IR 05000458/2025003
| ML25345A229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2025 |
| From: | Douglas Dodson NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBC |
| To: | Hansett P Entergy Operations |
| Day L | |
| References | |
| IR 2025003 | |
| Download: ML25345A229 (0) | |
Text
December 22, 2025
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2025003
Dear Phil Hansett:
On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at River Bend Station. On December 8, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 1, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations. However, due to the 43-day lapse in normal operations, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation granted the Regional Offices an extension on the issuance of the calendar year 2025 inspection reports that should have been issued by November 13, 2025, to December 31, 2025. The NRC resumed the routine cycle of issuing inspection reports on November 13, 2025.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000458 License No. NPF-47
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000458
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-003-0008
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station
Location:
St. Francisville, LA
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2025, to September 30, 2025
Inspectors:
B. Baca, Health Physicist
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
C. Highley, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Miller, Health Physicist
L. Moore, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
E. Powell, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Ruffin, Reactor Inspector
J. Talavera, Reactor Inspector
C. Wynar, Inspection Programs & Assessment Team Leader
Approved By:
Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at River Bend Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Assess Impacts of Operability Determination Compensatory Measures on Containment Unit Coolers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, a quality related procedure.
Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the ancillary impacts of compensatory measures implemented as part of an operability evaluation, which resulted in containment unit coolers 1A and 1B being inoperable.
Failure to Follow Procedure for Fill and Vent of HVK-CHL1A Results in Inoperability of the Chiller Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2025003-03 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.24 The inspectors noted a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to implement a procedure required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure EN-WM-102, Work Implementation and Closeout, and perform the work activity in accordance with the work package, site procedures, and company policies and guidelines, which resulted in a control building chiller flow transmitter valve left mispositioned after maintenance and inoperability of the chiller.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000458/2024004-02 Maintenance Rule Optimization Deficiencies 71111.12 Closed CAPR 05000458/2025003-04 HPCS Transformer Failure Planned Corrective Action a.(1)71152A Closed
CAPR 05000458/2025003-05 HPCS Transformer Failure Planned Corrective Action a.(2)71152A Closed LER 05000458/2025-002-00 Unidentified Drywell Leakage Increase Results in Shutdown 71153 Closed LER 05000458/2025-002-01 Unidentified Drywell Leakage Increase Results in Shutdown 71153 Closed LER 05000458/2025-003-00 Turbine Control Valve Closure Results in Loss of Safety Function 71153 Closed LER 05000458/2025-004-00 Unsecured Pressure Boundary Door Resulting in Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
River Bend Station began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power. On July 16, 2025, the unit reduced power to approximately 90 percent for a planned moisture separator reheater temporary modification. On July 16, 2025, the unit returned to 100 percent rated thermal power. On September 12, 2025, the unit reduced power to approximately 65 percent for rod pattern adjustment and scram time testing. On September 12, 2025, the unit returned to 100 percent rated thermal power. On September 16, 2025, the unit reduced power to approximately 70 percent in response to a request by the grid operator. On September 17, 2025, the unit returned to 100 percent rated thermal power. On September 18, 2025, the unit reduced power to approximately 86 percent for a planned rod shuffle. On September 19, 2025, the unit returned to 100 percent rated thermal power, where it remained for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)residual heat removal A train on July 24, 2025 (2)division 1 control building chilled water system on September 19, 2025 (3)standby liquid control A and B trains on September 24, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) D-tunnel, fire area AB-07, on July 23, 2025 (2)mezzanine area east, fire area AB-15/Z-4, on July 25, 2025 (3)residual heat removal pump A room, fire area AB-5, on August 22, 2025 (4)residual heat removal pump B room, fire area AB-3, on August 22, 2025 (5)125 VDC switchgear room, fire area C-24, on September 2, 2025 (6)standby switchgear 1C room, fire area C-22, on September 2, 2025
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a power reduction to 90 percent for moisture separator reheater dump and control valve temporary modification on July 16, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a power reduction to 65-70 percent for rod pattern adjustment on September 12, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator training on September 9, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)electric hydraulic control system 113 on September 29, 2025 (2)feedwater heating system 108 on September 29, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)elevated risk during division 2 standby service water 2-year position indication verification test on July 24, 2025 (2)elevated risk when auxiliary building unit cooler HVR-UC6 tripped on thermal overload rendering residual heat removal A, low pressure core spray, and reactor core isolation cooling systems inoperable on August 4, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)loss of secondary containment on July 24, 2025 (CR-RBS-2025-04165)
(2)control building chilled water system chillers HVK-CHL1C and HVK-CHL1A high oil level on August 8, 2025 (CR-RBS-2025-02935 & CR-RBS-2025-02974)
(3)potential 10 CFR Part 21 related to CR120B relay decks not meeting manufacturing dimensional requirements on August 21, 2025 (CR-RBS-2025-04396)
(4)source range monitor failed to withdraw during startup and was exposed to higher-than-normal radiation levels on September 11, 2025 (CR-RBS-2025-03250)
(5)primary containment isolation valve CCP-SOV140 on September 29, 2025 (CR-RBS-2025-04140)
(6)residual heat removal A shutdown cooling relief valve E12-RVF005 on September 29, 2025 (CR-RBS-2025-04234)
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modification:
(1)moisture separator reheater dump and control valve temporary modification on August 7, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)shutdown cooling relief valve E12-RVF005 on July 28, 2025 (2)containment unit coolers HVR-UC1A/1B 10 CFR Part 21, 52W relay replacement on August 28, 2025 (3)control building chilled water system chiller, HVK-CHL1A, fill and vent flow transmitter valve left mispositioned after maintenance on September 12, 2025 (CR-RBS-2025-
04725) Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) STP-205-6301, LPCS Pump and Valve Operability Test, Revision 030 on August 5, 2025
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system between August 18, 2023, and July 11, 2025.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization between August 18, 2023, and July 11, 2025. Inspectors also evaluated the licensee's ability to staff the emergency response facilities in accordance with emergency plan commitments.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:
- EIP-2-020, Emergency Classification, Revision 32
- EIP-2-001, Emergency Operations Facility, Revision 43 In addition, the inspector evaluated the 10 CFR 50.43(q) emergency plan change process and practices between August 18, 2023, and July 11, 2025. The evaluations reviewed screenings and evaluations documenting implementation of the process.
