IR 05000413/2005009
| ML053000342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/2005 |
| From: | Ogle C NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Jamil D Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| IR-05-009 | |
| Download: ML053000342 (30) | |
Text
ber 26, 2005
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC SAFETY SYSTEMS DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2005009 AND 05000414/2005009
Dear Mr. Jamil:
On October 7, 2005, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a safety system design and performance capability team inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station.
The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 6, 2005, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspection team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of the inspection, no findings of significance were identified. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000413/2005009 and 05000414/2005009 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 05000413/2005009 and 05000414/2005009 Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 Dates: September 19 - 23, 2005 October 3 - 7, 2005 Inspectors: R. Moore, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)
R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer D. Mas-Penaranda, Reactor Inspector N. Staples, Reactor Inspector A. Sabisch, Resident Inspector Accompanied by: K. Harper, Reactor Inspector (Trainee)
R. Lewis, Reactor Inspector (Trainee)
W. Fowler, Reactor Inspector (Trainee)
Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000413/2005009, 05000414/2005009; 9/19-23/2005 and 10/3-7/2005; Catawba Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability Inspection.
This inspection was conducted by a team of inspectors from the NRCs Region II office and a resident inspector from the site. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability
The team evaluated the capability of installed plant equipment to detect and respond to a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA). Procedures which direct the mitigating actions for this event were also evaluated.
A specific list of equipment and documents reviewed for each section is included in the to this report.
.1 System Needs
.11 Process Medium
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the availability and reliability of water sources required for the SBLOCA events. These water sources included the refueling water storage tank (FWST) and the containment emergency recirculation sump. The review included design documentation, drawings, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), corrective actions history, volumetric and water depth calculations for the FWST and the containment recirculation sump, calculations of system capacity, and calculations of net positive suction head (NPSH) available and required for the safety injection (NI) pumps, residual heat removal (ND) pumps, and the charging (NV) pumps.
The reviews were performed in order to determine the adequacy of the water supplies for the systems required to respond to a SBLOCA. The reviews were also performed to verify that design bases requirements delineated in the design basis documents for the water supplies were consistent with the plant's current licensing bases requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.12 Energy Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed test and design documents to verify that the 4160 volt alternating current (VAC) and 600VAC power sources were adequate to meet minimum voltage specifications for electrical equipment during and following a SBLOCA event. The team performed an independent voltage drop calculation from the 2ELXB Motor Control Center to motor operated valve (MOV) 2NI-184B to assess the adequacy of the licensees voltage drop calculation. A review of design torque values for selected critical MOVs was performed to verify that the safety functions (open/closed) were adequately tested assuming minimum voltage.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.13 Instrumentation and Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the instrumentation that is used by operators for detection and mitigation of a SBLOCA event. The team reviewed appropriate design basis documents, TS, system flow diagrams, instrument uncertainty calculations, calibration procedures, and calibration test records to verify that selected level, flow, and pressure process instrumentation had the proper range and accuracy needed to perform their safety function. The setpoints for the FWST level alarms and equipment actuation relays were reviewed to verify that they were established in accordance with setpoint guideline procedures and design output documents. The team reviewed vendor data demonstrating the operating characteristics for containment sump level transmitters and containment pressure transmitters and compared it to the minimum expected calculated inaccuracies in the applicable loop accuracy calculations to verify that sufficient margin was available for satisfactory operation under SBLOCA conditions. The team conducted field inspections of accessible instrument installations to verify that the instrument tubing, sensors, and supports were in good material condition.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.14 Operator Actions
b. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed plant operating instructions, including emergency procedures (EPs),abnormal procedures (APs), and alarm response procedures (ARs) that would be used during the identification and mitigation of a SBLOCA event. The team focused on installed equipment and operator actions that could be used to mitigate the event. The review was done to verify that the instructions were consistent with the UFSAR description of SBLOCA events and within the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs), any step deviations were justified and reasonable, and the instructions were written clearly and followed the emergency operating procedure (EOP)writers guide. The team held discussions with licensed operators and training instructors, reviewed job performance measures and training lesson plans pertaining to procedures and equipment used during a SBLOCA event to confirm that training was consistent with the applicable operating instructions. The manual operator action times for performance of SBLOCA mitigation activities were reviewed for consistency with accident analyses and operator training. The team observed an operator perform the manual alignment for high pressure recirculation (piggy back mode) on the simulator to verify time requirements were consistent with the time stated in the UFSAR.
c. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.15 Heat Removal
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed design documentation, drawings, vendor manuals, pump bearing temperature trend data, and completed surveillance tests to verify that the pump and motor cooling for the ND, NI, and NV pumps were adequate to ensure that the pumps would remain operable under maximum expected temperatures during design basis operating conditions. A review of the procedures used to provide an alternate source of cooling water to these pumps was performed. A walkdown of the components required to be manipulated to accomplish this action was conducted to ensure the components were well-labeled and accessible. In addition, the ability of the ND system heat exchangers to remove sufficient heat during postulated accident conditions was verified through the review of design documents and heat capacity surveillance tests.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 System Condition and Capability
.21 Installed Configuration
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed field walkdowns of accessible SBLOCA mitigation equipment to observe the existing conditions and configurations. Equipment examined included NI, ND, and NV pumps, system valves, piping, and related components. Also, the team walked down portions of the 4160 VAC and 600 VAC systems to verify that the installed configuration was consistent with design basis information, assess the observable material condition, and to verify that installed equipment tap settings were consistent with design calculation values. The walkdowns included review of potential impact on equipment operation or accessability from security modifications.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.22 Operation
a. Inspection Scope
The team walked down selected portions of NI, ND, and NV operating procedures and emergency procedures to check for human factors in the procedures and in the plant; including clarity, accuracy, labeling, lighting, noise, communications, and accessibility.
The team compared valve positions with those specified in the system operating procedure line-ups and drawings, and observed the material condition of the plant to verify that it would be adequate to support operator actions and system operation. The team also checked NI, ND, and NV system alignments to verify consistency with design and licensing basis assumptions and TS.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.23 Design
a. Inspection Scope
Mechanical Design Review The team reviewed design calculations, TS, the UFSAR, testing, maintenance, and modification documentation to verify that system and equipment design functions have been appropriately evaluated and maintained. Periodic test procedures and equipment monitoring activities were reviewed to verify that design criteria were appropriately translated into the acceptance criteria in the tests for the ND, NI, and NV pumps, selected motor operated valves, and selected check valves.
The team reviewed calculations and system configurations to assess the adequacy of the NPSH available for the NI, ND, and NV pumps from the containment sump including a reactor coolant system break inside the crane wall where some inventory could fail to reach the containment sump due to leakage through the incore sump room hatch covers; i.e., smart-break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). In addition, the team reviewed the most restrictive flow passage opening conditions in the systems to assess the adequacy of the sizing of the flow passage openings in the containment sump strainers. System design, testing, and as-maintained configuration were reviewed to assure pump minimum flow requirements and run out protection were provided for the ND, NI, and NV pumps.
A review of test data for ND pumps replaced over the past two years was conducted to ensure that the new pump assembly functioned within the design parameters required by the system and that the head curves were verified and updated following the replacement. The team reviewed a sample of replacement parts to verify the parts were appropriately evaluated and qualified for use in safety related applications to assure the design function of the equipment was maintained.
Electrical, Instrumentation, and Controls Design Review The team reviewed system flow diagrams, instrumentation and control (I&C) drawings, electrical elementary and schematic diagrams, instrument setpoint calculations, as well as calibration procedures and calibration test records to verify that the instrumentation and controls for the NI, ND, NV systems, and FWST were in accordance with design basis documents. The team reviewed control schematics and electrical drawings to verify design features are incorporated in control circuits for selected pumps and MOVs.
The team also reviewed setpoint calculations for selected process instruments including containment pressure, containment sump level, letdown flow measurement, and FWST level to verify that the calculations included appropriate instrument uncertainties. The last two completed calibration test records were reviewed to confirm that instrument setpoints were consistent with setpoint calculations. For the instruments selected, the team reviewed documentation of completed surveillance tests and calibrations to verify that equipment performance was appropriately monitored and maintained consistent with the design and licensing basis.
