ML19354A856

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Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 0500413/2019010 and 05000414/2019010
ML19354A856
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/20/2019
From: James Baptist
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
To: Simril R
Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2019010
Download: ML19354A856 (22)


See also: IR 05000413/2019010

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

December 20, 2019

Mr. Robert Simril

Site Vice President

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Catawba Nuclear Station

4800 Concord Road

York, SC 29745

SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION

(PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2019010 AND

05000414/2019010

Dear Mr. Simril:

On November 21, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at Catawba Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and

other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed

report.

Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of

these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as

non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this

inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection

report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional

Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at

Catawba Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,

Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC

Resident Inspector at Catawba Nuclear Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the

R. Simril 2

NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/ Brian R. Bonser for/

James B. Baptist, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000413 and 05000414

License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML19354A856 SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED

OFFICE R-II/DRS/EB3 R-II/DRS/EB1 R-II/DRS/EB1 R-II/DRS/EB1 R-II/DRS/EB1

NAME B. Collins C. Franklin M. Greenleaf M. Riley B. Bonser

DATE 12/ 18 /2019 12/ 18 /2019 12/ 19 /2019 12/ 18 /2019 12/ 20 /2019

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000413 and 05000414

License Numbers: NPF-35 and NPF-52

Report Numbers: 05000413/2019010 and 05000414/2019010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0029

Licensee: Duke Energy Carolina, LLC

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station

Location: York, SC

Inspection Dates: October 28, 2019 to November 21, 2019

Inspectors: B. Collins, Senior Reactor Inspector

C. Franklin, Reactor Inspector

M. Greenleaf, Senior Reactor Inspector

M. Riley, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: James B. Baptist, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at

Catawba Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor

Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial

nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more

information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Qualify GEMS Level Transmitters for Submergence

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N

Systems NCV 05000413,05000414/2019010-01

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49(f)

when the licensee failed to demonstrate the GEMS containment sump level transmitter

NILT5270 would meet its specified values for one year post-accident during submerged

conditions in accordance with Section 6.5.4 of IEEE 323-1974, the standard the licensee

chose in order to meet environmental qualification requirements.

Failure to Demonstrate Qualification of Conduit Sealant Compatibility for Electrical Wires and

Cables

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N

Systems NCV 05000413,05000414/2019010-02

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR

50.49(f) when the licensee failed to demonstrate the qualification of the conduit sealant and

cable/wire interfaces utilizing Scotchcast Epoxy 9 in accordance with NUREG-0588 Section

2.2(7).

Failure to Assess Radiation and Thermal Degradation Effects of Replacement Sealant

Equivalency

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.8] - 71111.21N

Systems NCV 05000413,05000414/2019010-03 Procedure

Open/Closed Adherence

The inspectors identified a Green finding and Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49(f)

when the licensee failed to demonstrate that the qualification of Scotchcast Epoxy 9 was

applicable to Scotchcast Epoxy 9N in accordance with Section 5.5.7 of procedure AD-EG-

ALL-1612.

2

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21N - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs)

The inspectors evaluated Environmental Qualification program implementation through the

sampling of the following components:

Select Sample Components to Review - Risk Significant/Low Design (Inside/Outside

Containment) (IP Section 02.01) (8 Samples)

(1) 1NDPUAMR, 1A Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor (Westinghouse)

(2) Commodity Item, Okozel Low Voltage Power/I&C Cable (Okenite)

(3) Commodity Item, Scotchcast 9 and 9N Epoxies (3M)

(4) Commodity Item, Terminal Blocks (States- and Stanwick-types)

(5) 1TBOX0019, Terminal Block Enclosure (Hoffman)

(6) 2TBOX0656, Terminal Block Enclosure (Hoffman)

(7) 2CFHP0330, Main Feedwater Pneumatic-Hydraulic Isolation Valve (Borg-Warner)

(8) 1YC362/MO, Hot Gas Bypass Valve Actuator (Jamesbury)

Select Sample Components to Review - Primary Containment (Inside Containment) (IP Section

02.01) (2 Samples)

(1) 1NILT5270, Unit 1 Containment Sump Level Transmitter (DeLaval/GEMS)

(2) 2VXPS5110, Pressure Switch (Solon)

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INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Qualify GEMS Level Transmitters for Submergence

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N

Systems NCV 05000413,05000414/2019010-01

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49(f)

when the licensee failed to demonstrate the GEMS containment sump level transmitter

NILT5270 would meet its specified values for one year post-accident during submerged

conditions in accordance with Section 6.5.4 of IEEE 323-1974, the standard the licensee

chose in order to meet environmental qualification requirements.