The review of the change process documentation or the emergency plan changes do not constitute NRC approval.
This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program between August 18, 2023, and July 11, 2025. The evaluation reviewed evidence of completing various emergency plan commitments, the conduct of drills and exercises, licensee audits and assessments, and the maintenance of equipment important to emergency preparedness.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
(1)emergency response organization drill on July 30,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
(1)area radiation monitors in auxiliary building, turbine building, radwaste building, fuel building, and the drywell (2)portable ion chambers stored ready for use at the personnel access point (3)portable friskers used at the exit to the Unit 1 radiologically controlled area
- (4) Thermo Eberline AMS-4 continuous air monitor in the fuel building (5)personnel contamination monitors at the exit to the Unit 1 radiologically controlled area
- (6) CRONOS tool monitors at the Unit 1 radiologically controlled area and the T-Tunnel radiologically controlled area exits
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (10 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) Thermo Eberline AMS-4 detector, #CHP-AMS-D020, December 5, 2024
- (2) Ludlum 177 frisker, #CHP-CR-206, September 3, 2024
- (3) FastScan whole body counter system, #96-9762, January 27, 2025
- (4) Ludlum Model 9-3 ion chamber, #CHP-DR-497, September 9, 2024
- (5) Mirion RDS 31 area radiation monitor, #CHP-DR-559, January 14, 2025
- (6) Thermo Eberline AMS-4 detector, #RBS-06, April 3, 2024
- (7) Canberra CRONOS-4 tool monitor, #1011-061, November 18, 2024
- (8) Telepole II model BAK-2283, #CHP-TEL-092, December 11, 2024
- (9) Canberra GEM-5 portal monitor, #1902-091, November 13, 2024
- (10) Canberra Argos 5AB whole body monitor, #1410-186, October 30, 2024 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Unit 1, radwaste building ventilation exhaust duct effluent monitor, RMS-RE6A
- (2) Unit 1, RMS primary drywell area radiation monitor, RMS-RE20B
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling and securing the following radioactive materials:
(1)radioactive waste in the radioactive waste building to include stored resins and dry active waste (2)selected check sources containing Am241/Be (source C-179), Cs-137 (sources 6019, 8256GM, 83CS-26 (9053),83-758 and 83-759), and Sr-90 (2510-05 and 2513-05)
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
(1)reverse osmosis subsystem of the liquid radwaste system, which feeds into the solid radwaste system (2)liquid radwaste system and components, which feed into the solid radwaste system (resin)
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste: (1)dry active waste (2)reactor water clean-up reverse osmosis samples
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation and shipment of radioactive shipment RBS-2025-052 of contaminated main steam isolation valves and flow control actuators on August 7, 2025.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) RBS-2023-079 type B shipment of category 2 resin for processing
- (2) RBS-2023-086 type B shipment of category 2 resin for processing
- (3) RBS-2025-032 LSA-II shipment of dry active waste for processing
- (4) RBS-2024-061 LSA-I shipment of dry active waste for processing
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025 EP04: Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (ERFER) (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1 through March 31, 2025
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the completed corrective actions to preclude repetition (CAPRs) that were opened during IP 95001 Supplemental Inspection (ML24017A045), dated January 18, 2024, associated with a White notice of violation (NOV) in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors verified these corrective actions had been completed as scheduled.
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in human performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000458/2025-002-01, Unidentified Drywell Leakage Increase Results in Shutdown (ADAMS Accession No. ML25293A384)
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results, Section 71153. This LER is closed.
- (2) LER 05000458/2025-003-00, Turbine Control Valve Closure Results in Loss of Safety Function (ML25226A231)
The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is closed.
