Text

Forwards Sys 80+ Info for Closure of follow-on Questions to Draft SER Responses.Response to Question 4 on Psi/Isi Will Be Provided in Near Future
	ML20059J852
Person / Time
Site:	05200002
Issue date:	11/04/1993
From:	Brinkman C; ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC.
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	LD-93-160, NUDOCS 9311150079
	Download: ML20059J852 (550)
	v • d • e

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ABB ASEA BROWN BoVERI l'

F November 4, 1993

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LD-93-160 I Docket No.52-002 Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 1

Subject:

System 80+TM Information for Issue Closure ,

A

Dear Sirs:

The attachments to this letter provide material to %se follow-on questions to DSER responses. Attachment I provides responses to questions asked by EMCB reviewers on Octob9r 13, 1993. The response to question 4 on PSI /ISI will be provided in the near future.

Attachment 2 transmits the Technical Specification markups for I&C. These markups will be the subject of the November 18-18 meeting with the staff.

Attachment 3 is a copy of a fax to Mr. A. El-Bassioni, dated October 22, 1993.

Attachment 4 includes revisions to respond to questions on the turl>ine generator. These revisions have been discussed with Mr. D. Smith.

Attachment 5 transmits responses to questions from Mr. S. Sun.

Attachment 6 provides responses to questions ftom Mr. O. Chopra. '

Attachment 7 includes revisions to upgrade the Component Cooling Water supply to the instrument air compressors. This revision resuited from resolution of the steam generator tube rupture issue.

Attachment 8 responds to an October 13 question from Mr. S. Sun. This completes the series of questions. responded ',o in letter LD-93-159, dated November 3, 1993.

Attachment 9 provides revisions on the issue of cantainment spray mixing.

These changes have been discussed and sbruld be provided to Mr. C. Li.

Att achment 10 transmits revised sections of Chapter 14 in response to questions received September 15, 1993. Also included are corresponding ;

revisions to other sections for consistency.

Attachment 11 provides revisions and responses to questions from fir. T.

Chandrasekaran Attachment 12 includes changes to Section 1.2 required for consistency with changes submitted earlier.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LD-93-160 November 4, 1993 Page 2 j.

-Attachment 13 includes changes to Section 9.2 which should have been included in Amendment R. They will be included in Amendment T.

Attachment 14 provides the agreed-upon response to COL Action Item 9.2.2-2 and Open Item 6.2.4-2. These responses should be given to the Plant Systems Branch.

Attachment 15 transmits a revision to the ATWS analysis and copies should be given to Mr. S. Sun and Mr. N. Saltos.

Attachment 16 includes responses and CESSAR-DC revisions related to Plant Safeguards issues. Some of the CESSAR-DC revisions have already been formally printed. These should be provided to Mr. S. Young.

Attachment 17 transmits a set of responses for Mr. T. Chandrasekaran.

Attachment 18 provides minor changes to Chapters 6 and 9 which should be provided to the Plant Systems Branch.

Attachment 19 includes responses on radiation protection which should be given to Mr. C. Hinson. Included are changes to Section 11.5 and Chapter 12.

If you have any questions, please call me or Mr. Stan Ritterbu:ch at (203) 285-5206.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.

C. B. Brinkman Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing CBB/ser cc: J. Trotter EPRI)

T. Wambach NRC)

P. Lang (D0 )

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RESPONSE TO MATERIALS AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERING OPEN ISSUES OUESTION 1 Use of Inconel 600 - technically resolved in that the applicant at the July 22, 1993 meeting agreed to use Inconel 690. Involves. ;

the following Open Items which are considered confirmatory items: j i

4.5.1-1 l 4.5.2-4 !

5 . 2 . 3 ', !

6.1-2 !

ABB-CE to document use of Inconel 690 in CESSAR (4 places). '

ABB-CE RESPONSE '

ABB-CE has already documented the use of Inconel 690 in CESSAR-DC ;

(Amendment Q) in sections:

i 4.5.1.1 :

4.5.2.1 !

Table 5.2-2 j

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TABLE 6.1-1 (Bheet 1 of 2)

PRINCIPAL ESP PRESSURE RETAINING MATERIALS ^

_ Product Form ASME Specification Plate SA 515 GR 70 SA 516 GR 70 SA 240 TP 304, TP 304L '

SA 240 TP 316, TP 316L Inconel 400 (ASME SB 168)

Forgings WO SA 105 GR 2 SA 182 F304, P304L SA 182 F316, F316L SA 508 CL 2 SA 336 F 8 SA 403 F316 Castings SA 351 CF 3M, CF8, CF8M SA 216 WCB SA 351 GR CA6MM Pipe .

SA 106 GR B SA 312 TP 304, TP 316 SA 358 TP 304 Class 1 SA 376 TP 304, TP 316 Tube SA 249 TP 304/316 SA 213 TP 316 SS/304 Bar .

SA 479 TP 304, TP 316 TP 304H, TP 3 04 L SB 166 SA 276 TP 316 SA 564 TP 630 SA 193 GR B7, B6

, Bolting SA 193 GR D8 SA 193 GR B8M SA 453 GR 660 SA 307 GR B SA 540 B 24 CL 3 Nuts

. SA 194 GR 2H, GR 8, 6 .

SA 194 GR 8F, GR 8M, GR 7, s GR BT, GR 8C 4

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I OUESTION 2 l

Having an upper limit cn1 ferrite of 30% for austenitic stainless '

steel castings - technically resolved at the July 22, 1993 I meeting as CE agreed to an upper ferrite limit of 20%. The upper I limit of 30% is too high in that upon exposure to temperatures ;

, above 500 F, rather severe embrittlement occurs which may not ;

provide leak before break performance for plant life. Serious l degradation occurs within two years. Involves the following Open i Items which are considered confirmatory items: ,

4.5.2-5 !

5.2.3-9 i 5.3.1-11 5.4.2-9 i 6.1-4 i i

ABB-CE to document limits on ferrite content in stainless steel !

castings to 20% by an amendment t CESSAR (5 places). {

ABB-CE RESPONSE $

ABB-CE has already documented the upper limit ferrite content in ;

stainless steel castings to no more than 20FN for temperatures ;

greater than 500 F in the tollowing CESSAR-DC sections: !

4.5.2.3.1.3 1 5.2.3.4.1.1.1.C 6.1.1.1.4.

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OUESTION 3 '

Fasteners - there is a statement in CESSAR-DC, Paragraph 5.3.1.7, f last paragraph, which indicates that molybdenum sulfide is to be ~!

used on reactor vessel closure fasteners. The ABB-CE submittal I of November 24, 1992, indicated that1this statement would be !

modified to delete the use of molybdenum disulfide on reactor l vessel closure studs. Other fastener open items have been !

addressed / modified in the November 24, 1993, submittal or !

Amendment L, except for Open Item 5.3.1-5. This item is !

considered a Confirmatory Item which is to be corrected by a :

modification to CESSAR in an amendment. ;

ABB-CE RESPONSE l

The use of molybdenum disulfide on reactor vessel closure studs has been deleted in CESSAR-DC, section 5.3.1.7 in a previous ,

amendment.

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1 OUESTION 7 <

l Reactor coolant pump flywheel - Open Item 5.4.1.1-5 In Amendment N, the applicant modified the CESSAR-DC to state !

I that the design overspeed will be at least 10% above the highest ;

anticipated overspeed of the pump. The highest anticipated I overspeed is predicted based on the larges' break size remaining '

i after application of leak before break of the piping as described i in Section 3.6. In a telephone conversation on September 2, ;

1993, the applicant identified the largest pipe remaining after

, leak before break as a 4 inch charging line to the main loop. ,

The staff requires that the CESSAR-DC be modified to identify the i l largest line not analyzed for leak before break which affects i reactor coolant pump overspeed as it is a major consideration for !

, safety concerns other than flywheel overspeed. This item is '

! considered confirmatory until CESSAR-DC is modified to identify ,

the line by size and designation that controls the maximum ;

overspeed of the reactor coolant pump.

ABB-CE RESPONSE CESSAR-DC, Section 5.4.1.1.b.2 will be modified as shown below: j The design overspeed will be at least 10% above the highest ,

anticipated overspeed of the pump. Th- highest anticipated s overspeed is predicted for the largeat break size remaining '

after application of leak before break as described in Section 3.6. The largest break size remaining after j

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application of leak before break which affects the maximum '

overspeed of the RCP is a 4 inch pressurizer spray line.

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material if appropriate tensile tests have been performed on the actual material of the flywheel.

2.

The design overspeed of the flywheel will be 125 percent of normal operating speed.

5 The design overspeed will be at least 10% above the '

highest inticipated overspeed of the pump. The highest i anticipated overspeed is predicted for the largest break size remaining after application of leak before t break as described in Section 3.6.c -/NSot T 3.

The combined centrifugal and interference stresses at the design overspeed will be limited to two-thirds of l the minimum specified yield strength or 2/3 of the measured yield strength in the weak direction if appropriate tensile tests have been performed on the actual material of the flywheel. Design overspeed is defined above.

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The motor and pump shaft or bearings and coupling will 1 withstand any combination of normal operating loads or anticipated break transients, and the largest remaining pipe after application of leak i

described in Section 3.6, before break as t

( Earthquake Shutdown. combined with the Safe !

Each in B.2 flywheel above. will be tested at design overspeed as defined l The flywheel volumetric will be accessibic for ultrasonic inspection.

100 percent in-place The flywheel-motor assembly is designed to allow suca inspection with a minimum 1

of motor disassembly. The in-service inspection program will include ultrasonic examinations of the areas of high ,

stress concentration at the bore and keyway at about 3 1/3 year intervals, during the refueling or maintenance shutdown coinciding with the in-service inspection required by the ASME Code,Section XI. Removal schedule as ;

flywheel is not required. of the A surface examination of all exposed surfaces and 100%

volumetric examination by ultrasonic methods will be conducted at about ten-year intervals during the plant shutdown coinciding with the in-service inspection schedule as required by the ASME Code,Section XI.

Each flywheel will receive a preservice baseline inspection I incorporating the methods defined above for an inservice inspection.

, will be Examination procedures and acceptance criteria in accordance with the ASME Code Section III. !

i 5.4-3 Amendment Q June 30, 1993

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NUPLEX 80+ TECH SPEC IEC DEFINITIONS TERM DEFINITION ACTUATION LOGIC ACTUATION LOGIC is defined as a set of ;

interconnected hardware and software components that process initiation inputs to ;

produce an identifiable ESF actuation signal ,

within a division. This includes the initiation signal's associated selective 2- !

out-of-4 voters.

t CALIBRATION CHECK A CALIBRATION CHECK is defined as the ,

quantitative assessment, by measurement, of a i device's calibration during operation. The !

CALIBRATION CHECK is applicable to the precision reference voltage sourceu of A/D convertors, j

CHANNEL A CHANNEL is an arrangement of components and t modules that generate a single protective action signal when required by a generating station condition. (Derived from definition in IEEE 603). A CHANNEL is comprised of the cascaded elements of a TRIP CHANNEL, %OGIC '

CHANNEL, ACTUATION LOGIC, and COMPONrMT CONTROL LOGIC as applicable. l CHANNEL A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is the adjustment, as CALIBRATION necessary, of the CHANNEL output such that it i' responds within the specified range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the CHANNEL monitors. The calibration may be performed by any series of sequential, .

overlapping or total CHANNEL steps so that j the entire CHANNEL is calibrated. j i

CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK is the qualitative assessment, by observation, of a CHANNEL's behavior during operation. This observation shall include comparison of the CHANNEL's status to other status derived from independent CHANNELS. This check shall be performed to examine as much of the CHANNEL as practicable.

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11/2/93 CHANNEL FUNC" ONAL A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is defined as the (

TEST manipulation of a channel input condition to i exercise its output in order to verify the OPERABILITY of the channel. A CHANNEL i FUNCTIONAL TEST may be applicable to a TRIP I CHANNEL, LOGIC CHANNEL, ACTUATION LOGIC, or l COMPONENT CONTROL LOGIC. ;

For CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of TRIP CHANNELS, !

the following applies:

1) ANALOG CHANNELS - the injection of a ;

simulated or-actual signal into the ,

channel as close to the sensor as !

practicable to verify OPERABILITY, j including alarms, interlocks, display ;

and trip functions-

2) BINARY CHANNELS (e.g., pressure switches i and switch contacts) - the injection of [

a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as :

practicable to verify OPERABILITY, l including required alarm and trip. ;

functions; or ;

i DIGITAL COHPUTER CHANNELS - the use of I 3) diagnostic programs to test digital ;

computer hardware and the injection of ;

process data into the channel to verify :

OPERABILITY, including alarm and trip ;

functions.

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The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed !

, by means of any series of sequential, '

overlapping, or total channel steps so that l the entire CHANNEL is tested. )

l COMPONENT CONTROL COMPONENT CONTROL LOGIC is defined for ESF '

LOGIC functions as a set of interconnected hardware and software components which provides plant component control functions. This logic is implemented within the programming software in the COHPONENT CONTROL LOGIC for all component control functions including ESF components.

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11/2/93 ;

DIVERSE MANUAL A DIVERSE MANUAL ESF ACTUATION CHANNEL is ESF ACTUATION defined as a channelized manual initiation l CHANNEL switch and related signal wiring which is used to provide diverse manual actuation of ESF components in selected divisions. A j DIVERSE MANUAL ESF ACTUATION CHANNEL is -!

channelized, independent and diverse'from the TRIP CHANNEL, LOGIC CHANNEL, and ACTUATION i LOGIC. i ENGINEERED SAFETY The ESF RESPONSE TIME shall be that time !

FEATURE RESPONSE interval from when the monitored parameter l TIME TEST exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at_the ,

channel sensor until the ESF equipment is i capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach >

their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and !

sequence loading delays., where applicable. j The response time may be measured by means of i any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time '

is measured. ,

LOG 1C CHANNEL A LOGIC CHANNEL is defined as a set of !

interconnected hardware and software l components that process inputs to produce an !

identifiable trip initiation signal or ESF !

initiation signal within a division. This '

includes the initiation signal's associated j LCL 2-out-of-4 voters, data transmission, ;

software, trip channel bypass, and MANUAL i TRIP CHANNEL function for RPS and MANUAL .

INITIATION CHANNEL function for ESF. t t

MANUAL A MANUAL INITIATION CHANNEL is defined as a ('

INITIATION channelized manual initiation switch and CHANNEL related signal wiring which is used to ,

provide system level manual initiation of an ;

ESF function. :

MANUAL TRIP A MANUAL TRIP CHANNEL is defined as a !

CHANNEL channelized manual actuation switch and related signal wiring which is used to ,

provide system level RPS manual trip of a ,

channelized reactor trip circuit breaker. '

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11/2/93 i

MEASUREMENT A MEASUREMENT CHANNEL is defined as the CHANNEL equipment required to detect input signal information including sensor, transmitter, j signal _ conditioning and communication device (s). A MEASUREMENT CHANNEL is- <

comprised of the sensor, transmitter, and .

signal conditioning devices of an ANALOG l CHANNEL or COMPUTER CHANNEL.

OPERABLE / A system, subsystem, train, component, or OPERABILITY device shall be OPERALLE when it is capable ;

of performing its specified safety function (s) and when all necessary, 4 attendant instrumentation and controls, normal or emergency electrical power, _ cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function (s) ;

are also capable of performing their related ;

support function (s).

REACTOR PROTECTIVE The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be the time !

SYSTEM RESPONSE interval from when the monitored parameter TIME TEST exceeds its RPS trip setpoint at the channel ,

sensor until electrical power to the CEAs drive mechanism is interrupted. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total-steps so that the entire response time is measured. ,

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TRIP CHANNEL A TRIP CHANNEL is defined as a set of )

interconnected hardware and software i components that process an identifiable j sensor signal within a division. This l includes the sensor, data acquisition, signal 'i conditioning, data transmission, software and I all transmission lines and operating bypasses j associated with the sensor signal up to an .j input of a 2-out-of-4 voter.

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1) ANALOG CHANNEL i An ANALOG CHANNEL is defined as the equipment required to detect and ;

i digitize analog signal information l including sensor (e.g., pressure ;

sensor), signal conditioning device, '

multiplexer, A/D convertor, trip comparator, and communication device (s). .;

An ANALOG CHANNEL is a specific type of l TRIP CHANNEL. ;

2) A BINARY CHANNEL is defined as the !

equipment required to detect binary l signal information including sensor -

(e.g., pressure switch), signal ;

conditioning device, multiplexer, trip comparator, and communication device (s). ,

A BINARY CHANNEL is a specific type of TRIP CHANNEL.

3) COMPUTER CHANNEL ,

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equipment required to detect and l digitize input signal information {

including sensor (e.g., neutron flux i detector), signal conditioning device, j multiplexer, A/D convertor, software, ;

and communication device (s). A COMPUTER ,

CHANNEL is a specific type of TRIP !

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11/2/93 TRIP TEST A TRIP TEST is defined as the selective opening of two (2) reactor trip circuit bro kers to cause a reactor trip. The TRIP TEST is initiated by means of MANUAL TRIP CHANNEL manual actuation switches.

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/]l]h3 IEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PHILOSOPHY FOR REOUIRED ACTIONS AND ASSOCIATED COKPLETION TIME ,

1 GENERAL REPAIR LCO 1 The General Repair LCO ensures failed components in all ,

Safety channels / divisions and Non-Safety components specifically identified in Technical Specifications are :

repaired prior to return to power following a shutdown. ;

Failed components will be restored to OPERABLE status prior i to entering MODE 2 following next MODE 5 entry and not require on-line repair.

1. COMPONENT FAILURE WITHIN A CHANNEL WHEN THERE IS REDUNDANCY BEYOND THE LEVEL CREDITED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS When there is redundancy beyond the level credited in the ;

safety analysis (e.g. four PPS channels when only three are credited in the safety analysis) the required action will be to place the channel in trip or bypass and follow the

general repair LCO. The extra channel provides additional flexibility, by allowing one channel to be removed from

service for maintenance or testing, while still maintaining :

a minimum required logic. Thus, even with a channel :

inoperable, no single additional failure in the protection I system can either cause an inadvertent action, or prevent a i required action from occurring.

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2. EOUIPMENT PROVIDED TO MEET CRITERION 4 OF THE NRC POLICY STATEMENT When the equipment is provided to meet Criterion 4 (i.e. A structure, system, or component which operating experience '

or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety) of the NRC Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements and not ,

provided to meet Criterion 1, 2, or 3 of the NRC Policy I Statement on Technical Specification Improvements the required action will be to: i a) place the channel in bypass and restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, if there is a loss of function (e.g. Alternate Protective system), or .

b) place the channel in bypass and follow the General l Repair LCO if there is no loss of function (e.g. l Control Room Isolation Filtration Signal).

The 30 days with a loss of function allows sufficient time to repair to repair the equipment. Bypassing the channel when there is no loss of function allows continued operation when the function is available.

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3. FAILURE OF TWO CHANNELS WHEN THERE IS NORMALLY FOUR CHANYT4S- J ,

i When there is one or more functions with two cht.nnels inoperable (e.g. ESF Trip Channel) then one channel shall be !

placed in bypass within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and the other channel in trip within i hour and follow the General Repair LCO. With one protection channel bypassed, the function is in a two-out-of ,

three logic, but with another channel failed, the PPS may be operating in a two-out-of two logic. This is outside the assumptions made in the safety analysis and should be corrected. To correct the problem, the second channel is placed in trip. This places the PPS in a one-out-of-two logic.

4. FAILURE OF ONE CHANNEL WHEN THERE IS NORMALLY THREE CHANNELS When there is one or more functions with one channel inoperable out of a total of three channels (e.g. DG LOVS), ,

the required actions and completion times will be to place I the inoperable channel in trip within one hour. This places the function a one-out-of-two logic. If any of the other OPERABLE channels receives an actuation signal, the safety feature will occur. i

5. ONE OF FOUR CHANNELS INOPERABLE WHEN DOWNSTREAM LOGIC IS SELECTIVE TWO-OUT-OF-FOUR When receiving logic is selective two-out-of-four and one ;

channel is inoperable (e.g. RTSG, ESF Actuation) the ;

required action will be:

a) For the RPS - Open the affected RTCBs within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to !

place RPS trip function in a one-out-of-two logic vice !

a selective two-out-of three logic, then follow the General Repair LCO. -

b) For ESF-CCS - Open at least one contact in the affected ;

ESFAS logic within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the ESFAS function in a one-out-of-two logic vice a selective two-out-of-three logic, then follow the General Repair LCO. ,

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6. TWO CHANNELS IN THE SAME TRIP LEG INOPERABLE WHEN LOGIC IS SELECTIVE TWO-OUT-OF-FOUR When two-out-of-four channels in the same trip leg are .

inoperable (e.g. RTSG, ESF Actuation) the required action will be:

a) For the RPS - Open Both RTCBs immediately to place RPS logic into a one-out-of-two logic then follow the General Repair LCO. Without this action the function is inoperable, '

b) For ESF-CCS - Open both contacts in the affected trip leg of both ESFAS logic immediately then follow the ;

General Repair LCO. This places the Function in a one- ,

out-of-two logic. Without this action the function is !

inoperable.

7. FAILURE OF A CHANNEL OR DIVISION THAT DIRECTLY IMPACTS THE OPERABILITY OF A MECHANICAL COMPONENT ,

When there is a failure of a channel or division that causes the loss of a mechanical component (e.g. SIAS Component Control Logic, CSAS Component Control Logic, two CHANNELS of DG LOVS), the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for the associated mechanical component will be entered and the :

required actions and associated completion times for the failed Instrumentation Channel or Division will be consistent with those of the mechanical component.

8. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITHIN A SAFETY-CHANNEL THAT

MAY DECREASE THE RELIABILITY OF THE CHANNEL BUT NOT CAUSE ANY LOSS OF FUNCTION Failure of redundant components within a safety channel that may decrease the reliability of the channel but not cause ,

any loss of function will not necessitate the action _to !

declare the associated channel or division inoperable nor enter any action statements associated with function (i.e we will not require additional LCOs to address). However, the General Repair LCO applies to ensure all redundant safety equipment is OPERABLE prior to entering MODE 2. This accommodates continued plant operation with a failure of redundant equipment but ensures that the redundant equipment is available to provide requisite availability prior to return to power following a shutdown.

Page 3 of 3

l NEW SYSTEM 80+ CESS C 1 Bew AND TITLES >

SECTION NO. DESCRIPTION

= m# 54 ) .

16.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 16.6.1 3.3.1 Reactor Protective System (RPS) < ['

INSTRUMENTATION - OPERATING 16.6.2 3.3.2 Reactor Protective system (RPS) ;

INSTRUMENTATION - SHUTDOWN i 16.6.3 3.3.3 CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY CALCULATORS (CEACs) 16.6.4 3.3.4 Reactor Protective System (RPS) LOGIC AND TRIP INITIATION ,

16.6.5 3.3.5 Emergency Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION j 16.3.6 3.3.6 Emergency Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) LOGIC AND MANU7.L INITIATION }

l 16.3.7 3.3.7 DIESEL GENERATOR (DG)- LOSS OF VOLTAGE START j (LOVS) j 16.3.8 3.3.8 ALTERNATE PROTECTION SYSTEM (APS) 16.3.9 3.3.9 CONTROL ROOM INTAKE / FILTRATION SIGNAL (CRIFS). l 16.3.10 3.3.10 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION :

16.3.11 3.3.11 POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ,

(PAMI) 16.3.12 3.3.12 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS ,

i 16.6.13 3.3.13 LOGARITHMIC POWER MONITORING CHANNELS 16.6.14 3.3.14 REDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITHIN A SAFETY CHANNEL

[

t E

TECH 2.WP l

lr

, - - - -J

"N93

/ i rumentation-Operating (jigitidt l 3.3.1 3.3 3.3.1 INSTRUMENTATION RA Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentat n-Operating 7DP crtwnnJ; f, cjcpew ,

l LCO 3.3.1 Four RPS/tcip in Table 3.3.1-l 'hhall be OPERABL pa and/bhw,ss va nel) forremo/;,h each Function ' {E. i APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1. l ACTIONS *

---__-----------------_--------------NOTES------------------------------------

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each RPS Function.

2. If a channel is placed in bypass, continued operation with the channel in the bypassed condition for the Completion Time specified by Required Action A.2 or C.2.2 shall be reviewed in accordance with Specification 5.5.1.2.e.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. One or more functions A.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one automatic RPS bypass or trip.

4r4pshannel- / F cewn_

inoperable. AND A.2 Restore channel to Prior to OPERABLE status. entering MODE 2 following next MODE 5 entry i

B. One or more Functions B.1 --------NOTE---------

with two automatic RPS LCO 3.0.4 is not

-tdp-channel s mrctwrus applicable.

inoperable. ---------------------

Place one channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months bypass and the other in trip.

(continued)

.-4EOG-STS" .$ . 3 - 1 -Rcv. O, 09/28/S1_

?

__.__a

RPS Instrumentation-Operating (Bigitait-3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A -

C. One or more Functions C.1 isable bypass I hour with one automatic channel.

ygr4g bypass removal channel inoperable. M C.2.1 Place affected I hour automatic -trip 7tte

/ ~% cMwrc. <hannel in bypass or tri p.

~ 3

_. _ _ M cT c - - -

17g hes cely h Fuc4;ca s AND

) t9end:ny

_?' _u t&,igc JN ;u Talic3.3J-/ / C.2.2

___ . _ Restore 4 bypass Prior to removal channel and entering MODE 2 associated automatic following next r/ se enAurt-trip-ehannel to MODE 5 entry OPERABLE status.

D. One or more Functions ------------NOTEA------------

with two automatic {LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

3-----------------------------

cp 4 ;ng bypass removal

~

channels inopera o 0.1 Disable,fer4bypas%s 1 bour channels.

/

/ E f' J.

//ghes exly le McVica5 D.2 Place one affected I hour i automatic -tetpTft P dj hy />,/'j ud /c/ ;u Tash 7,33-M cgegw3c.-channel in bypass and

~ / place the other in tri p.

E. One or more core E.1 Perfonn CHANNEL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months protection calculator FUNCTIONAL TEST on (CPC) channels with a affected CPC.

cabinet high temperature alarm.

(continued)

JEDG-STF h3-2 Rev. u, 09/28/92-

RPS Iastrumentation-Operating 4Bhital) 3.3.1 ,

ACTIONS (continued) ;

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One or more CPC F.1 Perform CHANNEL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months !

channels with three or FUNCTIONAL TEST on more autorestarts affected CPC.

during a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period, f

G. Required Action and G.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-----------------.------_---.----.-_-

Refer to Table 3.3.1-1 to determine which SR shall be perfonned for each RPS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY prawfrure.pspes- tL ; :

. SR 3.3.1.1 Perform a CHANNEL a CHECK of each RPS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

~

instrument channel, Q ept Loss of Loaa %

(continued)

JEM4TS- G 3:3' Rev M M 9/28/92-(

RPS Instrumentation-Operating (dim 3.3.1

)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I 1

3.3.1.2 SR -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER a 70% RTP.

Verify total Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less ;

than or equal to the RCS total flow rate. ;

1 If necessary, adjust the CPC addressable !

constant flow coefficients such that each -

CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to !

the RCS flow rate. t SR 3.3.1.3 Check the CPC autorestart count. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.1.4 -------------------NOTES------------------- l

1. Not required to be performed until l 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER 2 20% RTP.

2. The daily calibration may be suspended l during PHYSICS TESTS, provided the l calibration is performed upon reaching ,

each major test power plateau and ~

prior to proceeding to the next major :

test power plateau. I i

Perform calibration (heat balance only) and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months i adjust the linear power level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to ;

make the CPC AT power and CPC nuclear power !

calculations agree with the calorimetric, if the absolute difference is a [2]%. 74ea i ady w o-eacec J -lh ucime sk/mfpsSAM?he ree e trctc

? 0aleat 3% "

1 (continued)

& T tS elk ,

GEOG STS - 3.3-4 -Rev. 07 -09/28/9 k l 1

/

l I

I I

, I I

I i l I

i I

! gcae, ~ ,, ,7 ,,i . a, , _

1 aypf! vy n ,o, v n,y v,v ~ w u y

' [k lPYTjand7 *W3g !*} ay nfv gg (i,n >= p ,f y) ~ :y r, p 7 y

~

4 13euff TFwyapt gyr Tmy tv I G m >1 :nm da a fR:r%>-i yog/

ll St % 'z m

/yy 7 g >-

1 Aa x

& 0-),-

' ' ~ , , - . ,

RPS Instrumentation--Operating (Digitel) l

3. 3. 1 l 4

1

~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY [

SR 3.3.1 l$((p -------------------NOTE-----------_--------

Not required to be performed until 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s-after THERMAL POWER e 70% RTP.

Verify total RCS flow rate indicated by 31 days each CPC is less than or equal to the RCS flow determined by calorimetric

calculations. C 1

SR 3.3.1 ;6 7 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed ui.til 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER a IS% RTP.

Verify linear power subchannel gains of the 31 days ,

excore detectors are consistent with the !

values used to establish the shape ann;aling matrix elements in the CPCs. l SR 3.3.1.)[f ------NOTES-------------------

1. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall The CPC ;

include verification that the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC. -

2. Not required to be performed for logarithmic power level channels until ,

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months af r reducing THERMAL POWER below((1E-4 RTP and only if reactor trip circui breakers (RTCBs) are '

closed.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days channel except(t03s of LDa an power range ;

neutron flux.

i (continued) :

f CEOC STS - 3.3-5 -

Rav. O, 09/28t92 f

i

, m

5 N

33.[

_.a. 1 ..4 ..

_ . _ . -.ER- 3 3 l lo !

_ Pidrm Cnc1Buxa0Lucc fh_Jd5 L 4 ~~ - 1 m - ., - . _.m. __..-w . . - . m.e--g-mm- .._.,

6

. _ - . ,m._ .._..- . ...___ _ _ _ _.. - . . ~ . . . . . . . . . ..-.. , , . .

-4 -.g w..

h

-* e .w--.. ,. . .- - - --. ,+-~ , ,. ... - .,. ._wg_ , ,.. , _ m_ , p,%g

_._. . . _ - i+ . - .. . .

u.

e

-- . - - - -_ _--________..__,,_._.,___,_,_.m-. .

, _ _ _,__,._ ,,o. ,,, ,,__,, _, , , , ,, , ,

+-m=me.--w- % -- - w... - m_ .m. . .,,m ._, ,, _. _,,.4 , ,, _ _, g

_. . ___ ._ . ._ ____._ . . __ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _____ ._ ._..._.._ ._..____ ._ ___ i

~. . -- .. . .~_ . ___ .... . - _ _ __ - . _.. _ __.._.,. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . .

L ad-*'sNbw.-6.mA ee m---.e, ,,_w. ,,_,,. ,,.,,,,. m,&

aw .sm..w. .w- e._w ,

- - - --- -- , _ w.. _. _ . _ . _ . ._. _ _ , . . _ _ . ._ , _ _ . _ __ , , _ _ _ , _ . __,,,, _,,___

9 .,- -+seete e. -.h -o--.es' m e .*+=.hw*** - - - ao..-m.=-a's-.w*an-u .ee m p m e-ei New ed e.-.h-**ha m

.-. ease.egmah-.m.e--,mmm. <-- .w . -

i

RPS Instrumentation-Operating (Oiguatt---

3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREHENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.p ----------------NOTE--------------------

-- tron detectors are excluded from the Neu CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the power 92 days range neutron flux channels.

~

SR 3.3.1.9 -----_-------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months anter THERMAL POWER t 55% RTP.

( Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Loss 92 days

\ of Load Function.

e cedO JO' SR 3 . 3 .1.40 // - - - --- -- -- - --- - -- - - N OT E-- -- - - --- -- --- -- - - - -

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL

~-

CALIBRATION.

i Perform CHANNEL CALIBr% TION on each [18] months channel, including, bypass removal functions. ged:g ^

i SR 3.3.1.tt/A Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIt"'AL TEST on each [18] months CPC channel.

SR 3.3.1 A2/3 Using the incore detectors, determine the Once after each shape annealing matrix elements to be used refueling prior.

by the CPCs. to exceeding 70% RTP (continued) cCC00 STS- 3.3-6 - -Rev . O, 09Q J

RPS Instrumentation-Operating (DigiM13- i 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR once witbir, 3.3.1.4-3 /4 Perfonn a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each automatic bypass removal function. 92 days -prier-- i I -to-each reactor C[#,4' ^D -sta rtep--- l SR 3 . 3 .1. 44 /.f - - - - - - _ _ -- --- -- - - - - f; 0 T E - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - -

Neutron detectors are excluded.

3 Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. [18] months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS I

l i

r t

b l

i l

l

. 1 i

A Wr-S W 3.3-7 Aevr-Or09/28/92- -

f

.1

S

~ RPS Instrumentation-Operating -(Mgbl-) '

3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (page 1 cf 3) .

Reactor Protective System Instrtnentation - O [f Mj/

r APPLICABLE MODES OR ,

OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE vaadl< Overpiser Cna.1]

1. W : ;. 7 "-- R . ;l - H i gh 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 5 iM64}% RTP SR 3.3.1.4_ M (tR3_Ta w SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.8 / g 3.3.Li ISR 3.3.1.1M .g g E1 I*jf g' SR 3.3.1.Hrfp b[C.ot{b $1$ ,

2. Logarithmic Power Level -High a) 2 SR 3.3.1.1 .-4-4,G6W*f r-SR 3.3.1.K D c .

[$R 3.3.1.1.R M/ 5~

SR 3.3.1.13t/ M 3.f./.fj SR 3.3.1.11/5-4 37o '

3. Pressurizer Pressure - High 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 5(2389 psia]

SR 3.3.1.Klf

[SR 3.3.1.,1JQ g g,g,,, fj SR 3.3.1.1,6 r 7f,p4-447GI-psiir,.

.? DEOS f )5 f

4. Pressurizer Pressure - Lob 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 R

3gf cy,,j; g,pm g,,,,l 3 [gon f5 ,

5C33).If \R 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1A S&f S [40Cf5?o]

g/w > g ,.g

5. Containment Pressure - High 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 5 53,441 psig JR 3.3.1.W g,7 SS 3 1 N _ISR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1# 5 6

6. Steam Generator #1 Pressure - Low 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 2 4711}-ps4e- '

JR 3.3.1.2 7 pR3.3.1.13 fgy3gsla]

[C '*

b I' SR 3.3.1.1F f' .

7. Steam Cenu ator #2 Pressure -Low 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 2 pit!

SR3.3.1.7f {g43 03p.

ggg.5JJ)JR3.3.1.171 SR 3 3 1 1 A.f f

Cg(g (continued)

(a) $ypass shall be automatically removed when Trip may be THEFMAL bypassed POWR when THERMAL is 5 L1E-43% PMR RTP. Trip may is > (1E-43%

be manually bypa RTP.,dsed during physics testing pursuant to LCO 3.4.17, "RCS Loops - Test Exceptions." ,

b) When any RidMosed.

(c) The setpoint may be decreased to a minimJn value of (300) psia, as pressurizer pressur provided the margin between pressurizer pressure and the setpoint is maintained 5 l400) psi. Trips may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < (400) psia. Bypass shall be automatically removed when

)

pressurizer pressure is t (500) psia. The setpoint shall be automatically increased to the normal setpoint as prer.surizer pressure is increased.

l

--ft0ta 515- 3.3-8 -Rev. O, 09/28/42 - !

f RPS Instrumentation-Operating _(Digual) '

3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protective System Instrunentation i APPLICABLE MOCES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVE!LLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE W.A

8. Steam Generator #1 Level - Low 1,2 $R 3.3.1.1 t I?4-iF#J%

SR 3.3.1.X Y

[5R 3.3.1.1 M _ gg g , g SR 3.3.1.1k g W.}

9. steam Generator #2 Level- Low 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 a [?4,M1% -

SR 3.3.1.7 f5R 3.3.1.11,_ gg 3,g,f,jf SR 3.3.1.1A

U~

90 7

10. Steam Generator #1 Level - High 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 5 [% M1%

SR 3.3.1.7 7

[$R 3.3.1.1 1 g g 7 7 f,j7 ;

SR 3.3.1.14 5 9 0. T

11. Steam Generator #2 Level - Hign 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 5 [ % 7 43 %

SR 3.3.1.

L5R 3.3.1.1 5 9 7.S. 4 //

SR 3.3.1.14t' Q,MD <>

6

,f 12. Reactor Coolant flow -Lo 1,2 g SR 3.3.1.1/ Ramp: A $ 1 ) psid/sec. j 0-r SR 3.3.1.7/ Floor: E . psid

Step: psid (7

/ _fSR3.3.1.1@ .

(,

r up s s 1. nL4-e,_,.

{ s R 3.5,l.it SR 3.3.1.1A ( < !

1 SR 3.3.1.9 a 1100) psis

13. Loss of Load (turbine stop'yalve SR 3.3

10 contrcl oil pressure)

[sR 3.3.i.131 (y(p, Ang ,

(continued)

I (h/ Trip may be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is < (1E-41% RTP. Agypass shall be automatically retwved when

, THERMAL POWER is E [1E-4]% RTP. During testing pursuant to LCD 3.4.17, trip may be bypassed below

[ 5%]RTP. Bypass shall be automatically refroved when THERMAL POWER is Q5%]RTP.

(e) Trip may be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is < ISS)% RTP. Bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is z [55]% RTP.

d E06 515 3.3-9 -Rev. O,-09/28/3 (

e

/o !

i RPS Instrumentation-Operr. ting (Digital) 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 3) ,

Reactor Protective System Instrtrnentation !

I APPLICABLE MODES OR - i OTHER SPECIFIED SURVE!LLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE I

/3 -M. Local Power Density- High 1,2 k SR 3.3.1.1 5 121.03 kW/ft SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.4 p (SR3.3.1. C SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1, 3;R 3 3./. h

[5R 3.3.1. '

SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.12 ' '

SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.14 S R 3. S. I. s S

/ -4t Departure From h- te Boiling 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 ti 1 L

Ratio (DhBR) - Lo ' ) SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.4 l

(SR 3.311-SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.

~

gg g,3. J.g SR 3.3.1

[SR3.3.1.1 >

SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.14 5 e 3.5.1.1s-Q Trip snay be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is < [1E-4]% RTP. Bypess shall be automatically removed when [

/ THERMAL POWER is t (1E-4]% RTP. During testing pursuant to LC- 3.4.17 trip may be bypassed below

[5%]RTP. Bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is > %}RTP.

)

i i

I F

p CEOG STS 3.3-10 Rev. O, 09/28/92 [

(

-_ a

RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown -(Digitel)-

3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION i

3.3.2 Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation-Shutdown (Digitel)

LCO 3.3.2 Tour Rr; Logarithek-Power Level-High trip channels-en&-

acccciated i n;trsacnt sad bypes; ,cineval clia iiiEls sh: 11 be

-OPERABLE. Trip chanacis shall heve en Allowable Yalue af r [. 93] *. RTP.--

Fwr gps TptecHAmrts and t-ey in d efenhq byfasstfMoual b u c+;en t s 4m- ec.ci, Fu acNo n in Table LS.1-l skall be creR/18t n1 APPLICABILITY: ODES 3, 4, and 5,Eh any reactor trip circuit breakers (RTCBs) closed and any control element assembly capable .

q tf being withdrawn. f' Act.J;$ k T'U" ##- d------/-rM-- 79-NOTE - -- - -MW-- - --

/ By 5 ca mo( .E EN '

,- fy 64]kr'RTV // /# / ff y - -g s----- x- x--- - '~ -,------ ,-------- a --

'9 g /C Cahd p 8 e/ &

g , u

/ ACTIONS

^-- ....--------------

- NOTE-------------------- ----------------

IfachNnnelipp by a[ssed conditio) acedtion for the/Compl byh--operat in hme on ith th3 % nnel 'n1

- continped'haecif Required Ac_t2 d A.2b e

o C.2.2Vall be revieweil in acc rda,nce wit Hfiecifica Vn 5.5.1.2.e.

,......----------n-,Z-------------------------------------------------------

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

^

e s m e Fu clie.23 WHA o., 4 ,

I hour A. Oneg RPS-4eganthtte A.1 Place channel in cv4%4;c RPSpower level -tnp B Tf sP bypass or trip.

egger (Annel inoperable.

AND A.2 Restore channel to Prior to OPERABLE status. entering MODE 2 following next MODE 5 entry (continued) i I

]

j l

1

__CEOG-STS- 3.3-11 Dau n nom /S2 l

J s

[^9., _ 2 , .- T ----- -%d~fgg

~

~ e nf y,, 4

- hed T/g 2.

If a channel is placed in bypass, continued *W ;

the bypassed condition for the Completion Ti operation with the chan Action A.2 Specification 5.5.or C.2.2 shall be reviewed ordance with in acc me specified by Required

--_____________.._____1.2.e. _ ___.- - --

-- - -.- -- - . , _ . _ _ . - - -~ -

Y

, . ~ .

- - -- -- - - -.--- - _ _ _ _ . . . - . _ - ~

- -e- - % +.

- e-- - umm., - a a

.- %.. +e_e._

.-,.e--+-

m., - - - . . = - + - - - - - - - - - -, * * .

e

.--- . . . - m. - - - -- . ., --. . . . #

-w ,e -

- -,-se -, - - - + .

..wm

. - * . . - - + , -----+,p-e

-- .... , -.sm--+=em=.e --e.ewi--=-e-.e--- - . - , .,,-, . - .- -- - - - ., --- #w

- - _ --. ..- - + ..4 - -e>.e.----w ---.we= - +-ex-++,ee-%. w ..-em -mm.m-_,a. ..~_ . _ _ + _m----i--.--ma%,mmis. --ew-he*-

_ _ _ . . o.- __ _ _ . . _ _ ..__ _ . . . , _ . . . . , _ . . - . ._ _.

.e %, _ e --e,awesu.a.sw sw+-e ++^.m- -,*.a.*.+--- -w -+.-y------w i

- - '+ - - - + +. - - - - - ., me-

- - --=-%r= e.i..~.m,<m . - + .-su-+- * - -,,-.r*- - - - + .---45,-+ -w. %- ~ -m.o..+qm--,. . we_, , ,n. _-$>. ors

RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown 4DigitstP 3.3.2 1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l B. -Jwo_.RPS-l eg a ri thW B.1 --------NOTE---------

. power-kvci trip LCO 3.0.4 is not ,

.rhannels inspcrable. applicable. '

~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~

One e-, ~ er Fu edices w!4A Yw aadwaNc- Place one channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months RFI TOP cNBA'vFLS j bypass and place the

/wres h /e, other in trip.

i n

&) ofend;~g C. O~ [ ,, C. Disableg bypasr 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channel.

OR

'C.2.1 Place affected I hour Dne ce neee Fnc};ws automatic-tr4p'rC#

to ,.4js c r + a w4m.dic cwyrc-channel in bypass or trip.

cpedssy ypass b l

^"U rem ov t cisu el5 q,,44 scred/4 C.2.2 Restore 4 bypass Prior to removal channel and entering MODE 2 associated automatic following next ,

n/comrctrip chafmet to MODE 5 entry OPERABLE status.

D. .Jwo-autmat4e-bypass ------------NOTE 3------------

-removal ci.oritietr i,LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

4noperabic. A 5--------------------------

On + er we re belic*5 / 1 Disable b pas I hour to ;4h -tw o a de on 4; c- channels.

oferuh3 6 pas 5 Nm cva / c s a n a e/g OR '

h,o f e al{e ~ .

(continued)

~

p/ A>oTE Afflles cu ly -lo %diers 1, <f, s%) (,,

x le m/c '3 3 3 - /

WM-STS~ 3.3-12 -Rev . O, 09/28/92 ~ l 1

L

RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown (M 9 ha13-3.3,2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION, COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 Place one affected I hour automatic trip Tr4P ciu mre channel in bypass and place the other in trip.

t E. Required Action and E.1 Open all RTCBs. I hour associated Completion Time not met.

URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY m erAsanrswr r SR 3.3.2.1 Perform axCHANNEL CHECK of o each WMc 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

_TM- R F5 l a % ,.c d c h a n o r /-

SR 3.3.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days le9wi-thmic p :rthanneb clua,,c/.

1 SR 3.3.2.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each -Ont; wYthin- r automaticg bypass removal function. 92 days W

-tes5-:

-sctar-T,j,yd 4ts***p-(2 den 4c 7 ;;bl.e 3.gy) -lo delrew; e &;ck

_ \ \

\ ;

CR s[c.fi le peder ~ eb St- each (2 f G Fu. dim

~ ~ ~

_ _. ~ _ . - - ___-

y ,/ l M-EOG-STS~ 3.3-13 - Rev. O,09/28/92.s I

l

RPS instrumentation-Shutdown {Mg%1F 3.3.2 .

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) ;

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY R 3 . 3 . 2 .gf --- - - - - -- - - ---- ---- NO T E- - ---- - -------------

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform a CHANNEL CA.LIBRATION on each [18] months !

cLac/ 4egarMhmic-pcar channeb including, bypass ,

removal function. jpegh

' i r

SR 3.3.2.)(r Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. [18] months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS S/2 3.1 p. 4 9 b

pn[_ cpueunca caec n en op gde< ~ e se n

[g p.4s t

)

I i

1 JLOhy 3.3-14 fev g-D9/28/92 l

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==*

CEACs4044t44) 3.3.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3 control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs) (Ohitel) -

LCO 3.3.3 Two CEACs shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION' TIME A. One CEAC inoperable. A.1 Perfonn SR 3.1.5.1. Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND A.2 Restore CEAC to 7 days OPERABLE status.

S. Required Action and B.1 Verify the departure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion from nucleate boiling Time of Condition A ratio requirement of not met. LCO 3.2.4, " Departure from Nucleate Boiling OR Ratio (DNBR)," is met

[and the Reactor Both CEACs inoperable. Power Cutback System -

is disabled].

l AND (continued)

__CEOLSTN, 3.3-15 Hev. u, u9/28/92%

CEACs (Digital)-.

3.3.3-ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 V if al ull 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months engt and part length /tontrol element assembly (CEA) groups are fully withdrawn and maintained fully withdrawn, except during Surveillance testing pursuant to SR 3.1.5.3 and SR 3.1.5.4 [or for control, when CEA group #6 may be inserted to a maximum of 127.5 inches].

AND 8.3 Verify the "RSPT/CEAC 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Inoperable" '

addressable constant in each core :

protection calculator (CPC) is set to indicate that.both CEACs are inoperable.

AND :

B.4 Verify the Control 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Element Drive

Mechanism Control System is placed in

%dy">0FT' and maintained in,*01%

except ,

gg,,,~~during CEA motion permitted by Required Action B.2. !

AND B.5 Perform SR 3.1.5.1. Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (continued)

N/

CE0G4TS 3.3-16 , 9728/92 a

l CEACs $itJNH-3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Receipt of a fPC-CEAC C.1 Perform CHANNEL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months !

-channe! 9 ce-E-cabinet FUNCTIONAL TE on ;

high temperature affected CEAC(s . l alarm. q D. One or two CEACs with D.1 Perfom CHANNEL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months three or more FUNCTIONAL TEST on ;

autorestarts during a affected CEAC. '

12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period. ;

E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

associated Completion l Time of Condition B, j C, or D not met. i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY hf05"f'H D' T

. SR 3.3.3.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 4

SR 3.3.3.2 Check the CEAC autorestart count. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months t

SR 3.3.3.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days I

SR 3.3.3.4 Perfom a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. [18] months !

i (continued)

X/

C STS 3.3-17 Rev.

/

9/28/92 l

/ / ,

V i CEACs (Big +t -

3.3.3 !

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.5 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. [18] months !

i i

i w_ !

SR 3.3.3.6 Verify the isolation cnaracteristics of [18] months !

each CEAC isolation amplifier and each optical isolator for CEAC to CPC data j transfer.

1 i

i

, ?

I I

j l

f

! i i

h I

l l

/

CEOG TS 3.3-18 Rev. -

/28/92

/ s \ ,

I O

RPS Logic and Trip Initiation fMghl} --

3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Reactor Protective System (RPS) Logic and Trip Initiation (Digital)

LCO 3.3.4 Six channels of RPS Matrix Logic, four channels of RPS Initiation Logic, [four channels of reactor trip circuit breakers (RTCBs),] and four channels of Manual Trip shall be :

OPERABLE.

k r- 5:ps u vc ct & m Lj Sc+ t- ck n e d s cj-- fr6 Tap %u H len kn s ( R.TCSSl) cond 4 buy f%:ane TCrp cH11Nort.C3lu// he OfESJ?$lE_

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODES 3, 4, and 5, with any RTCBs closed and any control element assemblies capable of being withdrawn. .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

~

g;? - . ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months This action also OPERABLE status, applies when three g Matrix Logic channels are inoperable due to a common power source

~

failure de-energizing three matrix power supplies.

One Matrix Logic ~

channel inoperable.

continued)

MEE4TH 3.3-19 7 eve OF99/28/GB--.

i

h RPS Logic and Trip Initiation .(Digi +al) 3.3 4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

.A p- -

NOTE--------- A".1 Open the affected I hour RTCBs associated with RTCBs.

one inoperable channel may be closed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months for the performance of an RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

n c1 -m One channel of An=1 Pg e+ ! % RTCBs,her cneenousc 'leitiatien Logic _

Tcer cugwrc inoperable in MODE 1 or 2.

gpE. ---------NOTE---------

eB E.1 Open all RTCBs. 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months RTCBs associated with one inoperable channel may be closed for up to I hour for the performance of an RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

One channel otyMamta+ .

g &Mh;-

T RTCBs er- pp cr e., s can JaiM at4cn mcgic-w,p cawet inoperable in MODE 3, 4, or 5.

{ 8'. -Twshannels of RTCBs,-- jK1 Open the affected Immediately arWt4ation Logit c_ RTCBs.

7affecting the same trip leg inoperable.

4 7clu4.,xch 4 (continued)

/ 4TC /s ,

cr -lpo nhnust TC P

QHiMAJ EL S kEOGSTI 3.3-20 Rev. > 09/28/92

\

]

RPS Logic and Trip Initiation @l}-

3.3.4 ACTIONS (continued) ;

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME S 0 -

,E Required Action and El Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months e associated Completion Time of Condition AgrC AND pprRnotmet. E2 Open all RTCBs. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months M D One or more Functions .

with more than one

_ Manual PTr4 r-Matti*4- - m Lcgj c, ism c R(S L c cic < d4NN:L,

[e r reasons ## "# * *'##> ]

oth than_ConditionK ^)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY :

Lc stc CH4ppFL ord)

SR 3.3.4.1 Per(.BrmaCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToneach [92] days RPSjtogMhame-ane- RTCB ch:ml .co,wrc, C

SR 3.3.4.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, [18] months including separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trips, on each RTCB.

TS If SR 3.3.4.3 Perfom a {HANNEb-RJNGT40NA6 TEST on each Once within cd e-P RPS 14anua+-Trip channel . MMBL TtIF 7 days prior to C# MP N E4f. each reactor startup ,

mCE0rc5TS = . 3.3-21 ~

HeCfi; 09/28/92

O ESFAS Instrumentation {0iglial b !

3.3.5 t

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation I (Digital) r 7p1PcMilmtss , o ob") l LCO 3.3.5 Four ESFAS j +r4p andjhypass emoval channels for each !

Function in Table 3.3.5-1 shall be OPERABLE. i APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.5-1. ;

ACTIONS -

i

NOTES------------------------------------

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each ESFAS Function.

2. If a channel is placed in bypass,-continued operation with the channel in j the bypassed condition for the Completion Time specified by Rec;uired i Action A.2 or C.2.2 shall be reviewed in accordance with ;

, Specification 5.5.1.2.e. :

I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

{

A. One or more Functions A.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one automatic bypass or trip. [

ESFAS tt49 -chartnel 7r.9 ,

C # 4 /* EL inoperable. AND j

~ ~

A.2 Restore channel to Prior to OPERABLE status, entering MODE 2 ;

following next l

MODE 5 entry ,

l (continued) d l !

i l

CEO S 3.3-22 Rev. O,/9 8/92 N- -

ESFAS Instrumentation (Bigitai)~

3.3.5 ;

i ACTIONS (continued) ;

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Functions B.1 --------NOTE---------

with two automatic LC0 3.0.4 is not ;

ESFAS trip channelsTrif ~ applicable. ;

cHa m ccs inoperable. ---------------------

j Place one channel in I hour ;

bypass and the other in trip. j i

~

e E%

C. One or more Functions C.1 Disable,fetbypass I hour with one automatic channel.

b cged;9 ypass removal channel inoperable. OR C.2.1 Place affected I hour ;

automatic -tr4ps 7eip ,

cuuyec-channel in bypass or trip.

t AND C.2.2 Restore bypass Prior to f'

'emoval channel and r entering MODE 2 associated automatic following next ,

trip channel to MODE 5 entry OPERABLE status, i

I D. One or more functions ------------NOTE------------- '

with two automatic LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. [

l

,7c, dig bypass removal channels inoperable. erredig l D.1 Disable, bypass I hour i channels. ;

OR 5 (continued) t CEOG STS 3.3-23 Rev. 28/92 )

/ j l

l

ESFAS Instrumentation _(Ditm., t 3.3.5 .

I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME j D. (continued) D.2 Place one affected I hour automatic -t+4p 794P l c Hanan chaanel in bypass and place the other in trip. !

t E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months !

associated Completion Time not met. AND ,

E.2 Be in MODE 4. [12] hours 1

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY n r45afE HSM T

~5R 3.3.5.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of each ESFAS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months !

channel. '

SR 3.3.5.2 Perfonn a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each 92 days ;

ESFAS channel, including 4 bypass removal functions. cgeghng SR 3.3.5.3 Perfonn a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of each ESFAS [18] months

channel, including pbypass removal ;

functions. J;n (continued) !

I r

l r

\/

CEE STS 3.3-24

/

0 09/28/92 t

/\ Rev. J \

ESFAS Instrumentation (Dig b i) 3.3.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.4 Verify ESF RESPONSE TIME is within limits. [18] months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.5.5 Perfonn a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 0 = d thi;r automatic bypass removal channel. 92 days p e

-ty d_ ' r n iur 4 .g u rg g .

ofcw t

i 1

1

\- 3.3-25

(

CEOKxSTS Rev. O, 9 8/92

/

i 4

ESFAS Instrumentation g Q 3.3.5 Table 3.3.5-1 (page 1 o' *)

Engineered Saf ety Features Actuation Sys e Instrisnentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS ALLOWABLE VALUE FUNCT10N 1 Safety injection Actuation Signal e2.9 1,2,3[ 5 [32441 psig

a. Containment Pressure - His

b. Pressurize- Pressure - Low ,9 f q ~ t (4763] y m {y g- g;

2. Containment Spray Actuation Signal

L M N

a. Containment Pressure - Nigh High 1,2,3[ -

5 fu on

,y mu { gr]rl h e

5Matic un w

,3. Contairvnent Isolation Actuation Signal

,2. ~7 Containment Pressure - High 1,2,3 j g

-' 3 p 2 (5U(3r%i psig ( jyp a.

b. Pressurizer Pressure - Low N ~7 g ",; p;4e .;

4. Main Steam isolation Signal MM

a. Steam Generator Pressure - Low W 1,2 ,3 # t G441-psit fyV $ fi h

b. Containment Pressure - High f p

jd pf g(c)g.) 5 43r44r} psig Q , 7] f v/3

c. W.* 6 4 4 wit +- L t u6 l- H e} *

/

) /g ) f g g, g

' /

Recirculation Actuation Sign W

a. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level - Low 1,2,3 It 17.73 and 5 19.273%

+-

6. Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal SG A1 (EFAS-1) 1,2,3 t 4A2ML b 3.Y W

a. Steam Generator Level - L ow < r ygg -

h er e - - D F ;;re 4 = Wigr re q:= cem..ter erer _ ; c, : p49_p,4;;;

b. R ca ou Gen edc+ Le acl- Ihf 1, },] $ ;}5 L 4 c/c> N A}

7. Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal SG #2 -

(EFAS-2)

a. Steam Generator Level - Low 1,2,3 2 424r.-2331t- [d1Y Io W h

--t . x m;_ri :;;m m.ca - @ -

t s as; pie re- gin p,q}-. -- _

me- c : ter rc;;c; .;

b. % Gu e4 Lex /-H:/ I, s 3 6 [gs.v% D0

/- - _ _ . _ _ .

l'

( w(a) Automatic SIAS also initiates a Containment Cooling Actuation ${gnal (CCAS).

QO The setpoint may be decreased to a a:ininsn value of 13001 psia, as pressurizer pressure is reduced, f j

g may provided the margin between pressurizer pressure and the setpoint is maintained 5 I4001 psia. Trips be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < [4001 psia. Eypass shall be automatically renoved when j pressurizer pressure is t (500) psia. The setpoint shall be automatically increased to the normal setpoint as pressurizer pressure is increased. l l

(' ) The setpoint may be decreased as steam pressure is reduced, provided the margin between steam pressure J and the setpoint is maintained 5 [2001 psig. The setpoint shall be automatically increased to the i normal setpoint as steam pressure is increased.

Containment (jl0 The Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) Function (Steam Generator Pressure -Lowj Pressure - High,pignal s) is not required to be OPERABLE when all associated valves isolated by the MSIS b Function are r osed and [de-activated) .

r

.) und %,v G eecwlev Lesel- N;S la /

\ /

3.3-26 Rev.

C1Qp'TS G9/28/92

/-

/

.%dlicllo n ESFAS Logic and Manual -T+ip -{0igital)- .

3.3.6 .

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Engineered Safety features Actuation System (ESFAS) Logic and Manual M&i9 t4W.hihdica 5 .

yc t ha' LCO 3.3.6 Six channels of ESFAS Matrix Logic, four channels of FAS '

Initiation tagic, two channels of Actuation Locic. and two channels of Manual TripMbe OPERABLE for each Functior)

~ '

~ in Table 3.3.6-1. ---

f _grp5 5 55fAJ '

L Foa9 ostccMidrit$

cHneM\j 5,dw four/srA,JA P"" :

19iTMriep e,tcu par ;

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1. f p;0,3,cws 4r cyg; ,L J psyg

! ESFo% '

j kou Fg ou TfM 7^ D tJ t S /O M -fc y 'l ACTIONS S*A* cs n$ e FAS .t, and c FAS-S, and c)u Did5CSE PMwnL Esf skrunxN,

_____________________. ___.-----------NOTE--- "### " -------------- >

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each function.

r CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-A C ____.--NOTE--------- A.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months

/

/ This action also OPERABLE status.

~A

()

applies when three ,

Matrix Logic channels j '

are inoperable due to a common power source ,

failure de-energizing i 1 three matrix power .

\ supplies.

, \ _____________.__ ..__. ,

. \ /

One or more Functions ,/

\ with one Matrix Logic __

&annel ino perable. .___ .

1 l

$ V4 , ,

[ l JK1 -4estore-thannel-to- - 40 "" ~ -

K One or more one yFunctions

with or N tiat - L;;pi =1Tt w

4 A PERABLE-status.

e

y gp i 1

_r.hann inoperable. p(un of .

/ml nc ,.chr4 f.d. -/ o c4k h /

A w ra o4:7 L cG/ <yrHgypt S i c a //

Q Of l- ~

l (continued) m iCtd (fW5 /

l 7 lA NW (W/, Net'_*l]'!'

.- -~^%- _

CEOQSTS 3.3-27 Rev. 0\

9/28/92

- x

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[

L

._. .._. - . _ _ . . . .._ . . _ _ _ . _ ____.__ __ __ ._ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ , _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . .. 1 I

i e- .-- _ . - w a h.m . . , , _ _ .

-~ =. - - - - -

_ _ _. - _ __-_m._ _ _ , _ . - - , . . , , . _ _. , . , _ _ , _ , , _ , , . . _ _ _ ,

~_~- --- .._ ._ ._.. _ _. .., _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . . .__~ . _ __ . _ . , _ , . . , . .

'!Le.r.-'= e. .swew y d.. ,,.%,_.%,,,,,,m.,,_ , , , ,y_ _,, ._,,,,,,,p.. , , ,, ,, ____ ,,, ,, _ , _ _

il - +-+ -+ *. Aw - . ___-g_. ...4wa .. . - wm --,,%__,___hwg.w,e,ehw,# , , ,, _ _,, _ _ _

* * * ' ~ =-=-- - . . - - - w.w-_ .

. .,_m. _,__-. , ,,, , , _ , _ , , , , ,

.-ia.--.---w,e._i % w - =: s .._ _-., , , , _ . , ~ . , , , , ,

& y - 2 my.vg..-w., -.-

w-

ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip {Dhii.ai) -

3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i pC ),Jh (f E< One or more Functions Jr.1 Open 4

+t-4+ast-~one- Immediately with two Logic j Initietica p' contactsin the affected trip legiof

'I. anne 4+

affectjngthesame all ESFAS -Aetuation trip leg inoperable. togics, v' k"QLo_6~ it.

AND ~ _

cH61@r c5 c 2.2 CH 6 m:cs Restore channels to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months -' J w~

)

cNibM"F$ (_ OPERABLE status.

ce naparn wa nnua; L eMupfL 5 /

g4gd:cw /6 In h

NOTE- ;-------

. ' p. -One-or-more-Ftmetions A.1

. p 4 h one Actnat4on- C One a channeHf- #cnM nep e-ccci ccl;v3/m

-Logic-channeb Achat4etHmgit n'ay

-inopereb b be bypassed for up to -

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months for - s Niff UDC ASEFA'~A Survei13ances, provided the other(hd/cisi% SM *cd F " d kj~)

of n&F 4 S o2 w ; / /,

cyd:v;ua ^ ^ ~ ~ ' '^ OPERABLE -

- d C

on e, llC 7t'l ATION L c 6 t ------------------ ,-- ~ .

W D # '

p , cy (cH(tcinT f/,7 Restore inoperable 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months 99-~)

Oc a:V e t L euc #, ~g4py,

,,ym. ,v - d." M hannel to OPERABLE

- status.

15 9

~

d.G Required Action and M.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hou'rs associated Completion G Time of Conditiont4ee MD

-; - - 4sn4einment-Spray 4 g~

['g e /M_ Actuation-Signal.,.

Steam J&olatie f.2 44ain-Be in MODE 4. [12] hours G

,Fer -signab-or-Emereency- ;

f9 i

/_FeodwaterActuation.

dI yg'p/

tv 4

5 / -Sigmrl not met.

i

/ (continued)

CJ TS 3.3-28

-N Rev - kJ9/28/92 1

1

83 6 l

t S fV ~ . . Oh f Y g,y

- .. Eke + off{icaNe $wNlIn s c>vl Seplw/ Zso hbf A J;o s & d e associa4/

sa4Jy zu3eck, , Cah:- d sp,y, .

Or Snet geec y Fe elwcky rev+<peu scl.5 nade n,yenh Ly c,e oscci<4J ;

d;vis.u ch ac ru,7 rion ce c,ic a~

i coneoscar courae t co ne iu cpen ue .

NNM .

1 5

0 6

h I

3. 3 G

/ -

/

CcpD 1770M S % fd G0 AC7?/ r lCor.fce-rtav 7/r15 f - '

- po T& -

o c dsa +iw lag 'n an hi Wg{f c3#5oeMyS Ca, /Icmnriwtcsick.wo,imy be .

tuMi, c .e did:s<w d bypasd -b up 4.t /wn f h Grae;/N+ce nelb)-/ke SF -}f e ac44 m hTfAl$770N L.Obl[ 0 $tel- divaraw g IS WERAALS.

4 Cy COMPON Cmr

~ ~ ~

i CC NTC04 Lao G(C f.dE114ey app (' cable (ed-l:eu;, p,sdidely lncremble ,. \ oud (de ,;yd .Qc+:ca 4or

$ba o55eco,- M n % ided m .n 0cvtbo:uor.os}/ve5 d din Us

.75:/csb n bb {ue G , o ao de ,

ln ofet-oblc by on i G%CCinbG:' CI '.'.;st'cu cN 0C7ttr'7NU

l. G6(C c e CCMP">FST CcOTr?c4 l c6 tc lis tfeH?bl4 -

. n H 5 Thr , byf f heup I V Muei]/ c -N.c ceafifembl.ef/pf.fje.fe -

Musup,ym/,

-eg

...'i

/

s

~

pd m F,eu

~ '

,ur-

[cuoir,'cu -- w Cndcsnew 77H5 .

i -

1 R .. Ams L,-- R 1. k hi appbcalAGdl%

MAsa cs u Hk L 4~ Mu_oe.aJacruariou

> La uialdd:n.s&R Mj_

i.osic ce cceveurccaracu -/d e a].sseerdel 5,e epy- _ _._ _

tout inopemile 18dh FeeduclenorSh%c d - - - - _ ,

sw e JLJ sy des Q ny c m e~4 _ _ . - . _ . ;

dwn . m k raey e d /< by d e ? _ . _..

. . - - - - - - assndeLoattar -

Olv'tS/op S_ Ju oj eNle,-- - . .-

AGO . . . - . .

.. h d:un,vs kweeaw c46. .

e

s. + _s. . - _ . . , - - . . .

- . .-- . .+*-- .-. . . - - - - a n., -

e' r -

we --d.-4.-_-_ . , .we.. .m., . --,___ , . ,_, , , , , _ , , ,_ _, _ , , , _, ,

. _ , - - - _.. - . , . , _ _ , _ _ _ - . . _ ~ _ . _ - -. ..

.__.e. _. . . , _ __ _ . _ . . . . . _ - . _ . _ _ _ _ > .

w e- . , - - - - + e4, .m -- - w_ _w.m.m. . e, me w,-

- - * -*-- *+-. wowew==ge.e ,w -ww. w -ws,ymem., e. i-.,.e+egrew-*a

.- .=me - i_.w- g,- .~ ..w-

ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip -(Bigi@

3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

&N

)(. Required Action and X.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s-q associated Completion /p Time of Conditions g,ND A

'@C ' Sa'etD3ectien-_ fee 0:

Actuation-Signale f.2 Be in MODE 5. 36-hours

. #r iontainment-Isolation

{ 'C3If s\. Actuation-Signal 3 h

, W -Reci rculatiron-

' gf0y A/ uActuation4ignal,_or_

p4v 2 / Jonteinment4+oHtny-at44n Signa 4 not f

,4jd'n/ .$.

/

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

- SR 3.3.6.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Testing of Actuation Logic shall include the verification of the proper operation of each initiation relay.

Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each [92]' days i ESFAS449e-channe1'y 4

7

~

/ . .

/ %

(continued)

DGIC C t/A@EL (n el m ,

q c+

n o w m a s w la,a ,, ,

CotJ rte o L asq CEO STS 3.3-29 'yA Re 09/28/92

'( \

l

gy au

-- -- l

. C A A D t-n ou ShDulOD ACT/oD__ ---- --.10H&L*71oa77k6 .

.T- - (2e uit<d kobW %. .L $ein /@DS 3 6, Ne up.$

cwd assocId ecl RNO Cn~pledin

Tim e 7.+ Be in Ho os.c [1?v3 hout-5 ;

ok Gnu (lltos $ ctC _ _ -

& csa o i-Cnd: 44 8 he Oll/5(2.5 5 M ADH el 65P /-)-cTu /IT/DD CH4/)N St- naha*l ,

I asi assoudeJ Conh hou., uJ ~

Cnpidn r;n c 12 J ca hhe8s -F)einJAJ;on 4- ass.aJaf 9 y , ,s ca a,.u.,

rn e-f { Main 56,rge/alie9 _

S d e ly m .j c dio , . .. -

0mbainm enb ._ ..

.qmy Fee l~d,ons~ep et-

)

f comm<ds. _ .

i V

ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip (Digita1F 3.3,6 i

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.6.2 g mcdAC744dT/cN 3.,.cdys4g----------NOTE--------------------

-Re exempt from testing during operation shall be tested during each MODE 5 entry toB/C a/%

geyp,vesr(cv7/0L exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months unless tested during the g o c.q c y 40 previous 6 months. f t/ s,- ty

./

Perform 5eleefive ajstrbgrou,y he r:f.g testsf- each

/

f164F-4ay n

-Acttratian Logic cisauel, winch-+neltrd

.dc energiaathf eech subgroup TeTay oud-

- verific-ahef the OPERABILITY of each Of A*o n f

-sttbgroup rcisy S e{ecEwe g&j#

SR 3.3.6.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each [18] months ESFAS Manual--Tnp-ehanneL,*9pudo /N me nc4 CHkpNFL and e d$ f DWI RSE +1rWu til Est~ '

ac 774 a v?c0 CH ANNf t . ,

b

=

/

\/

CEOGySTS 3.3-30 Rev. 0 9 28/92 x -

l

DG-LOVS 40iglial) -

3.3.7_

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7 Diesel Generator (DG)-Loss of Voltage Start (LOVS) h -

7 At-e e c us + s g 44s e LC0 3.3.7 [Fcur] cha"ach of Loss of Voltage Function and [fcur]

C##Fc) @?" ,ch of Degraded Voltage Function auto-initiation instrumentation per DG shall be OPERABLE. ,

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. .

