IR 05000498/2025001
| ML25101A146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/2025 |
| From: | Patricia Vossmar NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBA |
| To: | Harshaw K South Texas |
| Bywater R | |
| References | |
| IR 2025001 | |
| Download: ML25101A146 (1) | |
Text
April 17, 2025
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2025001 AND 05000499/2025001
Dear Kimberly A. Harshaw:
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. On April 3, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000498 and 05000499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000498 and 05000499
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000498/2025001 and 05000499/2025001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-001-0016
Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Wadsworth, TX 77483
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2025, to March 31, 2025
Inspectors:
R. Bywater, Senior Project Engineer
L. Flores, Resident Inspector
V. Lee, Project Engineer
J. Vera, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch A
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instructions Results in Inoperable Degraded Voltage Relays on Safety Related Bus Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71153 The inspectors documented a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion V, for the licensees failure to provide adequate work instructions appropriate to the circumstances for restoration of a safety related bus after maintenance. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide work instructions with enough specificity to properly manage configuration control and restoration of a pull-out fuse block after maintenance on safety related bus E1B. The fuse block was left in the OFF position, resulting in the inoperability of four channels of degraded voltage relays for longer than the technical specification allowed outage time.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000498/2024-007-00 Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed LER 05000498/2024-005-00 Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed LER 05000498/2024-002-00 Unit 1, Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function 71153 Closed LER 05000498/2024-002-01 Unit 1, Supplement to Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained there for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. Unit 2, lowered power to 90 percent power on March 8, 2025, for main turbine steam inlet valve testing and returned to full power on March 9, 2025, and remained there for the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems:
Units 1 and 2 essential cooling water system and emergency diesel generators during the week of January 6, 2025
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe winter storm weather on January 16, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1, train B essential cooling water system on January 16, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, train A engineered safety features switchgear room on February 25, 2025
- (3) Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater system on March 28, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2, train C diesel generator building on January 7, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, train C diesel generator building on January 16, 2025
- (3) Unit 1, train A electrical auxiliary building cable spreading room on January 17, 2025
- (4) Unit 2, train A electrical auxiliary building cable spreading room on January 17, 2025
- (5) Unit 2, train A electrical auxiliary building channel I battery room on February 25, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on February 21, 2025
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated external flooding mitigation protections in the: Unit 2, train B class 1E underground cable vault on February 6, 2025
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2, 10 percent downpower to support main turbine inlet testing on March 8, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 2, crew 2D shift managers scenario training and crew 2D examination on February 20, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 2, train C diesel generator exceeded maintenance rule A1 limits for unavailability on March 21, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, intermediate and power range detectors exceed environmental qualification life on March 6, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1, yellow risk the week of January 14, 2025, for planned work on train C EDG
- (2) Unit 1, unplanned configuration risk management program entry during winter weather while in train C major ELCO window on January 22, 2025
- (3) Unit 1, white risk and unplanned configuration risk management program entry for train B ECCS the week of February 17, 2025
- (4) Unit 2, white risk the week of February 17, 2025, for planned maintenance on Train C ECCS equipment
- (5) Unit 2, planned configuration risk management program entry for maintenance on E2D11 battery and DP 1202 inverter on February 25, 2025
- (6) Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator maintenance after "DG trouble" and "loss starting air" alarms were received on March 25, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1, ECCS after identification of voiding in downstream piping during 1RE25 on March 3, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, train A essential cooling water inoperability on September 10, 2025
- (3) Unit 1, train C essential cooling water piping below minimum wall thickness on March 13, 2025