Description: The purpose of GEMS level transmitter 1NILT5270 is to provide post-accident

monitoring of Unit 1 containment sump level. EQMM-1393.01-P04-00, Environmental

Qualification Maintenance Manual Equipment Type: Level Transmitter Manufacturer: Delaval,

Gems Model/Series: XM54852, XM54853, XM60620, XM60625, Rev. 0, stated that the post-

accident operating time for the transmitter was one year. The transmitters could be

submerged in the containment sump solution during the one-year post-accident requirement.

During the review of the qualification package for the transmitter, the inspectors identified that

the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) testing did not simulate submerged conditions and that

the post-LOCA testing only simulated a submerged condition for 30 minutes. The inspectors

also identified that the EQMM did not analyze how failing to submerge the transmitter during

the LOCA test and for only 30 minutes during Post-LOCA testing proved the transmitters

could perform their intended function for up to one year post accident.

Additionally, on August 25, 2016, a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification was supplied to the NRC by

NTS Huntsville notifying NRC that the qualification tests for the GEMS transmitters did not

simulate the submergence depth of 15-16 ft. to the junction box as stated during the 30

minute submergence test. The Part 21 notification stated that the wire conduit was not sealed

to the test chamber, but instead was left unattached to the test chamber accident

environment. As a result, the submergence test did not demonstrate the junction box gaskets

ability to prevent moisture intrusion into the internal components of the GEMs transmitter. In

response to the Part 21, the licensee completed an evaluation in AR 02149240 which stated

that the GEMS transmitter remained qualified due to the silicon oil fluid in the transmitter

acting as a general barrier between any potential moisture intrusion into the transmitter

junction box and the junction box wiring internals and that the wiring and splices used in the

junction box were installed using Raychem splice products which had been qualified as an

EQ environmental seal boundary. Due to questions from the inspectors, the licensee

reviewed their evaluation of the Part 21 notification and determined that the failure of the

unqualified junction box seal could allow sump fluid to displace the oil and submerge

subcomponents of the transmitter. The licensee determined that of the subcomponents

installed, only the Raychem Spec 44-insulated transmitter lead wires were not demonstrated

to be qualified for submergence in post-LOCA sump conditions by other test reports or

analysis.

The EQMM stated that the transmitter was qualified in accordance with IEEE 323-1974.

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Section 6.5.4 of IEEE 323 states, The electric equipment type shall be considered to be

qualified by demonstrating that the equipment performance will meet or exceed its specified

values for the most severe environment or sequence of environments in the equipment

specification during its qualified life. The inspectors determined that the qualification package

for the GEMS 1NILT5270 transmitter did not demonstrate its ability to perform its function

under the most severe conditions (e.g., submergence).

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and

performed an operability evaluation which determined that there was reasonable assurance

that the transmitter could perform its intended safety function based on operating experience

and the military specification of the wire which demonstrated the insulations ability to

withstand different adverse chemicals.

Corrective Action References: AR 02303851

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to demonstrate the GEMS level transmitter would meet

its specified values for one year post-accident during submerged conditions in accordance

with Section 6.5.4 of IEEE 323-1974, the standard the licensee chose in order to meet

environmental qualification requirements.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating

Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the

availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to qualify the transmitter lead wires by

testing or analysis for submergence did not ensure the wires could perform their function

under wetted conditions for up to a year post accident.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The

Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed

the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, "Initial

Characterization of Findings," issued October 7, 2016, for the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone, and IMC 0609, App. A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for

Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding was of very low safety

significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of a

mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC) and the SSC maintained its operability.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to

this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee

performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50.49(f) required, "Each item of electric equipment important to safety

must be qualified by one of the following methods:

(1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar

conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(2) Testing a similar item of equipment with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment

to be qualified is acceptable.

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(3) Experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with a supporting

analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(4) Analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions

and conclusions."