When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, ;

" AC Sources-Shutdown."

ACTIONS

NOTES-----------------------------------_

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. ,

CMwE L. CHAwR.

2. If a -ehennel- is placed in bypass, continued operation with the-ch=d in :

the bypassed condition for the Completion Time specified by Required Action A.2 shall be reviewed in accordance with Specification 5.5.1.2.e.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l.

A. One or more Functions A. Place eDn 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one 4hannel per ypass o trip.

DG inop able.

O -

~

C/M# I . A.2 Restore channel to Prior to OPERABLE status. entering MODE 2 following next MODE 5 entry (continued) i N }

-p g -

L Co so.y is "*.L ' 1 a p lic & e _ .-

t C- - STS 3.3-32 0 92

/ Re /v.

\ I

DG-LOVS (Di 9 ital) 3 . 3 , 7..

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME N

B. One or more Functions (B.YPEnter. applicable 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months l with two ehannel rper Conditions and ,

Required Actions for DG inoperable. ,

the associated DG i c d*>vnf made inoperable by i DG-LOVS instrumentation. t s /

O_3 ,

B.gt --------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4 is not W

Place onece s..s..... . In (-,, m, no coypass ano Ine othe?v' d

~5nnel if trip.

/

C. One or more Functions C.1 hM-but--two 1 liu

.. with more than two channels to OPERABLE channels inoperable. status.

C Imediately !

,K Required Action and D.1 Enter applicable associated Completion Conditions and - -

Time not met. Required Actions for 4 the associated DG gg ;4W 4 g made inoperable by DG-LOVS instrumentation.

i

]

i i

CEOG STS 3.3-33 Rev. O, 09/28/92

5 ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip (BhMMy--

3.3.6.

Table 3.3.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Logic and Manual Trip Applicability FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES

)

1. Safety injection Actuation Signal ( S.7 AS)

a. -#st:; ;sgtt - 4.06tf M AN 1,2,3 Y

b. M ei;;i:n ;;;i: A C T6f 4 T/c # L e 6s c 1,2,3,"4

c. As.t=:icn i;r,i: Cc/4 /C #f AJT CENT /' O L M 6. t C. 1,2,3,4

d. J4 ,uo i T , ip M/1 A7 M /) L.- / Ai/714 7/cM ct/s9A//vE L 1,2,3,4 3,7. Containment Isolation Actuation Signal ( C_7 t?$)

a. -Li, 6 iMTE" L C 6/C C //44' / ' # 1,2,3 Ll y

b. '"* h !;n L;;i /)cTM /ET/e M 406 / ( 1,2,3,#4

c. a rt=: . - . uLe ;C (2

r ('t # 6NT CeAf740 6 4 CC-/ C 1,2,3,4 t

d. y s~ ^ "7 t194NH HL lN IT/ r;' ThW lV' lfDf !' l ! 1,2,3,4 ;

3 3 0ntainment Cooling Act Signal (a)

s. Initiation Logic 1,2,3,4 !

b. Actuation Logic 1,2,3,4 f

c. Manual Trip 1,2,3,4 !

4. Recircu'.ation Actuation Signal i

a. Matrix Logic 1,2,3

b. Initiation Logic 1,2,3,4

c. Actuation Logic 1,2,3,4 i

d. Manual Trip - _ 1,2J/, l f

l g j . fContainment Spray Actuation Signa ( C S AS)

a. -N i.,a ivw ir 4 cs6 /C C///7# # T C 1,2,3, '/ $

b. M 2 at, ,, Lugic {iC Tmq Tr op L o& /C 1,2,3', Vy l

c. *:t =:::n ;..w 1,2,3 C OM[cMFNT Co A./TFc L 4 C6IC '

d. ";na; h ;Y fiAWHAL JH/T/A T/td CfldNNF L. '

E*3) W

, Arf Main Steam Isolation Signal (HSIS)

a. Jtau4n44Hpie-- 4 06 /C C // 4#NFL 1,2,3, '/ .

b. Jni44et4endegic jhru ff 7nw cf.f,pppc L 1,2,3 4/

- "'"*"N' C 0/1 fCNG+1T CcATROL 6 0 C, ll 1,2.$ 4 '

b1ANdQL /N/7 JA71c& Cjy'sf/Pf L * */

g ,,,,Z Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal SG #1 (EFAS-1)

a. W , - Logie - L o 6IC C}/ GNA/ F L- 1,2,3

b. Wttuion Logie- j9CTJ /FT,M g.:64C 1,2,3 ,

C- ( WC' MfN T C c NT4 e L L e (,4 C 1,2,3 A'4*' i i v". i vviC '

W/M4AL INIT~tATHD Cit'4f!FL

,4 Emergency feedwater Actuation Signal SG #2 (EFAS-2) ,

e. ::ri- L:S e--i L o 6/C C //W#F/- 1,2,3

b. . W tia;; s. L. ,;c /7CTLtd 7tCA /-O &ll 2 1,2,3

4. o c / C 1,2,3

c. .Aewi ; .. , i.s k -- rma rcM r# T CtN T/ 0 4 1,2,3

d. Manuat-ir,p -- )qpgjqg c jp) I T /4 TitA) O l h St Os') I

.s

/ -

(a) Automatic $1 AS also initiates CCAS. -

(b) Automatic S]AS also required for automatic CSAS initiation. )

~

frW 79 (J es 4A C s g y ce,qc, a h 4

- per a ri:e {}J k CJiOG-STS v, oO. a a u,- w 3.3-31 # Rev. 28/9 I l

_ _ _ - x 5

a l

i DG-LOVS (Digital) !

3.3.7 i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ,

x ,

a 3 SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s- l

?

6 SR 3.3.7,11 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. [92] days l

1 SR 3.3.7.y7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint [18] months Allowable Values as follows: <

a. Degraded Voltage Function a [ 18 ] V and s [ V

Time delay: a[ ] seconds and ,

s[ ] seconds at [ ] V; and ,

3 b. Loss of ltage Function a [ 18 ] V and 5 22 ] V :

Time delay: a[ ] seconds and 5 [ ] seconds at [ ] V. ,

I

{

i l

r

, CEOG STS 3.3-34 Rev. O, 09/28/92

@ \

3.3.Y !

i

v Y , t f f _ _

i A dsE // f// a. $ _

b no m 3 A l s n:.. p ;**y h j a n I,K .a.22=L.. ALE.A_aexxam i and .

(Wrw .'.* l hao ES l,f E -. -- - - - - - - _ - - . - - .. -

. _3 _ =- ._=. ;_. - .

_ -n - - - .

. C7.O Im' - -.

Ad&2: AF0~ _ ~_

_<gd 'i :2*^

. >c si T C . hf$ ( *L

,, _ J.Us Y.',> -- '3 . . - . - - - - . -

cwavecsige4/.e( i ._ -_

l. ~

1

. 8 fz . La at/ cj/iersiset s , . 2/ c.ti,. .

. . ,,5 ??W/!.C j &_.. i

- f-- . -~ - . _ . .

._ gp,. . - ,

f .

p"*1 ,. pm,c

x,_

J pM.,he . g' . /

j ossoces/*

h'

. O 'a W .,

f LL4 S . . ._ _ _ .

$_ _ ,_ . - . _ . . . . _ . . i

, O

~ 7 1 Yn e a 'r .. .. -.

. Cono' din A -- --_ _ - -

__-- - +- .-

n d e_ ed, ._ _ _ - _ _ _ _

t. - . - - - -. .--.

l 1

\

j l 4

)

! )

s.-W.

.m.

J ue 24swww g cua ,g,,,__ ._ ;

l

N$0 . -_.-j-..

HN%wanck.~ , .ff:dGlVavr,(

e , ,

a M E-MCuf C Mrpt chaudf J /T ~%50nl ,h4 >M y fjhpypt_cjjggg_c4mb gy NO ...Y' X K,.2--.-- _ } x_Wppgahyr, y, ,

9g l+

Poch h *aZpaatf (/f~l.}

e p ,, .' / O b -~'"sY' ] f~ ~ ~ OsV/WGl C4~ ///g/;79 _

---. ~ . . - - _ . . -

l

+.

l l

1 1

l 1

..._ - gE., s_%, .... -

$d-$Z/LgXJi,a$8 -

Y l b . 4,

- - - . - - - b ZZ W 0TilI$-

cop piric/) s

--.- ~ ._.-

_. cPEc o fi E D --

..>.----.. ..-,---__w,, . - .- ,- w- e w- .-%._ _ , . , _ .u..,. ., _ - . _ ,,

-A?~A r p - -.- - . _ _ - -. .

uwd j ce .- Lf;3fgh_--_

d J= iffs - - -

j

?. # n (7_cM ..2.. . _ _ _ _,._

..( _E _ __ _ .._ _ _ . _ __ _ _ --

N _. h .L h I 44 Air . _ . -

v. 5.A~ S y a a M. !

. 68A 79m ..

j

. e^^' -

w. -m s~

. am, _ .i--n . . _.

>._e. - -- ---_r.,a- ,%ge-we-m--..-..,--ww e- - ,. - ~e, .,,...%.__.,,, ...,__,i.,,4- , . ,, .

_.m -

+egne +4 ,ow-% -..-,er--i.,--i,-.ee -

..e, h., ms..-i,a 4.,m__... ,._,,m. ,.,, ..mg,,,,, ,.,,,,,a m.

---.. .c .-a-m.__.. - . -a,

-- w-* ww--,.g,.. --m-=,mme-_, -. , e- e .- ,._.. . ~ g ,,,,emwg .%_q,. ,,, _ , ,,_m,_ .-

-",---+---w- + - - . ----+-+_,,w-.g% .m, . m._ , _ , _.,

_ _ , .--. . _ - . . ~ _ -.

e*- -*e+- w- .- a> -- .. -e,--- *m.=.---_see,.+-.~ ---essem- .imum.,

_ _.. ._ . ,.4 _,,,,__.,_,_.,,,_,,__.,_.,,,m,,,.m.. _

+,---.im- -18. .~.e -

w_. . _ A, .+- -,,... , , -- m. ,.,..m,m,aimm.. ,,m,- i_,._ , m . , ,a p.,

E CRIS (OlgitSIL__

3.3.9 t

t 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION fdakel/p;Jhdh" F 3.3.9 Control Room 1seletis Signal (CRIS) -(Bigitai) ~

'Two F d vwien .

LCO 3.3.9 -One CRIS channe' shall be OPERABLE. -

4 ,

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3,[{ d 5, and ,

During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

i ACTIONS :

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l i

Ow e p j;m;e n flace d;olsin M eswaI lk A.

CRIS Manual-Tr4 Pr A.1 --

NOTE---------

Actuation Logic, or Pla e Control Room y

--[ene u. n ore-requi red ~ Emerg,ency Air Cleandp channels of Systeg(CREACSJAn

- parti culate/4cdi ne --or- toxic s protection gaseous] radistiinr - mode if utomatic

_monitses-inoperable in tranyf to toxic gas MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. protection ode fnoperable.

~

/ g

-N ace-one-CREACS- hour-

, train in-emergency-ndiation protection mode.

AuD pgd c.dAyW N.

A.) (?vsha fi+s;~lo OpsfNti 1/d s racD p op pf a -b l/ @t w ,

g eu.<

C f(g' Required Action and B'1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met. C

,B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

\x rwa cftFS d:ssia s

~uf ~^'"' , , - u , -

heresul/c in nooE ,yy / % _g/y4 g, ;j,

/ 3, 4 '

I

$$ /$ < in Mode.?

(( kgu15 iwo GdL B < .% nc<le r 36 h*"& S CEOMTS M9 % 8/92 i

CRIS (,0fzpitrt7 3.3.9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

fM >V F c];v;ricxs (5-g,G., CRI,S Manual Trip,

^c u_t wn magic, cr -

E.1

-P

-g/jN---- -7g r nw in cux %

-r+ quired part+etthitr/ _ gas _prateetion .Ticde--

f_. _ _

7~

indine or + secus - if-autematic Li ende ./ 1 Sadi4t40C mCn'sivss-- tO -tGKiC-$ C

/ s .-

.prntw+ ion mode- yy inoperablej'inMODES or 67, during CORE f

_inoperabl e y, cpu - d >y f f

- j ALTERATIONS, or durin ---------------------

movement of irradiate'd _

fuel assemblies. Tace one CREACS ImmediaW train in emergency radiation protection mode.

0,_R 5.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately

/- irradiated fuel 7 N assemblies.

[-- /UOTE - -N -

[ /ew by fan clcav/n5 m p g.2.2 M M w as .ff /hM Suspend positive ,

reactivity additions.

Immediately In n ; ]$

___. - ~ -

AND w - .2.3 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. _

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ,

1 nasacrarw at, SR 3.3.9.1 Perform a< CHANNEL CHECK on the C . J 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months control r'oom radiation monitor,

(' ///WA FC-5 I l

(continued) l CEd&$'S 3.3-40 Rev. 0 09/7

- x

$ $.f !

fised O @

awoim- ; gse01nw adwzarcei

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lnopenba ju Mc0E F now l l on & !

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. L l

l 1

--.________._l l

@'. l CRJS '-(Digi-tal-)--- l 9 j c n each cRTFS bo6K cMpp:: L, .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Jcontinued) i !

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY v k :

SR 3.3.9.2 Perform a CHANSEL FUNCTIONAL TES e [92] days

.y =';-4. 25;7 4 .

p 'T4 '

erify CRIS high radiatio setpoint ;

Allowable Value] is s [ E cpm above !

g normal background, j i

i p7u ATd'mc SR 3.3.9.3 -------------------NOT -----------------

1. Surveillance ofg uaticr. Logic shall .

include the verification of the proper i operation of each A wby -m' 'tt'et'f (eley- e

2. YekNassociatedwithplantequipment ]

that cannot be operated during plant !

operation are required to be tested i during each MODE 5 entry exceeding i 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months unless tested within the l previous 6 months.

l d

( ______________ ________________________

[18] months y,- -

SR 3.3.9.4 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on required [18] months CRIS radiation monitor chenm@ cr//lavrcs, -

(

SR 3.3.9.5 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on [18] mon {lis required CRIS Manual Trip channel, w _

/px j

SR 3.3.9.6 Verify that response time of required CRIS d;g;sts-.channe4 is within limits. 4

[18] months ( >

E _t i

- l

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CEy4TS 3.3-41 Rev. O, /28/92

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i PAMb-ru:^r.tatica -(Digit &l) t 3.3.11 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION '

k.

3.3.11 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM Instrumentation (Digital &( f/7H1 LCO 3.3.11 S (

The PAM :r.strs=crtatic-n for each Function in Table 3.3.11-1 ;

shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS i

NOTES------------------------------------

1. LCO 3.0.4 not applicable.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each function. :

____ ......____ .________________..____...._-- ____________-__...___..________ i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Restore required 30 days with one required channel to OPERABLE channel inoperable. status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action in Immediately associated Completion accordance with ,

Time of Condition A Specification -

t not met. 5.9.2.c. i i

I C. ---------NOTE--------- C.1 Restore one channel 7 days Not applicable to to OPERABLE status. l ce AMhydrogen-moni-torc.n..d 4 w l channels. l 1

l One or more Functions with two required channels inoperable.

1 I

(Continued)

CE TS 3.3-44 09/28/92 Rev /.

/\ -

~

h i PAM g instrumentstien (Digitoi)-

3.3.11 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ccA=:w <d cc a <dHh*k Cdca~eb .

D. Twoj hydrogengmen+ tor-. D.1 Restore onejhydrogen 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months l' channels inoperable, coceld,9 monitor-channel to OPERABLE status. ,

l E. Required Action and E.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition C Table 3.3.11-1 for l or D not met. the channel.

F. As required by F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i Required Action E.1 and referenced in AND Table 3.3.11-1. !

F.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months m

o G. As required by G.1 Initiate action in Immediately 7

, Required Action E.1 accordance with g

and referenced in Specification .

> Table 3.3.11-1. 5.9.2.c. ,

T ,

i l

l l

CEOG t 3.3-45 Rev. O, /28/92

3 -

PAM Instrumentation {0igital)---

3.3.11 P

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

_---_----_.-_-_-_.---_-_______-__---NOTE-------------------------------------

These SRs apply to each PAHHestiwnent&t4ea Function in Table 3.3.11-1. -

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY M54sdcHf+'t' SR 3.3.11.1 Perform, CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days

u. . - ~ r4 M +rumentetica-channeJ9that is normally y nergized. i c/d ;

SR 3.3.11.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. [18] months .

i t

1 6

CEOS STS 3.3-46 Rev. v, ./28/92 '

[

r.

s Y PAM Instrumentation -{Digiu1}-

d 3.3.11 Table 3.3.11-1 (page 1 of 1)

Post Accident Monitoring Instrunentation

, CONDITIONS REFERENCCD FRON REQUIRED FUNCTION REQUIRED CHANNELS ACTION D.1

1. dude-Genge} Neutron Flux few er- L e s<"[ ~ 2 F M /t f (N f _)

2. Reactor Coolant 4jgea ;;a u;ATenperaturelT-kel)Mefg^ 2 per loop F

% l<t-

3. Reactor Coolant r, 3^-"tetTg Temperature (Tu/.l) v a k 2 per loop F

4. Reactor Coolant System Pressure ' ide i 62 4 idf) 2 F Cocla.4

5. Reactorvesselwaargevet 2 -M}--- P

6. w ni m s ~ nter L:"c' 'uid: ::m:) Cur ltr(L;jyLe vel 2 F

7. Containment Pressure eMr r:n;ea. ( go f) 2 F

( t# ) l>

1perva]lve(s)

8. Containment Isolation valve Position ,

9. Containment Area Radiation 6;#, ws; - 2 g}- f:-

10. Containment Hydrogen ":n%:r:-(pr mbiie h 2 F adakt* r-

11. PressurizergLevei , 2 F

( S C-)

12. steam GeneratoF, Water Level W da r ang*2. (LO C) 2 per steam generator F

13. M R h h giank ' [wcmun Level FrctLsafersic*b.e. 2 per b /,s F

14. Core Exit Tenperature -Quadrant til [2(b ,

15. Core Exit Tceperature-Quadrant [2] [2(b)] ,

_ , 16. Core Fxit Tenperature -Quadrant [3] [2(b] ,

17. Core Exit Tenperature-Quadrant [4] [2(b)] ,

B. Ja. -, M aes F. r .Nec,a 6c.rw]g fgg gj g 2 F 1

(a) Not required for isolation valves whose essociated penetration is isolated by at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. j (b) A channel consists of two or more core exit thernocouples. c. ote: Table 3.3.11 1 shall be amefded for each mit as necessary to list: ~ . (1) all Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type A instrunents, and y ! (2) all Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 1, non-Type A instrunents specified in the unit's Regulatory I Guide 1.97 Safety Evaluation Report. l

19. Deyce of Gbeel:q ;z (c)

      ?c.       Pe;~, cm k d ci-Q rA;d, t cm                                       a                        p
 ,, 7,              3
 -lpf         C
                       /
           \/                                                                                       \

CEQG<STS 3.3-47 Rev. 4 /28/92

      /                                                                                            /\                        l

J Au

9. 5.//

pSeMC g

  .. ~..    .----a eseem-=*m-o-                    .-       -eme       ,                    _

ca as rngeA s eeA c /s x/d regeu.Jare (T-c N){t tode a e, 12eac L Glaaf ou+/e+ ie-penk (y7=hd) wde A g as J Puume L.sure(#4amy, 9 M.d e,Po9e, m J Lw % e.). S

b e

I MmA-w'- -+w- a,mmes, - e,

-w      f l
  "*M-                                          me n ..

l RS 3C - Demnte--Shtttdown System @igi Loi) 3.3.12- ! 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.12 Remote Shutdown Sysics (Digital)-- Dsbedc[/e ecl(M./5 (gEZc)

S clm w cklim e d lei b n l5 LC0 3.3.12 The Remote Shutdown g System-Functions in Table 3.3.12-1 shall- , be OPERABLE u APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. , ACTIONS

 -------------------------------------NOTES------------------------------------

1. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. ,

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f r A. One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days Functions inoperable. Functions to OPERABLE status. i, s B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. [12] hours CEOG STS 3.3-48 Rev. O, 09/28/92

Remote Shutdown System (Digital) 3.3.1,2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

     ,4                      pCASUORA ff' T
       $R3.3.12.1   Perform CHANNEL CHE , for each required                31 days
    /)                *brumentation c.,a             that is normally                          1
                                                 ~y C  ,

energized. r-- w p e-y M - SR 3.3.12.2 Verify each required control circuit and [18] months transfer switch is capable of performing the intended function. SR 3.3.12.3 ------------_------NOTE-------------------- Neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Perfom CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each [18] months , requiredginstrumentation channe]. y c/>su ggM wT c (McDEL. t f SR 3.3.12.4 Perfom CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the 18 months reactor trip circuit breaker open/ closed indication. ; 1 l 4 CEOG STS 3.3-49 Rev. O, 09/28/92 i

                                                                                                                                          %     l CESSAR nin"icui:n                                                                                                       J QEV                                                                                          ,
                                                                                                                                               ),

R g (. -RSMi-3.3.13-/A i tr- l

                 /                                     TABLE 3.3.1X-1                                                                          l
             /                                            (Sheet 1 of 3)
                                                                                                 /100 CwTtcL 6
         )l Y 57                          REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITOL';G INSTRUMENTATIO l-jl66                                                                                                                   -    MqwLED i                                                                                 W          pwBM .
         ,y             7 u MTIod/                                                                                  -MINIMUM         , g ,o,
   /4     y             INSTRUMENT CR                                                                               CHANNEts-         cg,pfq .

Qh -- cwrcoL F404en Tr4-

                      ;U a m m . s A
                                                                             ).           'rfd                       OPERABLE

{

     $              Neutron Loganthmic Power
                                                       >                  75 4                               r

[ ] j f Hot / Cold leg Temperature /4 2 ' [ ] - Pressurizer Pressure aP [ ] .i Pressurizer Level - [ ] -i Pressurizer RCGV Valve Positions f [ ] ; Steam Generator No.1 Pressure Rjp.. > [ ] Steam Generator No.1 Ievel 'ECF [ ] ! . Steam Generator No. 2 Pressure [ ] g p Steam Generator No. 2 level g.-7 [ ] CVCS Charging Flow l agp- [ ] CVCS Charging Pressure Boric Acid Storage Tank Level p ,p [ ] e, [ ] ; In-Contabent Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) level [ ] ! SIS Pump No. 3,4 Discharge flow [ ] ; y SIS Pump No. 3,4 Discharge Header Pressure [ ] g pg p ;

EFW Motor-Driven Pump 1 Discharge Pressure 9 -[ ] ,

2 EFW Motor-Driven Pump 2 Discharge Pressure [ ] ' EFW Steam-Driven Pump i Discharge Pressure N" [ ] ; EFW Steam-Driven Pump 2 Discharge Pressure p. [ ] EFW Motor Driven Pump 1 Suction Pressure r.nd Low Pressure Alann ~

                                                                                                     .p                 [ ]

EFW Motor-Driven Pump 2 Suction Pressure and Low Pressure Alarm c [ ] j EFW Steam-Driven Pump 1 Suction Pressure and Low Fressure Alarm - p ,p

[ ] l EFW Steam-Driven Pump 2 Suction Pressure and lew Pressure Alarm RS/ [ ] , EFW Steam-Driven Pump Turbine ! Inlet Pressure [ ] l EFW Steam-Driven Pump Turbine 2 Inlet Pressure EFW Motor-Driven Pump 1 Flow [, [ [

                                                                                                                          ]
                                                                                                                          ]                    i j

EFW Motor-Driven Pump 2 Flow [ ] 1 i EFW Steam-Driven Pump 1 Flow [ ] EFW Steam-Driven Pump 2 Flow p [ ] EFW Motor-Driven Pump 1 Recirculation Flow [ ] EFW Motor-Driven Pump 2 Recirculation Flow p [ ] SYSTEM S0+ 3.3-45 i Amendment ! 16.6-45 December 21,1990 1 1

CESSAR ESAibmu 3

                                                          ']D
                                                                                             /2 5 I c        1twr 3.3.11A A

TABLE 3.3.17-1 (Cont'd) (Sheet 2 of 3) g REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITeRWG INSTRUMENTATION 7

f. ---- -

OWfh FutJ l T70Af. -MINtMUM tJUV INSTRUMENT GHANNELS OF gg/ m twitcu PaSancrrA.- hp'uf OPERABtL~ ,g e us- m ro -, o w + ~-a A s [ EFW Steam-Driven Pump i Recirculation Flow / [ ] EFW Steam-Driven Pump 2 Recirculation Flow B [ ] EFW Storage Tank I Level and Low Alarm ssp [ ] EFW Storage Tank 2 level and Low Alarm f,p [ ] EFW Steam-Driven Pump 1 Turbine Speed ,ep [ ] EFW Steam-Driven Pump 2 Turbine Speed p,p [ ] EFW Turbine Trip and throttle (Stop) Valves [1 & 2] Open/Close Position and Close Position Alarm W [ ] EOP Instrumentation

                 'J1timate Heat Sink Status Indication                                           y Sp      [  ]

Emergency Diesel Generator Status Indication [ ] NSSS Controls ' p(j Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Pushbuttons p [ ] Backup beater Groups 1 and 2 Controls grp [ ] Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve and ADV Block Valves .r - [ ] Pressunzer Auxiliary Spray Valve Controls aP [ ] Pressurizer RCGV Valves crc-wo j Ai-w3 q (- vf3 g. r -w3 , [ ] Charging Pump Controls ,sp [ ] Letdown Isolation Valve Controls [ ] K Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Bleedoff Valve (cdkls [ ] SIS Pump No. 3 & 4 Controls [ ] SIS Header No. 3 & 4 Valve Controls g(,y p [ ]

            'YMSIS Actuation Switches                                                                      [  ]

EFW Motor Driven Pump 1 Controls [ ] j EFW Motor Driven Pump 2 Controls yrg' ' [ ]

/                EFW Steam Driven Pump 1 Controls EFW Steam Driven Pump 2 Controls (f        [ ]

[ ] EFW Steam Generator Isolation Valves [EF-100, EF-101, EF-102, EF-103] r [ ] ; EFW Flow Control Valves [EF-104, EF-105, EF-106, EF-107] .p [ ] EFW Steam Supply Bypass Valves (EF-112, EF-113] A- [ ] EFW Steam Supply Isolation Valves [EF-108, EF-109] / j' s p 1 [ ] s SYSTEM 80+ 3.3-46

  \       t
    \

Amendment K 16.6-46 October 30,1992

             %  se          i D       .1 -   .      <   -L/ -                  bJ                            -

C E S S A R E!stricuiu g7 'f WV {it& RSrc -RSMI-3.3.){/A A TABLE 3.3.lf-1 (Cont'd) (Sheet 3 of 3) A PD C w7t et 5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONRGENG INSTRUMENTATION

                                                                                          -/
                                                                                                 &             O        h FuNc 77eo/                                                              -MINIMUM           (WM INSTRUMENT                                                                                       F M ELS-             .O    g cc (cu rccc. /Mem 7r/L                                               Ayf4 , OPERABLE              D      c1 NSSS Controls (continued)

EFW Turbine Trip and Hrottle (Stop) Valves [1 & 21 Trip / Reset Controll ( . p [ ] EFW Turbine [I & 2] Speed Control i iP [ ] BOP Controls Ultimate Heat Sink Controls [ ]

~~

dnstmmentation N, P' rizer Pressure Variable Setpoints [ # Steam erator Pressure Variable Setpoints ] Shutdown g System Suction isolation Valve Interlock Status [ ]

 .            Safety injectio        (SIT) Pressure                                              [  ]
          ! SCS Pump Flow                                                                        [  ]

i Shutdown Cooli- that ger Differential Temper 1ture [ ] 3 [ Controls I Steam Generator Pressure Setpoin (eseV

                                                           /                                     [  ]

lK ( Pressurizer Pressure Setpoint Reseted{}perating Bypass [ ] l SCS Pumps -[ ] j SIT Vent Valves [ ] SIT Isolation Valves [ ] j Shutdown Coo ' g Header Valves [ 1 . Shutdown ling Heat Exchanger Flow Control Valves [. ] 1 Shutdown Cooling Warm-up Bypass Valves [ ] Shutdown Cooling Suction Line Valves [ ]

             )sfIutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Bypass Flow ControlValves                        .[  ]

( s K SYSTEM S0+ 3.3-47 Amendment K 16.6-47 October 30,1992

              $                                                                    Remote Shutdown System (Digital)                   i d1                                                                                                                3.3.12      '

hY ' Table 3.3.12-1 (page 1 of 1) Remote Shutdown System Instrtsnentation ard Controls

         ................. ................................. NOTE------------------ ---~~------ ~~**- --- --..........

ThistableisforItustrationpurposesonly. It does not attenpt to encorrpass every Functi used at every unit, but does conts' the types of Ftnctions conenonly found. , FUNCTION /INSTRUMlliT f fEQUIRED f; ORCONTROLPARAMETfj NUp)8ER OF DIVISIONS i

1. Reactivity controt !

a. Log Power [1] l Neutron Flux ,

b. Source Range [1] ,

Neutron Flux : i

c. Reactor Trip Circuit Il per trip breaker) l Breaker Position

d. Manual Reactor Trip I4] !

2. Reactor Coolant System l Pressure Control ,

s. Pressurizer Pressure [1] [

or ! RCS Wide Range Pressure \ !

b. Pressurizer Power '

                                                                       /                      [1, controts must be f or power Operated Relief Valve                                                  operated relief valve and block         6 Control and Block Valve                                                       valves on same line]             l Control                                                                                                        !

3. Decay Heat Removal (via steam Generators) g [

a. Reacter Coolant

                      ;iot Leg Temperature
                                               /                                    k                    (1 per loop)                I
                                                                                                                                   '( .

b. Reactor Coolant .

It per loop 3 f Cold Leg Tempera re [

c. Auxiliary Feedwater [1] .

i Controls / .

d. Steam G

rator Pressure (1 per steam generator} !

e. Steam enerator Level 1 per steam generator) !

or Aux) lary feedwater flow i

                          /                                                                                                          !

f. p6ndensateStorageTank [1] ,

evel , , 4. JteactorCoolantSystem ; Inventory Control ; e

a. Pressurizer Level (1

b. Reactor Coolant Charging It)

      /               Pump Controls
                                                                                                                                        )

4 s CEOG STS 3.3-50 Rev. O, 09/28/92 s

 - ~                                                   - - - - --- -                    -r ,

flogarithmic['t Power Monitoring Channels Wgiij-3.3.13 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION , 3.3.13 flogarithmicf Power Monitoring Channels 8 LCO 3.3.13 Two channels of [ logarithmic] power level monitoring instrumentation shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor trip circuit breakers open or Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drive System not capable of CEA withdrawal. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Suspend all Immediately channels inoperable. operations involving ' positive reactivity additions. AND - A.2 Perform SDM 4 hours verification in accordance with AND ; SR 3.1.1.1, i f T,, > 200*F, or Once per SR,3.1.2.1, if 12 hours , T,,, :s 200* F. thereafter

TS 3.3-51 Rev. /92 [

v dl

i flogarithmic{ Power Honitoring Channels 40i31224t -- ! 3.3.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY , tw&SuCFPfEs)l SR 3.3.13.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.13.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. [92] days SR 3.3.13.3 -------------------NOTE-------------------- Neutron detactors are excluded from i CHANNEL CALABRATION. . Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. [18] months

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m 3 FAX TO: Adel El-Bassioni USNRC - NRR Mail Stop 10E4 Phone (301)504-1094 Fax (301)504-2260 FROM: David Finnicum i ABB-CE Phone (203)285-3926 Fax (203)285-5881 XC: J. J. Herbst (w/o) , R. E. Jaquith (w/o) F. L. Carpentino T. K. Samuels J. Iengo Jr. S' E. Ritterbusch - 9424 Files 9612 files DATE: October 22,1993 ' NUMBER: OPS-93-0835 1

SUBJECT:

Transmittal in Information on SGTR Report in Response to Fax of October 22. 1993 i t In your fax of October 22, you requested that ABB-CE provide you with information related to the SGTR report. The following provides the requested information or a reference to the appropriate section of the SGTR report. If you have any additional questions, please call me , at (203)285-3926. page 1 of 4 1 i I

i e Question 1: Differences between System 80 and System 80+. , Response 1: Section Section 2.1 of the SGTR repon starting on page 2-1 ; Question 2: Identify the scenarios that could challenge the MSSVs. Response 2: The attached table lists the events that challeng the MSSVs and their associated single failures. Note that if the single failures do not occur for the events, th MSSVs probably will not be challenged. ! Question 3: The core damage frequency for System 80 and System 80+. ; Response 3: The core damage frequency for System 80, as calculated in the " Baseline < Level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment For The System 80 NSSS Design" is 8.1E-05 per year. The System 80+ core damage frequency as presented in i Section 19 of CESSAR-DC is 1.7E-06 per year. For System 80, the core damage frequency attributable to SGTR is 1.lE-05 per year. For System 80+, the core damage frequency contribution due to SGTR is 3.0E-07 per t year. This information can be found in table 19.15.2-1 in CESSAR-DC. Question 4: Timing of challenges to the MSSVs. Response 4: See table 4.3.0-1 in the SGTR Report. Question 5: Options available to mitigate challenges. ; Response 5: Table 1.3-1 of the SGTR report presents a list of the options. These options are summarized in section 2 of the repon. Detailed discussions of each option . are also presented in section 3 of the report. Question 6: Assumed frequency of a single tube rupture and multiple (5) tubes. 3 Response 6: The frequency used for a single tube rupture was 4.5E-03 per year. this value ! was derived from the EPRI ALWR PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules. Multiple tube ruptures (5) were assumed to be significantly less likely than a : single tube rupture. The conditional probability of multiple tube ruptures was _ not quantified, but, consistent with discussions with Nick Saltos, we assume it is probably in the range of 1.0E-2.

Question 7: Challenge rate (conditional probability) to MSSVs following 1 tube vs 5 tubes. Response 7: If the Turbine Bypass System (TBS) fails, the probability of challenging the ! MSSVs is 1.0 for both I tube and 5 tubes. The failure rate for the TBS is i about 1.0E-04 per demand. If the TBS operates for a single tube rupture, the ' MSSVs will not be challenged for a minimum of 3 hours, even if the operators take no action. For a 5 tube multiple tube rupture event with the TBS operating, the operators must take action within about 30 minutes to , either throttle the FPSI pumps, initiate the RDS for RCS depressurization or . establish secondary side level and pressure control. No specific operator error i rates were calculated for the five tube case because the probability calculations in the report are based on deltas and not absolute probabilities. ! Question 8: Type of significant improvements. Response 8: This information is summarized in table 2-1 of the report. ! I b 6 4 I

                                                                                                  'i i

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n. DESIGN BASIS TRANSIENTS AND ACCIDENTS THAT RESULT IN MSSV OPENING T_R.ANSIENT SINGLE FAILURES LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM (No Cutback, No Bypass)

TURBINE TRIP (Loss of Offsite Power, LOOP) FEEDWATER LINE BREAK (LOOP) LOOP (No TG Runback to House Load) SGTR (LOOP, No Aux Spray) LOSS OF FEEDWATER (LOOP) LOCKED RCP ROTOR (LOOP, No TG Runback) CEA WITHDRAWAL (LOOP) CEA EJECTION (LOOP) PLCS MALFUNCTION (LOOP) SB LOCA (LOOP) CLOSURE OF ALL MSIVs ---

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CESSAR-DC CHANGES

SUMMARY

t I i NRC Ooen Items CESSAR Resolution 10.2-2 Pg.10.2-11, Paragraph D. 10.2-3 Pg.10.2-11, New Section 10.2.3.2 10.2-5 Pg.10.2-15, Paragraphs B and C 10.2-6 Pg.10.2-15, Paragraphs B and C Question #8, subj. SCC Pg.10.2-11, New Section 10.2.3.4 NRC Telecopy dated September 15, 1993 NRC Questions from marked-up SRP: Section 1. Materials Selection Pg.10.2-11 Insert B Section 2. Fracture Toughness Pg.10.2-11 Insert C Section 3. Preservice Inspection Pg.10.2-15 Insert E , Section 4. Turbine Disk Design Pg.10.2-11, New Section 10.2.3.3 Section 5. Inservice Inspection Pg.10.2-16 Insert "F"

Additional NRC Questions: ;

1. Upset ratios Pg.10.2-11 Insert B L

2. Lubricant prohibition Pg.10.2-11 Insert B 1

I l PO5D105.B75

CESSAR naincmou 10.2 TURBINE GENERATOR 10.2.1 DESIGH BASES The turbine generator converts the energy of the steam produced in the steam generators into mechanical shaft power and then into electrical energy. The turbine generator is capable of a 30% l step load change with a following 2%/ min. load gradient in the loading mode of operation and a 15% in step load change the unloading withof mode a following 1%/ min. load gradient operation. emergency, and Turbine generator functions under normal, upset, faulted conditions are monitored and controlled automatically The by the turbine control system described in Section 10.2.2. control system includes redundant mechanical and electrical trip devices to prevent excessive overspeed of the turbine generator. Additional external trips are provided to prevent damage to the , yCY turbine generator.

      'The Megawatt Demand Setter interfaces with the turbine control M         system to control the loading of the generator as described in
'f       Section 7.7.

The COL applicant will ensure that the selection of the turbine valve operation time meets the turbine valves closing / trip criteria. 10.2.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION I The turbine generator consists of a double-flow, high-pressurea turbine and three double-flow low pressure turbines -driving direct-coupled generator. The flow of main steam is directed from the steam generators to the high-pressure turbine through stop valves and control valves. l After expanding through the high-pressure turbine, exhaust steam ' passes through in-line high velocity moisture separators and in-line two stage steam reheaters. Extraction from the high-pressure turbine and main andsteam secondfrom thereheater stage equalization tube header is bundle in supplied to the firstReheated steam is admitted to the low pressure each reheater. turbines through intercept control and stop valves and expands through the low-pressure turbines to the mairi condensers. I Bleed steam for the feedwater heating is provided from the turbine casing or turbine piping. Extraction steam piping is . constructed of low alloy chromium-molybdenum steel or equivalent ' for erosion / corrosion resistance. Amendment Q June 30, 1993 10.2-1

CESSAR niac-The source of extraction steam for each stage of feedwater heating is presented below: Heater Stage in Condensate /Feedvater Stream Extract 12n_fource Hester # 7 H-P turbine 1st Point H-P turbine 6 2nd Point Deaerator H-P turbine exhaust 3rd Point L-P turbine 4 4th Point L-P turbine 3 4th Point L-P turbine 2 6th Point L-P turbine 1 7th Point higher pressure extraction lines are Provided in the valves and spring-closed non-return check piston-assist, The piston-assist, spring-closed extraction line block valves. actuators are designed to overcome friction and allow the valves to close rapidly on turbine trip. These non-return check valves are capable of closing within a time period to maintain stable turbine speeds in the event of a turbine generator system trip. The four low pressure heaters and their associated Because ofextraction this, the lines are located in the condenser neck. extraction lines would be installation of valves in the impractical. Therefore, the extraction lines to the 4th and 5th point heaters are routed outside the condensar neck in order to -- locate power assisted non-return valves and extraction line block valves similar to the high pressure heaters. Because of the low energy levels of the entrained fluid in the two lowest pressure heaters (6th and 7th point heaters) non return and block valves are not required to prevent overspeed and water induction. However, the low-pressure heaters are provided with anti-flash baffle plates located inside the heaters. The LP turbines are provided with condensate spray cooling to protect the turbine against excessive temperature rise during run-up, no-load and shutdown. It consists of a number of spray jets mounted inside the LP casing in the neighborhood of the exhaust blades. The jets are arranged to spray uniformly over the internal walls and to form a film of water on the vertical surfaces. Spraying is started automatically when the steam flow rate drops below about lot of the full load flow rate. Generator rating, temperature rise, and class of insulation are Excitation is provided by a in accordance with IEEE standards. shaft-driven alternator with its output rectified. A conventional oil-sealed hydrogen cooling system provides rotor cooling. The stator conductors are water cooled by a stator water cooling system. Differential relays protect the generator against electrical faults. Amendment N 10.2-2 April 1, 1993

INSERT *G" The turbine generator is designed and manuf actured in accordance and. manufacturing with the manufacturer's design criteria practices, procedures, and processes as well as its cuality Assurance program. National codes are not ' included since to nuclear turbine i existing national codas do not apply generators. The =oisture separators, steam reheaters and drain tanks are designed and constructed to ASME Section VIII. The orientation of the turbine and the fact that Category I structures are designed to withstand turbine missiles structures provide and assurance that safety-related additional ^ components will not be affected in the extremely Further analysisunlikely event of turbine a turbine missile is generated. missiles is provided in Section 3.5. t

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l POSD105.B75

.i

I CESSARnu h o,, Hydrogen The hydrogen bulk storage facility is located cutdoors.is su hydrogen /orfgen generator. the hydrogen piping and In order to prevent explcsions or fires, the main generator are checked for leaks and then purged with CO2 to remove all air and oxygen before the introduction of hydrogen The hydrogen purged from thedissipatesgenerator in is vented throughair. the outside the Building roof and Turbine Provisions are included at various points in the distribution system to allow for Co., purging and safe venting of the hydrogen in the generator and pfping prior to maintenance. . Turbine generator bearings are lubricated The by a conventional main oil pump, whichlube - oil system of proven components. supplies oil to the bearings of the turbine generator shaft during normal mode of operation is a gear type pump and is drivenThis pum by the turbine shaft at the front end. It supplies oil at speeds and therefore needs no booster pumps. above 1000 rpm during startup and during shutdown nearly down turbine standstill. The oil flows through the lube is fed into the lube oil system. The oil cooler (2 xof100%) temperature andoilthe the lube lube oil filter is controlled on(2thex 100%) . by The coolers use fluid side turbine plant ' mixing of warm and cooled oil. component cooling water for cooling. one AC motor-driven auxiliary lubelube oil pump oil system (centrifugal upstream of thetype) lube , supplies lube oil into the startup, and shutdown oil coolers during turning gear operation, of the turbine generator. One DC motor-driven emergency lube oil pump (centrifugal type) supplies lube oil into the lube oil system downstream of the lube oil filters in case of loss of AC power for the auxiliary oil pump. incorporates the Control (EHC) System The Electro-Hydraulic circuitry and equipment required to provide the following basic turbine control functions: A. Automatic control of turbine speed and acceleration through the entire speed range. Automatic control of load and loading rate from auxiliary to full load, with continuous load adjustment and discrete B. loading rates. Amendment N April 1, 1993 10.2-3

CESSAR nainewo,. i C. The turbine speed controller (basic controller) is redundant and operates in a 1-out-of-2 mode. When one controller fails, there is an automatic switchover (bumpless) to the other controller. D. Limiting.of load in response to preset limits on operating parameters. E. Detection of dangerous or undesirable operating conditions, conditions, and initiation of annunciation of detected proper control respones to such conditions. F. Monitoring the status of the control system, including the power supplies and redundanc control circuits. G. Testing of valves and controls. The DiC system provides fluid at 580 psig (40 bar) for turbine controls. The mechanical overspeed trip device is fed from the lube oil system, The interface between this system and the turbine safety system is made via a separating relay. The hydraulic fluid la supplie'd to all components at the correct temperature and required cleanliness, and the unit is equipped . . . with special chemically active filters to maintain the properties of the fluid over very long service times. The unit offers two independent pumps and associated valves, allowing the turbine to operate while maintenance work is taking place on either pump. The unit incorporates various alarms and pressure switches which will auto-start the standby pu=p or trip the turbine, should The unit a is malfunction occur in the system which is operating. designed to maximize reliability. The electrical power required by the EHC equipment is supplied The power to 7 from two batteries (2 x 24 Vdc) for redundancy. charge each of these batteries comes from independent AC power ~ sources. Each EHC central processing unit (CPU) or function group is powered by both of the 24 Vdc batteries via isolation diodes. The turbine spsed is measured by three independent speed modules including sensors and conditioning devices. For overspeed protection, each module provides a binary output signal, that is nor= ally energized, to the 2-out-of-3 tripping , device. Amendment N 10.2-4 April 1, 1993

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CESSAR nnticAo-l I l i For speed control, the analog output signal from two of the speed the redundant speed ! modules provides input to each of controllers. The active speed governor closes fully all main and i i intercept control valves at 105% of the turbine normal operating speed. Built into the microprocessor-based controller (software) 4 is an acceleration limiter that is activated during a high load rejection. For this case, the valves are fully closed below 1051. . The turbine overspeed protection is divided into two categories of operation. i [ The mechanical overspeed protection provides one mechanical ! overspeed trip device which depressurizes both the hydraulic interface relay, the common emergency system and, via an hydraulic safety system, closing all stop and control valves. l The setpoint is 110% of rated speed. [ i The electronic overspeed protection uses the three binary signals ! from the speed conditioning units to the 2-out-of-3 tripping device in the common safety system (and not in the EHC) . The l l setpoint is 112% of rated speed. -l closing times for full load rejection or turbine trip shall be , such that the maximum expected overspeed of the turbine shall not exceed 110% of rated speed. Overspeed control systems and I turbine inertia shall be considered when establishing this criteria. control, e The turbine overspeed trips close the main steam stop, l reheat stop and intercept valves within a time period after a

trip signal that precludes an unsafe turbine overspeed condition. '

These closure times account for the residual steam in the piping . between the valves and the turbine. ! To further decrease the possibility of an overspeed condition Each relay has two : there are two redundant reverse power relays. l different trip strategies for tripping the generator breaker (unit disconnect). The tripping strategies to prevent overspeed ; l after a turbine trip and to prevent overheating of the last l stages of LP turbine blades are: ! ) A. Reverse power and depressurize turbine safety system for , l more than 1 second. B. Reverse power for more than 15 seconds. l The turbine speed control system protection devices are listed in I Table 10.2.2-1. \ The basic purpose of the load control unit is to provide the following functions: A. Two redundant speed controllers (basic controllers). Amendment Q 10.2-5 June 30, 1993

CESSARnEncm.

 .                                                                               I automatic   controller     (load, frequency,  pressure, B.      one limiters, etc.) provides a set value to a basic controller            l which provides the main control valves with positioning signals.

C. Interf ace with the unit master is made via the automatic l controller. ' The load control unit functions may be grouped as follows: s A. Sensing functions are provided to detectaffectand .loading generateof l signals proportional to parameters that the unit. ; B. Limiting functions are provided to electrically constrain , the flow reference signals in response to signals from the l sensing circuits, from the speed control unit, or from , devices detecting the state of plant components. I C. Computing functions are provided to generate flow reference ; signals f or the valve sets, considering the desired load signal, the limiting functions, and the speed error signal ' from the speed control unit. ! D. Logic functions are provided to ensure that necessary t permissives have been satisfied prior to changes in mode of operation, to communicate status information between the __ load control unit and other elements of the EHC system, and ; to provide switching signals to devices in the EHC system. . The EHC is a micro-processor based controller. The increase and decrease inputs are determined by operation of push buttons or i f the video operating keyboard located on the control panel in the 4 control room. Runbacks are determined by the logic from: l A. Speed control logic unless rated speed is selected. l l < B. Indication that the load reference signal exceeds a preset ! load limit. J C. Loss of generator stator coolant. D. Signal from the Process Control Syrten. E. Partial loss of load. If the flow reference signal exceeds the limit set by the operator, the output flow reference signal is limited to the : limit value and a load set runback is initiated to drop the load setpoint to slightly above the level of the limit. To prevent Amendment N 10.2-6 April 1, 1993

CESSARnn%mo. 1 pressure, a main l excessive decrease of the main steam (throttle) steam (throttle) pressure limiter circuit is provided topressure close ; the controlling valve set when The the main steam (throttle) regulation of this circuit is falls below a preset When level. the main steam (throttle) pressure falls fixed at 10%. below an adjustable setpoint, the flow reference signal to the controlling valve set is limited to the value permitted The pressure by the set level of the main steam (throttle) pressure. zero to rated pressure by using the is adjustable from or from the video operating , point increase or decrease pushbuttons in the control room. keyboard located on the control panel Meters indicate the pressure setpoint selected, An acceleration as well as the limiter actual main steam (throttle) pressure. breakers open and the turbine I when the field - operates acceleration is too high. during valve testing or The first stage controller only operates (switchover from one to the other ' in place of the MW controller controller in the automatic controller). the its control valves must be designed The turbine andthrottle pressure existing at the main stop valves to pass rated flow at i.e., at the lowest point of the ' f at rated output of the NSSS, pressure range. The load controller and the maximum of load live limiter steam is protected against overload. The feedback pressure is only provided for having a constant control gain. hydraulically operated from the common The stop valves hydraulic safety are system equipped with limit switches for stroke testing. The closing time of the stop valves during testing is short and corresponds to the time at turbine trip. The control valve position loop consists a of electronic hydraulic actuator circuitry, and a electrohydraulic servo-valve, linear position transducer. By use of valve position feedback an flow control unit positions load the control, the control valve control valves according to the flow demand signal from thevalve position l control unit, ~r directly from the control panel, control is pertarmed by using a feedback path that transmits the actual valve pocition back to a point where reference input. The error it issignal, compared when algebraically with the different from zero, positions the hydraulic Controlactuator via the valve testing is servo-valve in order to make it zero. designed to allow regular testing of each valve with the effectsThe turbine ma to on-line turbine operation minimized. valves have only slow valve testing the to prevent controller position load disturbances. via the This testing is performed by There are no additional solenoid valves l integrated servo-valve. The position controller and the on the control valves. servo-valve are fail safe to close the control valve. A=endment N April 1, 1993 10.2-7

CESSAR insncmon valve is equipped with a position 1 Each intercept control controller and a servo-valve. During normal operation, the intercept valves can be fast partial stroke tested without creating a load disturbance. The turbine speed controller (basic controller) including valve 1-out-of-2 scheme of redundancy. position controllers use a There is automatic switchover (bumpless) from one controller to There are the fourother linesinofcase of a disturbance defense on one controller. against overspeed during all modes of operation as follows: A. Turbine speed controller 1. B. Turbine speed controller 2. C. One mechanical overspeed trip at 110%. D. Electronic overspeed protection in 2-out-of-3 logic scheme at 112%. > running at load and suddenly the load on the generator is lost, the following events will take place in rapid If the unit is _, succession: A. An acceleration limitar operates on high acceleration. at the B. The control valves and intercept valves will close maximum rate. in C. The entrained steam between the valves and the turbine, the turbine casing and in crossover and extraction lines will expand in less than 2 seconds. D. The expected overspeed will be less than 10% (at full load). E. The intercept control valves will reopen when the act1al speed is below the set value. In case of malfunction of any portion of the first line of defense against overspeed (speed control on control and intercept < valves) when load is lost, the turbine will accelerate to will This the l trip speed where the overspeed trip will activate. (3rd and 4th , directly trip the main and inter =ediate stop valvesand the control and lines of defense), will also be tripped. Subsequently, the turbine will coast down to zero speed. Amendment N 10.2-8 April 1, 1993 l

CESSAR !nnacams . The turbine will include instrumentation for a trip on excess vibration. The Trip and Monitoring System will initiate appropriate action on abnormal operating conditions and indicate the existance of j these conditions to the operator. ! When tho'2-out-of-3 tripping device is actuated, the pressure in the common safety system is depressurized and therefore all stop ! and control valves will close very rapidly. ; The turbine safety system is independent of the turbine control systan. Any of the following generated trip. inputs will result > in a trip of the EHC system: A. Low Condenser Vacuum i B. Thrust Bearing Failure ! C. Low Bearing Oil Pressure D. Internal Fault in Generator : E. Generator Breaker Failure 1 F. Reactor Trip . G. Loss of Generator Statdr.,CoolantNilthout.' EHC'Rubbac'k* * * * ' ' ' H. Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level I. Safety Injection ,

                                                                                    ,i J. All Main Feedwater Pumps Tripped K. Manual Turbine Trip L. Turbine oil Fire Trip f

M. Moisture Separator Reheater Drain Tank Hi Level l f N. Excess Vibration Circuitry is provided to test the turbine safety system during ' operation. The EHC systems are divided into three safety categories. The categories are distinguished between;;different modes of sensing of process values as follows:. CATEGORY 1: 3 channel sensing, normally energized, will be tested during normal operation once every 4 weeks. > Amendment Q June 30, 1993 10.2-9 ,

CESSAR !! nam,. . CATEGORY 2: 2 channel sensing, normally desnergized, will be tested once per year during overhaul or during a standstill. CATEGORY 3: 1 channel sensing, normally doenergized, will be tested once per year during overhr.ul or during a standstill. CATEGORY 4: 1 channel sensing, only for alarm. A turbine trip will occur if at least 2-out-of-3 trip solenoids , are deenergized. ! Each electronic portion of the turbine safety system is also powered from the redundant 24 Vdc batteries via isolation diodes. , l The trip solenoid valves are powered from the same supply as the emergency lube oil pump. , The electronic safety system operates and is isolated from the - trip solenoids by interposing relays. The normally deenergized tripping signals from the Category 2 and Category 3 circuits will be converted to normally energized- ! tripping signals just prior to operating the trip solenoid to 3 gj3g -1 (t/ , s o,L improve

                .1 Tu duavailability,

a. A u e.a kiv assembly is 22:ind o withstand normal conditions ;

The turbine t and anticipated transients including those resulting in turbine The' design of the trips without loss of structural integrity. turbine assembly meets the following criteria:

$Y                 Turbine     shaft     bearings    are  designed   to  retain    their and f

bg& A. structural integrity under normal operating loads l anticipated transients, including those leading to turbina ' o ' trips. b B. The multitude of natural critical frequenciesspeed of the and turbine 20% i shaft assemolies existing between zero ' overspeed are controlled in the design to prevent distress to the unit during operation. The maximum tangential stress in wheels and rotors resulting f t0 [" C. from centrifugal forces, interference fit, and thermal '

  "h                gradients does not exceed 0.75 of the yield strength of the                 '

materials at 115% of rated speed.

             .1. L i t4A4u'.al S r._le c.4 i on N/    t a The welded LP-turbine rotor and few disc forgings consists of two shaf t end forgings (depending  on the design).      Each is        ;

separately heat treated and tested prior to the final welding , I i I Amendment N 10.2-10 April 1, 1993 ,

l i l l CESSAR annneuiu '

i TABLE 10.2.2-1 l TURBINE SPEED CONTROL SYSTEN PROTECTION DEVICES f f Design Operating Speed Function in % of Rated Speed Component Control 04 - 112% Turbine speed , controller 1 , control 0% - 112% Turbine speed controller 2 i Trip 110% ; Mechanical overspeed Trip 112% Electronic overspeed (2-out-of-3) 1 r i t I Amendment N April 1, 1993 i i

INSERT " A" A. Turbine shaft bearings are designed to withstand a turbine trip after the extremely improbable case of a loss of a complete last stage blade together with its root. For this reason, the bearings are able to withstand any combination of normal operating loads and transients. i i b 6 4 i i i i e s I i l POsD105.B7S 4 1 I

INSERT "H" i D. The design overspeed of th6 turbine is 115% of the rated speed (the highest anticipated speed resulting from a loss ofload is 110%). j

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I h 4 h I 9 I POSD105.B7S i

CESSAR !!Mincuou A E6 NEfid he h AaYid4 STELcs,bekttn/AT4W to.z.3-l. Due to the small forging process to buil to the velded rotor. center boring is not sizes compared one piece rotors, necessary. The velded LP-turbine roter is made from a weldable by processes which minimize flav occurrences and Tg I Rotor velds are not located Cr-Ni-Mo-V alloprovide adequate the disc centers fracture where the toughness. highest stress occur. adjacent to Furthermore, rotor velds are joint velds between thei.e. discs inand lov

             !are located at thetheouter          diameter of the rotor, rotor, p"l5SRT                 > r_tf SMT

_ stressed zones of'S"Each forging to be used for the v o" P the following criteria: A. Chemical analysis is made using manuf acturer's acceptance criteria. One tensile test (in tangential direction) at ambient B. temperature is made using manuf acturer's acceptance criteria and minimum elongation at r ptur ) A a.r.3ure.3.(min Ml at ambient C. Three impact tests (in tangential direction) using manufacturer's acceptance temperature are made criteria. (50% FATT) l D. The fracture appearance transition temperature vhich is obtained frca Charpy tests in the tangential direction performed in accordance with specification ASTM (M A-370mustbebY\0 higher than 0*F (48 'C) . a wabs eett' energy is measured at' inie r E. The Charpy V-notch (C,) yi creriti& temperature in the tangential direction A minimum of threeandC,should be at leastshould specimens 60 ft-lbs (82J). in accordance with specification be tested ASTM A-370. F. Estimation of fracture toughness Krc at minimum operating ing - N,Y / temperature from conventionalA.Charpy and tensile Begely and W. data A. Logsden us the method presented by J. l IM5gl (aeference u er the methods descrih.d in Specification E813. The ratio of fracture toughness Kr to the maximumASTM d t' tangential stress at speeds from normal at to design overspee minimum operating ( should be at least two /fR. Design overspeed is 115% of rated speed (the temperature. highest anticipated speed resulting from a loss of load is _ 110%). i Amendment Q June 30, 1993 10.2-11

i i INSERT "B" The upset ratio for the disk forgings will be at least two (2). l During disk assembly, no lubricants are used that may have a potential for causing stress ! corrosion cracking (SCC). Any lubricants used during blade mounting or any other assembly [ operations must be approved for use by the Engineer. ! The steel is made by the basic process in an electric furnace and degassed by pouring the ingot f in a vacuum chamber. I i i e i f h i r I

\

I 1 POSD105.B75

i l INSERT "C" 10.2.3.2 Fracture Touchness i The fracture toughness, he, is determined by testing a three-point bend specimen per ASTM E-813. The K evalue will be obtained from a relation between K ci and he given in para. 3 9.4 of ASTM E813. The test will be performed on the actual disk material at amLient temperature. . 10.2.3.3 Turbine Disk Design , For LP rotors, the stress at the rotor center is checked for mechanical loads only; the stress in the remainder of the rotor is checked for both mechanical and thermal loads. The overspeed ' case is taken into account by use of appropriate safety factors. The stresses of the rotors are specified to be l

               -       The ratio of the fracture toughness (Kc)    i of the disk material determined at        l i

ambient temperature to the maximum tangential stress at speeds from normal to '

design overspeed has to be, for this material, at least 2.1 Vin. for disks with the maximum operating temperature below 100*C and 2.2 Jin. for disks with the maximum operating temperature at or above 100*C. These criteria are equivalent i to a requirement that the ratio of the fracture toughness (K i c) of the disk material ,

to the maximum tangential stress at speeds from normal to design overspeed has I to be at least 2 Jin. j - The combined stress of LP turbine disks at design overspeed due to centrifugal forces and thermal gradients must not exceed 0.75"YS_, where YS., is the minimum yield strength of the material at the operating temperature. 10.2.3.4 Stress Corrosion Crackine (SCC) , e The cavities in the rotor are filled with inert gas (normally argon), therefore, initiation or growth of cracks by SCC or corrosion fatigue is not likely. Thus, only mechanical and i thermomechanical fatigue is addressed in the design. Stress corrosion cracking can only occur if each of the three following conditions are fulfilled: !

                   -     Presence of a corrosive medium, e.g. wet steam.                                      ;

f Use of a material which is sensitive to SCC. High tensile stress. , POSD105.B7S i

l

j INSERT "C" (Cont'd) SCC is unlikely to occur in the LP rotors of the System 80+ design: i

        -       As the cavities in the rotor are closed and filled with an inen gas, the rotor center I (which is the most highly stressed location) is not in contact with the steam.         l Therefore, SCC crack initiation and growth in the rotor center is not possible.

t a j - As these are full disks without center bore, the peak stress at the center is lower (approximately 50%) than at the borehole of rotors with center bore. !

          -     The lower stresses make it possible to use a material with a lower yield strength      f which is less susceptible to SCC.                                                      l i

i i i i I I a s I a a r h r I l POSD105.B75 l

i

l TABLE 10.2.3-1 Chemical Ccmoosition (wt. *H for Cr-Ni-Mo-V Allov ABB Material Desienation ST565S : C 0.18 to 0.25* i Si 0.4 max .l Mn 0.25 to 0.80 P 0.010 max S 0.015 max ; Cr 1.5 to 2.0 Ni 0.9 to 1.3 Mo 0.5 to 0.8 V 0.05 max j P+Sn 0.02 max , i e Mechanical Pronerties I Tensile Strength = 105 KSI mm : Yield Strength -90 to 105 KSIS Elongation Tangential 15% min mSpecimens taken from the center of a piece may exceed the top specified limit by 0.03%. mFor asymmetric disc-shaped pans, the yield strength of the test material located adjacent to the centerline may exceed the maximum value of = 105 KSI. j POSD105.B7S

CESSAR UMacwon ' l l, N M 10.2.h SAFETY EVAIDATION The turbine generator and all related steam This handling equipment unit automatically ' are of conventional proven design. follows the electrical load requirements from station auxiliary . load to turbine full load. ! is located entirely in the Turbine The turbine generator safety-related system or portion of Building. Thus, no ,? safety-related system is close enough to the turbine generator to ' be affected by the failure of a high or moderate energy line or the low-pressure generator associated with the turbine , turbine / condenser connection. : [ The results of a failure analysis10.2.3-1. of the turbine speed will The system control be ! system are tabulated in Table [ designed so that the single failure of a main stop, main control, intercept valve does not disable the t intermediate stop, or r turbine overspeed trip function. Under normal operatingItconditions, there are no radioactive ! l contaminants present. is possible for this system to become contaminated only through steam generator tube leaks. In this ; event, radioactivity in the Main Steam System is detected and j e measured by monitoring condenserSection vacuum pump and 10.4.2, discharge by monitoring which is l i released through the unit vent, tiic Steam generator blowdown samples, Section 10.4.8. < No radiation shielding is required for steam the components handling of the equipment. turbine generator and related i Continuous access to the components of this system is possible during normal conditions. The condensate polisher demineralizers are available to remove condenser hotwell, Section t radioactive particulates from the Provisions l 10.4.7, in the event of prinary to secondary leakage. 4 are included such that temporary shielding can surround the an area backwash containing the condensate polisher demineralizers, the decant monitor tank, and associated pumps. The control ; tank, located outside of the labyrinth shield wall for panel is accessibility. i i The steam reheaters and drain tanks are designed and constructed to ASME Section VIII. The generator rating, temperature rises i i and insulation class are in accordance with ASA Standards. 4 Amerr' ment N : l 10.2-13 April 1, 1993

CESSAR nutricuin

1 N l TABLE-10.2.h-1 p6 t

TURBINE SPEED CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS Malfunction OversE:9 Prevented try cr=manent Fail to close Closure of main stop Main control valves valves Fail to close Closure of main control j i Main stop valves valves I Fail to close Closure of intercept l Intercept control valves stop valves Closure of intercept Intercept stop valves Fail to close stop valves Fails Speed control, basic : Speed control basic controller 2 , controller 1 Fails Speed control, basic ! Speed control basic controller 1 controller 2 Fails Electronic overspeed ; Mechanical overspeed trip - trip Fails Mechanical overspeed Electronic overspeed trip trip e i.

                                                     /                                t t

I I r Amendment N April 1, 1993 [ i

                   -                      =_          _
                                                                                                    .              a C E S S A R neWac m ox                                                                                  i s

I 5 l yd 10.2.\ INSPECTION AND TESTING REQUIREKENTS l The pre-service inspection program is as follows: A. Rotor forgings to be used in the welded rotor are rough allowance prior to heat-j with minimum stock machined treatment. B. Each individual rotor forgings 100% to volumetric be used for (ultrasonic) the velded ! is subjected to forging, l rotor the oversize of each to l NgV/ g examinations. Due ultrasonic testing will detect indications which may be The l ph during final machining of the forging. ! v removed

                      =anuf acturer's acceptance criteria includes the requirement                                   '

h' gQ 3 that that subsurface

                             - they will not   sonic grow  indications     are evaluated to a size which       compromisesto assure the integrity of the unit during the service life.                                                !

subjected are to 100% the welded rotor i C. All velds in Due to the oversize , volumetric (ultrasonic) examinations. of each forging, ultrasonic. testing also detects indicationk l which may be removed during final machining of the forging. y, ft The finished machined surfaces of the welded rotor need not' be subjected to a magnetic particle test (items 'since they arec D. ' g previously tested by ultrasonia testing B and above), s [: [ E. Each fully bucketed turbine rotor assembly or above the maxidum speed anticipated is spinatested following turbineat l t [g{,- g trip from full load. , assembly g9 program for the turbine l The in-service inspection last two stages of blades , includes disassembly of theof interval turbine's approximately ten years or less -l in stages over an during plant shutdowns ten years. such that the entire turbine is inspected This includes complete j within approximately such as couplings, l inspection of all normally inaccessible coupling bolts, parts, This low pressure inspection consists turbine of rotol buckets, and high pressure rotors. as indicated below: l visual, surface, and volumetric examinations, j l 1 A. Visual examinations of all accessib3e surface of rotors. critical to rotor f i testing of all parts crack integrity, such as welds, inspection holes, balancing holes, B. Surface l geometric transitions and first three stages of turbine l , blade fixation grooves. Amendment N April 1, 1993 , 10.2-15 l I

CESS AR !!!Mcwo. ! C. Visual and surface examination of all low-pressure buckets. ! D. Surface and visual examination of coupling and coupling j bolts. of main steam and reheat valves The in-service inspection includes the following- 'I intervals, during refueling or ! A. At approximately 3-1/3-year coinciding with the inservice maintenance shutdowns l inspection schedule required by Section XI of the ASME Code ! for reactor components, at least one ' main steam stop valve, i one main steam control valve, one reheat stop valve, and one i reheat intercept valve should be dismantled and visual and ' surface examinations conducted of valve seats, disks, and stems. If unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion. are found in a valve, all other valves of that type should bushings should be be dismantled and inspected. Valve inspected and cleaned, and bore diameters should be checked for proper clearance. control, and combined intermediate valves are 7 -l l i B. Main stop, [ exercised at least once a week by closing each valve and observing by the valve position indicator that it moves l smoothly to a fully closed position. At least once a month,. ; this observation is made by actually watching the valve ! motion. Turbine generator inservice inspectioptesting shall be perfornect E Codes. 06 % in accordance with the requirements of the applicable ASM ; t _> that' ! The extraction steam check valves will be tested to each valve is capable of being actuated by its power cylinder andassure [ l to exercise the mechanism so as to keep it free to move.

        /                                                                                           !

The extraction steam check valves will be tested weekly with the ' turbine on line and loaded. : is based ; The turbine system maintenance program described above missile generation i on the manufacturer's calculations of probabilities. Under normal operatingIt conditions, there are no radioactive - contaminants present. is possible f or this system to become contaminated only through steam generator tube leaks. In this event, radioactivity in the steam is detected and measured by : . monitoring condenser vacuum pump discharge which in released l f through the unit vent, and by monitoring the steam generator ' blowdown samples. : Amendment N j 10.2-16 April 1, 1993 u i l

INSERT "D" B. Each individual forging is subjected to 100% volumetric (ultrasonic) examinations. The ultrasonic testing is performed by a straight-beam examination in both radial and axial directions and by an angle-beam examination. Detectable flaw sizes are: radial sound beam direction: 1.5 mm, axial sound beam direction: 1.0 mm, oblique axial sound beam direction: 1.3 mm. Prior to welding, inspection of all surfaces which would not be accessible after welding will be performed by magnetic particle inspection. The number of cycles to grow a subsurface flaw with an initial equivalent diameter of 5 mm to the cdtical flaw size in similar ABB rotors built from a similar material is far above the number of cycles expected at the end of the design life. The rotor designed . and built to the criteria of CESSAR will have a comparable or better crack growth life ; since the crack growth resistance (i.e. cyclic crack growth rate) and fracture toughness are expected to be at least as good or better (due to generally cleaner materials, improved ' melting and forging practices and newer equipment) than the rotors for which crack growth analyses have demonstrated a large margin on the number of cycles. C. After welding and final machining, all surfaces exposed to steam, i.e. all accessible surfaces except for shaft ends, will be magnetic pa:ticle tested. A special attention will

   /         be given to the areas of stress raisers and welds. Also, after machining of the disk to the final dimensions, the welds are 100% ultrasonically tested in radial and radial-tangential sound beam directions.                                                           ,

r i i k i POSD105.B7S

i i i 1 INSERT "E" l

                                                                                              -3 E. Each fully bucketed turbine rotor assembly is spin tested for 3 minutes at 120% rated    ;

speed. This is above the maximum speed anticipated following a turbine trip from full l load (110%). t i f, f r i I i i o 9 4 k I

                                                                                                 'i POSDlo5.B7S                                                                                   l 1

INSERT "F" In-senice testing and functional checks shall be performed periodically. These checks include testing of the following components:

1. Main and overload stop and control valves. Each control and corresponding stop valve is stroked independent of the other valves. This test will be carried out from the Main Control Room during normal operation once every two weeks.

