LD-91-024, Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Review of C-E Ssar

Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Review of C-E Ssar

ML20077D286
Person / Time
Site:	05200002
Issue date:	05/16/1991
From:	Kenney E ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
PROJECT-675A LD-91-024, LD-91-24, NUDOCS 9105300020
Download: ML20077D286 (51)

Text

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ADD B%EBEB ASE A t!nOWN FOVERi May 16, 1991 LD-91-024 Docket No.52-002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Rest 2nse to NRC Pequests far Additional Information

Reference:

NRC Letter, Reactor Systems Branch RAIs, T. V. Wambach (NRC) to E. H. Kennedy (C-E), dated February 15, 1991.

Dear Sirs:

The reference requested additional information for the NRC staff review of the Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Report - Design Certification (CESSAR-DC). Enclosure I to this lettor provides our responses to a number of these questions, and Enclosure II contains proposed changes to CESSAR-DC. Enclosure III provides a list of questions whose responses will be provided separately.

Should ycu have any questionc on the enclosed material, please contact me or Mr. Ritterbusch of my staff at (203) 285-5206.

Very truly yours, COMBUST N EN INEERING, INC.

E. H. Kennedy Manager Nuclear Systems Licensing EHK:mls

Enclosures:

As Stated cc: P. Lang (DOE - Germantown)

J. Trotter (EPkI)

T. Wanbach (NRC)

ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power cm , e n y r , m . - ,, u c' g

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Enclosure I to LD-91-024 i

RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH

Q.uestion 440.40 The primary system safety valves may be subject to steam and/or water discharge. Provide a discussion regarding the effects to the safety valves due to water relief including the passaga of a water slug and waterhammer. What water relief rates were assumed in the loading analysis? Are these valves consistent with test results obtained from similar valves?

Respense 440.40 System 80+ CESSAR-DC, Chapter 5, Appendix A, Amendment I, page SA-5, December-21, 1090, gives the results of the extended safety valve blowdown for the System 80+ pressurizer safety valves. The section states:

In addition, the System 80+ Standard Design safety analyses assumed a 18.5% blowdown below nominal set pressure for the pressurizer safety valves in lieu of the 5% specified by the ASME Code. For the feedwater line break event analysis, which produces the greatest increase jn pressurizer level, the increased blowdown did not result in the pressurizer liquid level reaching the safety valve nozzle elevation, thus ensuring normal safety valve operation. Further, subcooling in the RCS was maintained during the blowdown.

. Therefore, pressurizer liquid level will not reach the primary system safety valve inlet nozzles for any design basis event which requires the safety valves to be operable to mitigate the consequences of the event. In these scenarios, water will not be relieved through these safety valves. The design specification and procurement process assures that the System 80+ safety valves will be consistent with the valves which were previously tested.

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OuestiSD 140.43 CESSAR-DC Section 5.2.2.10.2.2 states that during heatup, if the SCS suction isolation valves are open and RCS pressure exceeds the LTOP pressure, an alarm will notify the operator the.t a pressurization transient is occurring during low temperature conditions. Clarify the definition of LTOP pressure mentioned above.

kesponse 440.43 The LTOP pressure mentioned in Section 5.2.2.10.2.2 is the maximum pressurizer pressure at which the SCS may be aligned to the RCS without the lifting the LTOP relief valves. The alarm is described in Section 5.4.7.2.6 and shown on Figure 6.3.2-1C, Amendment I.

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Ouestion 440.46 Provide a discussion on the ability of the pressurizer surge line for the System 80+ design to withstand the effects of thermal stratification. (Reference NltC Bulletin 88-11, December 20, 1988.)

Response 440.46 Thermal stratification can be establisht.d in the pressurizer surge line due to the temperature difference between the fluid in the pressurizer and the fluid in the RCS hot 109 Variations in fluid temperature across the cross-section of the surge line result in circumferential variations in wall temperature. These variations in wall temperature can cause distortions and movement of the surge line.

Measurements on operating plants have confirmed the presence of circumferential variations in surge line wall temperature during plant operations. Line distortion and motion during plant operations result in alternating pipe expansion stresses. Variations in wall temperature also induce local thermal stress. Operating plant measurements have shown the maximum variation in wall temperature to be less than the difference between the pressurizer and hot leg temperature during each transient for which measurements were taken.

Acceptable stress levels in the System 80+ pressurizer surge line are maintained by routing the surge line and arranging surge line supports to accommodate transient conditions, including distortions and movement of the surge line due to

! thermal stratification. The arrangement of the surge line and l its supports is optimized to minimize associated stresses.

Surge line expansion stresses are below ASME III allowable limits and the fatigue usage. factor is less than 1.0.

Hot functional testing will be conducted to verify that piping

. deflection due to thermal stratification results in no adverse consequences, such as contact with pipe whip restraints.

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Ouestion 440.47 CESSAR-DC Section 5.4.7.1.2 states that the shutdown cooling system is designed so that the SCS pumps can be tested at full flow conditions when the reactor is operating at power.

Discuss how this test could be achieved without overpressurization of the SCS. ,

l ResDonse 440.47 The System 804 3CS has the capability to test the shutdown cooling pumps at their full design flow rate while the reactor is at any power level. The recirculation line to the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) has been designed to achieve this functional design basis. The recirculation line has similar flow resistance characteristics as the normal shutdown - cooling flow path to the reactor .

vessel. For full design flow testing, flow will be routed through recirculation line valves (SI-314, 688, and 300 for pump 1; SI-315, 693, and 301 for pump 2) to the IRWST; SI-314 and SI-315 have throttling capability to provide the necessary hydraulic resistance to achieve design flow. The SCS pump suction is aligned to the IRWST for the full flow test, so the SCS is isolated from the RCS and the test can be performed without overpressurizing the SCS. -

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Question 440.49 Provide a discussion of the procedures and plant systems used to take the plant from normal operating conditions.to cold shutdown conditions. This discussion should include, heat removal, depressurization, flow circulation, and reactivity control.

Response 440.49 i l

The principal systems utilized in taking the plant from Mode 1 1, Power Operation, to Mode 5, Cold Shutdown are: l Reactor Coolant System Feedwater System Feedwater Control System Reactivity Control System Boron Control System Chemical & Volume Control System Shutdown Cooling System Pressurizer Level Control System Steam Bypass Control System Pressurizer Pressure Control System Liquid and Gaseous Waste Management Systems Main Steam System Condensate System Reactivity control capability is discussed in sections

7. 7.1.1.1; 7.7.1.1. 7 ; 9. 3. 4.1. 3. 3 ; 9. 3. 4. 2.1 (last paragraph) ,

and 9.3.4.2.3C. Power is reduced by increasing the boron concentration in the RCS to reduce k-effective to 5 0.99. At low power the rods are inserted. The operator borates to the cold shutdown boron concentration consistent with the Technical Specifications prior to the beginning of cooldown.

