IR 05000414/2009003

IR 05000413-9-003 & 05000414-09-003 on 04/01/09 - 06/30/08 for Catawba, Units 1 & 2

ML092090491
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/28/2009
From:	Bartley J NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To:	Morris J Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR-09-003
Download: ML092090491 (43)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 28, 2009

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2009003, 05000414/2009003

Dear Mr. Morris:

On June 30, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 7, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2009003, 05000414/2009003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 05000413/2009003 and 05000414/2009003 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: York, SC 29745 Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2009 Inspectors: A. Sabisch, Senior Resident Inspector R. Cureton, Resident Inspector D. Forbes, Health Physicist (Section 2OS3)

H. Gepford, Senior Health Physicist (Section 2PS3)

R. Hamilton, Senior Health Physicist (Sections 2PS1 and 4OA1)

J. Hamman, Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5.2)

A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector A. Nielsen, Health Physicist (Sections 2OS1 and 4OA1)

L. Pressley, Project Engineer E. Stamm, Project Engineer Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000413/2009003, 05000414/2009003; 4/1/2009 - 6/30/2009; Catawba Nuclear

Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report The report covered a three month period of inspection by the resident inspectors, two project engineers, four radiation protection (RP) inspectors, and one reactor inspector.

No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), Revision 4, dated December 2006.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in shutdown for a refueling outage. The unit was restarted on April 18, 2009, reached 100 percent RTP on April 23, 2009, and remained at or near there for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Evaluation of Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems: The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and measures designed to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system (grid) and the onsite alternate AC power systems prior to the onset of summer weather conditions and the resulting higher load demand on the grid. This included the review of the licensees Station, Nuclear Division, and Power Delivery group procedures defining the coordination of activities that could impact the on-site and offsite AC power systems and the communication protocols established between the Power Delivery group and Catawba to verify that the appropriate information is exchanged when issues arise that could impact the AC power systems. The inspectors also discussed the implementation of the procedural guidance with personnel from operations, engineering and work control. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

Adverse Weather Conditions: The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to the two adverse weather conditions listed below. This included field walkdowns to assess the material condition and operation of ventilation and cooling equipment, as well as other preparations made to protect plant equipment from high ambient temperature conditions. In addition, the inspectors conducted discussions with operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel responsible for implementing Catawbas hot weather preparation program in order to assess the licensees ability to identify and resolve deficient conditions associated with hot weather protection equipment prior to actual hot weather being experienced at the site. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine and Auxiliary buildings to ensure protection from external flooding in the building was functioning properly and discussed noted conditions with Operations and Engineering personnel. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

• Expected high temperatures

• June 4-5, 2009, heavy rain

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns: The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns during the five activities listed below to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety-related equipment was inoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down system components, selected breakers, valves, and support equipment to determine if they were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors reviewed protected equipment sheets, maintenance plans, and system drawings to determine if the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

• Protection of the 2B diesel generator and 2ETB 4.16kV vital bus during the period repairs of an electrical ground were in progress on the 2A Diesel Generator (DG)

• Equipment protection while the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) DG was out of service following a failed operability test

• Protection of F and G Instrument Air compressors following the failure of the E compressor and starting problems with the backup station air compressors.

• Equipment protection while the SSF Diesel Generator was out of service following a failed operability test

• Equipment protection of required equipment while the 1B Nuclear Service Water (RN) pump was out of service for planned maintenance requiring a Complex Activity Plan

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Protection Walkdowns: The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the five plant areas listed below to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensees safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment and sensitivity studies for fire-related core damage accident sequences. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the

.

• Unit 2 Main Transformer Area

• RN Intake Structure

• Unit 1 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Rooms

• Unit 1 Mechanical Penetration Room, 560 foot elevation

• Unit 2 Charging Pump Rooms Fire Drill Observations: The inspectors observed the following graded fire drill conducted by the on-shift fire brigade members. The inspectors verified the fire brigades use of protective gear and fire fighting equipment; that fire fighting pre-plan procedures and appropriate fire fighting techniques were used; that the directions of the fire brigade leader were thorough, clear and effective; and that control room personnel responded appropriately to the simulated fire events. The inspectors also attended the subsequent drill critique to assess whether they were appropriately critical, included discussions of drill observations and identified any areas requiring corrective actions.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• The drill on June 3, 2009, involved a simulated fire in the Unit 1 A Safety Injection pump room on the 543 foot elevation in the Auxiliary Building.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees internal flood protection features for the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator rooms. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and flood analysis documentation to determine the effect of flooding. Through observation and design review, the inspectors reviewed sealing of piping, the flood wall itself, and potential flooding sources. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of temporary plugs installed in holes bored through the outer walls to replace the existing carbon steel piping providing cooling water to the diesels with High Density Polyethylene piping.

The inspectors entered one conduit manhole (CMH-8A) to verify that the cables were not submerged, that the cables were not damaged or degraded, and that the sump pump was functioning properly.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed Active Simulator Exam ASE-5 to assess the performance of licensed operators during an evaluated simulator training session. The exam included the failure of a loop T-Cold instrument requiring operator action to address unplanned rod motion, the pressurizer spray valve failing open, failure of the reactor protection system to automatically trip the reactor requiring insertion of a manual trip, a main steam line break outside of containment and initiation of safety injection to stabilize the plant.