Contrary to the above, since the earliest date of record for the EQMM package in 1991, the

licensee failed to qualify the GEMS containment sump level transmitter NILT5270 for

submergence by test or analysis for post-accident conditions of one year.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Demonstrate Qualification of Conduit Sealant Compatibility for Electrical Wires and

Cables

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N

Systems NCV 05000413,05000414/2019010-02

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49(f) when the licensee failed to demonstrate the qualification of the conduit sealant

and cable/wire interfaces utilizing Scotchcast Epoxy 9 in accordance with NUREG-0588

Section 2.2(7).

Description: Duke EQ Files EQMM-1391.01-M01-01, Rev. 3 and CNM 1364.00-0007.001,

Rev. D3 contained the licensee's basis for environmental qualification (EQ) of conduit seals

utilizing Scotchcast Epoxy 9. In the EQ files, the licensee documented a test report that

utilized the epoxy as a sealant to prevent moisture intrusion into equipment electrical conduits

in accordance with Category II of NRC NUREG-0588. The focus of the testing was to

demonstrate the sealing ability of the epoxy around a pair of tefzel-insulated wires in a

Swagelock QF quick-connect pipe fitting by testing a mock-up conduit sealing

configuration. The testing generally demonstrated the capability of the epoxy to provide a

moisture barrier - but due to the use of de-energized wiring - failed to demonstrate that the

interface between the epoxy and wires/cables installed in the field were compatible and

capable of performing their functions of providing for the necessary transmission of signals or

power. By not demonstrating that the sealant was compatible (i.e. did not adversely impact

the electrical function of the wire/cable) with the field configurations, the licensee failed to

demonstrate that the field configurations were qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.

For the conduit sealant locations in the station scoped into the licensee's EQ program, the

licensee adhered to Category II requirements of NRC NUREG-0588 for qualification and

qualification testing to meet 10 CFR 50.49. Section 2.2(7) of the NUREG states that

"performance characteristics be verified before, after, and periodically during testing

throughout the range of required operability." By testing the sealant's mechanical sealing

function without confirming that the epoxy and wire/cable did not adversely impact their

electrical function of passing power/signals to/from important to safety equipment, the

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licensee failed to demonstrate that the sealant was qualified for the installed configurations in

the field.

Corrective Actions: The station entered this into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as

ARs 023011 and 02303697. Although environmental qualification had not been demonstrated

and documented, the licensee identified other tests that had been performed on other wire

types with Scotchcast Epoxy 9 (e.g. NAMCO limit switch lead wire and Mark WPA 14 gauge

hookup wire). The licensee's review of this additional testing provided reasonable assurance

that the installed configurations in the plant would be capable of performing their intended

safety functions.

Corrective Action References: AR 023011023011and 02303697

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to verify the Scotchast Epoxy 9 sealant cable/wire

interface would meet its electrical performance characteristics before, after, and periodically

during testing throughout the range of its required operability in accordance with Section 2.2.7

of NUREG-0588 (Category II) was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating

Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the

availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure that the cable/wire interface with

the sealant would not adversely impact the safety function fails to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of the electrical equipment important to safety that must send or

receive power/signals when challenged with the deleterious effects of aging and harsh

environmental conditions.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The

Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed

the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, "Initial

Characterization of Findings," issued October 7, 2016, for the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone, and IMC 0609, App. A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for

Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding was of very low safety

significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of a

mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC) and the SSC

maintained its operability.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to

this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee

performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50.49(f) required, "Each item of electric equipment important to safety

must be qualified by one of the following methods:

(1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar

conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(2) Testing a similar item of equipment with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment

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to be qualified is acceptable.

(3) Experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with a supporting

analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(4) Analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions

and conclusions."

Contrary to the above, since the qualification file for Scotchcast Epoxy 9 had been performed

in 2001, the licensee failed to qualify the epoxy by any of the four methods described above.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Assess Radiation and Thermal Degradation Effects of Replacement Sealant

Equivalency

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.8] - 71111.21N

Systems NCV 05000413,05000414/2019010-03 Procedure

Open/Closed Adherence

The inspectors identified a Green finding and Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49(f)

when the licensee failed to demonstrate that the qualification of Scotchcast Epoxy 9 was

applicable to Scotchcast Epoxy 9N in accordance with Section 5.5.7 of procedure AD-EG-

ALL-1612.