2. Intercept valves. These valves will be stroked from the Main Control Room during normal operation once every two weeks.

3. Turbine trips and pressure switches for lube oil supervision, electronic overspeed trips, and vacuum trips will be tested during normal operation, once a month.

4. Extmetion power-assisted check valves. A signal to allow these valves to partially close will be simulated from the Main Control Room during normal operation once a month.

5. Control fluid pressure switch. Verification of the pressure switch's ability to give a start signal to the standby control fluid pump is tested via a simulated reduction in control fluid pressure. This test is performed once a month.

6. Control system. All the control devices and positioning of control valves will be checked during turbine shutdown.

I

7. Mechanical overspeed trip device. This device is to be tested at each start-up *

(no-load) after the turbine is thermally stable.

8. Standby AC lube oil pump. A reduction in fluid pressure is simulated during normal operation once a month.

9. Standby DC lube oil pump. A reduction in fluid pressure is simulated during normal operation once a month.

10. Standby AC control fluid pump. A reduction in control fluid pressure is simulated during normal operation once a month.

NOTE: All checks (1-10 above) are also tested as part of prestart-up testing. POSD105.B7S

CESS AR !!aincam,. i No radiation shielding is required steam for the handling components of the equipment. turbine generator and related Continuous access to the components of this system is possible during normal conditions. The turbine generator is designed andcriteria manufactured and in accordance' manufacturing design with the manufacturer's practices, procedures, and processes as well . as its Quality Assurance Program. National codes are not included since apply to nuclear turbine j existing national codes do not yT.,,v generators. The moisture separators, steam reheaters and drain tanks are designed and constructed to ASME Section VIII. The orientation of the turbine and the fact that Category I structures are designed to withstand turbine missiles safety-related provide structures and l 4 assurance that additional components will not be affected in the extremely unlikely event a turbine missile is generated. Further analysis of turbine missiles is provided in Section 3.5. 10.2.5 INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION The turbine generator is provided with a full range of standard ; turbine supervisory instruments which indicate and record 7.7.1.1.12 thea for l operation of the unit. Refer to Section the Process-Component Control System which , description of provides applicable non-safety remote monitoring and controls , from the main control room. I l l I 1 Amendment Q June 30, 1993 10.2-17 l1

        . CESSAR n!OICAMM REFERENCE 8 FOR SECTION 10.2                                ,

scientific paper, 71-1E7-MSLRF-P1, by

1. Westinghouse (Westinghouse Electric J. A. Begley and W. A. Logsdon .. ;

Corporation), July 26, 1971. ; 6

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s I L

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4 i

l 1 Amendment Q i 10.2-18 June 30, 1993 l i l l 1

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h

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1 I

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L i r l ATTACHMENT 5 ; e b n h e I I t r l 1 I I t i i c,r - -- - , ~. --- . . wy,

CESSAR Knce g l The Reactor Protection System (RPS) is described in Section 7.2. Table 15.0-2 lists the RPS trips for which credit is taken in the analyses discussed in Chapter 15, including the setpoints and the trip delay times associated with each trip. The analyses take into consideration the response times of actuated devices after r the value of the monitored parameter at the sensor equals or , exceeds the trip setpoint. The Reactor Protection System response time is the sum of the sensor response time and the reactor trip delay time. The sensor response time is defined as the time from when the value of the ' monitored parameter at the sensor equals or axceeds the reactor protection system trip setpoint until the sensor output equals or exceeds the trip setpoint. The sensor response is modeled by using a transfer function for the particular sensor used. The reactor trip delay time (Table 15.0-2) is defined as the elapsad time from the time the sensor output equals or exceeds the trip setpoint to the time the reactor trip breakers are fully open. The interval between trip breaker opening and the time at which the magnetic flux of the Control Element Assembly (CEA) holding coils has decayed enough to allow CEA motion is conservatively assumed to be 0.50 seconds. Performance evaluations of the System 80 Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM), during reactor scram conditions, have been . performed using data obtained during CEDM testing. Testing is i conducted using equipment that is identical to that which is . installed on the reactor vessel. During a reactor scram the latch coil circuit is discharged. When the coil current l decreases sufficiently the mechanical latches spring open and release the CEAs. Information obtained from actual motor test data as well as from numerical electromechanical modeling of the CEDM motor both indicate that the CEDM latch release time, during reactor scram conditions, is about 0.50 seconds. This is corroborated by field test data on the PVNGS reactor, that the maximum measured drop out or release time was 0.49 seconds. Finally, a conservative value of 3.50 seconds is assumed for CEA insertion, defined as the elapsed time from the beginning of CEA motion to the time of 90% insertion of the CEAs in the reactor core. Under worst case conditions, the required scram time fer en ir.di v i d= 1 CEh from electrical power interruption to 90% insertion is 4.0 seconds. This is representedAlso, by the acceptance this figure curve in Figure 4B-4 of Appendix 4B. illustrates that the time period between the starting of CEA motion and 90 percent insertion in the reactor core is 3.50 seconds. 90% CEA insertion is used for establishing requirements for rate of insertion (see Section 4.2 and Appendix 4B) . However, 100% required shutdown margin corresponds to 100% CEA insertion. Note , that the required shutdown margin for the safety analyses ; conservatively assumes that the highest worth CEA does not ) insert. l Amendment R y 30, m3 15.0-4 I l

CESSAR nainemo. l TABLE 15.0-2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTDI TRIPS USED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS l Reactor ICI ' Analysis I*I Trip RPS Setpoint Delay Time' Event l High logarithmic Power Level 550 ms Variable Overpower 0.05{"I 119% 550 ms l CPC Variable Overpower 115% 550 ms : High Pressurizer Pressure 2434 psia 550 ms l , Low Pressurizer Pressure 1705 psia 550 ms Low Steam Generator Pressure 781 psia 550 ms i Events not g 600 ms Mentioned Below Low Steam Generator Water Level 40.7%widerange)II' High Steam Generator Water tevel 550 ms 95%grrowrange (g) Steam Generator 6P Low Flow 80% CPC Low RCP Shaft Speed 95% 300 ms CPC Coincident low Pressure /DNBR 2015 Psi 550 ms l High Pressurizer Pressure 2475 psi 550 ms . Feedwater and 1555 psia 550 ms Steam Line Breaks low Pressurizer Pressure Low Steam Generator Pressure 719 psia 550 ms low Steam Generator Water level 33.7% wide range ) 600 ms High Steam Generator Water Level 95% narrow range II 550 ms . CPC Low RCP Shaft Speed 95% 300 ms ! i CPC Variable Overpower 115% 550 ms

                                                                                                                'l .

a. See discussion in Section 7.2.

b. Percent of distance between the wide range instrument taps. See Chapter ,

5 for details. Setpoint is valid at full power only (i.e., 100-102% l. power). ,

c. Reactor Protection System response time testing is discussed in Section {

7.2.

d. Percent of distance between the narrow range instrument taps. See ,

Chapter 5 for details. j

e. Some Chapter 15 analyses assumed more conservative setpoints for specific ;

events. ,

f. Percent of hot leg flow,

g. 1.2 seconds from time of occurrence of low flow trip condition until the reactor trip breakers open.

h. Trip credited for 15.6.2 and 15.6.3 events.

Amenciment X

                                                                                        %Y       ? OO    _

gaan e- - e- --- r-, -

. i i ; I C E S S A R U nine m ox ) analyses (assuming the usual ; appropriate to SLB : conservatisms such as and of fuel cycle). ! J ; .J Decreasing the CEA vorth in conjunction with thisacurve i or using a CEA vorth of 10% Ap together with more ' adverse (more negative slope) curve vill increase the conservatism of the analysis results. The CEA vorth of 10% op used together with the moderator cooldown function employed in the SLB analyses (upper curve of Figure 15.1.5-0) yields results which are appreciably more conservative than the most adverse a value expected of 8.86% for Ap CEA System 80+. Employing both . vorth and the upper curve would produce an extreme, excessively conservative bound for the expected post-l trip reactivity change. ' W The comparison of available CEA vorths Table 4.3-7 is and allowances based on ROCS /DIT [ presented in equilibrium 1B month cycle core ! calculations for an l design for System 80+. The ' ^ F 40 C"J rorth m.ed in

                                                                                     .olime sh w n in-        [

tha-&LD nalyce: i: ! Ttrbic 3-7 IhWT h,;ictent ^.^it.h tho ! h Pre-Trip Degradation in Fuel Perfore.ance Cases ! ' 2. ' a } For the purposes of analyzing the pre-trip portion of ? the steam line break event, the initial conditions chosen for RCS pressure, temperature, core flow, and l power are such as: To nake the initial state near a power operating i { a.

limit for the values of ASI and radial peaking factors used, and To mininize the transient minimum DNBR.

b. !

are ! The value of ASI and radial peaking factor, Fa, l I chosen to maximize the fraction of fuel pins calculated DNB. Assumptions concerning initial , to experiencewater level have little er no impact on the pressurizer l transient DNBR. l inventory is reduced l The initial steam generator mass ; ' to its minimum value to maximize the RCS cooldown This ! during the first 10 seconds of the transient. ; lower initial inventory leads to a more rapid steam generator depressurization and temperature reduction. l l l } An.endment R 15.1-19 July 30, 1993 i .I J

I a f gug5 ons 440.2011 5t a Line Break This value is The ntrol roo worth of 10% was used in the SLB analysifor . the increase. -i signi cant increased (from 8.86%). Provide the bas rod design change or Clarify hat whether the change is due to the contr the calcu tional method change for the control od worth. l Etsponse 440.2021 i am line break (stb) analyses from 1he change in CEA orth used in the s analysis of the apportionment of 8.86% Af to 10%d esults from f the reactivity components of the $1B , conservative margins to he value Figure 15.1.5-0 of ; analyses for potential p -tr anding p return to power. this.. As a reference point,.a CEA , r CESSAR-DC is useful in unde worth of 10% Af used to the withigure the moderator cooldown function 15.1.5-0 results in post-trip represented by the lowe curve o hose appropriate to SLB analyses I reactivity values whi are typical o end of fuel cycle). Either- I (assuming the usual conservatisms such decreasing the C worth in conjunction wi this curve or using a CEA 1 negative slope) curve worth of IC%4f .ogether with a more adverse (m The CEA worth of l will increas the conservatism of the analysis resu , ployed in the [ IC%Af used egether with the moderator cooldown functic results ! es for CESSAR-DC (upper curve of Figure 15.1.5-0) y for ! SLB anal whith- e appreciably more conservative than the most adverse expec i Sys* m 80+. Employing both a value of 8.86%Af CEA worth and the UDr : ve would produce an extreme, excessively conservative bound for the c l rpected post trip reactivity change.

              --    7:mruon via tt           ..e!'

CG m 6 ;d Wj.;;d &ine" maidonet-rW ko; - u. l e c[t!*n Oc h;, been .g at t ack.a T 24. esi-"' *ir-: t

::.M:6 ;um '" :::' ,, ', ::-r d- ':- ' 5,;t: ha- '

                  ~The       results of these calculations show that the worth available f roi CEAs with all CEAs inserted except the most reactive CEA is 10.7Aaf. The                          !

net CI A worth of 10.7%dfis the difference Thebetween the total w calculated net : (ntes't(f() inserted'(15 3%Af) and the stuck red worth (4.6%A/).CEA worth assui ' CEA worth exceeds the 10% A/Therefore, the CEA worth used inl respecttotheactualreactivityavafbhblefromtheCEAs. l t 4 l 1 i i 4

~4

Il insert B The increase in the net CEA worth used in the SLB analysis from 8.86%Ap for the 3800 MWt core power level to 10%Ap for the 3914 MWt core power levelis due to a change in the fuel management for the System 80+ core from out-in to i Iow-leakage. In a low-leakage fuel management scheme, the fresh fuel assemblies are ' placed in the interior of the core rather than on the core periphery. As a result, a ' ' larger percentage of the fresh fuel assemblies are covered by CEAs, and the N-1 ' condition results in uncovery of fewer contiguous fresh fuel assemblies than is the

case for an out-in fuel management scheme, leading to an increase in net CEA worth.

Another contributing factor to the increase in net CEA worth is the change from B,C to erbium for the burnable absorber material. Use of erbium permits better control of , the power distribution peaking than is the case with B C, which in turn allows a lower , leakage fuel management and thus a greater net CEA worth. s I 1 9 5 4 't 4 P f l l 1 1 1 i i i! ; i

o V I i

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i e i P I i i i 1 r ATTACHMENT 6 'l ; a 6 if h

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D i I i h I e v 1 l 1 f f 4 5 l 4 r k I I I

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D DSER Ooen Item 5.3.1.4-3 The staff needs additional information on the following topics (concerning DG load sequencers):

1) the rationale for using a load sequencer when offsite power is available,

2) the separation between the two load sequencers, and

3) their mode of operation.

Pronosed Ocen Item 8.3.1.4-3 Resolution

1) A load' sequencer is used when offsite power is available to prevent a large voltage dip on the bus which results from multiple large lE pump motors being started simultaneously by ESF actuation signals. The load sequence logic to be used when offsite power is available is essentially the same as used for sequencing the loads on the diesel. A minimum time delay is utilized after sequencing a load onto a bus to insure bus stabilization. This is combined with bus frequency and voltage signals to insure bus conditions have been adequately restored prior to sequencing the next load group. The key difference between the two sequences is that when normal site power is available there is no load shed. As a result the only loads that require sequencing are the pumps directly initiated by the activated PPS ESEAS signal (s) (i.e., SI, EFW, and CS pumps).

2) There are not separate load sequencers for sequencing loads when offsite power is available and when it is not available. The sequencer itself is a part of the ESF-CCS system and resides in the same control cabinets as the ESF-CCS. This same ESF-CCS system controls all in-plant power paths for both the onsite and offsite power sources. Each ESF-CCS has redundant internal processors and also redundant data highways which connect to the individual processors at i the loads. There is no credible electrical event, except a ;

catastrophic one (e.g., a fire), that can leave both - processors for a single division's sequencer unable to i perform their function. The two ESF-CCS processors are not mutually redundant processors; therefore, there is no separation. The - redundant load sequencer is found in the ESF-CCS cabinets of the other division. Each of the two division ESF-CCS load sequencers is located in physically separated Category I structures. j l Open Item 8.3.1.4-3 1 Rev. 1 10/14/93 1 J

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3) One of the ESF-CCS's two internal processors-runs the sequencing program while-the other remains in a standby- ;

condition. If the one processor fails, the other takes over 1 control of the load sequencing from the point where the .; first left off. r This information has been incorporated into Amendment Q of j CESSAR-DC Section 8.3.1.1.4.6 as shown on the' attached-(indicated: ! by brackets). ; i i

                                                                                                         'l
                                                                                                          .1 i                                                                                                          I l'

f i r i 9 5 i i l 6 L I l l l Open Item 8.3.1.4-3 2 Rev. 1 -l

    ,a   _ --         - , -                                                         -- --    -   . - . -

CESSAR EMMcmou both in the control room and at the diesel generator unit in accordance with Branch Technical Position PSB-2. 8.3.1.1.4.6 Load Shedding and Sequencing All Class 1E switchgear and load center breakers that are required to automatically close following an accident, LOOP and/or station blackout condition are controlled by the ESF-CCS load sequencer associated with each emergency diesel generator. N Each ESF-CCS has redundant internal processors and also redundant data highways which connect to the individual processors that control the loads. One of the ESF-CCS's two internal processors runs the sequencing program while the other remains in a standby condition. If the one processor fails, the other takes over control of the load sequencing from the point where the first left off.

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Load shedding of all loads at the 4,160V level (except the 4,160/480V load center transformers) occurs whenever a sustained bus under voltage condition is detected by the ESF-CCS logic. Following the load shedding operation, the emergency diesel generator load sequencer automatically sequences the required loads per Tables 8.3.1-2 and 8.3.1-3, as described in Section l 7.3.1.1. A time delay will be provided between load shedding and sequencing to allow motor residual voltages to decay to less than 25% of rated voltage.

    'A   load sequencer is used when offsite power is available to prevent a large voltage dip on the bus which results from multiple large 1E pump motors being started simultaneously by ESF actuation signals.      The load sequence logic to be used when offsite power is available is essentially the same as used for sequencing the loads on the diesel.      A minimum time delay is utilized after sequencing a load onto a bus to insure bus              l stabilization. This is combined with bus frequency and voltage signals to insure bus conditions have been adequately restored prior to sequencing the next load group.        The key difference between the two sequences is that when normal site power is available there is no load shed.                                    y
   .N 8.3.1.1.4.7         Lube Oil system                                    i Reference Section 9.5.7 for a description of the Diesel Generator      i Engine Lube Oil system.

l 8.3.1.1.4.8 Puel Oil Systen Reference Section 9.5.4 for a description of the Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System. Amendment Q l 8.3-13 June 30, 1993 I i

4 ATTACHMENT Z Page 4 of S CE-002 Attacnment A Form CE-002-1 Reviston t CESSAR-0C INPUT l l NRC RAI Resconse l % l USI/GSI Response CESSAR-DC Section: 93.2 !!tle/Desertotton: 6#8#5' Ye DMR O#ea T+ ,,,, t . 3. 2 - I , I a . r . -. - e .. I D es e-'r t t e n Revteten h avnec - mz De,#f f,Tek - 9/92 Sva lvd. en Road ' ' Crssag-bc Ced,sa 1. 3. 2. p vhed R v/3elg3 Reaul dar. GN.le /.75 '2- N/78 hbS L. t[c e ALwR ~ 6 45 S;le t]s: uso-oo- M oo

9 Yl93 t

USE FORM CE-002-2 FOR LISTING ADDITIONAL REFERENCES ADDITIONAL REFERENCES LISTED ON FORM CE-002-2 O yES E No 1211E l Numcer of Pages: I (Excluding Forms CE-002-01 ONgtnated S : i

                                                                      ,               ,gj jyy Letter NumDer:            ALMM"                        Checked Sy:                     bm Date:         'o / /" Y File NumDers:           424- c o- /G24. o#

W o-40-1804,se ADoroved By: b+m e- O#M Date: Io//f/d1 i i Page i of I

DSER Open Item 8.3.2-1 Additional information is required to compk'.e the staff's review of de power systems. Proposed Open Item 8.3.2-1 Resolution : a The following non-Class IE components are powered from the Class IE 120 V AC Vital ; Instrumentation and Control Power System These non-Class IE components are isolated from Class IE circuits by double isolation breakers in series. The cabling downstream of the : breakers is treated as Associated Cabling in accordance with IEEE Standard 384-1981: , Division I Division II , Reactor Cavity Flood Valve Reactor Cavity Flood Valve Hydrogen Igmtors Hydrogen Ignitors ; Channel A Channel B ! Holdup Volume Flood Valve -Holdup Volume Flood Valve Channel C Channel D ! Holdup Volume Flood Valve Holdup Volume Flood Valve ; There are no non-Class lE loads which are directly connectable to the Class IE batteries and are required for design basis accidents (refer to CESSAR-DC Table 8.3.2-4). The only identified non-Class IE load directly connectable to the Class lE 125 V DC Vital Power System is the Containment Equipment Hatch Trolley. This load is not employed for design ; basis accidents; it is used solely as a measure for enhancing Shutdown Risk (i.e., ensuring capability of closing the equipment hatch for loss of power scenario). Like the AC circuitry , described above, the Containment Equipment Hatch Trolley is isolated from the Class IE DC , circuitry by double isolation breakers in series. The cabling downstream of the breakers is treated as Associated Cabling in accordance with IEEE Standard 384-1981. v J Open item 8.3.2-1 1 Rev.1 10/14/93

                                      +-w==

v -

Y u

   -6 DSER Open Item 8.5-1 Applicant must address several issues regarding core cooling for an SBO event.

Proposed Open Item 8.5-1 Resolution As described in CESSAR-DC Section 10.4.9.1.2.J, the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) contains two 100 percent capacity . Emergency Feedwater Storage Tanks (EFWSTs). Each tank has a safety-related condensate storage volume of 350,000 gallons, which is sufficient condensate to maintain the unit in hot , standby condition for 8 hours by using the EFW Turbine Driven i Pumps, which receive battery-backed control power (refer to CESSAR-DC Section 8.3.2.1.2.1.2). This fulfills the requirement of Section 3.2.3 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.155, " Station Blackout." Although the two EFWSTs have sufficient inventory to satisfy this SBO requirement, a non-safety grade condensate source may be aligned to the EFWSTs, as described in EFW Design , Bases, CESSAR-DC Section 10.4.9.1.2. . Assurance that the equipment and systems used for core cooling > for an SBO event will be operable is committed to in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program Plan (raference LD-92-088, July 31, 1992), which defines a program plan for the long term maintenance and update of the System 80+ PRA and the relationship to the Reliability Assurance Program (RAP) for the System 80+ Standard Design to assure that the system and equipment' reliability assumed in the System 80+ analyses are maintained , over the entire plant life-cycle. , Areas where SBO equipment is located will be habitable for personnel, since the AAC is capable and fully rated to power the non-essential chillers and required SBO area ventilation units as direct loads of the Permanent Non-Safety buses to provide appropriate environmental cooling to SBO areas. i 6 Open Item 8.5-1 1 Rev. 1 10/14/93 I 6

i

                                                                              ?
                     ~                                                         '

DSER Open Item 20.2-20 Issue B-56 will be discussed in the FSER. ; Proposed Open Item 20.2-20 Resolution Response to Issue B-56 (Diesel Generator Reliability) is ) presented in CESSAR-DC, Appendix A, Issue B-56. CESSAR-DC Section 8.3.1.1.4 and Appendix A, Issue B-56 will be modified as per attached markups to reference and commit to a diesel .! generator maintenance program in accordance with the Maintenance ! Rule (10 CFR 50.65) and guidance provided in Regulatory Guide l 1.160 to achieve goals for the diesel generators. i i I

\

i' a

                                                                            't I

II 3

,                                                                              ?

i i i i ! 3 ! i I Open Item 20.2-20 1 Rev. 2 " 10/19/93

'l

CESSAR 82Lmu l f AB. Regulatory Guide 1.131 l ( The qualification testing of electric cables, field splices, and connections complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.131. AC. Regulatory Guide 1.153 l The design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.153. The term, " Power", as mentioned here, includes electric, pneumatic and hydraulic power. AD. Regulatory Guide 1.155 l The installation and design of the onsite AAC power source system is in compliance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.155 for a station blackout (SBO). The AAC power source is designed to be made available to power one safety load division and its corresponding permanent Non-Safety Load Bus within 2 minutes of the onset of the SBO; such that the plant is capable of maintaining core cooling and containment integrity per Section 50.63 of 10 CFR Part 50. The AAC source is not normally directly connected to the [ plant's main or standby offsite power sources or to the ( Class 1E Safety Division power distribution system. There is a minimum potential for common cause failure with the offsite power system or with the emergency diesel L generators. The AAC power source is further discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.5. AE. Regulatory Guide 1.158 l The qualification testing of safety-related lead storage batteries complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide _ 1.158. _4.us<cf 4 8.1.4.3 IEEE Standards IEEE standards that are referenced in NRC Regulatory Guides are addressed under the appropriate Regulatory Guide discussed in Section 8.1.4.2. Others are addressed below. l A. IEEE Standard 387-1984 The preoperational and periodic testing of the emergency diesel generators complies with the requirements of IEEE I Standard 387-1984 as discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.4.11. Amendment Q 8.1-10 June 30, 1993

                                                                                   .I i

l> Insert A:

             "AF. Regulatory Guide 1.160 The diesel generators will have a maintenance program which         '

complies with Regulatory Guide 1.160, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.4."

                                                                                   .1 f

l l t W' ET W

CESSAR Hinnene. The Lesel geser.bes a;ll k.n r m <;a ic t< a re proge m ca <cco s an ,ain

     'Th e- MaMeanase Rafe ( o cc:rt So, la s ) <ex 3 v.'-l s ace pa J e.{ ta
      ;Te y is h ry Gun'de i. l(,0 h a clinc. % e- ya fr -fo e A e. dresei 3 eaerntoer, their normal vibration environment and qualiried to Seismic                           .

Category I requirements. The emergency diesel generator engine-mounted components and piping are Seismic Category I, seismically qualified in accordance with IEEE Standard 344-1987.

   'The dicscl gcncratcrs will have a r.sintend h y% um wiiivii cumylies with Option 4 of CECY 03-00!.

8.3.1.1.4.1 Starting Circuits Each emergency diesel generator is automatically started and loaded by the ESF-Component Control System Emergency Diesel Loading Sequencer as discussed in Section 7.3.1.1.2.3. In addition to the above automatic start, each diesel generator can also be manually started for test and maintenance purposes from the control room or from the local diesel control panel. 8.3.1.1.4.2 Starting System Each emergency diesel generator has an independent air starting ' system with storage to provide at least five fast starts. The Diesel Generator Starting Air System is further described in Section 9.5.6. - 8.3.1.1.4.3 Combustion Air System Refer to Section 9.5.8 for a description of the Diesel Air Intake and Exhaust System. 8.3.1.1.4.4 Emergency Diesel Generator Protection Systems The emergency diesel generator protection systems initiate automatic and ir.=ediate protective actions to prevent or limit damage to the emergency diesel generator. The following protective trips are provided to protect each diesel generator at all times and are not bypassed when the emergency diesel generator is started as a result of an ESF-CCS automatic or manual start signal. These are the only trips that will lock out the diesel generator breaker. A. Engine Overspeed. B. Generator Differential Protection. l l l C. Low-low Lube Oil Pressure. D. Generator Voltage-Controlled Overcurrent (Protection From External Faults). The diesel generator circuit breaker will trip during an accident condition or during periodic testing upon activation of the f voltage controlled overcurrent relay (51VC). During an accident > l l Amendment R 8.3-10 July 30, 1993

2 CESSARnnLum

                                 -                                                                      j I

( !

B-56: DIESEL RELIABILITY )

                                                                                                      .g i

i ISSUE l , Generic Safety Issue (GSI) B-56 in NUREG-0933 (Reference 1), ) addresses emergency diesel generator reliability. The reliability I goal identified in NSAC-108, (Reference 2) for-emergency diesel generator startup, is between .95 and .975 per demand. Typical onsite electrical - distributicn systems for plants use. j diesel generators as an emergency source of power. These ; emergency power sources supply safety-related equipment, which is ; used to prevent or mitigate accidents, in the event of a loss of l offsite power. ; Because of the safety significance of the emergency diesel i generators, limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were l developed and placed in the plant technical specifications. These ] LCOs require periodic testing. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) sent > to the NRC document problems encountered-during periodic testing l. of the emergency diesel generators (to demonstrate operability) . As discussed in NUREG-0933, a review of the LERs conducted by the b , ( NRC revealed that a diesel generators starting reliability is, on l the average, about .94 per demand. Thus, the NRC determined that ! there was a need to upgrade the reliability of emergency diesel ' ) generators. A new reliability of between .95 and .975 per demand i for emergency diesel generator deaign, operation and periodic

testing, was established in Regulatory Guide 16, Ecc . ; (ORArg (Reference 't5). /. /55 i ,

l . ecific emergency diesel generator starting rell= ; identifiec .- c. Guide 1.155 (Reference 'o e same as l P .e., it ranges from .95 in Regulatory Guide 1.9, . ! to .975 per demand). - o ution . - ated Unresolved ! Safety Issue ' n-44, Station Blackout, addresses .. t ! e, . o station-blackout conditions. i ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA , 1 i The acceptance criterion for the resolution of GSI B-56, is that ; emergency diesel generator design, operation, and periodic j ] testing shall ensure, as a minimum, a starting reliability of .95 l per demand, as identified in Regulatory Guider 1.;, Rce . ; j ( Orl'.rT) and 1.155. j j j 4 l 5 i I J Amendment G l A-105ci April 30, 1990 j

CESSAR n=nemou RESOLUTION t The System 80+ Standard Design includes an onsite electrical distribution system which employs two redundant and independent : Class 1E load group divisions. The Class 1E safety loads, are ! capable of being supplied, in decreasing priority, from tne unit l main turbine generator, unit main transformers, the emergency i diesel generators and the alternate AC source (See CESSAR-DC, { Section 8.1). l As described above, each Class 1E division can be supplied with emergency standby power from an independent diesel generator. The emergency diesel generator is designed and sized with sufficient capacity to operate all the needed safety-related loads powered l I from its respective Class 1E Safety Division Bus. Furthermore, : - each Division can be supplied from the alternate AC source (gas turbine) which is diverse from the diesel generators. Also, the alternate AC source is designed to the same reliability criteria l . as the emergency diesel generator. > Each diesel generator is specified to start reliably and, with . i present technology, industry experience has shown that a starting ] reliability of .986 per demand may be achieved as identified in ,. I the EPRI ALi4R Utility Requirements Document, (Reference 5) . The I, ; emergency diesel generators' required start and loading response ; j times have been eased and the diesel generators are now required l j to attain rated voltage and frequency and to begin accepting - load within 20 seconds after receipt of a start signal. This ! 0 l reduces their starting stress and contributes to improved i reliability over the life of the units. These response times are l necessary to meet the times assumed in Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ] (See CESSAR-DC, Section 8.3.1.1.4). 1 f Improvements in the System 80+ Standard Design loading sequence , i logic prevent unnecessary load shedding and reloading due to j subsequent emergency safeguards actuation signal (ESFAS) i actuations. This provides additional overall reliability in

response to changing plant conditions by reducing unnecessary transient demands on the diesel generators.

1 ! A variety of tests are performed to assure emergency diesel ! generator reliability and operability. In addition to factory f tests, a number of preoperational and onsite acceptance tests and periodic tests are conducted on each diesel generator and auxiliaries. These tests are identified in CESSAR-DC, Section 8.3.1.1.4.11. Also, conditions for operation are imposed to ensure continual reliability. The periodic testing of the diesel , generator meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.9, 2. . ;

        ,me. -                                                                                                    ;

q s - ,. , ' t Amendment G l A-105e April 30, 1990 l l

CESSAR Ennncmos 1 l In summary, the System 80+ Standard Design uses diesel generators i as emergency power sources which are incorporated in the onsite electrical distribution system and which have a diverse backup (i.e., the alternate AC source). , The onsite electrical distribution system meets the guidance given in Regulatory Guides 1.9p(Ilev. 2 ' DPl.FT) and 1.155. The *

       -dicccl gcncratcrs will cczply with Optics. 4 of CEC'l 23 044. In view of all the me sures, this issue is resolved for the System 80+ Standard Design REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0933, "A Status Report on Unresolved Safety Issues",

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission, January 1989.

2. NSAC-108, " Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators at U.S. Nuclear Plants", Electric Power Research Institute, September 1986.

'1

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 ("FJST-) , " Selection, Design, Qualification, Testing, and Reliability of Diesel Generator

Units Used as Onsite Electrical Power Systems at Nuclear i Power Plants", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, !

               "Ovent r 19S3.

Jul 11'13 3

4. Regulatory Guide 1.155, " Station Blackout", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1988.

5. EPRI, " Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document", Electric Power Research Institute, Chapter 11, April 1989.

6. -+ 9EC'Z- 2 3 - 0 4 4 , "Felicy Issus Essolutica cf Generic S&fsty lasuu B-36, Diesel Generster RelidLil2L f, Tchrucry 22, 1002. i

, 66 !

            ~/0 CFil $C.Q " Rey;remeafs & mul+or:9 ne. e [ed:g ea p33 ,(                                 l m sin s taa ac e .z + ij v e lea r power p lu }S, " ;ss a ef 9,,j'q,,

7. R e y (~Y*r3 Guih 1.16 0 , K o v, O, Effe ci:venesy ;

J nf a :aie aa~ce d Nnica c Po ac gfog;fo,;,k" riaai fLe Ts m 13 4 Tn e );es d meutednes will have a. ma:~ 4ema ce. p,-oJ o rm e

                                                                                              ;n
                            ./

a ccord<ace .vit11 The Ilfaraieraa ace Rule. (ta c fR S c. (,5 ) awak 3

           } J C A

4 ce- f ro videk s ,a Re A&j bv'IL I- I l* 0 h Ac E e ve.

chese g en e cd * "S. M 3 ea[5 -fo r iht . Amendment R l A-105f July 30, 1993

DSER Commitment on Diesel Generator Local and Control Room Alarms ! f r i

Background:

l . Previous responses to the NRC regarding emergency diesel l generator local and control room alarms resulted in the following ! statement being made as part of the Draft Safety Evaluation i Report for the System 80+ design (refer to NUREG-1462, Draft l Safety Evaluation Report, issued 9/92): ; I "The plant will include local and control room alarms for : each DG. The applicant states that it will determine the , number of control room alarms and the words to be placed on 1 the alarm windows for each DG annunciator after the NRC i certifies the System 80+ design. This aspect of the design will be verified as part of the.ITAAC program." { Discussion: } These issues were initially addressed within the diesel generator i: I ITAAC. However, the issues concern Human Factors Engineering and the Man-Machine Interface (MHI) design. In addition, as ITAAC. l has developed, the treatment of MMI issues has been established ~! I for the main control room (MCR). Proposed Resolution: It is proposed that the following statement, or content I reflective of it, be included in the SER, as appropriate:

                      "The plant will include local and control room alarms for                                    !

each DG. The applicant states that it will determine the l number of control room alarms and the words to be placed on i the alarm windows for each DG annunciator after the NRC i certifies the System 80+ design. Availability of local and l Main Control Room (MCR) DG annunciators, displays, and j controls will be verified as part of the validation and -t verification effort." Other specific actions which will be taken to document this i l 4 ! programmatic change are as follows: l

         -            ABB-CE will place the diesel generator local control panels                                  !

in the Human Factors database, which will address alarm and annunciator availability. Control Room panel design for } diesel generator control is already included in this i j database. l;

The suitability of alarms and annunciators for their f applications will be addressed in procurement by the Human j Factors Standards, Guidelines, and Bases, j

                                                                                                                   )
           . _ . _ . ~ . . ,_ -. _.               -    .    . . . _ , , _ _ .                , , . . - _   . , .

1 CESSAR !ancmou 8.1.4.5 COL Action Items A. The COL applicant will specify the immediate and alternate sources of offsite power for the 4.16 kv ESF buses. This will be decidad based on site reliability analysis. B. The COL applicant will perform final sizing calculations for the Class 1E emergency power diesel generators. C. The COL applicant will perform final sizing calculations for the Alternate AC Source. D. The COL applicant will specify all items with periodic ' testing commitments not covered by the technical specifications.

E. The COL applicant will periodically test relay sensors such as current transformers and potential transfcrmers before installing them and periodically thereafter.

F. The COL applicant will consider hazards in various areas of l the plant in which Class 1E systems are located and analyze these areas for pipe whip, missiles, and other hazards. Class 1E cables will not be routed through hazardous areas except those cables which terminate at devices or loads within the area. ,_ ,gg g g,4 C G. The COL applicant will erform preliminary fault studies l under bounding conditions to determine the fault levels to which the electrical distribution equipment must l be specified. Final fault studies will be done using actual systems data. pgg , H. The COL applicant will perform voltage studies #to determine j

the voltage levels on the electrical distribution system buses in confor=ance with Section 3 of Branch Technical Position PSB-1. Additionally, the results of these studies shall be verified by test in accordance with Section 4 of PSB-1.

I. The COL applicant will provide a process for periodically l verifying and calibrating relay trip setpoints. Dset-i- E. J. The COL applicant will perform protective coordination studies to verify that breakers closest to a device l fault opens before upstream breakers. K. The COL applicant will perform a dynamic analysis to l ! demonstrate that the Class 1E diesel generators are capable of starting and accelerating the required loads without exceeding the applicable voltage and frequency criteria per Regulatory Guide 1.9. Amendment Q 8.1-13 - June 30, 1993

1 l

                                                                                                            .i 1

5 9 I Insert c: i. t

             . . . using IEEE 141-1986 and/or other acceptable industry standards or practices. . . "
                                                                                                        - t Insert D:                                                                                        ;
                                                                                                        'i
             . . . using IEEE 141-1986 and/or other acceptable' industry                               ,

standards or practices. . . " ,

[ I J Insert E: '

             . . . using IEEE 141-1986, IEEE 242-1986 and/or other acceptable                          [

industry standards or practices. . . " ;

l

                                                                                                        'i i

1 p 1 l

a. ,

I I 4

                                              ~
    , f -  t       y,-  e           y c+ m- - - - - - . ~ - - - -      +,e.               - . - - - - .

CESSAR 8a'rincuiu S. The COL applicant snall provide each switchyard with two j redundant and independent 125V de power systems to provide 125V de power for all relaying, controls, and monitoring equipment in the switchyards. The COL applicant shall provide breakers for each switchyard l T. with redundant and independent trip circuits powered from two independent 125V de power sources. U. The COL applicant shall provide each switchyard with independent primary and secondary protective relaying l schemes. V. The COL applicant will determine the final rating of the Unit Auxiliary Transformers and the Reserve Auxiliary l Transformers. These transfor=crs are sized such that they supply their maximum design load within their self cooled rating. Additional margin is achieved by double or triple rating them to increase their capacity by 33 1/3% and 66 2/3% respectively. W. The COL applicant will determine the final rating of the vital batteries, chargers and inverters. The batteries are sized in accordance with IEEE 485 for the duty cycles specified in the CESSAR-DC. The battery chargers are sized to supply the largest combined demand of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the plant during which these demands occur. The inverters are sized to supply their maximum loads plus a margin of 15%. ' Lurr tb X. The COL applicant shall calculate relay and timer settings l for the first and second level of undervoltage protection provided for the Class 1E and permanent non-safety switchgear in accordance with Branch Technical Position PSB-1. Y. The COL applicant shall perform a voltage analysis and design an accelerated load sequence for loading the alternate offsite source which will allow the Class 1E switchgear voltage to return to 95% before sequencing the next load group. Z. The COL applicant shall establish a reliability based l maintenance program for plant electrical power systems. AA. The COL applicant shall verify that harmonic distortion waveforms do not prevent Class 1E equipment frem performing their safety function. Amendment Q 8.1-15 June 30, 1993 ;

4 F i p f I i 1 3 h J Insert B: _ . 2 Channel batteries and division batteries are rated to withstand the short circuit contribution from two chargers and a battery. L f A 3 ( l ' l f

i

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i e b I

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I i i h l i h

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         +-6--,         ,y --  -w-      s = 1--   w -r       .      , _ . , . , , - -             - w -

CESSAR nainewo,. A further description of the methods used to comply with the . intent of this standard and Regulatory Guide regarding physical identification and independence of redundant power sources, ' switchgear, inverters, motor control centers and related cabling is contained in Sections 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.4. l 8.3.1.2.7 Compliance with IEEE Standard 379-1977 S.i i The single f ailure criterion as set forth in +r* of IEEE Standard ! l (,e3-ngo 270 1071 and interpreted in IEEE Standard 379-1977 is applied to : the design and analysis of the Class 1E AC Power System. j Any single f ailure within the Class 1E Auxiliary Power System I will not prevent proper Class 1E AC Power System action when ; i required. t 8.3.1.2.8 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 i The mechanical, electrical, and test guidance as set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.63 for the design, construction, and I installation of electric penetration assemblies in the , containment structure are followed. All electrical circuits which go through containment penetration-

 -                  assemblies vill be provided with redundant protective devices

, unless the maximum current available in the circuit is less than i i the continuous rating of the penetration assembly (RTD, .! thermocouple, transducer, and annunciator circuits). j Redundant protective devices for circuits passing through 1 4 containment penetration assemblies will conform to all the l requirements of IEEE Standard 741-1990. The primary and backup , protective devices will be set with corresponding breaker trip times taken into account to ensure circuit interruption prior to j reaching penetration assembly maximum time-current capabilities. : This protection will ba designed to undergo periodic testing to verify equipment operational status as outlined in Section 7.3 of , IEEE Standard 741-1990. l The . primary and secondary overcurrent protection provided for each cable type which per.atrates containment will meet the requirements of independence and testing capabilities of IEEE ; Standard 603-1980, Sections 5.6 and 5.7. Redundant protection ' channels will be designed for independence to ensure proper operation in any event (including a random nonsafety equipment ; failure) which requires the protection circuit to be activated. [ ' Protection systems will be designed to allow circuits and devices i ' to be tested while maintaining their capability to perform i protective functions unless this will adversely affect safety or operability of the unit. , r Amendment-J 8.3-28 _ April 30, 1992

r

CESSAR Ennnem. Cable trays and conduit are located a safe distance from the high temperature piping to preclude the necessity of reducing the cable ampacity as a result of increased ambient temperature. Power cables shall be routed away from control and instrumentation cables. to prevent faulty operation which is caused by the electro =agnetic interference by the power cables. Multi-level cable tray systems provide, as a minimum, one-foot, four-inch vertical spaces between the bottom of the upper tray and the top of the lower tray, and two feet of horizontal space between adjacent trays. Any reduction of these distances will require a barrier. Drip loops are provided in conduit runs at the inlet to electrical devices where c.onduit anters from ~ the top and when required to maintain device quali ication as an alternative to device-sealing type hardware. Watertight sealing of all electrical conduit-to-junction boxes and conduit-to-terminal box connection points for safety-related equipment located in areas of the reactor building and areas that are potentially subject to high temperature steam or water impingement shall be provided. Box drain holes and equipment interfaces shall be in conformance with test setup established ' during the equipment qualification testing and with the vendor's recommendations. bip* unicht conduit, fittings, and cable tray materiale arc-utilized in lieu uf .ipid eteel. Tne"11Lun or intermediate =etal conduit nv hina rigia cuusit 4e utilized where t-echuwally acceptable (e.g., outside containment). In cable tunnels, in lica of ceiling supports, large seismic cable tray support structures are mounted on floors. Precast concrete trenches, ductbanks, and manholes are used whenever technically acceptable. Planning of cable pulls is included in the design of equipment locations, cable tray routings, and conduit routings to maximize group pulling of cables. Color-coded jacketing for multi-paired conductors is specified where possible. Exothermic cadwelded connections are used in the installation of the ground grid system in lieu of wedge pressure cable connectors where possible. Amendment-L 8.3-36 February 28, 1993

CESSAR Eannemou t For Limited hazard areas, the minimum separation distance between associated circuits and non-Class 1E and other redundant circuits shall be 3 ft between trays separated horizontally and 5 ft between trays separated vertically. When the plant arrangements preclude maintaining the minimum separation distance, between associated circuits and non-Class 1E and other redundant circuits, these circuits shall be run in enclosed raceways, or barriers shall be provided between circuits. The minimum distance between these enclosed raceways shall be 1 inch. For hazard areas, those areas of the plant subject to pipe failure hazards, missile hazards, or fire hazards, no class 1E or ' associated circuit cables or raceways shall be routed through the area, except those cables which terminate at devices or loads within the area. For those cables which must enter the area, the minimum distance between non-Class 1E circuit cable trays and Class 1E or associated circuit cable trays shall be 3 ft between trays separated horizontally and 5 ft between trays separated vertically. The minimum distances of 3 and 5 feet could be increased based on the results of the cables proximity to hot pipe analysis. Where plant arrangements preclude maintaining this minimum distance, the circuits requiring separation shall be run in enclosed raceways or barriers shall be provided between these circuits. The minimum distance between these enclosed

 .           raceways shall be 1 inch.                                               ,

8v".1.4.0 Electrical "Onetr4 tic" Redundant ans 1E containment electrical pene ons are I6 physically separa and electrically isolat o maintain the y b , independence of Class ircuits and p uipment so that safety functions required during and'fc11owing any design basis event , G'1 can be accomplished. The rpdurRTanbpapetrations are located in four quadrants of the containment each entdosed in a penetration i A roc =. The mini- M eparation between elect'D r penetrations containing -Class 1E circuits and penetrati(onsWtaining l Class ' or associated cables is 3 foot horizontally and l j ert^1cally. l 8.3.1.5 Cable Derating and Cable Trav Fill l 8.3.1.5.1 Cable Derating The cable ampacities for both AC and DC power cables are derated per IEEE Standard S-135 and IPCEA P-46-426 to assure minimum degradation of cable insulation caused by high temperatures, should the cables be loaded to their maximum ampacity rating. The maximum a=pacities for all power cables are determined by , multiplying the appropriate cable manufacturer's IPCEA cable I ampacity rating by 0.7. This provides a 30% margin between each Amendment Q 8.3-38 June 30, 1993

Insert A:

       "8.3.1.4.6       Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies             {

I Redundant Class lE containment electrical penetration assemblies i are physically separated and electrically isolated to maintain , the independence of Class lE circuits and equipment so that I safety functions required during and following any design basis I event can be accomplished. The redundant containment electrical ! penetration assemblies are located in four quadrants of the ! containment, each enclosed in a penetration room. The minimum ; separation between containment electrical penetration assemblies containing non-Class 1E circuits and containment electrical ; penetration. assemblies containing Class 1E or associated cables is 3 feet horizontally and 5 feet vertically. Containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against overcurrent by either use of independent overcurrent [ protection devices in series or by analyses which conclude that t the maximum overcurrent of the penetration assembly circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the penetration assembly. ! When independent overcurrent protection devices in series are i used, they shall employ the following features: i i A. The two independent devices will be independent such that i failure of one device will not adversely affect the other. B. The two independent devices will be located on separate ; panels or will be separated by barriers. l C. the two independent devices will not depend on the same ' power supply to accomplish their safety related function of protecting the containment penetration. D. Fault current clearing time curves for the containment electrical-penetration assembly's primary and secondary current interrupting devices plotted against the thermal ; capability curve of the containment electrical penetration i assembly will show proper coordination. E. The devices will be capable of being functionally tested and calibrated." j r I t 1 I i l

                                                                      --- , w.- w

i CESSAR nainemo,, , f limiting battery chargers are normally connected to their . respective 250 volt DC distribution centers to maintain the i charge on the batteries. The chargers are sized to recharge the battery or to carry the largest single DC load for testing t purposes. Power to the battery chargers is from their [ q respective permanent non-safety buses. Battery installations i are designed to meet the intent of IEEE standard 484-1987. j 8.3.2.1.1.4 Alternate AC Source 125V DC Power System o The 125V power system for the onsite AAC consists of a local 125V battery, battery charger and distribution panel as shown i on Figure 8.3.2-1. This system is designed to supply the DC power necessary to start and operate the AAC. The battery ;

charger is powered from a non-safety 480V AC MCC. The battery installation is designed to meet the intent of IEEE Standard !

484-1987. [ 8 . 3 . 2 .1. 2 Class 1E DC Power Systems [ F, w e,- 5 3 ,+cm ' 8.3.2.1.2.1 125V DC r 6%( and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and i Control Power System yoyp p ' Wfd P,-r spfem 7 1 The 125V DC nd 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power

a reliable, continuous source of power to Class !

j system providep' ion and controls. Thc cy terk consists of four 1E instrumentat

independent and physically separated load groups that supply instrumentation and control channels A, B, C, and D. Each load i t group includes a battery, a battery charger, a DC distribution i j center and associated DC panelboard, an inverter, and an AC !

panelboard. Each instrumentation bus is powered from a ! separate battery to provide stable and noise 6 free power to its ( respective control channel. Thts systems id shown on Figure ! 8.3.2-2. wse ;~wyJe). "n l f The Divisions I and II each also include an additional battery, i battery charger, DC distribution center, and associated DC l panelboard, inverter and AC panel board for their respective i Divisions and switchgear controls and indication. W+d P* -<e %s 4*m The 125V DC (and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power 4 system"is a- /eismic Category It systems and -iflocated in the Control Building. The 125 volt batteries are located in their separate respective channelized rooms within the Control

Building.h'The vital insil-cantatica and control power systems

, a. r t is aft ungrounded system S. Refer to Tables 8.3.2-3 and 8.3.2-4 for typical AC and DC vital buses loads. i l l l Amendment J l 8.3-42 _ April 30, 1992 ; l

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i Insert F: } b "Although the 125 V DC Vital Power System and the 120 V AC Vital ! Instrumentat' and Control Power System are treated separately, i together they form an integrated system which. . . -! 1

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l CEeseGMElC C ACERTIFICATION D DESIGN l l 8.3.2.1.2.1.1 125V DC Vital I.m u ;Lteti;L ;;d C;;t;;l Power Battery Chargers l Each load group of the 125V DC Vital Inst w an;;;i;n ; ,d C;u;;;l Power System is provided with a' separate and . independent 125 volt battery charger. The battery chargers of ! load group channels A and C are powered from Division I of the Class 1E Safety Auxiliary Power System. The chargers of load , group channels B and D are powered from Division II. Each , battery charger is capable of supplying the largest combined demand of the various steady-state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of

the plant during which these demands occur.

Each battery charger normally supplies the loads of its ! associated distribution center while maintaining a float charge ! on its associated battery. The battery chargers are designed i to prevent a battery from discharging back into any internal charger load in the event of a charger malfunction or AC power i supply failure. . 4 Should a battery be removed from service, either the normal

charger associated wi* n the isolated battery or a bus tie to one of the other DC buses in the same Division can be closed such that the two inter-tied channels would have one battery ,

and two chargers in operation. Each charger can recharge its associated battery, assuming the !

battery was discharged for one hour, in approximately 8 hours while also supplying worst case steady-state loads. ,

I Each battery charger is provided with an overvoltage sensiniJ i circui+ 1 The Class 1E DC loads have an operating voltage range of 105 to 140 volts. The minimum battery discharge voltage is 105V DC. [

                                                                     ' - - ' ^ "-- '

8.3.2.1.2.1.2 '125V DC Vital ! Power Batteries l I Each of the independent load group channels and divisions of

;        125 Volt DC Vital "- " ~-                                   Power is provided with a separate and independent 125 volt battery.

Each battery is sized to supply one division battery's loads and one channel of loads for a period of 2 hours. In addition, ! each battery provides a SBO coping capability which, assuming l . i manual load shedding or the use of load management programs, l 4 . 1 ! ] Amendment Q 1 8.3-43 June 30, 1993

                                                        -                               -r  --_--n-   g

CESSAR Mai"lCATION : i l exceeds 2 hours and, as a minimum, permits operating the , instrumentation and control loads associated with the l turbine-driven emergency feedwater pumps for 8 hours. Battery l'

installations are designed to meet the intent of IEEE Standard 484-1987 and are qualified using methodologies described in IEEE Standard 535-198ti. ,

8.3.2.1.2.1.3 125V DC Vital ILet. _estaties and Cee;;;l I Power Distribution Centers and Panalboards , A 125V DC distribution center is provided for each of the 125V DC Vital !nctru;;ntation and Ocntr:1 Power System load groups. Each distribution center supplies an independent channel of vital inst;uncntation and ;;ntrellPTnd is powered directly from an independent 125 volt battery and battery charger. Each of the distribution centers supplies one DC r panelboard and one 125V DC - 120V AC static inverter. Each Division I and II distribution center also powers its i respective emergency diesel generator. 8.3.2.1.2.1.4 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control - Power System The 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System consists of four separate and independent 120 volt AC power . panelboards, each powered from a 125 volt DC load group . distribution center via a 125V DC - 120V AC static inverter. ! This power supply system is designed to provide an output frequency of 60 0.5 Hz and voltage regulation to within 2% at : full rated load for a load power factor greater than 0.8 ! (towards unity). Each 120 volt AC power panelboard supplies l one channel of AC vital instrumentation and controls. A manual

!     make-before-break bypass switch is provided to bypass the                       l

. inverter for maintenance. An autostatic transfer switch is ! used to instantly transfer the load from the output of the ! inverter to the regulating transformer which is fed from a , Class 1E 480V MCC. The 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and l Control Power System is shown in Figure 8.3.2-2. ; The channelized portion of the AC vital instrumentation and . control power system is an ungrounded system. The 120V AC power feeds are provided to each redundant i ESF-Component Control System to enhance their availability. ) One feed is from the Class 1E inverter via the vital I&C i' channel power panel as shown on Figure 8.3.2-2. The other feed is from the same Class 1E channel 480/120V AC regulated transformer. 1 c d Amendment- Q l i 8.3-44 June 30, 1993 i

                                                                                              ,t ke!      h h khk bhr$ ICATION I

i U d Power S j5+tm 8.3.2.1.2.1.5 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation ' and Control Power System Status Information j The following parameters or status points are monitored in the f control room for the 125 volt DC and 120 volt AC Vital I&C { power systems: gg g A. Battery charger output voltage low. (Alarm) j B. Battery charger output voltage high. (Alarm) t C. Loss of AC input to battery charger. (Alarm) ! i D. Battery charger output circuit breaker open. (Alarm and { Indication) l E. Distribution center main circuit breaker open. (Alarm and l Indication) j F. Battery circuit breaker open. (Alarm and Indication) !; G. Vital distribution center tie breaker closed. (Alarm and ; Indication) ! i H. Vital 125 volt DC panelboard undervoltage. (Alarm) : I. Battery positive or negative leg ground. (Alarm) l 8 , l J. Battery Voltage. (High and Low Alarm and Indication) l K. Inverter 125 volt DC input failure. (Alarm) l < l L. Inverter AC output voltage low. (Alarm) _j M. Inverter manual bypass switch in alternate source position. (Alarm and Indication) j i N. Inverter alternate source abnormal (voltage or frequency) . l (Alarm) l l l l O. 120 volt AC inverter panelboard undervoltage. (Alarm) P. Static inverter manual bypass switch position. (Alarm and i Indication) l Q. 120 volt AC regulated distribution center breaker status. l (Alarm and Indication) l I j R. Battery Discharge Alarm (Alarm) { S. Battery Current (Charge and Discharge) (Indication) Amendment-Q 8.3-45 - June 30, 1993 1 1 . - . -

CESSAR naincmon l 1 l

i 8.3.2.1.2.2.2 Periodic Tests Inspection, maintenance, and testing of Class 1E DC systems are , performed on a periodic testing program in accordance with the ' recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.22. The periodic testing : program is scheduled so as not to interfere with unit ! cperation. Where tests do not interfere with unit operation, ! system and equipment tests may be scheduled with the nuclear ! unit in operation. The continuous operation of the vital instrumentation and l control system inverters is indicative of their operability and , functional performance since accident conditions do not i substantially change their load. The means for manual transfer t to the various power sources available to the 120 volt AC vital r power system can be tested on a routine basis to assure their operation. , t 8.3.2.2 Analysis l V;M Power S'fW , The 12SV DC (and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power l [ System are Class 1E systems, and as such, are designed to meet ! the requirements of General Design Critaria 17 and 18, and the ! intent of Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.32. For a discussion of ; i additional Regulatory Guides and Industry Standards applied in the design of the Onsite DC Power System, refer to Section-8.1.4. Refer to Table 58.3.2-1 and 8.3.2-2 for a single failure {t analysis of these systems. 8.3.2.2.1 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.32, IEEE Standards 308-1980 and 450-198F ! 7 s The design of Class 1E DC power systems complies with the ; intent of IEEE Standard 308-1980 as augmented by Regulatory . Guide 1.32. The Class 1E batteries are given a service test at l an interval not to exceed 18 months. The maintenance, testing, ' and replacement of the Class 1E batteries comply with the intent of IEEE Standard 450-1987. This includes safety i precautions; monthly, quarterly and annual inspections and i appropriate corrective actions resulting from the same; { acceptance and performance testing; battery replacement i criteria; and, proper record keeping. ! 8.3.2.2.2 Class 1E Equipment Qualification Requirements l The seismic and environmental qualifications of Class 1E DC power system equipment are discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11, r respectively. : i I r Amendment-J ; 8.3-47 - April 30, 1992 i

CESSAR n!'ancmo,. TABLE 8.3.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) 4 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE 125V DC CLASS 1E VITAL [ INSTRUNCNTATIGN AND CGRTRGL POWER SYSTEM ; 3

Component Mal function Comments & Consecuences _

1. 480V AC power Loss of power No consequences - power from supply to chargers to one battery is available to supply 3 power without interruption. 4 .

2. Battery chargers Loss of power The 125 volt DC bus continues to ;

from one receive power from its respective battery without interruption. Severe internal faults may cause

high short circuit currents to flow with the resulting voltage -

reduction on the 125 volt DC bus " until the fault is cleared by the isolating circuit breakers. Complete loss of voltage on one 125 volt DC bus may result if the - battery circuit breakers open. l

3. 125V DC batteries Loss of power Isolating circuit breaker manually i from one opened to clear the battery from Division or the bus on a fault condition Channel battery thereby allowing the battery ?

charger to continue supplying power to the connected loads. No safety significance - an !

independent division of 125V DC is 4 provided for the redundant diesel '

generator. An alarm in the

control room alerts the operator ,

l of the malfunction. [ t i

4. 125V DC P and N buses Power is lost to the !

distribution shorted on one instrumentation and control : centers Channel or Division serviced by ! the shorted distribution center. : Remaining redundant division j channels are available for the i safe operation of the Unit. ! 4 Amendment E , December 30, 1988 i

CESSAR nancme. TABLE 8.3.2-1 (Cont'd) l (Sheet 2 of 2) FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE 125V DC CLASS 1E VITAL i INSTRUNENTATION ANO CONTROL POWER SYSTEM ! i Comoonent Mal function Coments & Consecuences ] I

5. 125V DC distribution Grounding of The 125 volt DC system is an !

centers a single bus ungrounded electrical system.

Ground detector equipment monitors f and alarms a ground anywhere on the 125 volt DC system. A single !

ground does not cause any malfunction or prevent operation ' of any safety feature. l

6. 125V DC distribution Gradual decay The 125 volt bus is monitored to centers of voltage on detect the voltage decay on the i one bus and initiate an alarm at a i voltage setting where the battery can still deliver power for safe ,

and orderly shutdown of the unit. ' Upon detection power can be restored either by correcting the , deficiency, by switching to a redundant source.

7. DC distribution Cables Same coment as 4. Also, all j centers incoming shorted on incoming feeder cables are feeder cables one provided with isolating circuit ;

breakers that isolate the

                                                " shorted" cable on a sustained fault condition.                    ,

8. 125V DC Bus shorted Voltage on the shorted 125 volt DC .

instrumentation and bus system of the affected unit ! control power decays until isolated by the i panelboards isolating circuit breakers. 1 Remaining redundant division ; 3 channels are available for the : safe operation of the Unit. l I i Amendment- E l , December-30, 1988 !

i I 1 Figure 8.3.2-2 Class lE 125 VDC Vital Power System and 120 VAC Vital i Instrumentation and Control Power Supply System Diagram < i The following drawing reflects revisions to the Class Note: lE 125 VDC Vital Power System and 120 VAC Vital

Instrumentation and control Power Supply System ;

Diagram I

1. 4248-00-1607.00 E713-00-04 Rev. P2 :

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CESSAR EEinneimu - I r.i.v.s (coi) \ r AB. The COL applicant shall develop a program for maintaining (- ! 1 markings and labeling of safety-related components and l cabling. k- peden un un%l y sis do demesdralc. 4d ibt COL oglise,ct

              %c. D C. S w itch     is twicJ 40 v;iAs1.,r) 1 A c. s h.c-} ct,ww 3 c.c conAriLAion (rom 4wo c ha c r.s canc) m %0 e r y .

I 1 Amendment Q j 8.1-16 June 30, 1993 j

CESSARn h ou Tr.e 480V load center main and feeder breakers are selectively coordinated such that the breaker closest to a fault trips. Their interrupting capacity exceeds their required fault duty. The main breakers are equipped with overcurrent trip devices having long-time and short-time delay functions, and the feeder breakers are equipped with overcurrent trip devices having long-time and instantaneous functions. Each breaker in the auxiliary power system is provided with an anti-pump device. 8.3.1.1.1.5 Normal, Alternato and AAC Circuit Separation The normal and alternate offsite circuits are separated such that a single failure event to one circuit will not effectelectrically the other circuit. This results in two physically and reliable independent lines. The normal and alternate offsite circuits are routed overhead from the grid to their respective switchyards. Each switchyard has redundant 125 VDC power and controls which is physically separated by routing cables in redundant raceway, ductlines or trench, from the device in the switchyard to the relay house and from the relay house to the again routed plant. From the switchyards these lines are overhead to their respective transformers. The Unit Auxiliary Transformers are separated from each other and from the Reserve Auxiliary Transformers and main transformer by the dictcnce recon =cnded by IEEE 070--103". by a minarwm dotance. of 504t. ,

The isolated phase bus, non-segregated phase bus and/or cables located outside the Turbine Building and the Nuclear Island associated with the Unit Auxiliary Transformers, will be separated by a minimum of 50 ft. from the Reserve Auxiliary Transformers. Likewise, the non-segregated phase bus or cables located outside the Turbine Building and the Nuclear Island that are routed from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers to switchgears in the Turbine Building will be separated by a minimum of 50 ft. from other Unit Auxiliary and Main Transformers. Once cables enter the plant, separation is maintained such that a single failure will not effect both circuits. The separation of normal and alternate of fsite power circuits within the Turbine Building and the Nuclear Island will be maintained by floors and walls except within the switchgear room where they will be routed on opposite sides of the room and will be connected to the switchgear lineup on the opposite ends. The circuits associated with the AAC and the offsite power circuits will be routed on different floors within the Turbine Building to the Permanent Non-Safety Switchgear with the "X" and "Y" circuits separated by routing in different areas or on opposite walls to maintain separation. The non-Class 1E Permanent Non-Safety Switchgears ("X" and "Y") are located in the Turbine Building which contains only non-Class 1E cables thus they are physically isolated from Class-1E circuits. Amendment Q 8.3-4 June 30, 1993

CESSAR Ennncum ss.u.v.9sbG _ condition, the relay will activate aThis lockout relay which will lockout relay must be trip the diesel generator breaker. manually re-set. During testing, the relay will trip the breaker relay will be a test lockout relay. This lockout via electrically re-settable by an ESF signal, therefore the diesel generator will continue to be available if needed for an accident condition. The implementation of these protective trips is in accordance with Branch Technical Position EICSB-17. Overspeed protection is provided by an overspeed trip, the set-point is above in Therefore, theaccordance maximum engine speed on a full-load rejection. with Regulatory Guide 1.9, the engine speed resulting from a step increase or decrease in load will not exceed nominal speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint. The following mechanical trips are provided to protect the diesel generators during test periods and while running with offsite power available: A. Low Pressure Turbo Oil. B. Low Pressure Lube Oil. [ C. High Pressure Crankcase. D. High Temperature Bearings. E. High Temperature Lube Oil Out. F. High-High Temperature Jacket Water. G. High Vibration. These mechanical trips are bypassed in the event of an ESF ! actuation condition. The design of the bypass circuitry meets the <> intent of IEEE Standard 070 1071 and RG 1.9. , bO3 ~l9 80 In addition, the following electrical trips are provided to l 1 protect the emergency diesel generators during testing periods: A. Generator Instantaneous Overcurrent Protection. B. Generator Loss of Field Protection. C. Generator Reverse Power Protection. D. Generator Ground Protection. Amendment Q 8.3-11 June 30, 1993

CESSARnainc- , r

\'

These electrical trips are bypassed in the event of an ESF actuation condition, concurrent with a Loss of Of fsite Power. 1071 The bypass circuitry meets the intent of IEEE Standard-270 603-1980 4 and RG 1.9. 8.3.1.1.4.5 Control Room Indication of Emergency Diesel Generator Operational Status Various monitoring devices are provided in the diesel room and the control room to give the operator The the complete following is a status listing of theof operability for the diesels. typical parameters monitored: t A. Lube Oil Temperature and Pressures. B. Bearing Temperatures. C. Cooling Water Temperatures and Pressures. D. Generator Parameters. E. Speed. F. Starting Air Pressure. In order to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.47 and Branch Technical Position PSB-2, the followingofconditions are monitored the emergency diesel to determine the operable status generator: A. Cooling water not available. B. Diesel generator breaker racked out. C. Diesel generator overspeed. D. Loss of control power. E. Generator fault. F. Low air and oil pressure. G. Maintenance mode. Conditions that render the emergency diesel generators incapable l of responding to an ESF-CCS automatic start signal will activate bypassed / inoperable status indication in the control room, in accordance with Sections 7.1.2.21 (conformance to Regulatory and 7.1.2.21.3 (ESF components inoperable). Guide 1.47) Unambiguous indications are provided that separately specify the resulting unavailability of (.. disabling conditions and the emergency diesel generators: 1) for each diesel generator and 2) Amendment O June 30, 1993 l 8 . '* -12 \ l i

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8.3.2.1.2.1.5 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation

and Control Power System Status Information i

The following parameters or status points are monitored in the ! control room for the 125 volt DC and 120 volt AC Vital IEC power systems: } A. Battery charger output voltage low. (Alarn) B. Battery charger output voltage high. (Alarm) C. Loss of AC input to battery charger. (Alarm) D. Battery charger output circuit breaker open. (Alarm and f Indication) E. Distribution center main circuit breaker open. (Alarm and ; Indication) ! i F. Battery circuit breaker open. (Alarm and Indication) G. Vital distribution center tie breaker closed. (Alarm and [ Indication) i e- H. Vital 125 volt DC panelboard undervoltage. (Alarm) ; i ! I. Battery positive or negative leg ground. (Alarm) , J. Battery Voltage. (High and Low Alarm and Indication) l 4 K. Inverter 125 volt DC input failure. (Alarm) L. Inverter AC output voltage low. (Alarm) 5 M. Inverter manual bypass switch in alternate source position. (Alarm and Indication) N. Inverter alternate source abnormal (voltage or frequency). (Alarm) i

0. 120 volt AC inverter panelboard undervoltage. (Alarm)

P. Static inverter manual bypass switch position. (Alarm and i Indication) { Q. 120 volt AC regulated distribution center breaker status, f (Alarm and Indication) , t R. Battery Discharge Alarm (Alarm) l Battery Current (Charge and Discharge) (Indication) S. T. 125 v.M DC swHche= - wliu3c. (yg;c.4;Q p Amendment Q i 8.3-45 June 30, 1993

(* w E"C E=G C G A M D R DESIGN CERTIFICATitN I 7.3. l.1. II B. (toNb intent of ICSB-18 to easily allow plant operators to restore electrical power to these valves. These nonsafety-related valves are not classified as

                       " active" valves (i.e., not required to open/close in a safety equence) and it is not necessary to quickly reclose tham for a seal cooler maintenance during a plant shutdown. Ref er to Sections 5.4.1. 2 and 5.4.1.3 for a further description and evaluation of the reactor coolant pumps and their seal cooling.

3. For these motor-operated valves, valve position status is provided in the main control room via the Process-Component Control System (P-CCS) and Data Processing System display devices.

                      -Ao-depicted in CEcc7&OC Figurc '.2-10b, r:ching cut of-breakerc docc not disabic t4tecc valve pocition inputc TNSEKT A 9            to ene p--ccc tecp__cectraircr. 73c uce er c 3ingic ;ce   1 of valve pccition ll=it-cuitchec meetc the intene of Branch Technicci Tccition ! CSS-IS, cince the valvec are eless4 fied ac non-active.

C. Additional System 80+ Control Complex Desien Features The System 80+ advanced man-machine interf w a (MMI) designs include the following additional features to keep the operator informed as to the status of these valves or their impact on their respective system availability:

1. Success Path Monitoring displays are provided in the main control room, as described in CESSAR-DC Section 7.7.1.10. These displays will alarm the unavailability of a SIT due to either its isolating valve closing or its venting, consistent with the recommeM itions of Regulatory Guide 1.47, " Bypassed and InoperC le Status Indication- for Nuclear Power Plant Systems," as described in CESSAR-DC Section 7.1.2.21.