This margin is maintained throughout cocidown by making up shrinkage volume by means of the CVCS witn water at the cold shutdcwn-margin boron concentration.

Cooldown is effected by the systems described, and techniques discussed in Sections 5.4.7.2.6.A; 9.3.4.2.3C; 7.7.1.1.2.1; 7.7.1.1.2.2; 7.7.1.1.4; 7.7.1.1.5 -and 10.4.7.2.4.

Additionally, the following precautions, limits and techniques are utilized during cooldown:

1. The reactor coolant pumps continue to run until they are manuall; tripped o Four RCPs shall not be operated below approximately 500'F o During cooldown RCP 1A and 1B shall be running to maintain pressurizer spray capability until they are required to be shutdown for some other reason

Response 440.49 (contingpAJ, o The RCPs shall not be operated when the system pressure is below cavitation or seal operation limits

2. The RCS pressure is maintained at 2250 psia until cooldowr; is initiated.

3. Pressurizer pressure and level controls are placed in manual mode at the beginning of cooldown, and power to heaters is reduced.

4. Core flow is maintained throughout cooldown by RCPs and/or shutdown cooling system pumps.

5. The bubble in the pressurizer is maintained as long as possible.

6. Volume Control Tank (VCT) gas space is vented to reduce fission gas and hydrogen gas prior to cooldown.

7. Letdown flow is directed, as required, to tne gas stripper to remove dissolved gas.

8. Initially, heat is removed from RCS by dumpi.ig steam:

o Steam may be dumped to the condensors through the Steam Bypass System, or to the atmosphere through the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADV).

o Feed control is in manual during cooldown using the startup pump and manual control valves, o The MSIS setpoint is adjusted to 200 psi below existing steam pressu: ? as cooldown progresses.

9. As RCS water cools, pressure is decreased by manually adjusting pressurizer spray to cool the vapor space.

Pressurizer pressure is controlled such that saturation margin limit is not exceeded, and such as to comply with the pressure-temperature curves specified for the plant.

10. As pressurizer pressure decreases the SIAS & CIAS setpoints are decreased to 400 psi below existing pressurizer pressure.

11. RCS cooldown rate shall be maintained within Technical Specifications (TS) at all times during cooldown.

12. Pressurizer water temperature should exceed RCS water temperature by no more than 350*F and no less than 50*F whenever there is a bubble in the pressurizer.

Eesconse 440.49 (continued) -

13. Auxiliary pressurizer spray is utilized to reduce

- pressurizer pressure whenever normal spray is inadequate ,

or not available.

14. _ When the pressurizer pressure is approximately 400 psia and the RCS temperature decreases to 350'F, cooldown is transferred to the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS).

Cooldown from this point is fully described in Section 5.4.7.2.6A. Steaming and feed may be terminated.

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Ouestion 41g m Provide a discussion on how the System 80+ design complies

-with the staff position set forth in the Branch Technical Position (BTP) RSB 5-1 attached to SRP Section 5.4.7.

R2soonse-440.50 Branch Technical Position (BTP) RSB 5-1, entitled " Design Requirements for the Residual Heat Removal System" provides certain recommended design guidelines for systems involved in the cooldown and depressurization of the reactor. BTP 5-1 specifies that the system (s) which are used to take the reactor from normal operating conditions to a cold shutdown shall satisfy certain functional requirements; those being:

(1) the system (s) shall be safety grade, (2) the system (s) shall have suitable redundancy so that

, assuming a single failure, the system (s) can still perform their intended safety function, (3). the system (s) shall be capable of being operated from the Control room,,

(4) the system (s) shall perform the safety function in a reasonable period of time following shutdown.

Further BTP 5-1 design requirements include specific Residual Heat Removal (RHR) isolation capability, RHR pressure relief capability, testing requirements for cooldowns under natural circulation conditions to confirm adequate mixing and cooldown rates, procedures which cover natural circulation cooldowns,

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and requirements for a Seismic Category I auxijiary feedwater supply which would guarantee a conservative inventory of auxiliary feedwater for cooldown purposes.

System 80+-has been designed to meet the requirements for 5 Class 1 plant under Branch Technical Position RSB U-1. A. i plant systems which are used to meet the requirements of BTP i RSB 5-1 are controlled from the control room. Ref er - to

! specific system Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams submitted I

as ' Figures' in CESSAR-DC to note control location capabilities. The Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) (used for RHR) is used in conjunction with the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) to reduce the temperature in the reactor coolant system to the refueling temperature. The design basis for the SCS is discussed in CESSAR-DC Section 5.4.7. The design basis for the EFW System is discussed in CESSAR-DC Section 10.4.9.

No single failure of either system will prevent a cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The EFW System has a Seismic Category I feedwater inventory in excess of the volume needed to support a BTP RSB 5-1 cooldown.

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-Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurization capability can be provided by one of three systems. The Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray System would be used if available. This system is not designed to accomodate single failures and, therefore, is not credited in the BTP RSB 5-1 analysis. The Safety Depressurization System is safety grade and has two subsystems (Rapid depressurization System and Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System), either one of which could be used for-depressurizing the RCS. It is expected that depressurization would be accomplished via the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS) if the Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray System is not available. No single failure of the RCGVS will preclude that system from performing its intended safety function. The RCGVS is discussed in CESSAR-DC Section 6.7. Systems used to cooldown and depressurize the RCS will perform their safety function at least as rapidly as the systems in the System 80 design.

Boration for cold shutdown is accomplished using the Safety Injection System (SIS) . This system is discussed in CESSAR-DC Section 6.3.1, and also is designed to accomodate a single failure. The source of borated water is the In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST). The plant design does not rely on the Chemical and Volume Control System as a means for boron injection for meeting BTP 5-1 requirements.

Verification of boron concentration is via the boronometer, which is discussed in CESSAR-DC Section 9.3.2.

