.

Equipment Record - update to CHAMPS coordinator specify chanee(s): PBF-9922 x

5.

Spare parts stocking and scrapping inputs into CHAMPS.

PBF-9925, PBF-1023 X

6.

Unused material removed from modification bin I E. OPERATIONS x

1.

Abnormal Operating, Normal Operating, System Operating, and I

Refuelin2 Procedures - PBF-0026a X

2.

Operatine Instructions and Checklists - PBF-0026a x

3 Alarm Response and RMS Alarm Serpoint and Response Books X

PBF-0026a X

4.

Testing - TS. IT. ORT, other - PBF-0026a x

5.

EOPs. ECAs. CSPs. SAMG's - PBF-0026a X

I 6

Periodic Surveillances - PBF-9920 X

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Fire Protection Procedur-s - PBF-0026a S

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F DOCUMENT UPDATE CHECKLIST Plant Modification/Minor Plant Change No. _iR 02-001 Work Order No.:

"D5OCUMENTATION UPDATE SHEET AND CLOSEOUT CHECKLIST Required For N/

Release Acceptance Closeout N/A (Completion)

(Submittal)

ReternczIsi NP72 Pl-otf PBF-160b F MAINTENANCE/I&C X

I Maintenance Procedures/Instructions - PBF-0026a X

2.

ICPs - PBF-0026a X

3.

Serpoint Document - PBF-SOO I x

4.

Preventative Maintenance - initiate/revise CHAMPS callups:

PBF-9921/9920 x

5.

Ensure station batteries' load profile changes are incorporated into the appropriate discharge test RMPs X

6 Lubrication Manual (NP 7.3.11)

G. SECURITY X

1.

Security Procedures H. ENGINEERING/MISC.

X

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ISI Program X

2.

IST Program X

3 Miscellaneous HX ECT/Cleaning prosram x

4 Reactor Engineering Instructions - change; specify section(s) affected.

x 5

Reactor Engineering Procedures - change, specify section(s) affected X

6.

Software Control - specify system affected and software change request number.

X 7

Component maintenance programs x

8.

Governing calculations and models (e.g, SW model, DC loading, EDG loading, pioing analysis, structural loadin., etc.)

X 9

Design Guidelines (ref. NP 7.1.2)

1. OTHER (CHEM, HP, ETC.)

X

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Other (Misc. Procedures. etc.)

I ECRs I

ECR Final Resolution completed and aporoved by Design Suoervisor I2.

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Simulator Changes Initiated A.4.

Plant Status Update/Just In Time Training B.l.a.

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Seismic Qualification Updates (2,T'

["I Seismic Qual Report 5e e

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