IR 05000408/2005024

Insp Repts 50-443/85-09 & 50-444/85-01 on 850408-0524.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Procedures & Records Re Instrumentation & Control Activities Sys Piping & Walkdowns

ML20127A951
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook, 05000408
Issue date:	06/06/1985
From:	Barkley R, Cerne A, Gallo R, Reynolds S, Wescott H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127A935	List: IR 05000408/2005024 ML20127A932
References
50-443-85-09, 50-443-85-9, 50-444-85-01, 50-444-85-1, IEB-82-01, IEB-82-1, IEB-83-07, IEB-83-7, NUDOCS 8506210301
Download: ML20127A951 (12)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I 50 443/85-09 Report N /85-01 50-443 Docket N CPPR-135 License No. CPPR-136 Priority --

Category A Licensee: Public Service. Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection conducted: April 8 - May 24,1985 Inspectors: b A.C.Cerne, Sr. Resident Inspector 2 I date signed

& Mnn li.N.We' scott,~ Resident Inspector

& ;Q f- PC6~~

date signed t s- 8-28'

date sianed N

'R.S.Ba'rl ley, )(actor Enoineer

+W S.D.Reynolds,4 Lead Reactor Engineer YL3f8C date signed Approved by: b R.M.Gallo, Chief, Projects Section 2A, 6 !BF" date sianed Division of Project and Resident Programs Inspection Summary:

Inspection on April 8-May 24,1985 (Report Nos. 50-443/85-09 & 50-444/85-01)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of work activities, procedures and records relative to instrumentation and control activities and system piping and component walkdowns. The inspectors also reviewed licensee action on previously identified .

items, including 10CFR50.55(e) reports, and perfonned plant inspection-tours. A region-based inspector also conducted an in-office review of an A/E metallurgical evaluation contained in a component failure analysis report. The inspection involved 249 inspection-hours of Unit I activities and four inspection-hours of Unit 2 activitie Results:No violations were identified. One unresolved issue remains concerning the justification for the use of non-Class 1E solenoids for positioninn the air operators of certain valves in the excess letdown line to the Chemical and Volume Control syste PDR ADOCM 05000443 G PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted W. J. Cloutier, Lead Systems Engineer (YAEC)

T. M. Cizauskas, PAPSCOTT Task Team Coordinator (YAEC)

J. DeVincentis, Director, Engineering and Licensing (NHY)

W. N. Fadden, Lead Instrumentation Engineer (YAEC)

G. F. Mcdonald, Construction QA Manager (NHY)

D. G. McLain, Startup Manager (NHY)

K. Powers, Project Engineering Manager - Piping (UE&C)

J. W. Singleton, Field QA Manager (YAEC)

2. Plant Inspection-Tours The inspectors observed work activities in-progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the plant duriag general inspections of the plan The inspectors examined work for any obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions. Particular note was taken of the presence of quality control inspectors and quality control evidence such as inspection records, material identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation. The inspectors interviewed craft personnel, supervision, and quality inspection personnel as such personnel were available in the work area Specifically, an inspector reviewed some hanger rework instructions associated with achieving acceptable fit-up gaps for specific pipe supports in the containment spray and safety injection systems. He also examined rework to some piping in the main steam line, feeding the emergency feedwater pump turbine, accomplished in accordance with Engineerina Change Authorization (ECA) 19/102794D. Material Certifications and Receiving Inspection Reports for piping used in the modification were checked. The inspector verified minimum pipe wall thickness to be within the allowance of UE&C sketch SK-465 of specification 248-51, thru independent measurements utilizing a Nortec NDT-124D, ultrasonic thickness gag The inspector performed a walkdown of the following systems to determine whether their as-built configuration matched that provided in the FSAR:

- Residual Heat Removal System (Train A)

- Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Taps

- Emergency Feedwater System

- Boric Acid System While certain inconsistencies with the FSAR were noted, each variation, but one, was shown on the latest P&ID drawings and/or the most recently issued i Engineering Change Authorizations (ECA's) and Design Change Notices (DCN's). '

The inspector revieved UE&C Administrative Procedure 15 which addresses the incorporation of ECA's and DCN's into the FSAR. The procedure appeamd adequate to insure that the chanaes will be incorporated into the FSAR.The one variation found with the FSAR concerned instrumentation on the Emergency Feedwater System. Since the system was still under construction and modification and had not yet been reviewed by QA, the design change implementation was considered in-process. The subject inconsistency, concerning flow transmitter identification and tagging, was discussed with a licensee QA engineer who l