RHR system isolation capability required in BTP RSB 5-1 is provided by two power-operated valves in series in each SCS suction line. Refer to CESSAR-DC Figure 6.3.2-1C. The interlock capability for each of the valves is discussed in CESSAR-DC Sections 5. 4.'i and 7. 6. Note that the valves do not have interlocks which automatically close the SCS suction icolation valves on an RCS pressure increase during SCS operation. This precludes a loss of shutdown cooling by automatic closure of the isolation valves. Additionally, the SCS suction side design pressure has been increased.On the discharge side of the-SCS, three check valves in series are provided for isolation of the SCS from the RCS.

i Pressure relieving capability provided for the SCS is j disGU:' sed in r'ESSAR-DC Section 5.4.7.2.3 and on Figure 6.3.2-l 1C. In aadition, the design pressure of the SCS has been

l. increased to 900 psig.

The design of the SCS prevents damage to the pump caused by overheating, cavitation, or loss of adequate pump suction fluid. Pump protection features of the System 80+ design are discussed in CESSAR-DC Sections 5. 4.7.1. 2. D, 5.4.7.2.2.B, and 5.4.7.2.2.E.

Testing of the System 80+ design meets the requirements of IEEE Standard 338 and Regulatory Guide 1.22. The results of

Resnonse 440.50 (continued);

the Natural Circulation Cooldown simulation performed for the System 80 design bound the System 80+ design. An evaluation of a natural circulation cooldown for the System 80+ design is provided in the response to NRC Question 440.51.

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Ouestion 440.51 Provide the results of a thermal hydraulic analysis including transient curves for a natural circulation cooldown following a reactor trip at full power. Discuss the method to be used for preventing voids in the reactor upper head during the cooldown.

Resoonse 440.51 A thermal hydraulic analysis of the System 80 design, including transient curves, for a natural circulation cooldown following a reactor trip at full power was provided to the NRC in a lqtter dated August 12, 1983 (letter No. LD-83-074; Docket No.: STN S0-470F). The report demonstrated that the System 80 NSSS design was capable of achieving cold shutdown using the assumptions and systems defined by Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1. In that analysis, it was assumed that the reactor coolant head vent system was available to help reduce the void in the reactor vessel upper head.

The System 80 analysis applies to the System 80+ design in a conservative marner. As summarized in Table 1, System 80+ has design features which improve operating flexibility, increase primary depressurization capability, and orove reliability and long term heat removal capability.

Table 1 lists the operational status of systems and equipment assumed in the analysis. A direct comparison between System 80 and System 80+ shows that for System 80+, the system / component availability and their respective capacities are equivalent or superior to the System 80 design. The main differences as shown in Table 1 are: 1) charging pumps versus safety injection pumps; 2) auxiliary spray versus a reactor l coolant gas vent system (RCGV) and 3) the storage capacity of the condensate storage tank. The flow capacity of the System l

80+ high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps at the time of reactor vessel upper head (RVUH) bubble formation far exceeds that of the charging pumps, which represents a less limiting l, condition for System 80+. Prior to RVUH oubble formation, the System 80+ pressurizer has ample water volume for RCS make up inventory. The purpose of the auxiliary spray was to rapidly depressurize the pressurizer once the RVUH hubble was vented.

This depressurization is now conducted via the RCGV system (part of the System 80+ Safety Depressurization System) which has a greater capability for depressurization than the Systea 80 auxiliary spray system. Finally, the condensate storage capacity has more than doubled in going from the System 80 to the System 80+ design.

Response 440.51 ( cont inu ed.).

l The availability of the systems and components for System 80+

is equivalent to System 80, and the capacities of those I components are equivalent or superior to System 80, thus the results of the natural circulation cooldown simulation performed .for the System 80 NSSS design would bound the System 80+ design. As a result, the System 80+ design complies with the functioncl requirements of BTP RSB 5-1.

TABLE 1 EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS WHICH CAN DE CREDITED IN THE EVALUATION STATUS System / Component System 80 System 80+

Charging pumps One initially (44 gpm), t-o None creditedd) i after 30 minutes (88 gpm)

IIPSI 1 of 2 pumps (gleater than 150 2 of 4 pumps (greater than gpm) 300 gpm)

Auxiliary pressurizer Approxiraately 0.75 psi /sec None creditedz) t spray (relief capacity)

Reactor Coolant Gas Vent None credited (3) Greater than 0.75 psi /sec System (pressurizer)  ;

Reactor vessel upper head Used as needed Available  !

vent system Emergency diesel One available only One available only generators Atmospheric dump valves Available Available Auxiliary feedwater Available (2 train system) Available (4 train system) system Seismic Category 1 1-300,000 gallon tank 2-350,000 gallon tanks condensate storage tank Refueling water tank Available with a boron Available with a boron concentration of 4000 ppm per concentration of 4000 ppm per Technical Specifications Technical Specifications (1) The centrifugal charging pump in System 80+ has a flow capacity of 150 gpm at pressures below 2400 psia, but would not be credited in an RSB 5-1 analysis.

(2) The auxiliary pressurizer spray in System 80+ has a greater depressurization rate capability than System 80 but would not be credited in an RSB 5-1 analysis.

(3) The pressurizer portion of the reactor coolant gas vent system in System 80 has a  ;

smaller depressurization capability than System 80+ but was not credited in the RSB 5-1 analysis.

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Ouestion 440.54 Discuss the alarms and indications which would inform the operators that the SCS suction line isolation valve has closed while the plant is in shutdown cooling? Is tnere any common mode failure which would result in isolation valves in both trains being closed while in shutdown cooling? Are there any manual maintenance valves whose closure could isolate the SCS suction, if so, describe procedures and controls to restrict this possibility?

Response 440.54 The SCS suction line isolation valves are SI-651, SI-652, SI-653, SI-654, SI-655, and SI-656, as shown on CESSAR-DC Figure 6.3.2-1C. Valves SI-651, SI-653, and SI-655 are in line with shutdown cooling pump 1. Valves SI-652, SI-654, and SI-656 are in line with shutdown cooling pump 2. There are several alarms and indications to inform the operators that a SCS suction valve has closed while the plant is in shutdown cooling:

Valve positior. indication is provided in the main control room.

- If a suction valve were to close, a drop in SCS pump flow for the affected train would actuate a low shutdown cooling flow alarm.

SCS pump current and pressure indicators in the control room would indicate a loss of flow.

- Valves SI-651, SI-652, SI-653, and SI-654 are alarmed when not fully open with concurrent low RCS temperature (below the LTOP enable temperature).

There is no interlock to automatically close the SCS suction valves if RCS pressure increases during shutdown cooling operation. The suction valve interloc'k with pressurizer pressure described in Section 5.4.7.2.3.A.2 only provides a permissive open signal to allow the operator to open the valves when aligning the SCS.

