LD-92-089, Forward Draft Rev of Pilot ITAAC for Sys 80+ Std Design,In Response to NRC 920521 Comments on 920430 Submittal.Revs Account for Comments Provided by NUMARC & Reflect Comments Obtained in NUMARC 920716 Meeting
| ML20099H199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1992 |
| From: | Brinkman C ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | Pierson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LD-92-089, LD-92-89, NUDOCS 9208180181 | |
| Download: ML20099H199 (94) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
A BD ED
- %EpE9 Abf.A OnOWN BOV E RI August 10, 1992 LD-92-089 Docket 52-002 Mr. Robert C. Pierson, Director Standardization Project Directorate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Revised System 80+" Pilot ITAAC urences: 1) Letter LD-92-060, C. B. Brinkman ( ADB-CE) to NRC, dated April 30, 1992.
- 2) Letter, R. C. Pierson (NRC) to E. H . 1(ennedy (ABB-CE) , dated May 21, 1992.
Dear Mr. Piernon:
Enclosed are eight (8) draft pilot ITAAC for the System 80+"
Standard Design. These ITAAC are revised versions of those submitted by Reference 1. The revisions respond to NRC comments (Reference 2) on the Reference 1 submittal, account for comments provided by NUMARC, and reflect comments obtained'in an industry meeting on July 16, 1992, convened at ABB-CE's request to review the pilot ITAAC. They have been further modified to conform to the comments of legal counsel.
Two of the ITAAC provided by Reference 1 have been removed from the enclosea submittal for the reasons noted below.
- 1. ITAAC 1.3.2, Design for the Protection of Structures, Components, Equipment and Systems against Dynamic Effects of Pipe Break and Leak before Break, has been removed because it is presently planned to incorporate it into a broader scope Design Acceptance Criterion (DAC) for piping design.
2.- ITAAC 1.9.22.9, Station Service Water System (SSWS) Pump Structure, has been removed because it may not be appropriate as an interface ITAAC as originally envisioned. Although the approach to handling interface ITAAC continues to evolve, it presently appears that interf ace ITAAC may be appropriate only for design-specific requirements that a certified design imposes upon a site. The SSWS Pump Structure does not appear to fall'into this category. It is a feature outside the System 80+ scope that may be treated straight forwardly as a COL design matter. pv &
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Mr. Robert C. Picrcon LD-92-009 August 10, 1992 Pcgo 2 Each comment in Reference 2 was evaluated by the cognizant engineering group. Most comments were addressed by revisions to the ITAAC. Some comments, however, could not be incorporated for reasons such as requiring information beyond that available for design certification. For example, the shielding requirements for operators to conduct safety Injection System (SIS) maintenance during post-LOCA long term cooling would depend, in part, on the number of personnel available and on the time required to peri.cm maintenance. Personnel availability is a utility planning e tter, and time requirements depend on the installation and u.sembly details of specific equipment.
Regarding the level of detail for the SIS, we have added numerical critoria to the SIS design description and ITAAC in response to the NRC staff's comments. The concept of deviation criteria presented in the lead plant ITAAC may, however, augment or modify the use of Tier 1 numerical criteria. Modifications to the enclosed pilot ITAAC where numerical critoria are presented may be required as the concept of deviat. ion criteria is developed.
We anticipate meeting with the staff to obtain concurrence that the revised ITAAC are acceptable in scope, level of detail, and specificity. Prompt NRC feedback on this submittal is key to the quality of the entire System 80+ Tier 1 Design Description and ITAAC package which is presently under preparation. We will contact you in the near future to make the necessary meeting arrangements In the meantime, please do not hesitate to contact me or Mr. Henry Windsor at (203) 285-9661 should you have any questions on the enclosed ITAAC.
Very truly yours,.
COMBUSTION ENGINEEPJ.,tG, INC.
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C. B. Brinkman Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing gdh/lw
Enclosures:
As Stated cc: T. Boyce (NRC)
A. Heymer (NUMARC)
T. Wambach (NRC)
. - , .- - - - ~ _ . _ - - . -- - .
3 EySTEM m+ = i I
l 1.6.3 ANNUI.US VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description 1hc Annulus Ventilation System (AVS) is an engineered safety feature which reduces the concentration of radioactivity in the annulus air by filtration, holdup (decay) and recirculation before the air is released to the atmosphere.
1 The AVS takes air from above the primary containment dome, filters it and discharges a portion of tho air through openings close to the annulus Door and a portion of the air through the unit vent to the atrnosphere. Two redundant filtration trains are provided. Each AVS filtration train includes a fan, filter, dampers, ductwork, and control systems. A general conceptual illustration of the AVS is shown in Figure 1.631 (NOTE 1). Dampets modulate exhaust air to maintain a negative pressure higher than 0.25 inches of water gauge within the annulus. By design, fan flow is limited to less than 18000 CFM.
Each filter train includes a moisture climinntor, p.mfilter, electric heater, carbon adsorber and IIEPA filters; one llEPA filter before and one llEPA filter after the carbon adsorber. The llEPA filters remove 99% or more of airborne particulate matter greater than 03 micron size. The carbon adsorbers remove 95% or more of elementaliodine and organic iodine. Failure of the AVS to perform the intended functions can be detected by a unit vent radiation monitor, which monitors the radioactivity level of the AVS cfnuent and triggers an alarm in the control room.
Electrical and control component separation is maintained between the two AVS trains, although the ducting inside the annulus is shared. All components of the AVS are safety related and of Scismic Category I classification and qualified for the environment for locations where installed.
The AVS is not operated during routine (normal) plant operations. Rather, each
- AVS train is activated by a containment spray actuation signal. Each AVS train is powered by the Class IE Auxiliary Power System or the on-site emergency power source (Emergency . Diesel Generator). Indications _of fan operating status are provided in the control room, liigh temperature in each adsorber unit and high and ,
low differential pressures across filter units trigger alarms in the control room.
The AVS design permits periodic inspection and testing of fans, Glters, dampers, ductwork, and starting controls.
1.63 8 10-92
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i Inspectinns, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria l i
Table 1.631 provides the inspections, tests and/or analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the AVS.
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the Systern 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrarns are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all ,
components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact j reptr-o -tations of the detailed system configurations that will be 4 utif .ed in e f.er;q teferencing the certified design.
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TABLE 1.63-1
. ' ANNULUS VENTfLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment ' -Inspections. Tests. Analvscs Acceptance Criteria
- 1. Inspections of the as-built AVS. 1. Actual AVS codguration, for L The general configuration of. the L A"S is shown in F ;ure 1.63-1 those components shown, conforms 4
with Figure 1.63-1 (NOTE 1).
(NOTE 1).
Documented record reviews and 2.a) AVS filter efficiencies meet the
- 2. The AVS has the following cap- 2.
tests conducted to verify the cap- foIIoning ieqsments:
abilities: .
abilities . specified in the Table L63-1 Certified Design Commit- 195% for elemental and organic trent, No. 2, specifically; iodine a) Each carbon adsorber stage tested 199% for p, articulate matter greater a) Filter Efficiencies; than 03 microns.
in place for elemental and organic 195% for elemental and organic . iodine filter ' efficiencies using a iodine refrigerant tracer gas or equivaient.
199% for particulate matter greater DOP (Diocryl phthalate) test or than 03 microns equivalent to measure partienlate matter efficiencies for HEPA fil-ters.
b) AVS fan generated flow meets the
) ** b) Fan generated flow tested in a fouoming requirement:
straight portion of duct either up.
gg g stream or donstream of the fan. <18,000 Cat 8-10-92 1.63 i _ i
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TABLE 1.63-1 (Continued)-
ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 3. The AVS ' operates when powered 3. Tests ' performed to demonstrate 3. The AVS is capable of operating
. from the Class IE Auxiliary ' Power operation of the AVS when sup- when supplied by either of the System or the on-site - emergency plied by the Class IE Auxiliary ' electrical postr sources.
power source (emergency diesel Power Source er the onsite emer-generator). gency power source.
4 All AVS components' ' are Seismie 4 See Generic Equipment Quali- 4 See Generic Equipment Quali-Category I' classificatier and- fication (ITA) fication 'AC) qualified for the environment - for locations where insta!!cd.
- 5. Each AVS train is activated by a 5. Tests to venfy the actuation of each 5. Each AVS train is activated by a Containment Spray _ Actuation train upon receiving a simulated simulated Containment Spray Act-Signal. Centainment Spray Actuation uation S~q;nal.
Signal
- 6. The AVS maintains the annulus 6. Test to measure annulus pressure 6. During AVS operation, the AVS volume at ~a negative pressure during AVS operation. maintmim a negative pressure greater than 0.25 inches of water - greater' than 0.25 inches of witer gauge when the AVS is in gauge in the annulus volume.
. operation.
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1 TABLE 1.63-1 (Continued)
- ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acxotance Criteria Certified Design Commitment' Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. Unit vent radiation monitoring 7. Inspection of the as-built configur- 7. Radiation monitoring of the AVS capability - of AVS effluents - is ation to verify capability. Test to - effluent paths to the emironment is
. provided with alarr capability that , verify alarm activation using simu- presided at the Unit Vent. High triggers in the control room. lated actuation signal. radiation alarms trigger in the control room in response to a simulated activation signal.
- 8. Instrumentation indications and 8. Inspection of the as-built configur- 8 The AVS has the instrumentation alarms are provided in the control ation Test to verify alarms activa- indications and alarms specified in room for.- tion using simulated activation sig- Table L63-1 Certified Design nals. Commitment, No.8.
a) Fan operation status indications b) Alarms for adsorber unit high
- temperature -
c) Alarms for high and low dif-ferential pressure across filter units.
- 9. The AVS design permits periodic 9. Evaluation of the as-built con- 9. The AVS components depicted in inspection and testing of AVS com- fig;urath. Figure 1.63-1 (NOTE 1) are acces-ponents depicted in Figure L63 sible for periodic inspections and (NOTE 1). testing.
1.63 8-10-92
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~ SYSTEM 80+"
TABLE 1.6.3-1 (Continued)
_ ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM
- Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria -
' Certified Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. The AVS has electrical and-control 10; ' Inspection of. the as-built AVS. 10. With the exception of shared ' duct-component separation between . ing within the annulus volume, the trains ' except for shared ducting AVS provides electrical and control within the annulus volume. component separation betaren trains.
N O T E 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of t he System 80+
systems, components and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations -'of the. detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certified design.
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i 1.fi.5 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Design Description i 1
1he safety injection system (SIS) injects borated water into the scactor vessel to provide core cooling in response to a loss.of-coolant accident (LOCA) lhe SIS limits fuel damage in order to maintain a coolable core geometry, limits the cladding metal. water reaction, removes the decay heat in the core, and maintains the core subcritical during the extended period of time following a LOCA.
1he SIS also injects horated water into the reactor vesset to mitigate accidents other than LOCAs, such as steam generator tube suptures, steam line breaks or control element assembly (LIIA) ejection incidents.1hc horated water injected by the SIS ,
provLles inventmy and reactivity control for these events.
)
1he SIS accomplishes these functional requirements by use of active and passive injection subsystems. the active portion of the SIS consists of four mechanically separated trains, each consisting of a motor-driven centrifugal safety injection (SI) pump and associated valves. Each Si pump is provided with a separate suction line from the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and a separate discharge line to a direct vesst! injection (DVI) nozzle on the scactor vessel.1hc passive portion consists of four identical pressurized safety injection tanks (SITS),
described below. Each SIT discharge line is headered with an Si pump discharge line. Figure 1.6.51 shows basic system components and their configuration (NOTE 1).
' For large break LOCAs (greater than the site of a DVI line), two SI pumps, in conjunction with the SITS, provide 100 percent of the minimum injection flow required to satisfy LOCA performance requirements. For small breaks (equal to, or smaller than, the size of a DVI line), one SI pump, in conjunction with the SITS, provides 100 percent of the capacity to satisfy LOCA performance requirements.
Long tcrm cooling for LOCAs is accomplished by manually realigning the SI pumps for simultaneous hot leg injection and DVI nozzle injection.1his provides Ilushing flow and core subcooling for LOCAs until the shutdown cooling system (SCS) can be used.
Ihe SIS is automatically initiated by a safety inicction actuation signal (SIAS) on low scactor cool:nt system (RCS) pressure or higi. containment pressure. An SIAS starts all four SI pumps and opens all four Si header isolation valves. The SIS piuvides indication in the contial room when tne SIAS is bypasced or when the SIS is inoperable. The SIS can also be manually initiated from the Main Control Room.
SIS indications are provided in the control room to monitor system actuation and operation.
The SITS, which contain borated water pressurized by a nitrogen cover gas, constitute a passive injection system. No operator action or electrical signal is i
1.6.5 - 8-10-92
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- icquired for operation. Each tank is connected to a DVI noule by a separate line containing two check valves which isolate the tank fioin the itCS during normal operation. When 1(CS pressure falls below SIT pressure, the check valves open, discharging the contents of the tank into the scactor vessel. A remotely operated isolation valve in each SIT discharge line is administratively controlled open to assure SlT injection when needed. To further assure SIT availability, each SIT isolation valve receives an open signal upon an SIAS. Two remotely operated vent valves are connected to each SIT. Venting may be required to lower SIT pressure to shutdown cooling systern ently pressure following some small break I,0CAs.
The shutoff head and flow rates of the Si pumps were selected to insure that adequate flow is delivered to the reactor vessel to cool the core during 1.OCAs and non-LOCA design basis events. The SIS provides net positive suction head (NPSil) greater than the pump's acquired NPSil for all expected Huid temperature conditions during SIS operation.11ach SIS pump has a minimum now recirculation line to the IRWST to ensure pump Dow during low.now operation exceeds the pump's required minimum How.
Key system and equipment parameters are:
Pump flow to RCS at 0 psig 9801232 gpm Si pump differential pressore at minimum 1600 2040 psig now recir:ulation
!!csponse time from SIAS to initiation of S1 40 seconds Dow, maximum Volume of unborated water in each Si line 15 cubic feet _
prior to SIAS, max.
IRWST volume, minimum 495,000 g,'lons SIT volume, minimum 2406 cubic feet each SIT noule elevation above DVI noule 0-25 feet centerline llot Leg How with split between hot leg and ~ 1 gpm minimum to DVI and RCS at 0 psig pressure not leg The SIS components, instrumentation and controls necessary for injecting water into the reactor vessel can be powered from the plant startup power source (offsite power) or the emergency diesel generators (emergency power) Power connections are through at least two independent electrical divisions. One independent electrical division supplies power to two Si pumps and associated valves. A second 1.6.5 8-10-92
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I independent electrical division supplies power to the other two Si pumps and anociated valves.
Power is supplied to the SIS hot leg injection valves such that a single electrical failure cannot cause spurious initiation of hot leg injection flow, not can a single electrical failure prevent initiation of now through at least one hot leg injection line.
SIS components required for injection of borated water into the reactor vessel are ;
of Seismic Category I classification. He SIS is installed, and SIS mechanical components are built to meet ASME Dailer and Pressure Vessel Code Section 111 requirem:nts as follows: !RWST, Si pumps, SITS, piping and valves up to the second check valve from the llCS are Class 2; piping and valves from (and including) the second check valve from the RCS are Class 1. ,
SIS components and instaurnentation which must operate following a design basis event are designed, built, and qualified to operate in the post-event environment in the compartment where the component or instrument is located.
