IR 05000458/2025002
| ML25217A032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/2025 |
| From: | Douglas Dodson NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBC |
| To: | Hansett P Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2025001 | |
| Download: ML25217A032 (16) | |
Text
August 12, 2025
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 05000458/2025002 AND 07200049/2025001
Dear Phil Hansett:
On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at River Bend Station. On July 10, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000458 and 07200049 License No. NPF-47
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000458 and 07200049
License Number:
Report Number:
05000458/2025002 and 07200049/2025001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-002-0006 and I-2025-001-0017
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station
Location:
St. Francisville, LA
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2025, to June 30, 2025
Inspectors:
L. Brookhart, Senior Spent Fuel Storage Inspector
J. Freeman, Spent Fuel Storage Inspector
E. Powell, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Wynar, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at River Bend Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Improper Tagout Causes Loss of Normal Service Water and Reactor Scram Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000458/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to correctly follow established tagout procedures, which resulted in a manual reactor scram.
Specifically, the licensee failed to properly tagout service water valve SWP-V3302,
SWP-MOV55A block valve, and ensure the valve was closed prior to conducting post-maintenance testing. This resulted in a loss of normal service water and subsequent insertion of a manual reactor scram.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status NOV 05000458/2024002-03 Failure to Restore Compliance of Emergency Diesel Generator Air Starts 71152A Closed LER 05000458/2025-001-00 Human Performance Error Results in Manual Reactor Trip 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
River Bend Station began the inspection period in the middle of the startup procedure at approximately 3 percent rated thermal power. On April 8, 2025, the unit achieved 95 percent power after post-refuel testing and manually scrammed due to a loss of normal service water and subsequently the unit commenced a startup. On April 15, 2025, the unit achieved 100 percent rated thermal power. On May 21, 2025, while at 100 percent power, the unit was shut down due to a leaking check valve on residual heat removal A that exceeded technical specification allowable leakage. On May 26, 2025, the unit began startup, and on May 29, 2025, returned to 100 percent rated thermal power. On June 11, 2025, the unit experienced a low suction pressure trip of reactor feedwater pump A, which resulted in a recirculation flow control valve runback and power reduction to 75 percent power. On June 12, 2025, the unit returned to 100 percent rated thermal power. On June 18, 2025, the unit was at 100 percent rated thermal power, and the station reduced power to 90 percent in response to a turbine control valve unexpectedly closing. On June 19, 2025, the unit returned to 100 percent rated thermal power.
On June 27, 2025, the station reduced power to 55 percent for a planned rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent rated thermal power on June 28, 2025, where it remained for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)emergency diesel generator B on April 30, 2025 (2)standby service water system on May 16, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)standby switchgear 1B room, fire area C-14, on April 18, 2025 (2)diesel driven fire pump 1A room, fire area FP-1, on April 23, 2025 (3)water chiller equipment 1A room, fire area C-13W, on May 7, 2025
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power reductions in support of rod pattern adjustments on April 14, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an operator proficiency training graded scenario on May 6, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated an operator proficiency training graded scenario on June 24, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)reactor water cleanup flow-accelerated corrosion on May 13, 2025 (2)division 3 emergency diesel generator room fan on June 18, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)elevated risk during cleaning and adjustment of the NNS-SWG1C relay, which resulted in high pressure core spray and standby service water pump 2C being inoperable on April 22, 2025 (2)elevated risk during coil and filter inspection and relay replacement for containment unit cooler 1A on May 5, 2025 (3)elevated risk during reactor core isolation cooling system isolation calibration on June 20, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)division 3 emergency diesel generator fan on June 26, 2025 (condition report (CR)-
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 23 activities during this quarter. The inspectors completed IP Sections 03.01.d (startup) and 03.01.e (fatigue management).