Description: 3M Corporation changed the chemical composition of the Part B of its

Scotchcast Epoxy 9 two-part formulation from a nonylphenol component to formulation of

cashew, nutshell liq.ccidentale, anacardiaceae, and toluene components. In 2018, the

licensee generated an equivalency evaluation in engineering change EC 144757, Rev. 0 to

evaluate the differences between the original formulation (Scotchcast Epoxy 9) and the new

formulation (i.e. Scotchcast Epoxy 9N). The focus of the evaluation was to determine if the

environmental qualification (EQ) performed for the original epoxy was applicable to the new

epoxy. The licensee reviewed the material safety data sheets (MSDSs) of the two epoxies,

performed durometer testing of representative samples of both epoxies, and performed

Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) Spectroscopy to determine if the materials were similar

enough to warrant the use of the Scotchcast Epoxy 9's qualification file to that of the

Scotchcast 9N's. Based on a FTIR high percentage match (>80%) and similar durometer

testing, the licensee concluded that the materials were similar enough and qualification of

Scotchcast Epoxy 9 was applicable to Scotchcast Epoxy 9N.

The inspectors reviewed the engineering change and noted that FTIR spectroscopy and

durometer testing would provide information showing similarity between the chemical

constituents and discrepancies in hardness between the two epoxies (respectively), but

neither test individually (nor combined) could provide detailed information on how these

different epoxies would behave when subjected to the deleterious effects of nuclear radiation

and thermal degradation (i.e. aging). Inspectors reviewed the licensee's EQ procedure, AD-

EG-ALL-1612, Revs. 3 and 4 and noted that Section 5.5.7(11)(b)(4)(a) stated, in part, that:

"materials of construction shall either be the same or equivalent and differences shall be

8

shown not to adversely affect performance of the safety function." Furthermore, the

procedure states that the evaluations should, "evaluate the differences in material properties.

Minor chemical differences can cause significant variations in properties (e.g. radiation-

withstand capability, dielectric strength, thermal aging, chemical interactions, and changes in

material activation energy."

The licensee's technical review of the differences between the two epoxies lacked the

necessary level of detail to demonstrate that the Scotchcast Epoxy 9N - which is chemically

different - will age and withstand nuclear radiation in the same (or better) manner than the

qualified Scotchcast Epoxy 9. As a result of the inspection, the licensee contacted 3M and

determined that mechanical and electrical properties were similar between the two epoxies,

however, no radiation or thermal degradation comparisons had been made between the

materials.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP)

as AR 0203601. The licensee determined that the Scotchcast Epoxy 9N had only been used

in four recent work orders and based on a review of the material data sheets and on the

technical opinion of the licensee's subject matter experts, the licensee concluded that the four

seals in question were capable of performing their safety function.

Corrective Action References: AR 0203601

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an evaluation

that appropriately considered the effects of nuclear radiation and thermal aging in accordance

with procedure AD-EG-ALL-1612, Section 5.5.7(11)(b)(4)(a) was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating

Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the

availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to perform the necessary evaluation

of Scotchcast 9N's capability to withstand nuclear radiation and thermal aging failed to ensure

the reliability and capability of the Scotchcast Epoxy 9N to perform its safety function of

protecting equipment important to safety from the deleterious effects of potential steam and

moisture intrusion in the four locations where it had been applied to electrical conduits for the

span of their designated life.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The

Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed

the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, "Initial

Characterization of Findings," issued October 7, 2016, for the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone, and IMC 0609, App. A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for

Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding was of very low safety

significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of a

mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC) and the SSC maintained its operability.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures,

and work instructions. This finding is indicative of current performance because the finding

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occurred within the last 3 years. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of H.8

because the licensee's failure to adhere to their EQ procedure AD-EG-ALL-1612, Section

5.5.7(11)(b)(4)(a) was the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50.49(f) required, "Each item of electric equipment important to safety

must be qualified by one of the following methods:

(1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar

conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(2) Testing a similar item of equipment with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment

to be qualified is acceptable.

(3) Experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with a supporting

analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(4) Analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions

and conclusions."

Contrary to the above, since the issuance of EC 144757 in 2018, the licensee failed to qualify

the Scotchcast Epoxy 9N by any of the four methods described above.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On November 21, 2019, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection

(programs) inspection results to Robert Simril and other members of the licensee staff.

