ML051520226

2SI-825B Not Full Open with Handwritten Notations

ML051520226
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/24/2005
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0282
Download: ML051520226 (2)

Text

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2SI-825B Not Full Open NRC ID'ed TSAC 3.5.2 SR 3.0.1

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Introduction:==

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of TS having very low safety significance (Green) for the licensee's failure to enter Technical Specification 3.5.3, "Two ECCS Trains Shall Be Operable," when the safety injection pump suction valve, 2SI-825B, "RWST Outlet to 2P-15A/B," was declared out of service during the performance of surveillance IT-02, "High Head SI Pump and Valves".

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Description:==

During the performance of control board walkdowns on April 1, 2004 the inspectors noticed that safety injection pump suction valve, 2SI-825B, "RWST Outlet to 2P-1 5AIB,"

open and closed indicating lights were lit. The inspectors questioned the operations crew as to the status of the valves and was informed that the valve had been declared out of service during the performance of the surveillance test on March 31, 2004.

Following step 5.3.10 (Open 2SI-825B) the valve showed intermediate indication on control panel C-01. Local indication showed that the valve had about another one quarter of an inch travel to full open. After questioning by the inspectors the Technical Specification was enter on April 1, 2004 and back dated to the time of the occurrence.

Analysis:

the inspectors determined that failure to enter Technical Specification 3.5.2 was a performance deficiency warranting a significance determination. The inspectors concluded that the finding was greater that minor in accordance with IMC 0612, uPower Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, uIssue Disposition Screening," issued on June 20, 2003. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, the inspectors performed a SDP Phase 1 screening and determined that the finding affected the attribute of operability could have affected the mitigating system objective of the reactor safety cornerstone of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences because of an event requiring ECCS as well as human performance. The finding also affected the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because operators did not recognize the entry requirements for Technical Specification 3.5.2 because of valve 2SI-825B being declared inoperable, despite having entered the Technical Specification for the surveillance. This wil be discussed in'section 40A4.

The inspectors completed a significance determination of this issue using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)," dated March 21, 2003, Appendix A, "Users Guide for Significance Determination of Reactor Inspector Findings of At-Power reactors," dated March 18, 2002. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the system would have met its design function.

Enforcement:

Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.1 states, "Verify each ECCS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is no locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position." Contrary to this on March 31, 2004 the licensee did not enter Technical Specification 3.5.1, Action "A" when the valve was declared

inoperable during a surveillance test. This issue was considered a finding (FIN) of very low safety significance (FIN XXXXXXX). This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CAP055226, "2SI-825B shows intermediate valve position during IT-02."