- (2) The inspectors evaluated Forced Outage 24-02 activities due to technical specification shutdown from exceeding unidentified leakage specification on May 27, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
(1)work order (WO) 53032503, standby service water cooling tower inlet valve SWP-MOV55B clean and inspect, on April 23, 2025
- (2) WO 5424275, bus 1NNS-SWG1B alternate supply breaker ACB 4 switch replacement, on June 9, 2025
- (3) WO 00596079, standby cooling tower spray nozzle piping replacement, on June 13, 2025
- (4) WO 54251249, standby service water cooling tower fan SWP-FN21M replacement, on June 26, 2025
- (5) WO 54246326, 94C relay replacement in 480V switchgear undervoltage circuit, on June 30, 2025
- (6) WO 54212247-19, division 1 control building AC HVK-CHL1C, on June 30, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) STP-203-6501, HPCS Pump and Valve Operability Test, Revision 016 on April 30, 2025
- (2) STP-508-0201, Manual SCRAM Channel Functional Test and LSFT, Revision 021 on May 14, 2025
- (3) STP-109-6802, MSIV Cold Shutdown Full Stroke Operability Test, Revision 004 on June 26,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025
===71152A - Annual Follow Up Problem Identification and Resolution (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample 1 Partial Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the basis for the FLEX strategy for the suppression pool cooling system, specifically the FLEX pump, FLX-P1.
(2)
(Partial)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to NOV 05000458/2024002-03, Failure to Restore Compliance of Emergency Diesel Generator Air Starts, and determined that the reason, corrective actions taken and plan to address recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved for this violation is adequately addressed and captured on the docket and was reviewed during the most recent biennial problem identification and resolution inspection (Inspection Report 05000458/2025010). NOV 05000458/2024002-03 is administratively closed by this report.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000458/2025-001-00, Human Performance Error Results in Manual Reactor Trip (ADAMS Accession No. ML25156A246)
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results, Section 71153. This LER is closed.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
===60855 - Operation of an ISFSI The inspectors performed a review of the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) activities to verify compliance with certificate of compliance 72-1014, license amendment 15, and the River Bend ISFSI final safety analysis report (FSAR) Revision 22. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures, corrective action reports, and records to verify ISFSI operations were compliant with the site-specific technical specifications, requirements in the FSAR, and NRC regulations.
Operation of an ISFSI===
- (1) During the on-site inspection, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the ISFSI pad to observe the current condition of the canisters and reviewed/evaluated the following documentation:
1. radiation surveys for radiological dose at the owner-controlled boundary to
verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 for years 2021 - 2024
(July 2022)
3. quality assurance program implementation, including recent audits,
surveillances, receipt inspection, and quality control activities related to ISFSI operations
4. compliance with technical specifications for operational surveillance activities
and FSAR required annual maintenance activities
5. selected licensee design changes and program changes to the ISFSI
performed under the sites 10 CFR 72.48 program
6. changes that had been made by the licensee to the sites 10 CFR 72.212
evaluation report since the last inspection, from Revision 4 to Revision 5
===60859 - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Renewal Inspection Inspectors assessed the licensees programs to implement aging management for SSCs that are important to safety. Inspectors evaluated the licensees program to verify consistency with 10 CFR Part 72 requirements, NRCs safety evaluation report, and site-specific conditions or requirements. Inspectors verified the license conditions, regulatory commitments, aging management programs, time limited aging analyses, and license renewal activities were implemented and/or completed, to verify that age-related degradation is identified and adequately managed or corrected, as applicable. Inspectors were on-site and observed some of the baseline aging management inspections.
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Renewal Inspection===
- (1) NRC inspectors were on-site March 31 through April 3, 2025, to observe, evaluate, and assess the licensee's aging management programs and implementation.
- Inspectors performed a comprehensive review of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 storage systems renewal application, NRC staff evaluation, FSAR changes, the licensees aging management program, implementing procedures, and observed some baseline inspections while on-site.
- Confirmed the licensee met the requirements associated with certificate of compliance HI-STORM 100 new Condition 13 to perform evaluations required by 10 CFR 72.212 to adopt the renewed amendment and FSAR changes prior to entering the period of extended operations.
- Observed baseline inspections that utilized a remote operated robotic non-destructive examination device to perform remote visional inspections on the inside of an overpack and the outside surfaces of the canister.
- Inspectors confirmed the licensee adequately utilized the properly calibrated equipment and used trained and qualified individuals to perform the baseline inspections in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI, Article IWA-2200 for VT-3 examinations.
- For River Bend, the period of extended operations begins December 29, 2025, the licensee had the programs and procedures in place to meet all new requirements associated with the renewed license Technical Specification 5.8.
- For each of the aging management programs and their prospective procedures, the inspectors verified the licensee incorporated all applicable SSCs important to safety, correctly directed the parameters that required monitoring or inspection, contained the correct frequencies of inspection, and correct number of samples.
