IR 05000458/2025010
| ML25184A333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/2025 |
| From: | Ramirez-Munoz F NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB2 |
| To: | Hansett P Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2025010 | |
| Download: ML25184A333 (17) | |
Text
July 24, 2025
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2025010
Dear Phil Hansett:
On June 26, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your River Bend Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The inspectors reviewed your corrective action program to confirm that the station complied with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight process can continue to be implemented.
The inspectors also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure. Although this inspection identified one example of an incomplete evaluation and an example of untimely corrective actions, the inspectors determined that, overall, your staff has taken steps to appropriately categorize issues and implement corrective actions.
Finally, the inspectors reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment by interviewing station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the inspectors observations and the results of these interviews, the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Frances C. Ramirez Munoz, Team Lead Inspection Programs & Assessment Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000458 License No. NPF-47
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000458
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-010-0011
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc
Facility:
River Bend Station
Location:
St. Francisville, LA
Inspection Dates:
June 8 to 26, 2025
Inspectors:
N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector
G. Pick, Senior Reactor Inspector
E. Powell, Resident Inspector
S. Thapa, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Frances C. Ramirez Munoz, Team Lead
Inspection Programs & Assessment Team
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at River Bend Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality for the Unit 2 Flood Control Berm Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2025010-01 Closed H.1 - Resources 71152B The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality with the unit 2 flood control berm.
Specifically, the licensee failed to restore 100 feet of the unit 2 flood control berm height to 96 feet, in accordance with updated safety analysis report figure 2.5-72a, to ensure that the G tunnel, a safety-related structure, would not be adversely affected by a postulated design basis flooding event.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
- Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees corrective action program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors sampled approximately 250 condition reports and their associated cause evaluations.
The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the standby service water system, which included review of failures, maintenance issues, surveillances, corrective and preventative maintenance, and maintenance rule performance.
Additionally, inspectors reviewed a sample of findings and violations issued during the biennial assessment period. Specifically, Non-cited Violations, 2023001-01, 2023003-02, 2023003-05, 2023003-06, 2023003-07, 2023003-08, 2023010-01, 2023010-02, 2023090-01, 2023092-01, 2024001-01, 2024001-02, 2024001-03, 2024001-05, 2024001-06, 2024001-07, 2024001-08, 2024002-02, 2024002-03, 2024002-04, 2024003-01, 2024003-02, 2024003-03, 2024003-04, 2024003-05, and 2024404-01.
- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience. The sample included industry operating experience communications like 10 CFR 50 Part 21 notifications and other vendor correspondence, NRC generic communications, publications from industry groups, and site evaluations.
- Self-Assessments and Audits: The sample included reviews of licensee self-assessments and internal audits.
- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors interviewed 30 individuals, interviewed the employee concerns program manager and reviewed employee concerns files.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensees corrective action program complied with regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards. The licensees performance in each of the areas of Problem Identification, Problem Prioritization and Evaluation, and Corrective Actions adequately supported nuclear safety.
Problem Identification Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee's performance in this area adequately supported nuclear safety. Overall, the inspectors found that the licensee was identifying and documenting problems at an appropriately low threshold that supported nuclear safety. The inspectors determined that conditions that require generation of a condition report have been entered appropriately into the corrective action program.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation Overall, the inspectors found that the licensee appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues to support nuclear safety. Of the samples reviewed, the inspectors generally found that the licensee correctly characterized each condition report as to whether it represented a condition adverse to quality and then prioritized the evaluation and corrective actions in accordance with program guidance.
During this assessment period, the NRC identified an instance of an incomplete evaluation during a 95001 supplemental inspection (ML24074A476) in the emergency preparedness cornerstone. Specifically, the licensee had not listed three area radiation monitors used for emergency action level classification in procedure EPP-2-503, River Bend Station Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EITER), revision 7, as a part of the corrective actions in condition report CR-RBS-2023-04450. The licensee evaluated and corrected this deficiency in condition report CR-RBS-2024-00392.
Corrective Actions Overall, the licensee concluded that corrective actions supported nuclear safety. Of the samples reviewed, the inspectors generally found that the licensee developed effective corrective actions for the problems evaluated in the corrective action program. However, the inspectors identified one example of untimely corrective action related to restoration of the unit 2 flood control berm. Specifically, the licensee had not corrected a condition identified in 2021 as of this inspection. This untimely corrective action resulted in a green non-cited violation, as documented in this inspection report.