Physical separstion is provided between the piping trains and containment penetrations for redundant SIS lines (IRWST to pump suction, pump discharge to RCS, S!T discharge to RCS) to prevent a failure of one train from preventing or interrupting operation of other trains.
SIS piping trains are protected from the effects of internal or local flooding. He SIS is also protected against dynamic effects associated with postulated ruptures of high energy and moderate energy Guid systems.
He SIS permits periodic inspection of important components such as injection nozzles, piping, pumps, valves, and those pressure retaining welds which are not exempted by the ASMli Code from inspection, and periodic functional testing, including the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation. He SIS also permits system testing at design flow during reactor power operation.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, ana Acceptance Criteria Table 1.6.51 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the SIS.
NOTl!1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of' the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certified design.
1.6.5 - 8 10-92
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s-SYSTEM 80+*
TABLE 1.6.5-1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analvscs. and Acceptance Criteria inspections. Tests. Analvses Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Perform inspections of the as-built SIS L Actual SIS configuration, for thme
- 1. The general configuration of the SIS is 1.
shown, conforms unh configuration. coreponents shown in Figure 1.6.5-1. (NOTE 1)
Figure 1.6.5-1.
l Inspect Code Data Reports for instal- 2. SIS installation and comperents br.c The SIS components shown in Figure 2.
- 2. required ASME,Section III, Cass cmic are iricalled, and SIS mech- lation and components. Inspect the 1.6.5-1 stamps, per the Code Cancs shown in anical equipmu is built, in accord- sptem and components for the pre-sence of N stamps for ASME Section Figure 1.6.5-1.
ance with the ASME Code,Section III, Class categorizations that are shown in III components.
Figure 1.6.5-1.
See generic Equipment Qualification 3. See generic Equipenent Oudficn a All SIS components required for in- 3.
3.
(ITA) (A.C.)
jecting water into the reactor vessel are of Seismic Category I classification and qualified for the environment for loca-tions where installed.
4 Ar. SIAS starts the SI pumps, opens the A safety injection actuation signal 4 Ferform SIS functional tests to demon-4 strate the SIS actuates ht response to an Si header isolation valves, and sends an (SIAS) actuates the SIS. open signal to the SIT isolation valves.
SIAS.
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, TABLE 1.6.5-1 (Continued) ir j SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria 7
Certified Design Commitment inspections. Test. Analyses Acceptante Criteria
'. 5.a) The SIS operates when powered from- 5.a) Perform SIS functional tests to demon- 5.a) The SIS is capable of operating shen jj the offsite . p'ower source 'he on-site strate operation when supplied by . supplied by either of the ciectrica! -
emergency power . source. either ' the offsite' power source or the' power sources.
IL *= on-site emergency power source.
i . . .
b) Electric. power for SIS components ;is - b) Inspect the electrical power distri- b) Electric power for SIS components is 4- supplied ;. through at least two inde- bution system. Confirm that at least. supplied through at least tsu inde-pendent ' electrical 'dhisions. . One inde- two independent electrical . dhisions pendect electrical dhisions. One inde-pendent division supplies power to two supply SIS components and that each pendent dhision supplies power to two 4 SI pumps and associated valves. . A dhision supplies power for two 51 SI pumps and associated valves. A sec-second independent division ' supplies pumps' and a<sociated. vah:s. ond independent dhisio:. supplies i_ power to thef othet two SI pumps and power to the other two 51 pumps and associated valves. associated vahes.
reactor vessel to proside core cooling spections 'in a), b), and c), below, to j- following a LOCA, and inventory and confirm the assumptions of the perfor-reacthity . control fo!!owing non-LOCA mance analyses for LOCA and non-g accidents such - as steam generator tube LOCA design basis events.
ruptures, steam line breaks or CEA ejections.
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TARLE 1.6.5-1 (Continued)
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Test. Analyses Acccotance Criteria
- 6. (continued) 6.a) Perform SIS functional tests to deter- 6.a) Pump differential pressure (at mini-mine as-ouP.t system flow vs. RCS mum recirculation flow) = 1600 to 31 pressure and time to rated flow after psi; pump flow rate to RCS =1S) to an SIAS. 1232 gpm at 0 psig RCS pressure; res-pense time not to exceed t0 seconds from SIAS to initiation of 51 flow.
b) Perform tests to confirm the SITS and b) SIT isolation valves open on SIAS and associated valves respond to an SIAS tae pressurized SITS discharge water to and the pressurized SITS discharge the depressurized RCS.
water to the depressurized RCS.
c) Inspect drawings and documents of es- c) The calculated parameters meet the built SIS componcats to determine the following acceptance criteria:
following-4
- 1) Volume of unborated water in 1) Volume of unborated watcr in each Si line prior to an actuation, each SI F.ne prior to an SIAS not to exceed 15 cubic ft.
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- SYSTEM 80+"'
TAELE 1.6.5-1 (Continued)
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analvscs. and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Test. Analyses Acccotance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment
. 6. 6. 4) . SIT nozz!c clevation above the 6. . 4) SIT nozzle elevatica abme the (continued) . ' DVI nozzles center = 0 to 25 feet
' DVI nozzles centerline.
7.a)(1) Manually align the SIS from the Con- 7.a)(I) The SIS can be mancaUy aligned from 7.a) lang term cooling for large break the Control Room for long term cool-LOCAs is accomplished by manuaUy trol Room for long term cooling ming simultaneous DVI and hot Ic. in- ing using simultancom DVI and het -
realigning the SI pumps for simul- leg injectionc taneous hot leg injection and l DVI ' jection. -
nozzle injection. (2) With flow spEt between the hot Icg (2) Perform fund anal tests to determine and DVI lines, hot leg flow is not ten the hot leg slow with flow split bet-ween hot leg and DVI lines. than 44I gpm with the RCS at 0 psig pressure.
b) The two valves in each hot leg injec-Power is supplied to the hot leg in- b). Inspect the electric power distnbution b) tion line receive power frem separate jection vahrs is ' designed such tha' s system. Confirm that the two valves in each hot leg injection line recewe electrical buses. The cIectrical buses single electrical failure canno' ca w for the two valves in one bid Ice in-spurious initiation of bot leg injection - power from separate electrical buses.
Confirm that the electrical buses for jection line' are separate and indepen-flow, nor will a single electrical fail- dent from the electrical buses for the ure prevent initiation of ficw through the two valves in one hot leg injection line are separate and independent two vehes in the other hot leg in-at least one hot leg injection line. '
from the electrical buses for the two jection line.
valves in the other hot leg injection line.
S-10-92 I.6.5
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SYSTEM S0e '
TABLE 1.6.5-1 (Continued)
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM
, Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Inspet' ions. Test. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Available NPSH meets or exceeds re- 8. Inspect Pump. vendor data to deter- 8. Corrected pu=p NPSH asailaMe. as quired pump NPSH for conditions mine NFSH required by the as-pro- determined. based on aobuilt con-under which the pump must operate. cured pump. Inspect actimi system ditions and the results of vendor tests installation and/or take measurements, amd/or analyses. meets or exceeds as-and correct by analyn for saturated procured pump NPSH require,cntt IRWST fluid conditions and minimum IRWST water level, to determine availabic pump NPSH.
- 9. Indication is provided in the main 9. Perform functional tests to verify op- 9. SIAS bypassed and SIS componer:ts control room when the SIAS is by- eration of control room indications inoperabic are indicated in the main passed and when SIS components are when the SIAS is bypassed and SIS control room.
inoperabic. components are inoperable.
- 10. Piping trains and containment pene- 10. Perform walkdom inspections to ver- 10. Four-quadrant separaGon is prodd d trations for redundant SIS lines ify physical separation of piping for the SIS p; ping trains and the con-
] (IRWST to pump suction, pump dis- trains and containment penetrations tainment penetratiom- for the his re-charge to RCS, and SIT discharge to for the SIS redundant lines (IRWST to dundant lines (IR%ST to pump me j RCS) are physically separated such pump suction, pump discharge to tion, pump discharge to RCS, and 51'I 1 that failure of one train will not pre- RCS, and SIT discharge to RCS). discharge to RCS).
vent or interrupt operation of other
! trains..
1.6.5 S-10-92
l DRAFT
- ESYSTEM SO A
- I i
- TABLE 1.6.5-1 (Continued) '
1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspc-* ions. Tests. Anafrses, and Acceptance Criteria 4
o i Certified Design *. r.itment : Inspections. Test. Analyses Acceptance Criteria l-
}. 11. The SIS permits periedic- inspection of IL Perform 6 cal inspection of access- 11. Access is prodded for . inspection of 2
injection nozzles, : piping-- pump . ibili:y for periodie inspecdons . of the MS injection nozrics, piping. pum,n 1 valves ' and pressure-retaleing . welds SIS injection , nozzles, piping. pumps, vants, and pressure-retaining stIds,
, which are not exempted frets impec- valves and pressure-retaining welds, except for the exemptions allowed in tion by the 'ASME Code. as detailed in the In-Service In- Code Articles I%%I220, iW C-1220, specdoa Plan. and I%D-1220.
4 12.a) The SIS permits.. functional testing of. 12.a) ' Demonstrate that the SIS fu!I opera- 12.a) ne irdfistian signals generate an the full operational sequence that tional sequence can be tested by per- SIAS, and an SIAS actuates . the SI i brings the system into operation. forming tests to show that a simulated pumps and associated . vahrs.
{. Iow pressunzer pressure condition or j high containment pressure condition i generates an SIAS, and an SIAS act-i nates the SI prmps ' and associated
}. valves.
l 1 b) The SIS permits testing the SI pumps b) Demonstrate the capability for testing b) The SIS delivers design finw to th:
at design flow during reactor power '
the - SIS at design flow by manually IRWST through each subtrain.
i-;
^
operation. aligning- 51 flow to the IRWST and manually starting each SI pump.
9 l
1.6.5 S-10-92
+
w- -. 4 s s -
n -
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Li$
TAllLE 1.6.5-1 (Continucd)
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Intocctions. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria inspections. Test. Analyses Acientance CP 4a Certified Desien Commitment
- 13. The instrumenta' ion shown en Figure The SIS provides indications in the 13. Visually inspect the control room for 13.
the presence of the indications shown 1.6.5-1 are indicated in the cont:M control room to monitor sptem act- room. The SI pumps and ::mme-op-uation and operation, and controls to on Figure 1.6.5-1. Perform test to operate the SI pumps and the remote- erated injection vahts can be c; cr-manually initiate SI flow from the ated from the contro! rmm. !
control room. operated injection vahrs from the l
contro! room. l 14 Perform walkdown inspections of the 14 Flood barriers exist between the 4 14 The SIS is protected from the effects quadrants of the contain nent sub-of internal or knl flooding. SIS to verify the presence of design features to protect the SIS from in- sphere which house the a Si traint ternal flooding. Ikxxl barriers exist between the S15 and emergency feedwater equipment in the same quadrant, and drain lines i to sumps from the area below the SI (
pumps are imtailed.
See the inspections, tests, and analyses 15. See the acceptance criteria of Section The SIS is protected against dynamic 15.
15.
of Section 13.1, Piping Design. 13.1, Piping Desien.
effects associated vkh postulated rup-tures of high energy and moderate energy fluid systems.
S-10-92 1.6.5
m A "T vg aam.n-c+,. . e, r
' SYSTEM 80+"
. TABLE 1.6.5-1 (Continued)
SAFETY INJECITON SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Cfiteria Certified Desien Commitment- Inspections. Test. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 16. The SIS includes a minimum flow re- 16. Inspect pump vendor data to deter- 16. Minimum flow recirculatien, as deter-drculation path ~ for each SI pump to mine minimum flow ~ required by the mined based on at-built conditions, protect the'. pump from overheating i
as-procured. . pump. Inspect actual meets or exceeds the pump's required
- during low-flow operation. . system . installation and/or take meas- minimum flow. No deleterious effects urements, to determine actual mini- are observed during extended oper--
mum flow. Perform ' functional tests ation at minimum flow. (Recircu-for extended minimum flow operation lation flow does . not de;:rade below (mtil pump and fluid temperatures minimum required.)
stabilize).
- 17. ThW safety injection tanks can be 'de- 17. With the SIT pressurized and the as- 17. The SIT vent valves can be epened pressurized by venting to permit low- sociated SIT isolation ,vahr ' shut, open from the control room.
cring RCS pressure to sh'utdown cool-_ each SIT vent valve from the control ing entry pressure. room. . Perform this test for aII 4 SITS and 8 vent vahrs.
NOTE 1 Such diagrams : are for the we of Dustrating 1 the general conceptual design features of the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified ' diagrams are not nereuarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencmg the certified design.
1.6.5 8-10-92
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SYSTint 80+"
1.7.1 1%\NT l'ItOTECTION SYSTEM Design Description
'Ihe System 80+ Plant Protection System (PPS) is a warning and trip system which supports two plant protection functions: (1) reactor trip, and (2) actuation of enginected safeguards features. The PPS monitors infoimation provided by the process instrumentation to determine the need to initiate plant safety system responses. Initial warning and trip decisions are implemented in the PPS with software logic installed in programmable digital devices to provide limit logic, coincidence logic and safety system initiation logic.
Reactor Trip initiation Function An automatic reactor trip is performed to protect against the onset and consequences of events or conditions that threaten the integrity of the fuel barriers. Process instrumentation, the PPS and the reactor trip switchgear are implemented to perform an automatic reactor trip. The process instrumentation provides sensor data input which the PPS uses to monitor selected plant conditions for this protective function.
An acceptable set of monitored conditions for achieving this piotective function, any one of which will result in an automatic reactor trip,is provided here:
Variable Overpower liigh logarithmic Power Level liigh local Power Density Low Departure fiom Nucleate Boiling Ratio Iligh Precsurizer Pressure Low Preu rizer Pressure low Steau Generator Water level low Steam Generator Pressure Iligh Containment Pressure Iligh Sttam Generator Water level Imw Reactor Coolant Flow.
An alternate set of conditions may be determined to also achieve this protective function.
Setpoints for initiation of a reactor trip are selected for each monitored condition to protect the core fuel thermal limits and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary .for Anticipated Operational Occurrences, and also to mitigate the consequences of accidents. If a monitored condition exceeds its setpoint, the PPS automatically initiates a reactor trip, which is actuated by the reactor trip switchgear.