- (3) LER 05000458/2025-004-00, Unsecured Pressure Boundary Door Resulting in Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function (ML25259A219)
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results, Section 71111.15. This LER is closed.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 92723 - Follow-Up Inspection for One Severity Level III and Two Severity Level IV Traditional Enforcement Violations or for Three or More Severity Level IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the Same Area in a 12-Month Period As noted in inspection reports issued between September 30, 2022, and December 31, 2024, the inspectors reviewed the licensees actions to address the following traditional enforcement violations:
1. NCV 05000458/2022003-02, Failure to Maintain Accurate Information in the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report
2. NCV 05000458/2022004-05, Failure to Obtain License Amendment Prior to
Implementing a Proposed Change
3. NCV 05000458/2022010-01, Failure to Obtain Prior Approval for a Change Which
Adversely Affected the Approved Fire Protection Program
4. NCV 05000458/2023001-02, Failure to Maintain Accurate Information in the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report
5. NCV 05000458/2023001-04, Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Standby
Liquid Control Tank Level Instrument
6. NCV 05000458/2023003-02, Failure to Obtain an Amendment for Technical
Specification Bases Change
7. NOV 05000458/2023003-04, Notice of Violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and
Experiments, for the Failure to Obtain a License Amendment for a Change to [the] Licensing Basis for the Ultimate Heat Sink
8. NCV 05000458/2023003-05, Failure to Maintain Accurate Information in the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report
9. NCV 05000458/2023402-01, Failure to Maintain Information Required by the
Commissions Regulations Complete and Accurate in All Material Respects 10. NCV 05000458/2024002-04, Installed Power Supply in Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Does Not Meet Updated Safety Analysis Report Requirements 11. NCV 05000458/2024003-05, Failure to Meet Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 for Control Room Envelope Habitability Failed Surveillance Test 12. NCV 05000458/2024403-01, [Redacted Title]
Consistent with the guidance provided in IP 92723, the inspectors evaluated the licensees response to multiple Severity Level (SL) IV violations that occurred within a single traditional enforcement area. Specifically, the inspectors evaluated the licensees response to 12 SL IV violations associated with impeding the regulatory process. These violations involved the following regulatory issues:
- The failure to perform adequate licensing basis impact evaluations (10 CFR 50.59)
- The failure to maintain accurate and complete information in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (10 CFR 50.71(e))
- The failure to provide accurate and complete information to the NRC (10 CFR 50.59)
- The failure to obtain license amendments prior to making changes (10 CFR 50.59)
- The failure to follow Technical Specifications requirements (10 CFR 50.36)
The inspectors noted the following corrective actions were planned but not completed at the conclusion of the inspection, and the NRC may choose to inspect completion of these actions at some point in the future:
- CR-RBS-2023-08479-00006, Track NRC review of the LAR submittal. Issue additional actions as necessary to implement the LAR.
- CR-RBS-2024-05329-00006, Revise ADM-0100, Control Room Habitability Program.
- CR-RBS-2024-03842-00019, Enabling Perform quality reviews of all Alternate 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, and PADs for the next 12 months using the quality review checklist attributes and grading criteria established in CR-RBS-2024-03842-00018.
- CR-RBS-2024-05825-00007, Perform an Extent of Cause review of USAR Table 7.5-2 to ensure the equipment listed aligns with the actual plant configuration and environmental qualification status.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Maintenance Rule Optimization Deficiencies URI 05000458/2024004-02 71111.12
Description:
The inspectors documented an unresolved item (URI) in inspection report 2024004. The inspectors noted a potential performance deficiency and violation associated with the licensee's compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) and (a)(3). Specifically, the inspectors noted the licensee was not tracking availability for all maintenance rule scoped systems, and the licensee had potentially ineffective maintenance preventable functional failure criteria, which the licensee uses as the basis for determining reliability. The inspectors noted that to be compliant with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3), licensees need to be able to evaluate if maintenance is effective through SSC performance to determine if the objective of balancing reliability with availability is met and adjust as needed. If the licensee is neither directly nor indirectly tracking availability for all scoped systems, it is unclear how the licensee can ensure the objective of preventing failures of SSCs through maintenance is appropriately balanced against the objective of minimizing unavailability of SSCs due to monitoring or preventive maintenance. The inspectors needed more information to determine whether a violation exists and to determine whether the issue is more than minor. Specifically, the inspectors needed to review a forthcoming 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation to assess the unresolved item (URI). Subsequently, the licensee completed the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation, which was over a year late from the required due date (NCV 05000458/2024003-01 documents a violation associated with the licensees late 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation). The licensee implemented core damage frequency (CDF) trending as a means of ensuring reliability and availability are balanced, and the licensee is tracking revisions to the fleet maintenance rule procedures in fleet condition reports CR-HQN-2024-00965 and CR-HQN-2024-01160.
The inspectors neither identified a finding nor violation. Specifically, Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3)states, in part, that the objective of preventing failures of SSCs through maintenance is appropriately balanced against the objective of minimizing unavailability of SSCs due to monitoring or preventive maintenance. At the time the URI was generated, the licensee did not have a current 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) report and was not tracking direct unavailability times for maintenance rule scoped systems. Therefore, the inspectors were unclear if the licensee could make the required determinations per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3). Upon review of the new evaluation, the inspectors noted that the licensee has utilized changes in CDF trending as an indirect way to correlate unavailability time to risk. The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations associated with the licensee's most recent 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation using CDF trending to correlate unavailability time to risk and demonstrates the assessment required by the regulation.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2024-04013, CR-RBS-2024-04624, CR-RBS-2024-04957, CR-HQN-2024-00965, and CR-HQN-2024-01160 Failure to Assess Impacts of Operability Determination Compensatory Measures on Containment Unit Coolers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, a quality related procedure.
Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the ancillary impacts of compensatory measures implemented as part of an operability evaluation, which resulted in containment unit coolers 1A and 1B being inoperable.
Description:
On August 14, 2025, the licensee implemented compensatory measures as part of an operability evaluation to address a 10 CFR Part 21 communication, SC 24-03, "CR120B style relay, GE Vernova part number DD945E118P0060," Revision 1, from GE Hitachi related to CR120B relay decks not meeting manufacturing dimensional requirements. The failure mode caused by this condition is some normally open contacts on the second or third contact decks will not change state when the relay is operated. Per the notification, 12 of the affected relays were shipped to River Bend Station. Six of the relays were currently installed. Two of the installed relays that could be impacted by the potential failure mechanism described in the 10 CFR Part 21 communication were in the circuit breaker control circuits for containment unit coolers HVR-UC1A and HVR-UC1B. These relays are normally open and need to close to perform their safety function. Failure of these relays could result in the affected circuit breakers not reclosing as required during a loss of off-site power (LOOP). The licensee implemented compensatory measures to prevent the potential failure mode described in the 10 CFR Part 21 communication. The compensatory measures the licensee implemented included operating HVR-UC1A and HVR-UC1B continuously during normal operation with the lockout/reset pushbuttons in lockout. Following a LOOP, a dedicated operator would be required to reset the lockout within 10 minutes of the event.