- The procedures directed the proper acceptance criteria using the correct equipment and/or processes in accordance with the applicable code requirements.
- Inspectors verified the implementing procedures directed issues that did not meet acceptance criteria required by the FSAR be placed into the corrective action program for evaluation and directed results of the inspections be placed in an industry operating experience database.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Improper Tagout Causes Loss of Normal Service Water and Reactor Scram Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000458/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to correctly follow established tagout procedures, which resulted in a manual reactor scram.
Specifically, the licensee failed to properly tagout service water valve SWP-V3302, SWPMOV55A block valve, and ensure the valve was closed prior to conducting post-maintenance testing. This resulted in a loss of normal service water and subsequent insertion of a manual reactor scram.
Description:
On April 8, 2025, at approximately 2:00 p.m., the licensee assigned two operators as the performer and peer checker to hang tagout 256-012-SWP-MOV55A on SWP-V3302, the SWP-MOV55A block valve. By installing the tagout, the operators were supporting a motor-operated valve inspection of the safety-related standby cooling tower division 1 return isolation valve, SWP-MOV55A. SWP-V3302 needed to be repositioned from locked open to danger tagged closed to prevent a flow path for service water to the cooling tower. Prior to starting the job, the operators participated in a pre-job brief, which the licensee later determined to be inadequate, because it was not performed to the standards of procedure EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, Revision 029.
At approximately 2:36 p.m., operators incorrectly placed the equipment protection tag on SWP-MOV55A instead of the intended valve, SWP-V3302. This was a direct result of not following EN-OP-102, Section 5.9, Hanging Tagouts, Steps 5.9.4.b and 5.9.4.f, which require reviewing the tagout descriptions, placement instructions, and hazards as well as ensuring the tag hang sheet equipment identification agrees with the description on the tag and on the component label in the field.
At 4:02 p.m., the licensee stroked SWP-MOV55A open for post-maintenance testing. Since SWP-V3302 had not been tagged out closed as intended, the stroking of SWP-MOV55A provided an open flow path to the standby cooling tower, causing all normal service water pumps to receive a low-pressure lockout condition and trip.
The licensee took immediate corrective actions by entering procedure AOP-0009, Loss of Normal Service Water, Revision 025, inserting a manual scram, verifying all control rods were fully inserted, and ensuring the stabilization of the plant.
Corrective Actions: The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program as CR-RBS-2025-02347. The licensee also conducted an Adverse Condition Analysis, scheduled operator corrective actions, implementation of a standards reset focusing on human performance tools and verification practices, and enhanced oversight and coaching during tagout activities.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2025-02347
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to follow tagout procedure EN-OP-102, Section 5.9, Hanging Tagouts, Steps 5.9.4.b and 5.9.4.f, which requires reviewing the tagout descriptions, placement instructions and hazards, as well as ensuring that the tag hang sheet identification matches the description on the tag and on the component label in the field, resulted in tagging out the wrong valve and was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and therefore constitutes a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency also represents a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, failing to follow pre-job brief and tagout procedures, which led to incorrectly tagging out SWP-MOV55A, prevented the normal service water system from functioning properly and led to a reactor scram.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, Section C, Support Systems Initiators.
The finding required a regional senior reactor analyst to perform a detailed risk evaluation because the finding resulted in an actual complete or partial loss of a support system (i.e.,
normal service water) and the insertion of a manual scram. In performing the detailed risk evaluation, the senior reactor analyst determined that the finding associated with the loss of normal service water and reactor scram event was of very low safety significance (Green).
The analyst performed an initiating event analysis as called for in Section 8.0, Initiating Event Analyses, of Volume 1, Internal Events, of the RASP Handbook. The analyst chose to run this analysis as a loss of normal service water event since the SPAR model assumed the reactor scrams during that event. No other failures were assumed to occur beyond those initiated by losing normal service water. Applying these assumptions resulted in a change in core damage frequency of 4.9E-7/year for the finding. Losses of normal service water events comprised the most dominant core damage sequences. The standby service water and reactor core isolation cooling systems remained available for mitigation of the dominant sequences. The analyst assumed that external events would be an insignificant contributor to the increase in core damage frequency because the probability of any external event coinciding with the loss of normal service water event would be extremely low. As a result, only the increase in core damage frequency from the internal events was used in the final estimate. After reviewing IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, the analyst determined that the only dominant core damage sequence for losses of normal service water only contributed 6.7E-9/year to the large early release frequency and considered the finding to be Green for large early release frequency.