The inspectors selected the standby service water system for a focused review within the corrective action program. For this system, the inspectors performed sample selections of condition reports, looking at the adequacy of the licensee's evaluation process for determining which items are placed in the corrective action process, and the corrective actions taken. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with this system that were not already being addressed by the station's monitoring and corrective action programs.
Assessment 71152B Use of Operating Experience The inspectors reviewed a variety of sources of operating experience including part 21 notifications and other vendor correspondence, NRC generic communications, and publications from various industry groups including INPO and EPRI. The inspectors determined that, overall, the licensee adequately screened and addressed issues identified through operational experience that apply to the station, and this information is being evaluated in a timely manner once it is received.
The licensee incorporated operating experience information into plant procedures and processes as appropriate. The inspectors determined the licensee appropriately evaluated industry-operating experience when performing root cause analysis and apparent cause evaluations. The licensee appropriately incorporated both internal and external operating experience into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs.
Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments and audits to assess whether performance trends were regularly identified and effectively addressed. The inspectors also reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. Identified conditions were appropriately addressed within the corrective action program or through another licensee process. Overall, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had an adequate departmental self-assessment and audit process.
Assessment 71152B Safety Conscious Work Environment The inspectors conducted safety conscious work environment interviews with 30 employees from seven different disciplines that included operations, radiation protection, engineering, mechanical maintenance, electrical maintenance, and instrumentation and control maintenance. The interviews allowed the inspectors to evaluate:
- (1) the willingness of the sites staff to raise nuclear safety issues, either by initiating a condition report or by another method,
- (2) the perceived effectiveness of the corrective action program at resolving identified problems, and
- (3) the sites safety-conscious work environment. The inspectors interviewed the employee concerns program manager and reviewed a sample of case files that may relate to safety conscious work environment.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had a safety conscious work environment where individuals felt free to raise concerns without fear of retaliation. Most expressed positive experiences after raising issues to their supervisors and after documenting issues in condition reports, and all individuals indicated that they would not hesitate to raise safety concerns, through at least one of the several means available at the station. Based on feedback from these interviews regarding raising concerns anonymously, the licensee should consider enhancing communications with plant personnel so that it is better understood what avenues are available for employees to raise concerns anonymously.
Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality for the Unit 2 Flood Control Berm Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2025010-01 Open/Closed H.1 - Resources 71152B The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality with the unit 2 flood control berm.
Specifically, the licensee failed to restore 100 feet of the unit 2 flood control berm height to 96 feet, in accordance with updated safety analysis report figure 2.5-72a, to ensure that the G tunnel, a safety-related structure, would not be adversely affected by a postulated design basis flooding event.
Description:
The inspectors evaluated the timeliness of corrective actions taken by the licensee to restore the unit 2 flood control berm protecting the unit 1 G tunnel from flooding that would result from a postulated design basis flooding event. The G tunnel contains safety-related piping and valves for the standby service water system. In the fourth quarter 2020 baseline inspection report (ML21041A546), the licensee received a 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, violation related, in part, to failure to ensure adequate design of structures for protection against external flooding, and in the first quarter 2021 baseline inspection report (ML21124A276) the licensee received a 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2),
Maintenance Rule violation related to failure to scope a flood control structure into the maintenance rule program. As a result of those two violations, the licensee performed a survey and identified that they had not maintained approximately 100 feet of the unit 2 flood control berm at the required height of 96 feet, in accordance with updated final safety analysis report figure 2.5-72a. On September 23, 2021, the licensee wrote condition report CR-RBS-2021-06016 stating they need to restore the unit 2 flood control berm to the design height of 96 feet. As of June 26, 2025, the unit 2 flood control berm height has not been restored to the required design height.
The unit 2 flood control berm is not safety-related, but its failure could prevent safety-related structures, systems, and components from fulfilling their safety-related function during a postulated design basis flood at the site. If the berm were to fail to divert runoff from a postulated design basis precipitation event, the unit 2 excavation pit could fill up to a level above the ventilation shaft opening in the G tunnel (despite the presence of a dewatering pump in the unit 2 excavation pit), allowing water to enter and submerge the safety-related standby service water cooling tower return valves.
The licensee established compensatory measures until they restore the unit 2 berm that included monitoring the National Weather Service 24-Hour Forecast daily as provided in procedure AOP-0029, Severe Weather Operation, revision 50, attachment 5, Pre-Stage Flex Equipment for Flooding (Commit A-17319), for the updated 48-hour forecast of anticipated rainfall to determine if storms, approximating the probable maximum precipitation, are predicted to be imminent and, if water within the unit 2 excavation pit rises to approximately 74 feet (halfway up the first course of security blocks), the equipment within the G tunnel will be declared inoperable and appropriate actions taken as specified in the technical specifications.