On August 20, 2025, following review of the compensatory measures implemented as part of the operability evaluation for the 10 CFR Part 21 concern, the inspectors questioned the licensees actions, and the licensee discovered that placing HVR-UC1A and HVR-UC1B in lockout prevents the load sequencing timer from energizing following the start of an emergency diesel generator. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 8.3-2a states that the containment unit coolers should load on their respective diesel generators in 10 minutes and 10 seconds. However, with the unit coolers locked out and the load sequence timer de-energized, the load sequence timer would not start counting until the lock reset push button was pressed, which would result in the unit coolers not load sequencing on in 10 minutes and 10 seconds per the UFSAR design requirement following a loss of coolant accident. Hence, the compensatory measures, as implemented, resulted in both containment unit coolers 1A and 1B being inoperable.
The inspectors noted that station procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 20, a quality related procedure, Section 7.6, "Compensatory Measures," requires the licensee to account for ancillary aspects of compensatory measures to determine if the compensatory measure could have other effects that need to be evaluated before implementing the compensatory measure. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to adequately account for ancillary aspects of the implemented compensatory measures.
Corrective Actions: Following discovery of the two containment unit coolers being inoperable simultaneously, the licensee entered the applicable technical specification shutdown action statement at 10:20 a.m., removed the lockout from the running unit coolers at 12:19 p.m., and replaced the relay on unit cooler 1B and exited the shutdown technical specification action statement at 3:29 p.m. On August 21, 2025, the licensee replaced the associated relay for containment unit cooler 1A at 1:19 p.m. and exited the technical specification shutdown action statement for one containment unit cooler being inoperable. Additionally, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2025-04396, CR-RBS-2025-04664, and CR-RBS-2025-04782
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Station procedure, EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 20, a quality related procedure, Section 7.6, "Compensatory Measures,"
requires the licensee to account for ancillary aspects of compensatory measures to determine if the compensatory measure could have other effects that need to be evaluated before implementing the compensatory measure. The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to adequately account for ancillary aspects of the implemented compensatory measure per EN-OP-104, Section 7.6 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to adequately account for ancillary aspects of the implemented compensatory measure as part of the operability evaluation adversely impacted the reliability and capability of safety related containment unit coolers 1A and 1B by causing them to be inoperable.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Section A, Mitigating System Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding screened to a detailed risk evaluation because
- (1) the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC;
- (2) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) function of a single train technical specification system for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time;
- (3) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train technical specification system for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time;
- (4) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; but
- (5) the degraded condition did represent a loss of a PRA system and/or function as defined in the PRIB or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A senior reactor analyst performed the detailed risk evaluation with the River Bend SPAR model, version 8.83, ran on SAPHIRE, version 8.2.12, and estimated that the increase in CDF was 2.6E-9/year, characterizing the finding with very low safety significance (Green). For this evaluation, the analyst assumed that containment unit coolers 1A and 1B were unavailable for LOOP events for 6 days. Further evaluation of the increase in CDF from external events and the increase in large early release frequency were not performed due to the very low increase in CDF.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform a thorough review of the planned activity every time work is performed rather than relying on past successes and assumed conditions, which resulted in the licensees failure to adequately account for ancillary aspects of the implemented compensatory measure.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings." Licensee procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 20, a quality related procedure, Section 7.6, "Compensatory Measures," requires the licensee to adequately account for ancillary aspects of the implemented compensatory measure.
Contrary to the above, from August 14, 2025, to August 20, 2025, the licensee failed to adequately account for ancillary aspects of the implemented compensatory measure.
Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately account for ancillary aspects of implemented compensatory measures associated with the safety related containment unit coolers 1A and 1B, and as a result, containment unit coolers 1A and 1B were inoperable for longer than their TS allowed outage time.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Follow Procedure for Fill and Vent of HVK-CHL1A Results in Inoperability of the Chiller Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2025003-03 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.24 The inspectors noted a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to implement a procedure required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure EN-WM-102, Work Implementation and Closeout, and perform the work activity in accordance with the work package, site procedures, and company policies and guidelines, which resulted in a control building chiller flow transmitter valve left mispositioned after maintenance and inoperability of the chiller.
Description:
On August 23, 2025, operations attempted to place control building chiller 1A in service from standby to support restoring chiller 1B from planned maintenance. However, chiller 1A failed to start when it was placed in service. This resulted in two aligned chillers, 1A and 1Bone in each divisionbeing inoperable at the same time. The licensee briefly entered Technical Specification 3.7.7.B, a 12-hour shutdown action statement, for approximately 16 minutes until the licensee could put chiller 1B back in service to provide cooling to the control building. After chiller 1B was placed in service, operations aligned chiller 1C and put it in standby, taking chiller 1A out of alignment for operation.
The inspectors noted that on August 23, 2025, while performing work order 53029682, task 07, for performing a fill and vent of the division 2 control building chiller, station personnel left the flow transmitter low side isolation valve HVK-FTY5B-V2L closed when it should have been left open. This valve being mispositioned resulted in chiller 1A failing to start when it was placed in service, and the unplanned entry into a 12-hour shutdown action statement.