Electrical power assignments are as follows (all valves can be

, powered from the emergency diesel generators or the alternate AC power source):

Valves SI-651 and SI-655 are-on electrical train A.

Valve SI-653 is on electrical train C.

Valves SI-652 and SI-656 are on electrical train B.

Valve SI-654 is on electrical train D.

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Response 440.54 (Continued):

Because of the redundancy and diversity of power supplies, no postulated single failure would result in loss of shutdown  !

cooling capability as one shutdown cooling train would remain  !

op'rable.

Manually-operated isolation valves SI-106 and SI-107 in the shutdown cooling pump suction lines are normally locked open and administrative 1y controlled.

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J Ouestion 440.55 Provide the following information related to pipe breaks or leaks in high _ or moderate energy lines outside containment associated with the RHR system when the plant is 'in a shutdown cooling mode:

1. Determine the maximum discharge rate from pipe break for the systems outside containment used to naintain core cooling.

2. Determine the time frame available for recovery based on these discharge rates and their effect on core cooling.

3. Describe the alarms available to alert the operator to the event, the recovery procedures to be utilized by the operator; the time available for operator action.

A single failure criterion consistent with Standard Review Plan 3.6.1 and Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1 should be applied in the evaluation of the recovery procedures utilized.

Response 440.55 )

High and moderate energy piping failures outside the containment associated with the shutdown cooling system have been investigated. Using the criteria given in SRP 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, a study was performed to determine a postulated leakage location in high or moderate energy lines outside containment which could affect shutdown cooling.

The shutdown cooling system, outside of containment, is considered a moderate-energy fluid system, since the time period in which the system operates at temperatures above 200'F and pressure above 275 psig is less than two percent of the time period required to accomplish its design function.

Shutdown cooling system piping outside containment is located in the reactor subsphere area which contains no high-energy lines. Based on the above, only moderate-energy lines located in the reactor building subsphere were considered in the study. Of the moderate-energy lines whose failure could have the most adverse affect on shutdown cooling, the shutdown cooling suction line was determined to be the limiting pipe, based on its size and direct connection to the reactor coolant system. In accordance with the SRP criteria, the most adverse location for a pipe failure resulting in the maximum effects of fluid spraying and flooding was determined to be a through-wall leakage crack in the shutdown cooling system suction line. The leakrate from the crack was determined to be 1988 gpm.

Rciconse 440.55 (continuedl In addition, a study was performed to determine the flood level within a reactor building subsphere quadrant containing shutdown cooling system components. In order to maximize flood conditions, the study conservatively utilized the leak rate of 1988 gpm and no operator action for 30 minutes. This study verified the validity of the present design under these conditions.

Adequate design features exist such that any fluid leakage from the shutdown cooling system would be contained in the particular quadrant in which the leak occurs. Flood doors and curbs are utilized to prevent flood waters from migrating to adjacent quadrants or the nuclear annex. The reactor building subsphere and nuclear annex is divisionally separated by a wall with no unsealed penetrations up to elevation 70+0. This prevents a potential flood in one division from flooding into the other division.

From CESSAR-DC Section 9.3.3, each subsphere quadrant is equipped with a floor sump having redundant sump pumps. Each sump is also equipped with Seismic Category I level alarms.

High-temperature alarms, high-level indicators, and level operated switches used for pump control are also provided on each sump. Any leakage into these sumps would initiate a control room alarm, thereby informino the operator of a piping failure. The reactor subsphere is also provided with safety-related radiation monitors to measure any airborne effluent to aid the operator in identifying the leakage source.

In addition to the two aforementioned leakage detection systems, any significant shutdown cooling system leakage would be detected immediately by the reactor coolant system parameters displayed in the control room. Pressurizer water level indication and low pressurizer level alarms are provided in the control room. In addition to the level instrumentation, both high pressurizer range channels and low pressurizer pressure range channels are provided. This instrumentation is sufficient to alert the operator of any abnormal decay heat removal system operation.

Based on the above, a moderate-energy line break in a shutdown cooling suction line and the resulting flood will not affect the plant's ability to achieve safe shutdown. With the resulting flood water contained within the af fected quadrant, a maximum of only one quadrant is rendered inoperable by the leak. Therefore, the equipment in the remaining division quadrant and both quadrants in the opposite division remains available for maintaining core cooling and allowing the plant to be brought to safe shutdown considering a single failure.

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Responso 440.55 (continued)

A 30 minute operator action time after the first alarm is considered adequate for the operator to identify and isolate-i the damaged train prior to any significant ofrect on core cooling.

A constant flow rate of 1988 gpm (the flow rate would actually decrease with time as a result of the leak) and a 30 minute operator action time would result in a loss of 7973 cubic feet of RCS coolant. Assuming that the 30 minute time for operator action starts when the pressurizer level is at the heater cutoff level, the loss of 7973 cubic feet of RCS coolant would still leave sufficient inventory to preclude the loss of shutdown cooling. Therefore, shutdown cooling system performance, coolant circulation through the reactor vessel and core cooling would be maintained.

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ouestion 440.56 Indicate whether there are any systems or components needed for shutdown cooling which are deenergized or have power locked out during plant operation. If so, discuss what actions have to be taken to restore operability to t to components or systems, and describe where the actions must ce taken.

Resnonse 440.56 The components needed for shutdown cooling which are deenergized or have power locked out during plant operation are-the safety injection tank vent valves SI-605, 606, 607, 608, 613, 623, 633, and 643, and SIT isolation valves SI-614, 624, 634, and 644. During normal plant operation, power is removed from the SIT vent valves to prevent depressurization of the tanks. During shutdown cooling, power is restored and the SITS are depressurized by opening the vent valves or draining some of the SIT inventory to the IRWST. Power is restored to the SIT isolation valves and they are closed during shutdown cooling. Provisions for removal and restoration of power to these valves is described in CESSAR-DC, Amendment I, Section 6.3.1.2.3.A.5.