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agreed to check for proper design control. The inspector had no further questions on this issue at this tim '

The inspector also observed the steam generator eddy current testing operation in progress during the reporting period. This testina was the subject of a region based specialist inspection documented in inspection report

! 443/85-14. Review of Preoperational Test, PT-10 for the Accumulator Blows,

which was also in progress at the time, was performed. The installation and

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proper calibration of the pressure and level instrumentation required to

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support the test were verified. Several questions were asked of the test i director concerning the methods used to comply with the test instruction '

All questions were answered to the inspector's satisfactio The inspector reviewed and discussed with licensee project management and 1 engineering personnel their 10CFR50.55(e) Construction Deficiency Reporting l (CDR) program and a newly instituted Piping and Pipe Support Closecut Task j

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Team (PAPSCOTT) program. In regard to 50.55(e) reports, new guidance was issued jointly by the Director of Engineering and Licensing and the Construction QA Manager to clarify evaluation criteria and establish uniformity in the

, project interpretation of the regulation requirements. The inspector noted i

that existing documentation requirements for CDR review have already been l formalized in NHY Administrative Site Procedure (ASP-3), UE&C Administrative Procedure (AP-48), and YAEC Project Policy No.2 Initiation of the PAPSCOTT program is intended to consolidate, direct, and manage the efforts associated with piping and support as-engineered and as-t constructed stress reconciliation, NRC Bulletin 79-14 as-built considerations, and ASME Code Stamping requirements. The inspector was briefed on the proposed PAPSCOTT organization, status reporting, and schedular goals. He discussed with the responsible engineering personnel the relationship of PAPSCOTT to existing procedural requirements (eg: AP-39 on As-Building), covering the

, same areas of interes With regard to both PAPSCOTT and the new 10CFR50.55(e) guidelines, the inspector indicated that he had no further questions at this time, but that routine inspection in the future would verify proper implementation of these programs.

, The inspector also reviewed a Part 21 report submitted to PSNH by HUB Inc.,

dated 4/14/85, concerning SA-106 pipe manufactured by Phoenix Steel, which has potential minimum wall thickness deficiencies. The pipe in question was traced to four different heat numbers. Licensee representatives i

have established that none of the affected pipe has been received at Seabrook Station. However, other heats of pipe manufactured by Phoenix Steel are in the process of being verified to assure that minimum wall thickness has not '

been violated. The inspector has no further questions on this issue and the Part 21 report is close With regard to all of the above plant inspection-tour and independent

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inspection items, no violations were identified.

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3. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (443/84-01-02): Discrepancies in design pressure / temperature data. The inspector reviewed UE&C memoranda MM-21837A, MM-23269A, SM-10484A, and MM-24021A discussing the subject inconsistencies and the method of reconciling the Code Data Reports with the design documents. The licensee has confirmed via telecons with the Authorized Nuclear Inspection (ANI) acency for Seabrook that corrections to the Code Data Reports (HPP-1 or NPV-1) are not necessary if UE&C, as N Certificate Holder, includes a reconciliation statement with their N-5 Code Data Repor The inspector also checked hydrostatic test pressures for certain of the questioned cmponents to verify that the subject discrepancies represented transcription errors and not hardware problems. He checked, as a sample, the temperature and pressure design data listed on the T/P Form (S8) of Appendix G to Specification 248-43 for the Emergency Feedwater (EFW)

System. Comparison to UE&C piping Specification 248-1, as amended by Design Change Notice (DCN) 67/0009A, resulted in an additional question which was resolved by the issuance of DCN 67/0009B reestablishing an envelope of design pressure and temperature conditions for the EFW syste Discussions with UE&C piping design engineers, in parallel with the above actions, have resolved the subject discrepancies and served to outline the proposed program to assure that the component records reflect accurate information. The inspector has no further questions on this issue and considers this item close (Closed) Unresolved Item (443/84-03-03): Qualification documents for installed Class 1E equipment. NRC Inspection Report 443/85-03 documented the licensee tracking of environmental qualification (EQ) of installed components as an open issue, based upon questions raised in the 443/84-03 report. However, at that time an inspector had discussed the EQ of all Class 1E electrical equipment with the licensee and had determined that their method of tracking equipment qualification status was acceptabl The resident inspector has also noted that EQ of both electrical and mechanical equipment is an outstanding issue (reference: Safety Evaluation Report, paragraphs 1.7 (6) and 3.11) currently residing with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Therefore, no additional unresolved issues currently exist in this area and the documentation in the 85-03 report of an open item was in erro The inspector has no questions on this issue at this time and considers the matter closed, (Closed) Unresolved Item (443/84-04-01): Differences in Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) nozzle reinforcement. The inspector reviewed the UE&C engineering response to YAEC Blue Sheet No.67. Review has revealed that the original nozzle loads, as transmitted to the RWST vendor, were different, resulting in a different stiffener system for each nozzle.