The team reviewed voltage drop calculations and performed an independent voltage drop calculation for a portion of the vital AC distribution to verify that adequate power would be available to meet design basis scenarios. Additionally, it was verified that calculated minimum voltage values were appropriately used as inputs to MOV torque and thrust calculations. Valve operation test evaluation system (VOTES) test results were reviewed to check that motor inrush currents were consistent with those used in the calculations.
In addition, the team reviewed overcurrent protective relays data set point calculations and curves to verify the margin between the motor start current and the time the instantaneous relay would allow the motor to start without an inadvertent trip.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.24 Testing and Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed performance and post-maintenance testing of NI, ND, and NV systems pumps and valves to verify that the tests and inspections were appropriately verifying that the assumptions of the licensing and design bases were being maintained and that performance degradation would be identified. The team reviewed service and performance testing and electrical preventive maintenance procedures for the 4160VAC and 600VAC power system to verify that specified acceptance criteria were met and that the equipment operation was consistent with the plants licensing and design bases.
The emergency core cooling system performance test documentation was reviewed to verify the system control functions were appropriately tested.
The team reviewed calibrations for the overcurrent protective relays to support proper operation of 4160VAC safety buses. Additionally, the team reviewed inservice test performance for the NV pump motors to verify that the motors load current and vibrations under full load conditions were consistent with the manufacturers guidelines.
The team reviewed valve operability stroke time testing, thrust and torque testing, and corrective maintenance records for selected NI, ND and NV system risk-significant MOVs. This review was conducted to verify the availability of the selected valves, adequacy of surveillance testing acceptance criteria, and monitoring of these valves for degradation. The team also reviewed selective risk-significant check valve periodic tests to verify the check valves were periodically demonstrated to function to the appropriate open / check positions to support system operation. The team reviewed completed periodic test results and calibration data related to NI, ND, and NV systems instrumentation to verify that testing was being performed in accordance with applicable TS requirements.
Test records were reviewed to verify that permissives and interlocks not normally tested during pump testing were verified during periodic surveillance testing. The team reviewed surveillance procedures of containment sump level and containment pressure process instrument channels to verify that tests were consistent with the instrument design including uncertainty calculations, setpoint documents, and TS. The last two completed instrument calibration records were reviewed for the selected instruments to verify that they had been calibrated in accordance with the setpoint documents and calibration procedures. The calibration records were also reviewed to verify test deficiencies such as out of tolerance conditions, were being entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and disposition. A sample of measuring and test equipment used for calibrations and performance tests was reviewed to verify the equipment was calibrated and appropriate for the application.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Selected Components
.31 Component Degradation
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed maintenance and testing documentation, modifications, performance trending, and equipment history as identified by work orders, problem investigation process reports (PIPs), and system health reports to assess the licensees actions to verify and maintain the safety function, reliability and availability of selected components.
Equipment reviewed included safety-related pumps (NI, NV, and ND), selected critical valves, 4160 VAC and 600 VAC breakers, FWST level and letdown flow instrumentation.
The team reviewed the potential for common cause failure mechanisms in maintenance.
Additionally, the team reviewed in-service trending data for selected components, including the NI, ND, and NV pumps to verify that the components were continuing to perform within the limits specified by the test and design basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.32 Equipment/Environmental Qualification (EQ)
a. Inspection Scope
The team conducted in-plant walkdowns to verify that the observable portions of selected mechanical and electrical components were suitable for the environment expected under all conditions, including high energy line breaks (HELBs) and flooding. The test data was reviewed to confirm that the components were qualified for the worst case postulated accident environments where they are installed. The team also reviewed documents that implemented EQ requirements to verify that the components EQ conditions are maintained.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.33 Equipment Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The FWST cold weather protection was not included in this inspection as the licensee was in the process of installing a modification to provide this protection. A walkdown of the Unit 2 FWST level transmitters, located adjacent to the exterior of the FWST, was performed to assess the condition of the instrumentation. The team also walked down the enclosure around the FWST to verify it provided adequate missile protection for the tank and instrumentation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.34 Component Inputs/Outputs
d. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected MOVs and evaluated the capability of the valve operators to perform their design function under degraded voltage conditions. For equipment control functions used for a SBLOCA, the team reviewed functional, and elementary drawings for a sample of pump control circuits in the NI, ND, and NV start circuits. The team also reviewed control circuits for MOV actuation on the FWST-containment sump MOV interlock. The objective of the review was to confirm that the circuits implemented the functional requirements stated in the design and licensing basis. The team reviewed samples of surveillance test procedures for LOCA and logic functional testing to confirm that the logic paths were being tested in a manner to adequately demonstrate that the equipment would perform in accordance with design basis documents. The team also reviewed test records to verify periodic surveillance testing of permissives and interlocks for selected MOVs.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.35 Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees applicability evaluations, extent of condition reviews, and corrective actions for industry and station operating experience issues related to NI, ND, and NV equipment problems, use of non-conservative acceptance criteria in safety related pump surveillance tests, plugging of safety injection pump oil coolers, gas voids in NV and ND pump suction lines, charging pump impeller pitting, and check valve problems to verify that plant specific issues were appropriately identified and addressed.