2. Breaker rack out and solenoid fuse removal status information is available in the main control room via the DPS CRT displays.

3. Breaker rack out and solenoid valve fuse removal status information is also provided in the main control room via the ESF-CCS and P-CCS valve control switch open/ closed status lamps being extinguished.

4. The System 80+ control room ESF-CCS and P-CCS interfaces are channelized and specifically designed utilizing fi'. r optic data communications cabling to provide improved isolation and minimize the Amendment Q 8.3-31 June 30, 1993

i INSERT A - j As depicted in CESSAR-DC Fig. 7.3-10b, racking out of breakers does not disable the valve position inputs to the i P-CCS Loop Controller. These inputs are redundant to the limit switch valve position inputs,.therefore, the use of a single set of limit switches meets the redundancy requirements of Branch Technical Position ICSB-18. t I I i i I l f s 6 t t y P i t l 1

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CESSAR naincmo. 7; 9.2.2.2 System Description The CCWS consists of two separate, independent, redundant, closed loop, safety related divisions. Either division of the CCWS is capable of supporting 100% of the cooling functions required for a saf'e reactor shutdown. One component cooling water pump and heat exchanger (matched with operating SSWS division) is required to operate during post-LOCA. Cooling water to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger (s) and the non-essential header (s) is isolated on a SIAS. If these headers f ail to isolate, the idle component cooling water pump in the respective division will automatically start on a low pump l differential pressure signal. This assures that there is no flow degradation to the essential components. Heat is removed from the CCWS by the flow of station service water through the tube side of the component cooling water heat g exchangers. The CCWS operates at a higher pressure than the SSWS 3 thus preventing the leakage of station service water into the v' CCWS in the event of a CCW heat exchanger tube leak. N w E Each division of the CCWS includes two heat exchangers, a surge O tank, two component cooling water pumps, a chemical addition

         .9  tank, a component cooling water radiation monitor, two su=p

_( c pumps, a component cooling water heat exchanger structure sump xge pump, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. No cross connections between the two divisions exist. l 5 j The CCWS provides cooling water to the essential components and c non-essential compone.nt listed in Section 9.2.2.2.2. Essential components are supplied component cooling water by means of 3 Safety class 3 cooling loops. Non-essential components are

supplied component cooling water by means of non-nuclear safety l class cooling loons with the exception of the charging pump minirlow neat exchangers they cnarging pump motor coolers,vand the diesel generator engine starting air aftercoolers which are supplied co=ponent cooling water by means of Safety Class 3 cooling lcops. Containment isolation valves and penetration piping are designed in accordance with Safety Class 2 requirements. The non-essential headers and the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers are isolated automatically on an SIAS. The non-essential headers and the RCP headers isolate on a low-low surge tank level signal. Makeup water to the CCWS is normally supplied by the Demineralized Water Makeup System, described in Section 9.2.3. If the Demineralized Water Makeup System is unavailable, such as during an accident, a backup makeup water line of Seismic {

  .          Category I construction is provided.           This essential safety-
     ~

related makeup water source is from the Station Service Water Amendment R 9.2-23 July 30, 1993

TABLE 9.2.M (Cont'd) (Sheet 10 of 16) TYPICAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM llEAT LOADS AND FLOW REQUIREMENTS REFUELING OPERATIONS Number With Total Number Receiving Total Component ' lleat lo.ad

                                                                                       -                    lleat load                         Flow            Flo w Div.1                 Div. 2    (E + 06 Blu/In)               Div. 1      Div. 2    (gpm)

Shutdown Cooling lieat Exchangers 1 1 60 1 1 26000 Shutdown Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 0.222 1 1 60 Shutdown Cooling Mini Flow fleat Exchangers 1 1 1.36 1 1 320 Safety injection Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 160 Containment Spray lleat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Containment Spray Pump Motor Cookrs 0 0 0 1 1 60 Containment Spray Mini-Flow fleat Exchangers 0 0 0 1 1 320 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Coolers 2 2 0.82 2 2 354 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 1.24 1 1 80 Emergency Feedwater Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 60 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling licat Exchangers

1 1 19.19 1 1 10000l Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 2000 Diesel Generator Encino Starting Air Aftercoolers 0 0 0 2 2 100 Amendment R July 30, 19

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5 INSERT A: (?e.b ko bee t instrument Air Compressor 1 A Inlet Manual 3 i NA / l / - N/A Divisional Separation

Isolation Valve. CC-1649 Instrurnent Air Compressor 18 iniet Manual 3 i NA /1/ - N/A Dnnsional Separation' isolation Valve, CC-1655 Instrument Air Cornpressor 2A Inlet Manual 3 i NA / l / - N/A Divisional Separation' is::lation Valve CC-2649 e Instrument Air Compressor 2B intet Manual 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Isolation Valve, CC-2655 instrument Air Compreasor I A Header Relief 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Valve, CC-1650 Instrument Air Compressor 18 Header Relret 3 i NA / I / - N/A Drvisional Separation
Valve, CC-1656 instrument Air Compressor 2A Header Rehet 3 1 NA/I/- N/A Divisional Separation' Vane, CC-2650 instrument Air Compressor 28 Header Relief 3 i NA/I/- N/A Divisional Separation' Valve, CC-2656 Instrument Air Compressor 1 A Manual Throttle 3 i NA / l / - N/A Divisional separation * / Locked in Valve, CC-1652 Place Instrument Air Compressor 18 Manual Thrcttle 3 i NA / l / - N/A Divisional Separation * / Locked in Valve, CC-1658 Place Instrument Air Compressor 2A Manual Thrcitle 3 I NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' / Locked in Valve, CC-2650 Place Instrument Air Compressor 28 Manual Throttle 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional separation * / Locked in Valve, CC 2658 Place instrument Air Compressor 1 A Outlet Manual 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation
lsolation Valvo, CC-1653 ,

instrument Air Compressor 1B Outlet Manual 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Isolation Valve, CC-1659 Instrument Air Compressor 2A Outlet Manual 3 i NA/I/- ' N/A Divisional Separation' Isolation Valve, CC-2653 Instrument Air Compressor 28 Outlet Manual 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separatton* lsolation Valve, CC 2659 _ _ _ _ _ w._-m __. .+ ___. - . . . ._ =_..m.w_~.m .-n. e..-= ,, ,4-. _m e n .e.-.--.m~.-,,2. _ . . .-n,-~._. = u. e.----.. ..e no w, . _ _ . . ~____._._._m.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - -

TABLE 130-15 ISheet 13 of 20) SYSTEM 80 +

VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL 8 NOTES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL. POWER SOURCE DGE Starting Air Aftercooler 1 A Outlet Manual 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation * / Locke'd Open Isolation Valve, CC-1855 DGE Starting Air Af tercoolet IB Outlet Manual 3 I NA/l/- N/A Divisional Separation * / Locked Open isolation Valve, CC-1861 DGE Starting Air Af tercooler 2A Outlet Manual 3 I NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation * / Locked Open Isolation Valve, CC-2855 DGE Starting Air Af tercooler 2B Outtet Manual 3 i NA / I /- N/A Divisional Separation * / Locked Open isolation Valve, CC-2861 DGE Jacket Water Cooler 1 Inlet Manual 3 i NA/I/- N/A Divisional Separation / Locked Open isolation Valve, CC-1602 DGE Jacket Water Cooler 2 inlet Manual 3 i NA /1/- N/A Divisional Separation / Locked Open

! Isolation Valve, CC-2602 ! DGE Jacket Water Cooler 1 Header Relief 3 i NA/I/- N/A Divisional Separation Valve, CC-1603 DGE Jacket Water Cooler 2 Header Relief 3 i NA /I /- N/A Divisional Separation Valve, CC-2603 DGE Jacket Water Cooler 1 Manual Throttle 3 I NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation / Locked in Valve, CC-1606 Place l DGE Jacket Water Cooler 2 Manual Throttle 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation / Locked in Valve, CC 2606 Place DGE Jacket Water Cooler 1 Outlet Manual 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation / Locked Open isolation Valve, CC-1607 DGE Jacket Water Cooler 2 Outlet Manual 3 i NA / I /- N/A Divisional Separation / Locked Open Isolation Valve. CC-2607

-o

ECW Condenser 1 Miet Manual isolation Valve, 3 i NA/I/- N/A Divisional Separation / Locked Open l CC-1608 j ECW Condenser 2 Inlet Manual isolation Valve, 3 i NA / I /- N/A Divisional Separation i Locked Open l CC-2608 1

IMD IW> O l\ Amendment Q 3, , ,m 2n $nn,

e INSERT 0: tr o eM !l 6 QO) instrument Air Compressor 1 A Flow instrument 3 i NA /1/ - N/A Divisional Separation * - Instrument Air Compressor 18 Flow instrument 3 I NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation * , instrument Air Compressor 2A Flow instrument 3 i j iM / I / - N/A Divisional Separation

Instrument Air Compressor 2B Flow Instrument 3 1
f.A / I / - N/A Divisional Separation
R

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TABLE 130-15 I (Sheet 19 of 20) _.. /\j{i lt15 W l b. SYSTEM 80 +" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL 8 NOTES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL. POWER SDURCE DGE Starting Air Af tercooler I A Flow instrument f 3 i NA/I/- N/A Divisional Separation

DGE Starting Air Aftercoo!er 1B Flow instrument 3 I NA / l / - N/A Divisional Separation
DGE Starting Air Af tercooler 2A Flow instrument 3 i NA / I I- N/A Divisional Separation
DGE Starting Air Altercooler 2B Flow Instrument 3 1 NA /1/ - N/A Divisional Separation
DGE Jacket Water Cooler 1 Flow Instrument 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation DGE Jacket w'ater Cooler 2 Flow instrument 3 i NA/1/- N/A Divisional Separation ECW Condenser 1 Flow instrument 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation ECW Condenser 2 Flow instrument 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Charging Pump Motor Cooler 1 Flow instrument 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Charging Pump Motor Cooler 2 Flow instrument 3 i NA / l / - N/A Divisional Separation Charging Pump Miniflow Heat Exchanger 1 Flow 3 1 NA /l / - N/A Divisional Separation Instrument Charging Pump Miniflow Heat Exchanger 2 Flow 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation instrument CCW Pump 1 A Inlet Pressure Instrument 3 NA / I / -

I N/A Divisional Separation

CCW Pump 1B Inlet Pressure instrument 3 i NA / l / - N/A Divisional Separation
CCW Pump 2 A Inlet Pressure Instrument 3 i NA/l/- N/A Divisional Separation
CCW Pump 2B inlet Pressure Instrument 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation
CCW Pump 1 A Discharge Pressure Instrument 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation
CCW Pump 1B Discharge Pressure Instrument 3 I NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation
CCW Pump 2A Discharge Pressure Instrument 3 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation
CCW Pump 2B Discharge Pressure Instrument 3 l NA / l / - N/A Divisional Separation
CCW Surge Tank 1 Level Instrument 3 I NA /I /- N/A Divisional Separation CCW Surge Tank 2 LevelInstrument 3 I NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation CCW HX 1 A Outlet Temperature Instrument 1E I CCWX / I / - Divisinnat Sep. nation
CCW llX 1B Outlet Temperature instrument IE CCWX / I / -

P Divisional Separation

CCW HX 2A Outlet Temperature Instrument 1E i CCWX / I / -

Divisional Separation

CCW HX 2B Outtet Temperature Instrument 1E I CCWX / I / -

Divisional Separation * , Amendment Q

tap _LH 3.9-15 (Dheet 5 of 73) Ing EltvicE_T CQTI NG DBEETY-BELATED l'UMPG. APID VAINEQ (a) (b) (-) (d) (c) (f) (g) (i) Valve Vahe Valve Valve Sa fety Code Valve Test Test Test CESSAR.DC No. p_escription hce_ Act Class f_gt Funct Ergj Freg Conf 1 Fie No. CC-1507 CCW SUITLY TO RCP I A.lu CK SA 2 A/C Cl S CS(2) 11 9.2.2-1.5 LT 2 yr. 2 CC-1548 CCW PETURN FROM RCP I A,ln CK SA 2 A/C Cl RF CS(2) - 9.2.2-1.5 S RO(2) 12 LT 2 yr. 3 CC-1591 CCW PUMP MOTOR COO! ER I A IIEADER REllEI: RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9 2.2 1.3 CC-1597 CCW PilMP MOTOR COOLER ID llEADER REllEF RV SA 3 C RVT to yr. - 9.2.2 1 3 CC 1603 DGE J ACKET WA1ER COOLER I IIEADElt REl.lEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.3 CC-1609 ECW CONDENSER 1 IIEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2 2-1.3 CC 1637 CllG PilMP MOTOR COOLER I IIEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.4 CC-1643 CilG PUMP MINIFLOW IlX l llEADER RELIEF RV S A. 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.4

 ' CC-IB51   DGE START AIR AFTERCOOLER 1 A IIEADER REl.IEF         RV                 SA      3        C                         RVT        10 yr.           -

9.2.2 1.3 CC.lR57 DGE START AIR AFIERCOOI.ER in llEADER ItEl IEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2 1.3 CC-XXXX CCW SURGE TANK l VACUUM BREAKER RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.1 CC-200 CCW llX 2A HYPASS CONTROL GL AD 3 B RF RO(2) - 9.2.2-1.7 5 3 mo. - MT 3 mo. - TS 3 mo. - LPV 2 yr. - CC 201 CCW IlX 2H BYPASS CONTROL GL AD 3 D S 3 mo. - 9.2.2-1.7 MT 3 mo. - FS 3 mo. - LPV 2 yr - CC-202 NON ESSENTIAL SilPPLY IIEADER 2 ISOLATION BF AD 3 Il S CS(3) - - 9.2.2-1.7 MT CS(3) - FS CS(3) - LPV 2 yr. - CC-203 NON-ESSENTIAL RETURN llEADER 2 ISOL ATION BF AD 3 B S CS(3) - 9.2.2-I.7 MT CS(3) - FS CS(3) - LPV 2 yr. f m nSo IibTatea NR cno) % UtNW EtuEF W 5A 3 C. WT lo yr, -- Wq Cc-iss(* Rsumun NR CcMP it &KoIR etutt El SA '3 C TNT lOyr- - qa.m Amendment R a,i t u 1n inn,

      .       __..                         ..    - -          .   . . , - _ _ _ , . ,              _       _.      , _ _ . - . . _ _                 _           _         _ _ _ .._ m _ .

TABLE 3.9-15 (Sheet 9 of 73) INSERVICE TESTING BAFETY-RELATED PUMPS AND VALVE 8 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) Valve Velve Valve Valve Safety Code Valve Test Test Test CESSAR-DC No. DescriNinn h Act Class Cat [unc1 Eg.g Confic Fir. No. Res! CC 2 83 CCW RETURN I ROh! 1.E1 DOWN llX liF EL 2 A Cl S CS(4) - 9.2.2 1.14 klT CS(4) - LPV 2 yr. - LT 2 } r. 3 DDP 5 yr. 3 CC 2507 CCW SillTI.Y TO RCP 2A,28 CK SA 2 A/C Cl S CS(2) 11 9.2.2-l.11 LT 2 y r. 2 rc 2548 CCW RETilRN I ROh! RCP 2A,2B CK SA 2 A/C Cl RF CS(2) - 9.2.2 1.11 S RO(2) 12 LT 2 yr. J CC-2591 CCW PUhlP hlOTOR COOLER 2A IIEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2 1.9 CC-2597 CCW PUhlP MOTOR COOLER 2D llEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.9 CC-2603 DGE J ACKET WATER COOLER 2 IIEADER REl.lEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.9 CC-2609 ECW CONDENSER 2 IIEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.9 CC 2622 CCW SillTLY 10 LliTDOWN IIX CK SA 2 A/C Cl S CS(2) - 9.2.2-1.14 LT CS(5) 11 RF 2 yr. 2 CC-2628 CCW RETURN Filokt LETDOWN llX CK SA 2 AIC Cl S CS(2) 13 9.2.2-1.14 LT RO(2) 3 RF 2 yr. - CC 2637 CllG PilklP hlOTOR COOLER 2 IIEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.10 CC-2M3 CilG PUhlP hilNIFLOW llX 2 IIEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-l.10 CC 285) DGE START AIR AFIERCOOLER 2A IIEADER REllEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.9 CC-2857 DGE SI' ART AIR AFTERCOOLER 2B IIEADER RELIEF RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2 1.9 CC-XXXX CCW SURGE TANK 2 VACUUht DRE'AKER RV SA 3 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.2.2-1.7 Cll.144 BAST TO PCPS ISOLATION VALVE GT hl 3 H S 3sno. - 9.3.4 l.2 Cll.189 CVCS hl AKEUP TO 1RWST CK SA 2 C S 3ano. - 9.3.4-1.2 Cil-199 SEAL. INJECTION RETilRN llEADER REI Il!F RV SA 2 C RVT 10 yr. - 9.3.4-1.2 (C-2L5o TA9tumtHT Ne cetop -% owxtauty tv rA 3 C. LN r 10 7 - 9.o.Q -l.14 cr.- a d b T e ntt w ; rT Ne enne a uvAwe 1Pwtr _g _ g g 3 _ Amendment R July 30, 1993

l i Ficure 9.2.2-1 s Component Cooling Water-System Flow Diagram i i Note: The following drawings reflect revisions to the Component t Cooling Water System Flow Diagrams: I 1.4248-00-1607.00 F411-03 Rev. P4 f 2.4248-00-1607.00 F411-06 Rev. P3 , 3.4248-00-1607.00 F411-09 Rev. P3 ; 4.4248-00-1607.00 F411-14 Rev. P4 e h b i l t i t t e i J , i 4 i t t

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snn us m m es&owndLL A D OL5lGN @4W p,c C E.Q., (~ OM 51 CERTIFIC ATION - FOI? HEh50 PSD sct2 A M Ti HE3 TD 7M. 90 9e ] u S61_T10 M Poi MT

 '    PE%CTO2 scAAH.S MUST BE d'55 octM tEBudL R y 4,4 Nit n MQgs' e D to me;,

s 6 cou DS #f); glr)(i uct.v D wc- cotL l 4.0 TEST RESULTS SM MhW5 p l 1 4.1 SCRAM TIME vs. ACCEPTANCE CURVE Hot loop tests previewed the scram performance checks that will ,

CEA, during pre-operation i be required for every reactor !

                                        ;c;; ac        d ;x ;i n c.       :    tir: f:r r rrt r : r:rr functional tests. - -                         -, --           .
                                                                          ,gea :       - , n + .7  -- q m         !

_.3 r2 1 y 21 . , : The reactor scram tests are runfor at approximately this condition ETE*" with all The TF-2 scram

                                                                                            \is plotted    in     ;

pumps running. ; Figure 4B-4, along with the acceptance curve.

                                                                                            ' SSY;

F '

4.2 PRESSURE DROPS IN TUEL Fuel assembly pressure drops were measured good overagreement a range of with flov Results are in Reynolds Numbers. The test i measurements for similar fuel in prior TF-2 tests. l results support the flow resistances used in designThose analyses for analyses l System 80 and based on the prior measurements. design requirements, support fuel holddown spring include structure hydraulic loadings and the prediction of system flow rate. 4.3 [UEL ROD FRETTING with The test for fuel rod fretting ran 1300 The hours, settingatwas620*F, based on , flow 113,400 gpm through the fuel. { worst case reactor conditions at full power, with 116% design ! flow. Test fluid velocities exceeded those expected in any found on any of the fuel rod ! System 80 reactor. No fretting was surfaces. 4.4 GUIDE TUBE WEAR ! dependence on upper guide , In .iew of observed CEA motion ' structure flow, a sequence of different flow conditions was set With each change of flow conditions the ', during the wear test. Conditions included the CEA was raised to a new position. maximum pressure differences expected across the reactorequalized intermediate UGS5p, and an both upward and downward, all CEA guide tubes were Following the tests condition. Four tubes which gave the l inspected with an eddy current probe. ' largest indications were removed and sectioned longitudinally Greatest wear occurred for (clamshelled) for precise inspection. the UCSSP upflow condition, at points of CEA rod tip contact in guide tubes. Guide tube wear at the highest rate observed in l I tests will not centribute to violation of stress limits described in Section 4.2.J. 1 4B-3 rs r

I e !

150 [ , , 140 -

                                                                                                                                                     .j 130 -

120 - 110 - ( N s - {

100 - [/ < l 1 90 - ! ' e A ANCE CUR E G 80 - .f E ! , r ; z- ' O 70 - T F-2 TES~

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A 60 - i Q --

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                                                                  \

$ 20 - 0"fo_INSjBT10N -+- -- l 10 - 8 0 i i i 0 1 2 3 4 5 t ELAPSED TIME,. SECONDS .l t i Figure : TEST SCRAM vs ACCEPTANCE CURVE, .j jff u 525 F FOUR PUMP FLOW SETTING IN TF 4B-4

l

                                                                                                                  'l
                                                                                                                  -l
                                                                                                                 .l 150                       i                i           i          i                               ;
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140 -- j I 130 - !

                                                                                                                 .I 120   -
                                                                                                                 /!

110 - l ACCEPTANCE CURVE 100 - i t I ,, @ 90 - l 4

i O TF-2 TEST

              ~
                -   80    -

WITH 0.5 SEC. - l z l o TIME DELAY t- -

              $n. 70    -
               <                                                                                                    r 1              m                                                                                 -

4 o 60 - l i 1 50 - , i 40 - l 30 - , t I 20 - ., t I 90% INSERTION + - - 10 -

                                              '                '           '          '     ft4vs,S .

0 ' - 0 1 2 3 4 ELAPSED TIME, SECONDS Y8 -

                                                                                                          -    +
                                                                                                    ?

Figure i m TEST SCRAM vs ACCEPTANCE CURVE, j jfj / 5250F FOUR PUMP FLOW SETTING IN TF-2 48-4 i,

150 i a i 140 - - 130 - 120 - 110 - ACCEPTANCE CURVE 100 -

     @    90  -
     =

y TF-2 TEST

                                                                          -               t j    80   -

WITH 0.5 SEC. o TIME DELAY . r h 70 - n. U 60 - 50 - 40 - h 30 - us ( 20 - %f h, 90% INSERTION + - - 4 1 10 - I I I I ' 0 5 O 1 2 3 4 ELAPSED TIME, SECONDS l l

                     =                                                             Figure  '

TEST SCRAfA vs ACCEPTANCE CURVE,

i j 5250F FOUR PUfAP FLOW SETTING IN TF-2 48-4 1

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I I i I 4 Ih E l t 4 ATTACHMENT 9 '! e I

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i. CESSAR nufflCATION

( _. - I i t 6.5.2.2.3.3 Relief Valves-l protection against overpressurization of components within the f CSS is provided by conservative design of the system piping, j appropriate valving between high-pressure sources and low t pressure piping, and by relief valves. Relief valves are ! provided as required by applicable codes. 6.5.2.2.4 Spray Headers and Nozzles l { i The CSS, including the spray headers, consist of two independent, j redundant trains. Each train provides spray to three regions.(I,_ II, and III) of containment as shown in Figure 6.5-1. The. spray e nozzles are attached to and become part of the spray headers l located in the upper portion of the containment building _ and below the operating floor. i The nozzles disperse the spray solution throughout containment in the forn of droplets to ; increase the heat transfer surface. l The spray nozzles and b .- J headers are oriented to providefapproximately aos area coverace] gi am vuerstino noor level and to ene m 1 maximum effective !

                                                                                                   -l coverage of the containment volume (See Section 6.5.3.1 for = ore                           j information of volume coverage). The sprcy nozzles are of the nonclogging type, designed to pass particles having a maximum                               {

diameter of 5/16th of an inch. , The CSS uses Lechler (SPRACO Company) 1713A nozzles. The nozzles l provide a drop size distribution which has been established by l { testing and found to be suitable for the. fission product removal I function. The CSS provides a nozzle pressure differential of 40 l psid which fixes the drop size distribution. The mass mean drop ! size produced at this differential pressure is conservatively assumed to be 1000 nicrons. l i 6.5.2.2.4.1 Arrangement of Spray Headers and Nozzles ! The CSS headers and nozzles are arranged to provide maximun coverage of the containment volume. i provided for The following information is ; train A with train B information included in parentheses. Where no information is included for train B, ; values are the same as train A. All nozzles are oriented to l spray downward at a 60 degree angle from the vertical unless i otherwise noted. Reference Figure 6.5-1 for sprayed regions and location of spray headers. Region 1 is sprayed by 6 ring headers located 3 ft from the containment vall and a minimum of 80 ft2 in. above the operating floor. Each train in Region I contains 126 nozzles. Amendment 11

6.5-13 April 1, 1993 l

l l

l Inserth - i As discussed in Section 6.2.4.1 of Reference 1, these overlaying spray patterns ; are useful for the purpose of illustrating the co=pleteness of spray coverage ' vithin the sprayed regions, but the actual case involves significant =omentum , exchange between the spray droplets and the closed air volume of the containment. ' providing far greater mixing within the sprayed regions than the idealized spray ; patterns would indicate. Inserth ; Therefore, even thou5h minor interstices exist within the overlapping spray l patterns, the sprayed regions (Regions I, II and III) are well-mixed. The sprayed regions are described more fully as follows: Insert (D) In addition to the containment sprayed regi'ons there is an unsprayed region of a the containment identified as Region IV. : i t 9 i 8 3 s t s l t 5 1

CESSAR Ennscirion 6.5.2.6.3 Plant Shutdows (Startup) The Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) is used in conjunction with the Main Steam and Feedwater Syste=s to reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature in post shutdown periods from normal operating temperature to refueling temperature. In the event that one or both of the shutdown cooling pumps is unable to perform its function and the CS pumps are not required to be aligned for containment spray operation, one or both of the containment spray pumps may be aligned for shutdown cooling. This is accomplished by repositioning valves SI-104, SI-105, SI-340, SI-341, SI-342, SI-343, SI-687, and SI-695; see Figures 6.3.2-1A and 6.3.2-13. 6.5.3 DESIGN EVALUATION . 6.5.3.1 Containment Coverace The CSS uses a nozzle that provides a drop size distribution which has been established by testing and found suitable for the fission product removal function. The CSS provides a nozzle pressure differential of 40 psid which fixes the drop size distribution. The mass mean drop size produced at this differential pressure is conservatively assumed to be 1000 nicrons. Figure 6.5-1 is a diagram of containnent which shows the locations of the spray headers and sprayed regions, labeled Region I, II, and III. The developed spray patterns for the sprayed regions are shown in Figures 6.5-2 and 6. 5 'J . (2 ~ ~I~ngeff-The total containment . free volume is 3.337 x 10 6 whic Jb( ft consists of the following: 7 A. Region I 6 3 ' The total free yolume of Region I is 1.328 x 10 ft

                   @hich 1.062 x 10       ft" is covered by spray (80 percentjf and      y' includes the following:                                            h.b  p

1. Volume above operating floor level at elevation 146 ft .[u i

0 in, and inside the crane wall, S 1

2. Vol me inside the steam generator cavities. 4 A.

ba

3. Volume between elevations 91 ft 9 in. and 146 ft 0 in, which is sprayed through the 10 ft x 10 ft grated opening at elevations 146 ft 0 in. and 115 ft 6 in.

4. Refueling canal (portions which are not obstructed by equipnent located above).

Amendment Q G.5-20 June 30, 1993

CESSAR Enlisca-

m. ,

5

5. Core Support Barrel Laydown Area.

6. Upper Guide Structure Laydown Area.

B. Region II The total free volume., of Region II is 1.317 x 10 6 3 ft 8 Ghich 1.054 x 10' it' is covered by spray (80 percent This volume is located outside the crane wall and above elevation 115 ft 6 in. and includes the portion of the refueling canal which extends outside the crane wall. C. Region III The total free vglume, of Region III is 0.077 x 10 ft of

                      @hich 0.060 x 10' ft"            is covered by spray (77.3 Dercenti.

This volume is located between elevations 115 ft 6 in, and 142 ft 0 in, and radii of 55 ft and 65 ft from the centerline of containment. , (D Region InferY h All free volumes inside containment not included as part of Regions I, II, or III are combined tocether in Reaion IV ass

                                                                     ~
                      "unsprayed volure".[_ Region IV has a total free volume of 2      -0.615 x 10" ft" and includes compartments such as the
               <      following:                 gcg

1. Cavity around and below reactor vessel.

2. Pressurizer cavity. ,

3. Heat exchanger compartments. bretkdovn d 4k '

                                                                                  . g yg,c,

4. 'In-core chase. irrto 5)>9d on.rprayeA Wy"

5. Annular space above the crane wall. jf The effective spray volume consists of the sdraved volumes ih Regions I, II, and TTT f The (results arWsummarized in Table

_g 6.5-4. Thg total sprayed volume from all rayed regions is 7 g.2 -Q M x 10 ft .j fhis volume represents 3

                                                                       % of the containment. ._

free volume. The remaining @ is assumed to be unsprayed. @ gg prayed and unsprayed volumes are summarizea on raole

     ^ j . fall height for each volune is a weighted value based                    d.a-3on Q The the
         ' number of nozzles at each elevation. The base elevation for the determination of fall height is as follows:

Rcgion I - elevation 146 ft 0 in. mmh a M2I centeinme>& free Volume tf 3.U7 X /0 0 3 Amendment N ffj / 6.5-21 April 1, 1993

I i CESSAR ESMemou l l i Region II - elevation 115 ft 6 in. Region III - elevation 115 ft 6 in. The Train B (lower elevation) values for individual nozzles have been used. To obtain a weighted value,for the entire sprayed volume (the sum of (th'e sprayed nortions o$ legions I, II and III).the individual regions have been weighted by the number of nozzles included in each region. This value is 84.8 ft. Mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed volumes of the containment has been calculated using the method described in Reference 1. This method is based on the density increase in the sprayed volume (and the resulting density-driven flow exchange with the unsprayed volume) as the containment cools due to the effects of spray. A minimum mixing rate of two unsprayed volumes per hour is used in accordance with standard Review Plan 6.5.2, Revision 2. CMixing between sprayed and unsprayed volumes using the Reference \ l method does not apply to the unsprayed portions of sprayed 1 regions discussed above. For these regions mixing will be due 3 1 g largely to nonentum exchange between the air entrained with the N k spray and air outside the spray pattern cones. This nixing is %5g nne o mcw ewnen- nw

      \   expected Wha    fissionto nroduct be quiteremoval rapid, havin rate /g f aFor ti-nexample, in Reference l    ~

an analysis is discussed wherein it has been shown that the induced air velocities associated with_ spray operation are of the. n der of tens of feet per second.ffuslug only lu ips and a n' average spray f all ne19h t. vt 5 4 . s i t. , the recirculation time of air entrained by the spray would be of the order of 17 seconds or over 200 volumes per hour. Removal coefficients (discussed in the next section) are only a small fraction of this; i.e., of the order of tens per hour. Therefore, in a two-region containment

        ' model    such as that described in Appendix              15A the unsprayed portions of sprayed volumes may be combined with the sprayed portions, increasing the effective sprayed           region volume to the The ef fective unsprayed full volumes of Regions I, II and III.

6.15 x vogume3 is correspondingly reduced to that of Region IV, 10 ft . f , containment mixing rates are shown en Figure 6.5-4 for the design basis accident LOCA used to demonstrate compliance with 10CFR100 as discussed in Section 15.6.5. During the blowdown phase of.the ICCFR100 DBA LOCA (and for about the first 10 minutes after b1cudown) there is considerable condensation on structural heat sinks. Heat renoval by sprays dces not become dominant until Amendment U 6.5-22 April 1, 1993

CESSAR M%mou l l after the first ten minutes. Therefore, containment mixing is ; limited to two unsprayed volumes per hour during the first ten minutes. The same situation exists at the end of the fission product release period (at 110.5 minutes) when the overheated core is quenched. This quenching produces another period of significant condensation on heat sinks during whien time the sprays contribute relatively little to containment atmosphere mixing and the minimum mixing rate of two unsprayed volumes per hour is used. Finally, beyond 165.5 minutes, it is assumed that the cooldown is essentially complete (cooldown rate less than 10 F/Hr), and once again the minimum mixing rate of two unsprayed volumes per hour is used. Accepting the minimum mixing rate of two unsprayed volumes per hour during the immediate post-blowdown and core quench phases of the DBA LOCA is a significant conservatism. g Even though mixing due to the density-driven flow proc w ff represented in the Reference 1 K model may not be present during these phases, momentum exchange between escaping steam and two-phase flow from the primary system break and the containment atmosphere'would be expected to be strengest at these times. These forces are not included in the Reference 1 mixing model; nor are the momentum exchange forces associated with the drag of the spray droplets on the containment atmosphere in the sprayed volumes and the transfer of this momentum into the unsprayed volume. By virtue of ignoring these forces the mixing values used ' in these calculations are conservatively low. 6.5.3.2 Containment Spray pH Control The borated containment spray solution contains no additive for pH control during the initial stage of a LOCA. The effectiveness 4 of the CSS in removing elemental iodine from the containment at=csphere during a LCCA is discussed in Section 15.6.5. For post-accident iodine control and to minimize corrosion of the stainless steel in the containment, the pH of the water in the IRWST and thus of the recirculated containment spray solution, is maintained at a minimum of 7.0. Disodium phosphate stored in baskets in the IRWST holdup /olume becomes immersed in water during a LOCA and the resulting solution overflows into the IRWST. The stainless steel baskets, which are attached to the primary shield wall of the holdup volume, have a solid top and bottcm with mesh sides to permit submergence of the disodium phosphate. The elevation of the baskets is above the normal operating water level in the holdup volume and below the IRWST spillway. sampling. Access is provided to the baskets for inspection and Amendnent M 6.S-23 April 1, 1993

4 TABLE 6.5-4 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM CllARACTERISTICS Regions Total I II III IF-6 3 Total Volume, (x 10 7t ) 1.328 1.317 0.077 0.615 3.337 pg M Sprayed containment volumes, (x 10 6 ft3 ) g ,g 3,g M 0.0h 0.0 2{17[h t Unsprayedcontainmentvokumes,(x10 6 ft3 ) (0.266

0.263 0.017 0.615 @'O 687 Spray drops fall height, (ft) 91.2I ") 94.l(a) 26.5 - 84.8(3) Number of nozzles per train (b) 126 163 40 - 329' ~ l-(aj Average value (b) 15.2 gpm/ nozzle 1 4 Amendment N April 1, 1993 1

 . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .               _ _ _ __,.m..~.-...._m.,-...~..__....-_...__,,,...._.,.,_.._...m...,-,,..m,..,_,.                                . . , _ . . _ ~ , _ . , . .  ,,.....,,,,_..,,.-_,._,,,-.,.-,._-.,-,_.[

i CESSARunhuou i l

1 REFERENCEB FOR SECTION 6.5

1. " Licensing Design Basis Source Ters Update for the Evolutionary Advanced Light Water Reactor", Advanced Reactor Severe Accident Program (ARSAP) Source Tern Expert Group, September, 1990. Se J &Jeiriu ,

Gmineeny Corp *d"'

2. "SWNAUA VER0f.bLEVO[o- Aerosol Behavior in # a Condensing Atmosphere -

Diffusiophoresis Version", NU-185, (Augusty ' peg 4 Iq93 (SWEC Popn'ettrh N Sf'G Cn 8 PC-

3. SUNZ, H., Koyro, Schock, W., "NAUA Mod 4: A Code for Calculating Code Aerosol Behavior in LWR Core Melt Accidents,

               . Description          and    User's    Manual,    Preliminary Description",           Laboratorium       fur    Aerosolphysik     and Filtertechnik            I,      Projekt      Nukleare     Sicherheit, Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, March, 1982.

1 l l l l

I I f 1 Amendment N 6.5-30 Itpril 1,.1993 l l

CESSAR nainemos

LABLE 15.5.5-2 (Sheet 2 of 4) PARAKETERS USED IN EVALUATING THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) PARAMETER VALUg fuel Release Core Inventory Table 15A-1 Fraction groups of the core discussed released in Section for the 9 15.6.5 Group 1 Noble Gases) 0.95 Group 2 Iodines Group 3 Cesiums), etc 0.35 Group 4 0.25 Group Strontiums 5 I,Telluriums,etc e)tc) 0.15 Group 6 fRuthenium ,etc ) 0.03 Group 7 flanthanum, e 0.003 Group 8fCerium}etc)tc)) Group 9 (Barium 0.002 0.01 0.04 Chemical species of iodines in the fuel release Inorganic elemental particulate 4.75 95 Organic 0.25 Duration of fuel release, hrs 1.3 release starts, secs release ends, secs 1930 6530

3. Containment Parameters Minimum containment Free Volume, cu ft Containment leak Rate, % vol/ day 3.34E-6 0-24 hrs 1-30 days 0.5 0.25 Duration of containment leakage, days 30 Containment spray effective start time, secs E0 Unsprayed region, % volf(effective) 0.18 Sprayed region s/

Sprayremoval[amda% vol and' effective) 0.82 'N particulateferaasw(eIplicabletoallisotopesin l as elemental iodines), per hr 80-110 secs 110-E00 secs 1.4 1,4 ECO-lC00 secs 1,4 ICCO-1320 sccs 1,7 1320-4230 secs 10.3 Ar.er.dment R July 30, 1993

CESSAR Ennnemou l l l l where: D, = whole-body garna dose due to external cloud shine, rem x/Q3

atmospheric dispersion f actor for the time period j, calculated at the Control Room air intake assuming a ground IcVel release, sec/m 3 Au = total activity of nuclide i released during time period j, Ci CF i = a, dose rate response function for a unit concentration of nuclide i,- rem-mz /Ci-sec 4.0 COMPUTER CODES USED IN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS The cor.puter programs described below have been used to calculate design-basis source terms and radiological consequences of design basis accidents. 4.1 DRAGON (Reference 6) Program DRAGON evaluates the activities, dose rates, and time-integrated dose in the reactor building and control room of a nuclear facility or at an adjacent site following release of halogens and noble gases from some control volume. The fission product release to the atmosphere, together with the activities and time-integrated activity concentrations of the halogens which are accumulated in the systen, are also co=puted. Site dose calculations performed by DRAGON employ the semi-infinite cloud

    =cdels suggested by Regulatory Guide 1.4.          The ganna dose in the control room is computed based upon a fi.1ite cloud model.

Average beta and garra energies are used in all dose calculations. 4.2 PERC (Reference 7) l 2. Progran PERC 3 is identical to DPJsGON in terns of the environmental transport and dose conversion, but it includes the following: Provision of time-dependent releases from the reactor coolant system to the containment atmosphere Provision for airborne radionuclides other than noble gas and iodine, including daughter in-grcwth a Provision for calculating organ doses other than thyroid a Provisicns for tracking tine irq < n !c nt inventcries of all radicnuclides in all ccatrol r r_ g ! : r.n c f the plant 'cdel j i Arendnent R l '; A - 7 July 30, 1993

CESSAR nnincmou m D. No credit is taken for depletion of the effluent plume due to either deposition on the ground or to radioactive decay during transport to the locations of interest. L E. Dose, calculations are performed with the computer program PERCf(15A.4.3- using inputs for breathing rate, containment KN parameters, and control room parameters on Tables 15A-8 through 15A-10, respectively. 6.0 ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR NON-LOCA EVENTS This section provides a brief description of analytical nodels for cal:ule. ting offsite radiological doses resulting from non-LOCA events. The models described below incorporate the SRP (Reference 18) guidelines for calculating offsite radiological consequences and through the use of conservative assumptions naximize the offsite radiological doses. The non-LOCA doses are calculated for the following locations: A. Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) B. Low Population Zone (LPZ) For each of the above locations, the dose is calculated to: 1. the thyroid due to inhalation of radioicdines, and 2. the whole body due to garna radiation from radiciodines, cesiums, rubidiums and noble gases. .The cesiums and rubidiums are included only for events resulting in fuel failure. In accordance with the guidelines of Reference 13, the doses at the exclusion area boundary are calculated based-on the total activity released over the first two hours following the initiatten of the event. Similarly, the doses at the low population zone are deternined on the basis of* the total activity released over the entire event (in ' general, acout eight hours from the initiation of the event, by which time the shutdown cooling system is placed in operation). The total doses at a given location are derived frca activities from various release paths to the atmosphere. These include: l A. Main Stean Safety Valves (MSSVs) l B. Atmospheric Dunp Valves (ADVs) C. Nuclear Annex D. Containment l l Atendrent R ISA-11 July 30, 1 9 9 'l

CESSAR !!nincuio

TABLE 15A-9 CONTAINMENT DATS Iten Value 3 Volume, nominal, f t 3,337,dOO Sprayed volume, % 82 h(82)(a) Transfer rate between sprayed See Figure 6.5-4 unsprayed regions Spray removal constant, hr-1 See Figure 6.5-5 Maximum containment power 16,000 purge rate, CFM Containment leak rate See Section 15.6.5

                                                                                        ,,   L (a) Value in parentheses is the effective two-control volume containment      :

model value. ~ -/

l I Amendment !1 April 1, 1993

I f s I i

                                            .i t

i r a L

i I

                                            .i i

T ATTACHMENT 10 ! t 6 b I i t l i j j l i l

I l s l 1 J l, I i 1 1

CESSAR 88Wnemon /0 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) CEAPTER 14 Bubiect Pace No. Section Initial Criticality 14.2-19 14.2.10.2 Safe Criticality Criteria 14.2-20 14.2.10.2.1 TEST PROGRAM SCHEDULE 14.2-20 14.2.11 Testina Secuence 14.2-21 14.2.11.1 INDIVIDUAL TEST DESCRIPTIONS 14.2-22 14.2.12 Preoperational Tests 14.2-22 14.2.12.1 14.2.12.1.1 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Motor 14.2-22 Initial Operation 14.2.12.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Test 14.2-24 Pressurizer Safety Valve Test 14.2-26 14.2.12.1.3 14.2-27 14.2.12.1.4 Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Systems Test l Chemical and Volume Control 14.2-29 14.2.12.1.5 System (CVCS) Letdown subsystem Test CVCS Purification Subsystem Test 14.2-31 14.2.12.1.6 14.2-33 14.2.12.1.7 Volume Control Tank (VCT) Subsystem Test _ CVCS Charging Subsystem Test 14.2-35 14.2.12.1.8 14.2-37 14.2.12.1.9 Chemical Addition Subsystem Test Reactor Drain Tank (RDT) 14.2-38 14.2.12.1.10 Subsystem Test Equipment Drain Tank (EDT) 14.2-40 14.2.12.1.11 Subsystem Test Boric Acid Batching Tank (BABT) 14.2-42 14.2.12.1.12 Subsystem Test Concentrated Boric Acid Subsystem 14.2-43 14.2.12.1.13 Test Reactor Makeup (RMW) Subsystem 14.2-45 14.2.12.1.14 Test Holdup Subsystem Test 14.2-47 14.2.12.1.15 14.2-48 14.2.12.1.16 Boric Acid Concentrator Subsystem Test Gas Stripper Subsystem Test 14.2-50 14.2.12.1.17 14.2-51 14.2.12.1.18 Boronometer Subsystem T6st Letdown Process Radiation 14.2-52 14.2.12.1.19 Monitor Subsystem Test Amendment Q iv June 30, 1993

CESSAR EnLuou TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) CHAPTER 14 Section Subject Page No. 14.2.12.1.66 Main Steam Isolation Valves 14.2-127 (MSIVs) and MSIV Bypass Valves Test 14.2.12.1.67 Main Steam System Test 14.2-129 14.2.12.1.68 Steam Generator Blowdown System 14.2-131 Test 14.2.12.1.69 Main Condenser and Air Removal 14.2-133 Systems Test 14.2.12.1.70 Main Feedwater System Test 14.2-135 14.2.12.1.71 Condensate System Test 14.2-137 14.2.12.1.72 Turbine Gland Sealing System Test 14.2-139 14.2.12.1.73 Condenser Circulating Water 14.2-141 System Test 14.2.12.1.74 Steam Generator Hydrostatic Test 14.2-142 14.2.12.1.75 Feedwater-Heater and Drains 14.2-144 System Test 14.2.12.1.76 Ultimate Heat Sink System Test 14 . T.-14 6 14.2.12.1.77 Chilled Water System Test 14.2-147 14.2.12.1.78 Station Service Water System 14.2-149 H Test 14.2.12.1.79 Component Cooling Water (CCW) 14.2-151 System Test 14.2.12.1.80 Sp nt Tucl Pool Cooling and L'M M m14.2-153 cicanup System-Test 14.2.12.1.81 Turbine Building Cooling Water 14.2-155 System Test 14.2.12.1.82 Condensate Storage System Test 14.2-157 14.2.12.1.83 Turbine Building Service Water 14.2-159 l System Test 14.2.12.1.84 Equipment and Floor Drainage 14.2-160 System Test i 14.2.12.1.85 Normal and Security Lighting 14.2-161 Systems Tesi 14.2.12.1.86 Emergency Lighting System _ Test 14.2-162 14.2.12.1.87 Communications System Test 14.2-163 14.2.12.1.88 Compressed Air System Test 14.2-165 14.2.12.1.89 Compressed Gas System Test 14.2-168 14.2.12.1.90 Process Sampling System Test 14.2-170 14.2.12.1.91 Heat Tracing System Test 14.2-172 Fire Protection Systemd Test 14.7 3 14.2.12.1.92 14.2.12.1.93 Diesel Generator Mechadical 14. I', 5 System Test Amendment H vii August 31, 1990

i CESSAR naincum i generator economizer valves. The performance of load rejection test and turbine trip test from full power provides sufficient information to verify design adequacy. Thus, the plant response to reduction in feedwater temperatures will not be demonstrated. 14.2.7.1.10 Reference Appendix A, Section 5.m.m This section requires that the dynamic response of the plant to automatic closure of all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) be demonstrated from full power. Performance of this test could result in the opening of primary and secondary safety valves. Instead, the dynamic response of the plant can be obtained during the performance of the turbine trip test when the turbine stop valves are closed. The turbine trip test from full power will result in essentially similar dynamic plant response and should ensure that primary and secondary safety valves do not lift open during.the performance of the test. For these reasons, the plant response to automatic closure of all MSIVs from full power will not be demonstrated. 14.2.7.1.11 Reference Appendix C, Section 3 l This section requires that a neutron count rate of at least 1/2 count per second should be registered on the startup channels before the startup begins. The desir'n criterion calls for a neutron count rate of 1/2 count per second with all CEAs fully withdrawn and a multiplication of 0.98. Therefore, prior to the initiation of the initial approach to criticality, the startup channels may see significantly less-than 1/2 count per second; but prior to exceeding a multiplication of 0.98, the desired neutron count rate of 1/2 count per second will have been achieved. 14.2.7.1.12 Reference Appendix C, Section 4 The standard test plateau power levels of 20, 50, 80, and 100 percent are used instead of the recommended power levels of 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent.

                                                          ~ .: C
            ~

r-- v. m ic e, . " 14.2.7.2 Regulatory Guide 1.68.2, Initial Startup Test Procram to Demonstrate Remote Shutdown capability for Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Shutdown outside the control room will be demonstrated to Hot Standby condition. Plant cooldown to entry into Shutdown Cooling conditions will be demonstrated during Hot Functional testing.

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14.2-16 May 1, 1993

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l (#! h h k k bEb FICATION l

l i 14.2.12.1.19 . Letdown ~ Process Radiation Monitor Subsystem Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate proper operation of the Letdown Process Radiation Monitor of the Process Sampling System. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 The Letdown '. Process Radiation Monitor has been l installed, all interconnections have been completed, and the sample chamber has been filled with reactor makeup water. 2.2 The Latdown ' Process Radiation Monitor has beenl calibrated. 2.3 A check source is available. 2.4 Support systems required for operation of the Process Radiation Monitor are complete and operational. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Utilizing the built-in test features, observe process monitor indications, outputs to interface equipment, and alarm operation. - 3.2 Utilizing the check source, verify calibration of the process monitor. 4.0 DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Check source data. 4.2 Process monitor operating data. 4.3 Process monitor response to the check source. 4.4 Value of parameters required to actuate alarms. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Letdown [ Process Radiation Monitor of the Process Sampling System performs as described in Section 9.3.2. p:

                                   -         f.' , >)

3-Amendment Q # 14.2-52 June 30, 1993 ) l

CESSARunL - i i 14.2.12.1.21 Shutdown Cooling System Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE () G k, ' ' , 1.1 To demonstrate proper operation of Shutdown Cooling System and the Shutdown Cooling Pumps, t. e c 2.0 PREREOUISITES - bE Ek' i r~ ~t 2.1 Construction activities on the systems to be tested are C C! ' complete. 2.2 Plant systems required to support testing are operable- M i and temporary systems are installed and operable. 4( L 2.3 Pernanently installed instrumentation is operable and calibrated.

                                                                                                                              -Et
     $$$9:;5
        ~

2 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. } f5%V yC e.:g g p ,

                                      .gj'An T1nes b thea.,.*;v g Shutdown yg g fic" %Cooling C -(( w System have been'
                                   >f.

, ';4 ' filled and'veiited7 ~~"'N~~ -

                                                                                                    -  m   u . ,,  .

4 I

-~

3 .'O TEST METHOD cc i 3.2 I Verify proper operation of each shutdown cooling pump h Qk[f.

     $,                     .ff..w._.with     y[1 minimum flow established.      .
     " ?!%..%(rj - i.r;
                           .2 ~ ~ . _      verify   pump   performance        including         head   ,nd      flow          s J.

J S 1 z M' .!:

                       . . , ~

characteristics 44 %, ~ \ dex% for ankahdesign mew &\=wflow pa paths w and ~ - g

          % , 3 .3 '                       Perform a full flow test of the shutdown cooling
          - 7.~.;7 ~                       system.                                                                              (n 1 hI-e; 3.4                  Verify proper operation, failure mode, stroking speed,                                    6         '
           "4                              position indication and response                  to    interlock of c'M                               control and isolation valves.

(pi'I mL% -

3.5 Verify the proper operation of the protective devices, {'

                  '                        controls, interlocks, indications, and alarms using l                                          ;

actual or simulated signals. {A g

             -{                                                                                                                       SI!

3.6 Verify isolation valves can be opened against design 3' p t differential pressure. $, I< 3.7 Verify setpoint of the LTOP relief valves. t 3.8 Verify the interchangeability of the Containment Spray , l

~-

Pumps with the SCS pumps. j

g:

3.9 Verify adequate net positive suction head is available gg-to the pumps. W Amendment Q [.l 14.2-54 June 30, 1993 - O

=J

l CESSAR naincma i f i 3.10 Verify adequate heat removal capability by the SCS heat- l B

3. tr exchangers,.

                                         .yegn -~

y _ o p p wWug'M A 4 : 4.O DATA REOUIRED - m j2:= n Afy }* l 4.1 Valve position indications. i 4.2 Pump head versus flow. 4.3 Valve opening and closing times, where required.- 4.4 Setpoints of alarms and interlocks. 4.5 Setpoints of the LTOP relief valves. , 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Shutdown Cooling System performs as described in . Section 5.4.7. t Nerfv N+ each M5 c4m (5 CapcMe oE 'o e m l , 3 11 l p ovaced oy d e_ elecirse d v in egend os on[ ..,." M

                                       ,    i f t" duna A^7 d VA E Q e A C_f p o w e r Supp(es,
                                                                                                                     ~: g:

i f t s t o 1 i j ! i ! ( i ; i- Amendment Q 14.2-55 June 30, 1993 1

CESSAR nainc=u

14.2.12.1.36 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System Test 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Feedwater System to supply feedwater to the steam generators for i design emergency conditions. . f 2.9 PREREQUISITES , a 4

i 2.3 Construction activities on the systems to be tested are

             . complete.

2.2 Permanently installed instrumentation is operable and calibrated. 7 { 2.3 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. , g._ Nfg , 2.4 Plant systems required to support testing are operable,~ ~' or temporary systems are installed and operable. !

                                                                            ' t.

3.0 TEST METHOD p, , 3.1 Verify all control logic. E r ,.. w 3.2 Verify head and flow characteristics of motor driven {; emergency feedwater pumps. vg: 3.3 Verify the starting time and head and f: low ' characteristics of the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump at the full design range of steam pressures (HFT/ PAT). 3.4 During the course of the startup program, demonstrate five consecutive cold quick starts for the steam driven , emergency feedwater pump (HFT/ PAT). ; 3.5 Verify all design flow paths and verify flow downstream of Venturi meets design requirement. 3.6 Verify proper operation in response to signals frgm the ! Plant Protection Systemet dAgu,g J. [wff.w.hynw . 3.7 Verify, if appropriate, proper operation, failure mode, stroking speed, and position indication of control valves. 3.8 Verify EWF discharge line isolation valves stroke s properly with design basis differential pressure across H them. Amendment H 14.2-79 August 31, 1990 I l

CESSARinsnc-3.9 Verify proper operation of protective devices, controls, interlocks, instrumentation and alarms using actual or simulated inputs. 3.10 Demonstrate proper pump performance during an endurance test. l 4.O DATA REQUIRED j 4.1 Valve position indications. i 4.2 Valve opening and closing times, where required ! including valve stroke time under design basis differential pressure. ; 4.3 Pump head versus flow curves. 4.4 Flow rates downstream of Venturi. j 4.5 Response of Emergency Feedwater Pumps to ESFAS signals. E 4.6 Pump start times. i 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Emergency Feedwater System performs as described in ! Section 10.4.9. u . . c- - "7i.J.ii, i r Amendment E 14.2-80 December 30, 1988

H CESSAR 8lNacuion l i 14.2.12.1.42 In-contairusent Water Storage System Test i 1.0 OBJECTIVE , 1.1 To demonstrate the proper operation of the In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST), J ' the Holdup Volume Tank (HVT) and Cavity Flooding j System (CFS). . l 2.0 PREREQUISITES 1 2.1 Construction activities on the systems to be tested are - complete. ; i 2.2 Plant systems required to support testing are operable E or temporary systems are installed and operable. : 2.3 Permanently installed instrumentation is operable _and.} , calibrated. - [ 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. f

3.0 TEST METHOD ( 3.1 Operate control valves from . all appropriate control

positions. Observe valve operation, position g indication and, measure opening and closing times.. ."$' m

                                                                               ~'& . '             .u 3.2        Simulate failed conditions and observe valve response.'

3.3 Fill the IRWST with reactor makeup water and record E volume versus indicated level. Observe level alarms. 3.4 Simulate IRWST temperature and observe alarms. 3.5 Verify design flow path from IRWST to the HVT and reactor cavity. J 3.6 Verify the level alarms and indication of the HVT and reactor cavity. f 9 +

3. 7 Vs u p M gp A u m i w.by<y WAame y Amk M" /M 3."d Verify the operation and setpoints of the IRWST relief

                                                                        ~~-~ ^

valves and vacuum breakers. 39 &nt Mpc spat Gk ?t'ipOQ wura q e s. a . . t . e c: ,s, 4.G DATA REQUIREDt b e ~ e.M ' . . . .4k s e_ ; w , 4 %,%, ' x 6e. A T* w - m rw k.c w v .o r G . u ., p , I Valve position in'dicat'lons. 4.1 ~

                                                                         ~              i           E 4.2        Valve opening and closing time, where required.

Amendment J 14.2-89 April 30, 1992

CESSAR naincmou 4

4.3 Response of valves to simulated failed conditions. l 4.4 Setpoint at which alarms occur. E l 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA S.1 The In-containment Water Storage System performs as described in Sections A 6.8. cid 7. 7. / / ,Jt[ Y q,4

1. ,

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f ( Amendment J ' 14.2-90 April 30, 1992

CESSAR nai"icuion l 4.0 DATA REQUIRED l 4.1 Computer generated summaries of external input data, data processing, analysis functions, displayed l information, and permanent data records. l i ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ! 5.O 5.1 The DPS and DIAS associated with the Advanced Control Complex performs as described in Sections^ 7.7.1.3) 7.7./.% >

7. 7.1. 7, usi 2. 7. /. P. ~,'

                                                                                                       .e. x
                                                                                                      =::

t i

                                                                                                     ,,d%
                                                                                                                 ,   k 3

t i l i 1 .l i Amendment E 14.2-97 December 30, 1988

I I CESSAR E!aamou l

                                                                                                                                         ?
                            -                                                                                                            i
                                                                                                                             .(          l 14.2.12.1.49              Pre-core Instrument Correlation                                                                       l 1.0         OBJECTIVE 1.1         To demonstrate that the inputs and appropriate outputs between the Plant Protection System (PPS), Process Instrumentation, Discrete Indication and Alarm System                                                E              -

(DIAS) and Data Processing System (DPS) are in ! agreement. ' i~

                                                                                                                         .. ,9           :

1.2 To verify narrow range temperature and pressure \~~1 [ instrumentation accuracy and operation by comparing similar channels of instrumentation. ~l , i 2.0 PREREQUISITES Nff

                                                                                                                         - q-2.1         Instrumentation has been calibrated and is operational.                                                  %          !

ff.%~

                                                                                                                                    ~    '

3.0 TEST METHOD

                                                                                                             % .. , 3 ;.

3.1 Record wide range process instrumentation DIAS and Data Processing System readings as directed by the Pre-core i Hot Functional Test. , 3.2 Record narrow range process instrumentation DIAS and Ek - Data Processing System readings as directed by the 2!*" Pre-core Hot Functional Test. ,;gf] }9p ' 3 4.0 DATA REQUIRED ' he i+ ; 4.1 Control room panel instrument reading. l E 4.2 DIAS and DPS readings. . 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA l I j 5.1 All narrow range instrument readings shall agree within ; i the accuracy of the instrumentationM c4en <I<2.6 Xu.Z~ e>ud ! l 7 7. t. 1, 7. 7. 1 7 uiL 7. 7 i. / ; ! 5.2 All wide range ' instrument readings shall agree within j the accuracy of the instrumentation &y ch uwd<,d_v.v f M ,w, 77 J

                                   ? 7 i 7, :t. wi            ~7. 7 l- ?.                                                                ,

d e H 4 Amendment E 14.2-102 December 30, 1988 2

 .m-e              ,                            +-.-4   + - ,               - . - - - - - --               p  err-,-           +e-T

CESSAR 8nnnCAMN ( 14.2.12.1.51 Alternate Protection System Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the proper operation of the Alternate Protection System (APS). 2.O PREREOUISITES - i % f d b mc.7:rs 2.1 Construction activities on the -trip-circuit-breaker and the Alternate Protection System have been cal-ibrated. M 19 ehen 2.2 APS instrumentation has been calibrated. _ 2.3 External test instrumentation is available and calibrated.

                                                              ~e ;% is ww4ces 2.4         Support systems required for operation of trip-circuit-
               -breaker-- and APS are operational.                       - tweg

2 % Q~- p y, ,

3.O TEST METHODS , 3.1 Energize power supplies and verify output voltage. N h2~ Simulats-ground-faults-and-observe 7eration-of- tha- ( ground & ult-detectors. ,, ,

s'e$hpf 3.3: Using simulated signals, trip each reactor trip circuit A breaker with the breaker in the test position. Observe 7 circuit-breaker- operation. ME 1., sa _ m : -

3.4 Repeat-Step--34_ _with-circuit-breaker-in operate-

               -position.. -

3.5 ~ 'C Simulate $ input signals.and' observe trip-initiations, M N4411 +LE- t.Ltsuc tO.y 0$c & N[<.mv ,Jc,j,ga$,, 4.O DATA REOUIRED J' 4.1 Power supply voltages. 4.2 Resistance for ground fault detector operation. I 4.3 Trip setpoints. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA l 5.1 The APS performs as described in Section 7.7.1.1.11. ( Amendment E 14.2-104 December 30, 1988

CESSAR NEncuion 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Unrestricted expansion for selected points on components &; doctu.C a,v ,ke L ~ 3 9' . 2 - 1 1-5.2 Verification that components return to their baseline anbient positions; dos ckSe,L .4+v .bA>r > J 'l d- r*t~

                                                                      .?f'~

5.3 Verification that proper gaps exist for selected points on conponentszw cCocsse.L, _iw Mhv 394- .gp ej $ n? 4 (( g :. A-d

                                                              .i.
                                                                                   ~
                                                                    .4 i

l l 14.2-107

CESSAR annemos 14.2.12.1.54 Pre-core Reactor Coolant and Secondary Water Chemistry Data 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate that proper water chemistry for the RCS and steam generator can be maintained. 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Primary and secondary sampling systems are operable. 2.2 Chemicals to support hot functional testing are available. 2.3 The primary and secondary chemical addition systems are operable. . . y 7 4 Purification ion exchangers are charged with resin.

                                                                         %d 3.0  .

TEST METHOD 3.1 Minimum sampling frequency for the steam generator and RCS will be specified by the chemistry manual. The ( sampling frequency will be modified as required to ensure the proper RCS and steam generator chemistry. water Lygy *[. a 3.2 Perform RCS and steam generator sampling and chemistry analysis after every significant change in plant conditions (i.e., heatup, cooldown, chemical additions). 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Plant conditions. 4.2 Steam generator chemistry analysis. 4.3 RCS chemistry analysis. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 RCS and steam generator water chemistry can be maintained as described in Sections 9.3.4 and 10. 3./'{ s 14.2-108 I I

CESSAR 8ln%mo 14.2.12.1.57 Pre-core Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Flow Measurements 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To determine the pre-core RCS flow rate. 1.2 To establish baseline RCS pressure drops. -gg 2.O PREREOUISITES g, Q" iJth 2.1 All permanently installed instrumentation has been ..I properly calibrated and is operational. j,';'[ sy= 2.2 All test instrumentation has been checked and D-calibrated. TEr-

                                                                                     .g 2.3        RCS operating at nominal hot, zero power conditions.,"           .

w 2.4 Desired reactor coolant pumps operating. -I (

                                                                                      .c 2.5        COLSS, CFCs, and Data Processing System in operation.               Aiv 3.0        TEST METHOD Yh^ en l                                                                                     ~,

3.1 RCS flow,x , pressure drops, and the data necessary to calculated RCS flows for four Reactor Coolant Pump " - (RCP) ope' rations will be obtained. 4.0 TEST DATA k, , 4.1 Data Processing System. 4.2 RCP differential pressure. 4.3 RCS temperature and pressure. 4.4 RCP speed. 4.5 Reactor vessel differential pressure. 4.6 Pump configurations. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The RCS flow exceeds the value necessary to insure that post core flow is in excess of that used for analysis in Chapter 15 but less than the.-flow-which-could-cause- & me h . .m e < 2cmpl-i-f-t.CJ 1'24ca4.'- h ,N E w 37,.2 //.f./J, (

                    ~' 2. I. l . 4 4', w A ' 7  7. J. / 1 3 l' Y.&!f
                                                               ' Amendment E 14.2-113                D eamhar 30, 1988

l l ( lE!iSi/LFt 8lainCAUCN l ( ; i l 14.2.12.1.59 Pre-core Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Measurement 1.0 OBJECTIVE ' 1.1 To measure the Reactor Coolant leakage at hot, zero power conditions. 2.0 PREREOUISITES , 2.1 Hydrostatic testing of the RCS and associated systems has been completed. 2.2 The RCS and the CVCS are operating as a closed system. 2.3 The RCS is at hot, zero power conditions. t

                                                                       .. g 3.0         TEST METHOD

_%"$$I. :, 3.1 Measure and record the changes in water inventory of the RCS and CVCS for a specified interval of time. 4.0 TEST DATA ( 4.1 Pressurizer pressure, level, and temperature. ._; >[i,$p

~#;

4.2 volume Control Tank level, temperature, and pressure. y gy'~ '

                                                                        ~ L..

4.3 Reactor Drain Tank level, temperature, and pressure. 4.4 RCS temperature and pressure. . 4.5 Safety Injection Tank level and pressure. 4.6 Time interval. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Identified and unidentified leakage shall be within the limits described in the technical specification.La E~ u u bei s;v cGv S A 5-1 1 14.2-116 l

CESSAR naincmou ; 14.2.12.1.66 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), and MSIV Bypass Valves Test j 1.O OBJECTIVE , 1.1 To demonstrative the functional performance of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and MSIV Bypass Valve , Controls. 1.2 To demonstrate the proper operation of the MSIVs at normal operating temperatures (HFT). ; 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Main Steam Isolation l Valves (MSIVs) have been completed. 2.2 Main steam system instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support Systems required for operation of the Main Steam Isolation Valves are complete and operational. + 2.4 Test Equipment is available and test instrumentation is ! calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD h 3.1 Operate the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves from all appropriate control positions. Observe valve operation and position indication and, where required, measure i opening and closing times at ambient and HFT ; 4 conditions. 3.2 _., Simulate-failed-conditions-and-observe-valve-response. - 3.3 Verify MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve controls, alarms and interlocks. I i 3.4 Verify MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve response to Main i Steam Isolation Signal. 3.5 Verify MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve seat leakage. 3.6 Perform MSIV drift test. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED ; 4.1 MSIV and MSIV bypass valve opening and closing times at ambient and HFT condition. 7

                  's    ~          :. 5      .A   '. ._          _      .;    ', 'E5 %       wA
                                                  -                                          ~ . _ -

e ; -e._.. a r yc _ .g . . r " Amendment H 14.2-127 ~ ~ -

                                                                           ~ ~ ~ August 31, 1990
         , .c:n -            -
                                    ;c ; ap , -
           %~             _ _ . . _ _            f

CESSAR naincarion i 1 ( l i 4.2 Valve position indication. .

                    ,~                           :s  ,c;,  _

m e = . .: e. : e x2. ;

4.3 , Response of valves to . simulated fai-led--conditions, i' 4.4 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. i 4.5 MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve seat leakage. l 4.6 MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve response to MSIS. g 4.7 MSIV drift data. ; 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Main Steam Isolation Valves, and MSIV Bypass Valves operateasdescribedinSectionfl0.3.2.3.2.17 4w2 - t to. 3. c? 3. 3.1. a e i ' E.1 m. W ., 'E - e m ., 1#,<! Aee w MSN . J24Nk.. s , ,m ss ms ~m ~ ,-=m e -= s- . r .- ..cea , Sz<-.mu, .c.5.] 9; ( ; Th. .g7.7 u ::.

                                                                                            $'kk'

H.ci+

se . t i i t t ,0 1 g Amendment H ; 14.2-128 August 31, 1990 1

CESSAR Mfaincarion I 14.2.12.1.67 Main Steam System Test l T 1.O OBJECTIVE , 1.1 To demonstrate the operation of the Main Steam System. l 2.0 PREREQUISITES i 2.1 Construction activities on the Main Steam System have been completed. 2.2 Main Steam System instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Main ; Steam System are complete and operational. 2.4 Test equipment is available and test instrumentation is calibrated. 3.O TEST METHOD r 3.1 Demonstrate automatic drain valve operation, j 3.2 Demonstrate all flow paths. ! 3.3 Verify the operability of the Atmospheric Steam Dump } '; Valves at no-load steam pressure (HFT).

                                                      % c .,.-                                r 3.4        Verify the operability of the Steam Bypass Valves at no-load steam pressure (HFT).                                                   l 3.5        Operate control valves from all appropriate control                             l positions.          Observe      valve operation     and position               '

indication and, where required, measure opening and ! closing times. 3.6 Simulate failed conditions and observe valve response. 3.7 Verify proper operation of designated components such ; as protective devices, controls, interlocks, instrumentation and alarms using actual or simulated

   ,          inputs.                                                                         ,

4.O DATA REQUIRED j l 4.1 Valve opening and closing times, where required. 4.2 Valve position indication. 4.3 Response of valves to simulated failed conditions. 7g u.,, .ns _ ca m <_ r ,g a; :,q m . , , , 7~, y a n c, j y- _ Amendment H t he ' pu 14.2-129 August 31, 1990 q l a

i DE51*.N CESSAR CERTIFICATION , l

I 4.4 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. - 4.5 Flow path data. ; i 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA H ; b 5.1 The Main Steam System performance is as described in i. Section 10.3. ! [. r n,. C -~m+ s

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c.+4 P i i e i r t

I r t 1 i r Amendment H 14.2-130 August 31, 1990 l

CESSARnahn. 14.2.12.1.78 Station Service Water Systan Test . 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the ability of the Station Service Water System to supply cooling water as designed under normal and emergency conditions. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Station Service Water , System have been completed. 2.2 Station Service Water instrumentation has been ' calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for the operation of the Station Service Water System are complete and operational. g pa

                                                                                           % ~~C..

