IR 05000413/2005005
| ML060240472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/2006 |
| From: | Ernstes M NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
| To: | Jamil D Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| IR-05-005 | |
| Download: ML060240472 (24) | |
Text
ary 24, 2006
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2005005 AND 05000414/2005005
Dear Mr. Jamil:
On December 31, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 5, 2006 with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
This report documents a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the issue was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Catawba Nuclear Station.
DEC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael E. Ernstes, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414, 72-45 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52
Enclosure:
Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2005005 and 05000414/2005005, w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
DEC 3
REGION II==
Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414, 72-45 License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report No: 05000413/2005005 and 05000414/2005005 Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 Dates: October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005 Inspectors: E. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector A. Sabisch, Resident Inspector G. Laska, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)
J. Lenahan, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07)
M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07)
Approved by: Michael E. Ernstes, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000413/2005-005, IR 05000414/2005-005; 10/1/2005 - 12/31/2005; Catawba Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by two resident inspectors, two regional-based senior reactor inspectors, and an in-office review by an operations engineer. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, that was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and the corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Unit 1 operated at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent RTP. On December 5, 2005, power was reduced to 94 percent RTP following a tube leak in the 2E1 feedwater heater which required removing the 2E1 and 2D1 heaters from service. The tube leak was repaired and the unit returned to 100 percent RTP on December 9, 2005 and remained there for the rest of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Cold Weather Preparation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations for adverse weather associated with cold ambient temperatures. This included field walkdowns to assess the material condition and operation of freeze protection equipment (e.g., heat tracing, instrument box heaters, area space heaters, etc.), as well as other preparations made to protect plant equipment from freeze conditions. Risk significant systems reviewed included the standby shutdown facility, nuclear service water pump house and the refueling water storage tanks. In addition, the inspectors conducted discussions with operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel responsible for implementing the licensees cold weather protection program to assess the licensees ability to identify and resolve deficient conditions associated with cold weather protection equipment prior to cold weather events. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified the critical portions of equipment alignments for selected systems remained operable while the redundant trains for that system were inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed plant documents to determine the correct system and power alignments, as well as the required positions of selected valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact mitigating system availability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors verified the following three partial system alignments:
- 2A diesel generator (DG) when the 2B DG was inoperable due to a failed fuel oil pump coupling
- 2A DG and 2A 4160V Vital Electrical Bus when the 2B DG was removed from service for scheduled maintenance
- Main switchyard, unit 1 transformer yard, 1A and 1B diesel generators and the Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) pumps when the Unit 1 standby makeup pump was removed from service for planned and subsequent corrective maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Fire Protection Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensees safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment, sensitivity studies for fire related core damage accident sequences, and summary statements related to the licensees 1992 Initial Plant Examination for External Events submittal to the NRC.
Documents reviewed/generated during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors toured the following eight areas important to reactor safety:
- Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
- Unit 2 A Essential Switchgear Room, 577 foot elevation
- Unit 2 B Train Auxiliary Shutdown Panel
- 2B Diesel Generator Room
- Unit 1 A & B Residual Heat Removal (ND) Pump rooms, Auxiliary Building 522 foot elevation
- Unit 2 A & B Containment Spray (NS) Pump rooms, Auxiliary Building 522 foot elevation
- Unit 2 Mechanical Penetration Room, 543 foot elevation
- Unit 1 Mechanical Penetration Room, 577 foot elevation
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
Service Water Piping Refurbishment Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees program for restoration of the service water system piping which has undergone degradation due to fouling from growth of marine organisms, pipe wall thinning caused by corrosion, and accelerated corrosion attack in the heat affected zones in the proximity of welds (seam welds and joint welds). The inspectors examined the mock-up which was fabricated to train and qualify the coating applicators and quality control personnel, and provide weld orientation mockup for the welders.
The inspectors reviewed calculation number CNC-1167.01-00-0002, Justification of Plastocor Coating System for Safety Related Service Water Piping, which provided background information to justify selection of the Plastocor system to coat the piping and provided details for surface preparation requirements, prior experience (case histories) using the system at other facilities, and recommended inservice inspection intervals to identify localized areas of coating degradation. The inspectors reviewed the inspection procedures and specifications for the materials to verify the following attributes were specified: surface preparation requirements, environmental conditions, controls for the coating materials, application procedures, and inspection requirements.