l The addition of a pipe support downstream of the RWST on the CBS-1202 line reduced the nozzle loads on assembly "F", and thus eliminated the need for external stiffener plate . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ __

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The inspector noted that the final piping analysis for the CBS-1201 and 1202 lines connecting to the subject nozzles,has not been complete However, a program for confinning the as-engineered and constructed system acceptability, in conjunction with stress and transient analyses,

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has been initiated. The inspector discussed this program and its implementation with the responsible supervisory engineers and has no further questions on this issue. This item is close (Closed) Violation (443/84-07-04): Construction Appraisal Team (CAT)

Report (Section IV.B.1)- Design drawings improperly translated into fabrication and installation drawings for rebar details around openinq A program was implemented to review vendor rebar drawings for consistency with the UE&C design drawings. A random sampling of 57 openings in several structures (Primary Auxiliary Building, Main Steam and Feedwater Building, Waste Processing Building and Cooling Tower) were reviewe Openings were reviewed for consistency with regard to number, size and developed length of bars. In addition, one wall and floor elevation I were selected from the Primary Auxiliary Building, Control Building,and

Fuel Storage Building for review. These structural elements were

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reviewed for number and size of bars, developed length, splice length, and opening reinforcing details. This review included an additional 77 opening , This program identified 3 discrepancies which had no impact on structural i adequacy. The inspector reviewed a sampling of UE&C's documentation of

! this verification program activity and has. no further question !

i This violation is considered to be close l (Closed) Violation (443/84-07-05): CAT Report (Section IV.B.2)-Design loading conditions not properly considered for four hot leg restraints

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and one crossover leg restraint. The inspectors reviewed UE&C's " General Computation Sheet" for the hot leg restraint anchor bolts, dated 5/21/8 The calculations were provided for six cases that were considered to be

worst case examples of loads that had not been accounted for in previous calculation In each case, the existing design was determined to be adequate for the

assumed loads. The licensee also connitted to document these, and all

. similar, loading conditions in the applicable calculation sets to avoid

future questions on design load acceptabilit This issue is closed, l (Closed) Unresolved Item (443/84-07-07): CAT Report (Section VI.B.1)-

Ouestionable traceability of bolting material. The inspector reviewed documentation provided by licensee representatives which indicated that

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traceability has been established for bolting material used on the safety injection accumulator tanks, reactor coolant pumps, diesel generators, pressurizer, battery racks, packing gland fasteners, flange bolting, motor control center cabinet to cabinet fasteners, and high strength

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bolts / nuts for other components. Review of the material traceability documentation indicated no problems / concerns with the existing material control progra Therefore this item is considered to be resolve _ _ _ . _ _ - _, __ _ _ ,_ ._

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? (Closed) Violation (444/84-03-01): Inadequate storage and preservation measures for Unit No.2 NSSS components. The inspector reviewed records indicating that the four steam generators and the pressurizer had been

, purged by evacuating these vessels to 25" to 28" Hg., then refilled with

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nitrogen and maintained at 3 to 6 psig. The reactor flange and stud holes were inspected, cleaned and recoated with Tectil, where required. Records indicate that a periodic maintenance / surveillance program has been

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established for the NSSS component The resident inspector, accompanied by one reactor engineer, visually examined the system for maintaining a nitrogen atmosphere in the primary and secondary side of the steam generators and the pressurizer. Further actions taken by the licensee to preserve Unit 2 components and structures were evaluated and documented in Region I inspection report 444/84-08, paragraph 10.