10

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.21N Calculations CGD-3007.02-04- Acton Environmental Testing Corporation Test Report: Rev. 5

0001 Attachment States Terminal Blocks and Test Switches

10

CNC-1206.03-00- Flood Level for Structures Outside the Reactor Building Rev. 26

0001

CNC-1206.03-00- Environmental Effects Due to Pipe Rupture Outside Rev. 3

0004 Containment

CNC-1381.05-00- FWIV Life Extension Rev. 3

0158

CNS-1465.00-00- Design Basis Specification for the Flooding from Internal Rev. 1

0020 Sources

CNS-1591.CF-00- DESIGN BASIS SPECIFICATION FOR THE FEEDWATER Rev. 34

0001 (CF) SYSTEM

DPC-1381.05-00- Qualified Life of AGASTAT E7000 Series Timing Relays Rev. 5

0009

DPC-1381.05-00- Electrical Enclosure Latching Environmental Qualification Rev. 0

0017 Analysis

DPC-1381.05-00- Qualified Life Analysis for Brand Rex Flame Retardant Rev. 2

0032 Cross-Linked Polyethylene Insulated Instrument Cable

DPC-1381.05-00- Environmental Qualification (EQ) Evaluation of Equipment Rev. 1

0050 Installed in the Doghouse Buildings

DPC-1381.05-00- Environmental Qualification (EQ) Qualified Life Analysis Rev. 0

0077 (TLAA) for Trane Chiller Controls Supporting CNS License

Renewal

DPC-1381.05-00- Environmental Qualification (EQ) Qualified Life Analysis Rev. 0

0082 (TLAA) for DeLaval, GEMS Level Transmitters Supporting

MNS and CNS License Renewal

DPC-1381.05-00- Environmental Qualification (EQ) Qualified Life Analysis Rev. 1

0087 (TLAA) for Okonite Flame Retardant Ethylene Propolene

(Okonite-FMR) Low Voltage, Control and Instrument Cable

11

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Supporting MNS and CNS License Renewal

DPC-1381.05-00- Environmental Qualification (EQ) Qualified Life Analysis Rev. 0

0093 (TLAA) for Scotch 130C Insulating/Jacketing Tapes

Supporting MNS and CNS License Renewal

DPC-1381.05-00- Environmental Qualification (EQ) Qualified Life Analysis Rev. 000

0104 (TLAA) for Terminal Blocks Supporting MNS and CNS

License Renewal

Corrective Action AR01528008 At Risk Procurement of 3M Scotchcast Resin No. 9 11/13/2014

Documents AR02016420 EQ Rev Tracking 03/31/2016

AR02096602 2017 NRC EQ Program Inspection - Cable/Splice EQML 02/01/2017

Question

AR02149240-01

AR02165587 Fleet License Renewal EQ TLAA Additional Action Tracking 11/14/2017

AR02172829 Tracking of FLRIT EQ TLAA questions to Fleet EQ 12/18/2017

AR022242460 PE-003, Environmental Qualification (EQ) Transformation 11/09/2018

AR02233927 EQ Program Documentation Inefficiencies 09/29/2018

AR02235165 Assignment 1: Develop and execute an EQMM deficiency 10/11/2018

recovery plan

AR02253701 EQ Equipment in a Non-EQ Zone 01/22/2019

AR02275149 Evaluation of WL Sump Pumps Support of CA Operability 05/30/2019

AR02275671 Complete all prep activities associated with CNS EQ NRC 06/04/2019

DBAI

AR02275676 EQ DBAI Self-Assessment - EQML Deficiency 06/04/2019

AR02275676 EQ DBAI Self-Assessment - EQML Deficiency 06/04/2019

AR02275785 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Self-Assessment - EQ Master List 06/05/2019

Data Gaps

AR02276144 EDB discrepancy found during EQ program self- 06/06/2019

assessment

AR02280114 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Focused Self-Assessment AFI#1 07/02/2019

AR02280116 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Focused Self-Assessment AFI#2 07/02/2019

AR02280118 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Focused Self-Assessment AFI#3 07/02/2019

AR02280121 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Focused Self-Assessment AFI#4 07/02/2019

12

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

AR02280125 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Focused Self-Assessment AFI#5 07/02/2019

AR02283803 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Focused Self-Assessment AFI#8 07/25/2019

AR02284923 2019 CNS EQ DBAI Focused Self-Assessment AFI#6 08/01/2019

Corrective Action AR02294978 2019 DBAI EQ Mechanical Components Incorrectly 10/02/2019

