ML021210488
ML021210488 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Point Beach ![]() |
Issue date: | 04/30/2002 |
From: | Grobe J Division of Reactor Safety III |
To: | Warner M Nuclear Management Co |
References | |
EA-02-049 IR-02-004 | |
Download: ML021210488 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000266/2002004
Text
April 30, 2002
Mr. M. Warner
Site Vice President
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241
SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/02-04(DRS); 50-301/02-04(DRS)
Dear Mr. Warner:
On April 1, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection of your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and
2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with Mr. M.
Reddemann and members of your staff at an interim exit meeting on February 15, 2002.
Following the on site inspection, additional information was provided by your staff that was
reviewed in the Region III office. A final exit meeting was conducted on April 1, 2002, with Mr. A.
Cayia and other members of your staff to discuss the NRCs preliminary significance determination
of the inspection results.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on emergency preparedness, including your
staffs determinations of performance indicators for the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone.
The enclosed report discusses an issue involving your staffs critique of its performance during
the biennial emergency preparedness exercise that was conducted on February 12, 2002. The
NRCs preliminary conclusion is that two exercise performance concerns, which are associated
with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), were inadequately
critiqued by your staff. The first concern was the critique of the initial protective action
recommendation that your exercise participants communicated to offsite officials. Your
exercise critique concluded that this recommendation was a successful performance indicator
opportunity. However, our inspection identified issues concerning this recommendation that
were not fully evaluated within your critique. The second concern involved your staffs critique
of the exercise participants decision making on the simulated removal from the site of non-
essential personnel, who were not members of the current shift of emergency responders, after
all onsite personnel were accounted for.
M. Warner -2-
This issue was assessed using the applicable significance determination process as a
potentially safety significant finding that was preliminarily determined to be White, i.e. an issue
with some increased importance to safety which may require additional NRC inspection. A
basic reason for conducting emergency preparedness drills and exercises is to identify
performance and procedure concerns through the critique process so that corrective actions
can be taken before such concerns might occur during an actual emergency and possibly have
an adverse impact on health and safety. Therefore, it is important that your staffs critiques of
emergency preparedness drills and exercises be thorough and self-critical whether or not NRC
staff are also present to observe and assess these activities. Since both items are associated
with an exercise critique, rather than an actual emergency event, no apparent violation is
associated with the preliminary White finding.
Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to
request a Regulatory Conference where you would be able to provide your perspectives on the
significance of the finding, the bases for your position, and whether you agree with the apparent
violations (if applicable). If you choose to request a Regulatory Conference, we encourage you
to submit your evaluation and any differences with the NRC evaluation at least one week prior
to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a
conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press
release to announce the conference.
Please contact Mr. Kenneth Riemer at (630) 829-9757 within seven days of the date of this
letter to inform the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you by telephone or in
writing regarding a conference within 10 days, we will continue with our significance
determination and enforcement decision, and you will be advised by separate correspondence
of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by Roy Caniano Acting For/
John A. Grobe, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-266/02-04(DRS);
50-301/02-04(DRS)
See Attached Distribution
M. Warner -2-
This issue was assessed using the applicable significance determination process as a
potentially safety significant finding that was preliminarily determined to be White, i.e. an issue
with some increased importance to safety which may require additional NRC inspection. A
basic reason for conducting emergency preparedness drills and exercises is to identify
performance and procedure concerns through the critique process so that corrective actions
can be taken before such concerns might occur during an actual emergency and possibly have
an adverse impact on health and safety. Therefore, it is important that your staffs critiques of
emergency preparedness drills and exercises be thorough and self-critical whether or not NRC
staff are also present to observe and assess these activities. Since both items are associated
with an exercise critique, rather than an actual emergency event, no apparent violation is
associated with the preliminary White finding.
Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to
request a Regulatory Conference where you would be able to provide your perspectives on the
significance of the finding, the bases for your position, and whether you agree with the apparent
violations (if applicable). If you choose to request a Regulatory Conference, we encourage you
to submit your evaluation and any differences with the NRC evaluation at least one week prior
to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a
conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press
release to announce the conference.