Corrective Actions: The licensee established compensatory measures to mitigate potential flooding and has obtained funding to complete the berm restoration.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2020-04429, CR-RBS-2021-06016, CR-RBS-2023-06378, CR-RBS-2025-03792
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality with the unit 2 flood control berm height was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to restore 100 feet of the unit 2 flood control berm height to 96 feet, in accordance with updated final safety analysis report figure 2.5-72a.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency could result in the standby service water system being unable to perform its function in the event of a postulated design basis flood.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using exhibit 2, Mitigating System Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event for greater than 14 days (i.e., unit 2 berm). Using exhibit 4, External Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the loss of this equipment or function by itself during the external initiating event it was intended to mitigate would degrade two or more trains of a multi-train system or function.
A senior reactor analyst performed the detailed risk evaluation and determined that the issue was characterized by very low safety significance (Green). In performing the evaluation, the analyst used the detailed risk evaluation performed for a design control finding in the River Bend Station fourth quarter 2020 baseline inspection report that began on page 13 (ML21041A546).
The analyst modified the estimates from that evaluation to account for the degradation of the berm for the postulated events as follows:
1. Precipitation event with 24.1 inches of rain in 30 days. This precipitation event would
permit water to flood the G tunnel up to high level and affect all of the risk-significant mitigating equipment (high pressure core spray pump swap-over valve, reactor core isolation cooling swap-over valve, service water return line valves 055A and 055B, FLEX pump P-1, and FLEX pump service water injection equipment). With the conditional core damage probability for this equipment applied to the precipitation frequency of 0.017/year as the initiating event frequency, this scenario yielded an estimated increase in core damage frequency of 4.0E-7/year.
2. Precipitation event with 43.0 inches of rain in 30 days. This event would permit water
to flood the G tunnel up to the high level and affect the mitigating equipment listed below that high level. An initiating event frequency of 5E-4/year was applied. This scenario yielded an estimated increase in core damage frequency of 7.5E-8/year.
3. Precipitation event with 8.3 inches of rain in 30 days after an operations basis
earthquake (OBE). These concurrent events would permit water to flood the G tunnel up to high level and affect the mitigating equipment listed above. The analyst assumed that one year before the rain an OBE would occur and degrade the berm, and the licensee would not repair the berm. This would allow a smaller rainfall total to fill the unit 2 excavation pit with the degradation from the OBE and the missing 100-foot section combined. The analyst assumed that this rainfall continued at a frequency of 2.0 precipitation events/year. With the conditional core damage probability applied to the precipitation as the initiating event frequency, this scenario yielded an estimated increase in core damage frequency of 2.1E-8/year.
4. Precipitation event with 13.6 inches of rain in 30 days after an OBE. These concurrent
events would permit water to flood the G tunnel up to high level and affect the mitigating equipment previously listed. This would allow a smaller rainfall total to fill the unit 2 excavation pit with the degradation from the OBE and the missing 100-foot section combined. The analyst assumed that this amount continued at a frequency of 0.67 precipitation events/year. This scenario yielded an estimated increase in core damage frequency of 5.4E-8/year.
The analyst summed the results of these events that yielded an estimated total increase in core damage frequency of 5.5E-7/year. Consequently, the analyst determined the significance of the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) from the core damage frequency.
To estimate the large early release frequency, the analyst used table 6.1, Phase 1 Screening
- Type A Findings at Full Power, from Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. This table instructs further phase 2 analysis for BWR reactors with Mark III containments for station blackout sequences. From that point, Table 6.2, Phase 2 Assessment Factors - Type A Findings at Power, prescribes an assessment factor of 0.2 for BWR reactors with Mark III containments for station blackout and high-pressure sequences. Since approximately 90 percent of the contribution to core damage frequency came from transient and loss of offsite power sequences, the analyst multiplied the 0.2 assessment factor to the total core damage frequency results. After application of the assessment factor, the analyst estimated the increase in the large early release frequency at 9.7E-8/year. The analyst considered use of the dewatering pump described above qualitatively that would lower the estimated increase in the large early release frequency. Consequently, the analyst determined the significance of the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) from large early release frequency.