- (4) Unit 2, dry fuel storage canister fire accident relief device burst during lid welding on March 19, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Unit 1, train C diesel generator jacket water cooler Belzona coatings on March 5, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, addition of Belzona coatings to control room envelope HVAC ducts on February 28, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator engine speed adjustment and overspeed trip test following maintenance on January 27, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, train C essential chiller after planned maintenance on February 6, 2025
- (3) Unit 2, train C essential chiller after planned maintenance on February 19, 2025
- (4) Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator following 6-year planned maintenance on March 4, 2025
- (5) Unit 2, train A essential cooling water after planned maintenance on March 7, 2025
- (6) Unit 1, train C control room envelope heating, ventilation, and air conditioning after replacing electrohydraulic actuator assembly on March 24, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator surveillance on February 15, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, train C emergency diesel generator surveillance on February 20, 2025
- (3) Unit 2, E2C11 battery quarterly surveillance on February 27, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1, train C essential chilled water pump inservice test on March 6, 2025
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
(1)tabletop drill involving an anticipated transient without scram, steam generator tube rupture, and radiological release on February 19,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
(1)
- (2) Unit 1 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)
Unit 2 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
(1)
- (2) Unit 1 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)
Unit 2 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
(1)
- (2) Unit 1 (January 1 through December 31, 2024) Unit 2 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000498/2024-005-000, "Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications,"(ADAMS Accession No. ML24318C508). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000498/2024004 and 05000499/2024004 under Inspection Results Section 71153 dated January 30, 2025. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 05000498/2024-002-00, "Unit 1, Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfilment of a Safety Function (ADAMS Accession No. ML24130A271) and LER 05000498/2024-002-001, "Unit 1, Supplement to Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfilment of a Safety Function" (ADAMS Accession No. ML24179A341). The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is closed.
- (3) LER 05000498/2024-007-00, "Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML25023A280)
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results section 71153. This LER is closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instructions Results in Inoperable Degraded Voltage Relays on Safety Related Bus Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71153 The inspectors documented a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion V, for the licensees failure to provide adequate work instructions appropriate to the circumstances for restoration of a safety related bus after maintenance. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide work instructions with enough specificity to properly manage configuration control and restoration of a pull-out fuse block after maintenance on safety related bus E1B. The fuse block was left in the OFF position, resulting in the inoperability of four channels of degraded voltage relays for longer than the technical specification allowed outage time.
Description:
On November 27, 2024, South Texas Project (STP), Unit 1, operators found the E1B 4160V bus cubicle 2 degraded voltage relay flags dropped, and found the flags would not reset. Operators identified that the 30A pull-out fuse block that supplies power to the safety related E1B 4160 VAC bus cubicle 2 degraded voltage relays 27E, 27F, 27G, and 27H, was in the OFF position. Without the 30A pull-out fuse block ON, the E1B bus does not have degraded voltage protection. Unit 1 entered technical specification (TS) 3.3.2, action C, items 8.b and 8.c, action 20 A.b of table 3.3-3 for all four channels being inoperable.
Prior to October 12, 2024, at 0311, the degraded voltage relays were operable, as the control power to the monitoring relay was energized and the 30A pull-out fuse block was in the ON position. On October 12, 2024, the four degraded voltage relays were rendered inoperable when maintenance personnel de-energized the control power to support planned maintenance on the bus. During the maintenance, the 30A pull-out fuse block was set to the OFF position. When the relays were placed back in service, the 30A pull-out fuse block was not reset to the ON position, and as a result the relays remained de-energized, and the equipment was not in the proper alignment before the licensee returned it to service.
Therefore, the degraded voltage protection relays were inoperable on the E1B 4160 VAC bus cubicle 2 from October 12, until November 28, 2024, when the pull-out fuse block was turned ON and the degraded voltage relays were restored to operable.
The inspectors reviewed the work instructions and completed records for the maintenance performed during the outage. The inspectors noted that several configuration control sheets were included per procedure 0PGP03-ZM-0021, Control of Configuration Changes, revision 23. These did not include a record for configuration control of the pull-out fuse block that supplies power to the degraded voltage relays. As the station assessed the event, the inspectors noted that the configuration control approach used for electrical bus maintenance at STP relies on craft training, knowledge, and awareness. The level of specificity for component manipulation varies according to the work instructions and procedures in use.