Documents Labeled EQ=H

Resulting from AR02295176 2019 DBAI EQ Housekeeping and Material Condition in U2 10/02/2019

Inspection DH

AR02296270 Update EQMMs to Incorporate EQ Document Package 10/09/2019

AR02296584 Items Listed in EQMM not in EDB 10/10/2019

AR02298945 1CFHP0660, Armored Cable Pulled out of Junction Box 10/24/2019

AR02298957 2CA-66B; Armored Cable Pulled from Junction Box 10/24/2019

AR02298964 2BB-148B, Connector Pulled back from Elbolet 10/24/2019

AR02298990 2CF SV 0901; Missing Screw on Junction Box Cover Panel 10/24/2019

AR02299853 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - DPC-1381.05-00-0104 10/29/2019

Documentation Error

AR02299853 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - DPC-1381.05-00-0104 10/29/2019

Documentation Error

AR02299853 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - DBC-1381-05-00-0104 10/29/2019

Documentation Error

AR02300081 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - NCR 02233927 Screened Incorrectly 10/30/2019

AR02300307 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - EQ procedure Issues with Sealant 10/31/2019

Use

AR02300311 2019 NRC DBAI EQ Scotchcast 9 Resin Testing Issues 10/31/2019

AR02300347 2019 NRC DBAI EQ: Lack of EQMM for TBOX enclosures 10/31/2019

AR02300347 CNS 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - EQ Documentation for 10/31/2019

Electrical Enclosure Latches Missing Information

AR02300415 2019 NRC DBAI EQ: EQMM clarification report for 11/01/2019

submergence

AR02300438 2019 NRC DBAI EQ, DPC 1381.05-00-0104 has error in 11/01/2019

table

AR02300438 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - DPC 1381.05-00-0104 Error in 11/01/2019

Tabled Data

13

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

AR0230081 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - NCR 02233927 Screened Incorrectly 10/30/2019

AR02303599 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - EQMM-1393.01-P04-00, DeLaval, 11/20/2019

Gems

AR02303601 2019 NRC DBAI EQ Scotchcast 9N Equivalency 11/20/2019

AR02303602 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - EQMM-1393.01-G04-00, 11/20/2019

Westinghouse Motors

AR02303697 2019 NRC DBAI EQ Electrical Continuity Testing Not 11/20/2019

Performed

AR02303697 2019 NRC DBAI EQ Electrical Continuity Testing Not 11/20/2019

Performed

AR02303851 2019 NRC DBAI EQ: Raychem Spec 44 Wire No 11/21/2019

Submergence Qualification

AR02306022 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - Scotchcast 9/9N EQ File 12/05/2019

AR02306022 2019 NRC DBAI EQ - Scotchcast 9/9N EQ File 12/05/2019

Drawings CN-1499-CF.12-00 SG Feedwater Isolation Instrument Detail Rev. 9

CN-1702-02.01 One-Line Diagram 4160V Essential Auxiliary Power System Rev. 18

(EPC) 4160V Switchgear No. 1ETA

CN-1721-21.09 Catawba Nuclear Station Panel Cutout Sheet, Stanwick- Rev. 7

Type DG Sliding Link Terminal Blocks

CN-1721-21.21 Catawba Nuclear Station Panel Cutout Sheet, States Co. Rev. 1

Type-ZWM-Sliding Link Terminal Block

CN-1734-01.04 Connection Diagram Safety Injection System (NI) B-Train Rev. 15

Motor Operated Valves 1NI010B, 1NI005B, 1NI178B,

1NI183B & 1TBOX0019

CN-2747-01.02-16 Connection Diagram Feedwater System (CF) Doghouse Rev. 001

Level Switches

CNEE-0151-01.03 Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System (NI) B.I.T. Rev. 10

Discharge Isolation Valve 1NI010B

CNEE-0151-01.45 Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System (NI) ND HDR Rev. 13

to N.C. Cold Legs A and B Valve 1NI178B

CNEE-0151-01.46 Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System (NI) NS HDR Rev. 12

to N.C. Hot Leg Isolation Valve 1NI183B

14

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CNEE-0245-01.05- Elementary Diagram Main Feedwater Sys. (CF) Doghouse Rev. 9

02 Safety Level Switches Train A

CNM 1210.04- 323 Transmitter Bottoming/Transfer Type, Bracket MTD., 12/16/1993

0434 001 J/Box Output

CNM 1210.04- Installation Specifications Transmitter Wiring and Mounting 7/27/1995