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Ouestion 440.52 CESSAR-DC Section 6.3.1.2.1 states that the safety injection i system (SIS) is designed so that the SIS pumps can be tested at full-flow conditions with the reactor at power. Discuss how this functional design bases could be achieved in light of the fact that available pump head at full-flow is much lower  ;

than the RCS pressure at power. l Resoonse 440.59 The system 80+ SIS has the capability to test the safety injection pumps at their full design flow rate while the reactor is at any power level. The recirculation line-to the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) has been designed to achieve this functional design basis. The recirculation line has similar flow resistance characteristics as the normal safety injection flow path to the reactor vessel. Full design flow will be routed through the respective orifice bypass valve (s), SI-218, 219, 254 or 255, for the pump (s) being tested; the orifice bypasu valves will have throttling capability to provide the necessary hydraulic resistance to achieve design flow. The safety injection pumps are normally aligned to take suction from the IRWST. Thus the testing ability of the pumps has been provided without adding any major components or increasing the complexity of the SIS and can be performed regardless of the operating pressure in the Reactor Coolant System.

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Question 440.60 CESSAR-DC Section 6.3.1.3 states that air for all SIS pneumatic valve operators shall be clean, dry, and oil-free.

IC.antify all air-operated valves in SIS and discuss the safety c)assification of the air supplies. If a nonsafety grade compressed air system is used, assess the consequences of the failure of these valves in the case of loss of air supply.

Describe sizing analysis for safety grade air supplies and what test programs will be run to demonstrate adequacy of air supply to provids safety functioning throughout the time period they are required. Account for the credible air leaks or propose controls to ensure a leak tight system.

Response 440.60 System 80+ systems required for safe shutdown are designed such that modulating pneumatic operators are not required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown or for accident mitigation.

The System 80+ air-operated components on these safety-related systems are designed to fail-safe on loss of air supply. This allows the instrument air system to be designed as a nonsafety-related system, and as such, it is not relied upon to perform any safety-related function. By effectively eliminating dependence on safety-related air actuations for safe shutdown, System 80+ also eliminates the need for safety-related backup air supplies.

Table 9.3.1-1 (see proposed CESSAR-DC change in Enclosure II) denotes each component's safety function as well as its loss-of-air failed position and fail-safe position. From-Table 9.3.1-1 it is noted there is only one safety injection system (SIS) air-operated valve listed as having an active safety-related function. The valve is the containment isolation valve for the safety injection tank drain line. By design, the System 80+ containment isolation valves (CIVs) are required to close following a design basis event. However, the CIVs have also been determined to be nonessential for achieving safe shutdown and consequently are designed to fail in the closed position. Therefore, the active safety-related SIS valve is designed to fail-safe in the closed position upon a loss of air to its operator.

1 ResDonse 440.60 (continued)

All CIVs will be functionally tested under the inservice  !

inspection program using the normal instrument air supply to j verir; their f ail closed design function. The nonsafety grade 1 instrument air system will be sized to ensure a more than adequate supply of air to its dependent air-operated '

components. The instrument air system will also be designed and leak tested to minimize excess air leakage. Features such as all-welded air supply headers, capped vents and drains, and soft seat valves will be utilized to prevent system air leakage.

See Enclosure II for proposed CESSAR-DC changes concerning Compressed Air Systems.

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Question 440.61 The SCS and SIS pumps are used for long term cooling following an accident. Discuss the capability of these pumps to be operated for very long periods of time following a postulated severe accident. Are there any test data available to support the above discussed capability? How will long term performance capability be maintained throughout plant lifetimes?

Resoonse 440.61 This question was answered in Response 440.30 transmitted via LD-91-018 dated April 26, 1991.

Ouestion 440.64 Discuss the provisions available in the System 80+ design to keep SIS piping filled with water to prevent potential water hammer.

Response 440.64_

This question was answered in Response 440.29 transmitted via LD-91-018 dated April 26, 1991.

Ouestion 44 0.65 CESSAR-DC Section 6.3.3.2.2 states that an evaluation of posstble single failures shows that no single failure in SIS or the diesel generator system is the worst condition for the large br eak analysis. This is because full SI flow would maximiz9 the SI flow spilling to containment which minimizes the containment pressure. This, in turn, minimizes the core reflooding rate. For the limiting break location (pump discharge leg), there is no single failure that results in an injection flow rate which cannot keep the downcomer filled to the elevation of the discharge leg. Thus, maximum SI flow rate from all four SI pumps are assumed in your large break LOCA analysis. The staf f understands the qualitative argument presented above. However, the results of a thermal-hydraulic analysis should be provided to verify that with a single failure in the dicsel generator system, SI flow from only two SI pumps would indeed keep the downcomer filled to the elevation of the pump discharge leg in the same time frame as that with all four SI pumps feeding the reactor vessel.

Response 440.65 l A separate thermal-hydraulic analysis is not required to l

Verify that minimum flow from two SI pumps will keep the i

downcomer filled to the elevation of the pump discharge leg.

It can be verified from the results of the LBLOCA analysis in l Section 6.3.3 of CESSAR-DC which used maximum flow from four l SI pumps. The following discussion presents the verification.

l While they are injecting, the safety injection tanks (SITS) provide sufficient flow to first fill the downcomer and then keep it filled to the elevation of the pump discharge leg.

( After the SITS empty, the SI pumps are the only source of I . safety injection flow. The greatest demand for SI pump flow occurs immediately after the SITS empty. If two SI pumps provide sufficient flow to the downcomer to replace what flows from the downcomer/ lower plenum to the core at that time, they will provide sufficient flow to keep the downcomer filled to the elevation of the pump discharge leg for all time thereafter.

For the limiting LBLOCA (1.0 DEG/PD break), the downcomer is filled to the elevation of the pump discharge leg at approximately 48 sec (Figure 6. 3.3.2-5M and Table 6. 3. 3.2-1 of CESSAR-DC). This is well before the SITS empty at 94.96 sec (Table 6. 3. 3. 2-1 of CESSAR-DC) . When the SITS empty, the flow rate into the core from the downcomer/ lower plenum is approxi-mately 210 lbm/sec (slope of Figure 6.3.3.2-5G of CESSAR-DC at 94.96 sec). If two SI pumps supply more than 210 lbm/sec to the reactor vessel, the excess will spill out the broken discharge leg. If they supply less than 210 lbm/sec, the water level in the downcomer will begin to decrease.

Eesponse 440.65 (continued)

From Figure 6.3.3.3-1 of CESSAR-DC, the minimum SI pump flow rate to the reactor vessel at an RCS pressure of 20 psig is 268 gpm - per pump, or approximately 130 lbm/sec per pump.

Therefore, the two SI pumps - available following a diesel generator failure will provide a total injection flow rate of 260 lbm/sec to the reactor vessel. That is 50 lbm/sec or approximately 25% greater than the 210 lbm/see that is calculated to be reflooding the core (i.e., leaving the downcomer/ lower plenum) immediately after the SITS empty for the limiting LBLOCA.