The analyst assumed that the probability of other concurrent external events would be extremely small and therefore an additional increase in core damage frequency from external events was considered negligible.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, executives and senior managers didnt ensure sufficient corporate resources were allocated to the nuclear organization for short and long-term safe and reliable operation of the station.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from September 23, 2021, to June 26, 2025, the licensee failed to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to restore 100 feet of the unit 2 flood control berm height to 96 feet, in accordance with the sites updated final safety analysis report.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On June 26, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Phil Hansett and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-HQN-
23-00688, 2023-03112, 2023-03844, 2025-00041,
25-00222, 2025-00223, 2025-00224, 2025-00225,
25-00238
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
2006-01084, 2019-05868, 2020-02385, 2020-02445,
20-03873, 2020-03876, 2020-03880, 2020-03926,
20-04320, 2020-04429, 2020-05391, 2020-05580,
21-00099, 2021-02119, 2021-06016, 2022-01401,
22-02739, 2022-03067, 2022-03801, 2022-04478,
22-04549, 2022-04772, 2022-05422, 2023-00875,
23-00984, 2023-03301, 2023-03306, 2023-03370,
23-03844, 2023-04060, 2023-04135, 2023-04550,
23-04919, 2023-04966, 2023-04984, 2023-05657,
23-05892, 2023-05977, 2023-06378, 2023-06479,
23-06819, 2023-07170, 2023-07756, 2023-07863,
23-07889, 2023-08020, 2023-08041, 2023-08126,
23-08135, 2023-08159, 2023-08167, 2023-08168,
23-08206, 2023-08249, 2023-08251, 2023-08253,
23-08254, 2023-08255, 2023-08256, 2023-08257,
23-08278, 2023-08286, 2023-08287, 2023-08298,
23-08301, 2023-08320, 2023-08336, 2023-08342,
23-08359, 2023-08362, 2023-08365, 2023-08422,
23-08439, 2023-08477, 2023-08479, 2023-08482,
23-08483, 2023-08517, 2023-08518, 2023-08565,
23-08569, 2023-08578, 2023-08586, 2023-08606,
23-08646, 2023-08726, 2023-08733, 2023-08788,
23-08789, 2023-08846, 2023-08880, 2023-08942,
23-08986, 2023-09058, 2023-09059, 2023-09060,
23-09107, 2023-09201, 2023-09202, 2023-09203,
23-09204, 2023-09216, 2023-09233, 2023-09245,
23-09281, 2024-00059, 2024-00062, 2024-00063,
24-00112, 2024-00114, 2024-00226, 2024-00229,
24-00275, 2024-00280, 2024-00287, 2024-00288,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
24-00297, 2024-00392, 2024-00404, 2024-00443,
24-00473, 2024-00475, 2024-00479, 2024-00481,
24-00496, 2024-00616, 2024-00667, 2024-00757,
24-00940, 2024-00985, 2024-01048, 2024-01103,
24-01112, 2024-01213, 2024-01233, 2024-01257,
24-01288, 2024-01295, 2024-01341, 2024-01356,
24-01648, 2024-01707, 2024-01778, 2024-02042,
24-02043, 2024-02051, 2024-02052, 2024-02055,
24-02077, 2024-02148, 2024-02189, 2024-02190,
24-02192, 2024-02195, 2024-02197, 2024-02263,
24-02302, 2024-02309, 2024-02380, 2024-02495,
24-02503, 2024-02710, 2024-02810, 2024-02812,
24-02815, 2024-02816, 2024-02817, 2024-02818,
24-02881, 2024-02895, 2024-02957, 2024-03067,
24-03091, 2024-03120, 2024-03134, 2024-03407,
24-03827, 2024-03844, 2024-03859, 2024-03880,
24-03881, 2024-03882, 2024-03996, 2024-04013,
24-04019, 2024-04030, 2024-04586, 2024-04746,
24-04764, 2024-04811, 2024-04957, 2024-05047,
24-05128, 2024-05193, 2024-05199, 2024-05227,
24-05306, 2024-05325, 2024-05326, 2024-05327,
24-05328, 2024-05333, 2024-05438, 2024-05652,
24-05653, 2024-05746, 2024-05789, 2024-05845,
24-05923, 2024-06180, 2024-06260, 2025-00103,
25-00386, 2025-00389, 2025-00840, 2025-00872,
25-01221, 2025-01513, 2025-01712, 2025-01797,
25-01900, 2025-02316, 2025-02347, 2025-02577,
25-02640, 2025-02660, 2025-02688
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-RBS-
25-03529, 2025-03588, 2025-03713, 2025-03714,
25-03715, 2025-03716, 2025-03717, 2025-03718,
25-03726, 2025-03792
Engineering
Changes
000093841
Engineering Change E22-S003 - Transformer
Replacement