Work orders, procedures, field observations and discussions with engineering staff were used to verify that operating experience related corrective actions were accomplished.
The team reviewed a report summarizing the results of the licensees evaluation of safety related logic system testing in response to NRC Generic Letter 96-01. Specifically, the section of the report dealing with NI, ND, and NV logic system testing was reviewed to verify that logic test deficiencies were properly evaluated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected system health reports, maintenance records, surveillance test records, and PIPs to verify that design and performance problems were identified and entered into the corrective action program.
The team assessed the scope of the licensees extent-of-condition reviews and the adequacy of the corrective actions. The team reviewed calibration test records to verify that out of tolerance conditions were properly entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and disposition. The team reviewed a sample of corrective maintenance work orders on the NI, ND, and NV pumps and selected valves.
Additionally, the team reviewed documentation of individual PIPs which were originated as a result of the teams inspection activities, including documentation of the status of each initial PIP evaluation as it existed at the conclusion of the onsite inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The lead inspector presented the inspection results on October 6, 2005, with Mr. Jamil and other members of the licensee's staff. All proprietary information reviewed during the inspection was returned to the plant staff prior to the exit and is not included in this inspection report.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- S. Beagles, Manager, Chemistry Manager
- A. Dickard, Engineering, Senior Electrical Engineer
- R. Herring, Senior Engineer, Primary Systems
- D. Jamil, Site Vice President
- L. Keller, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- K. Phillips, Manager, Operations Support
- B. Pitesa, Station Manager
- R. Repko, Manager, Engineering
- T. Simril, Supervisor, Balance of Plant
- S. Snyder, Supervisor, Primary Systems
- G. Strickland, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
NRC (attended exit meeting)
- G. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector
- H. Christensen, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
None
LIST OF EQUIPMENT REVIEWED Report sections 1R21.11a Process Medium Unit 2 FWST 2A & 2B Residual Heat Removal (ND) pumps 2A & 2B Safety Injection (NI) pumps 2A & 2B charging (NV) pumps Suction piping and valves in the suction piping associated with the ND, NI and NV pumps MOVs 2NI-185A 2NI-103A 2NV-252A 2FW-27A 1R21.12a Energy Sources MOVs:
2FW-27A 2FW-55B 2NI-185A 2NI-184B Degraded Voltage Relays:
Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETB 27ZX, YX, ZY Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETA 27ZX, YX, ZY Loss of Voltage Relays:
Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETA Relay 27XA Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETB Relay 27XB 1R21.13a Instrumentation & Controls Containment Sump Level Instrument 2NILT5260 Containment Pressure Ch. 3 NSLP5040 FWST Level Instruments (2FWLT5000, 2FWP5000)
NV Flow Instruments (2NVFE5530, 2NVFT5530, 2NVP5530)
NV Mini-flow Orifice (2NVFE5980)
1R21.15.a: Heat Removal Valves required to align Station Drinking Water (YD) to the 2A NV pump in the event normal cooling water is lost (per AP/2/A/5500/021, Loss of Component Cooling Water, Enclosure 4)
Vents in the pump room doors NV Pumps 2A and 2B NV Pump Coolers
1R21.21a Installed Configuration 2A & 2B Residual Heat Removal (ND) pump 2A & 2B Safety Injection (NI) pumps 2A & 2B charging (NV) pumps MOVs 2FW-27A 2FW-55B 2NI-185A 2NI-184B 2ND-25 2ND-59 Pump Motors:
2ANV 2BNV 2ANI 2BNI 2AND 2BND Breakers:
2ETA-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETA 2ETB-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETB 2ETA-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A1 2ETA-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A2 2ETB-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B1 2ETB-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B2 2ETA-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2B 2EMXA-F02B 2FW27A 2EMXA-R08D 2NI185A 2EMXB-F01B 2FW55B 2EMXB-F01C 2NI184B 230kV Switchyard Transformer Yard 2ETA/ETB Switchgear Unit 2 Diesel Generators Unit 2 NV System Instrumentation Unit 2 ND System Instrumentation Unit 2 DC Switchgear/Battery Rooms 1R21.23a Design 2A & 2B Residual Heat Removal (ND) pump 2A & 2B Safety Injection (NI) pumps 2A & 2B charging (NV) pumps
MOVs 2FW-27A 2FW-55B 2NI-185A 2NI-184B 2ND-1B 2ND-2A 2NI-184B Breakers:
2ETA-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETA 2ETB-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETB 2ETA-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A1 2ETA-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A2 2ETB-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B1 2ETB-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B2 2ETA-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2B FWST Level Instrument (2FWLT5000, 2FWP5000)
2NV Flow Instruments (2NVFE5530, 2NVFT5530, 2NVP5530 Switchgear 2ETA(B)-6,7,9,11,12 1R21.24a Testing and Inspection MOVs 2FW-27A 2FW-55B 2NI-185A 2NI-184B Pump Motors:
2ANV 2BNV 2ANI 2BNI 2AND 2BND Breakers:
2ETA-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETA 2ETB-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETB 2ETA-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A1 2ETA-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A2 2ETB-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B1 2ETB-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B2 2ETA-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2B FWST Level Instruments (2FWLT5000, 2FWP5000)
NV Flow Instruments (2NVFE5530, 2NVFT5530, 2NVP5530)
2ETA(B)-6,7,9,11,12 CN-IAC-27917
CN-IAC-21278 CN-IAC-18900 CN-PRF-20851 CN-PRF-20870 1R21.31a Component Degradation 2NI-185A 2NI-103A 2NV-252A 2FW-27A 2NV-270 2NV-813 2NV-482 2NV-205 MOVs 2FW-27A 2FW-55B 2NI-185A 2NI-184B 2ND-25 2ND-59 2NI-1B 2NI-2A Pumps and Motors:
2ANV 2BNV 2ANI 2BNI 2AND 2BND Breakers:
2ETA-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETA 2ETB-03 feeder Breaker for Class 1E 4160 VAC Bus 2ETB 2ETA-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A1 2ETA-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A2 2ETB-06 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B1 2ETB-07 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B2 2ETA-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-09 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-11 Safety Injection Pump Motor 2B 2ETA-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2A 2ETB-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 2B 2EMXA-F02B 2FW27A 2EMXA-R08D 2NI185A 2EMXB-F01B 2FW55B 2EMXB-F01C 2NI184B
Auxiliary Relays:
ESG Auxiliary Relays K649A, K648A FWST Level Instruments (2FWLT5000, 2FWP5000)
2NV Flow Instruments (2NVFE5530, 2NVFT5530, 2NVP5530)
2KCFT5531 1R21.32a Equipment/Environmental Qualification MOVs:
2FW-27A 2FW-55B 2NI-185A 2NI-184B 2ND-1B 2ND-2A Pump Motors:
2ANV 2BNV 2ANI 2BNI 2AND 2BND FWST Level Instruments (2FWLT5000, 2FWP5000)
2NV Flow Instruments (2NVFE5530, 2NVFT5530, 2NVP5530 1R21.33a Equipment Protection Unit 2 FWST instrumentation within the missile wall 1R21.34a Component Inputs/Outputs MOVs:
2FW-27A 2FW-55B 2NI-185A 2NI-184B 1R21.4a Identification and Resolution of Problems 1ETA-12 Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor 1A 1NI183B 2NI183B