Therefore, SI flow from only two SI pumps will indeed keep the downcomer filled to the elevation of the pump discharge leg in the same time frame as with all four SI pumps feeding the reactor vessel.

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_Quention 440.68 Discuss in detail how your interf ace requirement will specif y the preoperational test program for ECCS in conformance with RG 1.68 and 1.79. Specifically, include the procedures which will be used to verify nominal and runout ECCS flow, pump characteristics, piping losses and verification that each valvo in the system is capable of performing both isolation and flow function.

EREE2nce 440.{ift The programs for preoperational and startup test, and conformance to Regulatory Guides 1.68 and 1.79, are provided in Chapter 14 of CESSAR-DC. Sections 14.2.12.1.22,

14. 2.12.1. 2 3, and 14. 2.12.1. 61 describe tests to verify safety injection system and component performanco, i

Question 440.69 ,

Describe the instrumentation for lovel indication in the IRWST. Also provido detailed design drawing of the IRWST, including the design provisions which preclude the formation of air entraining vortices. Discuss the anti-vortex criteria '

which was utilized during the design of the IRWST. Discuss t

what testing has been performed to verify design objectivos of no vortrX formation.

Resoonso 440.69 Level instrumentation is provided in two locations in the IRWST. These level instruments provide IRWST level indication as well as high and low level alarms in the Control Room. Soo CESSAR-DC, Figuro 6.8-4, Amendment I.

The In-containment Refueling Water Storago Tar 'IRWET) is designed to moot the intent of Standard Revir n Section 6.2.2 and Regulatory Guido 1.82. Design provisic:.. to provent air-entraining vortex formation include the geometry of the IRWST at the Safety Injection _(SI) and contair. ment Spray (CS) pump suctions as well as the IRWST water lovel. Soo CESSAR-DC, Figuros 6.8-1, 6.8-2 and 6.8-3, Amo4dment I. The hydraulic performance of the IRWST can be verified by testing the pumps at design flow and minimum level in the IRWST using return lines to the IRWST.

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Ouestion 440 21 In P&ID Figure 6.3.2-1A for SIS short term injection indicatos that valve SI-305 is normally closed for SI injection into hot leg #1; however, valve SI-304 is drawn in the open position for the SI injection path to hot leg #2. Should SI-304 be normally closed for the initial phase of short term safety injection (less than two hours)? Provide clarification.

Response 440.74 Ilot 109 injection valve should have been shown as closed.

Correct valvo positions are now shown on Figures 6.3.2-1A and

6. 3. 2-1D in Amendment I . SI-304 and SI-305 are renumbered SI-609 and SI-604, respectively.

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Ouestion 440.76 What is the minimum amount of boron concentration and minimum liquid volume assumed in the safety injection tanks (SITS) for the large break LOCA analysis, and why is 2000 ppm, as cited in Table 6.3.2-1, acceptable in lieu of the 4000 ppm required for the System 80 SITS?

Response 440.76 The minimum boron concentration and liquid volume in the SITS for the System 80+ plant is 2000 ppm and 1600 ft, 3 respectively. Tho LOCA long-term cooling analysis of Section 6.3.3.4 requires the use of the maximum boron concentration and volume. The values used in this analysis are 4400 ppm and 1927 fL 3 , respectivel).

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1 Ouestion 440.77 )

What is the minimum amount of borated water assumed in the IRWST for the large break LOCA analysis?

i Resconse-440.77 The amount of borated water assumed in the IRWST for the large break 14CA Long Term Cooling analysis is 4.127 x 106 lbm.

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/ On page 6.3-3 under CESSAR-DC Section 6. 3.1. 3 ( A) (2) ( f) states "i that SIT vent valves SI-331, SI-335, SI-329, SI-333, SI-330, SI-334, SI-328 and SI-332 shall have provinions to remove

l power from these valves. According to Figure 6.3.2-1B, these valves are nitrogen supply valves. Should this statement address SIT vent valves SI-320, SI-321, SI-322, SI-323, SI-324, SI-325, SI-326, and SI-327?

Response 440.7B Safety injection tank vent valves SI-320, SI-321, SI-322, SI-323, SI-324, SI-325, SI-326, and SI-327 should have been listed in the referenced section. Section 6.3.1.2.3.A.5, Amendment I, reflects the correct SIT vent valves which require power removal and restoration provisions during plant operation. The valves are renumbered in Amendment I, also.

_ - . . _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .

T D ijon 440,79 What type of " throttle valves" are SD-653 and SD-652 supposed to be? (Reference CESSAR-DC Sections 5.4.7, 6.3 and Figurc S.4.7-3 and Figure 6.3.2-1A) 1 89'OOnse 440,yg o Valves SD-652 and SD-653 have been replaced by motor-operated globe throttle valven SI-310 and SI-311 in Amendment I, Figures 6.3.2-1A and 6.3.2-18.

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Ouestion 440.8Q CESSAR-DC Section 5.4.7.2. 3. A(3) "Overprassure Protection" on page 5.4-3'., indicates that an alarm on the Scs system is provided - to warn operators of a pressurization transient during low RCS temperature conditions. This instrumentation should be appropriately reflected on the associated P&ID Figure 5.4.7-3.

ResDonse 440.80 SCS alarms to warn operators of pressurization transients during low RCS temperature conditions are shown on the safety injection system P&ID, Figure 6.3.2-1C, Amendment I. Figure 5.4.7-3 is a flow diagram showing the alignment of the SCS in the shutdown cooling modo, and is not intended to show details ,

of instrumentation.

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Ouestion 440.81 Provide an environmental qualification of ECCS equipment for post-LOCA conditions; i.e., Appendix 3.11B.

llesDonse 440.81 The- environmer,tal qualification of ECCS equipment for post-14CA conditions has boon incorporated into Appendix 3.11B, '

Amendment 1.

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Enclosure II to  !

d LD-91-024 f

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t PROPOSED REVISIO!1S TO TIIE COMBUSTIO!4 E!1GI!1EERIl4G t STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT -- DESIGli CERTIFICATIoli  !