The inspectors noted that the station personnel did not follow the work order procedure steps to perform a fill and vent of the control building chiller flow transmitter and instead flushed the flow transmitter. The work order procedure for the fill and vent of the flow transmitter did not require technicians to close the flow transmitter low side isolation valve. The technicians should have stopped work and contacted their supervisor when they decided to deviate from the steps in the work order. This resulted in the control building chiller '1A' flow transmitter valve being left mispositioned after maintenance.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2025-04725, CR-RBS-2025-04758
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Station procedure EN-WM-102, Work Implementation and Closeout, Section 5.2, Perform Work and Test, Revision 15 requires that the work activity is performed in accordance with the work package, site procedures, and company policies and guidelines. The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to perform the work activity in accordance with EN-WM-102 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to perform the work activity in accordance with the work package, site procedures, and company policies and guidelines adversely impacted the operability of control building chiller 1A.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Section A, Mitigating System Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding screened to Green, because
- (1) it was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC;
- (2) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of a single train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time;
- (3) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time;
- (4) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate TS systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />;
- (5) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of a PRA system and/or function as defined in the PRIB or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and
- (6) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, individuals did not consider potential undesired consequences of their actions before performing work and implement appropriate error reduction tools, which resulted in the licensee failing to perform the work activity in accordance with the work package, site procedures, and company policies and guidelines and a valve was left mispositioned after maintenance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 4.S of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires procedures for filling and venting of control room heating and ventilation systems.
The licensee established procedure EN-WM-102, Work Implementation and Closeout, Revision 15 to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement. Section 5.2, Perform Work and Test, requires that the work activity is performed in accordance with the work package, site procedures, and company policies and guidelines.
Contrary to the above, from August 23, 2025, the work activity was not performed in accordance with the work package, site procedures, and company policies and guidelines.
Specifically, on August 23, 2025, the licensee failed to perform control building chiller fill and vent activities in accordance with the work package, work order 53029682, which resulted in inoperability of the control building chiller.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution Process: Question as to whether area radiation monitors were within an accepted calibration tolerance (10 CFR 20.1501(c))
71124.05 This issue is a current licensing basis question and inspection effort is being discontinued in accordance with the Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution (VLSSIR) process. No further evaluation is required.
Description:
The inspectors identified an issue of concern regarding area radiation monitors with potentially incorrect calibration conversion factors. The calibration conversion factors are set by the manufacturer relative to the primary calibration. This is to ensure the radiation monitors read radiation quantities within an accepted calibration tolerance from a known or true value. These area radiation monitors were used to demonstrate compliance with regulations and plant normal operational technical specifications/requirements and to inform workers of changing radiological conditions per Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 11.5.1.1.2, 11.5.1.2.2, and 12.3.4.1.3.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents CR-RBS-2023-6964 and CR-RBS-2023-6969, documented per the extent of condition evaluation with the IP 95001 radiation monitor inspection. These reports listed 41 area radiation monitors with potentially incorrect conversion factors. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had 24 area radiation monitors left to verify correct conversion factors. Of the remaining 17 area radiation monitors whose conversion factors were verified and updated, four were not within an acceptance tolerance of
+20 percent (%). The maximum deviation of the four area radiation monitors was approximately 52% of the manufacturers specified values. One additional area radiation monitor was not within the +15% calibration tolerance with the prior or manufacturers conversion factors assigned. For the area radiation monitors with a greater than 20%
deviation, the inspectors did not research at what point in time the conversion factors diverged outside the accepted tolerance band. However, the licensee informed that the issues with the area radiation monitors found out of tolerance have since been corrected.
The inspectors did not have an immediate safety concern because the inspectors verified the list of affected radiation monitors did not include radiation monitors that were safety related or important to emergency response. Also, work orders were in place for the remaining area radiation monitors to ensure they were restored to proper operating tolerances.
After considering the available information, the inspectors were unable to conclude whether the remaining 24 area radiation monitors were in calibration consistent with industry standard calibration tolerances, but did confirm the five area radiation monitors did not have proper operating tolerances at some point. The inspectors determined that this issue met the criteria for the VLSSIR process because:
1. The inspection staff identified that the issue of concern appears to be a
non-compliance after considering licensee -provided supporting information and relevant information developed during the inspection process. However, considering there are open WOs to verify the remaining tolerances, and the monitors found out of tolerance were fixed, there will be a significant amount of time and resources expended to continue inspection efforts.
2. The specific issue of concern cannot have any potential to be Greater-than-Green
safety significance.
3. The resources required to resolve the current licensing basis question would not
effectively serve the agencys mission.
This issue of concern was discussed with the licensee.
Licensing Basis: Title 10 CFR 20.1501(c) states, in part, instruments and equipment used for quantitative radiation measurements (e.g., dose rate and effluent monitoring) are calibrated periodically for the radiation measured.
The nuclear industry developed standards to ensure the adequate calibration of radiation protection instruments and equipment, specifically, American National Standard Institute N323, American National Standard for Radiation Protection Instrumentation Test and Calibration, 1978, and American National Standard Institute N323D, American National Standard for Installed Radiation Protection Instrumentation, 2002. These standards have calibration tolerances between +10 to +15 percent (%) of known or true radiation values. The licensee has a +15% calibration tolerance in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 11.5.2.3.2 for selected radiation monitors. Further, standard N323D provided that an exchange of equivalent detectors without a recalibration was permitted if the variation between the individual detectors had been documented to be within +20% of known or true radiation values. This may be roughly demonstrated through comparison between the current verified calibration factors and those provided by the manufacturer.