1.7.1 1- 8 10-92
~np*
LN ?a SYSTEM 80+"
If the setpoint for a trip condition varies with power, the setpoint change is performed automatically within the PPS. For each trip condition, pre-trip alarms are provided. 'Ihese provide the operator with an opportunity to take control actions to ,
avoid the trip limit condition. Manual initiation of a reactor trip can be performed '
from cither the main control room or the remote shutdown panel. ;
Entineered Safety Features Inhiation Function 4.utomatic actuation is provided for the engineered safety feature systems which act
.o mitigate the consequences of Anticipated Operational Occurrences and to limit radiological release in the highly unlikely event of an accidental release of radioactive fission products from the Reactor Coolant System. Process instrumentation, the PPS,
.the Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (EJF CCS), motor starters and actuated devices are implemented to actuate the engineered safety features. The process instrumentation provides sensor data input which the PPS uses to monitor selected plant conditions for this protective function. An acceptable set of monitored conditions which ruult in automatic actuation of one or more of the engineered safety features is provided here:
1 Low Pressurizer Pressure
. _ Low Steam Generator Water Level Low Steam Generator Pressure :
Ifigh Containment Pressure Iligh Steam Generator Water Level liigh Iligh Containment Pressure -
If a monitored condition exceeds its setpoint, the PPS automatically generates one or more of the following Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signals (ESFAS):
Safety injection Actuation Signal Containment Isolation Actuation Signal Containment Spray Actuation Signal-Main Steam Isolation Signal Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal 1 Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal-2 These initiating signals are provided to the ESF-CCS which responds by actuating the engineered safety feature systems. These signals can be initiated manually from either :
the main control room or the remote shutdown panel.
I 1.7.1 - 8-10-92 1
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SYSTliM 80+
Flements Of'1he PPS The PPS is divided into four redundant channels. The following elements, depicted in Figures 1.7.1-1 and 1.7.12 (Note 1), are ir Juded in each channel of the PPS:
Limit Logic incal Coincidence Logic Reactor Trip Initiation logic .
ESF Initiation Logic Interface and Test Processor Limit logic for simple process-value to set point comparison is implemented in one or more bistable processors in each channel, referred to as the Plant Protection Calculator (PPC). The bistable trip processors generate trips based on the measurement channel digitized value exceeding a digital setpoint. Limit logic for complex calculations (i.e., the departure from nucleate boiling ratio and high local power density), are implemented in each channel in a device referred to as a Core Protection Calculator (CPC).
'lhe trip outputs of the PPC and the CPC in each channel are sent to the local coincidence logic processors in all four channels. Therefore, for each trip condition, the local coincidence logic processor in each channel receives four trip signals, one from its associated PPC or CPC from within the channel, and one from the equivalent PPC cr CPC located in each of the other three channels. The coincidencc processors evaluate the local coincidence logic based on the state of the four like trip signals and their respective bypasses. A coincidence of two-out-of-four like trip signals is required to generate a reactor trip or ESF initiation signal. The fourth channel is provided as a spare and allows bypassing of one channel while maintaining a two-out of-three system; Upon coincidence of two signals indicating one of the conditions for reactor trip, the PPS' initiates actuation of the reactor trip switchgear. The reactor trip switchgear breakers interrupt power to the Control Element Drive Mechanism coils, allowing all Control Element Assemblics to drop into the core by gravity. The reactor trip switchgear can be tripped manually frora the main control room or the remote shutdown panel, independent of the PPS bistable and coincidence processors.
Upon coincidence of two signals indicating a condition for generating an ESFAS, the ESF initiation logic transmits the actuation signal to the ESF.CCS. The functional logic used in the PPS to generate each of the ESF initiation signals is shown in Figures 1.7.13,1.7.1-4,1.7.1-5 and 1.7.1-6 (Note 1).
1.7.1 8-10-92
3
. . . ..-.. ,(t n
. , I' L; At t, L, SySIlihi80+
i The PPS interfaces at the main control panel and at the remote shutdown panel cach !
provide for manual initiadon of all ESF actuation signals. hianual initiation of all !
ESF actuation signals can be performed independ.nt of the bistable and coincidence !
processors from the main control room. hiancal initiation of the hiain Steam Isolation Signal can be performed independent of the bistable and coincidence processors from the remote shutdown panel. 1hc ESF CCS interface in both l locations provide, ior initiation of all ESF functions on a train or component basis.
The Interface and Test Processor (ITP) performs autornatic testing of PPS lagic.
PPS Divisional Separation and Isolation The PPS is a four division system which provides reliable single failure proof-capability for initiation of reactor trip and actuation of engineered safety features, while maintaining protection against unnecessary reactor trips resulting from single failures in the PPS. All functions of the PPS and all PPS components implemented for initiation of reactor trip or engineered safety feature actuation are safety related.
The PPS and the electrical equipment impicmented for protective functions are of Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I and of IEEE electrical category Class 1E ,
classifications.
Figure 1.7.12 shows the PPS divisional separation aspects and the signal flow from the process instrumentation to the individual channels for initiation of protection system functions. Four measurement channels with electrical and physical separation are provided for each parameter used in the direct generation of trip signals, with the exception of the Control Element Assembly position which is a two channel measurement.
Basic System Parameters are: ;
- a. Number of independent divisions of equipment 4
- b. hiinimum number of sensors per trip variable 4 (at least one per division)
- c. Number of automatic trip systems (one per division) 4
- d. Automatic trip initiation logic used for plant sensor inputs 2-out-of-4
- c. Number of separate manual trip systems 4
- f. .htanual/ Automatic actuation trip logic Selective 2-out-of-4
- g. ESF hianual/ Automatic Actuation legir Selective 2-out-of-4 l
1.7.1 8-10-92 1
.l i
_ _ , - - - - , . , - . . . . . . _ - ~ _
JRA;T .
RYST131 80 + '=
- Physical separation and electrical isolation are prosided between the PPS and the process control system. Where the PPS and the process control system interface with the same component (i.e., sensors, signal coc.ditioners, or actuated devices), electrical isolation is provided between the process control system and the shared component.
Where the PPS and the process control system inte face with the same sensor or signal conditioner, the PPS and process control system functions are independent, such that a failure of the sensor or signal conditioner don not result in a process control system response that conflicts with the PPS response.
Capability is provided to electrically isolate operator interfaces to the ppd,6e reactor trip swithchgear and the ESF.CCS, such that a failure at the interface will neither result in a failure of a protective function or spurious actuation of a protective function. Use of a switch to transfer manualinitiation capability for ESF functions from the main control room to the remote shutdown panel is an acceptable implementation for this purpose.
The PPS remains sing!c failure proof even when one entire division of channel sensors is bypassed and/or when one of the four PPCs or CPCsi s out-of service. In the event of a failure, equipment within the PPS is designed to fall into a trip init!ating state or other safe state upon loss of power or input signals, or upon disconnection of portions of the system. The system also includes trip bypasses and isolated outputs for display, annunciation and performance monitoring. PPS interfaces with the Power Control System, Discrete Indication and Alarm System, Data Processing System, PPC Operator hiodules and the hiaintenance and Test Panel are electrically isolated so that no malfunction of the associated equipment can functionally disable any portion of the PPS. 'the PPS related equipment is divided into four redundant divisions of senser (instrument) channels, trip logics and trip actuators, and manual scram controls and scram logic circuitry. The manual trip uses diverse and independent methods and equipment from the autometic trip, to provide defense in depth against common mode failurcs. Once a reactor trip has been initiated, the breakers in the reactor trip switchgear latch open, assuring that the intended fast insertion of all control rods into the reactor core cannot be compromised by any action of the normal power control system. After all of the trip
. conditions have been cleared, deliberate operator action is required to manually
- reclose the trip breakers.
PPS Inr , cnd Testine As illu;. :eted in Figure 1.7.1 1, the PPS interfaces with the following:
Class 1E safety process instrumentation:
Reed Switch Position Transmission (for Control Element Assembly position).
1J.1 8-10-92
1 l
O ['! /: p 9-L> Lt t- u l S YSTEM 80 + "
Auxiliary Process Cabinet (for Pressurizer Pressure, Steam Generator Ixvel, Steam Generator Pressure, Containment Pressure, Reactor Coolant Flow, Ret.ctor Coolant System 110t Leg Temperature, Reactor Coolant System Cold Ixg Temperature, Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Pulses, and Ex-Core Neutron Flux Power' hianual Actuation Signals for Reactor Trip at the hiain Control Panel and the Remote Shutdown Panel.
hianual Actuation Signals for ESF Systems at the hiain Control Panel and the Remote Shutdown Panel.
Reactor Trip Switchgear.
Engineered Safety Feature Component Control System (ESF-CCS).
The Interface and Test Processor portion of the PPS provies op'.ical cable data link interfaces to the following:
Power Control System Discrete Indication and Alarm System Data Processing System PPC Operator's hiociule in the hiain Control Room PPC Operator's hiodule at the Remote Shutdown Panel PPS interfaces for operator interaction, alarm annunciation and tes, ..g ' manual and automatic) are illustrated in Figure 1.7.1-7 (Note 1).
The local and main control room PPS operator's module (oric per channel) provides operators with the capability to enter trip channel bypasses, operating bypasses, and variable setpoint resets. These modules also provide indication of status of bypasses, operating bypasses, histable trip and pre-trip. The local operator module provides the 1 human-machine interface for manual testing of histable trip functions.
An Interface and Testing Processor (ITP), one per channel, communicates with the bistable trip processors, coincidence processors, operator's modules, ESF-CCS and reactor trip switchgear within that channel and with the ITP's in the other three chtanels to monito test and control the operational state of the PPS. Each ITP also provides selected PPS channel status and test results information to the Data Processing System (DPS) and the Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS).
Access to PPS trip setpoints, calibration controls and test points is restricted by
[,_ physical barricts and administrative controls.
1.7.1 8-10-92
s- n m.
$.)J & %y -,, ~
u
- SYSTl!M 80 + =
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1,7.1-1 provides the inspections, tests and/or analyses, toe e with associated acceptance criteria, for the PPS.
NOTEli .Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simpliGed diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certiGed design.
1.7.1 ' 8-10-92 L
' SYSTEM 80+" L r 1
1"g[h LJ @47'y in TABLE 1.7.1-1 i
PLANT PROTECTION-SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment . Inspections. Tests. Analyses , Acceptance Criteria
- 1. PPS safety related software is de- ' 1. Examine design documentation to 1. A . quality assurance ' plan - which veloped, ' implemented, ' verified, . verify ~ that a quality assurance addresses software . development,
'~
validated, and integrated with - plan, approved by the NRC for vlementation. . .. verification, ' val-hardware in .accordance with . a safety related software has been W zion and integration with, hard -
. NRC approved plan, which is in- included in the . design documen- w are, and which has received 2 cluded in the design ' documen m tation' and that audits have been NRC approval for ' application to tation performed which verify that the safety related software, is included -
l plan was implemented. in the design documentation.
The design - documentation in--
cludes records of audits which certify ' that the quality assurance plan was implemented.
]-
- 2. Setpoints used for initiation of PPS 2. Examine design documentation for 2. Documentation of the method-
[ ology used to determine the set-
- protective functions ,are deter- the setpoint methodology and its l, mined using a'NRC approved implementation. points for initiation of PPS p;o-i method. tective functions is included in the design documentation and has re-j' ceived NRC approval. Documer-l tation of the implementation of
- the approved setpoint methodology is provided and has received NRC approval.
i j 3. PPS equipment is designed to be 3. See Generic EMI/SWC Qualifi- 3. See Generic EMI/SWC Oualifi-i protected from effects of noise, cation verification activities (ITA). cation Acceptance Criteria (AC).
- 1.7.1 8-10-92 I
i t
. - . . - . - _ . _-, ._m.
I 0
l > s-\s
~.
p.y,,
a g; SYSTEM 80+"
i TABLE L7.1-1 (Continued)
PIANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Certified Desizn Commitment See Generic Equipment Qualifica- 4. See Generic Equipment Qualifi-
- 4. PPS equipment is qualified for 4 tion verification acthities (ITA). cation Acceptance ' Criteria (AC).
seismic loads and emironment for locations where installed.
Failures in the process control sys- 5. Review of the design documenta- 5. Separate equipment in phpically 5.
tion to verify physical separation separate locations are used for the tems can not propagate to the PP3.
and electrical isolation between the PPS and process control systems.
PPS equipment and the process Isolation is provided at interfaces control systems. between the PPS and the process control systems.
Failures in sensors or signal condi- 6. A preoperational test on a set of 6. The response of the process con-6.
tioners used by both the process PPS components that is represen- trol system to the single failure tative of all sets of components does not impede or delay the PPS control systems and the PPS will demonstrates independence of PPS response.
not result in a process control sys.
tem response that conflicts with and process control system res-the PPS response. ponses for the single failure of any common sensor or common signal conditioncr.
8-10-92 1.7.1
- - - _- ~ , ,
- y L SYSTEM 80+= 7 e' 4- *
{-
_t .H=,.
r TABLE'1.7.1-1 (Continuedl PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Cdteria Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
~ 7. Upon loss of power or disconnec-'. 7. Field .' tests to confirm that upon- 7. Upon loss of power ;or disconnec-tion of components,_ fail-safe fail- loss of power or disconnection of a tion of the representative : sample ure modes result. representative . sample - of. active of the PPS, ' a trip ' condition or l Sub Assembly PPS components, bypass inhibit occurs.
trip conditions or bypass inhibits will result The representatist
. sample shall consist of one of each different type module, power sup-ply, and cable utilized -in one PPS
+
Channel.
- 8. Access to trip setpoints, calibra- 8. Visual field inspections of the in. 8. - P h y sie aI barriers . exist.
tion controls and test" points is re- stalled equipment confirm .the Administrative controls exist and stricted by physical barriers ' and existence of physical barriers and include procedures that restrict administrative controls. administrative controls. personnel access to sensitive areas
< by requiring prior administratist approval-
- 9. The four divisions of the PPS are 9. Inspections of fabrication and in- 9. Installed PPS equipment . as
] redundant, . separated and elec- stallation records and construction depicted in Figures 1.7.1-2,
- trically isolated. drawings or visual - field inspec- 1.7.1-3, 1.7.1-4, 1.7.1-5 and j tions of the installed PPS equip- 1.7.1-6 (Note 1).
i ment will be used to confirm the
- quadruple redundancy of the PPS, physical separation between the four divisions and electrical 4 isolation at interfaces.
+
1.7.1 8-10-92 i
, SYSTEM 804 " '
- ;Ledt"d"]qpp %
- TABLE 1.7.1-1 (Continued) f-PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria i Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria .
- 10. - PPS operations, both on-line ' and 10. Preoperational tests confirm the 10. The installed ' reactor protection .
off-line, can be verified by means capability to perform trip bistable s3 stem configuration, controls, .;
. tests, channel ~ functional power sources and installatic . of of individual _ . instrument ' channel - tests, functional test s, - trip - system channel calibrations, : coincident interfacing systems - supports the- . l-functional tests and total system logic tests, reactor trip initiation PPS logic system functional testing functional tests. logic tests, manual trip test, and and the operability verification of engineered safety feature initiation design as follows: ,
and actuation logic . tests. These tests will involve simulation of PPS a. Installed PPS hardware /firmware testing modes of operation. Tests initiates trip conditions in all four -
will confirm interlocks associated PPS automatic trip systems .upon with the reactor mode switch posi- coincidence of trip conditions in :
tions, and with other operational two or more instrument channels
, and maintenance bypasses or test associated with the same trip var-switches and associated annunc- iable(s).
, iation, display and logging func . ,
tions. b. Installed system initiates trip upon ;
! coincidence of trip conditions in two or more of the four PPS auto--
matic trip systems.
l C. Installed system initiates - trip I conditions if two manual trip f i svntches are operated. .
