Information Notice 1988-64, Reporting Fires in Nuclear Process Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

Reporting Fires in Nuclear Process Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

ML070180062
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	08/18/1988
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-064, NUDOCS 8808110206
Download: ML070180062 (3)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 18, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-64: REPORTING FIRES IN NUCLEAR PROCESS

SYSTEMS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to the importance

of prompt reporting to the NRC of fires in nuclear process systems at nuclear

power plants. These incidents involve ignition, detonation, burns, combustion, explosion, and the like, of solid, liquid, or gaseous material in safety and

nonsafety related nuclear process systems. It is expected that recipients

will review the information'for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions con- tained in this information notice du rot constitute NRC requirements; therefore

no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On February 27, 1988, a fire lasting more than ten minutes occurred in the off- gas system charcoal beds at Grand Gulf while the plant was at 100 percent power.

A hydrogen detonation caused the fire. The charcoal beds were isolated and

power was reduced to 55 percent to reduce off-gas radiation release levels, although no radioactive'materials were released as a result of this fire. A

nitrogen purge wnm used to extinguish the fire.

On June 20, 1986, a test of the temperature reducing capability of the non- safety related off-gas vault refrigeration system was performed at the Perry

plant. External radiant space heaters were used to raise the temperatures of

the charcoal bed vessel and equipment. Dry instrument air was blown through

the charcoal beds to simulate system gas flow. The test was stopped when the

charcoal beds caught fire. A nitrogen purge of the charcoal beds was used to

extinguish the fire. The test resumed on July 6, 1986. The charcoal beds

dgdin caught fire, dnd the test was stoppEd. A nitrogen purge was again used

to extinguish the fire. No radioactive releases resulted from either fire.

8801 1026

IN 88-64 August 18, 1988 Pdge 2 of 2 Discussion:

For each of the fires at the Perry plant, the licensee declared an Unusudl

Event ana notified the NRC Operations Center. However, the fire at Grand

Gulf was not reported to the NRC Operations Center, because Grand Gulf

defires an unusual event as a fire lasting more than ten minutes in a

safety related area.

Various NRC documents refer to fires that should be reported to the NRC Operations

Center. NUREG-0654, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of

Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear

Power Plants,"-lists a fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minutes as

an example of a condition that would require notifying the NRC of an Unusual

Event. Accordingly, fire in a process system lasting more than 10 minutes

would be an adequdte criterion for declaring .an Unusual Event in accordance

with the Emergency Plans of most licensees.

NUREG-1022, "Licensee Event Report System," and Supplement No. 1 thereto provide

informatiun and guidance orn notifying the NRC Operations Center per 10 CFR 50.72 and on preparing licensee event reports per 10 CFR 50.73. These documents con- tain examples of potentially reportable events, several of which deal with

various aspects of fires.

It is important that recipients notify the NRC Operations Center of events in- volving fires in nuclear process systems at nuclear power plants in a timely

manner. Timely reporting of events ensures that the NRC can properly respond, including alerting or informing other governmental agencies of the potential

or resultant consequences, as appropriate.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact

listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional uffice.

'~Chr~e

E.Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Richard J. Jolliffe, AEOD

(301) 492-7159 Attachment: List of Recently Issuec WRC Information Notices

Attachment

IN 88-64 August 18, 1988 Pace 1 of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-63 High Radiation Hazards 8115/88 All holders of OLs

from Irradiated Incore or CPs for nuclear

Detectors and Cables power reactors, research reactors

ind test reactors.

88-62 Recent Findings Concerning 8/12/88 All holders of NRC

Implementation of Quality quality assurance

Assurance Programs by program approval

Suppliers of Transport for radioactive

Packaqes material packages.

88-61 Control Room Habitability - 8/11/88 All holders of OLs

Recent Reviews of Operating or CPs for nuclear

Experience power reactors.

88-60 Inadequate Design and 8/11/88 All holders of OLs

Installation cf Watertight or CPs for nuclear

Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-4, Inadequate Qualification 8/9/88 All holders of OLs

Supplement I and Documentation of Fire or CPs for nuclear

Barrier Penetration Seals power reactors.

Main Steam Isolation Valve 8/9/88 All holders of OLs

Cuide Rail- Failure at or CPs for nuclear

Waterford Unit 3 power reactors.

88-58 Potential Problems with 8/8/88 All holders ci' OLs

ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L or CPs for nuclear

Time-Overcurrent Relays power reactors.

88-57 Potential Loss ofSafe 8/8/88 All holders of OLs

Shutdown Equipment Due to or CPs for nuclear

Premature Silicon Controlled power reactors.

Rectifier Failure

F8-56 Potential Problems with 8/4/88 All holders of OLs

Silicone Foam Fire Barrier or CPs for nuclear

Penetration Seals power reactors.

OL -Operating License

CP - Construction Pcrniit