2.4 Test instruments available and calibrated. 2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink is available. I 3.0 IEST METHOD , 3.1 Verify head versus flow characteristics for the Service T _gg g g, Water Pumps. t 3.2 Verify adequate flow of , Station , Service Water to each supplied component. 3.3 Verify alarms, indicating instruments and status lights are functional. _ ,. m , y, .

                                                  ..      mm t    ar 3.4        Verify that on-loss of- of f site- power , - the previously-                         I operating pumps-are- returned- to- operation,

= : - e, .e :n cu .., c 3.5 Verify a low header- discharge pressure starts the idle pump in each division.

3b Mwk "I' F;blo t AA ud (bick YAc a . 3.6 Verify'.p,kc<.x. edtas.n s lYi.i r % 10 ump control from the cont /o 7 4.O DATA EEOUIRED 4.1 Record pump head versus flow and operating data. 4.2 Flow to CCW heat exchangers using various pump l j combinations. 1 Amendment Q 14.2-149 June 30, 1993

P CC C A wEwGMR D DESIGN CERTIFICATION 4.3 Setpoints of alar =s. interlocks,and controls, t 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA I 5.1 The Station Service Water System operates as described in Section 9.2.1. 4,q \ a ve. on ,rsdich,on, {ost f l i 1 Amendment H j 14.2-150 August 31, 1990 j

CESSAR 88?incmon

                                                                                    '?Cf5 \
                               . cc   .= c u .= w     mr~~=c-                                 J 14.2.12.1.80           Spent-Fueldi>ol_. cooling--and41eanup System Test 1.0        OBJECTIVE 1.1        To demonstrate the capability of the system to provide the proper flow paths and flow rates required to remove decay heat from the Spent Fuel Pool.              The purification capability of the system is verified by demonstrating the proper purification flow paths and flow rates.

2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Fuel Pool Cooling and yleanup Systems have been completed. . e.ne,c, s, 2.2 Spent. _Euel- Pooling- Cooling and _ Cleanup Systems instrumentation has been calibrated. , y ,

                                                                                   . u...$rf    t 2.3        Test instrumentation available and properly calibrated."

2.4 Component Cooling Water water available, a 2.5 Spent Fuel Pool and Reactor Vessel Cavity construction H ( leak tests completed. di ' 2.6 Support system required for the operation of the $ pent Fuel' Pool Cooling system are complete and operable. ' '#$l$ ,1

                                         . . z -qwmw r - r . : e .,                  'M           ,

2.7 The spent fuel phol is'~ filled to normal level. 3.O TEST METHOD 3.1 Verify head versus flow for the pumps. 3.2 Verify control logic. 3.3 Verify the proper operation of controls, interlocks instrumentation and alarms using actual or simulated inputs. 3.4 Verify the operability of the fuel pool gates and verify leakage within acceptable limits. 3.5 Verify the anti-siphons holes are free of obstructions. 3.6 Verify no leakage of the spent fuel pool by checking the leak detection system. J t$xC C /1 / C /D mue6) ' gL .Cc~ 7* y M-j7

                    & ;z ;g W T;.eimt.. 'l Lf 0 c%i Amendment H I                                           14.2-153                    August 31, 1990              l

CESSARannnumu l 4.O DATA REQUIRED I 4.1 Pump head versus flow and operating data. 4.2 Setpoints of alarms, interlocks and controls. 4.3 Flow data through various system flow paths. H

      - Fuel i% pool  gate leakage s ab y data.

4.4 k? l,v%, ;; 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA c _rL c.ucp e n ' 5.1 The Spent--Fuel Pool Cooling and__ Cleanup _ System operates as described in Section 9.1.3.

                                                                          .gy. ..- .
                                                                      .:- h$$

4: ( w 1.$N$ki' em:-~,; l l 1

                                                                                   . I
                                                                                  \

I Amendment H 14.2-154 August 31, 1990 1

CESSAR nn%uiou 14.2.12.1.92 Fire Protection Systems Test 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the ability of the Fire Protection System to provide water at acceptable flows and pressures to protected areas. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Fire Protection System have been completed. 2.2 Fire Protection system instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Fire Protection System are complete and operational. 74 2.4 Test Instrumentation is available and calibrated. Add 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Demonstrate the proper operation of the Fire Detection i systems. 3.2 Demonstrate the head and flow characteristics of the fire water pumps, and the operation of all auxiliaries. 1 $. 3.3 Verify control logic. 3.4 Verify flow rates in the various flow paths of the Fire 'c-' Water. System. 3.5 Verify sprinkler and deluge spray patterns where possible. 3.6 Verify alarms, indicating instruments and status lights are functional, . 3? Gk 9N n rcis:a.c.t$ era s/,Jvrw kk t~n E i inl' & d.tm f 1& 4.O DATA REOUIRED' / .' 4.1 Setpoints under which alarms and interlocks occur. ! l 4.2 Sprinkler and deluge spray patterns. 4.3 Fire alarm operability. J Amendment Q 14.2-173 June 30, 1993

CESSAR nuiricui: ( . 4.4 Temperature.and s oke sensors operability. s' .% . coa s .c . _ . . :.

                               .    ._...,2    3.; nc--..,a   ,e, 4.5   System-flonatosi                      . 1     ,

Nh tck MZtt-l n+'d j?bu. clb"f U :fAd b

4. b *f '

5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA / 5.1 The Fire Protection Systems operateras described in _ Section 9.5.1. ** 4,=;

                                                                                            ,. a '

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s k Amendment H 14.2-174 August 31, 1990

i CESSAR Emincmon i l 3.2 For systems that do not attain design operating temperature, verify by observation and/or calculation that the snubbers will accommodate the predicted thermal movement. 3.3 Inspect small pipe in the vicinity of connections to large pipe to ensure that sufficient clearance and flexibility exists to accommodate thermal movements of the large pipe. 3.4 The Feedwater System and Emergency Feedwater System hot displacement measurements will be obtained during the initial startup and power escalation phase. All snubbers and spring supports, which required 3.5 adjustments during the test, will be reinspected in its hot condition to assure proper adjustments were made.

                                                                        ,w,.m 4.0   DATA REOUIRED P.$

4.1 Position measurements versus temperature for cold heatup, steady state, cooldown and return to ambient conditions for designated piping, spring supports and +

snubbers. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ;4 7) 5.1 The pipe shall move freely, except at locations where. -d supports / restraints are designed o restrain pi'pe " ?.~,1-thermal movement lu) &J ukhed ,% l

Qlw 3,9,.2 .

5.2 Thermal movement of pipe at the locations of spring hangers and snubbers shall be within their allowable travel rangeM cw cavul ec ,'/2Lv 3 9 J . The thermal movement of the pipe at restricted 5.3 measurement locations shall be within the acceptable limits or discrepant response be reconciled using acceptable reconciliation methodsa.; chacuual -

       -f  2
       .w c w.=      .
                       , c,;   a a.

t Amendment H 14.2-235 August 31, 1990

CESSAR Ennncam,. I 14.2.12.1.129 BOP Piping Vibration Measurement Test ; i 1.O OBJECTIVE . l 1.1 . To verify that piping layout and support / restraints are ; adequate to withstand normal transients without damage ! in the designated piping systems. i

                                                                                      .i i

1.2 To demonstrate that flow induced vibration is sufficiently small to cause no fatigue or stress , failures in the designated piping systems. ~ "JV !

"+

2.0 PREREOUISITES f 2.1 System components and piping supports have been installed in accordance with design drawings for system : to be tested. ! h 2.2 System piping has been installed in accordance with "i > design drawings for system to be tested. p.$ f i 2.3 Hot Functional Testing and/or Pre-critical Heatup for power escalation is underway. g 2.4 System piping has been filled for normal operation. ( ; 3.0 TEST METHOD ~4 I l g# '- ~ 3.1 Perform an assessment of piping system vibration. r.,

                                                                          - a; 4.0       DATA REOUIRED                                                              :

4.1 Pipe response data to include piping drawings, - vibration measurements and operating conditions. , q 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA , 5.1 Steady State Vibration Testing a 9 Ocichd w - 3,9 5.1.1 Acceptance criteria are based on conservatively estimated stresses which are derived from measured i velocities and conservatively assumed mode shapes. ( i Amendment Q 14.2-236 June 30, 1993

CESSAR 824?ncamr 5.2 Transient Vibration Testing M 9 cEdockdd Aw by , 3, 9. A 5.2.1 No permanent deformation or damage in any system, structure, or component important to nuclear safety is observed. 5.2.2 All suppressors and restraints respond within ' their allowable ranges, between stops or with indicators on scale.

                                                                  . ~~% -

9$bi mg.ip AfgEgr 'i. i 't I Amendment II l 14.2-237 August 31, 1990

CESSAR Ennficou l 4.3 Minimum level and maximum flow limits for the SCS pumps. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Mid-Loop Instrumentation provides accurate

       , indication of RCS parameters as described in Sections       7. ~7, / 4 sig 16.13. 2.                                                        .w 5.2       The    SCS   pump operating  limits at mid-loop are             $@

established and within the expected design range as described in Section 19.6.3.9. ..

                                                                            -n
                                                               ,g; .QggAfr.'
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                                                                      , Nayw

( 5hhfL w. ( Amendment O 14.2-250 May 1, 1993 l i

CESSAR 8Encuinn ( 14.2.12.2.5 Post-core Reactor and Secondary Water Chemistry Data 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To maintain the proper water chemistry for the RCS and steam generators during post-core hot functional testing. 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Primary and secondary sampling systems are operable. 2.2 Chemicals to support hot functional testing are available. 2.3 The primary and secondary chemical addition system are operable. Ent<g .. 2.4 Purification ion exchangers are charged with resin. 4tyd - 3.0 TEST METHOD 65-3.1 Minimum sampling frequency for the steam generator and RCS will be as specified by the chemistry manual. The ( sampling frequency will be modified as required to.[%: ensure the proper RCS and steam generator water chemistry. g ,, p f

                                                                               . :6 3.2        Perform RCS and steam generator sampling and chemistry analysis after every significant change               in   plant conditions       (i.e.,     heatup,      cooldown,     chemical additions).

4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Plant conditions. 4.2 Steam generator chemistry analysis. 4.3 RCS chemistry analysis. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 RCS and steam generator water chemistry can be , maintained as described in Sections 9.3.4 and10.3.gvo' l 5.2 Baseline data for the steam generators and RCS is established.

                                                                       /               ,

O. ], [ , i 14.2-260 l

CESSAR naincum

                                                                   --. (

14.2.12.2.7 Post-core Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Measurement 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To measure the post-core load RCS leakage at hot, zero power conditions. . 4 2.0 PREREQUISITES g6e 2.1 Hydrostatic testing of the RCS and associated systems . has been completed. Tj, 2.2 The RCS and the CVCS are operating as a closed system. 2.3 The RCS is at hot, zero power conditions.

                                                                    . ', 4.c 2.4      All permanently mounted instrumentation      is              4*d .

calibrated. properly Hj $ [ , 3.O TEST METHOD .. s ,a 3.1 Measure and record the changes in water inventory o[ the RCS and CVCS for a specified interval of time. ( 4.O DATA REQUIRED ;g;[y . v. 4.1 Pressurizer pressure, level, and temperature. "~.%g ~ 4.2 Volume Control Tank level, temperature, and pressure. 4.3 Reactor Drain Tank level, temperature, and pressure. 4.4 RCS temperature and pressure. 4.5 Safety Injection Tank level and pressure. 4.6 Time interval. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Identified and unidentified leakage shall be within the limits described in the Technical Specifications 4d M ceta c ust .ssu AdG u 5 2. 3 N 14.2-262

CESSAR EnnnCATION

                                                                       . l.

5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The measured ITCs agree with the predicted values within the acceptance criteria .specified in Table E

14. 2-6 a ed sa atc.wLeM .v>v lw'ic&r 4'. 3. A .twl } 3 3 5.2 The moderator temperature coefficients (MTC) derived from the measured ITC are in compliance with the Technical Specifications a ad coo cfre ut.c 6cd 4,v,/M

d. 3 2 .un<d W. 3. 3.

                                                                   .x$,*?.

( c-:V %. Ai% h ,* 39

Amendment E 14.2-268 December 30, 1988 l

CESSAR nainemon ( i 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA j 5.1 The measured CEA group worths agree with predictions within the acceptance criteria specified in Table E ' 14.2-6. d b : '; : d fc - 6 M .r. :. 44 n 3.1 5.2 Evaluation of the measurements verifies shutdown

marginM (,$t.dLk$4d iv ,&Eiovw & 3. 2. cW:l A,j, 27 ..

t E f i P i

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L3m p ". a k Amendment E 14.2-270 December 30, 1988

CESSAR nai"icarien

 /                                                                            .

14.2.12.3.4 Diffcrential Boron Worth Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To measure the differential boron reactivity worth for various CEA configurations. 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 CEA group worth tests are completed. - 2.2 . Critical configuration boron concentration tests are completed. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 The differential boron worths are determined from the measured boron concentrations associated with state points measured during the CEA group worth tests. Ngil. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED ~g 4.1 Conditions of the measurement at state points: 4.1.1 RCS temperature g 4.1.2 Pressurizer pressure g7g

                                                                      --x u-4.1.3           CEA configuration                                    -

4.1.4 Boron concentration 4.2 Integral reactivity changes between state points. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The measured boron worths agree with the predicted values within the acceptance criteria specified in Table 14.2-6.Sog 20 n.ne.a w i.0,v m m ,;w y 3. :t E

              ;L4 m   -3J

\ Amendment E 14.2-271 December 30, 1988

CESSAR naincmu ( 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Measured values agree with predictions within the acceptance criteria specified in Table 14.2-6 and conform with the Technical Specifications. >^ E lu.1 b,,3(s & d n) .

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( Amendment E 14.2-274 December 30, 1988

14.2.12.4.2 Unit Load Transient Test l 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate that load changes can be made at the desired rates. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 The reactor is operating at the desired power level. , 2.2 The RRS , FWCS, SBCS, RPCS, MDS, and the pressurizer l level and pressure control systems are in automatic operation. 3.0 TEST METHOD i 3.1 Load increases and decreases (steps and ramps) in accordance with the ABB C-E Fuel Preconditioning g , Guidelines and as allowed by the MDS and RRS will be l performed at power levels in the 75% to 95% range and ;

in the 25% to 50% power range. 4.0 DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Time dependent data: wa% 4.1.1 Pressurizer level and pressure -,jgg 4.1.2 RCS temperatures 4.1.3 CEA position 4.1.4 Power level and demand 4.1.5 Steam generator levels and pressures 4.1.6 Feedwater and steam flow 4.1.7 Feedwater temperature. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The step and ramp transients demonstrate that the plant performs load changes allowed by C-E's Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines and data has been taken that will demonstrate the plant's ability to meet unit load swing design transients.to d'c.nukG 2,u 'd eG,w J . c/ . / . /, d . -.' 3 9f

                  .        . ut   ? 7 /. /,

Amendment Q June 30, 1993 g , g 75

CESSAR ninnemen - , e,-- 14.2.12.4.3 Control Systems Checkout Test 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate that the automatic control systems operate satisfactorily during steady-state and i transient conditions. ~ yg 2.O PREREQUISITES 2.1 The reactor is operating at the desired conditions. $ 4

                                                                                       .Q 2.2       The RRS, FWCS, SBCS, RPCS, and the pressurizer level                                 !

and pressure controls are in automatic operation. 2.3 The Megawatt Demand Setter (MDS) is operational. -g 3.0 TEST METHOD %5 G jg .C' 3.1 The performance of the control systems including the f' . MDS during steady-state and transient conditions will ' i be monitored to demonstrate that the systems are operating satisfactorily. T - 4.0 DATA REQUIRED i

                                                                                 .4%           s.'

4.1 Time dependent data-

                                                                              -a.              ,   ;

4.1.1 Pressurizer level and pressure ~-( 4.1.2 RCS temperatures 4.1.3 CEA position 4.1.4 Power level and demand 4.1.5 Steam generator levels and pressures 4.1.6 Feedwater and steam flow 4.1.7 Feedwater temperature 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The control systems maintain the reactor power, RCS ; temperature, pressurizer pressure and level, and steam generator levels and pressures within their control bands during steady-state operation and are capable of returning these parameters to within their control ( bands in response to transient operation.w S&tNAM' 1 i L. , l'C M t!)U E* l Amendment E 14.2-277 December 30, 1988

I CESSARnn% mon i i e; -l 14.2.12.4.4 Reactor Coolant and Secondary Chemistry and Radiochemistry Test ! 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To conduct chemistry tests at various power levels with ,, the intent of gathering corrosion data and determining activity buildup. - 1.2 To verify proper operation of the process radiation monitor. ; 1.3 To verify the adequacy of sampling and analysis procedures. l 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 The reactor is stable at the desired power level. 2.2 Sampling systems for the RCS and CVCS are operable. ; 3.0 TEST METHOD i 3.1 Samples wi'l be col %ected from the RCS and secondary system atf various power levels and analyzed in the sampling laboratory procedures. f ing / applicable and analysis 3.2 Samples w be collected at the process radiation monitor at various power levels, analyzed in the laboratory, and compared with the process radiation monitor to verify proper operation. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Conditions of the measurement: 4.1.1 Power 1 4.1.2 RCS temperature i. 1 4.1.3 Boron concentration l 4.1.4 Core average burnup { 4.2 Samples for measurement of gross activities and/or isotopic activities. O i I '

    ,                                     14.2-278 i

C SSAR DE51GN CERTIFICATIDN 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Measured activity levels are within their limits. 5.2 The Process Radiation Monitors agree with the laboratory analypes within measurement uncertaintiessco a2co c5L iec JetGaru ? 3 4 5.3 7 Procedures for sample collection and analysis are 4 ' ^ verified;.1.a 07 La L istd_ .s n Webw ?. 3 2 . _ ;_,.<.~

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J 4 .x _ _ ,,y m ..ww e j 14.2-279

CESSAR !!anamu 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Time dependent data: 4.1.1 Pressurizer pressure and level 4.1.2 RCS temperatures 4.1.3 Steam generator pressure and level E i 4.1.4 CEA drop times _ 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The ability to achieve and control the reactor at Hot Standby from outside the control room is demonstrated.14

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l-Q~'n.A' g Amendment 2 14.2-283 December .0, 1988 l l

CESSAR naincmon j ( i e 14.2.12.4.8 Loss of Offsite Power Test I 1.0 OBJECTIVE i 1.1 To verify that the reactor can be shut down and ( maintained in Hot Standby in the event of loss of j offsite power. ; 2.O PREREQUISITES 2.1 Reactor operating at > 10% rated power. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 The plant is tripped in a manner to produce a loss of generator and offsite power. : 3.2 The plant is maintained in Hot Standby for at least 30 , : minutes before restoring power. :/ . 4 g ! 4.O DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Time dependent data: 4.1.1 Steam generator pressure and levels .

                                                                     ,,c       t-4.1.2             Pressurizer pressure and level                ,               ,

4.1.3 RCS temperatures Ni , 4.1.4 Boron concentration 4.1.5 CEA drop times ' 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The reactor is shut down and maintained in Hot Standby i 1 on emergency power for at least 30, minutes during a j simulated loss of offsite powerc6) h uigi ,yv ' l/ l3 . x,. 3 - _ dic Gott l l i i a .J i Amendment E 14.2-284 December 30, 1988

CESSAR EnWICATION i ( 14.2.12.4.9 Biological Shield Survey Test , j t 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To measure the radiation levels in accessible locations of the plant outside of the biological shield.

z , 1.2 To determine occupancy times for these areas during j power operation. E , 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Radiation survey instruments have been calibrated. ' 1 2.2 Results of the radiation surveys performed at zero power conditions are available. 3.0 TEST METHOD [ 3.1 Measure gamma and neutron dose rates at 50 and 100% ' power levels. ;qF:. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED ( - 4.1 Power level. . Gamma dose rates in the accessible locations. 4.2 4.3 Neutron dose rates in the accessible locations. ~ : e ..- 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Accessible areas and occupancy times during, power E , operation have been defined.L] c2caca.ufe4 im j@ .

                 /232                                                                          ;

[ h l Amendment E 14.2-285 December 30, 1988 l

-l

CESSAR Enli"icuiou l 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Agreement between the predicted and measured power distributions and core peaking factors are within the , acceptance _ criteriappecifi- in Table 14.2-6. , sv:1 MJ - u-e a _ ns- a-c. rn,v i T. 2 awr ' 7 /. / /> 4" 5.2 The measured power of each assembly in a symmetric group is within 110% of the average powers of the E , group .; %2 wet. - >t- 'h<th w V 3- 2 e-W( 7 7 /. / 8. Quadrant tilt is less than 10% M c.) N

                                                              'u 5.3 he Cu,,x    ] 3 .2 a vvi      . ~7 t.t. 9 .

b t

                                                                       ^h 'r Amendment E 14.2-287                  December 30, 1988

I CESSAR nn%- , ( ' 14.2.12.4.11 Intercomparison of Plant Protection System ! (PPS), Core Protection Calculator (CPC) , Data Processing System (DPS) and Discrete Indicating Alarm System (DIAS) Inputs 1.0 OBJECTIVE < 1.1 To verify that process variable inputs / outputs of the ; PPS, the CPCs, the DPS, the DIAS, and the console instruments are consistent. 2.0 PREREQUISITES j E 2.1 The plant is operating at the desired conditions. :

                                                                                                                 ,       t 4

2.2 All CPCs, CEACs, DPS and the DIAS are operable. f 3.0 TEST METHOD . , n. 3.1 Process variable inputs / outputs of the PPS, the CPCs, the DIAS, the DPS, and console instruments are read as near simultaneously as practical. E 4.0 DATA REQUIRED ( w~ 4.1 Conditions of the measurement: ;$ 7'. '\ 4.1.1 Power measurements '(. [ 4.1.2 Boron concentration j 4.1.3 RCS temperatures 4.1.4 Pressurizer pressure and level i 4.1.5 Steam generator pressures and levels 4.1.6 RCP speeds and differential pressures ; 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The process variable inputs / outputs from the PPS, the l CPCs, the DPS, the DIAS, and the console instruments sare within the - uncertaint-ies assumed-for-them--in-the- b CPC 7 -PPS,-and the-PM:Im x m c.uotu dTCow f57 ,

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           ~_              _

Amendment E 14.2-288 December 30, 1988 ;

CESSAR nainemon ( 4.2 Time dependent data: li 4.2.1 In-core and ex-core detector readings , 4.2.2 CEA position 4.2.3 RCS temperatures , 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Measured radial peaking factors determined from in-core flux maps are no higher than the corrpsponding values used in the CPCsr3 & ab utLM jri.- ,da>vs 4. L A , 4 3 3., i kg 7 / . /. A 5.2 The C / shadowing factors and temperature shadowing factors used in the CPCs agree within the acceptance criteria 'specified in the CPC test requirementsa 7 H d2so vuAuL .byt ,W st. 3. 3 ,

5.3 The shape) annealing matrix have been measured and the boundary point power correlation constants used in the CPCs are/ within the limits specified by the test requirem5nts.cw h udle/_. m. ;fcC,6 y'. 3 3 H

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                                                                                 \

Amendment H 14.2-290 August 31, 1990

CESSAR ninnearieu 14.2.12.4.14 CPC Verification 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify Departure from Nucleate Boiling Rates (DNBR) and Local Power Density (LPD) calculations of the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs). 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 The reactor is at the desired power level and CEA configuration with equilibrium Xe. 2.2 The CPCs are operational. 2.3 The in-core detector system is operational. 3.O TEST METHOD . , , . _.am

                                                                     , q f- wp 3.1        Specified values are recorded from the CPCs.                .

3.2 The values for LPD and DNBR obtained from the CPCs are compared with the values calculated for the same conditions using the CPC FORTRAN Simulator. ( 4.O DATA REQUIRED .c*% i Reactor power. b 4.1 4.2 CEA positions. 4.3 Boron concentration. . 4.4 Specified CPC inputs, outputs, and constants. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The values of DNBR and LPD calculated by the CPCs are consistent with the values calculated by the CPC FORTRAN code.M cb Mel a ,:/4c Gr_, 7. J. /. 14.2-293 j

1 (;IE!iSi/LFtE!lnincarmu l

                                                                                        -r 14.2.12.4.16          In-core Detector Test-
                                                                                        -f 1.0         OBJECTIVE                                                                  i To verify conversion of the fixed in-core detector 1.1 signals to voltages for input to the Data Processing                   E System (DPS).                                                              .

l-2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 The reactor is at the specified power level and ! conditions. 2.2 The DPS is operable. )

                                                                                         ,r 3.0        TEST METHOD                                                                !

t 3.1 Arplifier output signals are measured. El 3.2 Group symmetric instrument signals are measured. ; 3.3 Background detector signals are recorded. l t 4.0 DATA REQUIRED i 4.1 Reactor power. 4.2 CEA position. , 4.3 Boron concentration. _ , _ 4.4 In-core detector system data. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA i 5.1 The DPS input signals for group symmetric instruments are within the measurement and distribution uncertainties. i!.c:..= n E rn~,d.h.powerEgs: E

                                                &cc r o ccc m 5-       - ~ ~ . J. v.     ;

5.2 Background detector signals are within tolerances

                                                   'I specified by ABB C-E.                                                      ,

i i 1, I Amendment E December 30, 1988 l 14.2-296 i I

CESSAR nuiPICATI@N 5 l 14.2.12.4.17 Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) Vcrification 1.0 OBJECTIVE E 1.1 To verify COLSS Secondary Calorimetric, Departure from Nucleate Boiling Rates (DNBR) and Local Power Density (LPD) calculation. . 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 The reactor is at the desired power level and CCA ' configuration with equilibrium Xe. 2.2 The COLSS is operational. , 2.3 The in-core detector system is operational. w freia - ; 3.O TEST METHOD .p f , ~ 3.1 Specified values are recorded from the COU S. .f , t 3.2 The values for secondary calorimetric power, LPD and E

  ,             DNBR  obtained from        the COLSS   are compared with independently    calculated    values     using    the     COLSS algorithms.                                                            f x   >

4.0 DATA REQUIRED O .. I

                                                                         . i5n           i      I 4.1        Reactor power.

a , i 4.2 CEA positions. 4.3 Boron concentration. 4.4 Specified COLSS inputs, outputs, and constants. 4.5 In-core detector maps. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA I 5.1 The values of COLSS secondary calorimetric pover, DNBR and LPD obtained from the COLSS agree with the E l ' independently calculated valuer within the ! uncertainties in computer processincJ contained in the : COLSS uncertainty analysis (Ls cbuided Av,NcCand l I

                 / q J q Gud      7 7-/.J'/,

1 i Amendment E j 14.2-297 December 30, 1988 ! l

l CESSAR nnince ;

                                                                                  .(   i r

14.2.12.4.18 Baseline Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) ! Integrity Monitoring [ 1.0 OBJECTIVE l 1.1 To obtain baseline Internals Vibration Monitoring System (IVMS) data at various power plateaus. l t 1.2 To obtain baseline Acoustic Leak Monitoring system i (ALMS) data at various power plateaus. I 1.3 To obtain baseline Loose Parts Monitoring system (LPMS) , data at various reactor coolant pump configurations * , and power plateaus. l 1.4 To verify existing, or establish new alarm setpoints as ! required for the NSSS Integrity Monitoring System. .y ( 2.0 PREREQUISITES e

                                                                                 +E     t 2.1       Plant is stable at the applicable power level (0, 20,                     !

50, 80, and 100 percent). j 2.2 IVMS, ALMS, LPMS are operational as applicable. ,( l 3.0 TEST METHOD NY b 3.1

                        ,, v

- a.. _

__.;z,..: % .we=_ M- Iwtl Collect baseline data at the applicable power levers.'_g s l 3.2 Collect baseline data with various Reactor Coolant Pump { combinations. ; I 4.0 DATA REQUIRED i 4.1 Reactor power level, temperature, pressure. ( 4.2 Baseline data for ALMS, IVMS, LPMS. t 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Baseline data have been collected for various reactor ! coo 1 ant pump combinations 44 thstcded 4+ M.c&.a 77/S. ( 5.2 Baseline data has been collected at 0, 20, 50, 80, and l 100 percent power. 5.3 Alarm setpoints have been evaluated for adequacyM cdmAbMM ; a ,' h c h s ?. ? /- lo . . ! k 4

Performed at Post-Core Hot Functional tests.

E l 1 Amendment E 14.2-298 December 30, 1988

CESSAR HELuiw

t J 14.2.12.4.20 dooling Tower Acceptance Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify the Cooling Tower is capable of rejecting the design heat load. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 4

                                                                                                           .g. .

2.1 Construction activities are complete. 2.2 Circulating water system has been flow balanced. 2.3 Permanently installed instrumentation is operable and 4 calibrated. TI @ p

'~

Test Instrumentation is properly calibrated and . 2.4 , . 2 available. m- n. . 2.5 Plant output is at approxima'tely full power. 'I N

n. ,

s. 3.0 TEST METHOD e;g ,

                                                                                                     .n n> .

a measurement of the Cooling Tower 3.1 Perform i performance. ,

t 4.0 DATA REOUTRED ,,

                    ~; ,       .,. . zww.~ce;;;. L  .r~ t . n. ;t , ,    ,s;; 4c 4.1       Cooling water temperature and flows.                          j~                                          ;

_ ~.3 , , 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA . . . .- . 5.1 The Cooling Tower performance meets manufacturers designcu Cku u h v} k t A /O.4 s./. i 4 4 t Amendment Q June 30, 1M3 , 14.2-301 ! l l

CESSAR En'rincari:n 4.2 Pressurizer pressure and level. 4.3 Steam generator levels and pressure. 4.4 RCS Boron Concentration 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The natural circulation power to flow ratio is less than 1. OM C0:%sMOtA Zas - Qy,& J b . 5.2 The RCS can be borated while in natural circulation M

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( e sg g;,,9)*.y g, g Qbg.;.[,pp 93.] 3.yqip s g 3,.; i s Amendment R 14.2-305 July 30, 1993

(#! h h khk k Tk ICAT12N l TABLE 14.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 8) PREOPERATIONAL TESTS Section Title 14.2.12.1.1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Initial Operation 14.2.12.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Test 14.2.12.1.3 Pressurizer Safety Valve Test 14.2.12.1.4 Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Systems 14.2.12.1.5 CVCS Letdown Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.6 CVCS Purification Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.7 Volume Control Tank Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.8 CVCS Charging Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.9 Chemical Addition Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.10 Reactor Drain Tank Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.11 Equipment Drain Tank Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.12 Boric Acid Batching Tank Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.13 Concentrated Boric Acid Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.14 Reactor Makeup Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.15 Holdup Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.16 Beric Acid Concentrator Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.17 Gas Stripper Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.18 Boronometer Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.19 1Lortdown Process Radiation Monitor Subsystem Test 14.2.12.1.20 Gas Stripper Effluent Radiation Monitor E : Subsystem Test Amendment E I December 30, 1988 l

()! h h kkk bbb FICATICN TABLE 14.2-1 (Cont'd) (Sheet 5 of 8} PREOPERATIONAL TESTS Section Title 14.2.12.1.77 Chilled Water System Test 14.2.12.1.78 Station Service Water System Test 14.2.12.1.79 Component Cooling Water System Test bMecf ,te 4 14.2.12.1.80 -Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Clocnup System . Test 14.2.12.1.81 Turbine Building Cooling Water System Test 14.2.12.1.82 Condensate. Storage System Test 14.2.12.1.83 Turbine Building Service Water System Test 14.2.12.1.84 Equipment and Floor Drainage System Test 14.2.12.1.85 Normal and Security Lighting Systems Test Emergency Lighting System Test H 14.2.12.1.86 14.2.12.1.87 Communications System Test 14.2.12.1.88 Compressed Air System Test 14.2.12.1.89 Compressed Gas System. Test 14.2.12.1.90 Process Sampling System Test 14.2.12.1.91 Heat Tracing System Test 14.2.12.1.92 Fire Protection System,E Test 14.2.12.1.93 Diesel Generator Mechanical System Test 14.2.12.1.94 Diesel Generator Electrical System Test 14.2.12.1.95 Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems Test i 14.2.12.1.96 Alternate AC Source System Test j Amendment H August 31, 1990 i

1 Page 1 of 4 l CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1 Preoperational Tests Reviewed in Letter ALWR-670 Test Number Test Title 14.2.12.1.41 2 Integrated Engineered Safety Features / Loss of Power Test 14.2.12.1.76*3 Ultimate Heat Sink Test 14.2.12.1.77*3 Chilled Water System Test 14.2.12.1.78*3 Station Service Water System Test 14.2.12.1.79*3 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Test 14.2.12.1.84*' Equipment and Floor Drainage System Test 14.2.12.1.85*' Normal and Security Lighting Systems Test 14.2.12.1.86*3 Emergency Lighting System Test 14.2.12.1.87*3 Communications Systems Test 14.2.12.1.88 Compressed Air System Test 14.2.12.1.89 Compressed Gas System Test 14.2.12.1.92*3 Fire Protection System Test 14.2.12.1.93** Emergency Diesel Generator Mechanical System Test 14.2.12.1.94*5 Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical System Test 14.2.12.1.95*5 Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary System ; Test j 14.2.12.1.96*' Alternate AC Source System Test 14.2.12.1.97*' Alternate AC Source Support Systems Test Note: **"""*"" specifies attachment number containing required change package for test. Absence of asterisk indicates change package was not required.

                           .-      ._=

l Page 2 of 4 I CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1 Preoperational Tests Reviewed in Letter ALWR-670 i Test Number Test Title 14.2.12.1.101 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.102*' Containment Purge Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.103*' Control Complex Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.104*' Subsphere Building Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.104A*' Nuclear Annex Ventilation System Test .i 14.2.12.1.107 Diesel Building Ventilation System Test i 14.2.12.1.108*' Fuel Euilding Ventilation System Test i 14.2.12.1.109 Annulus Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.110*' Radwaste Building Ventilation System Test ; j 14.2.12.1.111*' Balance of Control Complex Ventilation System i Test 14.2.12.1.112*8 Hydrogen Mitigaticn System (EMS) Test ! t 14.2.12.1.113** Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (CHRS) ' Test 14.2.12.1.114*' Liquid Waste Management System Test ; 14.2.12.1.115 Solid Waste Management System Test ;

14.2.12.1.116*' Gaseous Radwaste Management System Test >

1 14.2.12.1.117*'" Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring l I System Test i Note: * """***" specifies attachment number containing required change package for test Absence of asterisk indicates change package was not required. I

l Page 3 of 4 i CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1 Preoperational Tests Reviewed in Letter ALWR-670 Test Number Test Title f 5 14.2.12.1.118*" Airborne and Area Radiation Monitoring System t Test 14.2.12.1.119*" 4160 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power System , Test , 14.2.12.1.120 480 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power System Test 14.2.12.1.121 Unit Main Power System Test 14.2.12.1.122 13800 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System. Test 14.2.12.1.123*" 4160 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System Test - 14.2.12.1.124 480 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System Test 14.2.12.1.125 Non-Class 1E DC Power Systems Test 14.2.12.1.126 Class 1E DC Power Systems Test 14.2.12.1.127 Offsite Power System Test i 14.2.12.1.130*" Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test ind Structural Integrity Test l t 14.2.12.1.131*" Fuel Transfer Tube Functional Test and Leak Test [ 14.2.12.1.132*" Equipment Hatch Functional Test and Leak Test j 14.2.12.1.133*" Containment Personnel Airlock Functional Test and Leak Test f i 14.2.12.1.134*" Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies- j Test j 1- ! Note: * *'""**" specifies attachment number containin~g required change package for test. Absence of asterick indicates ! change package was not required. > r

Page 4 of 4 } CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1 l Preoperational Tests Reviewed in Letter ALWR-670 Test Number Test Title i 14.2.12.1.135*" Containment Isolation Valves Leakage Rate Test 14.2.12.1.136 Loss of Instrument Air Test 14.2.12.1.140*" Containment Isolation valves Test 14.2.12.4.22 Ventilation Capability Test t P i i r s i P i i k Note: * ""**'" specifies attachment number containing required change package for test. Absence of asterisk indicates change package was not required. l

 -                                                   - - -   ,         e

CESSAR EnFinem:n 4.0 DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Response to ESFAS signals. 4.2 Diesel start times, load sequence times, frequency, voltage, and current. 4.3 Valve stroke times. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA eci 9

5.1 The ESFs respond as described in Chapters 6 and in Sections 7.3, 8.3, 0.3, 0.53 and 10.4. 5.2 Electrical redundancy, independence, and load group assignments are as designed. 5.3 Plant response to partial and full losses of offsite power is as designed. 5.4 The diesel generators re-energize loads as designed and full load is within design capability. Amendment Q 14.2-98 June 30, 1993

CESSAR Einiscum 14.2.12.1.76 Ultimate Heat Sink Sy-t = Test 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify that Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) Syct= is maintained by its associated support systems. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Ultimate Heat Sink have been completed. 2.2 UHS makeup source available as required. 2.3 UHS blowdown path available as required. 2.4 Ultimate Heat Sink System instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.5 Test instrumentation available and properly calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Demonstrate that UHS makeup flow meets design. 3.2 Demonstrate that UHS blowdown flow meets design. 3.3 Demonstrate the operation of UHS level and temperature instruments and alarms. 4.0 DATA REOUIRED Nbg 4.1 UH S " ' 4"p- flow.

4.2 UHSflowdownflow. 4.3 Setpoints of alarms. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Ultimate Heat Sink Systen operates as described in Section 9.2.5. Amendment H 14.2-146 August 31, 1990

I I CESSAR unincuia i k I 14.2.12.1.77 Chilled Water System Test 1.O OBJECTIVE r 1.1 To demonstrate proper operation of the Esstatial l Chilled Water and Normal Chilled Water Systems. 2.0 PREREQUISITES

                             - boe b Construction activities on the Chilled Water System 2.1                                                                         ,

icompleted.

2.2 Chilled Water System instrumentation has been ; calibrated. 2.3 Test instrumentation available and properly calibrated. .

2.4 Componentj

olingyIter[stemavailable. I 2.5 Appropriate fand((powersourcesavailable. , l 3.O TEST METHOD gb d,qiggon j 3.1 Demonstrate that each sential Chilled Water %e can . be operated from its local and remote manual control H i station. j 54 ave 3.2 Demonstrate that each [sential Chilled Water + 4.M ! starts automatically in response to the appropriate ECTAC signal. 3.3 Verify that the chillersunitr supply chilled water at j the rated flow and design conditions. , 3.4 Verify chilled water flow to supplied components. f i 3.5 Verify alarms, interlocks, indicai.ing instruments y and ; status lights are functional. l 3.6 Verify head versus flow characteristics for the Chilled Watergumps.System - 3.7 Verify system baseline performance during HFT testing. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED , 4.1 Record flows as required to components and throttle valve positions. Amendment:H 14.2-147 August 31, 1990

i l CESSAR Ein%m:,. i t 4.2 Record alarm, interlock;and control setpoints. , 4.3 Record chiller normal cperating parameters. 4.4 Record pump head versus flow and operating data. 4.5 System operating parameters during HFT. H 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Chilled Water System operates as described in Section 9.2.9. i

};

e R 7 P i Amendment-H 14.2-158 August 31, 1990

C E S S A R n!4?nca m ,. I 3.1 Operate. ccd rol volves frorn all appropnde. ccdrol po sibns. O{05crvo Volve. Cyrakion a pcQ hen i f dt caTICO . 14.2.12.1.78 Station Servios Water System Test 1.O OBJECTIVE ; 1.1 To demonstrate the ability of the Station Service Water , System to supply cooling water as designed under normal !

        ,                                       and emergency conditions.

2.O PREREOUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Station Service Water ! System have been completed. 2.2 Station Service Water instrumentation has been-calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for the operation of the ; Station Service Water System are complete and ! operational. l 2.4 Test instruments available and calibrated. 2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink is available. t 3.O TEST METHOD __ p , 2 3.1 Verify head versus flow characteristics for the'Yervice fater[ umps. { 3.2 VerifyadequateflowofS'tationy'ervicey[atertoeach 3 supplied component. 3.3 Verify alarms, indicating instruments;and status lights l

              ,                                 are functional,                                                                            i
              !                                                                    on a loss ei oNsde pe9er,                               [

i 3.4 Verify th_g d . mcr. r9nse_ 1_;; cf effrit pe"cr, the previcu 1y ; 3 .r ..ti::g pu=pe are returned te operation.

                ;^                                                    7sMon semcc. wier pamp 3.5                Verify a low h: dcr discharge pressure starts the idle                                     ,

pump in each division. 1 i 3.6 Verify pump control from the control room. j

                      '.0 ,

4 DATA REOUIprn t i 4.1 Record pump head versus flow and operating data. t 4.2 Flow to CCW heat exchangers using various pump l ) combinations. l 1

    .'              wm                                                                                         Amendment Q
  ,         e:py3M d" ~                                                       14.2-149                           June 30, 1993 es

(

CESSAR nnincuia 4.3 Setpoints of alarms, interlocks,and controls. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Station Service Water System operates as described in Section 9.2.1. {q t on leidica ion . {c5 r l l i l l l Amendment H 14.2-150 August 31, 1990

CESSAR !!nLmn 1

\lenh OE Cornponend cocb W er he exchnger h55 ,

Whes close. en o-n G AS. erdy Ibe- conbininand sprey , f i hed exchanSer isolcrf s.n valve.s open ca CL C5AS and en c,_ , 14.2.12.1.79 component Cooling Water (CN) System Test j d 1.O OBJECTIVE ONNs W" r~ (cc d m+..v ww.m.5 CE.uh.A . c i pe

    ,     ,    1.1      l To demonstrate the capability of the               Component Cooling             .

4# i Water System V to provide cooling water during normal i unit operation, during unit cooldown and during an !

  -;      !                emergency situation; and to demonstrate proper system
     ?                     response to a       simulated engineered safety features actuation signal.

{ u 2.0 PREREQUISITES r o j t U , 2.1 Construction activities on the Component Cooling Water ! ) 1 ' System have been completed. ! 3 2.2 Component Cooling Water System instrumentation has been i E calibrated. i 1 w > C 2.3 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. ;

  -U c      2.4         Plant systems required to support testing are operable,                         !

or temporary systems are installed and operable. I 1 N, i

   ;i m          3.O         TEST METHOD s                                                                                                   ,

Lq g 3.1 Demonstrato proper operation of the surge tank H ; controls. 2c 2 ^ 3.2 Balance component cooling flow to supplied components-

   ,p                     by verifying rated flow to each component.

4

- 3

_ 5. 3.3 Perform a pump head versus flow verification for all four pumps. 4 E, N r non-essenbl hecders on "^ - t 7' 3.4 Verify the ner-cafety cc panente and the spent fuel pool heat exchangers are isolated in cafegucrd: actuatier ci~r:1.t ! non.esw.A d M f, and TCP benders f 3.5 Verify the st;n saf ety cc;panente are isolated on a surge tank low-low level. y , signal 3.6 y -Demonstratc ,Cosponent C.eeling Weter Fuwe 1,v. l l 3.7 operate control valves from all appropriate control ; positions. Observe valve operation and position indication.end-[easureopeningandclosingtimesj t__.vak , 3.8 Simulate failed conditions and observe valve response.

                                                                                ) Wkre recpired i

z Amendment H ! 14.2-151 August 31, 1990

CESSAR E!! Enc- , ,ayus, ry akarern; i M , q m 5dru m efd5, and dkos 5 afe. Aumiiom! 3.9 --4 Demonet-rate punp -opcration in rcopensc to a 5&fugnerds actuation signal.

 >                                                         r bvM             a gs 3 .J411      Demonstrate        the     ability     of     the l__CCW        C y a t.c.a    in conjunction       with     the Shutdown        Cooling'      and      Station Service Water System to perform a plant cooldown.

(HFT) 4.O DATA REQUIRED 7ecord pump VersusDeW ad

                                       !                               cyetahn3 dMc. .

4.1 L Hea. .-.,mm. -muvma .wm mumu emag. 4.2 Flow balancing data including flow to each component and throttle valve positions. 4.3 Setpoints of alarms, interlocks,and controls. l 4.4 Valve opening and closing times, where required. H 4.5 Valve position indication. 4.6 Response of valves to simulated failed conditions. 4.7 Temperature data during cooldown. 4.8 4emponent sc5pahaa t. v ES I'A S . brye o ukkS b 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 51M csM' 3 los los sage leal sanal, and - 5.1 The Component Cooling Water Systerf ' operates as .) described in Section 9.2.2. y f Q Compone) coolin3 l W</ter pum l MtNeredia!p (vp prepr,_ l Sip \. CcMrol roo m . lio VecSy p cudrol -Erom N l Amendment H 14.2-152 August 31, 1990

CESSAR EMWncui. 14.2.12.1.85 Normal and Security Lighting Systems Test 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate that the Normal and Security Lighting Systems provide adequate illumination for- plant operations. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Normal Lighting System have been completed. 2.2 Construction activities on the Security Lighting System have been completed. 2.3 Test 1struments are properly calibrated and available. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Flace the plant lighting in service and check that illumination levels are adequate. 3.2 Demonstrate that a single circuit failure will not cause the loss of all lighting in a room which requires normal access. 3.3 Demonstrate that loss of normal power results in proper activation of the Security Lighting System for each affected room, where required to monitor isolation zones, and outdoor areas within the plant protected perimeter. 3.4 Demonstrate the Security Lighting System provides adequate illumination levels, including, but not limited to, those required to support plant closed Circuit TV security functions. 4.0 DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Illumination levels in designated areas. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Normal and Security Lighting Systems operate as described in Section 9.5.3. Amendment O 14.2-161 May 1, 1993

CESSARE! Enc =# 14.2.12.1.86 Emergency Lighting System Test 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate that the Emergency Lighting System provides adequate illumination to operate equipment during emergency operations. 2.0 PREREOUISITES Lehhn 2.1 Construction activities on the Emergency !!iyht)ng System have been completed. 2.2 Test struments are properly calibrated and available. 3.0 TEST METHODS 3.1 Demonstrate that the Emergency Lighting System provides 10 foot candles of illumination as required in designated control areas. 3.2 Demonstrate that the Emergency Lighting System provides 2 foot candles of illumination in other areas of the plant. 3.3 Demonstrate that the Emergency Lighting System comes on upon loss of normal lighting. 3.4 Demonstrate that the battery operated emergency lights provide adequate illumination at designated locations. 3.5 Demonstrate that the battery operated emergency lights are capable of providing lighting for the designated amount of time. 4.0 DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Illumination levels in designated areas. 4.2 Battery powered lighting data. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Emergency - I'i nt Lighting System operates as described in Section 9.5.3. Amendment H 14.2-162 August 31, 1990

CESSAR!alb m, ; i

            '3, g               (lr e         b e. I(ikroo'ud ' 7er a Ne Nitele55 hmuniccdto n                             f 6ysh kunchcM             proper ly.

6plens l 14.2.12.1.87 Communications Syc"- Test 1.O OBJECTIVE , To demonstrate the adequacy of the traplant 1.1 communications Systemsto provide communications between' ; vital plant areas. 1.2 TodemonstratethegffsiteCommunicationSystem5 provide , communications with exterior entities. ; i 2.O PREREQUISITES drapd 2.1 Construction activities on the Lylout Communications Systemshave been completed. idrapled t 2.2 Support systems required for operation of the Inplant , Communications Systems are complete and operational. ; H 2.3 Plant equipment that contributes to the ambient noise . level should be in operation. l 2 TEST METHOD m) 3.0 s, , Verify that the Intraplant T g(elephoneSystem functions : i 372 properly, that cach station i; assigncd to the curr;nt l l ' restriction class. I Telefont. Powered Ph nc system Verify the Intraplant Sound

3. [3 functions properly.

I 3.g4 Verify the Intraplant Public Address System functions j properly. j i. 3.g'5 Verify tha Security Radio System functions properly at a all locations throughout the plant. t 3.[L Verify the normal offsite telephone system functions ! i properly. P Verify the Emergency Telephone System (Emergency ; 3.[~1 Notification System, Health Physics Network y and H i Ringdown Phone System) function properly. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED . 4.1 Record the results of all communication attempts from each system and its locations. Amendment J l - - 14.2-163 April 30, 1992 f s

CESSAR EnHncimu 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The traplant Communications Systems operate as descr[ibedinSection9.5.2. H 5.2 The. fsite Communication Systems operate as described in Section 9.5.2. i l l i i l 1 l l l Amendment H 14.2-164 August 31, 1990

                                                            . _ - _ .      J

CESSARinnnem 14.2.12.1.92 Fire Protection System Test

/\

1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the ability of the Fire Prctection System to provide water at acceptable flows and pressures to protected areas. 2.O PREREOUISITES , 2.1 Construction activities on the Fire Protection System have been completed. f' 2.2 Fire Protection /system instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Fire Protection System are complete and operational.

2.4 Test Instrumentation is available and calibrated. tr 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Demonstrate the proper operation of the Fire Detection System /. 3.2 Demonstre.te the head and flow characteristics of the fire water pumps, and the operation of all auxiliaries. 3.3 Verify control logic. 90eck 3.4 Verify flow rates in the various flow paths of the Fire Water System. Didokhon 7 3.5 Verify sprinkler and deluge spray patterns where possible. 3.6 Verify alarms, indicating instruments yand status lights l are functional. l i 4.O DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Setpoints under which alarms and interlocks occur. 4.2 Sprinkler and deluge spray patterns. 4.3 Fire alarm operability. Amendment Q

                          . 14.2-173         gi    June 30, 1993

CESSAR HNincom. ! l 4.4 Temperaturej'and smoke sensors operability. 4.5 ' i Syster f10U rat;;. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Fire Protection System' operates as described in r Section 9.5.1. 6 i I br pump d \/efsos oW ard cprakin] dkkc>.. t I i t i l i e i i i Amendment- H l

             .                            14_.2-174               August 31, 1990      l w                                                                         t

CESSAR nainemo. U i 14.2.12.1.84 Equipment and Floor Drainage System Test i 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate that the drain lines are correctly ' c routed to their rerpective cirfr. dE5ijnaMcI rIrFNnt-[-lN . 1 operate per design 1.2 To demonstrate the sump pumps '

   &              including alarms and interlocks.

1.3 To demonstrate the waste tanks operate per design ; including alarms and interlocks. h 1. 4 To demonstrate the sump level instrumentation operates , H per design including alarms and' indications. l i 1.5 To demonstrate system segregation. , 2.0 PREREOUISITES i 2.1 Construction activities on the Equipment and Floor Drainage System have been completed. l 2.2 Equipment and Floor Drainage System instrumentation has l been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Equipment ' i and Floor Drainage System are complete and operational. t 2.4 Water is available for flow paths to be checked.

3.0 TEST METHOD i l

4 3 .1 ' Verify the operation of alarms and interlocks. , [ Verify sump levels as required to demonstrate proper l g, 3. 2 ; W operation of the sump pumps. i O Flow water in each drain path to verify that the drains l f ' [3.3 discharge to their designated _p and that system- ( , segregation is maintained. b &,kov-- l 4.0 DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Sump pump operating data. J 4.2 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. : a 4.3 Discharge points of each drain. l l l Amendment J j April 30, 1992 ! 14.2-160

_ . . . - . .. ~ .. ... . . ..- , 1

INSERT A: (To be inserted on CESSAR-DC Page 14.2-160) ! , 3.4 Verify the ability of the turbine building floor drain sump - to divert liquids to the Liquid Waste Management System upon l detection of radiation in the sump.

i INSERT B: (To be inserted on CESSAR-DC Page 14.2-160) ; 1 1.6 To demonstrate the turbine building floor drain sump i operates per design upon detection of radiation in the sump. ! i i f 4 a i i, f f

i r

. l 1 4 L i i i 1 i l i t f

CESSAR ninneuio,. . i i s - These electrical trips are bypassed in the event of an ESF : actuation condition, concurrent with a' Loss of Offsite Power. { The bypass circuitry meets the intent of IEEE Standard 270 1071 and RG 1.9. 60 '3 - / f g o ; 8.3.1.1.4.5 Control Room Indication of Emergency Diesel Generator Operational Status Various monitoring devices are provided in the diesel room and- i the control room to give the operator the complete status of , operability for the diesels. The following is a listing of the typical parameters monitored: A. Lube Oil Temperature and Pressures. , t i B. Bearing Temperatures. ] t C. Cooling Water Temperatures and Pressures. , D. Generator Parameters. F E. Speed.

;         F. Starting Air Pressure.                                                               '

In order to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.47 and. Branch J

'        Technical Position PSB-2, the followir.g conditions are monitored

, to determine the operable status of the emergency diesel , generator: . c A. Cooling water not available. B. Diesel generator breaker racked out. i i C. Diesel generator overspeed. D. Loss of control power. l l E. Generator fault. . F. Low air and oil pressure. i 1 Maintenance mode. G. i Conditions that render the emergency diesel generators incapable l ; of responding to an ESF-CCS automatic start signal will activate ! bypassed / inoperable status . indication in the control room,'in i accordance with Sections 7.1.2.21 (conformance to Regulatory inoperable). Guide 1.47) and 7.1.2.21.3 (ESF components Unambiguous indications are provided that separately specify the i disabling conditions- and the resulting unavailability of I. emergency diesel generators: 1) for each diesel generator and 2) i Amendment Q { 8.3-12 June 30, 1993 l j

CESSAR EniLou condition, the relay will activate a lockout relay which will trip the diesel generator breaker. This lockout relay must be manually re-set. During testing, the relay will trip the breaker via a test lockout relay. This lockout relay will be electrically re-settable by an ESF signal, therefore the diesel generator will continue to be available if needed for an accident condition. The implementation of these protective trips is in accordance with Branch Technical Position EICSB-17. Overspeed protection is provided oy an overspeed trip, the set-point is above the maximum engine speed on a full-load rejection. Therefore, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9, the engine speed resulting from a step increase or decrease in load will not exceed nominal speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint. The following mechanical trips are provided to protect the diesel generators during test periods and while running with offsite power available: A. Low Pressure Turbo Oil. B Low Pressure Lube Oil. C. High Pressure Crankcase. D. High Temperature Bearings. E. High Temperature Lube Oil Out. F. High-High Temperature Jacket Water. G. High Vibration. These mechanical trips are bypassed in the event of an ESF actuation condition. The design of the bypass circuitry meets the intent of IEEE Standard 270-19'1 and RG 1.9. 403 - /1Fo In addition, the following electrical trips are provided to protect the emergency diesel generators during testing periods: A. Generator Instantaneous Overcurrent Protection. B. Generator Loss of Field Protection. C. Generator Reverse Power Protection. D. Generator Ground Protection. Amendment Q 8.3-11 June 30, 1993

CESSAR E! sinc == i h Emergeacy , 14.2.12.1.93 A Diesel Generator Mechanical System Test 1.O OBJECTIVE ' EDG 1.1 To demonstrate the Emergency Diesel Generator (DC) Hechanical Systems operate reliably. I 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the DieselGeneratorfystem . have been completed. Ene rgear s 2.2 a Diesel Generator System instrumentation has been i calibrated. g ,, A 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Diesel ; Generator System are complete and operational. i 2.4 Test [nstrumentationisavailableandcalibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD Gb6 , 3.1 Demonstrate that each f> W. can be started from the ' H Control Room and its local panel in automatic and j manual. m , ,) , , ,., ; ,aj ,j ,,3 ,y ,j ; , 3.2 Demonstrate that the following tri s are operableX =~d

   .               fo o c];oa

s describel l8 section B . 3 . l .1. .4{ ;.s etude fraftc4lve 3.2.1 Engine overspeed felps 6.p,srVfsp,)-

3.2.2 G e nre rrio Du feeeat; l Profetl o,cu 3 3.2.23 3.2.4 Low-Low [r-ube[1[ressure i G e at ryt* r % I+*4e - Coafr-olled Overcure-erd 3.2.75 LowpressureAurbo[il 1 8 3.2.#6 Low [ressure[ube[il 3.2.E7 High[ressure[rankcase ' 3 . 2 . $ f, High bearing [emperature 6earidjs

3. 2.1 i Highfemperature[ube[il[ut 41 6 3 .2. 810 High t"emperature facket [ater *

3 . 2 . 1 11 High[ibration 3.3 Demonstrate that the following parameters are correctly i monitored in control room and at the local panel: l 3.3.1 Lubefilfemperatureand ressures Amendment H 14.2-175 August 31, 1990

CESSAR !!ninCAmpi ;

                                                                                       \     ,

3.3.2 Bearing,kemperatures , 3.3.3 Coolingfaterfemperaturesandfressures 3.3.4 Speed . l 3.3.5 Starting [irfressure j i 3.4 Demonstrate the operation of the following status , indications: 3.4.1 Cooling water not available t i 3.4.2 i- dgreakerrackedout blesel Ge"er'A*r f 3.4.3 DC pverspeed I v i r 3.4.4 Loss of control power ! L 3.4.5 Generator fault ! 3.4.6 Low air and oil pressure 3.4.7 Maintenancejdode . 3.5 Demonstrate 35 consecutive starts capability. H l 3.6 Demonstrate full load capability. ! 3.7 Demonstrate"DG speed control. 3.3 Operate centrol valvec frcr cll cpprcprictc contrcl

              -pecitienc . Obccr ic   valve     operation        c .-  pccitien indicat4en and meccurc Opening and clecing tincc.

i 3.0 Simuletc failed conditienc and cbccrve valve rccpence. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 ELDG Engine operating parameters. j 4.2 EDG Engine consecutive starts data. ;

E

! 4.3 Setpoints of'DG trips. 4.4 EDG governor operating data. 4.5 Gentrcl valve Opening and cleci::g tincc, where- i tequiredv ! Amendment H 14.2-176 Auguct 31, 1990

CESSAR !!Nncuio i t

     'E    Centr:1 valv: peci+4^a indication.

4.7 " : pons: Of : ntr:1 valves t: simulated failed -l conditienc. 5 , 4.7 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. g 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Emer ; 5.1 The ^soJc3 Diesel Generator Mechanical System performs as described in Section 8.3.1. -i I t r i l 1 i a i i l Amendment H 14.2-177 August 31, 1990

CESSAR Ennnema Emert3eacy

                          ^  Diesel Generator Electrical System Test 14.2.12.1.94 i

1.O OBJECTIVE , E mergency G b Gs ' l 1.1 To verify the' Diesel Generators (DBr) can supply power { at the rated load, voltage and frequency under all ! design conditions. ' 2.0 PREREQUISITES Gme,3edcy

2.1 Construction activities on the Diesel Generator hstem have been completed. semea<3 2.2 'A Diesel Generator System instrumentation has been calibrated. Gmerg eaty i 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the " Diesel . Generator. System are complete and operational. l 2.4 Test [nstrumentationisavailableandcalibrated. 2.5 Electrical testing is complete as needed to allow the buses to be energized. i 2.6 DG electrical voltage tests are complete. l 2.7 ESF loads are available to be loaded onto the bus. 3.0 TEST METHOD i H q.1 Oc=0nctr tc all control icgic Ond controlc includir- ! p g,+ the DG sequencer and response to ESF actuation si s. A 3.2 emonstrate by simu1eeing a 1oss of offsit ower that:

a. t emergency buses are deen ized and the loads i are d from the emergen uses, and

b. the diesel ene or starts on the auto-start [

signal from o standby conditions, attains the required age a frequency within acceptable ! limit and time, en izes the auto-connected s own loads through load sequencer, and perates while loaded with i shutdown loads for greater than or equal to 5 minut' 3g Demonstrate that on a safety injection to-start (SIAS) signal, the diesel generator starts the auto-start signal from its standby conditions, att 'q

                                                                                        ,t Amendment H 14.2-178                    August 31, 1990

i t Insert A: , t "3.1 Demonstrate all control logic and controls including l the EDG sequencer and response to ESF actuation . signals. l 3.2 Demonstrate 90 to 100-percent of the continuous rating of the emergency diesel generator,.for an interval:of l not less than 1 hour and until' temperature equilibrium , has been attained. 3.3 Demonstrate that the emergency diesel generator unit starts from standby conditions, reaches _ required , voltage and frequency within acceptable limits and time l as defined in the plant technical specifications. : l 3.4 Demonstrate by simulating a loss of offsite power that: [

a. the emergency buses are deenergized and the loads l l

are shed from the emergency buses, and

b. the emergency diesel generator starts on the auto- ;

start signal from its standby conditions, attains j the required voltage and frequency within . acceptable limits and time, energizes the auto- ! connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer, and operates while loaded with its j shutdown loads for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. 3.5 Demonstrate that on a safety injection actuation signal . (SIAS), the emergency diesel generator starts on the f' auto-start signal from its standby conditions, attains ' the required voltage and frequency within acceptable limits and time, and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. e 3.6 Demonstrate the emergency diesel generator's capability } to reject a loss of the largest single load while operating at power factor between 0.8 and 0.9, and 1 verify that the voltage and frequency requirements are met and that the EDG unit will not trip on overspeed. 3.7 Demonstrate the emergency diesel generator's capability i' to reject a load equal to 90 to 100 percent of its continuous rating while operating at power factor [ between 0.8 and 0.9, and verify that the voltage ! requirements are met and that the emergency diesel ( generator will not trip on overspeed. i i

t

   - --                   -             -c,

f l

l i I Insert A (Continued)-

 -3.8       Emergency diesel generator endurance and margin test:  _l demonstrate full-load carrying capability at a power    6 factor between 0.8 and 0.9 for an interval of not less than 24 hours, of which 2 hours are at a load equal to 105 to 110 percent of the continuous rating of the emergency diesel generator, and 22 hours are at a load  i equal to 90 to 100 percent of its continuous rating.

Verify that voltage and frequency requirements are maintained. Verify that mechanical systems such as ; fuel, lubrication, and cooling function within design limits. 3.9 Demonstrate hot restart functional capability at full-load temperature conditions (after it has operated for 2 hours at full load) by verifying that the emergency -! diesel generator starts on a manual or autostart signal, attains the required voltage and frequency ' within acceptable limits and time, and operates for longer than 5 minutes. This testing is to occur immediately after the full-load carrying capability demonstration." . l

t i i j

CESSAR MM%mo. the required voltage and frequency within acceptabl : limits and time, and operates on standby for grea r ! than or equal to 5 minutes. i 3.4 Demonstrate by simulating a loss of offsite pow r in l' conjunction with SIAS that: the emnrgency buses are deenergized and oads are -j shed from the emergency buses, and i

b. he diesal generator starts on th auto-start !

                    'gnal from its standby conditions attains the                      i re uired voltage and frequency wi in acceptable                     j lim ts and time, energizes auto- onnected loads                      !

' thro h the load sequencer, an operates while loade with the auto-connected oads for greater .;

than or equal to 5 minutes. ; i In addition, rify that the au -connected loads do ] not exceed the hour rating of e diesel generator. 3.5 Demonstrate the di el generat capability to reject a H- ( loss of the larges single oad and verify that the voltage and frequenc requir ments are met.

3.6 Demonstrate the diesel rator capability to reject a :

1 full short-time rating 1 d and verify that the voltage ; requirements are met an t at the unit will not trip on overspeed. (If the a o-c nected loads do not exceed the continuous rating of the iesel generator, the load rejection test shou d be con ucted at its continuous rating). - 3.7 Diesel generat r endurance nd margin test: demonstrate f 1-load-carrying pability for an interval of n less than 24 hours, of which 2 hours ; should be at load equivalent to th 2-hour rating of ] the diesel nerator and 22 hours at a load equivalent to the co tinuous rating of the die el generator. Verify t t voltagc and frequency reg irements are ' maintain . The test should also veri that the mechani 1 systems such as fuel, lubri tion, and coolin function within design limits. 3.8 Demo strate hot restart functional capabil'ty at fu -load temperature condition by simulating a 1 ss of a AC voltage and demonstrating the diesel gene ator J J arts, attains the required voltage and freque y, i erforms the design accident-loading sequence o design-load requirements, maintains voltage- an i Amendment J 14.2-179 April 30, 1992

CESSAR !!Nncumn ! j L uqueuvy wiLisin 1.14 = i=qdised liaita, asid Oyaiates longe W an-five (5) minutes. This tccting ic to occur- J l

              -immcdiately after-the--faill lead carrying capabilit-y-                                       ,

demonst--

        /#                                                                                              '

3.g Demonstrate the ability to ;

a. synchronize the diesel generator unit with offsite power while the unit is connected to the emergency load,

b. transfer this-load to the offsite power,

c. isolate the diesel generator unit, and r

d. restore it to standby status. ;

  --ih l a    Demonstrate that all automatic diesel generator                                               l erential)
                                                                                      ~

( exttspt ---eng % overspeed and genera are automatically bypas '4- oss of voltage on the e current with a sarely injar tion _ : lon signal. 3.11 Demonstrate that with the diesel generator operating i.-y a test mode while connected to its bus, a simulated : safety injection signal overrides the test mode by a ck+isN r-emer$tuty !

a. returning the 6 diesel generator to standby operation, and I

b. automatically energizing the emergency loads from offsite power.

3.12 Denonctrate the proper Operatier of clectrical generater trips and-interlock. ., 4.O REQUIRED DATA 4.1 Starting and loading sequence timing. f 4 4.2 Test [ata traces for starting, stopping and. load shedding. 4.3 Running data for the parameters monitored during each ' of the required testing sequences. 4.4 Verification of field performance data versus shop , data. i

    . -            _:_x-     - .      - -       a   : ~ . - -,~,t--

n.a ..~ ~ y u w ~ ~ ay- ... . Amendment J April 30, 1992 i 14.2-180 ; 1 e

Insert B: l 1 "3.12 Demonstrate that,.by starting and running both ; redundant emergency diesel generator units simultaneously, potential common failure modes that may ; be undetected in single emergency diesel generator unit .i tests do not occur." i i i

l f l r h I e f f i i 1 l i r b B l

l CESSAR Eini"lCATION l r EmergMc3 l 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA l 5.1 Diesel Generator Electrical System performs as H described in Section 8.3.1. h I Amendment H 14.2-180a August 31, 1990 ' i

CESSAR Ennne.m., l l Em e rge dey

                               ^   Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems Test 14.2.12.1.95 1.D          OBJECTIVE                  g m ,rg e a c A

1.1 Demonstrate that de Diesel Generator's (p(T) fuel [il fystem provides a reliable and adequate supply to each - Emergency Diesel Generator.

                                                               & EDG 1.2          Demonstrate the operation of"pC' [ngine fooling fater fystem.              ,,,, gyg 1.3          Demonstrate that pC Engine / tarting )(ir fystem provides                       -

adequate amount of air for 5 consecutive De starts

 ,/ 1ts E D G - without makeup air.                                                           l 1.4           Demonstrate system.

the operation of the EDG pginefubepil 2.0 PREREQUISITES Emeryeucy

A 2.1 Construction activities on the Diesel Generator Auxiliary [ystems have been completed. 2-er- , 2.2 eahieselGeneratorAuxiliary[ystemsinstrumentationhas 6 l 3 been calibrated. g,,,e ug 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Diesel -; Generator Auxiliary fystems are complete and i operational. 2.4 TestE. [nstrumentationisavailableandcalibrated. 2.5 The#DGs are available for a loaded run to measure fuel consumption and perform consecutive starts. ; to 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Demonstrate the operation of the fuel oil automatic transfer feature from the storage tanks to the day tank. 3.2 Demonstrate the operation of the fuel oil and day tank level alarms. e 3.3 Demonstrate the day tank can be filled manually. l 3.4 Demonstrate the operation of the fuel oil booster pump. 3.5 Demonstrate the operation of the fuel oil recirculation system. i l Amendment Q ! 14.2-181 June 30, 1993 j

CESSAR slaincmu I Lscet C A4 Demonstrate-by-performing-e-loaded--run of theehat the-day-tank 4-lows-at--least 60 minuter of--running 41me for-the-DG . gy , ,_ 3.X 8 Demonstrate the operation of the#DG fooling #fystem keep warm pump. E 3.# 9 Demonstrate the operation of'DG pooling [ystem heaters. G 3.9 /0 Demonstrate the operation of the "DG pooling pystem alarms. 11 3.,14 Demonstrate pompressors. the operation of EDG $ tarting

                                                          "          fir iz             L 1**<h &

3 . y1 Demonstrate 7the'DGftartingflirfystemhassufficient volume available to perform 5 starts of the.DGs. EpG ca u se c.+; te i d' E G o5 3 . y2 Demonstrate the ptarting Kir S operates the 'DG pneumatic controls as designed.' ystem

   /1                      E 3 . F3     Demonstrate the'DG starting air alarm interlocks, and automatic operation.