Some electrical component procedures have a position checklist to ensure equipment is in the correct configuration prior to resuming operation, while others rely entirely on the craft appropriately applying and following knowledge-based configuration control protocols. The inspectors further noted that the post-maintenance testing procedure performed after the bus B outage did not ensure the operability of the degraded voltage relays. This was due to the electrical configuration, in which the pull-out fuse block also powers the alarm for the relays being inoperable. Therefore, the alarm, which should have been triggered by the condition, did not come in as operators would have expected. This could have been avoided by powering the alarm from a different source or by ensuring via procedure that there was enough specificity to verify proper configuration control or operability of each component (i.e.
with instructions to look for any improperly flagged relays upon bus restoration).
Corrective Actions: The licensee turned the pull-out fuse block back to the ON position, restoring power to the degraded voltage relays. Lessons learned were discussed with the craft across various departments. A performance analysis was conducted, and a causal product assigned. A benchmark of industry peers was requested on methods of configuration control. The licensee initiated plans to revise the work instructions to incorporate configuration controls, including independent verification for as-left positions of manipulated equipment during maintenance. They additionally began reviewing other electrical maintenance procedures to identify where configuration controls could be added.
Corrective Action References: condition report 2024-11655
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to provide adequate work instructions appropriate to the circumstances for restoration of a safety related bus after maintenance in accordance with 10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion V, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide work instructions with enough specificity to properly manage configuration control and the restoration of a pull-out fuse block after maintenance on safety related bus E1B.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the lack of configuration control resulted in inoperable degraded voltage protection relays on the E1B 4160 VAC bus cubicle 2 from October 12, 2024, until November 28, 2024.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that this finding required a detailed risk evaluation because 4 channels of degraded voltage relays being inoperable represented a loss of PRA function for one train of a multi-train system for greater than its TS allowed outage time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation and determined the issue to be of very low safety significance (Green). In the evaluation, the analyst assumed that the exposure time was from October 12, 2024, to November 28, 2024, and was broken down into 8 days when the plant was defueled, 6 days when the plant was fueled with the refueling cavity flooded up, 5 days when the plant had the reactor coolant system vented with the steam generators unavailable, 7 days with the reactor coolant system closed with the steam generators available, and 21 days with the plant at power. Also, the analyst conservatively assumed that bus E1B was failed for scenarios which did not result in losses of offsite power. For the times when the plant was defueled and the time fueled with the reactor refueling cavity flooded up, the analyst considered the increase in core damage frequency to be qualitatively negligible. For the 5 days with the reactor coolant system vented and the 7 days with the reactor coolant system closed, the analyst used the losses of level control and losses of residual heat removal worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, appendix G, attachment 2, Phase 2 Significance Determination Process Template for PWR During Shutdown, to estimate their increases in core damage frequency to be 1.4E-7/year and 3.0E-8/year, respectively. For the at-power time, the analyst used the STP SPAR model, version 8.80, ran on SAPHIRE, version 8.2.11, to estimate the increase in core damage frequency to be 3.7E-7/year. These results total to a conservative estimate of the increase in core damage frequency of 5.1E-7/year, or of very low safety significance. This estimate includes external events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, the analyst concluded that the increase in large early release frequency would also be of very low significance. Transients not resulting in losses of offsite power were the dominant sequences and were mitigated by the two operational trains of safety-related electrical power.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, the licensees work instructions and post-maintenance procedures did not ensure that a pull-out fuse block was properly restored after bus maintenance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances, and that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, requires, in part, in Modes 1-4, that the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in table 3.3-3 shall be operable with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of table 3.3-4 and with response times as shown in Chapter 16 in the UFSAR.
Technical Specification 3.3.2 action statement
- (c) requires, in part, that in Modes 1-4, with an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the action shown in table 3.3-3.