4 I
l 'i 1.7.1 8-10-92 -;
- - i w w . u
~
SYSTEM 80+" p p p y" ,.
l LJV zmi t TABLE 1.7.1-1 (Continued)-
PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Comm;tment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. (continued) '-
d, Installed system . initiates ESFAS
- 10. (continued) actuation signal upon coincidence of associated ESF trip conditions in two or more of the four PPS automatic trip sptems.
- e. Installed system initiates ESFAS actuation signal if two of the four associated ESF manual initiation switches are operated.
- f. Trip system and ESF initiation-(automatic and manual) trip con-ditions latch and protectiw actu-ation signals are maintained.
- g. Installed system provides isolated status and control signals to data logging, display, and annunciator i
systems.
i
- h. Installed system demonstrates op-erational interlocks (i.e., trip inhibits or permissives) required l
' for different conditions of reactor operation.
8-10-92 1.7.1
f SYSTEM 80+" P3 tm
- L.x N ^8r W
-e ir-
[.
- TABLE 1.7.1-1 (Continuedl a
PLANT PROTECTION ' SYSTEM i Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 11. The PPS provides timely initiation ~11. ' . Preoperational tests confirm ' the 11. ' Response times less than or equal e of reactor trip and . . protective - design response - times. to the following:
system actuations.
(continued on next page) ,
^
NOTE 1: Such' diagrams' are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the System 80+
The simplified diagrams are not systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. -
necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive - of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact ' representations - of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility ,
referencing the certified . design.
F L
1.7.1 8-10-92 f
r e
h 3 y- m
- p n,-
u n', j > r ,
' SYSTEM 80+ "
Acceptance Criteria (continued)
- 11, (continued)'
(RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure Illgh (1.15) seconds Pressurin:r Pressure low (1.15) seconds "'
Steam Generator Level ~- Iligh (1,15) seconds
- Steam Generator level - Low (1.25) seconds "'
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (1.15) seconds "'
Containraent Pressure - liigh (1.15) seconds "'
' Reactor Coolant Flow . Iow (1.20) *, (0.85)
- seconds Variable Over Power Trip - -(0.55) seconds
- Logarithmic Power Lcycl - liigh . (0.55) seconds *
- Local Power Density' Iligh :.
a): Neutron Flux Power from Excores (0.55) seconds
- b) CEA Positions (135) seconds
- c) CEAC Penalty Factor (0.75) seconds
- DNBR - 14w .
~
a) Neutron Flux ' Power from 'Excores -(0.55) seconds *
- b) CEA- Positions (135) seconds
- c) . Cold Leg Temperature - (0.55) seconds
- d) Ilot leg Temperature (2.61) seconds
- e) Primary Coolant Pump Shaft Speed (030) seconds
- f) Reactor. Coolant Pressure from- Pressurizer (0.55) seconds
- g) CEAC Penalty Factor- (0.75) seconds *
- a. - Unless otherwise noted, response time is defined as the time interval from when the monitored - parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at -
the input ? to the channel sensor until electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive mechanism,
- b. . For sheared shaft eventi. reactor trip is required 1.20 seconds after the flows in the hot leg reaches its analpis setpoint.
- e. For steam line break with loss of off. site power - up to 30 minutes into the eveut.- Reactor trip is required 0.85 seconds after the core flow reaches its analysis setpoint.
- d. The CPC signal delay is defined as the time interval from when the monitored parameter excceds the trip setpoint at the output of the
- channel L sensor until . electrical power is interrupted to the CEA mechanism,
- t. .
1.7.1 8-10-92
SYSTEM 80+" __
ORAFT Acceptance Criteria (continued)
- 11. (continued)
(ESFAS)
Lo Pressurizer Pressure - SIAS, CIAS (135) seconds "'
lo Steam Generator Level - AFAS (1.45) seconds "'
to Steam Generator Pressure - MSIS (135) seconds "'
Ili Steam Generator Level - MSIS (135) seconds "'
111 Containment Pressure - SIAS, CIAS, MSIS (135) seconds *'
Ili lli Containment Pressure - CSAS (135) seconds
'd -
- a. Time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the input to the channel sensor until the output of the actuation relays in the ESF Cabinet changes state.
1.7.1 8-10-92
SYSTeu80.
- OTHER SYSTEMS . CHANNELA LDRAF1
.. . OTHER CHANNELS PPS CHANNEL A SENSORS .
MAINTENANCE AND TEST PANEL U
'h CHANNEL A SIGNAL CONDITIONING i
POWER
- ~ * - ~-#k* " ~ ~'~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - -
F . - - 'S TO ITP'S
-- -ll F--C IN OTHER CONTROL SYSTEM 4 _ _ _
_ig __
INTERFACE
f-
-- - - - - - - - --f---
F--O CHANNELS AND DISCRETE TEST INDICATION ,._ PROCESSOR ___jk_
AND ALARM (ITP)
SYSTEM
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
"a 's DATA 'YU 17 U
~
l BISTASLE CORE Y EM TRIP ' PROTECTION PROCESSORS CALCULATOR gg a = - - - ---- A,_,,_
Ql- -- -B TO COINCIDENCE aT e
_... . : : - *C PROCESSORS IN
- -D OTHE CHANNEM MA.IN CONTROL PANEL I 8 U . '.t {-
' ' + - - - - - B FROM BISTABLES OPERATOR S MODULE +gh.._ss- . COINCIDENCE PROCESSOR + - --- Y -- C AND CPCS IN e
+ ~ ~
~lyl--D OTHER CHANNELS ,
MANUAL INITIATION ::::: (- 37 q7 REACTOR TRIP INITIATION ESF INITIATION 8
n MAIN CONTROL ROOM -
A m _
TRANSFER SWITCH ,/ _,j o h e y . DATA LINK OR REMOTE SHtITDOWN PANEL HARD WIRED TO REACTOR TRIP TO ESF-CCS NON-CONDUCTING OPERATOR'S MODULE MEh---* SWITCHOEAR (CH-A)
- - DATA LINK (E.O. FIBER OPTIC)
MANUALINITIATION FIGURE 1.7.1-1 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM INTERFACES
, , . , ,,~w
!" ( -
{l l '
Ci t- A CH-O CH-C Cit-O PROCEGS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS
. INST. It4S T . INST. INS T.
^ ^ -^ s<
^
s gyggggopu < -v v F F F V l F CPc l P cec l F CPc l P cPc CH-A CH-D CH-C CH-D ONE TRIP DIST ADLE DISTABLE
-PER PARAuETER DISTADLE DIST ABLE DISTADLE TRIP TRIP TRIP TRIP SET POINT PROCESSORS.. PROCESSORS I CPC/CH. PROCESSORS PROCESSORS..
2 DIST. PROC./ Cit .
CHANNEL TO ,
G AL SO ATION U " N N ENI N N UI ' ' " "I _
"N f Y " " '
l0lClDlIAl l C l D ll A l 0 l D lAl0lCl
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[
I b' LOCAL CH-A CH-D CH-C CH-D COINCIDENCE LOGICS CO!NCIDENCE COINCIDENCE COINCIDENCE COINCIDENCE PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS ONE/ TRIP 2 COIN. - PROC./CH.
p f p p U U U ESF U
INIT!ATION LOGIC RT ESF RT ESF RT ESF RT O A Cll- A CH-D CH-C CH-D g , C T C ON ^CH INI INIT INIT- INIT INIT INIT INIT INR ON, PER CHANNEL U F F M R TRIP l RT-D l l RT-C l l RT-D l h^N O l RT-A l "lr 7 p y f -D
_]. Uf 7 ] -C P H _
" " ~
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! FIGURE 1.7.1-2 PPS BASIC BLOCK DIAGRAM i
+ .
f ~g ** k r* * + l Y L./- j SYSTEM 80+ m
@ @ hip,^^'C
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AN [ ANOT ANth ANO[
i, ING NO] - NO @D S. l ANO l SYPASS I ANO I 7 ANO l ~l AND ' l O
N
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At fC8 f k A2 C2f A3 C3f fC4 _
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- frond FROu rROu FROW HIGH HIGH H10H HIGH CONT. CONT.
CONT. PRESS.
P !SE PRESS. '
CONT.
PHZSS. ]
LCL y " LCL LCL CHAN.A LCL CHAN. 5 CHAN C CHAN. O g'!
- CIAS LOGIC -
g'/ / N/ /
SIAS SIAS STAS fil AS IOCNT 80>4. TO - REWOTC REWOTE SIAS LOGIC . REWOTC REWOTC WAtAJAL WANUAL uANUAL u Anvet -
LLUSTRATCO rucy -
I.. t I.- o
(
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[ INITS ATION TO CIAS T O CI AS T O CI AS
- pr y., . TO CtAS OR OR LOGIC CR OR MYvow to CalWM&L$
A ( G e.w y y if it il 11- y it it u AL (N4TI A TION j' 'll i' 1' it . i' it it it 11 1; .1. it it'- 1 1, LOGIC
-. AA AS AC AD . DA (M) DC 00 CA CS CC CD DA 00 OC to
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SELECTIVE t. ELECTIVE SELECTIVE SCLECTivE 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 2 OJT CF 4 2 OJT OF 4 LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC EFAS-t EFAS-t EFAS-t EFAS-t ACTUATION
' ~
I l , ! .
Cn _ H SO4 m H SG-4 m _ Ni SG4 Ni SG t m _ LEWL f, ~ LEvCL g _. _ LEVEL p, LEVEL p, I' ii it it CNN1 CGCOPCNT CC14 9 4'N1 CLM D ONT COvifKX. CONTHOL CONTHOI-- OC>t1HOL LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC i l- 1 i M TRA2d A TRAIN 6 T R AtN C TRAIN D
_ COdWETS -
- CohoorCNTS - + CohoorCNTS +CObdD CNTS EFAS- -
+ Nt SG-t LEVEL.
CLOSES V ALVE ' EFASat a EMERGENCY FEEDwATER ACTUATION SIGNAL 4
+ + EF AS ' LOGIC - CFAS*2
- EKAGCNCY FEEDWATER SOENilbAL TO ACTUATION SIGNAL-2 '
b A - LC i . '
'.S-u
. FIGURE 1.7.1-4 .
ESFAS FUNCrlONAL LOGIC (EFAS1, EFAS2)
I t -y 1 , .+ -
h
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- n n y [- ].,-
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t t'ai Ot ra t p We4 NT f'HCSSLSC t T AGL(;
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2 OJT (f 4 COlHCIDCNCC E OJT OF 4 2 OUT (f 4 2 OJT (f 4 LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC low STEAM LOW STCAH
/ low STEM low STEAM -(4tCRA101
" MtCRA104 '- CitCfM1 Oft - OCFCRAlOl NO. I NO. f NO. s e4 0. I fM ESStJ1C f4 ES"AKC iMICS9AC fM E SSiflC LOW STEAM low STEM LCM STCAu low STCAu
- OCtCRATOl - COCRA103 - 00tCRA101
- UFCRATOR NO. 2 NO. 2 NO. 2 - 740. 2 StSTABLE TRtP At() III D I OIbb"AII I'INE9IIC I4Ibb9 IC LOCAL COtNClO(NCC L OGIC Slull AH 10 ( HtGH STCAu HIGH STEAu HfGH STEAM HIGH SirAu - GCtCf1ATOl tt )N fita NT ~ CO CFATOl - GEtCRAIOl -(EPCRA101 g 3(ggj( NO. 8 NO. I NO. t NO. I LCvCL Livil LLvCL LEvCL HIGH STEAu HIGH STEAu H1Gt( S1 CAM HIGH STE Au ~ GEtCRATOl
- CEtCRATOR - CEttRAT(il ~ CD CRATOR NO. 2 940. 2 NG. 2 NO. 2 LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL LEvt.L uSIS uslS uSIS usts IE_uoiC - FCuoTE - HE uoTC - FEuoTC -
unajAL uArgjAL uAra>AL awa)AL 1: if li 1 1; i F1 i'il li I: I'it 1; it 1[ 1l 1; I j 1[ ij 1[ It il Il i INIT1 ATlON On OR\ OR 01 LOGIC
/
i qq i , y 1! it DA 00
- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - -
C'JM AA BA CA DA An (M3 Cn 00 SELCCTIVCl SCLECTIVC 2 OJT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 LOGIC LOGIC WGIS uslS _
- M N y 1;
ACTU AT ION V31St WAIN STCAu 01g , 01 LOctC ISOL ATIOtt StGNAL -
CCMh3NENT COS44)O4T CONT ROL CONim]L LOGIC LOGIC I I s TflAIN A 1 R AIN O a
{ CCM*OrO4TS uSIS CCMUCNTS {
FIGURE 1.7.1-5 ESFAS FUNCTIONAL LOGIC (MSIS) l l
i ..
l A 3h. p~( ,,,
i - .,-
} {
SYSTEM R0+ m
,,,G ..GNCo ,A - Mi mSw BiSTA8(C 1 Red
- a r
As A7 aJ A4 i i i i 6# B2 03 6e i i i i Lt C2 C3 (4 i tti Ot O2 03 04 A4 e4 C4 04 At es C 4 Os A2 62 C2 02 A3 81 C3 03 O 4 2 C1 4 MWE 2 1 4 2 CV 4 2 LOMC LOGtC L OGIC LOGIC CSAS OSAS M CSAS $MI T I A 140N M WJfC *EW)f t M W)1C - M u)tt L.OG4C writent t enre4Jat i ene#4 eat i we4 Jet.
01 04 G1 G4
- F,e e. R.
. < m.,
R g ,_ - - . g g-.- ----.g g - - .-.- - - - - - - - - - -
i i i L SE LT Citvt
_Li i i5t'L E C 18vt 2 031 (F 4 2 OJT (F 4 L OGIC L OG8C CSAS C%A5 w** bN. ,7 wo4JsL f CSAS* CONT A3NhCodl 544 TAT AC TUA T 40N 54GeeAL CIw%M stT CCMtDe N1 O)41HLX, (INIMll L OG4C LOGIC I i
[
I TRAsse A COW TM NT$
T A Ated 6 CfM V M NT$
,1
, 1 11, , 1---11 1 -- ,
,r 1 1
$ A$ $ $
CIAS l CtAS C1AS CIAS M.sa)tE N WOTE , PEnOTC M u)TC uAedyL i adme4 Lent i, wae.AAL 4 unr4JnL 1, gt (yg gg 'gg GN T A Y TON AA #8 BA 08 CA CS CA On _
M W"CCS AA on CA DA A8 00 CO (M C4 Ass Co4TApedCNT 2 1 4 2 4 ISOL AIION L001C AC T UA T IOrd Lt%8C~
gggg CIA 5 S** WMJAL we4JaL ,,
AC Af TOM
< cyg gg}
- SIA$a SAFETY #4JCC TION ACT uATION 54Ge4AL COWMN'NT Ci%f MD4' NT CENT *Q, C[NYggA, 6 OGtC LOGaC 4 I
& CSO'es c,,, M4415 i FIGURE 1.7.1-6 EFSAS FUNCI'IONAL I.OGIC (CSAS, CIAS)
- m-- -__.__-____.---m , _ . _ . _ _ -_ _ - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - . _ _ - - - __.m_- -- - _ . - _ - _ - - - -
l
~
'l : '7 g- ,
av.