] This violation is considered to be close (Closed) Unresolved Item (443/84-10-01): Traceability of reactor vessel material surveillance program impact specimens. The inspector reviewed the Westinghouse Program (WCAP-10110) for the reactor vessel radiation surveillance program for PSNH (Seabrook) Unit No.1 and verified that the reactor vessel material heat numbers corresponded to the impact specimen heat numbers provided in WCAP-1011 ,

This item is considered to be closed t (Closed) Unresolved Item (443/85-01-01): Excessive gap between station j battery end cell and battery rack side stringer. When informed of the potentially generic problem with the Gould battery rack installations, the licensee conducted an inspection and identified the deficiency applicable to Seabrook also. On 5/8/85, the licensee reported this problem as a potential construction deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e). A design chanae is planned to correct the problem and vendor drawings will be revise The item will be tracked as CDR 85-00-09 and corrective action checked j after licensee issuance of the required 50.55(e) written repor The 3 unresolved item is therefore close (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR 84-00-04): Deficiency

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regarding cracked and broken puffer piston rods in Brown Boveri 5Hk circuit breakers. The inspector reviewed YAEC's Nonconformance/LHA Report (NCR No.82-209), dated 3/19/84, indicating that all puffer pistons have been replaced. This CDR was also the subject of I&E Information Notice 83-8 This CDR is considered to be closed.

l Review of IE Circulars and Bulletins l

The ins'pector reviewed the following IE Circulars and Bulletin and considers i l them closed, as they were determined not to be applicable to Seabrook Station.

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IE Circulars: 78-04 80-02 78-07 80-07 78-14 80-14 79-18 80-17 79-20 81-14 79-24 IE Bulletin: 82-01 The inspector also reviewed licensee reports / records associated with their investigation of "Apparently Fraudulant Products Sold by Ray Miller, Inc."

(Reference: IE Bulletin 83-07 thru Supplement No.2). He reviewed correspondence (UE&C letter SBU 77784, with attached " Summary of UE&C Survey" dated 8/31/83) indicating that a thorough search had been performed to locate any Ray Miller products that may have been received at Seabrook Station. The survey included mailing letters with questionaires to vendors / suppliers that may have purchased material from Ray Miller, Inc. In addition, the list of Seabrook vendors / contractors was compared to a. list of known Ray Miller customers provided by USNRC, IE Information Notice 83-0 It was determined that the Ecodyne Corporation had used material purchased from Ray Miller's West Caldwell, New Jersey office for some evaporator packaae assemblies. Since the NRC had determined that the only Ray Miller office involved with fraudulent material was in Charlestown, West Virginia and also since the evaporator assemblies were nonsafety, nonseismic components, no further action was taken regarding those Ecodyne supplied items. Concurrently, UE&C Engineering conducted a review of the technical significance of use of the subject material and identified no substantial impac Additional licensee review identified that some gas line fittings had been purchased from Ray Miller for temporary use during construction activitie These fittings do not affect permanently installed plant equipmen Based upon the review of the licensee investication, engineerina analysis, and reports, as noted above, the inspector considers Bulletin 83-07 to be close . Drain Valve Assembly Failures (Unit 1)

During flushing activities of the Containment Spray (CBS) piping on 1/8/85 and 1/10/85, socket weld failures were observed in two similar 3/4" drain lines, CBS-1214-4-301 and 1216-4-301. The resident inspectors visually examined ,

the failed piping with drain valves attached, checked the configuration of '

temporary piping set up for the flushing operation, and noted excessive vibration, apparently induced by such a configuration and the method of 1 modulatino flushing water flow. This was documented in Region I inspection report 443/84-20 (paragraph 2) along with the determination that the subject failures did not constitute an event reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

During this inspection period, a regionally based materials and corrosion specialist inspector reviewed a subsequent UE&C Report, " Failure Analysis of Containment Spray System Drain Valve Assemblies", dated 3/14/85 prepared by a UE&C Supervising Engineer for Materials Applications. The NRC specialist

