Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation

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Age Related Capacitor Degradation
ML120330272
Person / Time
Site: Hatch, Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/23/2012
From: Laura Dudes, Mcginty T
Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Alexion, T W, NRR/DPR, 415-1326
Shared Package
4 List:
References
FOIA/PA-2013-0030, FOIA/PA-2013-0139 IN-12-011
Download: ML120330272 (5)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 July 23, 2012 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2012-11: AGE-RELATED CAPACITOR DEGRADATION

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of or applicants for an early site permit, standard design certification, standard

design approval, manufacturing license, or combined license issued under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees of recent problems involving age-related degradation of capacitors. The NRC

expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Surry Power Station Unit 1

On June 8, 2010, an automatic reactor trip occurred from full power because of an inadvertent

electrical contact made during maintenance activities. The plant conditions encountered and

system responses as a result of the trip were generally as expected, except as noted below.

Approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following the event, failure of a resistor/capacitor (RC) suppressor in a

nuclear instrument (NI) cabinet resulted in a small control room fire, which was extinguished by

the use of manual carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. Approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> later, another RC

suppressor failed in a second NI cabinet, causing a control power fuse to blow and the source

range NIs to become deenergized. The source-range NIs were restored in about 5 minutes.

(No power failures or blown fuses resulted from the RC suppressor failures in the first NI

cabinet.)

The most probable cause of the RC suppressor failures was age-related hardening and

cracking of the RC suppressors epoxy insulation, which allowed degradation of the RC

suppressor capacitor. These RC suppressors were original plant equipment and had not been

replaced. The capacitor degradation allowed the RC suppressor circuit to draw excessive

current and overheat. The excessive heat caused the epoxy in the RC suppressor to ignite.

The older (date codes from 1969 to 1971) suppressors contained epoxy which is not flame

retardant. Subsequent to this event, the licensee opted to install newer RC suppressors which

use a flame retardant epoxy.

Additional information is available in NRC Special Inspection Report 05000280/2010006, dated

September 10, 2010, and can be found on the NRCs public website in the Agencywide

Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession No. ML102560333.

Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2

Between March 2005 and February 2009, three loss-of-offsite-power/loss-of-coolant-accident

(LOSP/LOCA) loading timers associated with redundant plant service water pumps for the two

Unit 2 and swing emergency diesel generators experienced failures. After the failure in

February 2009, the licensee established a root cause team which determined the failures were

caused by age-related degradation of electrolytic capacitors.

Specifically, the power supplies for the LOSP/LOCA circuitry were exhibiting excessive voltage

ripple on their outputs. The root cause team attributed this to degradation of electrolytic

capacitors in the power supply circuits, which tend to exhibit increased noise toward the end of

life. These capacitors had been installed for 20 years, which was beyond their vendor- recommended service life of 10 years.

Additional information is available in NRC Inspection Report 05000366/2009005, dated

February 12, 2010, and can be found on the NRCs public Web site in ADAMS under Accession

No. ML100430494.

Additional Examples of Age-Related Degradation of Capacitors and Other Components

Additional examples of problems involving age-related degradation of capacitors can be found

on the NRCs public Web site in ADAMS under Accession No. ML12033A044.

NRC IN 2012-06, Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations provides additional

insight on components that are left in service beyond the vendor-recommended service life.

IN 2012-06 can be found on the NRCs public Web site in ADAMS under Accession No.

ML112300706.

DISCUSSION

Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, of Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power

Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants to 10 CFR Part 50 requires licensees to assure that

conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected and corrective actions are

taken to preclude repetition. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation) (ADAMS

Accession No. ML003739995), Section 9.b, states preventive maintenance schedules should

be developed to specify lubrication schedules, inspections of equipment, replacement of such

items as filters and strainers, and inspection or replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime

such as wear rings.

RC suppressors contain a capacitor and a resistor connected in series. Both components are

normally completely encased in a molded epoxy package with an electrical lead from one end of

the resistor and one end of the capacitor extending out. In a non-degraded condition, the epoxy

electrically insulates the RC suppressor's capacitor, resistor, and their conductive surfaces in an

encapsulated environment devoid of oxygen, moisture, and other air contaminants.

Aging adversely affects the capacitors in RC suppressors by causing the epoxy insulation to

harden and crack over time. This degrades the capacitor, allowing a high flow of current and

excessive heating. The excessive heat can then ignite the epoxy in the RC suppressor.

Although newer RC suppressors use a fire retardant epoxy, capacitor overheating can still

cause failure.

Capacitors also may exhibit tendencies to leak, drift, or make electronic noise, as a result of

varying environmental conditions (e.g., shifts in temperature, humidity levels, or both). Extreme

temperature conditions can be problematic for capacitors that contain aluminum electrolytes. At

lower temperatures, capacitance falls off rapidly. At higher temperatures, the electrolyte may be

lost through evaporation, thereby accelerating leakage. This may result in premature circuit

damage or malfunction.

Capacitors are energy storage devices that are widely used in electronic and electrical power

circuits. Operating experience has shown that capacitors have finite lifetimes. Placing these

capacitors in a periodic preventative maintenance program that accounts for both time in

storage and time in service can address the adverse effects of aging capacitors in equipment

circuitry and prevent equipment failures.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation project manager.

/RA by SBahadur for/ /RA by JLuehman for/

Timothy J. McGinty, Director Laura A. Dudes, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Construction Inspection

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Operational Programs

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contacts: Rossnyev Alvarado, NRR Robert Bernardo, NRR

301-415-6808 301-415-2621 E-mail: Rossnyev.Alvarado@nrc.gov E-mail: Robert.Bernardo@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library.

ML120330272 *via e-mail TAC No. ME7139 OFFICE NRR/DIRS/IOEB NRR/DE/EICB Tech Editor BC:NRR/DIRS/IOEB

NAME RBernardo RAlvarado JDougherty* HChernoff (EThomas

Acting)

DATE 4/6/2012 4/17/2012 2/14/2012 6/21/2012 OFFICE BC:NRR/DE/EICB BC:NRR/DLR/RASB BC:NRO/DE/ICE D:NRR/DE

NAME JThorp MMarshall* TJackson* PHiland (MCheok for)

DATE 4/17/2012 6/26/2012 6/20/2012 6/25/2012 OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB NRR/DPR/PGCB BC:NRR/DPR/PGCB D:NRO/DCIP

NAME CHawes TAlexion DPelton LDudes (JLuehman for)

DATE 7/05/2012 7/06/2012 7/17/2012 7/20/2012 OFFICE D:NRR/DPR

NAME TMcGinty (SBahadur for)

DATE 7/23/2012