- s .? ?
- SYSTI?M 80+ m CHAtJtJEL 0,C,0 CitAf4NEL A CA01 NET SIMILAR TO CH-A DISTABLE TRIP h5
- , n PROCESSORS e
COINCIOEt4CE PROCESSORS
{ ]
o n 1' it ib P
l INTERFACE e TEST PROCESSOR l n a a c n i ,
LOCAL "~ A A c ,
.c - c OPERATCR uODULC FO FO FO FO FO '
() y --
- . - - - - -q -
f
~~
U \
WCR OPERATOR K WODULE
- u
-REuOTE- --
SHUTDOWN FIBER FIBER PANEL OPTIC OPTIC OPERATOR MODEMS CABLE uGOULE RTSS-A l STATUS F'OACK]
ESF-CCS-A l STATUS F*DACKl e
OISCRETE IttOICATION l l t ALARu SYSTEu OATA PROCESSING SYSTEu l l u
POWER CONTROL SYSTEu l l FIGURE 1.7.1-7 PPS FUNCITON INTERFACE AND TES11NG DIAGRAM l-I
Ip' /( C '"-
SYSTEM 80+"
1.9.1 SPENT FUEL STORAGE Design Description The spent fuel storage racks are free standing structures that support and protect spent fuel assemblics and assure a geometrically safe con 6guration with respect to nuclear criticality. Conceptualillustrations of both the Spent Fuel Storage Rack and the Spent Fuel Storage Rack Arrangement are shown in Figures 1.9.1 1 and 1.9.12, respectively (NOTE 1). The number of Spent Fuel Storage Racks used meets plant storage capacity as licensed by the NRC. -
The spent fuel storage racks are designed to maintain a neutron multiplication factor less than Keff=.95 for each of the two following loading conditions considered separately:
- 1. a) Loaded Fuel Rack dead weight b) Maximum temperature variation c) Hrce component seismic loading resulting from the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)
- 2. Drop of a fuel assembly plus fuel assembly handling tool onto the rack The spent fuel storage racks are designed and constructed to meet the stress acceptance criteria of the ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3, Component Supports.
The spent fuel storage racks are of Seismic Category I classification.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for spent fuel storage.
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustre 'ng the general conceptual design features of the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certified design.
1.9.1 -1 8 10-92 1
JRAFT
' SYSTEM 80+a TABLE 1.9.1-1 SPENT FUEL STORAGE Inspection. Tests. Analysis and Acceptance Criteria Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspection. Test. Analysis
- 1. Visual inspection of the rack veri- 1. The number of cells available
- 1. The rack arrangement has storage fies rack size, location and cap- equals licensed capacity.
locations for spent fuel storage as shown generally in Figures 1.9.1-1 acity. Count available ccits.
and 1.9.1-2. (NOTE 1)
Examine the following informa- 2. Fabrication Data Package and
- 2. The rack is designed and con- 2.
tion in the Fabrication Data Pack- Certificate of Conformance structed in accordance with the document the following-following specific sections of age and Certificate of Confor-ASME Code,Section III, Subsec- mance in accordance with Quality tion NF, Class 3, Component Sup- Class 3:
ports.
a? Calculated stresses and stress limits a) Calculated stresses do not exceed a) Stress limits in accordance with the stress limits set by NF -
NF " Design by Analysis for Class
" Design by Analysis for Class 3 3 Components" Components" 8-10-92 1.9.1
mn 'pp SYSTEM 807
- "pf3 LM*et - L:
TABLE ~ 1.9.1-1 (Continued) .
SPENT FUEL STORAGE-Inspection. Tests. Analysis and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment ' Inspection. Test. Analysis - Acceptance Criteria 2.b) Weld process in accordance ~ with' '2.b) Weld process description 2.b) . Weld process complies with - NF -
NF " Rules ' governing Making, " Rules governing. Making, Exami-Examining, and Repairing Welds - ning, and Repairing Welds" c) Visual inspection ' acceptance c) Visual weld inspection results c) Welds comply with visual inspec-criteria in accordance with NF - tion ' acceptance ' criteria of NF '-
" Acceptance Standards for Visual
- 3. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks have 3. Perform the following activities: 3. Design Verification ' Analysis the following ' structural charac- shows the following:
teristics to maintain .Keff less than
.95:
a) Dead weight plus thermal plus SSE a) . For dead weight plus therm plus a) The calculated values of nem-l loads result in membrane stress SSE loads, compare the calculated brane stress intensity .and mem-intensity ' less than 1.20 Sy and membrane stress intensity and brane plus bending stress intensity membrane plus bending . stress calculated membrane plus bending- are, respectively, less than 1.20 Sy intensity less than 120 Sy. stress intensity in- the Design and 1.80 Sy.
Verification ~ Calculation to the limits of 1.20 - Sy and 130 Sy, respectively.
1.9.1 8-10-92
E SMMU I
f q$l$
f m A c- ==
b l
I l SYSTEM 80+"
l i
l TABLE 1.9.1-1 (Continued)
SPENT FUEL STORAGE Inspection. Tests. Analysis and Acceptance Criteria Inspection. Test. Analysis Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment 3.b) Storage Rack loads produced by 3.b) In the Design Verification Calcu- 3.b) The calculated stress is less than lation, compare the calculated the yield stress in the region of the the drop of a fuel assembly plus a fuel assembly handling tool do not stress resulting from the drop of a active fuel cause permanent deformation in fuel assembly plus a fuel assembly the region of the active fuel. handling tool to the yield stress over the height of the active fuel Measure pitch between cells and c) Measured pitch and separation are c) Pitch between cells and separation c) separation between modules and in accordance with the design between modules meet the limits compare the measured values to drawings cnd the values used in shown on the design drawings and the values on design drawings and the critica!ity analysi; used in the criticality analysis.
to the values used in the criticality analysis.
l S-10-92 1.9.1
- . g
~ n((j N p'((A-Jg d'~~
[y-SYSTEM 80+"
TABLE 1.9.1-1 (Continued)
SPENT FUEL 'STORAGE ,
Inspection. Tests Analysis and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Inspection. Test. Analysis Acceptance Criteria 4
4.- Licen t:d fuel assemblies will fit in 4 A gauge shall be inserted for the 4 The . inspection gauge passes freely +
storage locations. full length of each storage - through . the ' full" length . of each location. - storage location. '
Note (1) . Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual. design features of the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations ' of the detailed system configurations that 'will be utilized 'in any facility referencing . the certified design.
t t
1.9.1 8-10-92
3
..I t [ls./'ig (}T "jt ~
i SYSTEM 80t"
. d)
(N x
N I e
N 'd /-]
x ' s T /
4 N x}
E
'I# d /
t P,
s
- s s ss j>
, e 4 4 # #
g 4 8 , #
% 0 4 8 kg FIGURE 1.9.1-1 SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACK l
1
c~ j l
f M ir#M
' SYSTliM 80'+
'~ r/ fA l *S.
., [\?t-l** k^ (p a
, at
, ,1
, f
, . NEW f UEL ,c 4 'l 5TORAGE ,1
- ,, ,y
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- l NEW FUEL '%:
[' ,
INSPECTION <
[
, . (
AREA g.g,,,,4,g ,
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- .gg,,jg,,gg,g ,,gg,3,j,,, ;
5: J
%,' y
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!, s' s', /
, 7 s'
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('
[
CASK /
2, . CASK WASH v ,
',, LAYDOWN % NUCLEAR s DOWN 3
-l; AREA- ,% ANNEX
. AREA
'. . 1 BUILDING fNsptcTh 8 [yNI 7
l 5
, y
~, 5,
',', ! N
- ll!lli!.ll!
- m::: s
- lili!!!!ili
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s -
FUEL- N s
s' POOL v 7 g y ;;ggg=
g s *4 !i'il:i '#
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ii ' "! '!:!!ili
/ l ::l
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l,:,;geggedg' pegg,ss2 s's
% s ss _ _ ._ _
O s,s
_ ' FUEL TRANSFER CANAL _ _ __ _
%,s N' '
CONTAINt1ENT A Ge?U2 Mf2Mf2MddfMdfMddf22Md 2022222M 2 2d BUILDING
\-
M NUCLEAR ANNEX DUILDING >
/
FIGURE 1.9.1-2 SPENT FUEL POOL ARRANGEMENT
AFT SYSTEM 80 + "
1.9.2.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
- Design Description
'Ihe Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) is a closed loop cooling water system that removes heat from the plant's safety related and non. safety related components and heat exchangers during operatien, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. The CCWS, in conjunction with the Station Senice Water System (SSWS) and the Ultimate deat Sink (UIIS), is capable of ren.oving the heat generated by essential components and heat exchangers that require component cooling water to achieve and maintain safe reactor cold shutdown and cooling following a limiting design basis event.
The Component Cooling Water System is an intermectate cooling water system between the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the Station Senice Water System (S.cWS). The CCWS provides protection against station service water leakage into the Reactor Coolant System. The CCWS also is a barrier against the release of radiological contamination into the environment.
The CCWS has two 100% capacity divisions. Each division is connected to its corresponding SSWS division through the component cooling water heat exchangers.
Each division has heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain safe cold shutdown.
Each division of the CCWS includes two component cooling water heat exchangers, a component cooling water surge tank, two component cooling water pumps, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. There are no cross connections between the two divisions. A single failure of any component in the CCWS will not impair the ability of the CCWS to meet its functional requirements. A general conceptual illustration of the CCWS is shown in Figure 1.9.2.2-1 (NOTE 1). '
Equipment depicted in Tables 1.9.2.2-2 and 1.9.2.2-3 receives component coohng water flow during the plant operating modes indicated.
i The temperature of the component cooling water leaving each component cooling water heat exchanger is regulated by a component cooling water bypass control valve.
A flow path is provided in each division to meet each CCWS pump's minimum pumped flow requirements.
The component cooling water surge tanks supply component cooling water at a pressure equal to or greater than each CCWS pump's required NPSII. Each ink allows for expansion arid contraction of fluid in the system due to temperature changes and provides a means to monitor Guid leakage into and out of the system.
1.9.2.2 - 8-10-92 l
l l
FT SYSTEM 80+"
Fluid losses are accommodated by Huld volume in the surge tank. System venting and filling are accomplished using the surge tanks. Each tank is also provided with an overnow line to protect against overpressurization. Instrumentation is provided to monitor component cooling water level in each surge tank. In the event that surge tank level falls below the low-low level setpoint, CCWS controls isolate component cooling water flow to cooling loops composed of non-nuclear safety class component cooling water piping.
Redundant isolation valves on the supply and return lines for cooling loops composed of non-nuclear safety class component cooling water piping assure the integrity of the safety related portions of the system. All pneumatic valves fail to safe positions upon the loss of instrument air. 'Ihe valves terminate flow to these cooling loop components upon the receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) except cooling water How to the reactor coolant pumps.
System water chemistryis controlled to minimize corrosion. The capability is prosided to sample water, and to adjust water pH by the addhion of chemicals. Organic fouling -
and inorganic buildups are minimized by water treatment. Radiation monitors and-system i sampling. are - provided to detect radioactive contamination in water.
Contaminated water can be processed as liquid waste.
Makeup water to the CCWS is supplied by the Demineralized Water Makeup System
- (DWMS) Makeup to the component cooling water surge tanks is automatic or can be initiated manually by operator action. If the DWMS is unavailable, a safety related backup makeup line of Seismic Category I construction is provided from the Station Service Water System. A remo.able spool piece on this line prevents the inadvertent addition of station service water. The spool piece does not interconnect independent divisior.s.
Instrumentation and controls monitor and control the CCWS. Failure of non. safety related instrumentation and controls will not cause degradation of the performance
, 'of safety equipment. The following process indications are provided in the Control Room:
A. . Component cooling water pump discharge pressure.
- B. Component cooling water pump discharge now.
C. Component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature.
D. - Component cooling water surge tank level.
E. Component cooling water radiation activity.
1.9.2.2 8 10-92
_ p_Y, STEM 80+ =
DRAFT The following alarms are provided in the Control Room:
A. Component cooling water pump high and low discharge flow alarms.
B. Component cooling water heat exchanger alarms for high and low outlet temperature.
C. Component cooling water surge tank alarm for high, low, and low-low level; D. Component cooling water high radiation activity alarm.
Controls are provided to initiate manually or to terminate manually component cooling water flow to components. Flow to each shutdown cooling heat exchanger is initiated and. terminated manually from the control- room. Flow to each containment spray heat excuanger is initiated automatically upon the receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) and can be terminated manually from the control room. Flow to each spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger can be initiated and terminated manually from !he Control Room. Flow to each spent fuel pool cooling heat' exchanger is terminated automatically by a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), but can be re-established manually.
Each division of the CCWS consists of essential and non-essential cooling loops.
Essential cooling loop piping and components are of ASME Section III Class 3 classification. The component cooling water pumps, component cooling water heat exchangers, and component cooling water surge tanks, are of ASME III Section III
- Class 3 classification.
Contaimnent isolation.vahes and containment penetration piping are of ASME Section III Class 2 classification. With the exception of those containment isolation
~ ~
valves that isolate component cooling water flow to the reactor coolant pumps,-
containment isolation valves within the CCWS close upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS).
The essential portions of the CCWS are designed as Seismic Category I. Failure of -
non-essential portions within the CCWS does not cause degradation of the cooling water flow'to safety related components.
Each division of the CCWS receives power from the Class 1E Auxiliary Power
. System._ In the event of a loss of offsite power, each CCWS division receives power fromits nsociated on-site emergency power source (cmergency diesel generator).
L Components of the CCWS dcpicted in Figure 1.9.2.2-1 are capable of being inspected L and tested (NOTE 1).
t 1.9.2.2 8-10-92 L
DRAFT SYSTEM 80+ a inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.2.2-1 provides the inspections, tests, and/or analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the CCWS.
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and theli interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certiGed design.
l 1.9.2.2 ,4- 8 10-92
svs- sa- DRAFT TABLE 1.9.2.2-!
COMPONEN LING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analvscs and Acceptance Criteri.a
! Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Comrnitment Instn-tions. Tests. Anabws Inspections of the as-built CCW3 1- Actual CCWS, e inose ce=ponents
- 1. The general conSguration of the 1.
shown, with Figure configuration. conforms CCWS is shown in Figure 13.2.2-1 13.2.2-1 p?OTE 1).
(NOTE 1).
Jests and analysis to verify heat 2. Each CCWS dhisica can dissipate
- 2. Each CCWS dhision has the 2.
dissipation capacity. the heat loads of crmnected capacity to dissipate the beat loads condensers, cooters, and heat of connected condensers, cooiers, exchangers.
and heat exchangers.
- 3. The CCWS flow in the Cow path in l
- 3. Each CCWS division is provided a 3. Tests to measure finw in the flow '
path in each CCWS dhision. cach dhision meets each CCu3 Cow path to meet each CCWS pump's minimum Dow requirement.
pump's minimum pumped flow Compare measured flow to each CCWS pump's rninimum flow requirements.
requirement. l 4 Inspection of control room instru- 4.a) The pmess indicators are prmided 4.a) The foUoaing process indications in the Control Room in accordance are prmided in the control room: mentation. Ahrm generated by simulated signals. with the Table 13.2.2-1, Certified Design Commitment No. 4a.