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CESSAR l'!Pancmou 9.3 PROCE!jS AUXI1.1 ARIES 9.3.1 COMPRESSFD AlR SYSTIMS 9.3.1.1 Doolyn liases The Compressed Air System consists of the Instrument Air, Station Air, and Breathing Air Systems. The Instrument Air System supplies cican, oil free, dried air to all air operated E instrumentation and valves. The Station Air System supplies compressed air for air operated tools, s 'cIlaneous equipment,  ;

and varicus maintenance purposes. Th, ;reathing Air System supplies clean, oil free, low pressura air to various locations in the plant, as require (/ for breathing protection against airborne contamination while performing certain maintenance and

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cleaning operations, ggy /

9.3.1.3.1 Codes and Standards The compresse  ;' stems and associated components are designed in accordanc applicabic codes and standards. The design conforms to Design Criteria 1, 2 and S and meets the s intent of tho ard Review plan.

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9.3.1.2 Systern Description 9.3.1.2.1 Instrument Air System A flow diatJram of Instrument Air System is shown in rigure

9. 3.1 - 1. A hs t ei a c ts% t s e h t y rela te d s e~ fret o, b ta r voud by si p > v,,.e,.t }

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-gro nde i & Ta b Ic . . . .... .,,..,_ .. ....- ... ,_ ,.,_,._,, .,_..- ,_. _ ,.. ,.. , _ ,__,_._.,.. ,_ .., .___ ,..... - --. , . ,_ -,,_..... _

insert 2:

The instrument air system consists of three parallel trains of instrument air compressors and drying trains. with associated equipment and two parallel instrument air filtering Each compressor train consists of an instrument air compressor, af tercooler, moisture separator, and air receiver connected in series. Each compressor is of oil-free, water-cooled, rotary screw design and is capable of providing 100% of the instrument air requirements for the generating unit. Each compressor is furnished with an intake filter / silencer, rated to remove all particles greater than 5 microns (pm). The compressor intales are located in an area free of corrosive contaminants and hazardous gases. The compressor controls are designed to allow continuous operation of any number of the compressor motors with the compressors automatically loaded and unloaded in response to system pressure.

The controls also permit automatic start and stop operation of any number of the compressor motors in response to system pres _are. During normal plant operating

- conditions, one of the compressors is selected for continuous operation while the other compressors serve as standbys and start automatically if the continuously operating compressor cannot meet system demand, A compressor switching arrangement allows any one of the compressors to be chosen as the base compressor while the others serve as standbys. This capability enables the compressors to have equal wear. Startup of a standby compressor is annunciated in the control room.

Downstream of each air compressor, the hot compressed air flows through an af tercooler and centrif ugal maisture separator before discharging into an instrument air receiver. The aftercooler cools the hot compressed air to within 10 F of the Component Cooling Water System (CCW5) temperature, The centrifugal moisture.

process by centrifugal force. The air receivers dampen pressure in separator swirls the air to remove any water condensed the cooling fluctuations and serve as a pressure reservoir for sudden demands on the system. Control room indicators are provided for individual air receiver temperature and pressure to allow remote monitoring of system operation status for each supply train on an on-demand basis.

Downstream of the air receivers the instrument air passes through one of two parallel instrument air filtering and drying trains before being distributed to the instrument air piping system. Each train is equipped with one coalescing prefilter, an air dryer assembly, and one af terfilter connected in series. 1he l

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redundant filtering and drying trains allow maintenance to be performed on one 1 train while the unit is in operation by diverting the air flow through the other l parallel train, prior to entering the instrument air dryer, the air passes '

through a coalescing prefilter which removes hydrocarbon and water aerosols as well as particulates from the instrument air. The air next passes through a dual-tower regene ative desiccant air dryer whero it is dried to a dewpoint of

-40'F at line pressure. Each air dryer consists of two independent drying towers connected in parallel and an external heater. The air dryer automatically alternates air flow throuah each of the towers to permit automatic drying of the desiccant in one tower while the other tower is in service. After the instrument air dryers, the air is passed through an af terfilter which removes particulates l greater than 1 micron. A high differential pressure alarm is provided in the control room on both prefilters and afterfilters to warn the operator of filter fouling. In addition, a moisture indicator and alarm is provided on the control board to warn the operator of excessive moisture content in the air downstream of the instrument air dryers. in either case, the operator can divert the air stream to the standby drying train through manually operated valves.

Downstream of the filters, the instrument air headers supply instrument air throughout the plant. At each air-operated valve or instrument, the air is filtered again through a filter regulator. The instrument air line penetrating the containment has an electrically operated isolation valve located outside containment which is installed in series with a check valve located inside the containment.

The instrument air system is designed with the following features to assure instrument air quality is consistent with the operability requirements of air-operated valves and instruments in safety-related systems:

• Dil-free compressors which minimize oil content in the air.

• Local in-line moisture indicator, control board moisture indicator, and annunciator to detect excessive moisture or dryer malfunction.

• Local and main control board prefilter and afterfilter differential pressure and trouble indicators and annunciators to detect filter fouling.

• Instrument air dryers which produce dewpoints of -40 F at line pressure (exceeds ANSI MCll.1-1976 (ISA-57.3) requirements).

• Afterfilters which remove all particles greater than 1 micron.

• Sampling connections throughout the instrument air system to allow periodic sampling of air quality.

• Low point drains and automatic drain valves on condensate drain lines to l

allow for removal of moisture collected in the air receiver tanks and suppiy lines.

• Filters installed at the intakes to the compressors.

• Filters installed in all lines to aic-operated valves and instruments.

- - - . _ . _._.. . - __.._.___e___ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

i Insert 3 .

In addition, inadvertent actuation of safety-related valves due to a loss of instrument air will not cause any conditions that preclude achieving and inaintaining safe shutdown,

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1 Insert 4:

The instrument air system is designed to meet or exceed the air quality requirements established in ANSI /ISA-57.3-1975 (R1981), formerly ANSI MC11.1-1976.

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j. TABLE 9.11-1 (Pa9e t of 4)  ;

. E l ACTWE SAFETY-M1ATED COMPONFNTS SE7MCED SY 905TML6 MR i

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COMPONI NT CESSAR-DC DESCfuPT10N SAFETY-MLATED 9eOftsAt. LOSSOr AIR SAFE  !