15 S 3.34 Demonstrate the operationofthe'DGfubepilfrelube " Pump. os G 3.M Demonstratetheoperationof'DG[ubepilfeaters. or 6 3.X Demonstrate the operation of'DG J,ube ,$11 alarms. 18 6 3 . y/ Demonstratetheoperationofthe'DG[ube$11fransfer pump. 4.0 DATA REOUIRED 4.1 EDG /uel pil fonsumption fate. 4.2 Setpoints of alarms, interlocks, and controls. 4.3 Operating data for pumps and compressors. 4.4 Operating data for the heaters. 4.5 ED6 X starting air volume parameters after consecutive i starts. Amendment H 14.2-182 August 31, 1990 l l

i 1 Insert C: ) 1 Demonstrate by performing a loaded run of the EDG with -')

     "3.6 its day tank filled to its low level alarm point, that the day tank provides sufficient fuel for at least 60      ,

minutes cf EDG operation with the EDG supplying the power requirements of the most limiting design basis ; accident. 3.7 Demonstrate by performing a loaded run of the EDG-and analysis of EDG fuel storage capacity, that each EDG has sufficient fuel storage capacity to operate for a ; period of no less than 7 days with the EDG supplying , the power requirements of the most limiting design , basis accident." , I i t i F 4 h h I r I e

1 CESSAR ENGncma ! I 14.2.12.1.96 Alternate AC Som ee System Test ! 1.O OBJECTIVE { 1.1 To verify the proper operation of the Alternate AC ; (AAC) Source System. ; 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Alternate AC Source have . been completed. 2.2 Support systems including the AAC Support Systems and the 4160 KV distribution system required. for the operation of the' AAC source system are complete and operational. ; 2.3 Alternato C [ource instrumentation has been calibrated 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD ggg.j,q 3.1 Verify the system alarms,' interlocks and controls. 3.2 Verify the AAC Source provides rated power at the H ' proper voltage and frequency. t 3.3 Verify operation of the AAC Source from all its control , stations.

3.4 Demonstrate the AAC Source can be connected in the '

design configuration to each 4160 V bus combination. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. 4.2 AAC Source operating data at designated loads. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Alternate AC Source System operates as described in Section 8.3.1. Amendment H 14.2-184 August 31, 1990 !

CESSAR Enincmou 14.2.12.1.97 Alternate AC Source Support Systems Test 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 Demonstrate the operations of the Alternate AC Source System fuel, starting, cooling and lubrication subsystems. 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the AAC Source Support Systems have been completed. AAC Source Support System instrumentation has been 2.2 calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the AAC Source Support Systems are complete and operational. 2.4 The AAC Source System is available to be run. 3.0 TEST METHOD Sosrce 3.1 Demonstrate the cperation of the AAC/fuel systems. 3.2 Demonstrate that the AAC Source can be started 5 times from each starting system. Sovece. H 3.3 Demonstrate the operation of the AAC / lube oil system. 3.4 Demonstrate alarrs, interlocks, and controls on the AAC 5.orce fuel systems, starting system, lube oil and cooling system. 3.5 With the AAC Source in operation, verify the AAC Source Cooling System maintains design temperatures. ; 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Setpoints of alarms, interlocks and controls. 4.2 Verification of starts from each AAC Source starting system. 4.3 AAC Source Cooling System Temperature. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The AAC Source Support Systems operate as described in , Section 8.3.1. l Amendment H 14.2-185 August 31, 1990

i CESSAR Muiricam. The AAC is not normally nor automatically directly connected to any Class 1E Safety Load Division. However, it can be manually aligned to power one Safety Load Division via one Permanent. - Non-Safety Bus, to accommodate an emergency diesel generator 4 failure or out-of-service condition. The AAC is provided with a continuous rating capacity margin of at least 10 percent to compensate for load growth. I e Those security loads which require an uninterrupted source will be on a UPS in a secure protected area of the plant. 8.3.1.1.5.1 AAC Starting and Loading The AAC is designed to start automatically within two minutes from the onset of a LOOP event' . It is then available for loading if either of the 4,160V Permanent Non-Safety Load Buses X and Y ' become de-energized. Automatic connection and sequential loading of the X and/or Y permanent non-safety loads will occur utilizing ' i a sequencer design similar to that described in 7.3.1.1.2.3. 8.3.1.1.5.2 AAC Instrumentation and Controls , The instrumentation and controls necessary to start-and run the AAC are powered from a dedicated local 125V DC battery. Various monitoring and control devices are provided locally and in the control room to give the operator control and operational - status information. The following- typical parameters are monitored and/or alarmed: A. Lube oil temperatures and pressures B. Bearing temperatures C. Cooling temperatures and pressures l D. Generator parameters and status (oded Voltaje,4mperes,wa% S,.eyueueg) , i E. Speed F. Starting air pressure J G. Control mode status (standby, starting, running, local). 8.3.1.1.5.3 AAC Auxiliary Support Systems i A. Fuel System and Supply i The AAC is provided with redundancy in the fuel systems. Sufficient fuel is stored on site to support 24 hours operation of the gas turbine generator at rated load. The fuel oil temperature is maintained above the cloud point. I Amendment Q-8.3-16 June 30, 1993

CESSAR n!Wnew. 14.2.12.1.101 Containment' Cooling and Ventilation System Test l 1.0 OBJECTIVE U l 1.1 To demonstrate the capability of the Containment ! Cooling and Ventilation System to maintain acceptable 'l' temperature limits and air quality in the containment during normal operations and normal shutdown. l 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 Construction activities inside the containment building ! have been completed. 2.2 Construction activities on the containment cooling and l ventilation system have been completed. l 2.3 Containment oling and /[entilation /ystem instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.4 Support systems requi ed for eration. of the j[ontainment/coling

                                                   !       and    entilation      ystem are complete             'N   ,

and operational. 2.5 Test /nstrumentationisavailableandcalibrated. i 2.6 The RCS is at normal operating temperature and pressure - (HFT). , l 3.0 TEST METHOD ) 3.1 Verify the operation of the containment recirculation ! cooling units. .{ 3.2 Verify the operation the pressurizer co=partment cooling fans. , ; - c.oatty i 3.3 Verify the operation of the reactor ::;parnar.t cooling i a fans. g%pA ~1 Perform air balance as appropriate for each subsystem.

!                      4.0         DATA REQUIRED                                                                      i l

4.1 Operation of all interlocks at proper setpoints. ) J i 4.2 Air balancing verification. l i Amendment H i 14.2-189 August 31, 1990

CESSAREHWnem. . t i l

1 4.3 Fan operating data. 4.4 Containment building. temperature data. ; H t 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA l 5.1 The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System performs as described in Section 9.4.6. r [0$$ l $ , e i i t t

                                                                        .- [

i l f 5 l l J l Amendment H 14.2-190 August 31, 1990

CESSAR !!Eincam,. - Yentiktion 14.2.12.1.102 Containment Purge System Test A < 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the capability of the Containment Purge System to maintain the containment air temperature and cleanliness at the required value during inspection testing maintenance and refueling operations. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 Construction activities in the containment have been completed and acceptable levels of cleanliness established. 2.2 Construction activities on the Containment Purge System have been completed g 2.3 Containment Purge System Instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.4 Support systems required for operation of the containment purge system are complete and operational. 2.5 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. 3.O TEST METHOD 3.1 Demonstrate manual and automatic system controls. 3.2 Verify alarms, indicating instruments and status lights are functional. y R ,, 7 4 ed 3.3 Verify design air flows for High Purgekend two Containment Cleanup Systems. 3.4 Perform filter and carbon adsorber efficiency tests. 3.5 Demonstrate system response to a high radiation signal wol pr high relative humidity signal. 3.6 Operate control valves from all appropriate control positions. Observe valve operation an position indication and measure opening and closing times. 3.7 Simulate failed conditions and observe valve response. HMAS 3.8 Simulate CIAS, and HRAS and observe isolation valve response. A 19 Ver.1 -lbc peger opernton et c.s hwe.d Purp datlI rf,w C y c+ m ra p(;r had moaHv s-Amendment =Q l 14.2-191 June 30, 1993

C E S S A R n ainc m . > l l

                                                                                                                    'l 4.O       DATA REOUIRED Air balancing verification.

4.1 Ic> d W%' Y 4.2 Fan operating data for enca vi tr: 1^^' hip. c.pe @ : purge fans.=nd ' _ -- centri----* M = ="; <rrr_ ejhwiT- } 4.3 Filter and carbon adsorber data for h filter trains. 4.4 Valve opening and closing times, where required. 4.5 Valve position indication. 4.6 Response of valves to simulated failed conditions. i 4.7 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. [! 4.8 Temperature of chilled water supply and return from cooling coils. l 4.9 Temperature of air supply (outside) to high purge ! supply and discharge into containment. , 4.10 Valves respond to simulated CIAS, HRAS, and HHAS signals. Pvqe Yea +:lation yS sien radkU*d m o a, fws '

4. I I C w +a.sen+

5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA gge perfere,auce Q ,, 5.1 The Containment Purge System performs as described in l Section 9.4.6. A ;

6. 2. ThL (0,J h ldMf N ofQC Yt'*ko $N I b N S 'M " Y ' '~

J /

med!Nors p er fo rm as de s c rohe d :d G e c h o rJ II. S. t i i i Amendment Q 14.2-192 June 30, 1993

CESSAR naricuia ' [ CowWM i 14.2.12.1.103 Control % Ventilation System Test 1.O OBJECTIVE ggg7 g 1.1 To verify the functional operation of the n--*--' n--- i em clep: L"J.'.C unit e =d ensure a proper environment for i personnel and equipment under all postulated ! conditions. ! 4 INSE8T 3 8 l 2.O PREREOUISITES i CeWW i 2.1 Construction activities in the Control ?"ilding have ? been completed and all penetrations sealed. g i C.m V . on the Control l'uildilig [ 2.2 Construction activities ; Ventilation System have been completed. ca* F l4 l 3 2.3 control Ouilding ventilation [ystem instrumentation has ~ been calibrated. Support systems required for operation of the Control I 2.4 ' Ce m7 \e6 E"ildi:q Ventilation System are complete and operational. 2.5 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. i 3.0 TEST METHOD t 3.1 Verify all control logic. 3.2 Verify, the proper operation, stroking speed, and . position indication of all dampers. j In manual operating mode, verify proper operation of 8 3.3 the units, system rated air flow, and air balance. ! 3.4 In automatic mode, demonstrate the transfer to i emergency operations as a result of radiation detection, smoke detection, toxic chemical detection,l

and safety injection actuation (cot signals.

                                                         =e         @. ~t "*$

3.5 Verify the filter particle removal efficiency, carbon adsorber efficiency and filter bank air flow capacity. 3.6 Verify the proper operation of all protective devices, alarms, controls, interlocks, instrumentation, and using actual or simulated inputs. Amandment Q l' 14.2-193 June 30, 1993 i

CESSAR nnincuit,, M MCkd g -r t- c.c.m% M 3.7 Verify that the systam maintains the control room at positive pressure relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation in the pressurized mode as-required by the Technical Specifications. 3.8 Verify the isolation capability of the control room ! upon detection of chlorine gas at the intakes meets the ) requirements of Reg. Guide 1.95. q, ytt- { col l 3.9 Demonstrate the operation of the battery room exhaust fans. 3.10 Demonstrate the operation of the Electrical Equipment ; Room Air Handling Subsystem. 3.11 Dezconstrate the operation of the Smoke Purge Fan. 4.0 DATA REOUIREQ 4.1 Air balancing verification. j l 4.2 Fan and damper operating Data. : 4.3 Temperature and humidity data in the Control Room envelope. 3 ; 4.4 Response to radioactivity, toxic gas, and products of combustion. t {ggg p@(eg4 . 4.5 Setpoints of alarms, interlocks, and controls. (h* 4.6 Pressurization data for the control room d**=_ h T9C. . 4.7 Filter and carbon adsorber data. 88 Co a4r ol C a r,fl ex Vra4. f r4 ; o a Sy sien re d;ci iaa meg,% ,s*

5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Perferrn u re gd, )

5.1 CoWO The Control Bud 444-ng Ventilation System operates as i described in Section 9,4.1.

6. 2- % c. Conir I % lex \ledilit+. a 5 s+en y ra c1hHo~ i incilNors f e rdarm .t s descrl bed in G d,og II. G.

L IZ Yer; Ne frof' off r"EC N 0 lodr'l & fl% YlN!ldiu

                                             '*'#' " 'S -

hsten

ra dk'S i D N w) Amendment H 14.2-194 August 31, 1990 1 i

CESSAR !!nhuo,. i

                                           $dkNM                          >

14.2.12.1.104 3---*ar Subsphere ;;d ""c1==* ?===r ' Ventilation System Test i 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the proper operation of the :;; tar ! Subsphere ::uclaur A nex Ventilation System to { maintain design condition. ' g, y ( M 2.O PREREOUISITES i 2.1 Construction activities on the Pe?-*^r Subsphere end "u 12 r .' . . : Ventilation System have been completed.

                   %SWCMg 2.2       Reac. tor Subsphere : .d "uclear ?. _nex Ventilation System   .;

instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Reactor Suhr-hnr: 2" !?ucit ar ?_r rm Ventilation System are , complete and operational. 'B.w(W 2.4 Test Instrumentation is available and calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD i Verify all control logic. i 3.1 3.2 Verify the proper operation, stroking speed and position indication of all dampers, g a .r(==ke ^ 3.3 Verify the system maintains the ";;1;a. 1. anew at a negative pressure. 3.4 Verify the system maintains the. Reactor Subsphere at a negative pressure. 3.5 Verify the proper operation of the Cuneral Ventilation Supply Units and Fans. ; 3,6 Y 2rify the proper operation of the--Genetal Ventilation Exhaust Units and Fans. > 3.7 Verify the proper operation of the Mechanical Equipment l Room Cooling Units. l 5 3.8 Verify the proper operation of the Mechanical Equipment Room Ventilation Units. 3.9 Verify filter efficiency carbon adsorber efficiency and air flow capacity. Amendment H 14.2-195 August 31, 1990

CESSAR 8mincaren 3.10 Verify the systems rated air flow and air balance. 3.11 Verify the proper operation of all protective devices, controls, interlocks instru=entation and alarms using actual or simulated inputs. 4.O DATA REOUIRED 4.1 Air balancing verification. 4.2 Fan and damper operating data. 4.3 Temperature data of building area. 4.4 Setpoints of alarms interlocks and controls. 4.5 Reactor Subsphere amu a ucual A.m c:: - negative pressurization data. 4.6 Filter and carbon adsorber data. 47 SAsphere 6;lding Vea4;letion Sy5 fem rajinfion (Mdi$o rs , fedormave 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 2 ^14

                                     @N             ]

5.1 Tpe Ec:st;r Subsphere a ~* :: clear 1.nn = Ventilation fystem operates as described in Section 9.4 . 5. s r.f - 2.1.:.

5. 2- M 5"S( k' T B 'I by Y' " M" I" S V

                                                   'l"    r* AM ; *"

moastoes as desc eib e J in Sec+;on ll 5 p e < fo r m 3.12 Verikg L pccper o pe ration afkSAsf ere h Su,'id;ag Yea +;l~itsa 5 sle e r>J:nt rea m ea Mces. 3 I l l Amendment Q 14.2-196 June 30, 1993

CESSAR innnco. : i 14.2.12.1.104g = '- Nuolear Annex ventilation System Test i 1.O OBJECTIVE i 1.1 To demonstrate the proper operation of the -

                -9"h phrr;         .nd Nuclear Annex Ventilation System to      ,

maintain design condition. ! I 2.0 PREREOUISITES i 2.1 Construction activities on the M .;ter Cuhsph;r; :- d Nuclear Annex Ventilation System have been completed. 2.2 --Res-m. mm- quoic a,d Nuclear Annex Ventilation System ; instrumentation has been calibrated. ; 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Areretes , Jub;phcrc and Nuclear Annex Ventilation System are complete and operational. 2.4 l Test [nstrumentationisavailableandcalibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD , 3.1 Verify all control logic. 3.2 Verify the proper operation, stroking speed and position indication of all dampers. 3.3 Verify the system maintains the Nuclear Annex at a ; negative pressure. 3.4 Verify the system maintains the Scarter c"" phere at a negative pressure. t 3.5 Verify the proper operation of the-0;ncr:1 Ventilation , Supply Units and Fans. 3.6 Verify the proper operation of the Centret Ventilation Exhaust Units and Fans. 3.7 Verify the proper operation of the Mechanical Equipment Room Cooling Units. 3.8 verify the proper operation of the Mechanical Equipment Room Ventilation Units. ! 3.9 Verify filter efficiency carbon adsorber efficiency and air flow capacity. j Amendment E 14.2-k August 31, 1990

CESSAR Ennne m., I i 3.10 Verify the systems rated air flow and air balance. ! i 3.11 Verify the proper operation of all protective devices, controls, interlocks instrumentation and alarms using actual or simulated inputs. ! 4.O DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Air balancing verification. l 4.2 Fan and damper operating data. f 4.3 Temperature data of building area. ! 4.4 Setpoints of alarms interlocks and controls. > 4.5 " " = " * " *"h ph;;; rnd Nuclear Annex negative ! pressurization data. - 4.6 Filter and carbon adsorber data.

4. 7 rJ u tta e Aenex htildi-a S slem y ra dMlou moaNocc ' pe rfo rm < ace 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 47. ,

i 5.1 T)e E .m T ' rk r; rrd Nuclear Annex Ventilation' , fystem operates as described in Section a ' '

9.4.9. l 5.2 The Asc les c A ~ " e' lleaHId;w S siem r*d!*fi*" m *"I0's y pe c4.cm as desc rlL et l is Se c tio a ll. 5. 3,gg fe r ,' $ %e prefer Of e rs fion o f&v g /es, f gge, 1 i

      }lggfj{aflod $ys fert rod l dioa monoVors, i

i l l t l l Amendment Q ! 14.2- g, June 30, 1993 i

CESSAR nancmon i C o ge-* 14.2.12.1.111 Control -Builditig Ventilation SystemN Test 1.O OBJECTIV 1.1 To demonstrate the operation of the Control S ullac.g D I l Ventilation S @ ystenf g c~ -ylC l i 1.1.1 Tech.ical Supe ma venter venuA2a;1e4 Sebrister. 1.1.2 Computer Room Ventilation Subsystems.

                                                                           % LH56V 5                 (

l 1.1.3 Operations Support Center Ventilation Subsystem.

1.1.4 Shift and Assembly Offices Ventilation Subsystem. { 1.1.5 CAS & SEC Group Ventilation Subsystem. pet J c) he.X- D4!'*- CJo% MW , j; 1.1.6 Err'r Otzng r ecr3 Ventilation Subsystem. 1 bn tte

                  '%-o"'c r"*7 r"'"ge Rcom Ventilation Subsystem.                                 4   i i        1.1.7     -

i ! 1.1.8 Break Room Ventilation Subsystem. . pd.-ried M (A e C.}%KA MC **d C* M bt>N N I 1.1.9 Vc"*ilatic" Equipment A Room Air M2ndli".g e, Units y . t t 2.O PREREQUISITES , 2.1 Construction activities in the Control r uilding are complete with all penetration sealed in place * ! p ev. l ; 4 2.2 Construction activities on the Control Euilding ! Ventilation Subsystems have been completed. I C o w rs(# ^ , 2.3 Control Euilding Ventilation Subsystem instrumentation ; has been calibrated. l l 2.4 Support systems required for operation of the Control , Euilding Ventilation Subsystems. ! Co m tes , 2.5 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. ; i 3.0 TEST METHOD ! 3.1 Verify control logic.

         ,2      n rify      +5       cnnn-4 m      c. f *%       T   r.ic21 cupp 2; - C ":ter       l r                 a i r .. ..m li .;-
                                         -4*=--    'M     #4'+n-     "-4*s.

t ', 3.2 Verify the operation of the Computer Room air handling units / fans. Amendment H l 14.,2-206 August 31, 1990 ,

i CESSAR nuiscam,. I t I 3.3 Verify the operation of the Operacions Support Center j air handling unit / fan. 3.4 Verify the operation of the Shift and AssenDly Offices air handling unit / fan. 3.5 Verify the operation of the CAS and SEC Group air f handling unit / fan. Scttle ry { 3.6 Verify the operation of the 207.' N "g Room air ! handling unit / fan. - 3.7 Verify the operation of the 0 0:07. ' ;- rh=e Room air [ handling unit / fan. ^ , P 3.8 unit / fan. E h < W ' O gm "air Verify the operation of the - Break Ro handling

ws.e c Leic_Ad

3.9 Verify the operation of the Equipment Room air handling .

units / fans. l 3.10 Verify operation of the Itch 7ical Support Certtr smoke purge fans. 3.11 Verify alarms, indicating lights and status lights are j functional. , C =W( e Y'- . I, 3.12 Perform air flow balancing of the Control Guildisg Ventilation Subsystems. ; 3.13 Verify the proper operation of dampers. .

                                             E   t4 5 W T       Y

_2.1- %v,. <y mc nron enri m-i nn y : I ' 4.O DATA REOUIRED A 4.1 Fan operating data for each of the air handling units and the smoke purge fans. 1 4.2 Damper operating data. . 4.3 Air flow and balancing verification. l 4.4 Setpoints at which alarms, centerbacks and control ! occur. ccq $ 4.5 Temperature data for each of the cBv subsystems. l l 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

        "      Control SL 1    g V ntilation   [dkfystemg operate as described in Section 9.4.1.

3 Amendment Q 14.2-207 June 30, 1993 ]

INSERT 1 (PG 14.2-189) 3.4 Verify operation of the control element drive mechanism cooling fans. 51 4 3.5 Verify operation of the containment air clean fans. i t [ 1 L e 4 f b i i I l l

1 1 4 i IE3ERT 2 PG 14.2-193 :

         ........ Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) and the Technical Support Center. Air Conditioning System (TSCACS) and to ...........
                                                                                                  .i 6

i F b E I k i i i i i

                                                                                                 -l l 1

.I 4 h

                                                                                                 .n t

t i

                                                                                                 .1 l

1

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                                                                                                 .i l

1

  .                . . - . . . - . . .  . . . _ . . . . _ .   . . _ - - . . ._ _ . . . . . _ , . J

i INSERT 3 PG 14.2-193 l Note: The preoperational tests on the . Balance of the l Control Complex Ventilation System are described in ;

                        .Section 14.2.12.1.111.                                        I 5
                                                                                      .i i
                                                                                       ?

i i i I k i J t a h i l l l

 - -    ---       ---          ,_                . . . , . - , . . - ,s.,   n.,,

INSERT 4 PG 14.2-207 3.14 Verify the proper operation of the Vital Instrument and Equipment Room Air Conditioning Units / fans.

                                                                                                                    'l l

l i i I

i

')

l i 1 INSERT 5 PG 14.2-206 -j Vital Instrument and Equipment Room Ventilation l Subsystems. ! l I i l 1 i e t r i I I 9 I I

                                                                      ~I I

6 J l t I 6 E h 1 , f 1 d n I 4 4 E l < 4 , .3 J n I

.}

 . -            _  .. ..- -.. . . . . . .               .. .= .                  . . . .

INSERT 6 PG 14.2-190 4.5 Filter and carbon adsorber data for containment air clean up filtration units. I l t I 6 i I I l l l I a t 1 i b i I i h [ r e

-f

CESSAR !!nLma 3.10 Verify systam response to a high radiation signal.

    >                                                                                  j 4.O     DATA REOUTREn k

4.1 Air balancing verification. , 4.2 Fan and damper operating data. i 4.3 Temperature data in the Fuel Building, i i 4.4 Setpoints at which alarms, interlocks, and controls i occur. 4.5 Fuel Building negative pressurization data during normal and postulated amargency conditions. ' 4.6 Filter and carbon adsorber data. , 4.7 Fnt buildid$ Ve"til*% S stemy

a dia& m *NHor~5 fer$ormance 4%,

3 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA , 5.1 The Fuel Building Ventilation System operates as described in Section 9.4.2. M f"cl

5. 2 0 *iMi"] 0'"N I* b 1 'I'"

.( '" S

                                                                '"II"'fio" " *"I "  l ft: o r m.S    as   described la Sec.hea ll 5*                           ;

i 3' Il L YOE & profer ofers $1cp o{ iht fuei B ullcf;a led;I'nhoa eng, a,.,, 5,g y m ,a;f,,. , 4 L I l l 4

                                                                                     ,1 i

I Amendment H 14.2-201 August 31, 1990

CESSARnnam. ; 14.2.12.1.110 Radwaste Building Ventilation System Test ; i a i 1.O OBJECTIVE i 1.1 To demonstrate the proper operation of the Radwaste > Building Ventilation System to maintain design condition. , 2.0 PREREOUISITES . 2.1 Construction activities on the Radwaste Building } Ventilation System have been completed. ; 2.2 Radwaste Building Ventilation System instrumentation 7 has been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Radwaste ; Building Ventilation System are complete and ; operational. 2.4 I Test [nstrumentationisavailab1r. and calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD I 3.1 Verify all control logic, 3.2 Verify the proper operation, stroking speed and l position indication of all damper. 3.3 Verify the capacity of the HVAC System to maintain the area temprrature. ; 3.4 Verify the system maintains the Radwaste Building at a ! negative pressure. ! 3.5 Verify the proper operation of the general ventilation i supply units and fans. , i 3.6 Verify the proper operation of the general ventilation l exhaust units and fans. ; 3.7 Verify filter efficiency and air flow capacity. l 3.8 Verify the_ systema rated air flow and air balance. i 3.9 Verify the proper operation of all protective devices, d controls, interlocks instrumentation and alarms using , actual or simulated inputs. t 3.10 Verify k f refer ef e rdica of % 11 ~ b v = & 6vld: 9 i Watilasiaa 53 sk rudidioa m oa i+er. Amendment H 14.2-204 August 31, 1990

I CESSAR inlincamn i 4.0 DATA REQUIRED , 4.1 Air balancing verification. - 4.2 Fan and damper operating data. , 4.3 Temperature data. 4.4 Setpoints of alarms interlocks and controls. H , 4.5 Radwaste Building negati'.e pressurization. .

       .t , 6     Ralw sh %'\d:43 Veatlln+ced Sy s}em endir+isov tb raffso 's        i 5.O        ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA                        ftefer/514#ce d 14.

5.1 The Radwaste Building Ventilation System operates as described in Section 9.4.3. ;

5. 2. ,

                 %e Radwasfr IkildiNy Ytai?Nion S]$ 5e"t r" E' '*N' N et e 4 iloe f e r-[* em s ag clescribed

', la j;ec f, on ll, [, t t . i i i i 1 l i Amendment H ' 14.2-205 August 31, 1990

          -=          -                         .               ..    .               .      . . .    .-    -     .

CESSAR !!nificam,, 1 l 14.2.12.1.112 Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) Test ] 1.O OBJECTIVE i 1.1 To demonstrate the proper operation of the Hydrogen ! Mitigation System. ? 2.0 PREREOUISITES f 2.1 Construction activities on the Hydrogen Mitigation I System have been completed. . 2.2 Hydrogen [nstrumentationhasbeencalibrated. 2.3 Electrical power systems required for the Hydrogen Mitigation System are available. : 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. ! I 3.0 TEST METHOD l 3.1 Verify HMS ignitor control logic and indication. 3.2 Demonstrate each ignitor reaches proper operating temperature. . 3.3 Demonstrate current draw for each group of ignitors is ; within tolerance. ! 4.O DATA REWJJEQ , 4.1 Current draw of each ignitor group. ; 4.2 Ignitor temperatures. ; t 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA g : 5.1 The Hydrogen Mitigation System ceprater as described in l Section 6.2.5. i i* a I l Amendment J 14.2-208 April 30, 1992

  = - - -    ,m %- ,,   ., ._   .  . . - . . ,                             - . . - -       -

e -

CESSAR Enihiou ' t 1 14.2.12.1.113 Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System 1 (CERS) Test i 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate that the Hydrogen Recombiners can be ; J ' properly installed and are operable. ; 2.0 PREREQUISITES ,. 2.1 Construction activities on the Hydrogen Recombiner : System have been completed. 2.2 Hydrogen Recombiner System instrumentation has been f H calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Hydrogen I Recombiner System are completed and operational. ; . n 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. : i 2.5 Manufacturer Hydrogen Recombiner tests completed and l 4 approved. l 3.0 TEST METHOD l 3.1 Install the CHRS in the specified location and connect the instrumentation, H test connection, power supply j 2 and piping. : J 3.2 Verify the proper operation of the Pf' '. ogen Sensors, [nstrumentation, controls and alarms. 3.3 Verify flow paths from containment to the CHRS and ; return. j a , -. 4.0 DATA REQUIRED i 4.1 Setpoints at which alarms, interlocks and controls occur. 4.2 Flow data to and from containment. lJ 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA $ 75[cm nlminmnt H

5.1 Th Hydrogen Recombinerg operate 5 as described. in Section 6.2.5. i F

i Amendment J W 14.2-209 April 30, 1992

CESSAR !!=ncum I i i 14.2.12.1.114 Liquid Waste Management System Test : 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the operability of the Liquid Waste ! Management System for collection, processing and l recycling of liquid wastes and for preparation of l liquid waste for release to the environment. 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Cpnstruction activities on the Liquid Waste Management- U i 1v

!                , system have been completed.
                                                                                                  -l h (LWwh                                                             !

2.2 Liquid Waste Management System instrumentation has been calibrated. t 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Liquid

Waste Management System are completed and operational.

D 2.4 Test [strumentationisavailableandcalibrated, i 3.0 TEST METHOD H } l 1 3.1 Operate control valves from all appropriate control i' positions. Obgerve valve operation and position q indication.eed peasure opening and closing times. - l dese wt at rtb. l 3.2 Simulate failed conditions and observe valv,e response. ' 3.3 Verify the proper operation of the tank level alarms ( and interlocks. ! 3.4 Verify the proper operation of system pumps. 4 3.5 Verify the proper operation of high differential t pressure alarms for the process vessel. l 1 3.6 Verify the proper operation of the tank mixers. l ts t 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Waste pump operating data. f i 4.2 Valve opening and closing times, where required. j 4.3 Valve position indication. l 4.4 Response of valves to simulated failed conditions. , ~ 3nxAT / b 14.2-210 Amendment H August 31, 1988

CESSAR E3Meme, F l 4.5 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. l 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA H l 3.1 The Liquid Waste Management System operates as i described in Section 11.2. . D## 5 ,7_ de [d h5 k t cd 4 L ( ^ M J r dhf ci A ct 3., w _swa u w'd'^, "r "" L

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('5 L rd ,la si7nd 4v rad?~&<A ru.4~ h Luas distka7

                    %;A           a\ m ,tM<<4 ,f -sbyt         1 g-   (     3s               y A~t(5bcis [ij                     APE        tr nc ht s rvt ]

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Amendment H 14.2-211 August 31, 1990 l 1 l

i CESSAR !Mnneuia l e 14.2.12.1.116 Gaseous ste Management System Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE I To demonstrate the ability of the Gaseous aste 1.1 System to collect and process radioactive gases vented , from p nt,(equip) 64W) ment. j 2.0 PREREQUISITES l 2.1 Construction activities on the Gaseous Rad)[aste Management System have been completed. g1%' l 2.2 GaseousRadhsteManagement System instrumentation has , been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Gaseous i Management System are completed and Radfaste i operational. 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. ; 3.O TEST METHOD - I 3.1 Verify flow paths. ' H 3.2 Demonstrate that discharge isolation features and other ;

                                                              $/                                  i system re   M A controls S.pid b   funcf i conGemproperly da h <%      b h wLi Ledhr rachk,E%       l .              i 3.3       Verify alarms, indicating i                                  lights are functional. $ ~W A              L mdbaduth Chad                            i 4Le Crw e. kigg yc8c%nstruments Jr t.e                   and statuu  A h,f 3.4       DeEo$sfrN E'tNe oper N ion of the gas drying equipment.                     a 3.5       Demonstrate proper hold up time of gas through the                             j charcoal adsorbers.

3.6 Demonstrate the operation of the dryer regeneration , equipment. 3.7 Demonstrate the operation of the system gas analyzers. :

  )*#      b 4.0        DATA REQUIRED
    }<

4.1 Setpoints of alarms interlocks,and controls. y 4.2 Gas dryer operating data. 4.3 Dryer regenerating equipment operating data. ( Amendment H 14.2-214 August 31, 1990 l

CESSAR !aMncar,o : 4 3 4.4 Gas analyzer operating data. , 4.5 Gas transport times. H 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA , 5.1 The Gaseous Waste Management System operates as , described in Section 11.3. C hk) h5 k( 3 c, o fa. (A dh I-t o en Ml o e mb as Aesa,W h Sech s n.y I 4 vs4e 4 5 b : [rt g

                     -       ECA C       ( 4gkgj Q     d f's

0 % A, C4 cedrA jos b Neue9a\n operdL d psh 'iW.uh. M /eu- l t R ding C^ Y\k C (O'u n;b t'Ad l td 4% Cf ([lfh s

[ w-m j l l Amendment H 14.2-215 August 31, 1990

C E S S A R n aine w s t DC B" g 14.2.12.1.117 Process and Effluent Radiat) ion Monitoring _ , 1 System Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify that the Process and Effluent N, Rad __!_ ion 4f kN ; Monitoring System can detect and record specific radiation levels, and to verify all alarms and interlocks. ! 2.0 PREREQUISITES (jY 2.1 Construction activities on the Process and Effluent jg andiatice Monitoring System have been completed. I h%%uk and Effluent DRadia

                                                                               ;,\ q ion J      Monitoring                                                            System 2.2         Process instrumentation has been calibrated.                                                                                                                   tN}       ,

Support - systems required for operation of the Process 2.3 and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System are completed h ; and operational. Ch.\.$cc l H [ strumentation is available and calibrated. 2.4 Test 2.5 Calibration check source is available. ( 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Utilizing the check source and external test equipment, verify calibration and operation of the monitor. I 3.2 Check the self-testing feature of the monitor. l 3.3 Where applicable, verify proper control the monitor and record the response time. cyati in u r- A by (ll\j y .; 3.4 ,Verj.fy-pro alarm actuation in the control room. t ID . QD sea v 4.O D N REQUIRED ; 4.1 The monitor response to check source. . 1 4.2 Technical data associated with the source. 4.3 Signal / levels necessary to cause alarm actuation. 4.5 Response time of the monitor to perform control hC Ii l i functions. ! ( ! i l ' Amendment H ! i 14.2-216 August 31, 1990 ! i e

CESSAR T4?r,cy,2,, 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA . 5.1 The wricus Process and Effluent 1 Monitor ' perform as described in Section 11.5.1. l hy n R"*

T n se er A; (TJer b py M.2-4)

(1n7 YEclimbh d yviel k 4 L c o f g reg r M [/) S i u J A<. ( b V 4 e's e. .c n C od Add n k o d. hrs ( GV\krok RC b c4kibw $ , 3 s ., y . (71 b pye ass) , PA A b6 #f Mg//fp. h bl Mwke he_ v A TyT 40 h cabahiw now A s b veMy 7 ge a\a c a a ck~% s in %

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                                 ,,+r, ) or 6*\ ad ro I roon, a s a pp rep c'ak l

1 1 Amendment Q 14.2-217 June 30, 1993

CESSAR Ein%$m. - 14.2.12.1.1 W 11&borns and Are'a n ation"N5nitoring , System Test l 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify the functional performance of the Airborne < and Area Radiation Monitoring System. 6 2.0 PREREOUISITES Airborne and Area ! 2.1 Construction activities on the Radiation Monitoring System have been completed. 2.2 Airborne and Area Radiation Monitoring System instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the Airborne and Area Radiation Monitoring System are completed and operational. 2.4 Test [nstrumentationisavailableandcalibrated. Y; 2.5 Calibration check source is available. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Utilizing a check source and external test equipment, verify the calibration and operation of the monitor. 3.2 Check the self-testing feature of the monitor. , 3.3 Compare local and remote indications. 3.4 Verify proper local and remote alarm actuations. - l 4.0 DATA REQUIRED

                                                                         .                    (  !

f4.1 Monitor response to a check source. , 4.2 Technical data associated with the source. , 4.3 Local and remote responses to test signals. ; , 4.4 Signals levels necessary to cause alarm actuation. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TheJA'irborne andf dea diation nitors will perform 5.1 i as described in Section}11.54 aM and l7M \ e [ ~ d a. h < to An be, q nd , 4 ger y 7topr nag e s is ks4 . 30, 1992

CESSAR !!!=,c.m. i i In addition to the transmission system design, the switching I arrangement in the switchyard and the redundant relaying that is i provided minimizes the probability of losing offsite power. !

                                                                                                             -t 8.2.2                 ANALYSIS f

8.2.2.1 Grid Stability and Availability Analysis l Grid stability and availability analyses involving i interconnections with the primary transmission system shall be ' - performed by the site operntor.7 s.2.2.2 offsite and Switchyard Power Svstamm Sincle Failure Analysis . The design of the offsite power system shal.1 be consistent with failure modes and effects analysis in Tables 8.2-1 and 8.2-2. ! i i These anel 3ses si,all shall demmckk bf the 13>S0*'"'"~* Yy to.a b.se s d. ~a sspa m ce<ch,- cnt + pys h _ ; Susla l4trk l<2ystWc 2't cn ys #M 2 UtlSec. of } ren~{te t f t I i (~. l l Amendment Q j 8.2-8 June 30, 1993

CESSARnn%mou The 480V load center main and feeder breakers are selectively , coordinated such that the breaker closest to a fault trips. Their interrupting capacity exceeds their required fault duty. The main breakers are equipped with overcurrent and trip thedevices feeder having long-time and short-time delay functions, breakers ar e equipped with overcurrent Each trip devices breaker having in the long-time and instantaneous functions. auxiliary power system is provided with an anti-pump device. 8.3.1.1.1.5 Normal, Alternate and AAC Circuit Separation The normal and alternate offsite circuits are separated such that a single failure event to in onetwocircuit will not effect the other physically and electrically circuit. This results reliable independent lines. The normal and alternate offsite circuits are routed overhead from the grid to their respective switchyards. Each switchyard has redundant 125 VDC power and controls which is physically separated by routing cables in redundant raceway, ductlines or trench, from the device in the switchyard to the relay house and fromlines' the relay are house to the again routed From the switchyards these plant. The Unit Auxiliary overhead 1.o their respective transformers. Transformers are separated from each other and from the Reserve Auxiliary Transformers and main transformer by the distan;: rcccancnded by IEGB-070-10 0 i . bya minimum dis %cc. o F 50 H. ( The isolated phase bus, non-segregated phase bus and/or cables located outside the TurbineAuxi]iary Building and the Nuclearwill Transformers, Island be associated with the Unit of 50 ft. from the Reserve Auxiliary separated by a minimum the non-segregated phase bus or cables Transformers. Likewise, located outside the Turbine Building and the Nuclear Island that are routed from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers to switchgears in the Turbine Building will be separated by a minimum of 50 ft. from other Unit Auxiliary and Main Transformers. .p,. dd separation is maintained such that The separation Once cables enter the a single failure will not plant,effect both circuits. of normal and alternate offsite power circuits within the Turbine Building and the Nuclear Island will be maintained by floors and h r ded walls except within the switchgear room where they will be routed on opposite sides of the room and willThe be circuits connected to the 3 switchgear lineup on the opposite ends. associated with the AAC and the offsite power circuits will be routed on different floors within the Turbine Building to the Permanent Non-Safety Switchgear with theor"X" and "Y" circuits separated by l routing in different areas on opposite walls to maintain separation. The non-Class 1E Permanent Non-Safety Switchgears j are located in the Turbine Building which contains i ("X" and "Y") only non-Class 1E cables thus they are physically isolated from l Class-1E circuits. Amendment Q June 30, 1993 8.3-4 i

                        "   a" CESSAR CERTIFICATION                                                            !

l The AAC is located in a separate area inside the plant protected area i,. a self-contained metal enclosure and surrounded by a security fence. This building contains no Class 1E cables. The "X" and "Y" circuits are routed to the Turbine Building in a dedicated raceway (conduit /ductline/ cable tray). Physical separation is maintained such that a single failure will not affect both circuits. Once in the Turbine Building, the AAC circuits are routed directly to the two Permanent Non-Safety Switchgear ("X" and "Y") within the non-Class lE Turbine Building. IEEE Std. 384-1981 does not apply because there are no Class 1E cables in this area. Physical and electrical separation of "X" and "Y" circuits is maintained between the combustion turbine generator and the offsite circuits. There are no electrical interconnections between the normal offsite circuit and the alternate offsite circuit, instrument and control circuits except where the power circuits connect to common Class 1E and non-Class 1E switchgear lineups. At the common switchgear, one open and one closed circuit breaker maintain l electrical independence. These circuit breakers are interlocked so that the closed breaker must be opened before the open breaker can be closed. Similarly, the power, instrument and control circuits of the AAC source are electrically independent from that , of the normal and alternate offsite power circuits. l Cables routed from the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer to the Class 1E Switchgear are routed with the other cables of the alternate offsite circuit which terminate at the Permanent Non-Safety Switchgear. From this point to the Class 1E Switchgear, the i alternate of f site circuit shall maintain separation from Class lE circuits and its redundant normal non-safety circuit routed between the Permanent Non-Safety Switchgear and the Class 1E Switchgear. Af ter the cable enters the Nuclear Island, IEEE Std. 384-1981 are met. The instrumentation and control cables that are affiliated with the normal offsite power circuits are routed in dedicated metal raceways. Similarly, the instrumentation and control cables that are affiliated with the alternate offsite circuit are routed in dedicated raceways. The alternate offsite instrumentation and control cables do not share raceway with any other cables. The separation between normal and alternate offsite instrumentation and control cables are the same as the separation between normal and alternate offsite power cables (i . e . , ,I floors, g walls, or 50 ft. of physical separation). i 0 e e. - rakt k h *rdek i ' Amendment Q 8.3-5 June 30, 1993

CESSAR E!nincam. 3.6 Verify the 4160V Class 1E buses can be energized from power sources including the Unit Auxiliary Transformer, respech c Resene_0terdby Auxiliary Transformer, Emergency Diesel Generators, and the Alternate AC Source. 4.0 DATA REOUIRED

  /.1         Full load bus voltage data.

4.2 Setpoints at which alarns, interlocks and protective relays occur. 4.3 System response to low bus voltage. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The 4160V Class 1E Auxiliary Power System operates as described in Section 8.3.1. l t 6 l Amendment H 14.2-220 August 31, 1990

CESSAR nainemou 4 e 14.2.12.1.123 4160 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the operation of the 4160 Volt Normal : Auxiliary Power System. 2.0 PREREQUISITE 2.1 Construction activities on the 4160 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System have been completed. 2.2 4160 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support systems required for operation of the 4160 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System are completed and operational. 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. 2.5 All 4.16KV feeders and buses voltage tested with acceptable results. 2.6 4.16KV power is available from the Unit Auxiliary H Transformer, the Standby Auxiliary Transformers and the Alternate AC Source. feSerge 2.7 Switch gear assembly, breakers, control and protective equipment / circuit have been inspected and tested and are capable of being placed into service. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Demonstrate the operability of the feeder protective circuit breakers from the permanent non-safety buses to the safety loads buses. 3.2 Demonstrate the operability of the feeder protective circuit breakers from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer to the non-safety loads locally and remotely. 3.3 Demonstrate the operability of the feeder and crosstie protective circuit breakers for the permanent i non-safety loads locally and remotely. . 3.4 Demonstrate the operability of the buses' interlocks, alarms and protective relays. 3.5 Verify the operation of meters and annunciators. Amendment H 14.2-225 August 31, 1990

f CESSAR Minncum Reserve. - ( 3.6 Verify the permanent from the non-safety buses can be energize 4 unit Auxiliary Transformer, the -Standby Auxiliary Transformer 3and the Alternate AC source. 3.7 Demonstrate the operation of the auto bus transfer for i the t*~cepermanent f* Preferretnon-safety buses

2. (aye,ay,) I

( p,.derred 1 (a,rd rYf } .

y 4.0 DATA REQUIRED ,Ml g,,er)* 4.1 Setpoints at which alarms, interlocks and protective i relays occur. H I

                                            +r.wsh e                                        c 4.2        System response to . loss of Preferred 1 (normal) supply powerg +o                                                                .

Fre Scered 2 (afferaafe) suppl y power, 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The 4160V Normal Auxiliary Supply System supplies the ' . loads as described in Section 8.3.1. i i

i 4 ; i I i } t i b - l Amendment H ! 14.2-226 August 31, 1990 !

 -e,-,s      > . -

CESSARESL = 3.8.2.1.3.3 Fuel Transfer Penetration A fuel transfer penetration is provided for transfer of fuel between the fuel pool and the Containment fuel transfer canal. The fuel transfer penetration is provided with a double sealed blind flange in the transfer canal and a gate valve in the fuel pool. An annular space is provided between the double seals on the blind flange for pressurized leak testing in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J. The fuel transfer tube penetration sleeve and flanges are designed, fabricated, tested and stamped in accordance with Section III, Subsection NE of the ASMF Code. The fuel transfer penetration is shown in Figure 3.8-2. 3.8.2.1.3.4 Hechanical Penetrations Mechanical penetrations are treated as fabricated piping assemblies meeting the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NE, and Subsection NC. The process line and penetration flued head making up the pressure boundary are consistent with the system piping materials; fabrication, inspection, and analysis requirements are as required by the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NC. All welds on the process pipe are accessible for inspection in accordance with the ASME Code, Section XI. High energy lines and selected engineered safety system and auxiliary lines require the typical " Hot Penetration" assembly shown on Figure 3.8-2 which features an exterior guard pipe for protection of other penetrations in the building annular space. Other lines use the typical " Cold Penetration" assembly also shown in Figure 3.8-2 since a leak into the annular space would not cause a personnel hazard or damage other penetrations in the immediate area. ) l Mechanical penetrations are leak tested in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. ) (ed:.mrat ) 3.8.2.1.3.5 4 Electrical Penetrationd /{S$e d it5 ~ c.& iumesf assam L I, ts - l Mediumvoltage'electricalpenetrationhforreactorcoolantpump power (shown in Figure 3.8-2) use sealed bushings for conductor seals. The assemblies incorporate dual seals along the axis of each conductor. g g- gl,gg/ Low voltage power, control, and instrumentation cables enter the containment vessel through penetration assemblies which are designed to provide two leak-tight barriers in series with each conductor. Amendment K 3.8-3 October 30, 1992

CESSAR nahuou cs,da;arne,d * % ' '" S All Lelectrical penetrations, including seals, are designed to l ; maintain containment integrity for Design Basis Accident

conditions, including pressure, temperature, and radiation.

Double barriers permit testing of each assembly in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J to verify that containment integrity is maintained, c ra hu u m evi 7 The* electrical penetration assemblies are designed, fabricated, tested, and stamped in accordance with IEEE-317. The pressure boundary portion of the assembly is designed, fabricated, tested and stamped in accordance with Section III, Subsection NE of the ASME Code. 3.8.2.2 Applicable Codes, Standards, and Specifications The design, materials, fabrication, erection, inspection, testing, and inservice surveillance of the steel containment and penetrations is covered by the following codes, standards, ! specifications, and regulations: Codes Title ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section II, " Material Specifications" ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, ' Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE, " Class MC Components" ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, " Nondestructive Examination" . ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX, " Welding and Brazing Qualifications" ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, i Section XI, Rules for Inservice ' Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Subsection IWE

                                             " Requirements for Class MC and Metallic Liners of Class CC Components of Light-Water Cooled Power Plants"                                                                       ,

I Amendment Q 3.8-4 June 30, 1993

l CESSAR Mancuic. 14.2.12.1.130 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test and Structural Integrity Test 1.O OBJECTIVJ 1.1 To verify the structural integrity of the Containment. 1.2 To verify that the integrated leak rate from the Containment does not exceed the maximum allowable leakage. 2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 The Containment is operational and penetration local leak rate testing has been completed to the greatest sxtent possible. 2.2 All systems inside Containment which havo containment isolation valves identified are vented and drained as required by Table 6.2.4-1. l 2.3 Leakage rate determination instrumentation available and properly calibrated. 2.4 Containment inspection completed as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. 2.5 Systems required including station air, for the test are available. Instrumentation to measure containment building 2.6 cellr 2nd. movement ineluding--etrain g:ugs, lead

             -deficction reds- are installed and calibrated.

IS 2.7 Containment Ventilation System Fans are capable of running for air circulation. ; 3.0 TEST METHOD j 3.1 Close individual containment isolation valves by the means provided for normal operation of the valves as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. 3.2 The internal pressure in the containment building will be increased from atmospheric pressure to 1.10 times the Design Basis Accident Pressure (Pac) in at least four approximately equal increments and depressurized in the same increments. e Amendment Q i 14.2-238 June 30, 1993

CESSAR !anncmo,, 3.3 At each pressure level, during pressurization and depressurization, data will be recorded to ascertain the radial and vertical displacement of the reactor building. 3.4 A visual inspection of the containment hatches, penetrations and gaskets will be made. 3.5 The containment leak rate will be determined at calculated peak accident pressure and at 1./2 calculated peak accident pressure. Leakage will be verified by reference vessel method and/or absolute pressure method. Test accuracy shall be verified by supplementary means. l 4.0 DATA REOUIRED

                                                            , , , , u s.;,,, M 4.1   Structural Integrity Data * ~ siv a m e "g. .g      sa;u;~3 movemeat 4.1.1       The readings of(strain gaugec, Icad ccll                   and deficction rad        will be recorded at selected pressure levels.

4.1.2 The displacement of the liner plate between anchor l points shall be monitored at selected locations. 4.2 Integrated Leak Rate Data 4.2.1 Containment temperature, pre.'sure and humidity 4.2.2 Reference vessel temperature and pressure 4.2.3 Atmospheric pressure and temperature 4.2.4 "Known leakage" air flow 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Structural Integrity Test 5.1.1 The Containment Vessel shows no signs of structural degradation following the 110% strength test. 5.2 Integrated Leak Rate Test 5.2.1 The upper confidence limit plus any local leakage l rate additions, shall be less than 75 percent of the maximum allowed leakage rate. Amendment Q 14.2-239 June 30, 1993

CESSAR Eni?,cm:n S.2.2 The verification test by removal of a quantity of air is acceptable if the mass calculated from the test instrumentation is 75 to 125% of the metered mase change. 5.3 G,de;-mu f pt,(,m 5 ,3 g,,ce,- M .y s m+, .4 c. . 2 c, c 2-g 44 3. r.z . t' t I I I Amendment H l 14.2-240 August 31, 1990

CESSAREm%ma ! h 14.2.12.1.131 Fuel Transfer Tube Functional Test and Leak I Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify the measured leakcge through the fuel transfer when summed with the total of all other Type B and C Leak Rate Tests tube is within the limits b stated within the Technical Opccificctionc.*5 e 'p ,,2 y toU$So Affrah 3. 1.2 To demonstrate the operation of the Fuel Transfer Tube quick closure hatch. 2.0 PREREOUISITES

 '1.1        Construction activities on the Fuel Transfer Tube have been completed.

2.2 Temporary pressurization equipment is installed and instrumentation calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Operate the Fuel Transfer Tube quick closure hatch in accordance with manuf acturers instructions. Verify the hatch can be opened and closed within the stated amount of time. 3.2 Place the hatch in the closed position and perform a 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Type B Leak Rats Test on the Fuel Transfer Tube Seal integrity at .10% Design Basis Accident Pressure (Pac). 4.0 DATI i ' IRE 0 4.1 Fuel TIcrafer Tube assembly leak data. 4.2 Time to operate the hatch. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The leak rate when summed with the total of all other Type B and C Leak Rate Tests does not exceed the limits as given in the Tcchnical Opccifications. repk<l t3 /e Crg so Appeu ;7 5.2 The Fuel Transfer Tube quick closure hatch operates in accordance with manufacturers instructions. N 5 & I Tram kes Tube peavtedica aad 9v&k clo t.is c h~1eit p*<km os descc;6 e1 la seJ aas 2.1.2 an4 0.24, j Amendment H 14.2-241 August 31, 1990 :

CESSAR EMMncuien 1 14.2.12.1.132 Equipment Ratch Functional Test and Leak Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE k 1.1 To verify the measured leakage through the Containment Equipment Hatch when summed with the total of all other

Type B and C Leak Rate Tests is within the limits '

i steted in the Technical Specificaticna as t o c6t}50ec **eed &y /h 3: -

                                                                     @f w              f 1.2       To demonstrate the operation of the Containment                         !

Equipment Hatch and Movable Shield Wall Assembly. j t 2.0 PREREOUISITES . 1 2.1 Construction activities on the Equipment Hatch and - Shield Wall have been completed. j 2.2 Temporary pressurization equipment is installed and i instrumentation calibrated. L t 3.0 TEST METHOD , 3.1 Demonstrate the operation of exterior shield wall ' assembly from its normal closed location to the open location and back. 3.2 Demonstrate the operation of the Equipment Hatch from i its normal closed location to its open location and ! back. 3.3 Place the hatch in the closed position and perform a 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Type B Leak Rate Test and Seal l Structural Integrity test at 110% of Design Basis Accident Pressure. l l 4.O DATA REOUIRED f ! 4.1 Equipment Hatch leak data. l 1 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA f , i 5.1 The leak rate when summed with the total of all other l

!              Type B and C Leak Rate Tests does not exceed the limits                 l as gicon in thm Tochnicel Specificaticna. eff v r*1 'j <.c rg yo
                                                               /*ppe4x 7.              l 5.2        The Equipment Hatch and Movable Shield Wall Assembly                    *

.i operate in accordance with manufacturers instructions. l S$ % Gy,'pm mi Hald teSems as deur,% L ta .kd ws - i s.9 :z. a~r G 2.s Amendment Q I 14.2-242 June 30, 1993

l l CESSAR naincamu l l l 14.2.12.1.133 Containment Personnel Airlock Functional Test l and Leak Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify the measured leakage through each Containment Personnel Airlock is within the limits stated in the , Technical SpEcificatm a s rey est by to cftt s o appead;, y, 1.2 To verify each Centainment Personnel Airlock operates as designed. , 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Containment Personnel Airlocks have been completed. 2.2 Temporary pressurization equipment is installed and instrumentation is calibrated. H 2.3 Electrical checks are complete on the hatches. 3.0 TEST METHOD , 3.1 Operate each airlock in accordance with manufacturers instructions. Verify alarms, interlocks and indications. Place each airlock in the closed portion and perform a 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Type B Leak Rate Test and Structural Integrity Test at 110% of Design Basis Accident Pressure (Pac). 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Individual airlock leak data. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The leak rates when summed with the total.of all other Type B and C Leak Rate Tests do not exceed the limits as given in the Tcchnical Cpccificationc.eeytrei 6 to do? Se 4) feds T 5.2 The Containment Personnel Airlocks operate as designed. 5.) TLt CeastManad fersa~.,a A:<t a s p ad,-m as desc,Aaj is fe disas (o Z.l, u l 3 . 9 . 2. . Amendment H 14.2-243 August 31, 1990

CESSAR Ein%mou l Coutawm en-}- 14.2.12.1.134 v Electrical Penetration' Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify the integrity of the electrical penetration o-ring seals, and to verify that a summation of the Type B and c leak rate test results does not exceed the limits of thc plent Tcchnicci Cpecifications. Ln , ay, :,,4 ky i e cf)c 50 Append & 7 2.0 PREREQUISITES C. A;umed O'"g".5

2.1 lectrical penetrations must be complete with no Q [ identified exceptions or discrepancies which would affect the test. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Perform a 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Type B Leak Rate Test g at 100% of Design Basis Accident Pressure (Pac). 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Electrical penetration leak data. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 4 sse Ll ca utr;um ed , b 5.1 The sum of the^ electrical penetration leak rate tests when summed with all other Type B and C tests does not exceed limits as gi/cn in the Tec."7ical Cpecificctions. rey ;rcl b to cfx S*o A c.od'i ~.C G. L Coa h:nmen) elec+e:a f (eae+,nt, s. a uenb lie.s prefo rm as

                            ;d de n r lL <<       Seckas 3. g.2,~L 6. 2.1 1

e 1 Amendment H 14.2-244 August 31, 1990 i l

CESSAR naincmon LeAX*3e fi d e v 14.2.12.1.135 Containment Isolation Valves (CPlc) Test l 1.O OBJECTIVE l 1 1.1 To verify that the measured leakage through each i ; containment penetration isolation valve when summed ! with the total of all other Type B and C Leak Rate Tests is within the limits d in the Tcchnical Opccificationc. ,7, state

                                                           ,,  gg        focnq 50 A mkt 2.0        PREREQUISITES 2.1        Construction activities on the systems to be tested have been completed.

2.2 Temporary pressurization equipment is installed and instrumentation is calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Close the individual containment isolation valves by . the means provided for normal operation of valve. 3.2 Perform 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Type C test, by local y pressurization of each penetration.

    ~ 2.1            I'v & pun e Li a L 2 v4 4=, . 2 L!4 fluids pie 55Urize t c.,   l '  %        !

Design Basis Accident Pressure (Pac) wit hat ' fluid. 3.2.2 other penetrations, pres. Ize with air to 100% a . 3.3 Measure leakage by e the following methods. 3.3.1 Prousure,DcCay 3.3.2 te 3.3.3 Water Collection 1 d-3.4 Vauuum ReLentivu 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 1 4.1 Individual penetration leak data. I l I l i l Amendment H 14.2-245 August 31, 1990

CESSAR Ennnemw i l 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The leak rates when summed with the total of all other H i Type B and C Leak Rate Tests must not exceed the I allowable limits as giver in the Tcchnicel-Cpecificctionc. L,y:~1 s,10creso s,,a;,7 52 %e Cutri~m~4 I s.1st.,~ L,(ae, a(, ,,4 e as ofese,,Las ca S e v+c.a (s . 2. H l 5 i i Amendment H 1'.2-246 August 31, 1990

i 14.2.12.1.140 Containment Isolation Valves Test [ 1.O OBJECTIVES 1.1 Demonstrate that containment isolation valves can be s operated manually and operate in response to automatic actuation. i 1.2 Verify that upon loss of actuating power, the valves f fail as designed. , 1.3 Verify that all valves operate in less than the time : specified in the plant technical specificatien. 2.O PREREQUISITES f" T

2.1 Construction activities on the containment isolation !

valves have been completed. ! 2.2 Support system required to operate the containment isolation valves are operable. i 2.3 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD , 3.1 Operate containment isolation valves from all appropriate control positions. Verify position , indication, and measure opening and closing times, ~ including at rated flow and no flow conditions. i 3.2 Simulate failed conditions and observe valve response. ; 3.3 Initiate the following simulated activation signals and j verify the appropriate valves go to the design : positions. CIAS Containment Isolation Actuation Signal ; i CSAS Containment Spray Actuation Signal MSIS Main Steam Isolation Signal i EFAS Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal AFAS Alternate Feedwater Actuation Signal HRAS High Radiation Actuation Signal l HHAS High Humidity Actuation Signal ; SIAS Safety Injection Actuation Signal j CCWLLSTAS Component Cor' ling Water Low-Low Surge Tank Actuation Signal ll 1 Amendment Q ne 0,1%3 14.2-253a

k#! h h k ICATIIN TABLE 14.2-1 (Cont'd) (Sheet 4 of 8) PREOPERATIONAL TESTS Section Title 14.2.12.1.58 Pre-core Reactor Coolant System Heat Loss 14.2.12.1.59 Pre-core Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Measurement 14.2.12.1.60 Pre-core Chemical Volume Control System Integrated Test E 14.2.12.1.61 Pre-core Safety Injection Check Valve Test 14.2.12.1.62 Pre-core Boration/Ditution Measurements 14.2.12.1.63 Downcomer Feedwater System Water hamm'er Test 14.2.12.1.64 Main Turbine Systems Test 14.2.12.1.65 MainStqgmSafetyValveTest 14.2.12.1.66 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and MSIV Bypass Valves Test 14.2.12.1.67 Main Steam System Test 14.2.12.1.68 Steam Generator Blowdown System Test 14.2.12.1.69 Main Condenser and Air Removal Systems Test 14.2.12.1.70 Main Feedwater System Test H 14.2.12.1.71 Condensate System Test 14.2.12.1.72 Turbine Gland Sealing System Test i 14.2.12.1.73 Condenser Circulating Water System Test l i 14.2.12.1.74 Steam Generator Hydrostatic Test 14.2.12.1.75 Feedwater Heater and Drains System Test i 14.2.12.1.76 Ultimate Heat Sink Systc- Test Amendment H August 31, 1990

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1 TABLE 14.2-1 (Cont'd) (Sheet 5 of 8)

PREOPERATIONAL TESTS 2 1

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Section Title ! 14.2.12.1.77 Chilled Water System Test 14.2.12.1.78 Station Service Water System Test ' 14.2.12.1.79 Component Cooling Water System Test : 14.2.12.1.80 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System : Test 14.2.12.1.81 Turbine Building Cooling Water System Test i 14.2.12.1.82 Condensate Storage System Test j 14.2.12.1.83 Turbine Building Service Water System Test l 14.2.12.1.84 Equipment and Floor Drainage System Test-14.2.12.1.85 Normal and Security Lighting Systems Test ; 14.2.12.1.86 Emergency Lighting System Test H 14.2.12.1.87 Communications System 5 Test !! l 14.2.12.1.88 Compressed Air System Test j 14.2.12.1.89 Compressed Gas System Test 14.2.12.1.90 Process Sampling System Test 14.2.12.1.91 Heat Tracing System Test l 14.2.12.1.92 Fire Protection Systemp Test 14.2.12.1.93 -H* Diesel Generator Mechanical System Test 14.2.12.1.94 --> Diesel Generator Electrical System Test 14.2.12.1.95 -~> Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems Test 14.2.12.1.96 Alternate AC Source System Test 6energe"c) Amendment H August 31, 1990 I i

CESSAR E!ance,, TABLE 14.2-1 (Cont'd) (Sheet 6 of 8) PREOPERATIONAL TESTS Section Title 14.2.12.1.97 Alternate AC Source Support Systems Test 14.2.12.1.98 Containment Polar Crane Test 14.2.12.1.99 Fuel Building Cranes Test 14.2.12.1.100 Turbine Building Crane Test 14.2.12.1.101 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System Test V r 14.2.12.1.102 Containment Purge f System enlllodie Testt CemfI o 14.2.12.1.103 Control DJ lding Ventilation System Test - 64l*Urg 14.2.12.1.104 Reactor Subsphere end Numcar Anncx Ventilation System Test

14. 2. 12. I, t o 'l A Welew l} dnex VeerfHefna S1Siem *Gsf 14.2.12.1.105 Turbine Building Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.106 Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.107 Diesel Building Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.108 Fuel Building Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.109 Annulus Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.110 Radwaste Building Ventilation System Test 6~Iwcc of Com u 14.2.12.1.111 A Control Dui(ding Ventilation .9%Is[ystem$ Test 14.2.12.1.112 Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) Test J 14.2.12.1.113 Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (CHRS)

Test 14.2.12.1.114 Liquid Waste Management System Test 7, 14.2.12.1.115 Solid Waste Management System Test Amendment J April 30, 1992

CESSAR n!'r%me,. i l TABLE 14.2-1 (Cont'd) (8heet 8 of 8). . PREOPERATIO1GLL TESTS t section Title i d5" : ConfMamesiElectrical 14.2.12.1.134 ^ Penetration?Ue5 Test ;g g 14.2.12.1.135 Containment Isolation Valves" Test 14.2.12.1.136 Loss of Instrument Air Test i 14.2.12.1.137 Mid-Loop Operations Verification Test 14.2.12.1.138 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Test 14.2.12.1.139 Auxiliary Steam System Test , 14.2.12.1.140 Containment Isolation Valves Test 14.2.12.1.141 Post Accider.t Monitoring Instrumentation (PAMI) ^ i Test , ! 14.2.12.1.142 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger , Structure (s) Ventilation Systems Test . 1 i i f 1 Amendment Q June 30, 1993

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                                           *='a1 AWEXAGE' L18E110 st1 rm' "" TtBR fcurien/vri fit Primary stemd          Licpid       Turtrine stds    Adjusted      secordery     Detersant       Total grildt         WgE12       Watte TY11gg    __ Draine        _ Total 131   Drvins (23       thaste       M so-140             0.0        1.29E 03          5.00E-05    5.91E-05        2.00E-04     9.10E 04     7.03E-03 La 140             0.0        1.74E-03         9.00E-05     8.05E-03        3.39E-04           0.0    8.39E-03 co-141             0.0        2.00E-05               0.0    8.00E-05        2.46E-06     2.30E-04    ,3.12E-04 co-141             0.0        6.00E-05          1.00E 05    3.00E 04        3.58E 05           0.0    3.36E-04 Pr-1&3             0.0        2.00E-05               0.0    1.00E.04              0.'0         0.0    1.00E-04 Co-144             0.0        5.10E-M          2.00E 05     2.34E-03        6.51E-05     3.90E-03     6.31E-03 Pr-144             0.0        3.10E-04         2.00E 05     2.34E-05              0.0          0.0    2.34E-03 Me-24              0.0        2.90E-04          1.00E-04    1.68E-03        4.83E 06           0.0    2.1&E-03
            .=. :

P-32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ,0.0 1.80E-04 1.80E-M cr 51 0.0 3.60E-04 1.00E-05 1.64E-03 5.26E-05 4.70E 03 6.39E-03 mn-54 0.0 2.10E-M 1.00E-05 9.60E-04 2.65E-05 3.80E*03 4.79E-03 Fe 55 0.0 1.60E-04 1.00E-05 T.30E-M 1.99E-05 7.20E 03 7.95E-Q3 0.0 4.00E-05 0.0 1.70E-04 4.87E-06 2.20E 03 2.37E-03 Fe-59 Co-58 0.0 5.80E-04 2.00E IO5 2.6&E-03 T.73E-05 7.90E-03 1.06E-02 l 0.0 7.00E-05 0.0 3.20E-04 8.98E-Da 1.40E-02 1.43E-02 Co-60 mi-65 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.70E 03 1.70E C3 Zn-65 0.0 7.00E-05 0.0 3.10E-04 8.56E 06 0.0 3.19E De W-187 0.0 3.00E 05 1.00E 05 1.80E-M 2.99E 05 0.0 2.1DE-04 up-z39 0.0 9.00E-05 1.00E 05 4.10E-04 .3.14E-05 0.0 4.41E-04 Totet 2.25E-03 4.21E-02 2.62E-03 2.11E-01 7.38E-03 8.98E-02 3.08E-01 Tritium Releess la 370 Curles/yr i 83TES: [1] 0.0 ameering in thle table irdicates relanse is less than 1.0E-05 curies /yr. [2] 50,000 entlans/ year et socordery content concentration is assumed to tse relanned with no proceastne. l Q2 Total is adjusted to Incluse 0.16 Curies attrlLwtable to operational occurrences that fI rv.utt in w ,t nn.d retee.e.. s.e-e ne ,wepoer c. . : :.. ni ;-,i w l agT8, e Total inclujen sus of

Total Adjusted", "5c Drain Tenka, and 8cetergent Weste" !

14] columw. (C. V h NRRErrdM ( See % *1s13.y % f.4 %

Anandment Q 2223 June 30, 1993 i

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CESSARna hon /4 communications to all critical areas of the plant 4uring nomal and abneral/ accident conditions. Additionally, sound-powered telephone systems are provided between selected critical areas of the plant for auxiliary shutdown and other required functional purposes. Finally, multiple offsite communications lines, both-direct and through the PABX are provided for effective communications during normal and abnormal / accident conditions. All of these diverse communications systems are independent of each other to assure effective communications assuming a single failure. A description of these systems is presented in Section 9.3.2. ; 1.2.11.11 Lichtinct System

                                      /\                                i
                               .is The lighting system      -are- designed to provide adequate and     I effective illuminati)o[n throughout the plant and plant site including all vital areas of the plant.