A. Component ooling water pump discharge pressure B. Component cooling water pump discharge flow C. Component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature D. Component cooling water surge tank level E. Component cooling water radi-ation acthity 8-10-92 1.9.2.2
I DRAFT
~
SYSTEM 80+=
4 l TABLE 1.9.2.2-1 (Continued)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
. Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment. Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria .
4.b) . The following alarms are provided '4.b) The alarms are provided in ' the in the Control ' Room: . Control Room in accordance with the Table 1.922-1, Cc:tified De-A. Component cooling ~ water pump . sign Description, No. 4b. Alarms
- . high and low discharge flow.. actuate in response to simulated I '
' alarm. signals.
I ' B. Component cooling water heat exchanger alarms for high and i Iow outlet temperature.
j C. Component cooling water surge j tank alarm for high, low, and l- low-low level.
j D. Component cooling water . high j radiation activity alarm.
i
- 5. Controls. are L provided ' to initiate 5. Tests of initiation an,i termination, S. CCWS controis operate in accord-
, manually or to terminate compon- both automatically and manually, of ance with the Table L9M-1, Cert-t ent cooling water flow to the fol- component cooling wat r flow from ified Design Commitment, No. 5.
! lowing; components as specified the Control Room. SIAS and CSAS
- below: signals are simu!ated.
I-j l.9.2.2 S-10 92
. . . .. ~ . . _. -- - - , _ - . ._ . . ~ . . - , _ . . . -_ __ , . , . ~ _ _ - _ _ _ , . _ , . _ . .
DRAFT SYSTEM 80+"
4 TABLE I.9.2.2-1 (Continued)
~
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
- j. Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria r ,
4
- Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria i' -
'5. . (Continued) :
a Flow to each shutdown ccoling
- 4. heat exchanger can be initiated l- and terminated manually from
- j. the Centrol Room.
i b. ; Flow to each containment spray -
- heat exchanger is initiated auto-j matically upon the receipt of a i Containment ' Spray Actuation
- j. . Signal (CSAS) and can be term-
! ~ inated manually - from ' the Control Room.
- c. Flow to each spent . fuel poci l cooling : beat exchanger can be i initiated and terminated man-
^
ually in the Control Room.
, Flow to each spent fuel pool j cooling heat exchanger is term-l inated automatically by a Safety
! Inj ection Actuation Signal j (STAS). Flow can be reestab-l lished manually..
l i 1.9.2.2 E-10-92 i
1
- , , -,.- , , . , - - . , , . - , 1,- .. ._. - . -. -< - __ _ , - - _ . - - - - , . - - . - . . - . . - _ _ _ _ __
- i. -
DRAJrB ,
i
=t SYSTEM 80 8 " -
TABLE 1.9.2 2-1 (Continued) ;
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM '
Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria l i !
Certified Design Cnmmitment - Inspections. Tests. Analyses - . Acceptance Criteria j i
. 6_a) Redundant isolation valvet are pro- ' 6.a) Inspection of construction records 6.a) kedundant isolation valves are pro-
' vided on the supply and return lines - and as-built insta!!ation.- sided. j for cooling loops composed of non- t nuclear . safety class ' component l cooling : water piping. ;
b) ~ The isolation valves close upon. . b) Test for closure of valves using a b) Isolation valves close in response to >
- 7. Containment isolation valves and ' 7. Review of plant records to verify 7. Containment isolation vahes and !
containment penetratian piping are . compliance. Test containment '. sol- penetration piping meet ASME '
designed in accordance with ASME.: ation valve closure using simulatio, Section III Class 2 (date) l Section III.' Class 2 - (date) of a CIAS. qG mcst. Containment isolation requirements. Containment valves close on a CIAS sig;nal wit!4 [
isolation- vahes close upon the the exception of those containment }
receipt of a Containment Isolation isolation vahrs which isolate Actuation Signal (CIAS) with the component cooling water flow to exception of those containment the reactor coolant pumps. :
isolation vahts which isolate com-
- ponent cooling water flow to the [
reactor ' coolant pumps. ;
3 I
[
<- t I
i 1.9.2.2 8-10-92 !
, I r
f
- r
, . . . ,-e w rw - -- .- --m- w--s ---w % -_ - .-,+---4.
- .*w+-- m. -m-
DRAFT SYSTEM 80+"
I TABLE 1.9.2.2-1 (Continued)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Simulate a low-low surge tank sig- 8- The affec:ed vaIves isolate supply
- 8. Level indications and controls isol- 8.
nal to test the response of valves and return lines consistirg of non-are supply and return lines of cool- nuclear safety class component ing loops composed of non-nudear that isolate cooling loops composed of non-nuclear safety class com- cooling water piping in response to safety class cornponent cooling a simuisted low-low surge tank water piping in the event of a low- ponent cooling water piping, level signal low surge tank le.tl
- 9. Simulate loss of instrument air con- 9. The afTected vahrs respond to a
- 9. Pneumatically . operated valves fail i G ot' instru:nent air by failing to to safe positions upon the loss of ditions to test response of vahrs operated by instrument air. tm.Tr safe positio.ts.
instrument air.
- 10. See Generic Equipment Quali- 10. See Generic Equipmer.t Ouali-
supply cooling water to safety re-lated equipment are Seismic Cate-gory I and qualified for the en-vironment for locations where in-stalled.
- 11. Each COVS division is capabic of
- 11. Each COVS division operates when 11. CCWS functional tests to demon-strate operation when supplied by operating when supplied by either powered from the Class 1E its Class IE Auxiilary Power Source the Class IE Auxiliary Power Auxiliary Power System or its on- or its on-site emergency power site emergency power source Source or its on-site emergency power source. source.
S-10-92 1.9.2.2
DRAFT i ' SYSTEM 80+"
-TABLE 1.9.2.2-1 (Continued)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM e- < Inspections. Tests.' Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria -
3 Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 12.L The CCWS design permits periodic 12. . Evaluation of. the as-built config-- 12. The COVS components depicted in inspection and testing of COVS uration will be performed. - Figure 1.9.2.2-1 are accessible for components . depicted in Figure periodic inspections and testing 1.9.2.21 .(NOTE 1).
- j. 13. Available' NPSH meets or exceeds 13. Inspect pump ' vendor data to deter-- 13. Minimum pump NFSH, as deter-required COVS pump ' net positive' mine NPSH required by the as-pro- mined based on as-built ' conditions suction head for conditions under cured pump. . Actual system instal- and the results of sendor tests which the COVS pumps : must lation will be inspected, and/or and/or analyses, meets or exceeds
, operate. measurements taken to determine as.procr M pump bTSH require-available pump NPSH.- ments.
- j. 14a) System water ; chemistry is con- 14. Inspection of installation records 1.t. The COVS includes provisions for 1 tro' led. The capability is provided and plant walkdowns to ensure pro- sampling, chemical addition, radi-2 to sample ' . water, and to adjust visions for sampling, chemical ad- ation monitoring, and processing as i water pH by addition of chemicals. dition, radiation monitoring, and liquid waste.
processing as liquid wastes.
b) Radiation ' monitors and system sampling are provided to detect radioactive contamination in water.
] Contaminated water can be proc-essed as liquid waste.
i-Y 1.9.2.2 S-10-92 i
e 4 _ - .. ~ . . _ . , . . _ , . . . _. . , _ . . -
i ..
4
- DRAFT SYSTEM 80+"
o
- TABLE 1.9.2.2-1 (Continned) .
4 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
- Certified Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Anahm Acceptance Critcria
- 15. The CCWS components shown in 15. Inspect Code Data Reports for in- 15. CCWS installation and components Figure 1.9.2.2-1 are installed, and. stallation and components. Inspect have . required ASME Section . III CCWS. . mechanical equipment is the systems and components for N class code stamps per the Code built . In accordance with ASME stamps for 'ASME Section 111 com- Classes shown in Figure 1.9.2.2-1 Section . III requirements that are ponents. for each component (NOTE 1).
shown in Figure ~ 1.9.2.2-1 (NOTE 1).
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and _ equipment, and are not intended to be exact represent 3rions of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certified design.
i' 9
4 1
i 1
1
^
i 1.9.2.2 8-10-92 i
i I
DRAFT l
SYSTEM 80+"
TABLE L9.2.2-2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER CONSUMERS Division 1 0 1 Shutdown Cooling Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Easis [ j Operating Mode /- Normal Operation Initial Final Accident I.
Components ESSENTIAL Note a Shutdoun cooling - X X f X - I l
beat exchanger
- - X l Containment spray - -
heat exchanger Spent fuel pool X (Note b) X -
X (Note b) cooling heat exchangers X X X X X Diesel Generator X X X X X Others (essential)
(Note c)
S-10-92 1.9.2.2
DRAFT SYSTEM RO*"
TABLE 1.9.2.2-2 (Continued)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER CONSUMERS Division 1 i
Shutdown Cooling Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Basis 1 Operating Mode / Normal Operation Accident initin! Final {
Components ff NON-ESSENTIAL .i X X X X j Reactor coolant .X ,1 pumps and pump l
motors 1; X X X X ll Charging pump X l
motor coolers X ! X X X Charging pump X i miniflow heat li exchancer i X X X X -
Others (non-
, essential) (Note d) 8-10-92 1.9.2.2
,-w DR A. 4 e
SYSTEM 80*=
TABLE 1.9.2.2-3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER CONSUMERS Division 2 Operating Mode / Normal Operation Shutdown Cooling Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Basis Components l Initial Final Accident ESSENTIAL Note a Shutdown cooling -
X X X -
heat exchanger Containment spray - - - - X heat exchancer Spent fuel pool X (Note b) -
X (Note b) X -
cooling heat exchangers !
i Diesel generator X X X X X l j Others (essential) X X X X X j (Note c) '.
1.9.2.2 8-10-92
mD A :T
- .Ji\ M 7 2
' SYSTEM 80+"
4 -.
TABLE 1.9.2.2-3 (Continued) t COMPONENT COOLING WATER CONSUMERS Division 2 -
i e
i i
Operating Modef Normal ' Operation ' Shutdown : Cooling' Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Basis Compenents . Initial Final Accident 'h NON-ESSENTIAL l Reactor coolant X X- X X X
- - Pumps and pump motor
4
} Charpng pump X X X X X '.
2 motor coolers
[ Chardng pump X, X X X X
~
miniflow. heat l exchanger j Others (Non- .
X X X X -
i .. essentis) (Note d) t 1.9.2.2 8-10-92 4-
v DRAM SYSTEM 80+"
. NOTES FOR TABLES 1.9.2.2-2 AND 1.9.2.2-3 t
- a. (X) = Equipment receives component cooling water flow in this mode
(-) = Equipment does not receive component cooling water flow in this mode
- b. Either or both spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers can receive flow during this operating mode.
- c. Pump motor coolers, miniflow heat exchangers, and essential chilled water condensers are included in this category.
- d. Normal chilled water condensers, instrument air compressors, letdown heat exchanger, sample heat exchangers. gas j stripper, and boric acid concentrator are included in this category.
i i
i 1.9 2 2 8-10-92 i
I 3 INNS I j a _ ..
staro=senver CCW 8
,s% C
. sSws y
~. "* -
~
CCW RETURN +
CCW FROM CCW PUMP _, . SUPPLY HEAT LOADS TO HEAT LOACS N CCW HX N--
' h t sSWS t
OMS 10N1 l OtVISION AL SEPARATION f3 NNS1 cmSiON 2
,P evmeou s I
er= t=crowarra --
i> %^,g,T4, CCW 4 =^ * ***5" esws murue +
1 SURGE t I
TANK .
n- nh ~' ^ 4 ; CCW HX ; N b-hL
- NOTES
- LL # k I -
CCW PUMP
$3W3 4
! A, THE DEMfMERAUZED WATER y ,
l' MAKEUP UNE AND THE OVERFLOW t UNE ARE SAFETY CLASS NNS.
ALL OTHER PIPING AND COMPONENTS '
SHOWN ARE SAFETY CLASS 3. -
a THE CCW SURGE TANKS AND CCW ! *
{ PUMPS ARE LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR CCW RETURN CCW [
' " " " ' HEAT LOADS TO HEAT j_ LOADS [
l
.W C. A REMOVABLE SPOOL PtECE IS
.N
j LOCATED ON EACH STATION SERVICE I l WATER SYETEM MAKEUP UNE TO EACH f ,
. CCW SURGE TANK. $ H FIGURE 1.9.2.2-1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM ;
I
~ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
l DRAr-w M l SYSTI!M x0+ =
-1.9.6 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS Design Description l
We Compressed Air Systems (CAS) are non-safety iclated systems consisting of the Instrument Air System (IAS), the Station Air System (SAS), and the Breathing Air System (BAS). De Instrument Air System supplies compressed air to air-operated instrumentation, air-operated controls, and air-operated valves. %c Station Air System supplies compressed air for air operated k>ols, and provides compressed air for general use in the plant. %c Breathing Air System supplies compressed air for breathing protection.
The Compressed Air Systems are Class NNS (Non-Nuclear Safety) with the exception of the containment isolation valves and associated piping, which are ASME Code Class 2 and Seismic Categosy I classification. Each containment penetration is isolatable by two independent valves.
The Compressed Air Systems are not required to achieve or maintain a safe reactor shutdown. Imss of Compressed Air Systems functions trigger alarms in the Control Room.
%c IAS has four redundant trains. Each train has 100% capacity and includes an air intake filter / silencer, an air compressor, an air ,cceiver, an air dryer / filter train, and associated piping and valves. A general conceptual illustration of the IAS is shown in Figure 1.9.61 (NOTE 1).
Ioss of instrument air due to a failure of the IAS causes all of the pneumatically-operated, safety-related components to fail to their safe positions.
Therefore, failure of the IAS will not prevent safety related components or systems from performing safety functions.
The SAS has two redimdant trains. Each SAS train has 100% capacity and includes an air intake Giter/ silencer, an air compressor, an air receiver, an air dryer / filter, and associated piping and valves. A general conceptual illustration of the SAS is shown in Figure 1.9.6-2 (NOTE 1).
He BAS has two trains. Each BAS train has 100% capacity and includes an air intake filter / silencer, a breathing air compressor, an air receiver, a breathing air purifier, and associated piping and valves. A general conceptual illustration of the BAS is shown in Figure 1.9.6 3 (NOTI? 1).
Instrumentation is provided to monitor compressed air systems pressure and to control the systems automatically manualiy under operating conditions.
1.9.6 1- 8-10-92
l DRA?T biyTJ13M 80+**
I
'the Compressed Air Systems are supplied c!cctrical power from the off. site power i source. Compressed Air Systems contaire 3ent isolation valve actuators receive electric !
power from the Class 1E Auxiliary Power System. 'the IAS can be powered from the
-on site Non Class 1E Alternate AC Source Standby Power Supply.