Significance: The staff determined that a violation, if proven to exist, would be no more than very low safety significance (Green). As part of the VLSSIR process, the inspectors screened the issue of concern through the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Determination Process, and determined that the issue of concern, as a violation, would be of very low safety significance because:
- (1) it did not involve as-low-as reasonably achievable planning or work controls,
- (2) there was no overexposure,
- (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and
- (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Technical Assistance Request: No technical assistance request was processed for this issue.
Corrective Action Reference: CR-RBS-2025-04927 Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), requires, in part, that components classified as ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 meet the requirements set forth in Section XI of the applicable editions of the ASME BPV and Addenda.
Contrary to the above, from March 25, 2025, to May 23, 2025, the licensee failed to meet the requirements set forth in Section XI of the applicable editions of the ASME BPV and Addenda. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform the required ASME OM code inspection on residual heat removal A check valve E12-AOVF41A after maintenance was performed on the valve during the refueling outage. Not performing the required inspection led to an undetected divot on the seating surface of the valve, which resulted in pressure boundary leakage above the technical specification allowable leakage and subsequent shutdown to repair the valve.
Significance/Severity: Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, Section B, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, for the Reactor Coolant System Boundary the inspectors determined that the finding screened to Green, because the finding did not involve potential non-compliance with regulatory requirements for protection of the reactor pressure vessel against fracture (e.g.,
pressure-temperature limits or pressurized thermal shock issues).
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2025-03175 and CR-RBS-2025-03316 Observation: Repetitive Human Performance Issues 71152 The inspectors identified a potential adverse trend associated with the stations human performance behaviors. Specifically, the inspectors noted personnel hung a tagout on the wrong normal service water valve, which resulted in a scram in April 2025 (NCV 05000458/2025002-01); in July 2025 personnel failed to fully dog the auxiliary building door, which resulted in a temporary loss of secondary containment; in August 2025 personnel failed to evaluate the ancillary impacts of compensatory measures implemented as part of an operability evaluation, which resulted in containment unit coolers 1A and 1B being inoperable (NCV 05000458/2025003-01); and in August 2025 personnel mispositioned a control building chiller 1A flow transmitter valve, which resulted in the chiller being inoperable (NCV 05000458/2025003-02). The licensee documented the inspectors observations in CR-RBS-2025-06390.
Assessment for IP 92723 92723 Based on the review of the licensees Apparent Cause Analyses and the associated Common Cause Analyses, CR-RBS-2023-01650 and CR-RBS-2024-05199, respectively, the inspectors determined that an extensive assessment of these conditions had been performed at the appropriate level of detail and included the identification of corrective and preventive measures. The inspectors determined the analyses appropriately addressed the identification, length of existence, prior opportunities for identification, and extent of conditions and extent of causes for each issue. The inspectors also determined that the licensee had implemented a wide range of corrective actions to address the adverse trend in the plants design and licensing basis documentation. The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance and concluded the station met the following inspection objectives:
a.
To provide assurance that the cause(s) of multiple traditional enforcement violations are understood by the licensee.
b.
To provide assurance that the extent of condition and extent of cause of multiple traditional enforcement violations are identified.
c.
To provide assurance that licensee corrective actions to traditional enforcement violations are adequate to address the cause(s).
Apparent Cause Analyses: CR-RBS-2023-08226, CR-RBS-2023-08479, CR-RBS-2024-03842-00014, CR-RBS-2024-05193, CR-RBS-2024-05329, CR-RBS-2024-05512, CR-RBS-2024-05649, CR-RBS-2024-05651, CR-RBS-2024-05652, CR-RBS-2024-05825, CR-RBS-2024-05923, CR-RBS-2024-05931, CR-RBS-2024-05932, CR-RBS-2025-00103, CR-RBS-2025-00102
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 17, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection results to Robert Melton, General Plant Manager of Operations (GMPO), and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 4, 2025, the inspectors presented the public radiation safety inspection results to Phil Hansett, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 8, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Phil Hansett, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
FSK-22-12E
Flow Diagram Control Building Chilled Water
Drawings
FSK-27-16
Flow Diagram Standby Liquid Control
Procedures
SDC-201