The normal = station- lighting system is used to provide normal illumination under all plant operation, maintenance and test conditions. The security lighting system provides the illumination required to monitor isolation zones and all outdoor areas within the plant protected perimeterg under normal conditi- o= .cil es upon ices of-all ?.C powee. The emergency lighting system is used to provide acceptable levels of illumination throughout the station and particularly in areas where emergency operations are performed, such as control i rooms, battery rooms, containment, etc., upon loss of the normal l lighting system. j A description of these systems is presented in Section 9.5.3. 1.2.11.12 Diesel Generator Encino Fuel Oil Systema j r The Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System is designed to i provide for storage of a seven-day supply of fuel oil for each l diesel generator engine and to supply the fuel oil to the engine, i as necessary, to drive the emergency generator. The system is designed to meet the single failure criterion. A description of the Diesel Fuel Storage Structure is provided in l Section 1.2.16.7. A description of the Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System is l presented in Section 9.5.4. Amendment Q 1.2-27 June 30, 1993

CESSAR nainum,, Building and to protect the diesel generator units from flooding caused by a major pipe rupture. A description of this system is provided in Section 9.5.9. 1.2.11.18 Compressed Gas Systems The compressed gas supply systems are provided to supply various gases for equipment and instrumentation cooling, purging, diluting, inerting, and welding. The major items of equipment are the high pressure gas cylinders and pressure regulators to V control the pressure and distribution of the various gases used throughout the plant. These compressed gas supply systems are non-safety-related and any failure does not jeopardize the g operation of any safety-related components or systems. g A description of these systems is provided in Section 9.5.10.

 <                      Potable and Sanitary Water Systems h- '

1.2.11.19 9

   > 1The-pot +bic and sanitsry water systems 'I'OWG}-are--cut - Of cope s-ycteac vhich-are-liccnssc sdeplied end arc sitc-Opocific. hhese systems process water for general plant use. These systems serve no safety functions and any malfunction has no adverse effect on any safety-related system.      The requirements of General Design Criterion 60 are met as related to design provisions provided to control the release of liquid effluents containing radioactive material from contaminating the PSWS.

These systems are described in Section 9.2.4. 1.2.11.20 Demineralized Water Makeup System The Domineralized Water Makeup System supplies filtered,l demineralized water to the Condensate Storage System for makeup and to other systems throughout the plant that require high quality, non-safety-related, makeup water. This system, therefore, surves no safe shutdown or accident mitigation function, and has no safety design bases. The Domineralized Water Makeup System Demineralizer trains are located in the Station Services Building. A description of the Demineralized Water Makeup System is presented in 9.2.3. 1.2.12 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Radioactive sources and waste management systems are described in Chapter 11. Design considerations to minimize exposure to radioactivity are summarized in Chapter 12. A description of the Radwaste Building which houses the Solid and Liquid Waste Management Systems is provided in Section 1.2.16.4. Amendment Q 1.2-29 June 30, 1993

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I I INSERT C: (Refer to page 1.2 29) l a Rose portions of the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems (PSWS) that are within the Reactor Building, Nuclear 4 Annex, Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, and Service Building are within the scope of the Cernfied Design. Those ponions of the PSWS that are not within the Reactor Buildag. Nuclear Annex, Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, and Service Building are not within the scope of the Certified Design. Out of scope portions of the system 7 l are licensee supphed and are site specific. t

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CESSAR E%inema l l 1.2.13 PHYSICAL PLANT SECURITY AND PROTECTION FROM SABOTAGE ; The System 80+ Standard Design features which protect against The owner-sabotage are listed in Appendix A to Chapter 13. specific plan will provide details on implementation of certain ' sabotage protection requirements. , i 1.2.14 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS 1.2.14.1 Condenser Circulatina water system The Condenser Circulating Water System provides cooling water for ! the turbine condensers and rejects heat to the normal heat sink. ) See Section 10.4.5 for a description of this system. i 1.2.14.2 Station Service water System ' i The Station Service Water System (SSWS) is an open system that takes suction from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) and provides l . cooling water 44ew to remove heat released from plant systems, structures and components. The SSWS then- returns the heated water to the UHS. The SSWS cools the com onent Cooling Water : System (CCWS) which in turn essenti cools safety-related- and non-essential reactor auxiliary loads. , A description of the Station Service Water System is presented in l Section 9.2.1. 1.2.14.3 Component Cooline water Gvstem The Component Cooling Water System is a closed loop cooling water , system that, in conjunction with the SSWS and the UHS, removes I heat generated from the plant's essential and non-essential Heat transferred by these components connected to the CCWS. components to the CCWS is rejected to the SSWS via the component .! cooling water heat exchangers. t A description of the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure is provided in Section 1.2.16.8. A description of the Component Cooling Water System is provided l in Section 9.2.2. 1.2.14.4 Turbine Buildina Coolina water system ; The Turbine Building Cooling Watcr System (TBCWS) provides cooling for the non-safety-related components in the various turbine plant auxiliary systems. Cooling is offected through heat exchangers with heat rejected to the Turbine Buildirr Service Water System .(TBSWS). This closed cooling water systen ' is used in lieu of direct cooling by the TBSWC because the Amendment Q 1.2-30 June 30, 1993

q pESSAR nsincim. j 1 i quality of the water being circulated in the TBSWS could result in a greater tendency for equipment fouling and corrosion. : A description of the Turbine Building Cooling Water- System ' is l provided in Section 9.2.8. 1.2.14.5 Chilled Water System g l The Chilled Water System / (CWS) -ah+ desi ed to provide 'and

distribute a sufficient quantity of chil ed water, through a ) group of dedicated piping systems, to air handling units (AHUs) , in specific plant areas. The CWS divided into two subsystems, an Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) that serves I i primarily safety-related HVAC cooling loads, and a Normal Chilled l Water System (NCWS) that serves non-safety-related HVAC cooling j loads. ; A description of these systems is provided in Section 9.2.9. l 1 1.2.14.6 Turbine Buildina Service Water System The Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS) removes heat from the TBCWS and rejects the heat to the cooling towers. . The TBSWS uses pumps to circulate water from the. plant cooling towers to remove heat from the TBCWS. Condenser circulating water from the cooling towers, is pumped through the TBCWS heat exchangers and is discharged back into the condenser Circulating-Water System at a point between the main condenser cooling water outlet and the cooling tower inlet. A description of the Turbine Building Service Water System is l provided in Section 9.2.10. 1.2.15 HEAT SINKS The ultimate heat sink described in Section 9.2.5 consists of a single passive independent cooling water pond. However, it is recognized that site-specific conditions may require the use of two ponds to meet Regulatory Guide 1.27. The design brackets alternative ultimate heat sinks which may be specified for a particular site if environmental restrictions limit the use of a cooling pond or if an alternative water supply is more reliable. Acceptable alternate ultimate heat sinks include an ocean, aj large lake, a large river, a lake and a cooling pond, a river and a cooling pond, or a cooling tower and cooling pond. The normal heat sink is not within the scope of the System 80+" Standard Design, but a conceptual design (cooling towers) is provided in Section 10.4.5. The normal heat sink receives the heat load from the Condenser Circulating Water System and the Turbine Building Service Water System. Amendment Q 1.2-31 June 30, 1993

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U CESSARnainem A. Components Requiring Class 1E Power

1. Station Service Water pumps: 1A, IB, 2A, and 2B.

2. Station Service Water Strainers: 1A, 1B, 2A, and 28.

B. Valves Requiring Class 1E Power

1. SSW strainer backwash valves: SW-100, SW-101, SW-102, SW-103, SW-104, SW-105, SW-106, SW-107, SW-108, SW-109, SW-110, SW-111, SW-200, SW-201 SW-202, SW-203, SW-204, SW-205, SW-206, Sw-207, SW-208, SW-209, SW-210 and SW-211.

2. Component cooling .ater heat exchanger isolation valves: SW-120, SW-121, SW-122, SW-123, SW-220, SW-221, SW-222, and SW-223.

- 9.2.1.2.2 System Operation and Controls The SSWS has two 100% capacity divisions, each with 100% redundancy. Each division supplies cooling to its corresponding CCWS division through the CCW heat exchanger. Each division has a 100% heat dissipation capacity to obtain safe cold shutdown. The SSWS provides cooling to essential and non-essential components and equipment indirectly through the CCW .. heat exchangers. Cooling water for the SSWS is supplied from the UHS as described in Section 9.2.5. The return flow from the CCW heat exchangers serviced by the SSWS is returned to the UHS for heat rejection. Upon low station service water pump discharge pressure, the idle station service water pump in the respective division will start , automatically. l The following sections describe the various modes of operation. 1 9.2.1.2.2.1 Unit Startup

                          &c                                     -

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  - -Fer- unit startup, 4we- station service water pumps and -two component cooling water heat exchangersg -onc per divicienx are required. Station cervice unter is supplied tc the -eomponent--

cool-ing--water heat exchangera thc.t arc in cervice and receiving heatdoads-from the CCWS. l l l picaNj urig o- 1 Amendmant I 9.2-0 December 21, 1990

I CESSAR nainemon I TABLE 9.2.1-3 (Sheet I of 2) ACTIVE VALVES, STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTD1 ASME Valve Safety Valve Section III Actuator Number function Type Code Class Type SW-100 Operate Plug 3 Electric-Motor SW-101 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-102 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor y SW-103 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-104 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-105 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor _ SW-106 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-107 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-108 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-109 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-110 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-lll Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor Operate Butterfl 3 Ele ric Motors

       -121    Operate         Butte ly               3            ectric Moto   I SW-122   Oper e           Bu erfly               3          Electric M or  <
                                                                                 )

SW-123 0 rate utterfly 3 Electri Motor i SW-1302 Operate Swing Check 3 None SW-1303 Operate Swing Check 3 None P SW-200 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor l7 Amendment J April 30, 1992

CESSAR n!Wnemo,,

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                                                                                               'l
                                                                                               'f TABLE 9.2.1-3 (Cont'd)                                       j (Sheet 2 of 2)

ACTIVE VALVES, STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

                                                                                               -l ASME Valve       Safety              Valve          Section III        Actuator              l Number     function            Type            Code Class           Type                ;

SW-201 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-202 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-203 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor i SW-204 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor - l } SW-205 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor l SW-206 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor i

   -     SW-207      Operate            Plug                 3          Electric Motor     .

1 l SW-208 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor I SW-209 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor l SW-210 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor i SW-211 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor E 'ectric Motor ('$W-22 SW- 1

Op ate But'/ terfly 3 Electric Moto i 5 -222 peratt utterfly 3 Electric H or q ; SW-223 Operate Butterfly 3 Electri Motor f l SW-2302 Operate Swing Check 3 None f SW-2303 Operate Swing Check 3 None lJ l t Amendment J ! April 30, 1992

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9.2.2.2 System Description The CCWS consists of two separate, independent, redundant, closed ; loop, safety related divisions. Either division of the CCWS is capable of supporting 100% of the cooling functions required for a safe reactor shutdown. One component cooling water pump and heat exchanger (matched with i operating SSWS division) is required to operate during post-LOCA. Cooling water to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger (s) and the non-essential header (s) is isolated on a SIAS. If these headers fail to isolate, the idle component cooling water pump in ! the respective division will automatically start on a low pump l differential pressure signal. This assures that there le .o flow degradation to the essential components. . Heat is removed from the CCWS by the flow of -tation service water through the tube side of the componer cooling water heat exchangers. The CCWS operates at a higher pressure than the SSWS thus preventing the leakage of station service water into the CCWS in the event of a CCW heat exchanger tube leak. Each division of the CCWS includes two heat exchangers, a surge ! tank, two component cooling water pumps, a chemical addition tank, a component cooling water radiation monitor, two sump , pumps, a component cooling water heat exchanger structure sump :

      -  pump, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation.          No cross connections between the two divisions exist.                            l The CCWS provides cooling water to the essential components and           '

non-essential component listed in Section 9.2.2.2.2. Essential components are supplied component cooling water by means of Safety Class 3 cooling loops. Non-essential components are supplied component cooling water by means of non-nuclear safety class cooling loops with the exception of the charging pump miniflow heat exchangersy the charging pump motor coolers, and the diesel generator engine starting air aftercoolers which are supplied component cooling water by means of Safety Class 3 cooling loops. Containment isolation valves and penetration in accordance with Safety Class 2 piping are designed reqairements. The non-essential headers and the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers are isolated automatically on an SIAS. The non-essential headers and the RCP headers isolate on a low-low surge tank level signal. , Makeup water to the CCWS is normally supplied by the Demineralized Water Makeup System, described in Section 9.2.3. If the Demineralized Water Makeup System is unavailable, such as during an accident, a backup makeup water line of Seismic ! (~ Category I construction is provided. This essential safety-related makeup water source is from the Station Service Water : Amendment R 9.2-23 July 30, 1993 ,

CESSAR nEnce 9.2.2.2.1.7 Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitors A component cooling water radiation monitor, one per division, is provided at the outlet of the .omponent cooling water pumps to detect any CCWS inleakage that contains radioactivity. 9.2.2.2.1.8 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance Bump Punps Two component cooling water heat exchanger maintenance sump pumps, one per division, are provided. Each division has a separate sump. The component cooling water heat exchanger maintenance sump collects the component cooling water drained from the CCW heat exchangers. The sump pumps return the sump water to the shell side of their respective heat exchangers. Alternate paths can direct the sump water to the component cooling water sump located in the Nuclear Annex or to the Liquid Waste Management System. 9.2.2.2.1.9 Active Valves

 } The Velvec required--t c maintain their functional cepsLilliy dur-ing 0 cafc plant chutdcun Orc lirted in Tabic ^ 2.2 5 and.

described in the fcilowing rections. A. Non-Essential Supply Header Isolation Valves (. Valves CC-102, CC-122, CC-202, and CC-222 are pneumatically controlled valves that fail closed on loss of instrument air. These valves close to terminate component cooling water flow to the non-essential equipment in the event of an accident. These valves automatically close on an SIAS or low-low component cooling water surge tank level signal.l Tha valve closure times are adequate to prevent complete loss of surge tank volume due to a break in the non-safety piping. These valves can be manually opened and closed from the control room. B. Non-Esser.tial Return Header Isolation Valves Valves CC-103, CC-123, CC-203, and CC-223 isolate the non-essential return headers fromThesethe essential return headers valves are pneumatically in the event of an accident. controlled and fail closed on loss of instrument air. They automatically close on an SIAS or low-low component cooling water surge tank level signal. The valve closure times are adequate to prevent complete loss of surge tank volume due to a break in the non-safety piping. These valves can be manually opened and closed from the control room. 045A} 'Jabet qce r M ko ccrn cm. k

                                                        'p ic,    uncYion trT f Mi5      Jean % Qc oc +o nhpe- ee. ms9ences d e

(*bE *2N" (Ve i^ N 1220 Amendment R July 30, 1993 l 9.2-30

CESSAR !alinemo,, These valves are pneumatically operated and are required to fail closed. These valves automatically close on an SIAS. I. Component Cooling Water Pump Discharge Check Valves Valves CC-1302, CC-1303, CC-2302, and CC-2303 are required to function during a safe plant shutdown. In the event that one of the pumps ceases to produce flow and. pressure head, these valves prevent flow reversal through the non-operating pump. J. Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Vacuum Breakers The CCWS surge tank vacuum breakers are required to function during a safe plant shutdown. K. Containment Isolation Valves l The followf.ng containment isolation valves close upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS): Supply to the letdown heat exchanger: CC-240, CC-241 Return from the letdown heat exchanger: CC-242, CC-24

i The following containment isolation valves are automatically closed on a low-low CCW surge tank level: _ CC-130, CC-131 - Supply to reactor coolant pumps 1A and 1B CC-230, CC-231 - Supply to reactor coolant pumps 2A and 2B CC-136, CC-137 - Return from reactor coolant pumps 1A and 1B CC-236, CC-237 - Return from reactor coolant pumps 2A and 2B These valves can be manually opened or closed from the control room. L. Containment Penetration Piping Bypass Check Valves Valves CC-1507, CC-1548, CC-2F07, CC-2548, CC-2622 and CC-2628 provide overpressure protection for containment penetration piping to prevent damage when the piping is isolated, i Amendment R 9.2-32 July 30, 1993

CESSARn=ncma 1 F. Letdown heat exchanger (1 total, serviced by division 2). G. Charging pump mini-flow heat exchanger (2 total, 1 per division). H. Sample heat exchangers (14 total, serviced by division 2 - 8 Primary Sample Heat Exchangers and 6 Steam Generator Primary Sample Heat Exchangers). I. Gas stripper (1 total, serviced by division 2). J. Boric acid concentrator (1 total, serviced by division 2) . K. Normal chilled water condensers (4 total, 2 per division) l L. Charging pump motor coolers (2 total, 1 per division) . M. Instrument air compressor (4 total, 2 per division) . N. Diesel generator engine starting air affercoolers (4 total, 2 per division). 9.2.2.2.2.1 Unit Startup Typically during a unit startup, cooling water is supplied to all

       + equipment except for the containment spray heat exchangers and
   .      possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger.            This requires the use of both divisions of the component cooling water system?-t+e- CCW heat exchangers, and four CCW pumps.        Certain components will not be in service at all times therefore allowing for a reduction in CCWS load.

9.2.2.2.2.2 Normal Operation Generally during normal operation, one CCW pump and one CCW heat exchanger (matched with operating pump) is required in each division. As the cooling requirements increase, additional system equipment may be needed. Cooling flow is supplied to all components except the containment spray heat exchangers, the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. The CCWS temperature is maintained at no greater than 105'F. 9.2.2.2.2.3 Unit Shutdown Both divisions of the CCWS (4 heat exchangers and 4 pumps) are required to accomplish a normal reactor shutdown, that is to cool the reactor coolant from normal operating temperature to 140*F within 24 hours of reactor shutdown. A normal reactor shutdown entails cooling the reactor coolant to 350*F through the steam generators and then cooling to 140*F by utilizing both divisions of the SCS, CCWS, and SSWS. Cooling water flow to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers is manually aligned from the control room Amendment R 9.2-35 July 30, 1993

CESSARHuhuie. R

                                                                                   .    )

radiation is detected at a preset level above background by one \ of the monitors. Component cooling water radiation activity is j indicated in the control room. 1 l . 9.2.2.5.6 Current Component cooling water pump motor current is indicated in the control room. l 1 9.2.2.5.7 Interlocks The component cooling water sump pumps are automatically started i when the sump level rises to a predetermined height. At this- , level in sump 1, valve CC-153 opens; and at this level in sump 2, valve CC-253 opens. The sump pumps pump component cooling sump l water to their respective surge tank and are automatically i stopped at a preset surge tank level or a sump low level. Valves -! CC-153 and CC-253 close when their respective sump pumps are l automatically stopped. ! Demineralized makeup water is automatically supplied to the- ! component cooling water surge tanks'when the tank level drops to ! a predetermined level below the point where the low level alarm ! sounds. The inlet valves to the component cooling water surge ! tanks, CC-152 and CC-252 (Division 1 and Division 2, i i respectively), are interlocked to the auto supply of ; demineralized makeup water. The surge tank inlet valves close - when the respective surge tank reaches a predetermined level.

Manual override is provided for these valves. j f Upon loss of component cooling water to the letdown heat ! exchanger, letdown flow is terminated. l l 9.2.2.5.8 Time Delays l I 1 The start of the second component cooling water pump is delayed ; by 10 seconds when a low differential pressure signal is actuated on the operating pump. ; 9.2.2.5.9 Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) ; on - The following valves close on#SIAS: f

l

. 1. Non-essential supply header        isolation valves:           CC-102,        !

CC-122, CC-202, and CC-222. l I

2. Non-essential return header isolation valves: CC-103, j l

CC-123, CC-203, and CC-223. ;

;                                                                                       i

3. CCW heat exchangers 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B bypass valves: !

i' CC-100, CC-101,.CC-200, and CC-201. j t Amendment J i 9.2-50 April 30, 1992 t

CESSAR E5Aincur., 9.2.9 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM The Chilled Water System (CWS) is designed to provide and l distribute a sufficient quantity of chilled water, through a group of dedicated pipingThe systems, to air handling units (AHUs) CWS is divided into two subsystems, in specific plant areas. that serves safety-an Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) related HVAC cooling loads, and a Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) that serves non-safety-related HVAC cooling loads. 9.2.9.1 Design Basis The ECWS system is designed as follows: A. The Essential chilled Water System is a Safety Class 3l system. The components of the system are designed in accordance with applicable ASME Codes and IEEE Standards. B. Safety-related portions of this system are protected from Safety-tornadoes, missiles, pipe whip, and flooding. related components and non-safety related components of the essential chilled water system are identified separately in Figure 9.2.9-1. C. The condensers of the chillers -unitc- are cooled by the all plant Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) during operating modes, including design basis events. D. Two 100 percent capacity equipment trains are provided to meet the single failure criteria. The electrical equipment in each train is powered from E. independent Class 1E electrical buses. F. This system is designed to withstand the effects of a safe l Butdown earthquake. G. The Essentia) Chilled Water System is designed to minimize l the consequences of potential water hammer. The NCWS system is designed as follows: However, A. The NCWS system is not a safety-related system. the contain=ent cooling systems serviced by this system are designed to operate during loss of offsite power. The power supply to the system pumps and chillers is transferred 1 automatically to Alternate AC power when normal electric i power is not available. I Amendment Q 9.2-73

CESSAR ninnc=,. t B. The evaporator tubes and the condenser tubes of the chiller are designed to include an allowance for 2 tube fouling of

0. 002 hr-f t

F/ Btu, respectively.

0.0005 hr-f tz *F/ Btu and C. Components of the system are designed in accordance with the Seismic Category I and Class 1E requirements. D. Each chiller along with its pump, expansion tank, and control valves is physically separated from the other > chiller. E. Each chiller is provided with a reservoir of refrigerant and a level gauge or sight glass. F. A cross connection is protided between the two essential chilled water pumps to allow the pump that serves the essential chilled water heat exchanger to serve as a backup for the pump that serves the essential chiller. 9.2.9.2.2 NCWS h gy) Each 100% capacity division consists of"two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, an air separator, a chemical addition The tank, system piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. operates during normal plant operation, hot standby, refueling or maintenance shutdown periods. The NCWS equipment design requirements are as follows: A. The condenser of the chillers are cooled by the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) during all normal operating conditions. B. The system is designed to provide an adequate quantity of chilled water at a maximum temperature of 42*F and a maximum 10*F AT across the chiller. The essential chilled water heat exchanger is sized to provide a terminal temperature difference of 3*F which allows the heat exchanger to deliver 45*F water. C. The chiller / pump combinations are cross connected such that either of the two pumps can serve either of the two chillers in a given room. D. The two divisions of the NCWS are interconnected through normally closed and manually operated valves such that each division of the NCWS can supply chilled water to containment cooling systems. (i.e., CEDM Coolers and Containment This interconnection assures that proper Coolers). Amendment Q 9.2-75 June 30, 1993

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__ _ .- ..- . . - . . .-~ . . . - . . I4 DSER Combined L~icense (COL) Action Item 9.2.2-2 : The COL applicant should reference the ventilation barrier guidance of RG 5.65 when describing the component cooling water system heat i exchanger. l i Proposed Combined License (COL) Action Item 9.2.2-2 Resolution i i

Ventilation barriers for the CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System shall be in accordance with the guidance i provided in Regulatory Guide 5.65. This response is reflected as a : revision to CESSAR-DC Section 9.2.2.1.4. With the - revision of . CESSAR-DC Section 9.2.2.1.4, this item should be deleted as a COL Action Item. 4 f i j 2 l l l 1 l l 6 i ; 1 COL Action Item 9.2.2-2 1 Rev. 0 l l 10/20/93 ) m

6 CESSAR !!!'r?Picuio c ' e m e u m-2 ;

              ,.      Venhb b n barriers Soc 4b. ccW Hea+ E d an e ,- shudure Vedicdion Sydem 56(1 be, in ace.oMemce wi                        k       '

guicience, proviclecl In kulcdory Guide, 5 45.

6. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System t shall be controlled from the main control room. '

Instrumentation and controls shall be provided in s accordance with ANSI /ANS 59.2. i ! The CCW heat exchangers are also out of scope items. A reference J , horizontal shell and tube heat exchanger is discussed in the l following sections, however a plate type heat exchanger may be . substituted. Sites selecting the plate type heat exchanger shall ! provide strainer protection against debris or arrangements which allow backflushing on the service water side. 9.2.2.2 System Description I The CCWS consists of two separate, independent, redundant, closed f loop, safety related divisions. Either division of the CCWS is ; capable of supporting 100% of the cooling functions required for t a safe reactor shutdown. ! one component cooling water pump and heat exchanger (matched with operating SSWS division) is required to operate during post-LOCA. I Cooling to the spent fuel pool heat exchanger (s) and the , non-essential loop is isolated on a SIAS. If these headers fail ! to isolate, the idle component cooling water pump in the ; respective loop will automatically start on a low pump l differential pressure signal. This assures that there is no flow y i degradation to the essential components. ! i The CCWS operates at a higher pressure than the SSWS. This l prevents the leakage of station service water into the CCWS in the event of a CCW heat exchanger tube leak. Each division of the CCWS includes two heat exchangers, a surge ' tank, two component cooling water pumps, a chemical addition ! tank, a component cooling water radiation monitor, two sump ! pumps, a component cooling water heat exchanger structure sump pump, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. No cross { connections between the two divisions exist. ~ Each division consists of an essential and non-essential cooling i loop. The essential loops are composed of ANSI Safety Class 3 piping and components. The non-essential loops are composed of I non-nuclear safety piping and components, with the exception of . the containment isolation valves and penetration piping which are ANSI Safety Class 2. ; Amendment J 9.2-23 April 30, 1992

 .     . - . ~                             ..                   .      .           .

1

l DSER Open Item E.2.4-2 1 l The. applicant must provide additional informacion on the ') containment-isolation valves listed in CESSAR Table 6.2.4-1. 1 I l Proposed Ocen Item 6.2.4-2 Resolution i 1 The following items are requested for addition to CESSAR-DC Table ~ ! 6.2.4-1:

1) Valve closure time i

2) Identification- of essential and nonessential systems as described in RG 1.141

3) Applicable GDC number (such as 55, 56, 57) i

4) Pipe line size i

5) Distance of isolation valve from containment i

6) ESF function. i 3

i i The proposed response to each of these. items is as follows:

1) Valve closure time will require a level of design detail I

beyond the scope of Design Certification. Valve closure time ! is suf ficiently described in CESSAR-DC Section 6.2.4.1.2.H, ! which currently states: " Maximum allowable actuation times are [ imposed on containment isolation valves consistent with their .; required safety function and ANSI /ANS '56.2. Valve closure l time will be established based on. system considerations, but ! all valves should be stroked to their designated position as i soon as practicable upon actuation. An upper limit of 60 i seconds shall be utilized in stroke time determination." '!,

2) CESSAR-DC Table 6.2.4-1 includes this requirement. Refer to ;

CESSAR-DC Table 6.2.4-1. )

3) Applicable GDC number is provided in parentheses under the !

column " Valve Arrangement" in Table 6.2.(.-l and in parentheses under the " Valve Arrangement No." column in Figure 6.2.4-1. i Refer to CESSAR-DC Table 6.2.4-1 and Figure 6.2.4-1. l l t

4) Final pipe line size will require a level of design detail l beyond the scope of Design Certification. ;

Open Item 6.2.4-2 1 Rev.-0 l

10/20/93 i i

i i

1

5) GDC 54 specifically requires that containment isolation valves 'i be located as close as practical to the containment. Final !

design will be required to provide this information, which is } considered beyond the scope of Design Certification. GDC 54 ; is committed to for the entire Containment Isolation System in -[ CESSAR-DC Section 6.2.4.1.1. j i

6) Valve ESF function may be determined by the actuation signal !

(ESF or non-ESF) received by the valve. The actuation signals ; are listed for each applicable valve entry in CESSAR-DC Table -! 6.2.4-1. Refer to CESSAR-DC Table 6.2.4-1. l i f i t 4 t i i i l I i I l 1 l l l Open Item 6.2.4-2 2 Rev. 0 ' 10/20/93 I

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19.4.13 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM 19.4.13.1 ATWS Description / pm - m ' 7' Anticipated Jransient WithoutScram,( ATWS)c _ _ _ is not an initiating

[ event, but/rather 17a faulted ree onse to an e ent requiring ' control e dment assptblies (CEAs) i sertion for rea tivity cont ol. (' However, plant because 6f the signifi -nt impact th an ATWS h .s on fesponses(/

            >                                it is includ           as a separat
         /          class'.f The initiating event M defined                 to b         initiatin       event     i tranhient re,q'uiring reactor rip for react'vity                the contro occurre ce of a /
       /           v' h failur,d of a trip to o                                                       coupled \

[ Ae CEAs ,t'o insert or the failure ur due to eith 9 mechanical ailure of

Systemp (NPS) and the Alt of bot){ f the Reactor Protection /

         ,         a trip signal.           Becau       nate    Protectiof   System     (APS)   to  generate      T)

[i faildre to trip was no ATWS is incJuded as a separate event, ; transient initiating eventaddressed

                  -'                                      classes. in the event trees for the other f

_~ ~- f - GX" The ATWS is potentially a severe event in which the Reactor Coolant System goes through a pressure excursion due to a mismatch between the core capability. removal heat generation rate and Although the Reactor 10CFR50.62 0" Coolant System energy solution for the ATWS scenario defines a prescriptive in terms of prevention ( mitigation, 0460, Volume the success criteria for the event is given in NULEG-and 3"" and can be summarized as follows: A. For the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressures calculated, the integrity of the reactor functionability of valves coolant pressure boundary and the needed for long term cooling shall be demonstrated. B. The calculated radiological consequences shall be within the guidelines set forth in 10 CFR100 *. C. The reactor fuel rods shall be shown to withstand the internal and external coolable transient pressure so as to maintain a long term geometry. D. The peak fuel enthalpy of the hottest fuel pellet shall not result in significant fuel melting. E. The probability of departure from nucleate boiling for the hot rod shall be shown to be low. ! I F. The maximum cIadding temperature and the extent of the Zr-H 2O ! reaction shall significant be determined cladding degradation.and shown not to result in i For the limiting ATWS scenario, the criteria relating to the i pressure boundary integrity and functionability of the valves required for long term cooling are of primary interest. The ; concern is that if the peak pressure in the RCS exceeds Level C i 19.4-147 Amendment M ' March 15, 1993 '

AI f d' INSERT A: - l An Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) is no an initiating event, but rather a faulted response to an event (e.g ., loss of main feedwater) where the control element assemblies (CEAs) r fail to insert into the core when required. USNRC regulation NUREG-0460 (" Anticipated Transients Without Scram for Light Water Reactors") states that an ATWS can be accommodated by reducing the probability of occurrence to the i extent that it is unnecessary to consider it as a design basis event or, alternately, by providing features to mitigate the consequences of an , ATWS. The USNRC's requirements for the reduction of risk from ATWS are : given in 10 CFR 50.62 (Reference 59). l The System 80+ Alternate Protection System (APS) described in Section 7.7.1.1.11 provides a diverse method of initiating a reactor trip and actuating the auxiliary feedwater system that addresses the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. The APS design includes an Alternate Reactor Trip . Signal (ARTS) and Alternate Feedwater Actuation Signal (APAS) that are separate and diverse from the Plant Protection System. The ARTS provides a mechanism to significantly decrease the probability of an ATWS by initiating a diverse reactor trip signal on high pressurizer pressure. The AFAS provides added accurance that an ATWS would be mitigated if it were to occur by generating a diverse signal to actuate the auxiliary feedwater system on low steam generator level. wah/ Since an ATWS has a significant impact on plant response it is included as a separate initiating event class. The initiating event is defined as i the occurrence of a transient requiring a reactor trip for reactivity control coupled with a failure of the CEAs to insert into the core. The failure to insert can be due to either mechanical failure or a failure

    ?                                                                             ,

of both the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Alternate Protection System (APS)to generate a trip signal. Because ATWS is included as a separate event, the failure to trip was not addressed in the event trees for the other transient initiating event classes. ! INSERT B: The minimum System 80+ safety valve capacity has been increased (see Table 5.4.13-1) by approximately 14 %. This additional capacity more than compensates for the power level increase from 3817 MWt to 3931 MWt and maintains the peak primary p e~su'e below the preticuc value of 3150 4 psia. 5 d ated , INSERT C: I These peak primary pressure values would also be preserved at the higher power level with the increased primary safety valve capacity. 1 INSERT D: ; No credit was taken for any actions by the Alternate Protection System (APS). t

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 .                                                               16 DSER Open Item 8.3.1.20-1 7
                                                                                ]

The CESSAR lacks discussion of cable penetrations through I security barriers. l I

                                         .                                      I Proposed Open Item 8.3.1.20-1 Resolution                                 ;

Tray penetrations through security barriers and all other security ! considerations shall be designed as stated in Appendix 13.A, , Section 2.2, Item g, Industrial Security. . l F :

      %Acmud added do           CE SS %-DC  Ch(E S i

f l P I ! l I i l J f Open Item 8.3.1.20-1 1 Rev. 1 8/26/33

oPte : rwa f. 3. t .20- 1 Kev. 1 C E S S A R E!s M e m ,. a, 2 , a , s.s.a s.) 4 Cable trays and conduit are located a safe distance from the high temperature piping to preclude the necessity of reducing the cable ampacity as a result of increased ambient temperature. Power cables shall be routed away from control and instrumentation cables to prevent faulty operation which is caused by the electromagnetic interference by the power cables. Multi-level cable tray systems provide, as a minimum, one-foot, four-inch vertical spaces between the bottom of the upper tray and the top of the lower tray, and two feet of horizontal space between adjacent trays. Any reduction of these distances will require a barrier. Drip loops are provided in conduit runs at the inlet to electrical devices where conduit enters from the top and when required to maintain device qualification as an alternative to device-sealing type hardware. Watertight sealing of all electrical conduit-to-junction boxes and conduit-to-terminal box connection points for safety-related i equipment located in areas of the reactor building and areas that are potentially subject to high temperature steam or water impingement shall be provided. Box drain holes and equipment interfaces shall be in conformance with test setup established during the equipment qualification testing and with the venC:.'s ( recommendations. Light weight conduit, fittings, and cable tray materials are utilized in lieu of rigid steel. Installation of intermediate metal conduit or aluminum rigid conduit is utilized where , technically acceptable (e.g., outside containment). In cable tunnels, in lieu of ceiling supports, large seismic cable tray support structures are mounted on floors. Precast concrete trenches, ductbanks, and manholes are used whenever technically acceptable. Planning of cable pulls is included in the design of equipment locations, cable tray routings, and conduit routings to maximize group pulling of cables. Color-coded jacketing for multi-paired conductors is specified where possible. j Exothermic cadwelded connections are used in the installation of the ground grid system in lieu of wedge pressure cable connectors where possible.

             %y penc k hens 1krtuf w l WnD und all c%r sec uc M y c ca'.dubbn$    ,

a r e_ des p d .g. 31w4al m Agyc4 15, A y M e l l , 'lic,, F, InJ Mr61 Scevc'd 7* Amendment L 8.3-36 February 28, 1993

                                                                  'I i

t DSER Open Item 9.2.1-1 The selection of more than.one protected area and whether cables ; and piping connecting separate areas will be inaccessible outside l separate protected areas is an open item. j i Proposed Open Item 9.2.1-1 Resolution - The Station Service Water System _will be designated as a vital system. The SSWS Pump Structure and all SSWS piping and cabling shall be_ located within the protected area that is common to the j main plant. l This response is reflected as a revision to CESSAR-DC Section ; 9.2.1.1.4. l i i i i i 1 l i i I l l

                                                                  -i Open Item 9.2.1-1                 1                         Rev 0 8/19/93 4

l l

CESSAR ESincum osa cm iwe u.i-i H. The SSWS is designuted as a vital system. The SSWS pump structure and all SSWS piping and cabling shall be located within the vitcl protection area yhat is common to the main plant. + p f ,c4.A The COL applicant will take appropriate measures to prevent organic fouling and inorganic buildup. 9.2.1.2 System Description The SSWS consists of two separate, redundant, open Joop, safety-related divisions. Each division cools one of twe divisions of the CCWS, which in turn cools 100% of the safety-related loads. The SSWS operates at a lower pressure than the CCWS to prevent contamination of the CCWS with raw water. Each division of the SSWS consists of two pumps, two strainers, two sump pumps, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. The station service water pumps circulate cooling water to the component cooling water heat exchanger and back to the ultimate heat sink. Provisions are made to ensure a continuous flow of cooling water under normal and accident conditions. 9.2.1.2.1 Components Description Table 9.2.1-2 lists component design parameters. Each component is also described in the following se.ctions. Table 9. 2.1-3 lists the active valves for the SSWS, These valves are described in Section 9.2.1.2.1.8. 9.2.1.2.1.1 SSWS Pumps Four identical station service water pumps are provided, two pumps per division. Each pump provides 100% of the required flow for post-LOCA conditions. During normal operation only one pump per division is required to be operating. The second pump in the respective division will automatically start on a low pump discharge pressure signal. This is indicative of a failure of the operating pump. The pumps are of the vertical centrifugal type and are installed in the station service water pump structure. They are installed i such that they meet the minimum required NPSH at the simultaneous ' occurrence of the UHS pond draw-down, maximum pond temperature, maximum flow through the screens and piping to the pits, and assuming the safety grade screens are 50% clogged. The station service water pump motor coolers receive cooling water from their respective station service water pump discharge at all times j while the pump is in operation. The pump motors and all other electrical equipment in the pump structure are located above the maximum flood elevation. Amendment Q 9.2-4 June 30, 1993

DSER Open Item 9.2.5-1 1 The applicant does not address the location of the area perimeter } relative to the ultimate heat sink. i Proposed Open Item 9.2.5-1 Resolution In the URD, EPRI specifies that water boundaries that form part of a protected area boundary shall be avoided, if at all possible. As , stated in CESSAR-DC Section 9.2.5, the selection of the Ultimate i Heat Sink is dependent upon site-specific parameters. Regulatory Guide 1.27, Ultimate Heat' Sink For Nuclear Power Plants, details ' examples of heat sinks that have been found to be' acceptable. Plant layout is dependent upon the selection of an Ultimate Heat Sink. Plant layout shall try to avoid having portions of the protected area perimeter abutting or crossing a body of water. This response is reflected as a revision to CESSAR-DC Section 9.2.5.1.3. i i i t i 4 a b l Open Item 9.2.5-1 1 Rev. 0 8/19/93

CESSAR Einh- - ccm s.as-i E. In order to ensure the normal cooldown (two division cooldown) performance requirements given in Section I 5.4.7.1.2.F.1 the Ultimate Heat Sink temperature at the SSWS I inlet must remain at or below 95'F throughout the cooldown. I One percent exceedance meteorologic conditions can be utilized in showing acceptability, since this is a performance requirement and not a safety requirement. F. For sites with severe winters, where ice formation of the Ultimate Heat Sink could occur, an analysis shall be I ' provided showing the function of the Ultimate Heat Sink is not impaired during winter months. Where required, the i intake structures shall be provided with a means of deicing, such as warm water recirculation, to prevent flow blockage ' of the SSW pump inlets. G. The site water chemistry for the Ultimate Heat Sink shall be analyzed to determine if a water treatment system is required to minimize corrosion and fouling of the SSWS. 9.2.5.2 System Description , The Ultimate Heat Sink described here consists of single passive independent cooling water pond. However, it is recognized that site-specific conditions may require the use of two ponds to meet Regulatory Guide 1.27. The design brackets alternative Ultimate Heat Sinks which may be specified for a particular site if environmental restrictions limit the use of a cooling pond or if an alternative water supply is more reliable. Acceptable E alternate ultimate heat sinks are an ocean, a large lake, a large river, a lake and a cooling pond, a river and a cooling pond, or a cooling tower and cooling pond. The cooling water pond is provided with redundant makeup water pump to maintain level. Water chemistry is maintained by a , site-specific water treatment system (i.e., chemical injection). Salinity buildup in a pond is limited by blowdown. i The Ultimate Heat Sink will operate for the required nominal 30 days following a postulated LOCA without requiring any makeup water to the source, and without requiring any blowdown from the pond for salinity control. 9.2.5.3 Safety Evaluation The Ultimate Heat Sink meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.27. The cooling water pond is Seismic Category I and of sufficient volume to provide the required noninal 30-day cooling ccpacity without makeup and under worst case meteorological conditions. H. Wahr bounclore. 4 d (ccm part cf %e_ pecifec3ed occa bounckry skall be ovoid J , 8 cd oO possibk. Amendment I 9.2-63 December 21, 1990

i

DSER Open Item 9.5.3-2 l 1 The applicant must address the. inconsistency between CESSAR Section 9.5.3.1 and the proposed changes for Section 9.5.3.2.2 and the reason for deviating from the EPRI URD. l i Proposed open Item 9.5.3-2 Resolution ! l The security lighting system is considered part of the permanent i non-safety systems and is fed from the Alternate AC-(AAC) Source [ (Combustion Turbine), which is located in a secure vital area for , protection. As stated in Section 8.3.1.1.5.1 of CESSAR-DC Amendment J, the AAC is designed to start automatically within two minutes i from the onset of a LOOP event. Selected portions of the security . lighting system essential to maintaining adequate plant protection i

shall be fed from an uninterruptible power supply.

The response to this open item is reflected to revisions to CESSAR-- DC Sections 9.5.3.1 and 9.5.3.2.2. . i. i i h i { r i i t t f i Open Item 9.5.3-2 1 Rev. O i 8/19/93 ;

i CESSARnnLm, ,gw: m m.a l 7 l t Provisions are made to allow the removal and reinstallation of lighting equipment in order to support room, space, or area ! modifications. l t j The design of the plant lighting systems is in accordance with I 1 applicable industry standards for illumination fixtures, cables, i grounding, penetrations, conduit, controls. The normal station lighting system is used to provide normc1 ; illumination under all plant operation, maintenance and test ! i conditions. Table 9.5.3-1 summarizes typical illuminance ranges i for normal lighting. l The security lighting system provides the illumination required , l to monitor isolation zones and all outdoor areas within the plant ! protected perimeterg under ncrsal conditicn: :: vell :: up:n lece ! cf all AC pcucr. The security lighting system complies with the j intent of NUREG CR-1327. 1 l The emergency lighting system is used to provide acceptable l j levels of illumination throughout the station and particularly in j areas where emergency operations are performed, such as control , rooms, battery rooms, containment, etc., upon loss of the normal ! 4 lighting system. ,

9.5.3.2 System Description l 9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting System E The Normal Lighting System provides general illumination [

throughout the plant in accordance with illumination levels ! recommended by the Illuminating Engineering Society. ! i Incandescent lighting is used in the Containment Building while ! incandescent, fluorescent and high intensity discharge lighting i is provided in the remainder of the plant and on the plant site. ! Power for the Normal Lighting System is provided independently l from the Normal Auxiliary Power System via dry-type transformers ; and lighting panelboards. ; i Indoor lighting ic designed for continuous operation. Switching I is by individual plant circuit breakers except in office areas. j outdoor lighting is controlled by photocells. , l The normal lighting system is considered part of the plant ; permanent non-safety systems. As such, the normal lighting system is energized as long as power from an offsite power source i or a standby non-safety source is available. l i b ( C e 6 s h ~T~Me) ' Normal system operation is not affected by the failure or unavailability of a single lighting transformer. I Amendment E 9.5-47 December 30, 1988

CESSAR !!!nn"e m. ,iw u.,y m 3.5.g.a 3 HA N %=<ed ciced4s Q fren separde. electrbl diddong, ! (. . The circuits to the individual lighting fixtures are staggered as > much as possible+to ensure some lighting is retained in a room in E the event of a circuit failure. , 9.5.3.2.2 Security Lighting System '

      -h g The security lighting system is considered part of the permanent
       +(c non-safety systems and is fed from the Alternate AC (AAC) Source j4 v

e (Combustion Turbine), which is located in a secure vital area for J gg protection.'d a

      'Aa W       The Owner-operator shall provide a security lighting system that g

Cg will meet CCTV illumination. requirements within camera viewing p areas to permit prompt assessment of intrusion alarms. > e ; i 3 The security lighting system is designed to provide a minimum illumination of 0.2 foot-candles when measured horizontally at E

.!?

ground level. i i

       -C' c7       9.5.3.2.3         Emergency Lighting 33 O h.2- Emergency lighting is located in vital areas throughout the plant               f k as identified in Emergency Procedures and Hazards Analysis for
       ,      u safe-shutdown of the plant following an accident or hazard.

y Included in the vital areas will be the control Room, Technical J i ,aj. Support center, Operations Support Center, the Remote Shutdown l e Panel Room, the stairway which provides access from the Control , , $ h Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel room, Sample Room, Hydrogen j{Recombiner Rooms routes for personnel passage and egress and g other areas where operator access is required post-accident or ,

              " hazard.                                                                        .

5 9 ' N emergency lighting system achieves illumination units of at , f-f 5' Theleast 10 foot-candles in those areas of the plant where emergency f operations are performed which could require reading of printed i or written material or the reading of scales and legends. These areas are typically control rooms or local control stations. In other areas of the plant, the emergency lighting achieves a ! minimum illumination level of 2 foot-candles. I E The emergency lighting is accomplished by two systems: 1 A. Conventional AC fixtures fed from class IE AC power sources, and i B. DC self contained, battery-operated lighting units. , Both systems are qualified Class 1E. For all emergency conditions both systems are considered operational except in emergencies involving some loss of Class 1E power, adequate Amendment J I 9.5-48 April 30, 1992

L DSER Open Item 9.5.2-3 ; The applicant has not addressed-the design provisions that may be ! necessary to allow wireless intraplant communications. Proposed Open Item 9.5.2-3 Resolution l As stated in the response to Open Item 9.5.2-2, a portable, ; wireless communication system will be provided for the System 80+" I design to conform with the EPRI ALWR URD. The Intraplant Portable, : Wireless Communication System will provide communications # capability among control room operators, equipment operators, and maintenance technicians for routine and emergency operations. In i addition to portable and wireless transmitter / receivers, this '; system will be supported by appropriate base stations, antennae, i amplifiers and/or repeaters to ensure that clear intelligible r communication can be achieved from any locations at which j operations and maintenance personnel may need to communicate. Appropriate antennae and the associated containment penetrations i will be provided to ensure adequate communication from areas inside l containment or within the control room. A sufficient number of communication channels will be provided to accommodate the expected message load based upon network analysis including task i requirements in critical or emergency situations plus allowing , margin for expansion and contingency. Specialized system portable and wireless transmitter / receivers will be provided for use in such , applications as respirator and/or underwater diving work. Emergency power will be provided via a standby diesel generator which will automatically start and accept load should normal power be lost. t Where portable, wireless communications units are ineffective or l not permitted due to structures or proximity to sensitive instrumentation, alternate means of communication outlined in Section 9.5.2 will be provided. Information concerning the site operators industrial security is within the site operator's scope and will be presented by the site l operator in a separate document. Interface requirements addressing site security and security communications are listed in Section 13.6 of CESSAR-DC Amendment J. , This response is reflected as revisions to CESSAR-DC Section 9.5.2. t Open Item 9.5.2-3 1 Rev. 0 8/19/93 - t 1

CESSAREininem c e ne y u . x m .s.a.3 l Te 'RdoW, Wirt.less Cwnunidien W is -b pri<mey i d?Secded eneans of ceniedian for- % plonY. E odclition /

           +o % %rMle. We.lec. Communicah'on Syskrn,                                     t.

D. Assurance of the capability to achieve safe shutdown in the event of fires. E. Minimization of radioactive exposure and the spread of contamination as the result of fires. F. Provision of manual backup to automatic fire suppression systems. A description of this system is presented in Section 9.5.1. 1.2.11.10 Communication Systems The communication systems are designed to provide effective communications between all areas of the plant and plant site addition, the including all vital areas of the plant. In communication systems are designed to provide an effective means to communicate to plant personnel and offsite utility and regulatory officials during normal conditions and abnormal / accident conditions such as fire, accident, and plant testing.

      +                                                                                E
   -> %e Private Automatic Business Exchange are        (PABX)    telephone system designed to provide and the Public Address (PA) system diverse means of communications               to all critical areas abnormal / accident of the conditicas.

l plant during normal and Additionally, sound-powered telephone systems are provided for auxiliary between selected critical areas of the plant Finally, shutdown and other required functional purposes. multiple offsite communications lines, both direct and through the PABX are provided for effective communications during normal conditions. All of these diverse and abnormal / accident communications systems are independent of each other to assure effective communications assuming a single failure. A description of these systems is presented in Section 9.5.2. 1.2.11.11 Lighting systems The lighting systems are designed to provide adequate and effective illumination throughout the plant and plant site including all vital areas of the plant. The normal station lighting system is used to provide nor=al illumination under all plant operation, maintenance and test conditions. J The security lighting system provides the illumination required E to monitor isolation zones and all outdoor areas within the plant

 )    protected perimeter, under normal conditions as well as upon loss of all AC power.

Amendment J 1.2-30 April 30, 1992 l

 -      CESSAREEL mn                           o m n v y a r e 2 e ss.a-a
              ~if,e ?db, NiG.h Cor'eunicdon                       m   is Oe. yitncaq c N ecded means ok cornrnunicdon          br- be. pbak. In allib fo                     O=.

w W e. Wire 65s co,nnonicedron sysb, 9.5.2 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS + , 9.5.2.1 Design Bases i The communications systems are designed to provide effective l communications between all areas of the plant and plant site In addition, the ! including all vital areas of the plant. ; communications systems are designed to provide an effective means ' plant personnel and offsite utility and to communicate to and abnormal / i regulatory officials during normal conditions accicent conditions such as fire, accident, and plant testing. !

ighe Private Automatic Business Exchange system are (PABX) telephone designed system to provide and the Public Address (PA) : diverse means of communications and to all/ accident abnormal critical areas of the conditions. l I plant during normal are provided ! Additionally, sound-powered telephone systems for auxiliary , between selected critical areas of the plant purposes. Finally, l shutdown and other required functional multiple offsite communications lines, both direct and through l l the PABX are provided for ef fective communicationsthese during normal diverse conditions. All of 7 and abnormal / accident l communications systems are independent of each other to assure l effective communications assuming a single failure. E ! 9.5.2.2 System Description j 9.5.2.2. Intraplant (PABX) Telephone System l The PABX telephone system provides independent communications ' d throughout the plant and plant site. To assure its functional i b operability, the PABX telephone switch is provided withNormal redundantpower g critical electronics, controls, and power supplies.is Provided fro l

2 rectifier / battery combination. For multi-unit plants, normal t power is provided from each of the units. Emergency power is i Q y provided via a standby diesel generator which will automatically start and accept load should normal power be lost. i The PABX telephone system is also connected to the commercial telephone system and the utility private and network which allows abnormal / accident offsite com=unications for normal i conditions.

1 Intraplant Public Address (PA) System l 9.5.2.2.[ 3 : i The intraplant PA syst.em provides two independent site. channels of These communications throughout the plant and plant

   )       indcpendent channels are page and party-line.

Amendment E 9.5-43 Dec==har 30, 1988 1 I

OPEN ITEM / q 5.M No cl5.Q-3 CESSAR-DC Attachment (Refer to page 9.5-43) DJSERT A: . 9.5.2.2.1 Intraplant Portable, Wireless Communication System The Intraplant Portable, Wireless Communication System provides communications capability among control room operators, equipment operators, and maintenance techniciansportable for routine and and emergency wireless operations. In addition to transmitter / receivers, this system is supported by appropriate base stations, antennae, amplifiers and/or repesters to ensure that cicar intelligible co:remication can be achieved from any locations operations and maintenance personnel may need to at which r communicate. Appropriate antennae and the associated containment penetrations are provided to ensure adequate communication' from areas inside conta%ent or within the control room. A sufficient number of communication channels are provided to accommodate the expected message load based upon network analysis including task requirements in critical or emergency situations plus allowing margin for expansion and contingency. Specialized system portable and wireless transmitter / receivers are provided for use in such applications as respirator and/or underwater diving work. Emergency power is provided via a standby diesel generator which will automatically start and accept load should normal power be lost. Where portable, wireless communications units are ineffective or to sensitive permitted due to structures or proximity not instrumentation, alternate means of communication outlined in Section 9.5.2 are provided. I l

      -   CESSAR !!=n"c--                                  o% em = qs.s 1

The page channel provides communications over loud speakers with integra1 amplifiers. Page channel speaker-amplifiers are ' ring-wired to preclude loss of system function in the event of a 4' single cable failure. Paging is accomplished via the use of [ either dedicated PA party-line handsets as described below, or [ via the use of the PABX telephone handsets. The connection t between the PABX system and the PA system is through an isolation ] device to preserve the independence of the two systems. l The party-line channel of the PA system consists of the dedicated PA handsets as noted above. Each party-line handset is provided i i 1 with the capability of selecting either the paging channel or the party-line channel. l Intraplant Sound-Powered Telephone Systems 9.5. 2.2.[ 4 ' Intraplant sound powered telephone systems, ind, pendent of the normal and l PABX and PA systems, are provided for l These sound-powered systems abnormal / accident conditions. include, but are not limited to, the following: ! A. Maintenance Circuit consists of phone jacks located , together to throughout the plant which can be patched i establish communications between areas as necessary. Refueling Circuit consists of phone jacks located in areas B. required for refueling operations. [ E I consists of phone jacks connecting i C. Emergency Circuit [ specific areas of the plant for the purpose of communication > during auxiliary shutdown operations. 4 i As a minimum, the emergency sound-powered telephone system is +

powered from diesel-backed power sources. ;

I offsite cor a. melons

9. 5. 2. 2./ 5 !

Normal offsite communicat ma is provided by public telephone # l

network which is connected to the )

l~ lines and the utility pri l J PABX telephone switch. 4 the PABX offsite communications, independent of l Emergency telephone switch, is provided by public telephone lines and' the utility privata network lines connected directly to specific telephones located in critical areas of the plant and support facilities. Emergency telephones are color-coded to distinguish emergency the intraplant telephone system. The them from 3 telephones include, but are not limited to, the following: i Amendment E 9.5-44 December 30, 1988 i

CESSAR E!ninc.m. em ,w ,. .:-2 = 3.3.2 3 l i 1 A. Emergency Notification System (ENS) l-Provides a communications link with the Nuclear Regulatory , Commiss: ion (NRC). . B. Health Physics Network (HPN) ; Provides a communications link with the NRC's health physics ; personnel. C. Ringdown Phone System , Provides communications link with local and state agencies. . In addition, a security radio system is provided in accordance E with 10 CFR 73. 55 ( f) and a crisis management radio system is provided in accordance with the intent of NUREG-0654. i 9.5.2.2.[(, System operation All of the communice.tions systems are designed to operate during i normal and abnormal / accident conditions. In areas of high noise levels, noise-cancelling devices,c.d/cr sound isolation boothsp ! are utilized. andfor' +%\ a\edig , 9.5.2.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements i All communichtions systems are inspected, checked, and tested for operability after installation to assure proper operation and ' coverace. + Normal and continued use of the systems provides the basis for inspections on the systems. e Ms are prkormed do sle.r-i M Adehe. r'ER5ure.s kW., heen 4cahn ~k~o Mtbk in 6e.nce. bekh h commurdcdions Sj1dbt% ord e.ledredc. equipmed-I 3 t l Amendment E 9.5-45 December 30, 1988 1

D5ER ohl ITm 95A.1-1 : DSER Open Item 9.5.4.1-1 The applicant should designate the diesel generator system as a vital area. Proposed Open Item 9.5.4.1-1 Resolution The Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System, the Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System, the Diesel Generator' Engine Starting Air System, the Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System, the Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake And Exhaust System, and the Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System will be designated as vital systems and components of the systems will be located within the plant's protected area. This response is reflected as revisions to CESSAR-DC Sections 9.5.4, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7, 9.5.8 and 9.5.9. l l i Open Item 9.5.4.1-1 1 Rev. 0 8/19/93 1

i

         .CESSARnnL m,,                                        meaunm95AM              i i

i 9.5.4 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE FUEL GIL SYSTEK 9.5.4.1 Design Bases ; i 9.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases

The Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System is designed to ; provide for storage of a seven-day supply of fuel oil for each ; diesel generator engine and to supply the fuel oil to the engine, i as necessary, to drive the emergency generator. The system is ; designed to meet the single failure criterion, and to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without the loss of operability. l All components and piping are located in a Seismic Category I structure (diesel generator building, diesel fuel storage structure) except for a portion of the piping from the fuel oil storage tanks to the day tank, which is scismically q2alifiedfully and protected. All essential components and piping are protected from floods, tornado missile damage, internal missiles, , pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with f non-seismic systems in the vicinity. The Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System -i-e-located within the plant's protected area. 9.5.4.1.2 Diesel Fuel Storage Structure There are two Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Structures, one on each '

      #   side of the Nuclear Annex.            Each   consists    of  a reinforced 4

concrete vault containing two bays, each bay containing a one-half capacity, steel, diesel fuel ,11 tank, a tank vent, sump, sump pump and necessary piping. An equipment room located within the structure contains a recirculation pump, piping and - simplex filter, fill connection, ventilation fan and intake and h exhaust dampers. A. The Diesel Fuel Storage Structure is designed to meet _, Seismic Category I requirements. p A B. The Diesel Fuel Storage Structure is designed to withstand i g((i the effects of the following events: , ag 1. Natural phenomena, including SSE, floods, tornados, and 21.+- hurricanes. E" h 2. Externally and internally generated missiles, j c 3. Fire and sabotage. L C. If located within 50 feet of any building containing . safety-related equipment, the Diesel Fuel Storage Structures i shall have a minimum fire resistance rating of 3 hours. ! 1 Amendment N 9.5-51 April 1, 1993 _ _ a

CESSAR !!n%=. osa MA FrM 9.M.H I I 9.5.5 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.5.5.1 Design Bases The Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System is designed to E maintain the temperature of the diesel generator engine within an optimum operating range during standby and during full-load operation in order to assure its fast starting and The load-accepting system is also capability and to reduce thermal stresses. designed to supply cooling water to the engine lube oillube cooler, oil the combustion air aftercoolers, and the governor cooler. . i All components and piping are located within a Seismic Category I I and all essential structure (diesel generator building) from floods, tornado missile

>  componenti. are fully protected i   damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. The              L Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System is designated as a vital system and components of the system are located within the plant's cital prej     tic. area.
                                  - yd                                              ,

9.5.5.2 System Description I The Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System is shown in Figure 9.5.5-1. 9.5.5.2.1 General 1 A separate and complete closed-loop cooling water system is provided for each diesel generator engine, receiving makeup water from the Demineralized Water System and uses as it's sink the Component Cooling Water System. A surge tank, the jacket water standpipe located in the diesel generator building, provides E 3 positive suction pressure for the circulation pump, pump is which andelectric for the keep warm pump. The keep warm motor-driven, operates continuously during engine standby to assure that the system is completely filled with water. When the diesel starts, the circulation pump, which is engine mounted and engine-driven, would operate to circulate cooling water through the closed loop system. From the circulation pump, the cooling water passes through an y Amot type or equivalent three-way thermostatic control valve which regulates the flow of water through the shell side of the ' jacket water cooler by diverting varying amounts through a bypass the cooling water flows ; line. From the jacket water cooler, E through the tube side of either the lube oil cooler or the l combustion air aftercoolers and then through the engine itself, j i ' returning to the standpipe. A small fraction of the flow from the discharge side of the combustion air af tercooler is diverted to the engine governor lube oil cooler. Amendment L 9.5-59 February 28, 1993 4

m ou a s5gu : CESS AR 'c"ur'*ir"icari:n

9.5.6 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE STARTING AIR SYSTEM

-                                                                               t 9.5.6.1          Design Bases E

The Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System is designed to , provide fast start capability for the diesel generator engine by ! using compressed air to rotate the engine until combustion begins l and it accelerates under its own power. All components and piping are located within aand building) Seismic all Category essentialI y ; (diesel generator fully protected from floods, tornado missile structure ; components are ' damege, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. The L l Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System is designated as a vital system and components of the system are located within the plant's vital pregcctic: area. I j 9.5.6.2 System Description I ! The Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System is shown in l Figure 9.5.6-1 (Sheets 1 and 2). 9.5.6.2.1 General ! Each diesel generator engine is provided with two independent consisting of a compressor and [ starting air systems, each aftercooler, a filter / dryer unit, air receivers, injection lines , I and valves, and devices to crank the engine. Ambient air from within the diesel room is compressed, cooled, filtered, dried, filtered again and then stored until needed in The starting air storage capacity

for each , receiver tanks. redundant diesel engine is sufficient for a minimum of five E successful engine starts without the use of the air compressor. Starting air is supplied to the diesel generator engine by four starting air solenoid valves, with each valve supplying starting The-air to one end of the two cylinder banks on the engine. right bank starting air starting air enters the left and manifolds which are interconnectedstartingwithin the engine to allow the air solenoid valves capability of one or all the From there, starting air. is , operating to start the engine. left and right bank starting air directed to both the on distributors which admit the air to the individual cylinders, to rotate the their respective banks, in firing order air sequence manifold also supplies engine. The combined starting starting air to the governor oil pressure boost cylinder which acts as an accelerator pump to ensure the diesel attains rated speed after receiving an automatic diesel start signal. Amendment L 9.5-63 February 28, 1993

CESSAREanncun Dste oeen 12ts s.s.4.i-1 i 9.5.7 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE LUBE OIL SYSTEK , 9.5.7.1 Design Bases The Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System is designed to :' deliver clean lubricating oil to the diesel generator engine, its g bearings and crankshaft, and other moving parts. By means of i heaters, the lube oil system is designed to deliver warmed oil to the engine during standby to assure its fast-starting and load-accepting capability. The system also provides a means by which used oil may be drained from the engine and its components, and replaced with clean oil. All essential components and' piping are located within a Seismic lK Category I structure (diesel generator building) and all-essential components are fully protected from floods, tornado I missile damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. The Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System is L designated as a vital system and components of the system are located within the plant's vital prctection area. l

                                              +       prdede)                      l I

9.5.7.2 System Description l The Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System is shown in Figure { 9.5.7-1 (Sheets 1 through 4). lK 9.5.7.2.1 General I Each diesel generator unit utilizes the " dry sump" lube oil , system, in which the supply of 3ubricating oil for the engine is stored in a separate sump tank, independent of, and located at a lK lower elevation than the engine crankcase. As oil accumulates in 3 i the crankcase, it drains by gravity into the sump tank. l7 ! Additions of clean oil are made to the sump tank from tank located outside the diesel generator building, and aused storage oil lK , is removed from the sump tank via a transfer pump to a used oil [I f storage tank. Each diesel generator has a separate and complete clean lube oil and used lube oil transfer system. g The engine-driven lube oil pump takes suction from the sump tank through a built-in suction pipe with foot valve and delivers the i oil in sequence from the pump discharge first to the oil pressure l regulating valves which limit the maximum pressure on the pump discharge, and then in series through the lube oil cooler, the I full-flow lube oil filter and finally to the full-flow lube oil strainer. From the strainer, the oil enters the engine internal circulation system. During engine standby, the motor-driven prelube oil pump operates continuously to ensure complete filling of the lube oil system. j Amend. ment L 9.5-67 February 28, 1993

CESSAR aninco, osa mo m q.u.s j 9.5.8 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEN , i 9.5.8.1 Design Bases ; E The Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System is designed to supply clean air for combustion to the diesel generator engine and to dispose of the engines exhaust. The I system is housed in a building designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena and credible missiles. , All components and piping are located within a Seismic category I structure (diesel generator building) and all essential y , components are fully protected from floods, tornado missile damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. The Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System is L designated as a vital system and components of the system are located within the plant's -v-ital protectio . area. g T ycEadN 9.5.8.2 System Description I The Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System is shown in Figure 9.5.8-1. 9.5.8.2.1 General i Each diesel generator is provided with a two pipe combustion air intake system. Combustion air is drawn in through in line air filters prior to entering the turbocharger. . Each diesel generator is provided with a two pipe exhaust system. E The waterjacketed exhaust manifold discharges directly into the l engine-mounted turbochargers. The exhaust piping then joins to pass through a single exhaust silencer and exits the building. Outside air intakes are located at one end of the building and exhausts (both Diesel and Ventilation System) at the opposite end of the structure. The intake and exhaust structures are separate for each diesel building and are similar in design. Each intake and exhaust structure is served by a floor drain. In addition a lK sump, formed by the curb at the bottom of the intake and exhaust accumulation of structures, provides capacity for preventing ' snow, ice, or freezing rain from interfering with emergency diesel generator system operation. E 9.5.8.2.2 Component Description The turbocharger, driven by the hot exhaust gases on one side, ! compresses the intake air on the other side and forces it through the engine aftercooler. Amendment L 9.5-73 February 28, 1993

CEOSAR niin'ic,m,, tw m, nm 3 5.4,g l l i M e Se} b b k i h irv3 b iug 6 sb ig

                                                                 - sh h    M de. sign ded c6   a   WYcd Spb            con                          ,

at'e. locded wihm -h. pbds prow arp_a. ' 9.5.9 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING SUMP PUMP SYSTEM E 9.5.9.1 Design Bases The Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System is designed to remove leakage and equipment drainage from the diesel generator , building and to protect the diesel generator units from internal i flooding caused by the maximum credible pipe rupture in the , Diesel Generator Building. 7 [ All components and piping are located within a seismic Category I structure (diesel generator building) and all essential components are fully protec.ted from floods, tornado missile ; damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement , and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. p t 9.5.9.2 System Description lE The Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System flow diagram is J shown in Figure 9.5.9-1. Two sump pumps are provided in each diesel generator building. E , The pumps are located in the pit below the lube oil sump tank. l The sump pumps start automatically on high sump water level and transfer the water to the equipment and floor drain system. I ;

The diesel generator building sumps and sump pumps are designed !

for a constant inflow rate of 75 gpm with a maximum pump cycle time of three starts per hour (one pump operating with 37.5 gpm inflow). is 150 gpm.The maximum pumping flowrate with both pumps operating f J , 9.5.9.3 Safety Evaluation t The Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System is an ANSI Class 3 E 7 piping system and the pumps and system components are designed in ' accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 3. i 4 Instrumentation associated with sump pump operation is Safety , class 3 and Seismic Category I. The sump pumps are then powered y from the diesel generators in the event of loss of offsite power. , 9.5.9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements System components and piping are tested to pressures designated ! by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are- I performed prior to initial operation; thereafter, equipment not in continuous use is subject to periodic testing and visual inspection. , i' Amend:nent J 9.5-77 April 30, 1992 I

DSER Open Item 10.4.9-1 The applicant should designate the emergency feedwater system a vital system. Proposed Open Item 10.4.9-1 Resolution The EFW System will be designated as a vital system and components of the system will be located within the plant's vital protection area. This response is reflected as a revision to CESSAR-DC 'Section 10.4.9.1.2. Open Item 10.4.9-1 1 Rev. 0 08/19/93

CESSAR uninem:n assp opga a w.cc,. ; T. A four-channel control scheme is provided to preclude J inadvertent actuation in the event of a single failure. A C 4 3_ four-channel design is provided for the initiation logic, ? actuation logic, and power. T 3 U. The Equipment and Floor Drainage System (Section 9.3.3) : [ provides for collection and detection of EFW system leakage which may originate in each EFW pump room, in each Emergency da Feedwater Storage Tank room or enclosure, and areas E T0 containing EFW system piping where a' moderate- or

      >D             high-energy pipe rupture is postulated, as defined in g              Section 3.8.      The control room is alerted on detection of         l excessive leakage,                                                    i V. The     emergency'    feedwater system     piping and     associated   *
   ]
   -+- %

supports and restraints shall be designed so that a single adverse event, such as a ruptured emergency feedwater line hpp.o or a closed isolation valve can occur without: , tr]

}}

74-

1. Initiating a Loss-of-Coolant incident.

t

  ~ ~g ._t_

Q '0 2. Causing failure of the other steam generator's safety class steam and feedwater lines, Main Steam . Isolation 4] gT Valves (MSIVs), safety valves, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) , Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation 0 Ey> Valves, or Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs). I l o _n + 2 u-M .