The inspectors observed mockup preparation for the weld activities and discussed potential repair techniques with the site welding staff. Additionally, the inspectors observed initial cleaning and preparation of the Lake Wylie end of the service water suction piping. Further, the inspectors reviewed the licensees completed piping weld inspection results and work order 98710599 that collectively represented the anomalies found in the pipe length.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
.1 Requalification Activities Review by Resident Staff
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed simulator exercise, PTRQ (Task Requirement Guide) scenario 35, conducted on October 25, 2005, to assess the performance of licensed operators.
The exercise included the loss of a reactor coolant flow instrument channel, a low power reactivity management issue, a steam line break inside containment and a turbine trip failure. The inspection focused on high-risk operator actions performed during implementation of the emergency operating procedures, emergency plan implementation and classification, and the incorporation of lessons learned from previous plant events. Through observations of the critique conducted by training instructors following the exam session, the inspectors assessed whether appropriate feedback was provided to the licensed operators regarding identified weaknesses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results
a. Inspection Scope
On August 05, 2005, the licensee completed the annual operating tests required to be given to all licensed operators by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating tests, and the crew simulator operating tests. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 609 Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees effectiveness in performing routine maintenance activities. This review included an assessment of the licensees practices pertaining to the identification, scope, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as common cause failure evaluations and the resolution of historical equipment problems.
For those systems, structures, and components scoped in the maintenance rule per 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability and unavailability were properly monitored, and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications were justified in light of the reviewed degraded equipment condition. The inspectors conducted this inspection for the degraded equipment conditions associated with the one item listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
C Unit 1 containment penetration airlock check valve PC24 failed the type C leak rate test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessments concerning the risk impact of removing from service those components associated with the six emergent and planned work items listed below. This review primarily focused on activities determined to be risk significant within the maintenance rule. The inspectors also assessed the adequacy of the licensees identification and resolution of problems associated with maintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities. The inspectors reviewed Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), for appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
- Removal of the Unit 1 EBA (125 VDC vital battery) from service for planned discharge testing (5-day duration)
- Scheduled maintenance on the 2B DG
- Pre-outage preparation work associated the Unit 2 DG battery replacement project
- Troubleshooting associated with the B Controlled Area Chilled Water compressor controller
- Planned maintenance schedule review and rescheduling of selected activities following the loss of both Belews Creek units and resulting Orange grid status
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions
a. Inspection Scope
On December 5, 2005, a Unit 2 intermediate pressure feedwater heater (2E1)experienced a failure of multiple tubes requiring isolation of the heat exchanger in order to conduct repairs. Power was reduced to 94 percent, and remained at that level while repairs were completed. The inspectors verified operator actions, particularly discussing reactivity management for the power decrease evolution and use of procedures in responding to the feedwater heater tube leak. In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected trend graphs for parameters and engineering assessments to verify the plant responded as expected and that no structural damage resulted during the isolation of the feedwater heater. The inspectors also observed the repair activities, system return-to-service and power ascension. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations to verify that the operability of systems important to safety were properly established, that the affected components or systems remained capable of performing their intended safety function, and that no unrecognized increase in plant or public risk occurred. Operability evaluations were reviewed for the five issues listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- PIP C-05-6096; Failure and repair of the component cooling (KC) water heat exchanger mini flow valve, 1KC-C40B
- PIP C-05-6827; Unexpected start of the A train of Controlled Room Area Ventilation (VC) during the performance of the VC System Performance Test
- PIP C-05-6986; Allowable values associated with the Pressurizer Pressure setpoints in the Tech Specs were determined to be non-conservative following completion of a new calculation
- PIP C-05-7243; Operability of the 2B Chemical and Volume Control (NV) pump due to an oil leak on the outboard bearing
- PIP C-05-7464; Failure of the SSF Standby Makeup Pump suction valve from the transfer canal (1NV-865A) to open on demand during testing