System Design Criteria - Standby Liquid Control
Calculations
G13.18.12.2-022
River Bend Station - Combustible Loading
AB-070-502
RHR Pump A Room Fire Area AB-5
AB-070-505
RHR Pump B Room Fire Area AB-3
CB-116-129
25 VDC Switchgear Room Fire Area C-24
CB-116-131
Standby Switchgear 1C Room Fire Area C-22
AB-070-408
D-tunnel Fire Area AB-07
Procedures
AB-141-533
Mezzanine Area East Fire Area AB-15/Z-4
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
25-04224
Procedures
ADM-0096
Risk Management Program Implementation and On-Line
Maintenance Risk Assessment
341
Procedures
STP-256-6608
Division II Standby Service Water 2 Year Position
Indication Verification Test
004
Drawings
ESK-06HVR10
Elementary Diagram 480 SWG Containment Unit
Cooler*UC1B
Engineering
Changes
HVK-CHL1C High Oil Level Resolution and Affect on
Bearing
Procedures
Operability Determination Process
Drawings
PID-04-02A
Engineering P&I Diagram System 108 Heater Feedwater
Engineering
Changes
DSR-TK1A Level Control
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
25-04396
Work Orders
Transient Information Brochure for IPAWS
Miscellaneous
River Bend Mailer - 2025 (educational mailer for
population in EPZ)
Miscellaneous
Transient Population Brochure Locations
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Alert and Notification
System Design
Report
24 Team C Off Hours Mobilization Unannounced Drill
06/02/2025
Emergency Communications Testing - 1st Quarter 2025
2/03/2025
Emergency Communications Testing - 1st Quarter 2024
03/20/204
Emergency Communications Testing - 2nd Quarter 2024
04/25/2024
Emergency Communications Testing - 3rd Quarter 2024
07/29/2024
Emergency Communications Testing - 4th Quarter 2024
10/18/2024
Miscellaneous
Emergency Communications Testing - 3rd Quarter 2023
09/10/2023
Procedures
EIP-2-006
Notifications
CFR 50.54(q)(3) Evaluation for EIP-2-020
CFR 50.54(q)(3) Evaluation for EIP-2-001
CFR 50.54(q)(2) Review for EN-EP-610-03
Miscellaneous
CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screening for PR-C-422 impact on
Unified Rascal Interface (URI)
Procedures
Emergency Planning 10CFR50.54(q) Review Program
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
23-08361, 2024-00337, 2025-02344, 2025-02493,
25-02780, 2025-03344, 2025-03354
25 1st Quarter Team A EOF Focused Drill
01/08/2025
25 1st Quarter Team D EOF Focused Drill
01/29/2025
24 HP Drill RDRL-EP-HP2103
06/20/2024
24 Onsite Medical Drill
04/16/2024
Severe Accident Management Drill / Training
06/06/2024
23 4th Quarter Team B Site Drill
10/04/2023
24 Team D 3rd Quarter Site Drill
08/14/2024
KLD-TR-1353
23 Population Update Analysis
KLD-TR-24-1440
24 Population Update Analysis
NQ-2025-011
QA Audit Report QA-7-2025-HQN-1, 2025 QA Audit of
Emergency
Preparedness
05/12/2025
Miscellaneous
QA-2024-RBS-001
24 Emergency Preparedness 12-Month Surveillance in
lieu of 2024 12-month Emergency Preparedness Audit
04/24/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NIOS/QUALITY
ASSURANCE
AUDIT of
EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
OFF-SITE
AGENCIES
INTERFACE
INTERVIEW
QUESTIONNAIRE
GOHSEP, LDEQ, MOHSEP, WFP, EFP, PCP
Miscellaneous
13.2 Emergency
Planning
04/16/2025
Drills and Exercises
Emergency Planning Critiques
Corrective Action Program
Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process
Causal Analysis Process
Procedures
Audit Process
Revs 44 &
Work Orders
Work Order -
4137999_1
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
23-05739, 2023-05769, 2023-05857, 2023-05859,
23-05860, 2023-05939, 2023-06256, 2023-06547,
23-06953, 2023-06955, 2023-06964, 2023-06965,
23-06969, 2023-07260, 2023-08332, 2023-08478,
24-00080, 2024-00392, 2024-00634, 2024-00983,
24-01654, 2024-02342, 2024-03729, 2024-03921,
24-04569, 2024-04933, 2024-04960, 2025-00825,
25-02340, 2025-02844, 2025-02894, 2025-02926,
25-03066, 2025-04407, 2025-04428
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
25-04925, 2025-04927
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Resulting from
Inspection
RBG-48220
22 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report River
Bend Station - Unit 1
22
RBG-48276
23 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report River
Bend Station - Unit 1
04/23/2024
RBG-48333
24 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report River
Bend Station - Unit 1
24
Miscellaneous
WTS-RBS-2025-
00085-00029
Table of Technical Specification and/or ODCM Required
Calibrations of Radiation Monitors
08/11/2025
Source Control
Radiation Protection Instrument Control
Operation of Radiation Protection Instrumentation
Source Checking Radiation Protection Instrumentation
Operation of Counting Equipment
Electronic Alarming Dosimeters
Operation and Calibration of the Canberra GEM-5
Operation and Calibration of the ARGOS-5AB Personnel
Contamination Monitor
Operation and Calibration of the CRONOS Contamination
Monitor
Central Calibration Facility
EN-RP-317-07
Calibration of Portable Count Rate Instruments
Procedures
STP-511-4205
SCCS/RMS Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation
High Channel Calibration RMS-RE5A
Self-Assessments
LO-RBS-2024-
00113
Focused Self-Assessment: Formal Benchmark Report
Template: IP 71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring
Instrumentation
04/28/2025
54008703-01
RMS-RE138 - Clean, Check Calibration, and Functionality
Test Inner, I&C Calibrate RMS-RE138 Loop Per MCP-
201
08/06/2025
54017256-01