The analyst ran the River Bend Station, SPAR model, Revision 8.83, on SAPHIRE, Version 8.2.12, to calculate the conditional core damage probability using a cutset truncation of 1.0E-
12.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, operators and supervisors failed to adequately consider potential undesired consequences of their actions before performing work and implement appropriate error reduction tools like an appropriate pre-job brief, which resulted in the loss of normal service water from incorrect tag placement.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 1.c of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires procedures associated with Equipment Control (e.g.,
locking and tagging). The licensee established procedure EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, Revision 29, for hanging equipment tags. Steps 5.9.4.b and 5.9.4.f require reviewing the tagout descriptions, placement instructions and hazards, as well as ensuring the tag hang sheet equipment identification matched the equipment identification label in the field.
Contrary to the above, on April 8, 2025, the licensee did not review the tagout descriptions, placement instructions and hazards, as well as ensure the tag hang sheet equipment identification matched the equipment identification label in the field. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement the established procedure EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, Revision 029, Section 5.9, Hanging Tagouts, steps 5.9.4.b and 5.9.4.f and review the tagout descriptions, placement instructions and hazards, as well as verification that the tag hang sheet equipment identification agrees with the description on the tag and on the component label in the field, which resulted operators incorrectly placing the equipment protection tag on SWP-MOV55A instead of the intended valve, SWP-V3302, and a subsequent reactor scram.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 3, 2025, the inspectors presented the ISFSI triennial and aging management inspection results to Phil Hansett, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 10, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Phil Hansett, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CoC 72-1014
Certificate of compliance for HI-STORM 100 used at River
Bend
River Bend HI-STORM 100 Final Safety Analysis Report
HI-STORM 10 CFR 72.212 App
D
River Bend 212 report for HI-STORM 100
Miscellaneous
QA-20-2024-RBS-
Corrective Actions Procedure
CFR 72.48 Evaluations Procedure
STP-000-0001 6-
16-2024
Storage module vent surveillance procedure and
documentation for the surveillances
STP-000-0001 9-
06-2022
Storage module vent surveillance procedure and
documentation for the surveillances
Procedures
STP-000-0005 3-
07-2023
Storage module vent surveillance procedure and
documentation for the surveillances
60855
Radiation
Surveys
Recent ISFSI Survey of RBS 2024
2.48-1673
Evaluation of activities required to add ISFSI expansion
concrete pad and its effects on existing ISFSI components.
Engineering
Evaluations
EN-FAP-OU-008
Canister selection process for aging management inspection
for River Bend Station
CEP-NDE-0100
Holtec NDE Vendor documentation review and approval
form
River Bend HI-STORM 100 Final Safety Analysis Report
River Bend HI-STORM 100 Final Safety Analysis Report
Miscellaneous
HI-2220473
Tollgate Report for the HI-STORM 100 System
HI-2250123
Aging Management Program Inspection Plan Report for
River Bend
60859
Procedures
HPP-3496-1000
MPC and HI-STORM Aging Management Examination
Procedure for River Bend Station
Drawings
PID-08-098
Engineering P&I Diagram System 309 Diesel Generator
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PID-08-098C
Engineering P&I Diagram System 309 Diesel Generator
PID-08-09A
Engineering P&I Diagram System 309 Diesel Generator
SOP-0042
Standby Service Water System (SYS 256)
057
Procedures
SOP-0053
Standby Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries (SYS#309)
347
Control of Combustibles
27
SEP-FPP-RBS-
001
008
SEP-FPP-RBS-
2
RPS Fire Fighting Procedure
004
Procedures
SEP-FPP-RBS-
004
RBS Guidelines for Preparation of Pre-Fire Strategies and
Pre-Fire Plans
2
Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis
009
Procedures
Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program
20
Protected Equipment Postings
019
Procedures
STP-207-4241
RCIC Isolation RCIC Equipment Room Ambient
Temperature High Channel Calibration and Logic System
Functional Test (1E31N602B)
Procedures
Operability Determination Process
20
Procedures
Fatigue Management Program
20
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
24-00875
Miscellaneous
G200-0113
Goulds Pumps Installation, Operation, and Maintenance
Manual
000
Loss of Normal Service Water
25
Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence
009
Procedures
Protective and Caution Tagging Forms and Checklist
017