'The Compressed Air Systems are designed to permit inspection and testing of the air compressors, receivers, dryers, filters, piping, ar.d valves illustrated in Figures 1.9.6-1, 1.9.6-2 and 1.9.6 3 (NOTE 1).
inspections, Tests, Annlyses, and Acceptance Criteria E
Tabic 1.9.61 provides the inspections, tests, and/or analyses and their with associated acceptance criteria for the CAS.
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of 'llustrating the general conceptual design features of _the System 80+ systems, wrnponents, and equipment and their interrelationships. 'the simplined diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility refemncing the certified design.
1.9.6 8-10 92
_ .- - ._ _. -_ ..,_ _. . . . _ . _ . . . _ . . . _ _. _ _ . . _ _ _ ~ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . .
DRAFT
- SYSTEM 80+"
-TABLE 1.9.6 ,
COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS ;
Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria j
> , i Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria !
t IJ The general configuration. of the IAS 1. - Inspections of the as-built ' IAS con- 1. Actual IAS configuration, for those is shown in Figure .1 sir 1 (NOTE figuration. components shown, conforms v.ith 1). Figure 13.6-1 (NOTE 1). t
- 2. The general configuration of the SAS 2. Inspections of the as-built SAS con- 2. Actual SAS configuration, for those ,
is shown in : Figure 13.6-2 (NOTE figuration. components shown, conforms with i 1). Figure 13.6-2 (NOTE 1). !
t
- 3. The . general configuration of the 3. - Inspections of the as-built BAS con- 3. Actual BAS configuration, for those ;
BAS is shown in Figure 13.6-3. figuration. components shown, conforms with l (NOTE 1). Figure 13.6-3 (NOTE 1).
4 The CAS operates when powered 4 CAS functional . tests to demonstrate 4. The CAS opera,es when supplied by '
from the off-site power source. operation ' when powered from the the off-site power source. j off-site power source.
- 5. The IAS can be powered from the. 5. An IAS functional test to demon- 5. The IAS is capable of operating i i' Non-Class - 1E Alternate AC Source strate operation when powered by when supplied from the Non-Class l Standby Power Supply. the Non Class IE Alternate AC IE Alternate AC Source Standly i Source Standby Power Supply. Power Supply.
i L
i 1.9.6 S-10-92 ,
t I
W g- W w. r r.-. ._ _ , . , , . , . _, . s __ _
c 3 ~cw .
kh$
SYSTEM 80+" -
4 TABLE 1.9.64 (Continued)
COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS 1 Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. The CAS containment penetrations 6. Inspection of construction records 6. The' CAS centainment penetrations are isolatable ' by two independent . and actual system installation. are isolatable by two independent-vdves. valves.
- spections and . testing of CAS com- Figures 13.6-1, 1.9.6-2, and 1.9.6-3
! ponents depicted in Figures 1.9.6-1, [
are accessib!c for periodic inspec- ,
1.9.6-2, and 1.9fr3 (NOTE 1). tions and testing (NOTE 1). .i
- 8. The CAS containment isolation valve 8. Inspection of instaIIed components. 8. The CAS containment isolation valve f a,:tuators receive electric power from actuators are powered from the Class F the Class - IE Auxiliary Power 1E Auxiliary Power System.
- System. ~!
[
- 9. Upon loss of instrument air due to a 9. T st the function of each pneuma- 9. All of the pneumatically-operated, !
]
failure of the IAS, all of the pnen- tically-operated, safety related com- safety related components fail to f matically-operated, safety related ponent with simulated loss of com- 11 r safe positions upon a simulated components fail to their safe posi- pressed air. loss of compressed air.
tions.
-[
F
. N O T E 1: Such diagrams are for the prpcse of illustrating the general concepteal design features of t he System 80+ i l
systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily l to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact l representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the 1.9.6 S-10-92
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DRAFT AR 71LTEM m
N W W W DRVERT ETEM ArR COMPRE,SSOR TRA!N Q
Am RECENER CUTSCE l MSCE CONTAnuEMT CONTAmwENT AIR FILTER I
m
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+
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+
- To tocAToos -s=E CONTAmut4T DRYERTETER e AR COMPRESSOR
' ASME CODE g
s2 y Am FETER RECENER =
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"f7$OE m AIR COMPRESSOR DRYERfLTER CONTArewENT [
COMTAssWENT D"
V g AIR RECENCR AIR FILTER MSTRUMENT Am SUPPLY I ? TO PLANT BUR.DfMGS
, CN CONTA!MMENT I
AIR COMPRESSOR 3RVEntLTER TRAM Am RECENER I
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FIGURE 1.9.6-1 N' INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM N l
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o N =
Am COMPRE3SOR BREATNfMG AnR
- uReER v AR PECEfVER x A. mm o
N Am COMPRESSOR BREATMrwo A!R PURfFtER LASWE C^DE CLASS I l l AswE CODE CLA%
RfCENER g BREATMMO AR SUPPLY TO LOCATONS I -
INSOE CONTAmuENT E mset CONTAmutsi
[ Ourses CONTAfMMEC FIGURE 1.9.6-3 . Emm1.mv BREATHING AIR SUPPLY M'2 ENT
. , ,3
- A.i :
SYSTIM80 4
1.11.1 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM i
l I)esign Description
'lhe Liquid Waste hianagement System (LWhtS) provides the capability to collect, segregate, store, process, sample, and monitor radioactive liauid waste. 'Ihe LWhiS is classified as a non. nuclear safety (NNS) system containing no safety class components except for containment isolation valves and penetrations which are of i Safety Class 2. The LWhtS is a non seismic quali0cd system.
Itadioactive liquid waste is segregated into the following categories:
1, Equipment drain waste which includes, for example, degassed reactor ,
grade radioactive liquid waste
- 2. Floor drain waste which includes, for example, non-reactor grade radioactive liquid waste
- 3. Detergent waste which includes, for example, laundry and hot shower waste liquids
- 4. Chemical waste which includes. for example, non-detergent liquid waste ,
"Ihe waste streams are not interconnected prior to collection and processing. 'lhe LWhtS is not intended to process post accident sources of liquid wastes. Therefore, the LWhis is isolated in post accident conditions by operator action.
'lhe equipment drain waste subsystem provides for filtration, decontamination, batch sampling, and recirculation capability for further processing. A general conceptual illustration of the equipment drain waste subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.11 (NOTE 1).
"Ihe .Hoor drain waste subsystem provides for filtration, decontamination, batch sampling, and recirculation capability for further processing. A general conceptual illustration of the Door drain waste subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.12 (NOTli 1).
'lhe Door drain waste subsystem has the additional capability for oil / crud removal, Docculent addition to collection tanks, and pli adjustment of liquid waste systems.
He chemical waste subsystem has the capability for pli adjustment through chemical addition to the collection tank, filtration, batch sampling, and recirculation to the floor.
drain waste subsystem for further processing. A generalconceptualillustration of the chemical waste subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.1-3 (NOTE 1).
The detergent waste subsystem has the capability for filtration, decontamination by
, demineralizes, batch sampling, and recirculation to the Door drain subsystem for I
~ 1.11.1- 8-10-92 l
- - . m,.---. . . . ,.v.,.. _ _ .,,,,c. ,_-, ..,__,,~,,-.,,._m__,._..,m_._ , , .,,- . . i,_;.._.--_..-..-.m.m
-m, q a m
' j g gp j b'YEXI?M 80+"
I i
further processing. A general conceptualillustration of the detergent waste subsystem i is shown in Figure 1.11.1-4 (NOTE 1). j i
"Ihis LWhtS has collection and storage capacity to process the maximum expected i liquid waste volurnes, based on anticipated peak daily inputs produced during plant operation, refueling, plant shutdowns, maintenance, and startup operations.
1.WhfS sarnple or waste rnonitor tanks have volumes equivalent or greater than their associated collection tanks. 'Ihe steam generator drain tank provides surge capacity only and has no associated sample tank or waste monitor tank. In addition, condensate collected in the containment cooler condensate tank is not radioactive, therefore no sample or dedicated waste monitor tank is provided. 'Ihe LWMS has the capability to divert nows within the LWMS for additional processing.
'lhe system processes radioactive liquid waste so that the concentration of the liquid efauents at the unrestricted discharge point is within the limits specified in 10CFR20, Appendix 13, Table II(Date). 'Ihc LWMS provides minimum decontamination factors of 1000 for radioactive isotopes, except radioactive noble gases and tritiurn, and a minimum dilution How of 100 CFS at the unrestricted discharge point.
The LWMS requires that release of processed liquid waste to the environment requires an operator action. Instrumentation and controls to monitor and control '
LWMS parameters and discharge are provided in the control room. This LWMS can batch-sample and monitor processed liquid waste prior to release to the environment.
A radiation monitor is located upstream of the plant discharge and terminates releases of liquid efnuents automatically if liquid efnuents will exceed the nadioactive concentration limits specified in 10CFR20, Appendix 13, Table II (date) at the unrestricted discharge point. .
(The LWMS is housed in a Radwaste Facility. 'Ihis facility provides adequate spacing for equipment to permit maintenance, testing and inspections.)
-Inspectinns, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria 1
Table 1.11.1-1 provides the inspections, tests and/or analyses and their associated acceptance criteria for the LWMS.
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the System 80+ systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships. 'Ihe sirnplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be- l l cxact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any l facility referencing the certined design.
1,1 L1 8 10-92
. - . . . -.:-.=.-..__....-_.-_____.-_-._..-_-._-_-
, ,, ,7 3 i -- . SYSTEMS 0+" .. 1 I' I
TABLE L11.1 LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i
a .
Certified Design Commitment ,
j -. inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptsace Criteria i
1' L' The L%'MS is designed and buik- ~ 1. ' Inspection of the as-built L%3tS . .La) Actual L%%fS subsystem con-for the components l as follows: configuration. Inspection of ven- figuration dor specification for isotope re- shewn, . conform with Figures
[
j
. a) . ' The general configurations' of the L%%iS L subsystems are shown in moval- factors of L%3tS compon-ents. Measurement of L%%f5 1.1L1-1 through 1.1L1 (NOTE 1).
[ Figures . LIL1-I through LIL1-6 flows . to unrestricted discharge (NOTE 1). points.
]
b) '4Inimum decontamination factors b) Minimttm decontamination factors v - of 1000 ; for radioactive : isotopes of 1003 ar achieved for radio-l~ except radioactive . noble gase.s and L actre isotopes except radioactive j, tritium. noble gases and tritium.
I
! c) A minimum dilution flow at the c) A minimum dilution flow of 100 j unrestricted discharge point of at CFS is achieved.
, least 100 CFS.
4 j d) R
- tculation capability for' d) Liquid wastes can be recirculated i a /,nal processing ~of liquid for additional processing.
I wastes.
4 I
l 1.11.1 8-10-92 i
g L
- - _--_ . , .s _ _ _
- ~.-
w j.m 80+'= -U5M e # :C '
E, .
- TABLE 1.11.1 (Continued) e LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
L Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria i'
- CertiGed Design Commitment' Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criten) i i' 2. ' Each LWMS subsystem described 2.' Inspection and tests . of process 2 The LWMS subsystems process-
, . in the Design Description ' has pro- . flows and storage capacities of as-- flows and storage capacities pro-cess flow- and ' storage capacity to - built LWMS subsystem.' cess the anticipated daily input i process' the anticipated '. daily input : produced during plant operation,
- produced during-. plant operation, refueling, plant shutdowm, main-
- refueling. plant shutdowns, main- tenance, and startup' operations.
t tenance, . and stntup _ operations.
j' 3. The LWMS reduces the concentra . 3. Analysis . of design specifications 3. . The LWMS meets the Table
/: tion of radioactive isotopes in ' and as-built LWMS performance - 1.11.1-1 Certified Design
- t. liquid effluents to levels that con " data. Description, No.3.
i-form to limits ' for releases to ' un--
restricted areas that are specified
- in 10CFR20, ' Appendix B, Table II j (Date).
4 The.LWMS can sample and moni- 4 Inspection of as-built LWMS sub- 4.a) Sampling capabilities exist for.-
for effluent ? batches prior to re- systems.
lease to unrestricted areas. 1) Each collection tant prior to processing.
a) Sampling . capability . is provided 1- for each collection tank prior to 2) Each waste monitor and sampic processing and for each waste tank upstream of the plant un-
- monitor tank and . sample tank restricted discharge point.
i ' prior to release of' liquid effluent-j to the environment.
$ 1.11Ji 8-10-92 i
4 g 4 w,--. rwy e - -, - ., , -. ,e... + . . - - .__ ___ --. w
i SYSTEM 80+= p)D /\ pT A 1".I 1 TABLE 1.11.1 (Continued)
LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM '
Inspections. Tests. Analvscs, and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria i
^
4.b) Radiation monitoring is provided 4. (continued) 4.b) Radiation monitoring equipment upstream of the plant unrestricted is located upstream of the plant discharge point. unrestricted discharge point.
4 5.a) Radioactive liquid wastes are seg- 5. Inspections of as-built systems 5.a) Radioactive wastes are segregated regated into: will be perforrned. into four waste streams:
- 1) Equipment drain waste 1) Equipment drain waste
- 2) Floor drain wastes 2) Floor drain w2ste 1
- 3) Detergent wastes 3) Deterg nt waste
- 4) Chemical wastes 4) Chemical w2ste b) The equipment drain, the floor b) ne four waste streams are not in-
- drain, the detergent, and the terconnected prior to collection
- chemical waste streams are not in, and processing.
terconnected prior to collection and processing.
- 6. The LWhtS , components shown in 6. Inspect Code Data Reports for 6. LWhtS installation and compon-Figures 1.1L1-1 through L11.14 installation and components. In- ents have required ASME Section are installed. and LWMS mechan- spect the systems and components III class code stamps per the Code ical equipment is built in accord- for N stamps for ASME Section Classes shown in Figures 1.1L1-1 ance with ASME Section III re- III components. through LIL1-6 (NOTE 1).
quirements that are shown in Figures L11.1-1 through L11.1-6 4 (NOTE 1).
- L11.1 8-10-92
SYSTEM 80+=
y~.T n C, l .
TABLE 1.11.1 (Continuet0 LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses . Acceptance Criteria
- 7. The instrument inAtions and 7. Impect instrumentation indica- 7.a) The L%3tS instrumentation indi-controls shown in Figures L1L1-1 tions and controls in the control cations and controls shown in through L1L1-6 are available in room. Figures L11.1-1 through L1L1-6 the control room with provisions are kcated in the control room to isolate the L%%iS inlet waste (NOTE 1).
flows (NOTE 1).
b) The L%31S subsystems inlet waste flows can be iso!ated with controh ,
located in the control room.
- 8. Release of processed liquid waste 8. Test LWMS subsystem controls. S. Release of liquid effluents to un-to unrestdeted areas can be init- restricted areas can be initiated isted only by manual action. only by manual action.
- 9. Liquid effluent discharge to unre- 9. Test of the as-built L%315 sub- 9. Liquid wastes discharge to unre- l stricted areas is terminated auto- systems using signals that simulate stricted areas is terminated auto-matically when the limits of excedence of limits. matically in respom e to signa!s 10CFR20, Appendix B. Table II that simulate excedence of limits. l (date) will be exceeded.
