|
|---|
Category:- No Document Type Applies
MONTHYEARML22034A3992022-02-16016 February 2022
Enclosure 1 - IP 71130.03 Cy 2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion
ML22034A3972022-02-16016 February 2022
Enclosure 2 - IP 92707 CY2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion
ML22034A3952022-02-16016 February 2022
Enclosure 3 - IP 96001 CY2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion
ML16285A3202016-10-12012 October 2016
ROP PI Frequently Asked Questions (Faqs): 13-04
ML16159A4002016-06-16016 June 2016
Iepra Ror for Point Beach SE Section 3.4
ML16159A4022016-06-16016 June 2016
Fpra Ror for Point Beach SE Section 3.4
ML15261A7492015-09-14014 September 2015
NRC Supplement to NRC Letter - Notification of NRC Inspection and Request for Information Dated May 1, 2015 - NextEra Energy Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Msh)
ML16072A0362015-06-0303 June 2015
Receipt of Cd Containing Revised I/O Files from NextEra Point Beach Nuclear Plant Flood Hazard Re-Evaluation Report
ML15014A1602015-01-14014 January 2015
Attachment 2 - NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process
ML15014A1532015-01-14014 January 2015
Attachment 1- NEI Comments on NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process
ML14314A5122014-11-13013 November 2014
Enclosure 2 - Frequently Asked Questions (Faqs) Discussed During the October 22 2014 Reactor Oversight Process Public Meeting
ML14147A0112014-06-20020 June 2014
Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident
ML14149A1532014-05-0101 May 2014
FOIA/PA-2014-0074 - Resp 4 - Partial. Group F (Records Already Publicly Available)
ML12056A0522012-03-12012 March 2012
Enclosure 6 - List of Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status
ML1017301232010-06-0909 June 2010
Green Ticket Tritium Releases
ML0806704192008-03-0707 March 2008
CDBI Findings
ML0732400242007-10-25025 October 2007
Examples of Max Thermal Power License Conditions
ML0726203022007-09-28028 September 2007
Amendment to Indemnity Agreement No. B-41, Amendment No. 14
ML0726303192007-09-14014 September 2007
P. Paquin Ltr Amendment to Certificate of Compliance No. 6574 for the Model No. 3-82B Package (TAC L24116)/ Register User List
ML0635404332006-12-20020 December 2006
Enclosure 2 - Consent and Hearing Waiver Form - the Nuclear Management Company, LLC
ML0634705992006-12-14014 December 2006
Plant Service List
ML0627903812006-09-29029 September 2006
Exhibit 26 to Case No. 2-2002-004, Interview Report
ML0626801502006-09-22022 September 2006
Escort Ratio for Visitors
ML0626503122006-09-0101 September 2006
Liquid Radiation Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report (Enclosure)
ML0626504142005-11-0303 November 2005
RIII-2005-A-0062 Closure
ML0626802782005-08-29029 August 2005
3rd ARB Action Plan RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach)
ML0626802752005-08-22022 August 2005
2nd ARB Action Plan, RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach)
ML0626504072005-07-19019 July 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP)
ML0626802642005-07-18018 July 2005
Initial ARB Action Plan RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach)
ML0518603982005-07-15015 July 2005
NRC Actions Under the Reactor Oversight Process for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
ML0518903972005-07-0101 July 2005
Log Entries Report
ML0518903962005-07-0101 July 2005
U1R28 Outage Risk Plan Ppg Outage Management
ML0518903952005-07-0101 July 2005
U1R28 Add/Delete Log
ML0626504032005-06-22022 June 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065250)
ML0626503992005-06-10010 June 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065041)
ML0626504012005-06-10010 June 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065035)
ML0515202282005-05-24024 May 2005
EP FFD Questions Not Asked
ML0514700842005-05-24024 May 2005
COLR 28 Replaced with COLR 29 Prior to Vessel Removal. Attach: 04/14/2004 Condition Evaluation 013784. Attach: 04/12/2004 CAP 055612. Attach: Undated Bullet Nose Disconnected & Removed with Head
ML0515202262005-05-24024 May 2005
2SI-825B Not Full Open with Handwritten Notations
ML0515202242005-05-24024 May 2005
Phone Line Through Containment Hatch While Fuel Movement in Progress
ML0515202232005-05-24024 May 2005