0438 001

CNM-1205.12- Operator Pneumatic Hydraulic Rev. 6

0050.002

CNM-1205.12- Operator Pneumatic Hydraulic Unit 1&2 Valves Rev. 9

0050.003 1(2)CF33,42,51,60

CNM-1205.12- Cylinder Assembly Hydraulic Operator Rev. 3

0050.004

CNM-1205.12- Reservoir Assembly Hydraulic Operator Rev. 7

0050.005

MCM 1210.04- Splicing & Sealing Procedure Rev. DC

0215 001

Engineering EC0000094280 CD201315 - CMP - Revise FWST Level Set-Points and Rev. 3

Changes Annunciators

EC0000408141 Revise EQMM to Include New Sections for EQ Cables & Rev. 0

Splices

EC0000408781000 CN/MC/ON, CGI, PQL2, various Type ZWM Terminal Rev. 0

Blocks, States, MIR/RWF

EC0000411757 CN/M/O. EE. PQL2, 9230027814, Electrical Resin, 3M, Rev. 0

WB/DT

EC400046 C, CGI, Q2, Various, Enclosures, Hoffman, LFC/KCM Rev. 0

Hoffman Enclosures

Engineering CGD-3007.02-00- Stanwick Electrical Products, Terminal Block Pole Rev. 0

Evaluations 0004

CGD-3010.02-06- 3M Company Scotchcast Electrical Resin No. 9 Rev. 19

0001

CGD-3010.02-13- Attachment 7: Environmental Qualification Parameter Rev. 1

0001 Summaries for the various Dow Corning products

15

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CGD-3015.01-01- Technical Evaluation: Commercial Grade Evaluation - Rev. 2

0001 Enclosures

Miscellaneous ADAMS Accession Potential Part 21 on Wyle Laboratories Test Report Nos. 04/25/2016

No. ML16155A354 45700-1 Rev. A dated November 21, 1988, and 45700-2

Rev. A dated November 21, 1988, Submergence Test of

Gems Liquid Level Transmitter

CNLT-1780-03.02 Response to NUREG-0588 Rev. 8

CNLT-1780-03.03 Environmental Qualification Criteria Manual (EQCM) Rev. 35

CNM 1210.04- Wyle Labs Test Report 45700-2 Rev. 2

0433.001

CNM 1211.00- Qualification Report for Traine CH531 Chiller Controls Rev. 3

2492.037

CNM 1318.00- Motor Qualification Report, WCAP 8754 Rev. 4

0004.001

CNM 1354.00- Qualification Test of Instrument Cable in a Simulated SLB & Rev. 2

0070.001 LOCA Environment

CNM 1362.00- Test Report on the Environmental Evaluation of Terminal Rev. 02

0004, TR-028 Blocks for McGuire Nuclear Station

CNM 1364.00- Environmental Qualification of Electrical Insulating Tape for Rev. 1

0005.001 McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations

CNM 1364.00- EQR of Quick-Connect Fittings Used as Cable Entrance Rev. D3

0007.001 Seals

CNM-1205.12- Feedwater Isolation Valve Pneumatic-Hydraulic Operator Rev. 26

0013.001 O&M Manual

CNM-1205.12- Environmental Qualification Report for BWFC FWIV Rev. 7

0026.001 Actuators

CNM-1354.00- Engineering Report No. 344 - Main Steam Line Break Rev. 1

0026 Qualification Test on Okozel Insulation

CNM-1399.05- 3m Scotchcast Electrical Resin 9N Data Sheet Rev. 0

0366.001

CNS- Elector-Hydraulic-Pneumatic Actuator and Spare Parts for Rev. 2

1205.12.00.0002 Feedwater Isolation Valves

16

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CNS-1354.04-00- Specification: Shielded and Unshielded 600 Volt Rev. 0

0006 Switchboard and Hook up Wire

DPM-1393.01- Environmental Qualification Package For Raychem Rev. D04

0001 Corporation WCSF-U Heat Shrink Tubing

DPM-1393.01- EQ Test Summary for Solon Pressure Switches Rev. 000

0040.001

DPM1393.01- Duke Power Test Summary For: Equipment Type: EGS Rev. 1

0019.001 Tape Splices Manufacturer: SAIC/EGS Division

Model/Series No: SCOTCH 130C Insulating/Jacketing

Tapes Report #EGS-TR-399.16-16

EGS-TR-880707- Test Report for Submergence Qualification of Raychem 10/05/1990

03 WCSF-N Nuclear Line Cable Splice Assemblies for

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant

EQMM-1393.01- ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE Rev. 10

A04-00 MANUAL EQUIPMENT TYPE: FWIV ELECTRO-

HYDRAULIC-PNEUMATIC-ACTUATOR:

MANUFACTURER: BORG-WARNER MODEL/SERIES:

PART NO. 37981

EQMM-1393.01- Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual - Low Rev. 0

C03-00 Voltage Power, Control and Instrumentation Cable /

Okenite / Okozel Tefzel (280) Extruded Insulation System

EQMM-1393.01- Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual Rev. 3

M01-00 Equipment Type: Commercial Grade/Approved Vendor

Items

EQMM-1393.01- Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual Rev. 3

M01-01 Equipment Type: Connector Manufacturer: Swagelok Model

Series: QF Series Quick-Connect

EQMM-1393.01- Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual Rev. 2

M01-04 Equipment Type: Electrical Enclosure Latches -

Manufacturer: Hoffman - Model/Series: A-L31, A-

FC412SS, A-FT44XSS

EQMM-1393.01- Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual Rev. 8

17

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

N04-00 Equipment Type: Differential Pressure Switch Inside

Containment; Manufacturer: Solon; Model/Series:

7PS1ADW / 7PS11DW / 7PSW11D2 / 7PSW1AD2

EQMM-1393.01- Devals, GEMS Level Transmitter Environmental Rev. 10

P04-00 Qualification Maintenance Manual

EQMM-1393.01- ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE Rev. 2

R02-00 MANUAL - EQUIPMENT TYPE: CHILLER CONTROLS -

MANUFACTURER: TRANE (SUPPLIED BY: NUCLEAR

LOGISTICS, INC. (NLI)) - MODEL / SERIES: CH531 &

ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS

MCM 1211.00- Nuclear Environmental Qualification Report: Solon Rev. 0

1505-001 Differential Pressure Switches for McGuire Nuclear Power

Station, Units 1 & 2

MCM 1211.00- Addendum 1 to CCL Report on Envir. Qual. of Solon DP Rev. 002

1505-002 Switch

MCM 1393.02- Test Report on the Effects of Radiation Exposure on Some Rev. 00

0007, TR-047 Class 1E Electrical Components for the McGuire Nuclear

Station

Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1103 Procurement Engineering Products Rev. 4

AD-EG-ALL-1612 Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program Rev. 4

AD-EG-ALL-1612 Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program Rev. 3

AD-PI-ALL-0100 Corrective Action Program Rev. 21

IP-0-A-3010-021 Nitrogen System Charging for Main Feedwater (CF) Rev. 23

Isolation Valve Operators

IP-0-A-3010-022 Removal and Installation of Rev. 9

Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation Valve Operators

IP-0-A-3190-004 Maintenance Procedure for YC System Hot Gas Bypass Rev. 5

Valve Actuator

IP-2-A-3010-020 Unit 2 Main Feedwater (CF) System Calibration of Rev. 10

Feedwater Isolation Valves Pneumatic-Hydraulic Operators

IP/0/A/0200/029 A Sealing Cable Entrance Fittings on Class 1E Devices Rev. 35

IP/0/A/3820/020 Q Namco Limit Switch Replacement for Utilizing Quick Rev. 13

18

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Connectors

IP/0/A/3850/013 A Procedure for Cable Termination Sealing Rev. 64

IP/0/A/3850/013 B Procedure for Sealing Rigid Steel Field Run Conduit Rev. 13

MP-0-A-7200-008 Feedwater Isolation Valve Corrective Maintenance Rev. 22

MP-0-A-7450-024 YC CHILLER HOT GAS BYPASS VALVE REMOVAL AND Rev. 11

REPLACEMENT

OP.0.A.6450.011 Control Room Ventilation/Chilled Water System Rev. 146

PT-2-A-4200-009 Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test Rev. 170

PT-2-A-4200-018B CF Valve Inservice Test (CS) Rev. 21

Self-Assessments 02276400 Focused SAST: CNS EQ Program DBAI NRC inspection 06/06/2019

Work Orders 01713620

01810701

02073010

02079985

20033963

19