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determined that the failure analysis report is complete and well written and that the conclusion of mechanically induced fatigue as the failure mechanism is consistent with the description and crack morphology. He noted that this type of failure is a standard industry problem where unsupported socket welded pipe connections have a cantilevered mass (eg: a valve) on one en Region I has observed similar failures due to the same cause at other site Additional support for the pipe or elimination of the introduction of alternating stress to the assemblies were noted by the specialist as possible corrective measure CBS piping supports, included in the design but not installed at the time of flushing, will be installed in proximity to the subject drain lines. Also, the excessive vibrations experienced when the lines failed will be mitigated in normal service by elimination of both the temporary pipina and the need to control flow by throttling of containment isolation valves CBS-V-11 and 17. Thus, it appears that the original design was adequate and the initial determination of nonreportability under 50.55(e) was correc The resident inspector confirmed that startup personnel have held discussions on this subject problem to preclude recurrence during future flushing operation He has no further questions or concerns on the handling of this issu . Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) The inspector examined some instrument racks within Unit I containment (eg: 1-MM-IR-1), particularly checking the Class IE instrument cable connections for the required Conax sealed terminal units. He noted some differences in the way certain of the instruments were mounted, specifically with regard to workmanship details such as drilled holes, and washer and clamp installation. The design requirements for these racks had been revised due to the addition of and changes made for mounting the Class 1E solenoid valves. The inspector reviewed the following design change detail information and identified no major discrepancies:

ECA NCR 05/101182D 93/600 05/1013840 93/733 However, with regard to the workmanship questions, the inspector asked licensee QA personnel to perform a surveillance on rack IR-1, as installe As a result of this inspection, a YAEC Surveillance Report with a list of ten deficiencies was generated and two nonconfomance reports were issue The inspector discussed the deficiencies with the responsible QA engineers and detemined thht while none of the problems constituted major functional deficiencies, the items should be addressed and/or corrected to maintain workmanship standards consistent to the documented I&C rack and instrument mounting criteri The licensee connitted to conduct additional surveillance of similar racks (eg: 1-MM-IR-4) within containment, which may have been also affected by the above design changes to the mounting details. The inspector reviewed the thoroughness of the licensee surveillance activity in this area and

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their subsequent corrective action. He determined that corrective measures appear to be commensurate with the severity of the identified deficiencies and has no further questions on the subject I&C rack installation The inspector also observed within Unit I containment the in-process installation of tubing tray and supports for the steam generator (SG)

level instrumentation. He reviewed the work package for SG "D" work to include attachment of the supports to the SG shell and associated main steam piping and QC inspection criteria of same. He noted NSSS involvement /

concurrence on certain design change details (eg: ECA 05/103176F)

governing the observed work and discussed this design criteria with both field engineering and QC personne On SG "B" and "C" the inspector examined similar as-built tray and support installation to confirm installation in accordance with desig He spot-checked welding, boltino, sliding joint installation, and conformance to the drawing details. Where material substitutions had been made, he confirmed proper authorization in accordance with both design and procedural requirement No violations were identifie b. The inspector discussed with licensing, engineering, and QA personnel the licensee's plans with regard to commitments made to USNRC Regulatory Guides (RG)1.97and1.151. An NRC unresolved item (443/84-13-05)

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is documented and still open in this subject area and the licensee has been taking measums to address the NRC concern During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the following documents and determined that licensee application of a " graded QA program",

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meeting the intent of RG 1.97 for design category 2 accident monitoring

, instrumentation, was in-process and that the existing UE&C QAS-5 program would be utilized to scope and procedurally govern such graded 0A implementatio ECAs 05/104421A, 10/102310B & 10/104766A

-- Interim Procedure Changes (IPC) 1 and 3 to UE&C Field Instrumentation Procedure (FIP) #18

-- Request for Information (RFI) 74/103043A

-- Response Form to NCR 82/3978 The inspector noted that the UE&C QAS-5 program was instituted at Seabrook several years ago to meet the intent of RG 1.29 positions C.2 and 4 with regard to the implementation of " pertinent QA requirements" to nonsafety components used in a seismic category 2 over 1 design applicatio It appears that the recent changes to QAS-5 will also meet the intent of RG 1.97 for design category 2 component In regard to the categorization and handling of instrument sensing lines, the licensee has indicated their intent to address in the FSAR the degree

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of compliance, and stated exceptions, to RG 1.151. The inspector reviewed an ECA (05/104233A) clarifying the separation criteria for redundant instrument impulse lines, as an example of licensee interpretation of RG 1.151 guidanc Since unresolved item 443/84-13-05 currently exists to review the licensee position on RGs 1.97 and 1.151, this issue will remain open to track and follow-up the licensee exceptions to these documents, until such time that the licensee formally submits to the NRC Office of NRR their position, clarifying their comitment and exception to the current regulatory guidanc Follow-up of this issue during this inspection period resulted in the identification of no violations or new unresolved safety question . System and Component Walkdowns (Unit 1)