Loss of SFP Cooling Due to Breaker Miss Alignment
ML0515202212005-05-24024 May 2005
2SI-825B Not Full Open with Handwritten Notations
ML0515202192005-05-24024 May 2005
U1R28 Interim Exit Meeting Notes
ML0515202182005-05-24024 May 2005
Tsac Not Entered When Source Range Audible Count Rate Removed from Service
ML0515202072005-05-24024 May 2005
Questions for Followup Based on Last Outage ISI Summary Report
ML0514700772005-05-24024 May 2005
Refuel Outage 1R28 Resident Inspector Coverage
ML0514700822005-05-24024 May 2005
Mikes 2004-03 IR Section Write Ups, 2T-34A Accumulator Level Indication
ML0515201472005-05-24024 May 2005
Phone Line Through Containment Hatch While Fuel Movement in Progress
ML0515202132005-05-24024 May 2005
Inservice Inspection Document Request
ML0515201492005-05-24024 May 2005
Transient Combustible Materials in Containment & Turbine Building Without Administrative Controls
2022-02-16
[Table view] |
Text
... - -
2SI-825B Not Full Open ;'/:; A NRC ID'ed D TSAC 3.5.2 SR 3.0.1 -feked
Introduction:
/e The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of TS having very low safety significance (Green) for the licensee's failure to enter Technical Specification 3.5.3, "Two ECCS Trains Shall Be Operable," when the safety injection pump suction valve, 2SI-825B, "RWST Outlet to 2P-15A/B," was declared out of service during the performance of surveillance IT-02, "High Head SI Pump and Valves".
Description:
During the performance of control board walkdowns on April 1, 2004 the inspectors noticed that safety injection pump suction valve, 2SI-825B, "RWST Outlet to 2P-15AIB,"
open and closed indicating lights were lit. The inspectors questioned the operations crew as to the status of the valves and was informed that the valve had been declared out of service during the performance of the surveillance test on March 31, 2004.
Following step 5.3.10 (Open 2.S1-825B) the valve showed intermediate indication on control panel C-01. Local indication showed that the valve had about another one
- quarter of an inch travel to full open After questioning by the inspectors the Technical Specification was enter on April 1, 2004 and back dated to the time of the occurrence.
Analysis:
the inspectors determined that failure to enter Technical Specification 3.5.2 was a performance deficiency warranting a significance determination. The inspectors concluded that the finding was greater that minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix.B, "Issue Disposition Screening," issued on June 20, 2003. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, the inspectors performed a SDP Phase 1 screening and determined that the finding affected the attribute of operability could have affected the mitigating system objective of the reactor safety cornerstone of ensuring the availability of systems !hat respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences because of an event requiring ECCS as well as human performance. The finding also affected the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because operators did not recognize the entry requirements for Technical Specification 3.5.2 because of valve 2SI-825B being declared inoperable, despite having entered the Technical Specification for the surveillance. This will be discussed in section 40A4.
The inspectors completed a significance determination of this issue using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)," dated March 21, 2003, Appendix A, "Users Guide for Significance Determination of Reactor Inspector Findings of At-Power reactors," dated March 18, 2002. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the system would have met its design function.
Enforcement:
Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.1 states, "Verify each ECCS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is no locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position." Contrary to this on March 31, 2004 the licensee did not enter Technical Specification 3.5.1, Action "A" when the valve was declared W- /3
inoperable during a surveillance test. This issue was considered a finding (FIN) of very low safety significance (FIN XXXXXXXXX). This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CAP055226, "2SI-825B shows intermediate valve position during IT-02."