The scenario was terminated when the safety injection termination criteria had been met.

The inspection focused on high-risk operator actions performed during implementation of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures, and the incorporation of lessons-learned from previous plant and industry events. The classification and declaration of the Emergency Plan by the Shift Technical Advisor and Operations Shift Manager was also observed during the scenario. The post-scenario critique conducted by the training instructor and the crew was observed. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the four samples listed below for items such as:

(1) appropriate work practices;

(2) identifying and addressing common cause failures;

(3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule;

(4) characterizing reliability issues for performance;

(5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; (6)charging unavailability for performance;

(7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and

(8) appropriateness of performance criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2)and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). For each item selected, the inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Repair of the outboard seal leak on the 2B charging pump

• Troubleshooting and repair of a ground on the 2A DG electrical power system

• Repair of a packing leak of the 1A RN pump strainer that resulted in an extension of a planned maintenance window and unplanned extension of the Technical Specification (TS) limiting condition for operations time

• Troubleshooting of an overcurrent condition resulting in an output breaker trip on the SSF diesel generator

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following six activities to determine whether the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors reviewed the risk assessment to determine that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the appropriate use of the licensees risk assessment tool and risk categories in accordance with Nuclear System Directive 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), for appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Assessment of change in station risk profile following the loss of one of the two 230kV busses in the switchyard and receipt of a tornado watch for York county

• Review of planned switchyard work in conjunction with a tornado watch declared for York county

• Review of planned activities for Work Week 17 on Unit 1 and Unit 2

• Assessment of planned work activities following the identification of a packing leak on the shaft of the 1A RN pump which extended the planned out of service time by 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />

• Review of planned and in-progress work activities including the repair of Unit 2 spent fuel pool tornado dampers following declaration of a tornado watch for the area surrounding the plant

• Review of planned and in-progress work activities following the unanticipated trip of the SSF diesel generator output breaker during an operational surveillance test resulting in the SSF being declared inoperable

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to determine if TS operability was properly justified and the subject components and systems remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred for the four operability evaluations listed below. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations to verify that they were made as specified by Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to determine that the systems and components remained available to perform its intended function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-09-03028; Tornado or Seismic induced damage to the Class G portions of Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) recirculation piping possibly compromising CA pump minimum flow protection

• PIP C-09-02810; Received Operator Aid Computer (OAC) alarm C1P0944 (Reactor Coolant (NC) loop B Over-Temperature Delta Temperature difference)

• PIP C-09-02839; T (T double prime) component of Over-Power Delta Temperature reactor trip setpoint needs to be changed for NC loop 2A

• PIP C-09-01635; Scaffold Crew found a 2x10x18 long piece of wood in the bottom of the B RN pump pit

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the seven post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test procedures to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Repair of the incore flux mapping system prior to reaching the 30 percent RTP plateau following restart of Unit 2

• Retest of the Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer 1B Fans following repairs

• Testing following preventative maintenance on the 2A Safety Injection Pump

• Post maintenance testing following performance of preventive maintenance activities on the Unit 1 turbine driven CA pump

• Post maintenance testing following performance of preventative maintenance on the 1A Centrifugal Charging Pump

• Functional test of the 1B RN pump and strainer following planned maintenance and cleaning activities

• Operability test on the 2A motor driven CA pump following annual preventative maintenance activities

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated licensee outage activities to determine whether the licensee:

considered risk in developing outage schedules; adhered to administrative risk reduction methodologies they developed to control plant configuration; adhered to operating license, TS and Selected Licensee Commitment requirements, and procedural guidance that maintained defense-in-depth; and developed mitigation strategies for losses of the key safety functions.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees outage risk control plan to assess the adequacy of the risk assessments that had been conducted and that the licensee had implemented appropriate risk management strategies as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).

The inspectors observed the Just-in-Time training conducted for the personnel involved in the unit startup on April 14, 2009, which simulated bringing the unit from Mode 3 to criticality and then through portions of the power ascension process.

Prior to reactor startup, the inspectors walked down upper and lower containment to observe that debris had not been left which could affect performance of the containment Emergency Core Cooling System sumps. In addition, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the upper and lower ice condenser areas to establish that debris had not been left which could affect ice condenser performance when called upon to perform its design function. The inspectors also accompanied licensee personnel during the performance of an as-left inspection of the reactor vessel bottom head following cleaning after reactor cavity drain-down.

The containment cleanliness walkdown of lower containment was conducted with the plant in Mode 3 which allowed the inspectors to observe the condition of major, normally-inaccessible equipment inside containment and review that indications of previously unidentified leakage from the reactor coolant system were not present.

The inspectors observed the reactor startup/pull to criticality on April 18, 2009, and portions of the subsequent power ascension to assure procedure compliance and that systems performed as designed. The inspectors reviewed reactor physics testing results to determine that core operating limit parameters were consistent with the core design.