3. Reducing the capability of any of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems or the Plant Protection I

d CL. y System. ! - 4. Transmitting excessive loads to the containment pressure boundary.

b. 5. Compromising the function of the plant control room.

l 6 Precluding an orderly cooldown of the RCS. j

10.4.9.2 System Description ; C : 10.4.9.2.1 General Description l The EFW System is shown in Figure 10.4.9-1, Sheets 1 and 2. The EFW System is configured into two separate mechanical { divisions. Each division is aligned to feed its respective steam ! generator. Each division consists of one Emergency Feedwater J l Storage Tank (EFWST), one 100% capacity motor-driven pump l subdivision, one 100% capacity steam-driven pump subdivision, 1 Amendment J l 10.4-39 April 30, 1992 i

 -   _ . _ ,         _ ~ . .     ,_    _          _.                      . _ . _ _.    .   ... . .

i e i DSER Open Item 13.6-2 The applicant must submit a standard listing of vital equipment and j vital areas, including a sound technical basis for any seismic l Category I systems not in a vital area. 1 i Open Item 13.6-2 Resolution A standard list of vital equipment and vital areas has been' l developed, and is included in CESSAR-DC as Appendix 13B in ~ Amendment Q. Attachment A provides revisions and additions to ! Appendix 13B, to be added in the next amendment of CESSAR-DC. i i In addition, all systems and components listed in CESSAR-DC Table l 3.2-1 as Seismic Category I have been reviewed.and a technical -I justification is given in Attachment B for any Seismic Category I ; component which is not considered to be vital. l t ( i i f

                                                                                                     .1 i

j i

l l i f i i Open Item 13.6-2 1 Rev. 0 08/20/93

i I Attachment A l t CESSAR-DC Change Package to Appendix 13B, Amendment Q 22 Pages

t i Open Item 13.6-2 Rev. 0 OR/20/93 i

                                                        'i 1

r CESSAR EniinCAT12N p5ER O rea Mm W b ~1

 .,                            LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

APPENDIX 13B Table subiect 13B-15 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Component Cooling Water System 13B-16 System 80+" Vital Equipment List - Station Service Water System 13B-17 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System 13B-18 System 80+" Vital Equipment List - Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System 13B-19 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System 13B-20 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System 13B-21 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System 13B-22 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System 13B-23 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Essential Chilled Water System 13B-24 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Control Complex Ventilation System 13B-25 System 80+m Vital Equipment List - Diesel Building Ventilation System 13B-26 System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Reactor Building Subsphere Floor Drain System

   ][ns e r f I      >>

13B-et System 80+" Vital Equipment List - Building Area 29 Designations 13 B System 80+* Vital Equipment List - Abbreviations 30 l Amendment Q iii June 30, 1993 l l

OSe n open T&e m G . C. - 2_ Insert 1 - List of Tables Appendix 13B, Sheet lii 13B-27 System 80+ Vital Equipment List - Steam Generator Blowdown System 13B-28 System 80+ Vital Equipment List - Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation System i t e

CESSAR c"JLri ,, open "L4 r IL G .t D6E(E l l l 1.O INTRODUCTION 2.0 ' This appendix provides a standard listing of vital equipment within the System 80+5 Standard Design scope. Vital equipment is , listed by system in Tables 13B-1 through 13B-29. Building area' , designations and abbreviations used in the vital equipment lists t are provided~in Tables 13B-2t and 13B-29. 29 30 :

                                                                                                     -i f

i

I r t i i

                                                                                                    ~f
                                                                                                    't s..                                                                                                     ,

Amendment Q j 13B-1 June 30, 1993 i

Qg u( M&h Enc \o+d rante 338 24 LQ c [ 3 $ -7 Y ISheet 1 of 6) SYSTEM 80* VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUlP T NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOT CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. I EL. POWER SOURCE Division 1 CR Air Inlet L er 3 i NA Division eparation Division 2 CR Air inlet Louve 3 1 Divi ial Separation Division 1 CR Air intake Damper A 3 i NA visional Separation' Division 1 CR Air intake Damper B 3 i NA Divisional Separation' Division 2 CR Air intake Damper A 3 i N Divisional Separation' Division 2 CR Air intake Damper B N 3 i A Divisional Separtaion' Division 1 CR A/C Unit 3 i CB /1/130 + 6 NA Division 2 CR AjC Unit I CB / I /130 + g/ NA Divison 1 CR A/C Unit Motor IE \ - Division 2 CR A'C Unit Motor IE \ - Division 1 Filtration Unit Bypass Damper A 3 /1/130+6 NA Divisional Separation' Division 1 Filtration Unit Bypass Damper B 3 i CB / I /130 + 6 NA Divisional Separation' Division 2 Filtration Unit Bypass Damper A 3 ' / I / 130 + 6 NA Divisional Separation' Division 2 Filtration Unit Bypass Damper B 3 i CB / 130 + 6 NA Divisional Separation 8 , Division 1 Filtration Unit inlet Damper 3 i CB / l /1 6 NA Divisional Separation Division 2 Filtration Unit inlet Damper 3 I CB / I /130 + NA Divisional Separation Division 1 Filtration Unit Motor Operated 3 i CB/I/130+6 NA Divisional Separation DiscMrge Damper Division 2 Filtration Unit Motor Operated / 3 I CB / I /130 + 6 N Divisional Separation Discharge Damper / Division 1 CR Return Air Motor D ated 3 i CB/I/130+6 NA isional Separation Damper Division 2 CR Fleturn Air . of Operated 3 i CB / I /130 + 6 NA Divisiona eparation Damper Division 1 Me quip. Rm. AIC Unit 3 I CB / I /130 + 6 NA Divisional Separatio Division 2 ch. Equip. Rm. A/C Unit 3 i CB / I /130 + 6 NA Divisonal Separation

Amendment Q June 30, 1993

OS EE P- Orea r + c ~. n . c. - z. TABLE 13B-24 (Sheet 2 of 6) SYSTEM 80* VITAL EDUIPMENT llST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBE IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' N CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL. POWER SOURCE Division 1 Mech. Equip. Rm. A/C U totor iE - Divisio Separation Division 2 Mech. Equip. Hm. AIC. Unit kor iE - Di ional Separation Division 1 CR Filtrabon Unit N 3 i CB / l /130 + 6 NA ' Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Filtration Unit \3 I CB / I /130 + 6 NA Divisional Separation Division 1 CR Filtration Unit Motor

                                                                                                                                                          -           Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Filtration Unit Motor                                          iE                                                                        -           Divisional Separation
 , Division 1 Control Room A/C Unit Motor                                        3    \         l           CB / I /130 +                                NA           Divisional Separation Operated Discharge Damper Division 2 Control Room A/C Unit Motor                                       3                          CB / I     30+6                              NA           Divisional Separation Operated Discharge Damper
                                                                                                          /

Division 1 Radiation Monitor A 3 i B/I/130+6 NA Divisional Separation Division 1 Radiation Monitor B 3 C I/130+6 NA Divisional Separation Divisior' 2 Radiation Monitor A 3 i CB / 30+6 NA Divisional Separation Division 2 Radiation Monitor B 3 , I CB / I /1 +6 NA Divisional Separation Division 1 Smoke Detector A 3 i CB /1/130 +h NA Divisional Separation Division 2 Smoke Detector A I CB / I /130 + 6 \ NA Divisional Separation Smoke Fan isolation Damper A 3 I CB / I /130 + 6 A - Smoke Fan Isolation Damper B j 3 I CB/I/130+6 N - Fire Damper at Division Wall 3 I CB / I /130 + 6 NA \ < Smoke Damper at Division Wall 3 i CB / I /130 + 6 NA \- Division 1 TSC isolatio per A 3 I CB / I /130 + 6 NA Division 1 TSC isola Damper B 3 i CB / I /130 + 6 NA - Division 1 CB - r inlet Louver 3 i CB / I /130 + 6 NA Divisional Separati Division Air inlet Louver 3 I CB / I /130 + 6 NA Divisional Separation Amendment Q June 30, 199.

bS E V O Pen The - n.G~2 TABLE 138-24 ISheet 3 of G) SYSTEM 80* VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM .. EQUIPMENT NUMB IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOT CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL. POWER SOURCE Division 1 CB Motor Operated Air Int 3 i NA Division oeparation Damper A Division 2 CB Motor Operated Air intake 3 i NA isional Separation Damper B \ j Division 1 CB Motor Operated Isolation I N Divisional Separation' Damper A Divisional Separation' Division 1 CB Motor Operated Isolation 3 I NA Damper B Divisional Separation

Division 2 CB Motor Operated Isolation 3 1 NA Damper A Divisional Separation' Division 2 CB Motor Operated isolation 3 i NA Damper B Division 1 Essential Electncal Room A/C Unit 3 i CB 70+0 NA Divisional Separation' A 3 CB/I/ +0 NA Divisional Separation' Division 1 Essential Electrical Room A/C Unit B 3 i CB / I / 70 + NA Divisional Separation 8 Division 2 Essential Electncal Room AIC Unit 3 i CB / I / 70 + 0 NA Divisional Separation 8 A

Division 2 Essential Electrical Room A/C Unit B Division 1 Essential Electrical Room AIC Unit iE I CB / I / 70 +0 - Divisional Separation' A Motor Division 1 Essential Electrical Room A/C Unit iE I CB/I/70+0 - ivisional Separation' Motor Divisi~. 2 Essential Electrical Room Unit iE I CB / I / 70 + 0 - Divisio I Separation' A Motv Division 2 Essential Electrica com A/C Unit B 1E I CB / I / 70 +0 - Divisional Sep tion' Motor Amendment Q June 30, 1993

TABLE 13B.24 06OS Ofa^ Mc~ 1 3. G.- Z. (Sheet 4 of 61 SYSTEM 80" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM , EQUIPMENT NUMBER ENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL 8 NOT CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL. POWER SOURCE Division 1 Essential Electrical Room A Unit 3 i CB/1/70+0 NA Divisional paration' A-Discharge Damper Division 1 Essential Electrical Room A/C Unit 3 I CB / I / 70 + 0 NA Di ,ional Separation 8 B-Discharge Damper Division 2 Essential Electrical Room A/C Unit 3 i CB/I/70+0 NA Divisional Separation 8 A-Discharge Damper Division 2 Essential Electrical P.oom A/C Unit 3 I CB / I / 70 +0 Divisional Separation' B-Discharge Damper Remote Shutdown Panet A/C Unit 3 \l CB /1/ 70 +0 j NA - Remote Shutdown Panel A/C Unit Motor iE \ CB /1/ 7 NA - Remote Shutdown Panet A/C Unit Inlet 3 1 \ CB /70+0 NA - Damper , Remote Shutdown Panet A/C Unit Outlet 3 i CB / I 0+0 NA - Damper Division 1 Channel A Vital Instrunant & 3 I CB / I / 50 + 0\ NA Divisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit A Division 1 Channel A Vital Instrument & 3 i CB /1/ 50 +0 NA Difisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit B Division 1 Channel A Vital Instrument & IE I CB /1/ 50 +0 - Divisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit A Motor Division 1 Channel A Vitalinstrument & IE I CB /1/ 50 +0 - isional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit B Motor , Division 2 Channel D Vital Instr ent & 3 i CB /1/ 50 +0 NA Divisional aration Eqwpment Room A/C Unit Divisir i 2 Channel B Vi nstrument & 3 I CB / 1 / 50 + 0 NA Divisional Separa Equ pment Room A/ nit B .- Amendment Q June 30, 199. [

L N f#^ Y Y~d ^ 13.( '- 2 TABLE 13B-24 (Sheet 5 of 6) SYSTEM 80" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NU ER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL: TES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL. POWER SOURCE Division 2 Channel B Vital Instrun . t& 1E I CB /1/ 50 +0 - Equipment Room A/C Unit A Motor Division 2 Channel B VitalInstrument & IE I CB /1/ 50 + 0 -

Equipment Room AIC Unit B Motor s / Division 1 Channel C Vital Instrument & Equipment Room A/C Unit A 3 i CB/1/50+0 [ Divisional Separation Division 1 Channel C VitalInstrument & 3 I NA Divisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit B CB /1/ 50[+ 0 Division 1 Channel C VitalInstrument & 1E I CB/1 0+0 - Div;sional Separation Equipment Room AIC Unit A Motor Division 1 Channel C VitalInstrument & 1E I B /1/ 50+0 - Divisional Separation

 -. Equipment Room A/C Unit B Motor                                                                                                       N Division 2 Channel D VitalInstrument &                                                                 3                      1         CB/     50+0                          -

Divisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit A Division 2 Channel D Vital Instrument & Equipment Room A/C Unit B 3 f

                                                                                                               /                  I        CB /1/ 50 +

g Divisional Separation Division 2 Channel D VitalInstrument & IE I CB /1/ 50 +0 - Divisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit A Motor Division 2 Channel D Vital Instrument & f IE I CB /1/ 50+0 - Divisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit B Motor / Division 1 Channel A VitalInstru ei & 3 i CB /1/ 50 +0 NA D nal Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit A charge Damper 3 i CB /1/ 50+0 NA Divisional c ration Division 1 Channel A ' al Instrument & Equipment Room Unit B Discharge Damper

                     /
    /

A1nendment Q June 30, 1993

    . . . , , , ,     -  . . ~ . . . . - . , ,       , . . , . , , . , , , _m_, - ~ , , . - ,        -,     .-   .--+.-e---.-        - ,-     +-  w----  , - - , - ,, --
                                                                                                                                                                                    -          ,  ,----r  . - - - - - . - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

TABLE 13B.24

I3 *b ~ E ISheet 6 of 6)

SYSTEM 80* VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBE IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL 8 OTES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL. POWER SOURCE Division 2 Channel B Vital instrument 3 I CB /1/ 50 + 0 NA Di ional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit A Discharge Damper 3 i CB /1/ 50 +0 NA Divisional Separation Division 2 Channel B VitalInstrument & Equipment Room A/C Unit B Discharge Damper Dieision 1 Channel C Vital Instrument & 3 i CB /1/ 50 +0 NA Divisional Separation Equipment Room A/C Unit A Discharge Damper 3 i CB/1/ +0 NA Divisional Separation Division 1 Channel C VitalInstrument & Equipment Room A/C Unit B Discharge Damper Division 1 CR Duckwork 3 1/ NA Safety-Related Piping located in Vital Division 2 CR Duckwork 3 i Areas

Division 1 Control Building Duckwork Division 2 Control Building Duckwork 3 / I CB/l/ CB /1/ NA NA Safety-Related Piping located in Vital 3/ I Areas U91091

1.

Reference:

o AR-DC, Pgure 9.4-2

2. A, B. C, a refer to the four Class 1E Safety Buses. Channel A. 8, C, and D refer to the four Class 1E annels providing power to components in the Pt rctection System (PPS) or the Engineered Safety Feature Component Control System (ESF-CCS). Di ion 1 and 2 refer to Class 1E DC Vital.

Po r.

3. Two components located in each division.

4. For instrumentation, includes root valve and piping / tubing to instrumentation.

Amendment Q June 30, 195 - . . - - - - - . ~ ~ - .. . . . - . . . . . - . . . - . . - - . . . - . . - . . . - - - . . . .-. -

_ . _ __ .. _ ..- . . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ .__ __ _ . _ __m -. m. D$69 Op,. .ree- >5.c-z TABLE 138 24 (Sheet 1 of 8) SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUlpMENT UST CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUlpMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOTES 1 CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL POWER SOURCE t DNision 1 CR Air Inlet Louver 3 1 CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Air inlet Louver 3 i CD / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Division 1 CR Air intake Tornado Damper 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Air intake Tornado Damper 3 1 CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Division 1 CR Air intake Motor Operated 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Damper A DNision 1 CR Air intake Motor Operated 3 I CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Damper B Division 2 CR Air intake Motor Operated 3 I CB / l / - N/A Divisional Separation' Damper A Division 2 CR Air intake Motor Operated 3 I CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Damper B Division 1 CR A/C Unit 3 I CB / I /13046 N/A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR A/C Unit 3 I CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Division 1 CR A/C Unit Motor 1E I CB / I /130+6 A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR A/C Unit Motor 1E I CB / l /130+6 B Divisional Separation Division 1 CR Fi!!er Unit Bypass Damper A (Air- 3 i CB / i /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation8 / Fails Closed Operated) Division 1 CR Filter Unit Bvpass Damper B (Air- 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation' / Fails Closed Operated) Division 2 CR Fitter Unit Bypass Damper A (Air- 3 I CB / I /13046 N/A Divisional Separation' / Fails Closed Operated) - Division 2 CR Fitter Unit Bypass Damper B (Air- 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation' / Fails Closed Operated) i Division 1 CR Filter Unit inlet Damper 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Filter Unit intet Damper 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ , . ~ , _ . . . . _ - . _ . . _ , _ . . _ . . . , . . . . _ - . . ~ _ ~ , . _ . - . . , . . . . , . . _ .._ _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ .

m . _ . _ _ _ _._ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ - . . _ _ i 2 , 6 - 2.1 D5EO opea T Pe-i TABLE 138-24 (Sheet 2 of 8) SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOTES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL POWER SOURCE i Division 1 CR Filter Unit Discharge Motor 3 i CB /1/130+6 N/A Divisional Separaton , Operated Damper Division 2 CR Filter Unit Discharge Motor 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Operated Damper Division 1 CR Retum Air Motor Operated 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A DNisional Separation ; , Damper Division 2 CR Retum Air Motor Operated 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Damper t Division 1 CR Mech. Equip. Rm. NC Unit 3 I CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Mech. Equip. Rm. NC Unit 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Division 1 CR Mech. Equip. Rm. NC Unit Motor 1E I CB / l /130+6 A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Mech. Equip. Am. NC Unit Motor 1E I CB / I /130+6 B Divisional Separation Division 1 CR Filter Unit 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Filter Unit 3 I CB / I /13046 N/A Divisional Separation Division 1 CR Filter Unit Motor 1E I CB / I /130+6 C Divisional Separation Division 2 CR Filter Un;t Motor 1E I CB / I /130+6 D Divisional Separation Division 1 Control Room NC Unit Discharge 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation Motor Operated Damper ,~ CB / I /130+6 Division 2 Control Room NC Und Discharge 3 i N/A Divisional Separation Motor Operated Damper Division 1 CR Air intake Radiation Monitoring 3 i CB / l / - N/A Divisional Separation' , instrument A Drvision 1 CR Air intake Radiation Monitoring 3 I CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation * ; Instrument B Division 2 CR Air intake Radiation Monitoring 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' instrument A Division 2 CR Air intake Radiation Monitoring 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Instrument B

g$gg c Efsm 13.6~7-TABLE 13844 (Sheet 3 of 8) SYSTEM 80+ VITAL EQUIPMENT UST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOTES 1 CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL POWER SOURCE Division 1 CR Air intake Radiation Monitor A 1E I CB / I / - - DNisional Separation' Division 1 CR Air intake Radiation Monitor B 1E I CB / I / - - Drvisional Separation $ Drvision 2 CR Air intake Radiation Monitor A 1E I CB / I / - - DNisional Separation' Division 2 CP Air intake Radiation Monitor B 1E I CB / I / - - Divisional Separation $ Division 1 Chlorine Gas Detector Instrument A 3 i CB / I / - N/A D! visional Separation' Division 1 Chlorine Gas Detector Instrument B 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Division 2 Chlorino Gas Detector Instrument A 3 i C3 / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Division 2 Chlorine Gas Detector instrument B 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation' Drvision 1 CR Air intake Smoke Detector 3 1 CB / I /130+6 N/A DNisional Separation Drvision 2 CR Air intake Smoke Detector 3 I CB / I /130+6 N/A Divisional Separation CR Smas Fan isolation Damper A (Air 3 I CB /1/130+6 N/A Fails Closed Operated) CR Smoke Fan isolation Damper B (Air 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A Fails Closed Operated) CR Air intake Fire Damper at Division Wall 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A - CR Air intake Fire Smoke Damper at Division 3 i CB / I /130+6 N/A - Wall CR Air intake TSC isolation Darmer A (Air 3 I CB / I /130+6 N/A Fails Closed Operated) CR A.ir intaks TSC isolation Damper B (Air 3 i CB / I / 'o0+6 N/A Fails Closed Operated) Division 1 CB Air Inlet Lnuver 3 I CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Division 2 CB Air inlet Louver 3 1 CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Division 1 CB Air intake Motor Operated 3 I CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Damper Division 2 CB Air intake Motor Operated 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Damper i

 - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . . - - - ,.. --.             .n. - - , -.-, - ---~  +,-+nn.en-,----,.--r-,                     ,--,.-r-     -+-,m----          -,--,+~~r-     -- ~ - - + , - , , , , - - - - -               . - , - , - - - . . - - - ---n-,   -- --

                                         .   .                                      .           -.          .      _ , ~ . .    . -     _-    - ~ . - -                            -,   -         =.                ..

Q$ g o pe n Dem 13.b-1 I TABLE 138-24 (Sheet 4 of 8) SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT UST CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTiflER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOTES

<                                                                                                                 CLASS 1E          CATEGORY            SEIS. CAT. / EL    POWER SOURCE Division 1 CB Non Essential Air isolation                                                      3            i           CB / I / -               N/A           Dwisional Separation' / Fails Closed Damper A (Air Operated)

Division 1 CB Non Essential Air isolation 3 i CB / l / - N/A Divisional Separation' / Fails Closed Damper B (Air Operated) Drvision 2 CB Non Essential Air Isolation 3 l CB / ! / - N/A Divisional Separation' / Fails Closed Damper A (Air Operated) Drvision 2 CB Non Essential Air isolation 3 i CB / I / - N/A Divisional Separation'/ Fails Closed Damper B (Air Operated) Drvision 1 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit A 3 i CB / I / 70+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Division 1 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit B 3 I CB / I / 70+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Division 2 Essential Electncal Room NC Unit A 3 i CB / I / 70+0 N/A Divisional Separation

Division 2 Essential Electrica! Room NC Unit B 3 I CB /1/ 70+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Division 1 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit A 1E I CB / I / 70+0 A Divisional Separation' Motor Division 1 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit B 1E I CB / I / 70+0 C Divisional Separation' Motor Drvision 2 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit A 1E I CB / I / 70+0 B Divisional Separation' "

Motor Division 2 Essential Electrical Room A/C Unit B IE I CB / I / 70+0 D Divisional Separation' Motor Division 1 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit A 3 i CB / I / 70+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Discharge Damper Division 1 Essential Electrica! Room NC Unit B 3 i CB / l / 70+0 N/A Divisional Separatton' i Discharge Damper Division 2 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit A 3 i CB / I / 70+0 N/A Divisional Separation

Dtscharge Darrper Division 2 Essential Electrical Room NC Unit B 3 I CB / i / 70+0 N/A Divisional Separation' l Discharge Danper Remote Shutdown Panel NC Unit 3 i CB /1/ 70+0 N/A -

Remote Shutdown Panet NC Unit Motor 1E I CB /1 / 70+0 D -

T

D 6 E R. O pen I+c ~ D. C - t T ABLE 138-24 (Sheet 5 of 8) I SYSTEM 80+'" VITAL EOUIPMENT UST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM . EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOTES l l CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL POWER SOURCE I Remote Shutdown Panet NC Unit inlet Damper 3 I CB /1/ 70+0 N/A - Remote Shutdown Panel NC Unit Outlet 3 i CB / I / 70+0 N/A - j Damper

Channel A Vitalinstrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 1 l Channel A Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Drvisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Channel C Vdal Instrument & Equipment Room 3 l CB /1/ 5040 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 1 Channel C Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 3 i C8 /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Channei 8 Vital instrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 1 Channel B Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 3 I CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Channel D Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 3 I CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation $ NC Unrt 1 Channel D Vital instrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation 5 NC Unit 2 1 l

D5ER. O y en T+* ~ I 3 G " 'L TABLE 11. <4 i (Sheet G of 8) SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOTES CLASS 1E CATECORY SEIS. CAT. / EL POWER SOURCE Channel A VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 1E I CB /1/ 50+0 A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 1 Motor Channel A VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 1E I CB /1/ 50+0 A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Motor Channel C Vitalinstrument & Equipment Room 1E I CB /1/ 50+0 C Divisional Separation' NC Unrt 1 Motor Channel C Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 1E I CB /1/ 50+0 C Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Motor Channel B Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 1E f CB /1 / 50+0 B Divisional Separation' A/C Unit 1 Motor Chrmnel B Vital I .strument & Equipment Ruom 1E I CB /1/ 50+0 B Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Moto' Channel D Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 1E I CB /1/ 50+0 D Divisional Separatior,' NC Unit 1 Motor Channel D VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 1E I CB /1/ 50+0 D Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Motor Channel A VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 1 Discharge Damper Channel A VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 3 I CB /1 / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Discharge Damper Channel C Vital Instrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB /1 / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation5 NC Unit 1 Discharge Damper Channel C VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 3 1 CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' AfC Unit 2 Discharge Damper Channsi B VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB /1 / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation

NC Unit 1 Discharge Darrper Channel B Vital instrumert. & Equipment Room 3 I CB /1/ 5040 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Discharge Damper Channel D VitalInstrument & Equipment Room 3 i CB /1/ 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 1 Discharge Damper Channel D Vi'alinstrument & Equipment Room 3 1 CB /1 / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' NC Unit 2 Discharge Damper l

bSER 0 fen T l- e % 13 . l. - 7 TABLE 13B-24 (Sheet 7 of 0) SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        -m EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER              SAFETY CLASS /                 SEISMIC       STRUCTURE /        ELECTRICAL'                                NOTES CLASS 1E           CATEGORY      SEIS, CAT. I EL    POWER SOURCE Channel A Battery Rm Exhaust Fan                               3                    i        CB / I / 50+0           N/A                   Divisional Separation

Channel C Battery Rm Exhaust Fan 3 I CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Channel B Battery Rm Exhaust Fan 3 I CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation
Channel D Battery Rm Exhaust Fan 3 i CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Channel A Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Motor 1E I CB / I / 50+0 A Divisional Separation' Channel C Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Motor 1E I CB / I / 50+0 C Divisional Separation' Channel B Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Motor 1E I CB / I / 50+0 B Divisional Separation' Channel D Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Motor 1E I CB / I / 50+0 D Divisional Separation
Division 1 Channel Equipment Rm Battery Rm 3 1 CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation Exhaust Fan Division 2 Channel Equipment Rm Battery Rm 3 i CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation Exhaust Fan Division 1 Channel Equipment Rm Battery Rm 1E I' CB / I / 50+0 A Drvisional Separation Exhaust Fan Motor Division 2 Channel Equipment Rm Battery Rm 1E I CB / I / 50+0 B Divisional Separation Exhaust Fan Motor Channel A Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Discharge 3 i CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisionsi Separation' Damper Channel C Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Discharge 3 i CB / l / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Damper Channel B Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Discharge 3 i CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Damper Channel D Battery Rm Exhaust Fan Discharge 3 I CB / l / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation' Danver Division 1 Channel Equipment Rm Battery Rm 3 i CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation Exhaust Fan Discharge Damper Division 2 Channel Equipment Rm Battery Rm 3 i CB / I / 50+0 N/A Divisional Separation Exhaust Fan Discharge Damper

D s se. op ,,, rhm e t c.-z . TABLE 138 24 (Sheet 8 of 8) SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT UST CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL' NOTES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. I EL POWER SOURCE Division 1 Battery Room Exhaust Fan Fire 3 I CB / l / - N/A Drvisional Separation Dampers (4) Division 2 Battery Room Exhaust Fan Fire 3 I CB / I / - N/A Divisions! Separation Dampers (4) Ductwork 3 i C8 / I / - N/A Safety-Related Ductwork located in Vital Areas Notes: 1,

Reference:

CESSAR-DC, Figure 9.4-2

2. A, B, C, and D refer to the four Class 1E Safety Buses. Channel A, B, C, and D refer to the four Class 1E channels providing power to components in the Plant Protection System (PPS) or the Engineered Safety Feature Component Control System (ESF-CCS).

3. Two components located in each division.

4. For instrumentation, includes root valve and piping / tubing to instrument.

5. Four Components located in each division.

6. All motor-operated and air operated dampers include the motor / solenoid operators. The damper operators are in the same location as the damper; and have similar separation characteristics.

_ . .. . .. ~ _ . - . - . R

                                                          %g p. O p e^ 74 c      . 14, L ^   f r ues                                                                 ;

z,,,a , g 35 -2 7 and I'} I~ Z @ w y,h t 67 *: r-<4 Lish ! TABLE 13B-ft- 2 9 l l l SYSTEN 80+" VITAL EOUIPMENT LIST - BUILDING AREA DESIGNATIONS i l 8 i CB Control Complex CCWX Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure DGB Diesel Generator Building DFS Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Structure > MSVH Main Steam' Valve House ; NA Nuclear Annex ; RB Reactor Building SSPS Station Service Water Pump Structure YUG Yard Underground i I

                                                                                            .i i

i 1 i I l t t f h 9 I i i t Amendment Q l June 30, 1993 ! _~

()$ 6 l?. de ea DN I"5 , b 'L. TABLE 13D-27 SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - STE AM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM l EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL NOTES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL POWER SOURCE Steam Generator Blowdown Line MOVs 2 i RB / I / - N/A Inside Containment Steam Generator Blowdown Inside Containment 2 i RB / l / - N/A Inside Containment isolation MOVs Steam Generator Blowdown Outside 2 i NA/I/- N/A Divisional Separation Containment Isolation MOVs Steam Generator Blowdown Check / Relief CIV 2 i RB / I / - N/A Inside Containment Bypass Vanes Vent / Drain / Test Valves 2 i RB, NA / I / - N/A A!! System Class 2 Vent, Drain and Test Valves for Safety-Related Lines Located in Vital Areas, Divisional Separation Outside Containment Piping 2 I RB, NA /1/ - NiA System Safety-Related Piping Located in Vital Areas, Divisional Separation Outside Containment Notes:

1.

Reference:

CESSAR-DC, Figure 10.4.81

2. All motor-operated valves include the motor operators. The vafve operators are in the same location as the valves and have similar separation characteristics.

g 5 6 (t Op en DrmD0-L TABLE 138-28, SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT UST - STEAM GENERATOR WET LAYUP RECIRCULATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT NUMBER / IDENTIFIER SAFETY CLASS / SEISMIC STRUCTURE / ELECTRICAL AOTES CLASS 1E CATEGORY SEIS. CAT. / EL POWER SOURCE Steam Generator Recirculation Inside 2 i RB /1/ . N/A Inside Containrnent Containment isolation Check Valves Steam Generator Recirculation Outside 2 i NA / I / - N/A Divisional Separation Containment isolation Valves Vent / Drain / Test Valves 2 I RB, NA / I / - N/A All System Class 2 Vent. Drain and Test Valves for Safety-Related Lines Located in Vital Areas, Divisional Separation Outside Containment Piping 2 i RB, NA / I / - N/A System Safety-Related Piping Located in Vital Areas, Divisional Separation Outside Containment Note:

1.

Reference:

CESSAR-DC, Table 6.2.4-1 . - _ . . _ __ _ . - _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ ~ , _ . . . ._. . _ . _ _ _ _

D S C. (t O p en ' T 4em It t, - z j l t TABLE 13B-29 3 0. j r (Sheet 1 of 2) , 4 SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EQUIPMENT LIST - ABBREVIATIONS .

                                                                                              .i 1

Air Conditioning j A/C i ADV Atmospheric Dump Valve Air Handling Unit ! AHU i BABE Boric Acid Batching Eductor BAMP Boric Acid Makeup Pumps ; CCW Component Cooling Water l CCWS Component Cooling Water System p CEAC Control Element Assembly Calculator ! CI Containment Isolation l CIV Containment Isolation Valve , CPC Core Protection Calculator .g CR Control Room , CS Containment Spray DFO Diesel Fuel Oil ' DIAS-P Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P DLO Diesel Lube Oil { DG Diesel Generator DGE Diesel Generator Engine : DWMS Demineralized Water Makeup System DVI Direct Vessel Injection (Safety Injection) ! ECW Essential Chilled Water ! ECWS Essential Chilled Water System [ EFW Emergency Feedwater , Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank j EFWST ESF-CCS Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System l HJTC Heated Junction Thermocouple HP High Pressure 7 HX Heat Exchanger , IRWST In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ]i j MCC Motor Control Center 1 MCR Main Control Room MOV Motor-Operated Valve . MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve -l l M/U Makeup NPS Nominal Pipe Size l PAMI Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation PPS Plant Protection System Reactor Building { RB RCP Reactor Coolant Pump j RCS Reactor Coolant System i RDT Reactor Drain Tank ! RSP Remote Shutdown Panel RV Reactor Vessel ; Amendment Q j June 30, 1993 ; l

a l D G E i2 Opem 7A e _ 13, 6 - t 1 i f so i TABLE 13B-te- (Cont'd) i (Sheet 2 of 2) SYSTEM 80+" VITAL EOUIPMENT LIST - ABBREVIATIONS P SC Shutdown Cooling SCS Shutdown Cooling System ; SDS Safety Depressurization System SFP Spent Fuel Pool SG Steam Generator SI Safety Injection , SIT Safety Injection Tank SSW Station Service Water SSWS Station Service Water System TLC Trip Logic Calculator TSC Technical Support Center UHS Ultimate Heat Sink e I i t 1 Amendment Q June 30, 1993

I f Attachment B ; i The following Seismic Category I systems or portions thereof were ; not included in the Vital Equipment List in CESSAR-DC, Appendix 13B ! because they are not required for maintaining the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary nor are they required for safe shutdown of the plant. A. Cavity Flood System - Valves from Holdup Volume to Reactor Cavity h B. Containment Spray System - r Spray headers C. Chemical and Volume Control System - ! Portions outside the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary D. Fuel Handling System - Fuel Transfer Tube Quick Closure ' E. Containment Isolation System - Portions which are not part of vital systems F. Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System - Post-Accident Airborne Radiation Monitors l G. Fire Protection System , H. Compressed Gas System I. Fuel Building Ventilation System J. Reactor Building Subsphere Ventilation System - Exhaust fans and filters , K. Annulus Ventilation System i L. Containment Purge System M. Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System (Site-specific system to be covered by COL applicant) < L N. Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System f O. Hydrogen Mitigation System ; Open Item 13.6-2 Rev. 0 08/20/93

         .DSER Open Item 13.6;2-1                                                    l Discuss the provision for timely detection of'mispositioning of         l manual isolation valves in safety systems.                                 :l
                                                                                    -i l

Response to Open Item 13.6.2-1 The list of safety system manual isolation valves requiring i control room position indication and alarms to detect-improper positioning will be added to CESSAR-DC Appendix 13A, Section 8.0 , in a future amendment. ! t t

                                                                                    't t

t j- f f I i

                                                                                    .i
                                                                                     ?

i

k l t

                                                                                    .i 1

i f Open Item 13.6.2-1 Rev. 0 08/25/93 - 1 l l 1

p CESSAR SElincu,a psee-o M tre M '5 ' " I i In addition, the CCS incorporates a high degree of continuous ' automatic on-line testing. This testing ensures CCS operability. , Further, setpoints' within the CCS are continuously monitored by ; the DPS for alteration via a checksum value which is periodically . computed and transmitted to the DPS. ; In summary, each vital equipment room has separate access } requirements and each vital IEC equipment cabinet has access requirements which are different from those c.f the rooms. Entry J to any room or cabinet is immediately annunciated. Since multiple rooms and cabinets must first be entered before a safety j system / function can be defeated or adversely affected, there is , ample time to respond to the threat. Additional protection is provided via " Memory Protection" within the I&C processors as I well as the monitoring of setpoints via the DPS. j The equipment rooms and the I&C cabinets contained therein fully i meet the alarm security requirements of 10 CFR 73. , Insert A i f f l i 1 i I I i l Amendment J ! 13A-19 April 30, 1992

f DSEF-oPc4 ( TEM / 3.(,,q ( INSERT A: (To be inserted on CESSAR-DC page 13A-19) Features are also provided to detect mispositioning of safety

system manual isolation valves, which, if mispositioned, could jeopardize the plant's ability to acheive safe shutdown. The following safety system manual isolation valves are provided with l position indication and alarms in the control room:

Safety Injection Pump 1 Suction Isolation Valve SI-470 Safety Injection Pump 3 Suction Isolation valve SI-130 Safety Injection Pump 2 Suction Isolation Valve SI-402 Safety Injection Pump 4 Suction Isolation Valve SI-131 , Safety Injection Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-476 ; Safety Injection Pump 3 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-435 ; Safety Injection Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-478 ! Safety Injection Pump 4 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-447 Steam Driven EFW Pump 1 Suction Isolation Valve EF-208 i Motor Driven EFW Pump 1 Suction Isolation Valve EF-210 - Steam Driven EFW Pump 2 Suction Isolation Valve EF-209 Motor Driven EFW Pump 2 Suction Isolation Valve EF-211 ; Steam Driven EFW Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-338 Motor Driven EFW Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-340 ; Steam Driven EFW Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-339 i Motor Driven EFW Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-341 ! SG 1 Supply to EFW Pump Turbine 1 Isolation Valve EF-238 , SG 2 Supply to EFW Pump Turbine 2 Isolation Valve EF-239 DGE Jacket Water Cooler 1 Inlet Isolation Valve , DGE Jacket Water Cooler 2 Inlet Isolation Valve ; i DGE Jacket Water Cooler 1 Outlet Isolation Valve j DGE Jacket Water Cooler 2 Outlet Isolation Valve DGE Starting Air Tank 1A Outlet Isolation Valve DGE Starting Air Tank 1B Outlet Isolation Valve , DGE Starting Air Tank 2A Outlet Isolation Valve DGE Starting Air Tank 2B Outlet Isolation Valve , Shutdown Cooling Pump 1 Suction Isolation Valve SI-106 l Shutdown Cooling Pump 2 Suction Isolation valve SI-107 ] Shutdown Cooling Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-578 Shutdown Cooling Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-579 i Containment Spray Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-488 Containment Spray Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-489 l I l

t DSER Open Item 13.6-4 -! The CESSAR should be revised to ensure that safety considerations are given priority over security considerations. ; Open Item 13.6-4 Resolution i As stated in the response P.o RAI Q500.17, the intention is to allow l the Owner-Operator er incorporate subcompartmentalization { techniques to protect vital equipment (using barriers provided for ! other purposes such as fire and flood protection) or to protect , larger areas or groups of components, as may be necessary to meet ,. the site specific security program in a balance with maintenance j functions. Several options would be available for emergency - override of failed security components. ? t CESSAR-DC, Appendix 13A will be amended to reflect this position. , All attached Appendix 13A markup changes have already been incorporated in Amendment Q of CESSAR-DC, except Insert B. Insert , B will be incorporated in the next CESSAR-DC amendment. : i I s i s i f 4 r 4 .i i i t . Open Item 13.6-4 1 Rev. 0 08/20/93 I I l J l

CESSAR E54%mou my o g,, m n.J l l i 1.O INTRODUCTION The System 80+* Standard Design is configured to be sabotage resistant. Considerations for sabotage include features which protect against both outsider and insider sabotage. The approach taken was to develop specific design criteria regarding prevention and mitigation of sabotage which were then implemented throughout the design as it proceeded. The criteria were developed to ensure the requirements of 10 CFR 73 were met as well as to provide additional protection against the knowledgeable insider. It is necessary to provide design features and interface requirements which facilitate prevention and mitigation of sabotage during construction and operation. Physical features are being provided in the design which permit the deployment of prevention and mitigation features. These will include those aspects of the security design discussed in 10 CFR 73 (and Standard Review Plan Section 13.6) such as employee screening, details of the access control scheme, a trained security force Iroccpand establishment of offsite security assets. b Protection against sabotage is comprised of prevention and mitigation. Prevention is provided by control of access to vital E equipment which, if tampered with or functionally impaired, could initiate an unanticipated event or prevent the accomplishment of a safety-related function, should such an event take place, r-- ntica thr 00@ avuesa uvuurvia uvudervacively acc ' unc 1 insider. These ontrol features o ,*bnr nreclu c ccccn v r= tvu uuceuciou ano celay

     <w e v m v .         ~~.-m-                   5 mv_. _ __-

Mitigation concerns the features of the design which are available to minimize the consequences of an event, should sabotage occur. Mitigation design features also provide for diverse means of mitigating design basis events in 11gnt of event initiation or vital equipment tampering by a saboteur. To assist in evaluation of the layout and access controls as well as the mitigation design features, a ranking of systems and components was performed. The ranking prioritized the systems and components according to their relevance to certain key scenarios. This is further discussed below. Amendment E 13A-1 December 30, 1988

D6EV Dres I+em 13. G - 9 Insert B - CESSAR-DC, Appendix 13A, Page 13A-1 ' The physical design features which protect against sabotage have been reviewed to ensure that the feature does not hinder normal

operation of the plant or emergency procedures.

b b t I 6 6 1 I l J

CESSAR EE"icari:n t>s e 42. o,,, 2 w is. c- if M. The site specific security plan shall include an outsider sabotage analysis as part of its security response planning. N. Security alarm annunciators and security non-portable communications equipment will be powered from am y uninterruptible power source, consisting of dedicated batteries, which in turn will be powered from the permanent non-safety buses and the AAC Source (Combustion Turbine). Other security loads will be powered from the permanent non-safety buses directly from the AAC or normal power, depending on availability. The AAC will be located in a secure vital area for protection. 2.2 ACCESS CONTROL DESIGN CRITERLA AL TVp I ar a sa1 b m'ni ize . Ty e pre ry t whi h, if a ce s i bt n , ou e iy sa o ap @}(ose be

         #t f c   d i ho t ac e s          ot er     r a.

R. Serial access through one or more vital areas to obtain access to a vital or non-vital area should not be permitted by the plant layout. 6 , tp . Area protection of vital areas shall be prioritized consistent with the ranking of systems and components identified in the ranking below. E C R. Space in the layout shall be provided for security access control devices, including detection devices, traffic control devices, access control barriers, and monitoring devices. f) $. Design features tr=Mitiemlly often located in physically

         =ccereible outside locations (albeit in the protected area) shall be protected. Specifically, these include:

1. HVAC outside air suctions for inhabited spaces, with special attention to control room, central alarm station, and secondary alarm station HVAC.

2. Diesel fueling ports and ventilation intakes.

3. Diesel fuel oil day and storage tanks and fuels i delivery systems. l l

4. Diesel cooling water systems. l S. Intake cooling water structures and systems.

6. Ultimate heat sink systems and structures.

Amendment J 13A-4 April 30, 1992 l

CESSAR WM,ema o g g,_ w n. g

7. Atmospheric steam dump valves and steam condenser bypass valves and controls. <

1

8. Steam generator safety valves. j

9. Auxiliary and/or startup transformers. ;

[ K. Support systems for vital systems and components shall be ; routed and protected in a manner which preserves the ' redundancy, separation and depth of protection of the served systems and components. ' F4 Penetrations to vital areas for piping, electrical power, E ' instrumentation and controls, support systems and HVAC shall ' be constructed so as to prevent undetected personnel ingress. , i G R. Since access to containment is non-routine and controlled, layout guidelines for separating and compartmentalizing systems and equipment do not apply to inside containment. ! l H t. The control room layout shall be such that access to the controls and instruments for vital components and systems shall be exposed to the minimum non-essential ; traffic. > Routine administrative activity, such as signing tagouts and ; radiation work permits requiring interface with other than control room operations staff, shall be provided outside the primary security boundary. 7 E. The control room design will include bullet resistance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (6). y l l; 3.0 APPROANES TO ACCESS CONTROL

There are a variety of access control approaches available, depending on staffing, the level of protection required, the ;

location (e.g., of the equipment, amount of traffic required, plant mode refueling, power operations, and other considerations. All the approachcc indicatud etc.) Scice 2ccu=0 that each individual entering a centrc'. led :ccerr area ruct pccitively identify hirrelf E er hercc1f te cbtain accccc 'i.e., nc "tcilgating") . Th; v;ricus options crc 1 I A. Tec= 2cning-- ' An apprccch uscd in secucity progrc=0 in the milit;ry, there i=plccented cc the twc san rulc. 7hsuf/) paritted only " hen tre equivalentlyEntry te vital crecc ic

                                                        %euledgeable perrenr are recogniced and grcnted accccr by the knculedgeable individu 10 detcrc cchetege.

Amendment J 13A-5 April 30, 1992 l

t 05 c 0- opes I+e- n L*Y l Insert A - CESSAR-DC, Appendix 13A, Page 13A-5 The System 80+ design provides protection to each area identified ! as a vital area, ' and also provides the flexibility to provide - equivalent protection to larger areas and groups of vital equipment i if the COL applicant desires to employ an alternate system. ( t t t i l i I 4 l

i CESSARHainemu mgu n. m i m u.

     .. m--  ,,,,,4.,,.,,,

Redundsat vitEl 5yoteL5 &nd/cr coopencnt: Orc ocgrcgatcd in a 4 r r o,-o e ui + ,1 .m- min - m p o ,-- *

accerr centrolc. Accces tc cppccing redundant cyctc= or cerpenent trainc is centrciled cn c tcan basic, where One tc:= cnly--hcc accccc to one train (e.g., tc = A har accerc to train A cnly and tc = B h:c accccc to trair B cnly).

C- Operational 2cning Scqucntial Occccc to vital campenent: and cyctc=c ncccccary for perfemance cf a particular safety function ir rcctricted until opcrchility cf the cyctc= cr Oc=penent le derenctrated. Tae-cxc=ple, accccc to : ceoond-component-i-n a safaty injection train is ra **i dad "* 41 perability of the firct acccssed canponent ic dc=cnctrated. D. Tire 2cning Accccc to vital cquipnent is rcctrieted to a certain time periedr, c-g_, day chift, chen cabotage ic lesc likely or

     =cre likely detected.                                                               j E. Function 2cning-Accccc to vitcl equip =cnt ic rectricted "ith recpcot to                        E
     ="ti"itier "hich percenncl : y per40Fh Ac indicated above, 2 number cf variabler det emine the type cf

.accerr centrelc ceployed. The design has been developg ip a manner which permits and supports the deployment of a.T the access control approaches since the layout of equipment and building design have been developed in a manner which provide for adequate train separation, cccp:ncnt ccrpartrentaliaation, and equipment placement 4 The layout and building design described in CESSAR-DC conform to the access control design criteria identified in Sect; n 2.2 above. More information on building layout is found lat in this section. Mdla prescvvikp ahtwie occas Tov ogaw.,9 4.0 SYSTEM 80+ STANDARD DESIGN SABOTAGE PROTECTION gg*

STRATEGIES AND SYSTEM RANTJNGS In order to prioritize the protection of vital systems and components from sabotage, the data and method found in Reference 1 were updated such that the system protection strategies and i system rankings reflected the System 80+ Standard Design. The i update of the system rankings was based on the review of the j methodology and results in Reference 1 and the insights gained i from the System 80+ PRA.

Amendment E 13A-6 December 30, 1988 i

CESSAR !!ainc m., w o,,_ % n.t. , ! i e i i F. The containment subsphere area contains many of the ' components highly ranked for protection against sabotage. : The access control for this region of the plant is strictly controlled. ; U < d(a v Amter t t G. ah @foi.rfs . The Em,eggency Feedwa er Storage Tanks will be located fe,4y,, ri/c3 insidc4 the au::ili= ~ hui1Mngh so as to make them less susceptible to sabotage. I H. The Nuplex 80+ instrumentation and controls design , incorporates semi-automated and on-line testing features for the Plant Protection System as well as on-line monitoring of i fluid and electrical systems _ making detection of sabotage' ; attempts more likely. gg up ; g pgg ; I. The. Nuplex 80+ instrumentat ou hom %ohn ud N -esign mid7am.roa.s Lui/r prov1d s channel separation for many of the safety systems ' y adequate physical accerr evel to each channel to make ~ sabotage more difficult. ylSEWoSon 4 7.0 PLANT LAYOUT FOR SABOTAGE RESISTANCE l i 2 f The layout of the components in the subsphere of the containment building and for selected other plant regions has proceeded ; according to the access control design criteria contained in ' Section 2.2 above and in view of the protection prioritization ' provided in Section 4.0 above. The plant layout is provided in l Chapter 1 of CESSAR-DC. It is important to note that the ~ i 2 subsphere area provides for complete train separation of safety i systems. T ere is also significant component compartmen-talization

D rovide additional access control thereby l permitting the deployment of a variety of I

strategies.a diccucced in Section J.0 0b010. acceh4 control ! opno ts

j Specific criteria for the location of safety-related . i ' instrumentation and controls -to- increase sabotage resistance are as follows: % c4 . 1 A. The channelized safety-related equipment sh 4_1 ba- located whhin separate rooms to ensure -bhat channel separation le ; maintained and to ethance the H C sabotage resistance. Each i room shall contain only equipment associated with a specific y , channel.and ch:11 be decigned with ccpareta ntry pointi there cM ll h= nc entry point mmen te scrc than cnt-reem. B. Each of the equipment rooms shall be designed to maintain a fire barrier between itself and the other I&C equipment ] rooms to minimize fire dam ge to the I&c. Ecch M hc

         -cquiprent recrc ch=ll contain a single carrtrolled accase
         -point - te rec **ict entry end incorporate rescurcs to ispede
         -f-orced entry.

Amendment J , 13A-16 April 30, 1992 l

bh ICATION gg p yb i 3, 4 ., 9 3 C. The Main Control Room (MCR) and the Remote Shutdown Control 2 Room (RSCR) shall be located in vital areas separate from i each other and separate from the equipment rooms which house ; the I&C equipment. These rooms -a4ee shall have restricted ; entry and incorporate measures to impede forced entry. ' Considering the above criteria, the following separate vital plant areas are defined for the System 80+ Standard Design. , 2 A. Main Control Room t B. Remote Shutdown Control Room C. Channel A Equipment Room D. Channel B Equipment Room E. Channel C Equipment Room i F. Channel D Equipment Room I I In addition, the following separate plant areas are also ! provided and contain restricted plant entry as well as measures to impede forced entry: j A. Computer Room B. Channel X Equipment Room C. Channel Y Equipment Room i The Motor Control Centers (MCC) are similarly located in J f physically separate rooms according to control channel assignment (A, B, C, D). Each car. has ; singic contrclied ecces; point te _ . ._ .. mn . The shutdown cooling system design utilizes two separate and independent fluid paths for redundancy. Each path contains ) suction valves which are associated with two of the I&C channels . in a mutually exclusive manner (A/C for one train and B/D for j another train). , This design precludes any adverse impact to shutdown cooling due to an intruder within a single MCC. Since an intruder would have s to enter two aseparated and 1ccked rooms to impact shutdown t cooling, there' is su time to detect and respond to the threat. \ p qy,g;fficient

                                       ,4q,y ,,,3p,c     gIy i

l 8.O INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL FEATURES FOR SABOTAGE ! RESISTANCE ! As part of the I&C sabotage resistance features, several levels ; of protection against unauthorized changes to setpoints are ' j provided. First, as was noted above in Chapter 7, each channel of a multichannel safety related system (A, B, C, D), is located i in a separate equipment room which is independent from the other safety related equipment rooms. Access to each of these

equipment rooms is controlled. Second, within each room, !
I Amendment J '

13A-17 April 30, 1992

t i i

i i i v t

                                                                                                                   -1 i

e I 1 1 1 t i i i i 2- ! I r I f 1 ATTACHMENT 17 !, r 1 I l a i 1

                                                                                                                  .i r -

DSER Open Item 11.1-1 CESSAR Section 11.1 requires more information to enable staff to evaluate the radioactive waste system. Proposed Open Item 11.1-1 Resolution ,

                                                                              .3 The effluent analyses for LhWS and GhMS have been revised to                 !

evaluate compliance with 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II based on i a 1% failed fuel rate. Proposed revisions to CESSAR-DC Sections 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3 are attached. The decontamination factors, shown in Table 11.2-3, are consistent ! with those provided in NUREG-0017, Revision'1. Radwaste ion- i exchange system decontamination factors are based on recent l industry experience with such systems, including the use of cesium- i selective zeolite media which are added to organic ion-exchange i materials to improve the performance of liquid waste treatment ion-exchange systems (and that additional processing can be performed, l as necessary, to achieve the stated performante levels). ! References which document cesium removal effectiveness of selective ! ion exchange processes have been added to the CESSAR DC Section 11.2 (References 2 and 3 in the proposed revision package). The effective decontamination factor for each flow stream is calculated based on the decontamination factors shown in Table 11.2-3 and the ! simplified liquid release pathway shown in Figure 11.2-2. The computer code PWR-GALE, based on NUREG-0017, Revision 1 [ methodology, accounts for operator error and adds an additional l 0.16 Ci/yr to the release from the LWMS. -Table 11.2-1, Note 3

states, "The total is adjusted to include 0.16 Curies attributable to operational occurrences that results from unplanned releases."

l The carrier gas flow rate (1 scfm) in Section 11.3 is based on the EPRI Utility Requirements Document, Chapter 12 specifications. 1 Expected waste gas flow rates are lower (see CESSAR-DC Table 11.3- t 1). This is consistent with operating PWR units, such as Beaver Valley 1 & 2 and Surry 1 & 2, that use carbon bed holdup for waste gas treatment. These operating units experience less than 0.1 scfr. average flow through the waste gas carbon bed adsorbers. Since I waste gas holdup time credit is reduced with higher gas flow rates, i the 1 scfm assumption is conservative. (See H. Elguindy, et. al . , . l Trns. Am. Nuc. Soc., 52, pg. 50, June, 1986). ! The gaseous release points are graphically represented in Figure 11.3-2. l 5 Open Item 11.1-1 1 Rev. 1 7/21/93 l i

CESSAR Ennnem=> w>_um t i i The accident is described as an unexpected and uncontrolled ) release of radioactive Xenon and Krypton gases from the GWMS i resulting from an inadvertent bypass of the main decay portion of the charcoal adsorber beds. It is assumed to take as long as 2 l hours to isolate or terminate the release. 11.3.7.2 Analysis of Effects and Consecuences A. Bases The bases for the estimated maximum offsite concentration of the gaseous effluent resulting from a leak or f ailure of the GWMS are as follows:

1. The design basis airborne ef fluent source term is based on 1% failed fuel rate in accordance with the Standard Raview Plan Branch Technical Position (BTP) ESTB 11-5.

The BTP ESTB 11-5 method adds the accident induced charcoal unit bypass leakage to the source term for normal operation; both accident source contributions are calculated based on a 1% failed fuel rate assumption.

2. In the absence of site specific meteorological data and site Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) information, the short-term 2-hour accident atmospheric dispersion factor, corresponding to a distance of approximately 5 miles from the station vent,is assumed to be This is consistent with the dilution l g* g 3

10-3 s/m. factors provided in Section 2.3.

3. The sum of total estimated annual airborne effluent releases and the expected airborne effluent releases associated with the zero minute decay case are calculated by PWR-GALE and are multiplied by an isotope specific multiplication factor. This multiplication factor is calculated by the division of the 1% failed fuel RCS equilibrium concentration, calculated using the Combustion Engineering DAMSAM computer code and presented in Table 11.1.1-9, by the RCS equilibrium concentration calculated using PWR-GALE presented in Table 11.1.1-2, for each isotope.

4. For isotopes with a 1% failed fuel rate calculated concentration which is less than PWR-GALE results, the PWR-GALE concentration is used for conservatism. It is assumed that differences in the methodology used to _

calculate the reactor coolant concentrations are l responsible for any differences observed in isotopic concentratien=. l Amendment Q 11.3-12 June 30, 1993 l

CESSAR ML*ic== wmn w - n. M

5. Particulates and radioiodines are assumed to be removed by pretreatment, gas separation, and intermediate radwaste treatment equipment. Therefore, only the whole body dose is calculated in this analysis.

B. Methodology To calculate the release of noble gases from the GWMS, the source term is based on the output from the computer code DAMSAM co=puter code. This code is used to calculate the reactor coolant equilibrium concentration with continuous degassing based on 1% failed fuel fraction in accordance with Standard Review Plan Section 11.3. The resulting reactor coolant equilibrium concentration is divided by the reactor coolant concentration determined by PWR-GALE, using NUREG-0017, Revision 1 methodology, to yield a multiplication factor for each isotope. The total release of gaseous effluent for the zero minute decay case is l calculated using PWR-GALE with BIT ESTB 11-5 alterations. The zero minute decay case releases are added to the normal l operation source term and the sum for each radionuclide is multiplied by the multiplication factor, the 2-hour accident atmospheric dispersion factor, the total body dose factor, and a conversion factor to calculate whole body dose. The methodology used to calculate the dose consequences for a GWMS failure, which is consistent with BTP ESTB 11-5, is as follows: D={ K(i) xO(i) x5x7. 0 25 Where: D = whole body dose (mrem) K(i) = the total-body dose factor given in Table B-1 of Regulatory Guide 1.109 for the ith isotope (mren-m 3 /pCi/yr) Q (i) = the noble gas nuclide accident release rate for the ith isotope (Ci/yr for 2 hours) tg O(i) = (R(i) 3. +R(1)[g[f xNF(i) (9j 1 R ( i) m,, a annual estimated airborne release rate for normal operation (Ci/yr) (Table 11.3-4)

Amendment Q 11.3-13 June 30, 1993

CESSAR inGcua l i M@ R(i) = annual estimate airborne release yea,1 I rate for zero minute decay case l, l (Ci/yr) MF = Multiplication Factor RCS(i) - RCS(i) an, X/Q = short-term 2-hour accident atmospheric dispersion factor at EAB (sec/m3)

                                 =       10 ~ 8  (Section 2.3)          l 7.25       m     conversion factor        for   2  hour          t release (pCi-yr 2/Ci-event-sec)

C. Results and Conclusions The calculated whole body dose at the exclusion area boundary is 49.3 mrem which is within the 500 mrem l acceptance criterion specified in Standard Review Plan Section 11.3. 11.3.8 CONCENTRATION OF NORMAL EFFLUENTS The Gaseous Waste Management System (GWMS) processes gaseous waste through a charcoal delay system which holds up noble gases and allows them to decay prior to release. The concentration at the exclusion area boundary during normal operation, including anticipated operating occurrences, was analyzed to verify it is less than 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 1. 11.3.8.1 Analysis of Effects and Consecuences j A. Bases The bases for the estimated concentration of effluent are as l follows:

1. The GWMS continuously diacharges at a uniform rate at j the design basis source term. l 1

2. The design basis airborne effluent source term is based on 1% failed fuel rate in accordance with the Standard Review Plan Section 11.3. It is assumed that the l Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is continuously degassed i by the CVCS during normal operating conditions. The '

reactor coolant equilibrium concentration is calculated using the Combustion Engineering DAMSAM computer code and is presented in Table 11.1.1-9. l , Amendment Q 11.3-14 June 30, 1993

Question 6 ABB-CE will review Section 4 of NUREG-0017 and. incorporate ; portions as applicable, including providing more detail on release points. t Response to Ouestion 6 A review of Section 4 of NUREG-0017 has been performed.and applicable portions not previously addressed in CESSAR have been ; incorporated, including providing more detail on release-points. ! See Attachment 11.2 for an item-by-item accounting of NUREG-0017, Section 4 required data. ; t t s 5 l 1 l l 1 Rev-. 1 6/29/93

ATTACHMENT 11.2 NUREG-0117, Revision 1, Chapter 4 Information Cross-References 4.1 GENERAL 1

1. The maximum core power (MWt) evaluated for safety j considerations in the SAR. !

2. The quantity of tritium released in liquid an gaseous effluents (Ci/yr per reactor). I l

REFERENCE:

Maximum core thermal power is provided in CESSAR Table 11.1.1-1. The quantity of tritium released in liquid and gaseous effluents is provided in ; CESSAR Tables 11.2-1 and 11.3-4, respectively. (See Response to Open Item 11.1-1, Revision 0 for latest revision of CESSAR Chapter 11 sections.) 4.2 PRIMARY SYSTEM

1. The total mass (lb) of coolant in the primary system, excluding the pressurizer and primary coolant purification system, at full power.

2. The average primary system letdown rate (gal / min) to ;

the primary coolant purification system.

3. The average flow rate (gal / min) through the primary coolant purification system cation demineralizers.

4. The average shimbleed flow rate (gal / min).

REFERENCE:

Primary coolant mass and letdown demineralizer i flow rate data is provided in CESSAR Table 11.1.1- l 1 and shimbleed flow rate data is provided in CESSAR Table 11.2-2. 4.3 SECONDARY SYSTEM

1. The number and type of steam generators and the carryover factor used in the evaluation for iodine and nonvolatiles.

2. The total steam flow rate (1b/hr) in the secondary ,

system.

3. The mass of liquid in each steam generator (1b) at full power.

1 Rev. 1 6/29/93

1 Attachment 11.2 (Cont'd)

4. The primary-to-secondary system leakage rate (lb/ cay) used in the evaluation.

5. Description of the steam generator blowdown purification system. The average steam generator blowdown rate (lb/hr) used in the evaluation.

6. The fraction of the steam generator feedwater processed through tim condensate demineralizers and the DF's used in the evaluation for the condensate demineralizer system.

7. Condensate demineralizers

a. Average flow rate (lb/hr);

b. Demineralizer type (deep bed or powdered resin); .

c. Number and size ( f t') of demineralizers; I

d. Regeneration frequency;

e. Indication whether ultrasonic resin cleaning is used and waste liquid volume associated with its l

use; and

f. Regenerant volume (gal / event) and activity.

1 i REF3RENCE: Much of the secondary system information is l provided in CESSAR Table 11.1.1-1. The blowdown purification system is described in CESSAR Section 10.i.8. Condensate demineralizer design is addressed in CESSAR Section 10.4.6. Although I specifics of the condensate cleanup system may vary from site-to-site (i.e., fresh versus salt water cooling sites), typically there will be 9 deep bed condensate demineralizers, each containing approximately 190 f t' of resin; no provisions for ultrasonic cleaning or regeneration are provided in the System 80+ design. 4.4 LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

1. For each liquid waste processing system, including the shim bleed, steam generator blowdown, and detergent waste processing systems, provide in tabular form the following information:

a. Sources, flow rates (gal / day), and expected activities (fraction of primary coolant activity) for all inputs to each system.

2 Rev. 1 6/29/93

t Attachment 11.2 (Cont'd) ,

b. Holdup times associated with collection, processing and :

discharge of all liquid streams. '

c. Capacities of all tanks (gal) and processing equipment l (gal / day) considered in calculating holdup times, j

d. Decontamination factors for each processing step.

e. Fraction of each processing stream expected to be !

discharged over the plant life. ! t

f. For demineralizer regeneration, provide time between regeneration, regeneration volumes and activities, ;

treatment of regenerants, and fraction of regenerant i discharged. Include parameters used in making these determinations.

g. Liquid source term by radionuclide in /yr for normal ,

operation, including anticipated or sational occurrences. , i

2. Provide piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID's) and !

process flow diagrams for the liquid radwaste systems along with all other systems influencing the source term calculations. .

REFERENCE:

The liquid waste processing system information i requested is provided in CESSAR Table 11.2-2. , Effective system DFs provided in Table 11.2-2 are calculated based on the process configurations j shown in CESSAR Figure 11.2-2 and the component DF r values presented in CESSAR Table 11.2-3. As stated in CESSAR Section 10.4.6, no provisions for ! regeneration of demineralizer resins are included in the System 80+ design. The estimated liquid l effluent release source term is presented in CESSAR Table 11.2-1. Liquid waste processing l system process flow diagrams are provided in i CESSAR Figure 11.2-1. ; i

l 4.5 GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM For the waste gas processing system, provide the following:

3 Rev. 1 : 6/29/93 l f

r P Attachment 11.2 (Cont'd)

1. The method of stripping gases from the primary coolant, the !

volume (ft 3 /yr) of gases stripped from the primary coolant, i the bases for these volumes. ;

2. Description of the process used to holdup gases stripped from the primary system during normal operations and reactor i shutdown. If pressurized storage tanks are used, include a -

process flow diagram of the system indicating the capacities [ (f t3 ), number, and design and operating storage pressures l for the storage tanks.

3. Describe the normal operation of the system, e.g., number of tanks held in reserve for back-to-back shutdown, fill time for the tanks, Indicate the minimum holdup time used in evaluation and the basis for this number.

4. If HEPA filters are used downstream of the pressurized storage tanks, provide the decontamination factor used in the evaluation.

5. If a charcoal delay system is used, describe this system and indicate the minimum holdup times for each radionuclide considered in the evaluation. List all parameters, 3

including mass of charcoal (lb), flow rate ( f t / min) , operating and dew point temperatures, and the dynamic absorption coefficients for Xe and Kr used in calculating holdup times.

6. Provide piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID's) and process flow diagrams for the gaseous radwaste systems along with other systems influencing the source term calculations.

REFERENCE:

The method used to strip waste gases from the primary coolant is described in CESSAR Section 9.3.4.2. Waste gas process flow information is provided in CESSAR Table 11.3-1. As described in CESSAR Section 11.3, the process used to hold up gases stripped from the primary system uses a charcoal delay system. Waste gases are filtered prior to release by the Nuclear Annex ventilation exhaust HEPA filters;' decontamination factors for effluent treatment systems are provided in CESSAR Table 11.3-2. Waste gas delay system design parameters are provided in CESSAR Section 11.3.2.1. A process flow diagram for the waste-gas processing system is provided in CESSAR Section 11.3-1. 4 Rev. 1 6/29/93

i Attachment 11.2 (Cont'd) 4.6 VENTILATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEMS For each building housing systems that contain radioactive materials, the steam generator blowdown system vent exhaust, gaseous waste processing system vent, and the main condenser - evacuation system, provide the following:

1. Provisions incorporated to reduce radioactivity releases through the ventilation and exhaust systens. I

2. Decontamination factors assumed and the bases (include ;

charcoal adsorbers, depth of charcoal beds, HEPA filters, , and mechanical devices). !

3. Release rates for radioiodine, noble gases, and radioactive particulates (Ci/yr), radioactive particulate size distribution, and the bases.

4. Release point description, including height above grade, height above relative location to adjacent structures, ;

relative temperature difference between gaseous effluents ! and ambient air, flow rate, velocity, and size and shape of ; flow orifice. ;

5. For the containment building, the building free volume ( f t') :

and a thorough description of the internal recirculation system fif provided), including the recirculation rate, charcoa ed depth, operating time assumed, and mixing ,

efficiency. Indicate the expected purge and ventilation frequencies and duration and continuous purge rate (if ; used).

REFERENCE:

Ventilation and exhaust system effluent treatment ; provisions are summarized in CESSAR Table 11.3-2; a simplified flow diagram for airborne release sources is provided in Figure _11.3-2. Table 11.3- l 2 provides decontamination factors and specifications for charcoal bed depth. Release : rates for radiciodine, noble gases, and radioactive particulates are summarized by release j source in CESSAR_ Table 11.3-4. Release point characteristics are provided in CESSAR Table 2.3-

4. Containment building free volume and ventilation information is provided in CESSAR Section 11.3.6 (see CESSAR Section 9.4 for more l l

5 Rev 1 6/29/93 l I

                                                          ;i Attachment 11.2 (Cont'd)                       ;

complete descriptions of all ventilation system provisions). . t l t 4 i h i l

                                                          -i I

1 I f I k I s t i I 6 Rev. 1 6/29/93 l i l i

COL Action Item 15.3.10-1: l Compliance with 10 CFR 20 is demonstrated, provided that the site-specific application, which uses the ABB-CE System 80+ design verifies that (a) the failure of the Boric Acid Storage Tank is limiting, among liquid waste tanks outside containment, and (b) the site provides a minimum equivalent dilution factor of 1.438E+08. t Response to COL Action Item 15.3.10-1: It is agreed that to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 20, it must be verified that the failure of the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) ! is limiting among liquid waste tanks outside containment. However, there is a question regarding _the requirement of a minimum equivalent dilution factor to be 1.438E+08 rather than 1.438E+05 (or, 1 / 6.95E-06) as calculated in the analysis presented in CESSAR-DC Section 15.7.3. ABB-CE believes the dilution factor in the COL Action Item is a typo. In previous revisions of Section 15.7.3, 6.95E-06 was specified as . the maximum allowable dilution factor. (This value has since been ! changed to 1.49E-06 as a result of revised reactor coolant source terms associated with a 3% rated power increase 0.12% failed fuel - the proposed revision to CESSAR-DC Section 15.7 is attached. ) " Dilution factor' is defined as 80% BAST volume divided by the dilution volume available at the potable water source. Therefore, based on a BAST volume of 250,000 gallons, the minimum dilution ; volume required to ensure 10 CFR 20 limits are met is 1.80E+10 cubic feet (under the revised analysis). ABB-CE agrees with this COL Action Item provided that the Staff accepts a minimum dilution factor of 6.711E+05. i 1 l 1 COL Action Item 15.3.10-1 1 Rev. 1 1 6/29/93 I i

~~

UESSAR EENn"un=> c3m u .r a ,- c .u-i 1 15.7 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL prr. EASE FROM A SUBSYSTEK OR l COMPONENT I 15.7.1}}

LD-93-160, Forwards Sys 80+ Info for Closure of follow-on Questions to Draft SER Responses.Response to Question 4 on Psi/Isi Will Be Provided in Near Future

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LD-93-160, Forwards Sys 80+ Info for Closure of follow-on Questions to Draft SER Responses.Response to Question 4 on Psi/Isi Will Be Provided in Near Future

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