NueseER FIGUFE ACTfvE FUNCTIOos PoemOrt FAILED POSITION POsmON [

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M AIN ST E AM SYSTEM j i t j SG-170 10.1-2 Mam Steam hetation Vaw Contammeet teetat% O C C i

i SG-171 10~t-2 Mah Steam kdatloa Vake Containme..t hotat$on O C C 9

SG 180 10 1-2 Mah Steam lootation VA, Coatanwnent lootates O C C 6

f' SG-te1 10.1-2 Main Swam Iw4 ate VaNo Contaerneet kdation O C C i

SG-183 10.1 2 MSN t3ypass va8vo Contanwnent kotation C C C {

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- 10.1-2 MSN Bypaes Vane Corttainment isolatnon C C C f

4 i

l M AIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM I L

5 i

! SG-130 10 1 Man Feeswaset ledation Vane Contamment kotate O C C i f l SG-t 32 10.1-2 Mam Feed =ater todanon Vane C-, m..t hotation O C C i i  !

i SG-135 10.t-2 Mah Feedwa?e ScotaWon Vaeve Contaenment teotatten -

O C C f

1.  ;

i' SG-137 10.1-2 Mah Fe.dwate. Isolanon Vaka Cc,s.. + t kdation O C C 1

i SG-172 10. t-2 Mam Feed = ate < bdaten Vake Contamment kotanon O C C

! SG-174 10.1-2 Mac Feed =ater ledation vap=, ' Contamment hetation O C C a .

f 4

SG-175 10.1-2 Mam Feed =stee kdation Vabe Containment kofatsort O C C I

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=

SG-t 77 10.1-2 Mim Feed-stee hota lon VaNo Containment hdaison O C C  !

EMEROU4CY FEEDWATER SYSTEM i I i: EF-10s 10.4.S-1  : Swam Suppy % da' m Va w Supp4 Swam to EFWTwb C O O 1

i f l EF-109 10.4.9-1 Steem Supp*y hotation Vane Supp8y Steam to EFw Teb C O O  !

I 4 6 I _ - __ 4 - _ _ .- ._ ,.- .__ - . . . __- , . . . - - -

_.- ~ _ . _ - .__ _ _ _ , . _ f

TABLE 9 3 t-t (Page 2 ef 4) i i

CfVE ShTTV-fELATfD CO*8PONENTS SETMCE'D BY INSTRUtsENT ANI COMPONT NT CESSMLDC DEscitrTION SAT ETY-TE1 ATE D NORMAL LOSS OF Apt SAFE NUMBER FKitFE ACTfVE FUNCTION POSITION FAILED POSITION POSTi3ON E9AEROf NCY FEEDWATEM SYSTEM (CONTD EF-112 to 4 bt S*eam Sucpy ecase hd vaw Ng Swam to EFW Tueb C O O I EF-113 to 4.%1 Steam Supply Deans Iset Vawe Preeg Swam to EFW Turb C O O COMPOt AENT COOLst*3 WATER SYSTEM CC-100 -

CCWS Hs 1 A Basse Vaw Syvem Mdatre C C C CC-101 -

CCWS Hs 19 Boese Vawe Sysw Isoistkm C C C CC 102 - Non EssW Spey Hoe hd Vaw tset Non Essn CCW Fto. O C C CC-103 - tbn Esta Rwe Ster led Vaw !sd Non Essa CCW Hdrs O C C CC-1 t o -

SOC He 1 Cont-d Vaw Flow Cmtrol C O O CC-112 - Spee Fuel Pool CW Ctri Vah, Ftow Conted C O O CC-231 -

CCWS 5tv 29 Daass Vaw fyse isolaccm C C C l

CC-202 - Non Essti Septy H1r Isot Vane tsd Non Essa CCW Flcw O C C CC-203 -

Non Essit Rtrn #41' 999 Va% bd Non Essif CCWt+1es O C C I

CC-210 -

SDC Hu 2 Coni of Vaw Flow Cec *d C O O CC-212 - Sper:t Fuel Pool CW Ctet Vane Fk>= Coctrol C O O REACTOR COOtANT SYSTEM RC 100E 5.1.2-1 Pressurizer Sp ay Ctri Vaw System hdate C C C PC 900F 5.12-1 Preteuefree Spray Cwt Va% System tseistice C C C

TABLE 9.11-1(Page 3 of 4) f ICTfVE SAFETY-NLATED COMPONENTS SER-1CED BY ptSTHLWENT AIR COMPONE NT CESSAR-DC DESCfBPTION SAFETY-MLATED NOft4AL LOSS OF AIR SATE NUMBEH FIGUnE ACTIVE FUD8CTION POSff3ON FALED FOSITIO*e POGfTION I

CHEulCAL ANOVOLUuE CONTHOL SYSTEM CH-505 9 3 4-t FICP C90 Contamment 1908 Vahre Containment hdatkm O C C CH-506 9.34-1 RCP CDO Containmeet hos Vane Contamment isolatk:n O C C I

CH-515 9.34-1 Letdown hotation Vahre System hotate O C C 1

CH-516 934-1 Letdown Backup tsotation Valve Sys'em hofaton O C C l

04-573 93.4-1 Letdown Contzet isol Vake Contala neat isdatio t O C C CH-660 9.34-1 HDT isotation va4 Contaement isotasi'tw O!C C C CH-581 934-1 HDT &ction isolat.on Valve Contown Isdatkan OfC C C CH-570 934-1 Letdown Contammant isof Valve Conta*mant isolation O C C i

CH-580 9341 HMWS to HDT 4ctation Vane Conta!nmeat isdark=. C C C a

., SAFETY tNJECTION SYSTEM 1

SI-307 6 3 71 A Sii Fa!fDrsin CTV Contaent Mc'a'en C C C CONTAttiuENT PURGE SVSTEM HI Voi Cont Putge Sys SpW 81

- - Oumide Contalem+nt he'ation C C C

- - taswie Conta+nment isotatwpr C C C Hi Vol Cont Putgo Sys Srp'y 82 Outside Containment Isotate C C C Inside Containwt isolation C C C

TABLE 9 31-1 (Page a e,; e)

ACTIVE SAFETY-fELATED COMPONENTS SETMCED BY MSTRMENT AIR  ;

COMPONENT CESSA4DC DESCHIPTIOP4 SM ETY-fELATED NOFWAL LOGS OF Mn SAFE NUMBER FIGURE ACTIVE FUNCTION POSrTION FAKED POSrTION POSIT 804 +

CONTAnsuENT PunGE SYSTEM (CT.'.,

th VS Cont Puep Sys E*st et I

< - - Oatsuse Contaaneeent SwAspen C C C

- - bsafe Containment isdation C C C HI Vr> Cont Pu,;e Sys E est *2

- - Outsee Conwement isdam C C C

- - 6,sde Conteisotaron C C C to Va4 Cent Pa go Sys Sospiy i

^

- - .-45 5 Contenmt tseta: ion C C C ensde ContaWe isotaw C C C ,

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