Table 3.3-3, functional unit items 8.b, 4.16 kv ESF Bus Undervoltage -Tolerable Degraded Voltage Coincident with SI and 8.c, 4.16 kv ESF Bus Undervoltage - Sustained Degraded Voltage. Action 20A.b, requires that with the number of operable channels more than one less than the total number of channels, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore at least two channels to operable status for functions with three channels and restore at least three channels to operable status for functions that have four channels, or apply the requirements of the configuration risk management program; or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in at least hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and be in cold shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from October 12, 2024, to November 28, 2024, the licensee failed to prescribe procedures and instructions appropriate to the circumstances, and which contained appropriate acceptance criteria to ensure that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide work instructions and post-maintenance testing procedures with enough specificity to properly manage configuration control and the restoration of a pull-out fuse block after maintenance on safety related bus E1B, and it was left in the OFF position, resulting in the inoperability of four channels of degraded voltage relays. Additionally, the unit entered mode 4 on November 5, 2024, a mode of applicability to the degraded voltage operability requirements of TS 3.3.2. As a result, the number of operable channels was more than one less than the total number of channels as required by TS 3.3.2, Action (c), table 3.3-3 functional unit items 8b and 8c, and the licensee did not within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore the inoperable channels, apply the requirements of the configuration risk management program, or be in cold shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, placing the unit in a condition prohibited by technical specifications.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 3, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Kimberly A. Harshaw, Acting President and Chief Executive Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5Q159MB1023
Standby Diesel Generator System
Miscellaneous
5R289MB01006
Essential Cooling Water System
Winter Readiness Program
Extreme Cold Weather Guidelines
Procedures
Essential Cooling Water Operations
5R289F05038#1
Sh 2
Essential Cooling Water System Train B
Drawings
5S141F00024
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater,
Sheet 1
Essential Cooling Water Operations
Procedures
Switchgear E1A(E2A) Bus Outage
Calculations
7Q270MC05800
Combustible Loading of Safety Related Areas
Fire Plans
Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building Cable Spreading
Room Train A
Procedures
Fire Preplan for Diesel Generator Building, Train C
Cable Management Program
Procedures
License Renewal Electrical Aging Management
Work Orders
Work Authorization
Number
680054
Procedures
Main Turbine Inlet Valve Testing
Work Orders
Work Authorization
Number
693955
EQCPROCKBESTOS
Type-1 Triaxial Cable
Calculations
ROCKBESTOS-U2
Type -1 Triaxial Cable
Corrective Action
Documents
CR YYYY-NNNN
25-0712, 2014-7979, 2003-11910, 2024-9776,
25-1166
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR YYYY-NNNN
25-1181
Procedures
Environmental Equipment Qualification Program
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Engineering
Changes
24-11292-6
Contingency for the Replacement of Eroded/Corroded
Aluminum Bronze ECW SBDG 12 Jacket Water Piping on
Pipe Spools EW-1230-F and EW-1230-G
Configuration Risk Management Program
Protected Components
Risk Management Actions (RMAs)
Procedures
Online Class 1E 125V DC Battery and Inverter Removal
from Service and Restoration
Corrective Action
Documents
CR YYYY-NNNN
24-2962, 2024-9728, 2024-11291, 2025-2401,
24-8965, 2025-2482, 2025-2492
Corrective Action
Documents
CR YYYY-NNNN
25-640, 2025-641
Engineering
Changes
25-640-4
Documentation of Belzona 1311 and Belzona Ceramic
S-metal Applied to jacket water Cooler and Lube Oil
Cooler Tube Sheet During DG#13 ELCO
Procedures
Standard Design Process Interface Procedure
Work Orders
Work Authorization
Number
677359
Corrective Action
Documents
CR YYYY-NNNN
25-0789
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR YYYY-NNNN
25-1807
Standby Diesel Generator Governor Oil Change and
Overspeed Trip Test
York Chiller Inspection & Maintenance 300 Tons
Essential Chilled Water Pump 11C(21C) Inservice Test
Standby Diesel 13(23) Operability Test
Standby Diesel 13(23) Twenty-Four Hour Load Test
Procedures
25 Volt Class 1E Battery Quarterly Surveillance Test
Work Orders
Work Authorization
Number
681620, 605441, 714787, 698355, 685956, 681526,
695673, 670579, 667142, 662948, 658529, 653550,
648493, 644989, 637729, 633267, 628679, 623393,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
667248, 717799, 721631, 627555, 694349
Control of Configuration Changes
4160 Volt Class 1E Switchgear Maintenance
Procedures
Switchgear E1B(E2B) Bus Outage
Work Orders
Work Authorization
Number
436899