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Cumulative Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the cumulative Catawba Nuclear Station Operator Workaround List for potential effects on the functionality of mitigating systems. The workarounds were reviewed to determine:
- (1) if the functional capability of the system or human reliability in responding to an initiating event was effected;
- (2) the effect on the operator's ability to implement abnormal or emergency procedures; and
- (3) if operator workaround problems were captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
Aggregate impacts of the identified workarounds on each individual operator watch station were also reviewed. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed post-maintenance testing procedures and/or test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk significant systems to verify whether: (1)testing was adequate for the maintenance performed;
- (2) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;
- (3) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;
- (4) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and
- (5) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The five tests reviewed are listed below:
- Operability run of the 1B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (KF) pump following maintenance
- Operability run of the 2B DG following planned maintenance
- Retest of 1NW8A, Containment Penetration Valve Injection System (NW) Surge Chamber RN Supply valve, following housing and o-ring replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the surveillance tests listed below to verify that Technical Specification surveillance requirements and/or Selected Licensee Commitment requirements were properly complied with, and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified. The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met. Additionally, the inspectors also verified that equipment was properly returned to service and that proper testing was specified and conducted to ensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function following maintenance or as part of surveillance testing. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. The following six activities were reviewed:
Surveillance Tests:
- CA Valve Inservice Test for 1CA-40, CA Pump 1B Flow to Steam Generator 1D; and 1CA-44, CA Pump 1B Flow to Steam Generator 1C
- 1B CA Auxiliary Safeguards Pump Start
- Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test
- Unit 2 Train B Reactor Trip Breaker Trip Actuating Device Functional and Operational Test
- Unit 2 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Train B Periodic Testing In-Service Tests:
- 1B NS Pump Inservice Test Procedure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI & R)
.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of PIPs, attending some daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized database. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends
b. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"
the inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP)and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screenings discussed in section 4OA2.1 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review primarily considered the six month period of June 2005 through December 2005, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, plant health team vulnerability lists, Catawba focus area reports, system health reports, self-assessment reports, maintenance rule reports, and Safety Review Group Monthly Reports. The specific items reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy.
c. Assessment and Observations Oversight and Control of Vendors and Contractors Trend Statement No findings of significance were identified. In general, the licensee has identified trends and has appropriately addressed the trends with their CAP.
However, the inspectors identified a trend, that the licensee had not previously fully recognized. The trend was associated with insufficient management oversight and control of vendors and contractors (non-station personnel). Licensee management was not effective in ensuring corporate and station procedures were effectively implemented and adhered to during work planning, execution and closeout.
This trend was identified based on inspector observations of major activities performed on-site as well as the review of station documents as described in the Inspection Scope section. Aspects of several of the observed activities over the previous two inspection periods have been dispositioned as both minor and Green non-cited violations (NCVs).
Observations included:
- Activities that were not planned or performed in accordance with corporate or station procedures; i.e., NSD, Duke Scaffolding Manual, Work Process Manual, operating procedures, maintenance directives and instructions
- Work that was initiated by vendors and contractors without notification of or approval by station operations or maintenance personnel. Work Control Center personnel have repeatedly placed special project work activities on-hold due to conflicts with planned activities or insufficient resources to support tagouts, maintenance or testing required by the project workers
- Attempting to start work without proper scheduling or assurance that required material was available to complete the activity
- Repeated examples of scaffolding erected in the vicinity of safety-related components that failed to meet the Duke Scaffolding Manual requirements.
In addition, on several instances these activities resulted in safety-related equipment being unnecessarily removed from service, work on safety-related equipment that required rework or additional inspections, and personnel injuries.