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Engineering
Changes
0054083813
Feedwater Temperature Versus Core Power Calculation
for AOP-0007
Engineering
Changes
0000095545
Issue RBS-ME-00001
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q2 2020
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q4 2020
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q2 2021
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q4 2021
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q2 2023
Miscellaneous
SSW Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q2 2024
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q4 2023
Miscellaneous
SSW Health Report Q4 2024
Miscellaneous
AR 21005910
EHS-MCC2E 5C/E12-MOVF064A Unitized Starter
Current Injection
5/26/2021
Miscellaneous
CMP-EM-000-
21
Miscellaneous
LER 2022-004
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Inoperable due to
transformer Failure
Miscellaneous
LO-RBS-2024-
00068 RBS
License Renewal Focused Self-Assessment: Readiness
for NRC Phase 2
2/22/2024
Miscellaneous
NOE-HQN-2024-
00018
Part 21 EN 56919 - EATON-CUTLER Hammer Relay on
Emergency Diesel Failed - V.C. Summer
1/15/2024
Miscellaneous
NOE-HQN-2024-
00056
OE evaluation for White Bluff Significant Transformer
failure
2/12/2024
Miscellaneous
PRG Briefing
Sheet HVN-FN6A
PRG Briefing Sheet for Diesel HVAC Fan 6A
5/29/2025
Miscellaneous
QA-19-2024-
RBS-1
Quality Assurance Audit Report
3/20/2024
Miscellaneous
Security, Including Cyber Security
2/11/2023
Miscellaneous
RF23 Scope
Change 11417
Scope Change Request Form Diesel HVAC Fan 6a
1/29/2025
Miscellaneous
RLP-ESPC-
OPEVAL
Operability Evaluations
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
RLP-OPS-CR
Condition Report Initiation
Miscellaneous
RLP-OPS-
HLO208-LO
Corrective Action Program
Miscellaneous
VTD G080-0967
General Electric Control Cabinet and Alarm Devices
8/9/1995
Miscellaneous
WT-HQN-2023-
2013495
WT to track 2023 Security -Cyber security audit
3/22/2024
Miscellaneous
A979-105_0_000
Installation and Instruction Manual for Dry-Type
Transformers
Procedures
1-PT-309-1
Div I Standby Diesel Generator Preoperational Test
Procedures
1-PT-309-2
Div II Standby Diesel Generator Preoperational Test
Procedures
ADM-0073
Temporary Services and Equipment
310
Procedures
Loss of Feedwater Heating
Procedures
Control of Combustibles
Procedures
Predictive Maintenance Program
Procedures
Implementation of the Technical Specification
Surveillance Frequency Control Program
Procedures
Corrective Action Program
50, 54
Procedures
FINAL Event Notification and Reporting
Procedures
Causal Analysis Process
Procedures
Fix It Now (FIN) Team Process
Procedures
Security Reporting Requirements
Procedures
Use of Encryption Software for Management of
Safeguards Information
Procedures
Operability Determination Process
Procedures
Training Oversight Program
Procedures
Systematic Approach to Training Process
Procedures
EN-TQ-201-01
SAT - Analysis Phase
Procedures
EN-TQ-201-03
SAT - Development Phase
Procedures
Online Work Management Process
Procedures
LO-RBS-2024-
00057
Cyber Security Program Effectiveness Review
6/17/2024
Procedures
PT-203-3
High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator
Preoperational Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
SEP-THERM-
RBS-001
River Bend Station Infrared Thermography Program
Section
Procedures
TSP-0016
Loop A RHR System Leak Test
2
Procedures
TSP-0017
Loop B RHR System Leak Test
301
Procedures
TSP-0018
Loop C RHR System Leak Test
301
Self-Assessments
LO-RBS-2024-
00079
Operating Experience Program Health
Self-Assessments
QA-1-2024-RBS-
24 Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization Audit
Self-Assessments
QA-10-2024-
RBS-1
24 RBS Maintenance Audit
7/22/2024
Self-Assessments
QA-4-2024-HQN-
24 Fleet Design Engineering Audit
4/29/2024
Self-Assessments
QA-8-2025-HQN-
25 Engineering Program Audit
4/15/2025
Self-Assessments
QS-2024-RBS-
001
24 Emergency Preparedness Audit
Work Orders
00586001, 53027936, 53037199, 54072096, 54083585,
54121086, 54152416, 54155814, 54177048, 54178669