I
- 10. The LWMS subsystems are acces- 10. Inspections of the as-b7 LW 3tS 10. LMWS subsystems are accessible sible for periodic inspection, and subsystems. for inspection, and periodic test-testing. ing, NOTE 1: Such diapams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual dedgn features of the System 80+
systems, components, and equipment and their interrelationships- The simplined diagrams are not ;
necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utniwd in any facili:y referencing the certified design. ,
1.11.1 S-10-92 i i i l
1
- . . , _ _ . _ . . ._ . ~ ~ . - _ . . . . - -- .,~ .._ - _ - _ = _ _ . = .
.t,.. n. F ""
1.OUIPMENT OftAtH e
[r' 't WASTC HEADLit Il RCAC10R GRACC LAB DRAINS ~> g U
{*O3 g jr f* 3
'ANNEA LOUIP.
NT QUIP.
WASTE WASTE TANK TANK 4 RADWA$TF ADO
- EOUIPMENI(POWDT* ~
I (@ 4_
CLUICE WaitfD TURBINii DUILDING COUIPMLNT ;y y (IF flADIOAC11VE) -> g >
G/ODLOWDOWN L10U10 SAMPLL
- ~ ( LWT PUMPS L3
- WASTES (i.e. VALVE - > (ts)
& PUMP LEA %GE)
BonlC ACfD ' l'
-> 03
- CARDON DED FILTERS ~* 03 E
boric ACID CONC [NTRATOR DEMINERAll2ERS ION EXCHANGER fg fjry f/QQ$ /QQ%
HOLDUP TANK FJACTOR MAKEUP %
WATER TANK (N) ~
t
~~
' 55 'J "
t WASTE GAS COOLtR->
CONDENSLR
~
g UT /U T
\ #'
ftS5H -
pg g
>5WMS *
"E]*- EWT POST FILTERS * [d swus SWus w -
r WA'
^
h SGDT U r WASTE d- > *Wus
, MONO ,- MONITOR TANK ,
TANK 4-SWMS CWMS WMT PUMPS
-> LS M-1 u H
FI NOTE:
ALL COMPONEtRS At4D otscHARGE PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS NNS.
FIGURE 1.11.1-1 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:
,, . ., ~m Q
FLOOR DRAlfi WASTE HEADER fl
- REACTOR CAVITY p AND CONTAINMENT - { > GWMS > GWMS
' COMP (NOTE A) I I
FLOOR NUCtIAH ANNEX DRAIN FLOOR FLOOR DRAINS TANK- DRAIN
- TANK m
- (rD r)
(rDT)
+ w_
FUEL DutLDING k rLoon DRAtus '
y
< p TUAalNE DLDO
- goog g,gg -- LS -=4f ' [ -
~> L,..-
C SCOT 'l '
if
' h) 4 '
- CARDON DED FILTERS -
> h)
W DEMINERAltZERS E M
~> <
~
~
~
LJ D\ /UT RSSH O h '
swus ns3H O 34 4- FDT POST FILT HS -
q swgg swus w - WASTE I WASTE MONITOR w- SGDT gwyg
--- > MONITOR TANK TANK V J %
- L J swus swus
/
WMT PUMPS 3
, + LS -*-
- NOTES: y NP H
_ A. CONTAINMENTISOLATION A VALVES AND ASSOCIATED nT
/
PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS 2.
BJ ALL COMi'ONENTS AND PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS NN5 UNLESS Y OTHERWISE NOTED.
DISCHARGE I
FIGURE 1.11.1-2 '
i
. LIQUlD WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM t
, .. . ~- .- ~_ _ .,,.
~'N 0, f\ 5 L. / a % gM.k w DETERGENT WASTE HEADER -
rT l
> GWMS g y-- CWMS LAUNDRY -> 'F 7 ( 7 DRAlHS LAUNDRY .
LAUNDRY
& HOT & HOT GHOWER SHOWER REGULATED > TANK TANK 4
. SHOP DRAIN w IUi"U 8I 4-L J V J
'l CASK CLEAN4
- PERSONNEL
-DECON (SHOWERS) f g LHST PUMPS f
,4 y MISCELLANEOU S
COUIP ORAING-> g FILTER rtLTER L1 M
U4ST MD DEMIN '
fM UtST MB DEMIN x: =m1 i- >sWus ,
urm i---> swuS RSSH + RSSH - >-
If~
DETERGENT DETERGEN SAMPLE SAMPLE TANK l, TANK L 2 L J
>. w-
'[ DST
]
PUMPS 1P 1r NOTE: A R
A. ALLCOMPONENI9 AND PIPING ARE SAFEW CLASS NNS.
FIG URE 1.11.1-3 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
.__g_ . - _ _ . . _ _ _ . _
. .s . , . <
s k' ju
- CHEMICALWASTE HEADER - i f1 CHEMICAL . - m CHEMICAL ADDITION +
DECON WASTE ' y y r 7 ;
CHEMICAL.
>- FDT ;
pH 4- CHEMICAL _
-SAMPLE > WASTE -
. DRAINS - TANK
> (CWT)
> CHEMICAL _ - t J
- _ LAB DRAINS
{ SMS U
.h '
)
CWT PUMP y tg U
CARBON FILTER r 3 CHEMICAL L
> SAMPLE TANK t
(CST)
LS w .--
u
-CST SWMS
- _ PUMP u
H.
A
! : NOTE:
. A ;: : ALLCOMPONENTS AND-
- PIPING ARE SAFETY '
CLASS NNS. V FIG U RE 1.11.1-4
, LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM :
th m e 6 ?? -
m . j . c ~~
I .' ^ 2" L INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT l CONTAINMENT l
l2 l 4]
l SG #1 y y 14 2] I
'l2 l 4l I
BLOWDOWN r 3 r , I I r 3 LA m LA VR %
V3 12l4l V S/G I DRAIN 1 SG #2 PllMP l BLOWDOWN -hI h4 STEAM 1
GENERATOR I
FDT b- DRAIN I TANK l
(SGDT)
LHST > A I (APPROXIMATELY I '
FLASH TANK lCONDENSATE I
' CONDENSATE BACKFLASH I
I L ~ -
J l
l l y I ( SGDT I A PUMP I
U i
I A
R I
NOTE: '
-C ALL COMPONENTS AND PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS ->-FDT NNS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. V CONDENSATE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM WASTE DISCHARGE FIGURE 1.11.1-5 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
g $ (-
1 I
l l
r7 l l
_w.GWMS + GWMS
>_ % 1 a r 1I I l r 3 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION CONDENSATE
- - "l g CONTAINMENT COOLER CONTAINMENT COOLER p CONDENSATE CONDENSATE
, TANK TANK
, , A g e
e l (APPROXIMATELY (APPROXIMATELY 4000 GALS) 4000 GALS) l t J L J LJ g I
CCCT "-
U CCCT l
[Y PUMPS [
PUMPS 1 ,
2 1 2 l
I U U if 1 f i
i i _
l i
INSIDE g OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT I A y R
NOTE: FDT <
ALL COMPONENTS AND PIPING ARE SAFETY II CLASS NNS UNLESS WT INDUSTRIAL OTHERWISE NOTED.
WASTE DISCHARGE FIGURE 1.11.1-6 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM i
1
1
, y )
SYS'IEh180 + "
L11.2 GASEOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT. SYSTEM Design Description The Gaseous Waste Management System (GWMS) collects, stores, processes, samples, and monitors radioactive gaseous waste, The GWMS is a non-nuclear safety (NNS) system containing no safety class components except for containment isolation valves and penetrations which are Safety Class 2.
The GWMS is a charcoal delay system. He GWMS can operate continuously or periodically. ne GWMS processes all radioactive gises generated by the plant
, - systems connected to it during plant operations. This system is not intended to process post. accident sources; therefore the GWMS is isolated in post-accident conditions. A general conceptual illustration of the GWMS is shown in Figure 1.11.2-1 (NOTE 1). ,
The GWMS system contains conditioning equipment (including a cooler. condenser for humidity control and a charcoal guard bed) _to minimize moisture and contamination in the charcoal adsorbers and charcoal adsorbers to delay passage of noble gases through the equipment.
The GWMS design precludes the buildup of an explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in the GWMS, Dual gas analyzers monitor the concentration of hydrogen and/or oxygen in the GWMS. Nitrogen purges maintain the concentration of hydrogen and/or oxygen at less than 4E The GWMS processes radioactive gaseous waste so that the concentration of the gaseous radioactive efDuents discharge to unrestricted areas is within limits specified by 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table II (Date). Effluents from the GWMS are filtered through particulate and activated charcoal filters prior to release at the unit vent to the environment. .
The GWMS can continuously monitor concentrations of radioactivity in processed gaseous waste prior to release to the environment. The radiation monitor activates controls to isolate automatically the GWMS discharge if the limits of 10CFR20,
~
Appendix B, Table II (Date) will be exceeded, Leakage rates of processing equipment of the GWMS are within limits speci6cd in ANSI /ANS 55.4, Table 9 (Date).
1,11.2 '
10-92
~
, n p ,\{ 3-y
, r ~. ;4 SYSTEM 80 + " -
(The GWMS is located in the Redwaste Facility.)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.11.2-1 provides the inspections, tests and analyses and their associated acceptance criteria for the GWMS.
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the System 80+ systems, compcments,. and equipment and their interrelationships. The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are not intended to be exact representations of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certified design.
p 1.11.2 -
2- - 8-10-92
g p y ?a ;-..- p Li i k i~'L i k l
l System 80+=
TABLE 1.11.2-1 GASEOUS T 'ASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM -
Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria l
Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdtena Certified Design Commitment
- 1. Analyze design specifications and 1. The GWMS meets the Certified
- 1. The GWMS reduces the concentra-as-built GWMS performance data. Design Description, Table 1.11.2-1, tion of radioactive constituents in the gaseous effluents to levels that No.1.
conform to limits specified in 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table II (date).
- 2. Actual GWMS configuration, for
- 2. The general configuration of the 2. Inspection of the as. built GWMS configuration shall be performed, those components shown, conforms GWMS is shown in Figure 1.11.2-1 with Figure 1.11.2 . (NOTE 1).
(NOTE 1).
3.a) Test to measure carrier gas flow 3. The minimum carrier gas flow rate
- 3. The GWMS has:
rate. of the GWMS is at least I scfm.
a) Minimum carrier gas flow rate of at least 1 scfm.
9 8-10-92 1.11.2
.c System 80+"
. TABLE 1.11.2-l'(Continued)
GASEOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and' Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment.~ -Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria -
- 3. - (Continued) 3. (Continued) 3. (continued) i b) Minimum mass' of charcoal -in ad- b) Inspect . as-built GWMS' config- b) The minimum mass of charcoal in t
' sorber at least 18,000 ~1bm. uration. the adsorber is greater. than 18,000 lbm.
c) Minimum. charcoal . adsorptMty for c) Inspect wndor specifications on c) Minimum charcoal adsorptivity' for
. Krypton ~ and Xenon of at least: . charcoal adsorber. Xrypton and Xenon of at least:
- 18.5 cc/gm for Krypton 18.5 cc/rm Kopton 330 cc/gm for Xenon ' 330 cc/gm Xenon
- 4. The GWMS precludes a buildup of 4.a) . Inspect as-built GWMS con- Dual gas analyzers are provided.
4.a) an explosive mixture of hydrogen figuration.
and oxygen. The GWMS has: -
a) Dual gas analyzers for hydrogen and/or oxygen.
g) Nitrogen purge capability to main- b) Test to measure nitrogen purge b) Nitrogen purge maintains Sydrogen tain the hydrogen and/or oxygen - flow.
and/or oxygen concentrations at concentrations at less than ' 45 less than '4%
1.11.2 8-10-92 e
- < - - rr w _ - i i_ a _ ___ _._._.____..__'
b.
~
lDRAFI System 80+=
. TABLE 1.11.221 -(Continucdt t
GASEOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses an'd Acceptance Criteria "
4 Certified Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4 5.I The GWMS can monitor -the radio-: - 5. Inspections 'of; the' assuilt system ' 5. Radiation monitoring ' capability : is active . concentration of gaseous ef .' will be performed. . located upstream of the plant unit :
fluents with radiation monitoring - vent.
equipment 1 located. upstream of the plant unit. vent.
- 6. The GWMS components shown in 6. . Inspect Code Data Reports for in- 6. GWMS installation and components Figure ,1.11.2-1 are installed, - and stallation and components. Inspect have required ASME Section III GWMS mechanical ' equipment'. is the systems and components for N class code stamps per the Cade built in accordance ' with y ASME stamps for ASME Section III com- Classes shown in Figure '1.11.2-1
'Section III requirements that are ' . ponents. for each component '(NOTE 1).
shown in Figure .1.11.2-1 (NOTE
.1).
- 7. The instrumentation ' indications 7. Inspections of the, as-built system 7. Instrumentation indications and and controls shown in Figure will be performed. Test inlet waste . controls shown in Figure 1.11.2-1 ;
1.11.2-1 are located in the control stream isolation. are located in the ' control room.
room. The inlet radioactive J
The GWMS inlet waste st eams can i i gaseous. watte streams to the be isolated by manual action ,
GWMS can' be isolated manually' 1
(NOTE 1). ;
from the control room (NOTE 1). .j 1.11.2- 8-10-92 r
i i
h
..r_.- r.,-- + ___._____.m.___ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _
y , w - -
a,, .-
- LJ n e t-cn
- System 80+=
, TABLE 1.11.2-1 (Continued)
GASEOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
._ Certified Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. - Discharges - of radioacti.e gaseous 8. ' Test isola; ion capability using a - 8. The Gw%is meet, the Table.
effluents to the emironment 'are. ' signal that simulates exceedence of 1.11.2-1, Certified Design terminated : automatically : if the limits. Description,' ' No. 8.
limits of 10CFR20, Appendix . B, Table II (date) will. be exceeded.
- 9. The GWMS is accessible for 9. Inspections of the as-built G W %iS. 9. The GWMS components are acces-periodie inspection and testing. sible for periodic inspections and testing.
NOTE 1: Such diagrams are for the purpose 'of illustrating the general conceptual design features of the System 80+
systems, compe .ents, and equipment and their interrelationships. ' The simplified diagrams are not necessarily to scale, are not necessarily inclusive of all components and equipment, and are' not intended .o be enct representations . of the detailed system configurations that will be utilized in any facility referencing the certified design.
1.11.2 S-10 92
g% y Ef '""';;.
k
' l a Gr s'-
. HEADER GAS' STRIPPER
- BYPASS BYPASS EQUlPMENT . D
- #2 g.
DRAIN TANK (EDT)
U 1I VOLUME CONTROL I I TANK (VCT)
( NDENSER 1+ WATER o ABSORBER ABSORBER TANiC (RDT)
- L _J n %) f %- > t i p 1r 1I UNIT .
qj DRAIN m TANK " BYPASS gq h FROM
- LWMS AERATED VENTS LI NOTES:
A. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES AND ASSOCIATED PIPtNG ARE SAFETY CLASS 2 B. ALL CDMPONEffrS AND PIP!NG t.RE -
SAFETY CLASS NNS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, FIGURE 1.11.2.1 GASEOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FLOW DIAGRAM g , - -
x- . -A