Please contact Mr. Kenneth Riemer at (630) 829-9757 within seven days of the date of this
letter to inform the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you by telephone or in
writing regarding a conference within 10 days, we will continue with our significance
determination and enforcement decision, and you will be advised by separate correspondence
of the results of our deliberations on this matter
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by Roy Caniano Acting For/
John A. Grobe, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-266/02-04(DRS);
50-301/02-04(DRS)
See Attached Distribution
DOCUMENT NAME: G:DRS\POI02-04DRS.wpd
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII RIII
NAME TPloski:aa KRiemer RLanksbury KLambert for RCaniano
BClayton for JGrobe
DATE 4/30/02 4/30/02 4/30/02 4/30/02 4/30/02
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
M. Warner -3-
cc w/encl: R. Grigg, President and Chief
Operating Officer, WEPCo
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
A. Cayia, Site Director
J. ONeill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman
Town of Two Creeks
D. Graham, Director
Bureau of Field Operations
A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin
Public Service Commission
S. Jenkins, Electric Division
Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer
W. Curtis, FEMA, Region V
M. Warner -3-
cc w/encl: R. Grigg, President and Chief
Operating Officer, WEPCo
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
A. Cayia, Site Director
J. ONeill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman
Town of Two Creeks
D. Graham, Director
Bureau of Field Operations
A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin
Public Service Commission
S. Jenkins, Electric Division
Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer
W. Curtis, FEMA, Region V
ADAMS Distribution:
WDR
BAW
RidsNrrDipmIipb
OEMAIL
J. Dixon Herrity, OE
K. Halvey Gibson, NRR
GEG
PGK1
C. Ariano (hard copy)
DRPIII
DRSIII
PLB1
JRK1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301
Report No: 50-266/02-04(DRS); 50-301/02-04(DRS)
Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC
Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location: 6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241
Dates: February 11 through February 15, 2002; and
April 1, 2002
Inspectors: T. Ploski, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
S. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist
P. Krohn, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief
Plant Support Branch
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000266-02-04(DRS), 05000301-02-04(DRS), on 02/11-04/1/2002, Nuclear Management
Company, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Exercise Evaluation.
The report covers a baseline inspection by two regional emergency preparedness
inspectors, one regional radiation protection inspector, and a senior resident inspector.
The inspection focused on the Reactor Safety, Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone,
during the biennial emergency preparedness exercise, and included a review of
records related to the three emergency preparedness performance indicators for the
period ending December 31, 2001. One preliminary White finding was identified
during the inspection.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red)
using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its
Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www/nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity
level of the applicable violations.
A. Inspector Identified Findings
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
TBD. Two exercise performance issues, which are associated with emergency preparedness
planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), were inadequately critiqued by licensee staff. The first
issue was associated with the licensees critique of the initial offsite Protective Action
Recommendation (PAR) that its exercise participants communicated to offsite officials. The
NRC identified issues that contradicted the licensees critique conclusion that the initial PAR
was a successful performance indicator opportunity with respect to its content. The second
issue was the licensees critique of its participants decision making process on the simulated
removal from the site of non-essential personnel, who were not members of the current shift of
emergency responders, once all onsite personnel were accounted for.
Using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, the NRC has made a
preliminary determination that the finding was of low to moderate risk significance (White). In
accordance with NRCs Enforcement Policy, as published in NUREG 1600, it was determined
that there is no apparent violation of NRC requirements since the critique issues were related to
an exercise, rather than to an actual emergency. (Section 1EP1.b)
2
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
The plant operated at approximately 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the February 2002 exercises objectives and scenario to
ensure that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensees
emergency plan and to verify that the exercises simulated problems provided an
acceptable framework to support demonstration of the licensees capability to
implement its plan. The inspectors also reviewed records of a pre-exercise practice
drill, which was conducted in January 2002, to determine whether the associated
accident scenario was sufficiently different from the scenario used in the
February 12, 2002 exercise.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees exercise performance, focusing on the
risk-significant activities of emergency classification, notification, and protective action
decision making, as well as implementation of accident mitigation strategies in the
following emergency response facilities:
- Control Room Simulator (CRS)
- Operations Support Center (OSC)
- Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The inspectors also assessed the licensees recognition of abnormal plant conditions,
transfer of responsibilities between facilities, internal communications, interfaces with
offsite officials, readiness of emergency facilities and related equipment, and overall
implementation of the licensees emergency plan.
The inspectors attended the initial post-exercise critiques in the CRS, OSC, TSC, and
EOF to evaluate the licensees initial self-assessment of its exercise performance. The
inspectors later met with the licensees lead exercise evaluators to assess the licensees
refined critique of its exercise participants performances. The licensees refined
critiques results were then compared with the inspectors independent observations and
assessments.