The inspectors performed a review of the Problem Investigation Process (PIP)documents generated as a result of the inspectors observations and events that occurred at the station related to non-station personnel. The PIPs reviewed and used as the basis for this trend statement are listed in the Attachment to this report. The description, classification, proposed and actual corrective actions, and the codes assigned to the issue were reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors noted that most of the coding assigned to the PIPs through the screening process identified Work Practices, Training / Qualification or Work Organization / Planning as the underlying cause(s) for the events, while cause codes which existed for Supervisory Methods or Managerial Methods were seldom assigned to the events described in the PIPs. Use of the seldom-used cause codes could have allowed for the identification of the trend in this area and development of more focused corrective actions A number of the PIPs initiated as a result of the vendor and contractor issues either did not have a group listed in the Culpable Group field or had the station group that the contractor/vendor reported to listed. The inspectors determined that the combination of Cause and Culpable Group coding issues was the most likely reason the licensee had not identified the insufficient management oversight and control of vendors and contractors trend while analyzing the PIP database.
Procedure Use & Adherence Trend Statement The inspectors continue to follow the actions being implemented by the licensee in response to the inspector-identified trend associated with inadequate procedure use and adherence. This trend statement was discussed in the following NRC Inspection Reports: 05000413/2005003 AND 05000414/2005003, section 4OA2.3, Semi-Annual Trend Review and 05000413/2004006 AND 05000414/2004006, section 4OA2.2, Semi-Annual Trend Review. Based on the inspectors identification of this trend, the licensee implemented a site-wide focus initiative in January 2005 covering the aspects of: self reporting; conducting cross disciplinary management observations focusing on procedure use and adherence behaviors; a common cause problem evaluation /
assessment on procedure use and adherence performed by work control, operations and maintenance; and the establishment of a human performance report card that includes measures for tracking procedure use and adherence indicating group and team error rates (colored from green to red) and employing feedback and reward incentives.
Reports showing station and department performance in this area were generated and provided to station management along with action plans when required. The inspectors have observed an improvement in technical procedure use and adherence. The inspectors found site wide initiatives to be comprehensive in nature. The station plans on assessing personnel performance during the Spring 2006 Unit 2 refueling outage period. According to station management, the initiative was developed and implemented to create a sustained culture change in this area.
.3 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected one PIP for detailed review. PIP C-05-03781 involved testing failures on the Unit 1 airlock penetration, PC24, that met the performance level criteria for maintenance rule a(1) status. The PIP was reviewed to determine whether the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the PIP against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program document and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On January 5, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D.
Jamil, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection period.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation:
- 10 CFR 50.55a(g) requires that inservice inspections be performed on American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components. The specific inspection requirements and techniques to be used are contained in the 1992 Edition of the ASME Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection ND; Article ND-5222; Piping, Pumps and Valves. Contrary to the above, on August 4, 2005, the licensee determined that the required final inspection of an internal weld had not been performed on a slip-on flange in the replacement nuclear service water piping at the point where it connected to the new 1A NS heat exchanger. Subsequent licensee review of the inspection records associated with the 1B NS heat exchanger replacement project identified two additional internal welds that had not received the ASME-required surface inspections prior to returning the system to operation.
These discrepancies are documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIPs C-05-4713 and C-05-6552. This violation is of very low safety significance because the internal and external welds were made, all other code requirements including welder qualification, proper weld material, fit-up clearances, cleanliness and preheating of the material were met, a visual Quality Control (QC) inspection was successfully performed on all three welds, and a hydrostatic test of the systems were conducted at the completion of the work. The required ASME Inspections were scheduled to be performed during scheduled nuclear service water train outages in early-2006.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- K. Adams, Human Performance Manager
- E. Beadle, Emergency Planning Manager
- S. Beagles, Chemistry Manager
- W. Byers, Security Manager
- T. Daniels, Emergency Planning/Fire Protection
- J. Ferguson, Safety Assurance Manager
- J. Foster, Radiation Protection Manager
- W. Green, Reactor and Electrical Systems Manager
- G. Hamrick, Mechanical, Civil Engineering Manager
- W. Hogan, Fire Protection Engineer, MCE
- D. Jamil, Catawba Site Vice President
- L. Keller/R. Hart, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- A. Lindsay, Training Manager
- S. Magee, Public Relations
- G. Mitchell, Emergency Planning
- M. Patrick, Work Control Superintendent
- J. Pitesa, Station Manager
- T. Ray, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Repko, Engineering Manager
- R. Smith, Emergency Planning
- G. Strickland, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- C. Trezise, Operations Superintendent
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None