STP-511-4290: RMS Primary Drywell Area Radiation
Monitor Channel Calibration Test
2/18/2025
Work Orders
54081702-01
STP 511-4205-SCIS/RMS Fuel Building Ventilation
05/06/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Exhaust Radiation Monitor
54154531-01
I&C Replace RMS-Fl6B, STP-511-4240: RMS Radwaste
Building Ventilation Exhaust Duct Monitoring System Flow
Rate Monitor Channel Calibration RMS-FE6B
08/05/2025
Work Orders
289252-01
STP-511-4516, Revision 12, RMS Radwaste Building
Ventilation Exhaust Duct Noble Gas Activity Monitor
Channel Functional Test RMS-RE6A
08/07/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-HQN-
24-01270
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
23-05933, 2023-06500, 2023-06524, 2023-07127,
23-07220, 2023-07515, 2023-07970, 2023-08027,
23-08179, 2023-08919, 2023-09049, 2023-09064,
23-09171, 2023-09173, 2023-09173, 2023-09189,
23-09189, 2024-00076, 2024-00526, 2024-00526,
24-00799, 2024-02181, 2024-02181, 2024-02898,
24-02966, 2024-03744, 2024-04061, 2024-04860,
24-05663, 2025-01356, 2025-01356, 2025-01649,
25-01649, 2025-03285, 2025-03340, 2025-03421,
25-03421, 2025-04071, 2025-04071
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-RBS-
25-04411
PID-31-01D
System 603 - Radwaste Liquid
PID-31-01F
System 603 - Radwaste Liquid
Drawings
PID-34-02B
System 602 - Fuel Pool Cooling
River Bend Part 37 Security Plan for the Protection of
Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive
Material
Physical Security Plan
FCBT-MPC-
HAZSEC
HAZMAT-DOT Shipping for Individuals with
Indirect/Limited Responsibilities
In-depth Security Training (Transportation Security Plan)
Miscellaneous
CFR Part 37 Lesson Plan
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
R-SEC-Part 37
CFR Part 37 Training
Procedures
Radioactive Material Category 1 and 2 Accountability
Radioactive Material Control
Radioactive Shipping Procedure
Radioactive Waste Tracking Procedure
Scaling Factors
Integrated Transportation Security Plan
EN_RP-143
Source Control
RWS-0304
Radioactive Waste Handling and Control
Procedures
RWS-0336
Set-Up and Operation of the RDS-1000 Dewatering Unit
Radiation
Surveys
RBS-2305-00312, RBS-2311-00101, RBS-2312-00060,
RBS-2312-00118, RBS-2312-00119, RBS-2312-00135,
RBS-2404-00212, RBS-2406-00182, RBS-2502-00071,
RBS-2502-00275, RBS-2503-00650, RBS-2504-00067,
RBS-2504-00292, RBS-2506-00029, RBS-2507-00085
CEO2025-00015
Surveillance Report Number QS-2025-ECH-001
07/14/2025
LO-HQ-2023-00056
24 Entergy Acceptance Review of Hittman 10 CFR 37
Transportation Security Plan
09/18/2024
LO-RBS-2024-
00113
River Bend Station Focused Self-Assessment: IP 71124.05 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and IP 71124.08 Radwaste Solid Waste Processing and
Radioactive Material Handling
04/28/2025
LO-RLO-2020-
00020
River Bend Station Focused Self-Assessment: IP 71130.01 Access Authorization
05/26/2021
LO-RLO-2021-0010
River Bend Station Focused Self-Assessment: IP 71130.05 Protective Strategy Evaluation and Performance
Evaluation Program
01/13/2023
LO-RLO-2021-
00112
River Bend Station Focused Self-Assessment: IP 71130.01 Access Authorization
2/24/2023
LO-RLO-2023-
00033
River Bend Station Focused Self-Assessment: IP 71130.04 Equipment Performance, Testing, and
Maintenance
2/05/2023
Self-Assessments
QA-1-2024-RBS-1
24 RBS Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization Audit
07/09/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
QA-14/15-2023-
RBS-01
Combined Radiation Protection and Radwaste
10/31/2023
UN 2911, Radioactive material, excepted package -
instruments, 7
07/12/2022
Shipping Records
UN 2911, Radioactive materials, excepted package-
Instruments, 7
01/26/2023
Work Orders
WO- 00559096-01, 52357838-01, 53001535-01, 53037561-01,
54108818-01, 54113928-01, 54135878-01, 54171442-01
EN-LI-114 R022 - 1st Qtr 2025 ERFER PI Data Sheet
04/17/2024
EN-LI-114 R021 - 2nd Qtr 2024 ANS PI Data Sheet
07/09/2024
EN-LI-114 R021 - 3rd Qtr 2024 ANS PI Data Sheet
10/09/2024
EN-LI-114 R021 - 4th Qtr 2024 ANS PI Data Sheet
01/07/2025
EN-LI-114 R021 - 1st Qtr 2025 DEP PI Data Sheet
04/16/2025
EN-LI-114 R021 - 1st Qtr 2025 ERO PI Data Sheet
04/17/2025
EN-LI-114 R021 - 2nd Qtr 2024 DEP PI Data Sheet
07/09/2024
EN-LI-114 R021 - 2nd Qtr 2024 ERO PI Data Sheet
07/09/2024
EN-LI-114 R021 - 3rd Qtr 2024 DEP PI Data Sheet
10/07/2024
EN-LI-114 R021 - 3rd Qtr 2024 ERO PI Data Sheet
10/09/2024
EN-LI-114 R021 - 4th Qtr 2024 DEP PI Data Sheet
01/07/2025
71151
Miscellaneous
EN-LI-114 R021 - 4th Qtr 2024 ERO PI Data Sheet
01/07/2025
2723
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
23-04477, 2023-08226, 2023-08479, 2024-00755,
24-00803, 2024-02878, 2024-03842-00014, 2024-
04094, 2024-05193, 2024-05329, 2024-05512, 2024-
05649, 2024-05651, 2024-05652, 2024-05825, 2024-
05923, 2024-05923, 2024-05931, 2024-05932, 2025-
00052, 2025-00087, 2025-00102, 2025-00103, 2025-
2170, 2025-03535, 2025-03721, 2025-03735
2723
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-RBS-
25-04099, 2025-04100
06-03-25 1526
Story Boards
06/30/2025
Design and Licensing Basis for Engineering Orientation
Revision 2
2723
Miscellaneous
RLP-ESPC-
Emergency training overview - station blackout, B.5.B,
Revision 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EMERGENCYTRNG
SMG's, and FLEX
RLP-ESPC-
OPEVAL
Engineering Training Operability Determinations
Revision 8
2723
Self-Assessments
LO-RBS-2025-
00086
Final Self Assessment RBS NRC follow-up 92723
inspection
03/31/25