3
b. Findings
One preliminary White finding was identified for the licensees inadequate critique of two
exercise performance issues associated with emergency planning standard 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10). Per Supplement VIII of NRCs Enforcement Policy, as published in
Nuclear Regulatory Guide (NUREG) 1600, no associated violation of NRC requirements
was identified since the finding was associated with an exercise rather than an actual
emergency event.
This planning standard encompasses protective actions for the general public and
onsite personnel. As demonstrated by the licensees exercise performance, the
inspectors identified two issues associated with the planning standard that were not
adequately critiqued by the licensee. The first issue was that the licensee failed to
adequately critique exercise participants initial Protective Action Recommendation
(PAR) that was communicated to offsite officials. The second issue was that the
licensee failed to adequately critique exercise participants decision making on the
simulated removal of non-essential onsite personnel, who were not members of the
current shift of emergency responders, from the site after all onsite personnel had been
accounted for.
The NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0609 divides the sixteen emergency planning standards
of 10 CFR 50.47(b) into two categories, namely risk significant planning standards and
other planning standards. With respect to the two aforementioned issues, MC 0609
states that 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) is risk significant for offsite PARs but not also for onsite
protective actions.
Protective Action Recommendation
The first issue associated with the preliminary White finding was that the licensee did
not adequately critique the initial PAR. Based on a review of the licensees exercise
scenario manual, Section 6 of the licensees emergency plan, Emergency Plan
Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 1.3, relevant guidance in Nuclear Regulatory Guide
NUREG 0654 and Supplement 3 of this NUREG, the Environmental Protection Agencys
protective action guides, and the criteria in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) publication 99-
02, Revision 2, the inspectors determined that the licensees initial PAR was incorrect
and unanticipated per the scenario and should not be considered as a successful
Performance Indicator (PI) opportunity. In contrast, the licensees critique conclusion
was that this initial PAR was a successful Performance Indicator PI opportunity.
In accordance with the exercise scenario, the licensees decision maker correctly
declared a General Emergency at about 10:48 a.m. Licensee staff then formulated an
initial PAR that was communicated to offsite officials within 15 minutes of the General
Emergency declaration. The initial PAR included a correct recommendation to evacuate
the public within a two mile radius of the site. However, the inspectors specific concern
was that this initial PAR also included an unexpected recommendation to evacuate
persons within five sectors (L, M, N, P, and Q) between two and five miles from the site,
rather than evacuation of persons within three or possibly four of these sectors between
two and five miles from the site, which was predicted by the scenario and which would
be consistent with the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspectors
4
based their conclusion that the initial PAR was not a successful PI opportunity on a
number of factors, including:
- Licensee participants were presented with plant conditions, which were correctly
recognized by those tasked with developing and approving the initial PAR, that
included a gap release from containment. The scenario also postulated a wind
direction from 90 degrees +/- five degrees, a forecast wind direction shift that
might occur, and a B atmospheric stability class before and after this possible
wind direction shift.
- Per Attachment A to EPIP 1.3 and the output from the licensees offsite dose
projection software, which was used by participants during the exercise and
included atmospheric stability class as an input, a wind direction from 90 degrees
+/- five degrees translated into the three downwind sectors (each having a width
of 22.5 degrees) of M, N, and P.
- Per Step 3.3 of EPIP 1.3 and Subsection 5.1.2 of Section 6 of the licensees
emergency plan, an offsite PAR would include evacuation of a two mile radius
from the site and typically (per EPIP 1.3) or in many cases (per the
emergency plan) three or four sectors between two and five miles downwind.
However, neither EPIP 1.3 nor the emergency plan specified what circumstances
might warrant a PAR having more than three or four downwind sectors with the
following possible exception. Step 3.4 of EPIP 1.3 stated that a PAR to evacuate
all sectors within a five mile radius of the site should be considered if either the
wind speed was less than three miles per hour or if a lake breeze effect was
identified. In contrast, the scenario postulated a wind speed remaining above
five miles per hour and no lake breeze effect.
- As noted by the inspectors and as documented in a few records generated by
licensee participants during the exercise, State officials modified the licensees
initial PAR to include evacuation of only three downwind sectors (M, N, and P)
between two and five miles from the site.