The inspector visually examined the in-line condition of the following needlepoint valves, which had been specifically left out of the safety injection (SI)

system to prevent damage during flushing activities, and then installed prior to the required hydrostatic testin SI Valves V-85 V-125 V-90 V-129 V-104 V-143 V-109 V-147 V-117 V-151 V-121 V-155 During the future conduct of Preoperational Test (PT-8) for the ECCS Performance Test, these throttling valves will be adjusted and locked in place to establish the proper flow balance and ensure that the specified flow distribution through the charging /SI header and hot leg / cold leg SI injection lines is obtaine The inspector also walked the cold leg piping for all four loops, the excess letdown line off loop 3 thru the excess letdown heat exchanger and the three-way valve diverting flow to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT), and the pressurizer spray piping off loops 1 and 3 thru their respective pressure control valve One discrepancy with the Piping and Instrumentation drawing (P&ID) was noted in the position of the pressurizer spray line (RC-21) on the loop 1 cold le It appears that P&ID F805003 (Revision 12) is in error by illustrating RC-21 to take suction off RC-3 upstream of the charging (RC-366) and safety injection (SI-201) lines, when in fact the isometric drawings and the actual installation indicate a downstream suction ta YAEC has issued a Blue Sheet #92 to clarify

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this discrepancy and the inspector has no further questions on this item, since a P&ID revision will correct the erro On the excess letdown line, the inspector noted two air operated, fail-closed isolation valves (CS-V-175 and 176) upstream of the excess letdown heat exchanger and an air operated, hand-controlled valve (HCV-123) between the heat exchanger and the three-way valve (CS-V-170) diverting flow to the RCD Further inspection and discussion with YAEC engineers indicated that the solenoids associated with these air operated valves were not considered

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safety-related and therefore not purchased or installed to Class IE require-ment Partial justification for this design was suggested in that the NSSS designer does not require Class IE solenoids because the subject valves are passive, normally closed, fail-closed valves. However, the inspector re-viewed Table 3.9(N)-ll of the FSAR and found CS-V-175 and V-176 to be listed as " active" valves. This appears to meet the logic of the Chemical and

Volume Control System (CS) design since the excess letdown line, while

, normally isolated, can routinely be used during plant operatio The inspector indicated to licensee engineering and QA personnel that the apparent discrepancy in the consideration of these valves as " active" or

" passive" is unresolved and that further justification for the design of the solenoid air-control valves as non-Class IE was required (443/85-09-01).

8. Followup of an Anonymous Allegation The inspector reviewed the licensee's records and documentation of an investigation / inspection pertaining to an anonymous allegation concerning unauthorized repairs to certain pipe whip restraints located in the west pipe chase tunnel of Unit NRC inspectors visually examined the pipe whip restraints in the area in question and reviewed licensee actions on this subject as documented in their letters to the NRC (SBN-752 and SBN-774) dated 1/18/85 and 3/4/85 respectively. The NRC inspectors checked for any adverse hardware and program impact, assuming the allegations were valid. No adverse effects were identifie The inspectors will review licensee follow-up of this allegation after receipt of the final licensee report on this matte . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . tianagement Meetings a. At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection. During this inspection, the NRC inspectors received no comments from the licensee that any of their inspection items or issues contained proprietary informatio .

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12 On May 15,1985, a meeting was held in the Region I office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania by mutual licensee / Region I agreement to discuss the Seabrook project status and schedule. New llampshire Yankee management personnel presented infonnation on recent licensee initiatives in resolving NRC open items, establishing a Site Licensing Engineer position and an Employee Allegation Resolution (EAR) Program, and conducting an FSAR consistency review. NRC questions related to project status and commitments made relative to the most recent NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP). Both the licensee and NRC management agreed that such meetings were beneficial on a periodic basis to provide for information interchange and for a consistent understanding of both regulatory developments and current project statu The following personnel were in attendance at this meeting:

New Hampshire Yankee W. B. Derrickson, Senior Vice President G. S. Thomas, Vice President of Nuclear Production W. P. Johnson, Vice President J. DeVincentis, Director of Engineering & Licensing G. F. Mcdonald, Construction QA Manager R. E. Sweeney, Bethesda Licensing Office Manager NRC, Region I T. E. Murley, Regional Administrator S. D. Ebneter, Director, Division of Reactor Safety W. F. Kane, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Proje cts L. H. . :tenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch

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R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A P. K. Eapen, Chief,QA Section A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector J. M. Grant, Reactor Engineer

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