- The scenario manual indicated that a wind direction shift from about 90 degrees
to about 115 to 120 degrees would be issued to participants around noontime in
order to support an exercise objective of having licensee, State, and county
staffs demonstrate their capabilities to deal with changing meteorological
conditions warranting two PARs. During the exercise, the licensees exercise
controllers modified the scenarios postulated wind direction shift such that the
revised wind direction was from about 130 degrees. The inspectors interpreted
this controller action to mean that the initial PARs inclusion of five sectors
beyond two miles from the site was not forecast by the scenario and was,
therefore, unexpected by the scenario and the licensees exercise controllers.
- The licensees exercise participants quickly recognized the wind direction shift to
be from 130 degrees. They developed a revised PAR that included the three
downwind sectors between two and five miles from the site that were consistent
with Attachment A to EPIP 1.3 and the output from the licensees offsite dose
projection software. The inspectors agreed with the licensees critique that the
5
development of this revised PAR was a successful PI opportunity.
- The licensee generated a number of Action Requests-Corrective Action Program
(AR-CAP) documents as a result of its exercise critique. The inspectors noted
that only AR-CAP002169 addressed PARs developed during the exercise.
However, this AR addressed a concern of how to document a PAR change due
to a wind shift. Specifically, this AR-CAPs concern was whether accumulated
sectors should be documented on the form or only the newly affected downwind
sectors. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had not
adequately critiqued its initial PAR.
Removal of Non-Essential Personnel
The second issue associated with the preliminary White finding was that the licensee did
not adequately critique its exercise participants decision making on the simulated
removal of non-essential onsite personnel, who were not members of the current shift of
emergency responders, from the site after all onsite personnel were accounted for.
An actual assembly and accountability of onsite personnel was performed during the
exercise and was successfully completed at about 10:05 a.m., which was after the Site
Area Emergency declaration and prior to the General Emergency declaration. The
subsequent removal of non-essential personnel from the site was simulated in order to
avoid further disrupting the normal work activities of personnel who were not chosen to
be otherwise involved in the exercise.
During the exercise, inspectors noted that the decision to begin the simulated removal of
non-essential personnel from the site was not made until about 12:50 p.m. The decision
occurred over 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after all onsite personnel were accounted for and about two
hours after the licensee issued its initial PAR to offsite officials that included evacuation
of the public. The decision was to release non-essential personnel and to allow them
to leave the site using their own vehicles, although the use of buses to be provided by a
local company was discussed.
The inspectors reviewed the following documents: Sections 5 and 6 and Appendix D of
the licensees emergency plan and EPIP 6.1, which was titled Assembly, Accountability,
Release, and Evacuation of Personnel. The inspectors also reviewed AR-CAP002156
and AR-CAP002170 that were generated as a result of the licensees exercise critique,
as well as log entries made by several participants who were involved in the decision
making process. Based on the inspectors exercise observations, review of the
aforementioned documents, and assessment of the licensees February 14 and 15
critique presentations, inspectors concluded that the licensee had not adequately
critiqued exercise performance regarding participants decision making to simulate
removing non-essential personnel from the site. In contrast, the licensees position was
that its staff had adequately critiqued this decision making and that participants use of
EPIP 6.1 was acceptable.
6
The inspectors conclusion was based on a number of factors, including:
- Subsection 5.1.1.d.2 of Section 6 of the emergency plan stated that an assembly
and release or evacuation will be ordered upon the classification of a Site or
General Emergency. This subsection and EPIP 6.1 stated that assembled, non-
essential personnel would either be released from the site when no radiological
conditions were present, or be evacuated from the site when radiological
conditions were present and additional actions, such as radiological monitoring
and relocation, were required.
- Subsection 3.2.3 of Section 5 of the emergency plan stated that non-essential
personnel will be released if conditions allow; however, these conditions were
not specified. Step 4.4 of EPIP 6.1 stated that an evacuation of non-essential
personnel to an offsite assembly area shall be considered under certain
projected or measured radiological conditions, or other hazards.
- Following the licensees critique presentation on February 14, the inspectors
asked the licensees exercise controllers about the acceptability of the
participants considering the use of buses from a local company to transport non-
essential personnel from the site. The licensee indicated that it believed that an
agreement existed with a local company to provide such a support. In contrast,
the inspectors did not identify evidence of pre-planning, either in the emergency
plan or in EPIP 6.1, to use a local company to provide buses to remove non-
essential personnel from the site during an emergency.
- At its February 14 critique presentation, the licensee gave the inspectors copies
of two AR associated with its exercise critique of the implementation of EPIP 6.1.
Eight concerns associated with the assembly and accountability processes in
one onsite building were summarized in AR-CAP002156. Assembly and
Accountability Process was the title of AR-CAP002170, which also listed eight
concerns. Although one of these eight concerns was when to evacuate
assembled personnel, the AR did not also list a concern about when to release
assembled personnel consistent with the emergency plans and EPIP 6.1's
different meanings of the words release and evacuate.
- After the licensees February 14 critique presentation, the inspectors asked other
questions about the participants decision making on removing non-essential
personnel from the site, such as whether the decision to begin removing non-
essential personnel was considered to be timely and what road was eventually
chosen to reach the Site Boundary Control Center (SBCC). The inspectors
concluded that the licensee did not have sufficient information available to
respond to these questions.
Significance Determination
Appendix B to NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0610* includes criteria for determining
whether an issue warrants further analysis and documentation in an inspection report as
a finding. Using these criteria, the inspectors determined that the issues of the
licensees failure to adequately critique: (1) its participants initial PAR and (2) its
participants decision making on the simulated removal of non-essential personnel from
7
the site were issues that had a credible impact on safety. Each issue could also be
viewed as a precursor to a significant event and would, if left uncorrected, under the
same conditions become a more significant safety concern. Both critique issues were
evaluated as such because a basic reason for conducting Emergency Preparedness
drills and exercises is to identify performance and procedure concerns so that corrective
actions on such concerns can be taken before these concerns may occur during an
actual emergency and have an adverse impact on health and safety.
Appendix B to MC 0609 divides the 16 emergency planning standards of 10 CFR
50.47(b) into two categories, specifically risk significant and other planning
standards. With respect to the two aforementioned issues, Subsection 5.10 of Appendix
B states that 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) is risk significant for offsite PARs, but not for onsite
protective actions.
Rather than have a separate finding for each critique issue, it is appropriate to identify
one preliminary finding to encompass both issues and to focus on their common factor,
specifically that both issues were inadequately critiqued by licensee staff. It is then
appropriate to assign a preliminary significance to the evaluation of the licensees
critique that is associated with the more risk significant of the two critique issues (White)
(Unresolved Item No. 50-266/02-04-01 and 50-301/02-04-01).
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees records related to each of the three emergency
preparedness PIs to verify that the licensees program was implemented consistent with
the industry guidelines in Nuclear Energy Institute publication No. 99-02 and related
licensee procedures. Specifically, licensee records related to the performance of the
Alert and Notification System (ANS), key Emergency Response Organization (ERO)
members drill participation, and Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) were reviewed to
verify the accuracy and completeness of the data submitted to NRC for the period
October 2001 through December 2001.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
a Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. M. Reddemann and
other members of licensee management and staff at an interim exit meeting on
February 15, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. No
proprietary information was identified. On April 1, 2002, a final exit meeting was held
with Mr. F. Cayia and other members of licensee management and staff.
8
b. Other Meeting
On February 15, 2002, an inspector summarized NRCs preliminary inspection results at
a public and media briefing hosted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in
Manitowoc, Wisconsin.
9
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Interim Exit Meeting
Licensee
J. Anderson, Production Planning Manager
L. Armstrong, Engineering Manager
R. Arnold, Chemistry Supervisor
W. Bartelme, EP Coordinator
A. Cayia, Site Director
G. Corell, Chemistry Manager
D. Hettick, Performance Assessment Manager
V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager
M. Kelley, EP Coordinator
C. Krause, Regulatory Compliance
K. Pavley, Nuclear Oversight Manager
M. Reddemann, Site Vice President
R. Repshas, Site Services Manager
J. Strarsky, Operations Manager
S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Walsh, Nuclear Oversight
D. Weaver, Assistant Manager
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
W. Yarosz, EP Manager
Final Exit Meeting
Licensee
J. Anderson, Production Planning Manager
L. Armstrong, Engineering Manager
W. Bartelme, EP Coordinator
A. Cayia, Site Director
F. Flenje, Senior Regulatory Compliance Specialist
R. Hopkins, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor
V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager
M. Kelley, EP Coordinator
R. Pulec, Assistant Director
R. Repshas, Site Services Manager
D. Schoon, Operations Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager
E. Weinkam, Regulatory Services Director
W. Yarosz, EP Manager
NRC
R. Caniano, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region III
T. Ploski, Senior EP Inspector, Region III
K. Riemer, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region III
10
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-266/02-04-01 URI Inadequate critique of two exercise performance issues
50-301/02-04-01 (Section 1EP1.b)
Closed
None
Discussed
None
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ANS Alert and Notification System
AR Action Request
CAP Corrective Action Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRS Control Room Simulator
DEP Drill and Exercise Performance
DRS Division of Reactor Safety
EOF Emergency Operations Facility
EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
ERO Emergency Response Organization
IR Inspection Report
MC NRC Manual Chapter
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG Nuclear Regulatory Guide
OSC Operations Support Center
PAR Protective Action Recommendation
PI Performance Indicator
SBCC Site Boundary Control Center
TBD To Be Determined
11
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation
February 2002 Exercise Scenario Manual
Summary of January 2002 Drill Scenario
Licensees Time Line on Decisions on Simulated
Removal of Non-essential Personnel
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan August 2000
EPIP 1.1 Course of Actions Revision 37
EPIP 1.2 Emergency Classification Revision 34
EPIP 1.3 Dose Assessment and Protective Action
Recommendations Revision 27
EPIP 2.1 Notifications Revision 22
EPIP 4.1 TSC Activation and Evacuation Revision 30
EPIP 4.2 OSC Activation and Evacuation Revision 14
EPIP 4.3 EOF Activation and Evacuation Revision 24
EPIP 4.7 Offsite Radiation Protection Facility Activation and
Evacuation Revision 1
EPIP 5.1 Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization Revision 13
EPIP 5.2 Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose Revision 13
Accounting
EPIP 6.1 Assembly and Accountability, Release and Revision 19
Evacuation of Personnel
EPIP 10.1 Emergency Reentry Revision 21
AR-CAP002117 Joint Public Information Center Does Not Appear
to be Set Up for Concurrent Kewaunee and Point
Beach Plant Emergency Events
AR-CAP002127 Supply Discrepancies in TSC, OSC, and EOF
AR-CAP002156 Assembly/Accountability Problems in North
Service Building
AR-CAP002166 Reassess Emergency Action Level 1.1.5.1
AR-CAP002167 Lab Coats Not Available for Sample Handlers
AR-CAP002168 Milwaukee Call Center Provided Out of Date
Information to Simulated Public Callers
AR-CAP002169 How to Document PAR Change Due to Wind
Direction Shift on State/County Notification Form
AR-CAP002170 Reassess Assembly and Accountability Process
AR-CAP002171 Discrepancy in Dose Assessment Programs
Computer Monitor Display versus a Printout
AR-CAP002172 Develop Briefing Sheets for Directors
AR-CAP002173 Miscellaneous Equipment Issues During Exercise
AR-CAP002174 Qualifications of Craft Personnel for Some Tasks
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AR-CAP002175 Shift Manager Unable to Activate Primary ERO
Notification System
AR-CAP002176 Dose/PAR Coordinator Checklist Concern
AR-CAP002177 CRS Crew Twice Started Equipment Without
Proper Investigation
AR-CAP002178 Problems Hearing Gai-Tronics Announcements
AR-CAP002179 Several Staff Reading Personal Reading
Materials in OSC Briefing Room During Exercise
AR-CAP002180 Participant Access Problem at Joint Public
Information Center
AR-CAP002181 Several Non-Participants Unwilling to Augment
Participants When Requested
AR-CAP002182 Several Simulator Fidelity and Controller
Performance Issues
AR-CAP002183 Several Information Flow Problems in TSC
AR-CAP002184 Two Participants Not Fully Qualified
AR-CAP002185 Environmental Sample Analysis Records Keeping
AR-CAP002186 Accumulated Dose Tracking Concern in OSC
AR-CAP002189 EP Staff Involvement in Operator Training for
DEP Performance Indicator
AR-CAP002190 Two Vehicles Had Insufficient Gas
AR-CAP002215 Instances of OSC Teams Not Demonstrating
Good Contamination Control Practices
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Fourth Quarter 2001 Evaluation Forms for Three
MO4-11 Field Observations of Sirens Full Sound Test November 7, 2001
MO4-12 Full Sound Siren Test Records - October through
December 2001
MO5-12 Growl Sound Siren Test Records - October
through December 2001
Drill Nuclear Accident Reporting Form October 4, 2001
Drill Nuclear Accident Reporting Forms December 6, 2001
Drill Scenario Time Line December 2001
AR-CAP-002214 Reassess Which EOF Position is State/County
Communicator for PI Reporting Purposes
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