The inspectors observed the items or activities described below, to substantiate that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk control plan for the key safety functions identified above and applicable TS when taking equipment out of service.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees responses to emergent work and unexpected conditions, to establish that resulting configuration changes were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan.

The inspectors observed the replacement of the reactor vessel head to ensure the lift was conducted in accordance with the recently revised procedures that incorporated the guidance for the head lift supported by the new head drop analysis performed by Westinghouse.

The inspectors observed fuel handling operations during core reload in conjunction with other ongoing activities to determine that those operations and activities were being performed in accordance with TS and procedural guidance. Additionally, the inspectors observed refueling activities to substantiate that the location of the fuel assemblies was tracked through core reload. The inspectors viewed the video of the final assembly in-core fuel assembly position verification prior to re-installation of the reactor internals and reactor head.

Prior to mode changes and on a sampling basis, the inspectors reviewed system lineups and/or control board indications to substantiate that Tech Specs, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations. Also, the inspectors periodically reviewed the setting and maintenance of containment integrity, to establish that the Reactor Coolant System and containment boundaries were in place and had integrity when necessary.

Periodically, the inspectors reviewed the items that had been entered into the licensees corrective action program, to establish that the licensee had identified problems related to outage activities at an appropriate threshold and had entered them into the corrective action program.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the nine tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data, to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

Surveillance Tests

• PT/2/A/4400/001; Emergency Core Cooling System Flow Balance, Rev. 033

• PT/2/A/4200/009A; Auxiliary Safeguards Test Cabinet Periodic Test, Enclosure 13.12; Safety Injection (K609) Train B, Enclosure 13.20; Safety Injection (K608)

Train B, Rev. 193

• IP/2/A/3145/001A; Containment Pressure Control System Train A Channel Operational Test, Enclosures 11.1.1 & 11.1.2 (Containment Air Return Fan portion),

Rev. 22

• IP/1/A/3241/001A; Train A Wide Range Neutron Flux Monitoring (ENC) System Calibration, Rev. 032

• PT/0/A/4400/008D; 1B RN Pumphouse Balance, Rev. 017

• PT/0/A/4200/017; Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Test, Rev. 003 Ice Condenser Surveillance

• MP/0/A/7150/006; Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors Inspection and Testing, As-Left section; Rev. 029 Inservice Testing

• PT/1/A/4200/026; Containment Spray Valve Inservice Test, Enclosure 13.5; 1NS-18A Valve Inservice Test, Enclosure 13.6; 1NS-20A Valve In-service Test, Rev. 058

• PT/2/A/4200/007C; Standby Makeup Pump #2 Performance Test, Rev. 020

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensees emergency planning performance during a drill conducted on May 5, 2009. The inspectors reviewed licensee activities that occurred in the Technical Support Center during a simulated event. The NRCs assessment focused on the timeliness and accuracy of the event classification, notification of offsite agencies and the overall response of the personnel involved in the drill from an operations and emergency planning perspective. The performance of the Emergency Response Organization was evaluated against applicable licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique for the drill to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment process for identifying potential deficiencies relating to failures in classification and notification. The inspectors reviewed the completed critique developed by the licensee documenting the overall performance of the Emergency Response Organization. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstones: Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety 2OS1 Access Controls To Radiologically Significant Areas

a. Inspection Scope

Access Controls: The inspectors evaluated licensee performance in controlling worker access to radiologically significant areas and monitoring jobs in-progress. The inspectors directly observed implementation of administrative and physical radiological controls; evaluated radiation worker (radworker) and health physics technician (HPT)knowledge of and proficiency in implementing radiation protection requirements; and assessed worker exposures to radiation and radioactive material.

During facility tours, the inspectors directly observed postings and physical controls for radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRAs), and airborne radioactivity areas established within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) of the Unit 1 (U1)containment, U1 and Unit 2 (U2) auxiliary buildings, and radioactive waste (radwaste)processing and storage locations. The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates or directly observed conduct of licensee radiation surveys for selected RCA areas. Results were compared to current licensee surveys and assessed against established postings and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) controls. Licensee key control and access barrier effectiveness were evaluated for selected U1 and U2 Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) locations. Changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls were discussed with health physics (HP) supervisors. Controls and their implementation for storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool (SFP) were reviewed and discussed in detail. Established radiological controls were evaluated for selected tasks including movement of primary filters and work in the SFP decontamination pit. In addition, licensee controls for areas where dose rates could change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations were reviewed and discussed.

For selected tasks, the inspectors attended pre-job briefings and reviewed RWP details to assess communication of radiological control requirements to workers. Occupational workers adherence to selected RWPs and HPT proficiency in providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff. Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for the selected tasks.

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of radiation exposure controls, including air sampling, barrier integrity, engineering controls, and postings through a review of both internal and external exposure results. Worker exposure as measured by ED and by licensee evaluations of skin doses resulting from discrete radioactive particle or dispersed skin contamination events were reviewed and assessed. For HRA tasks involving significant dose rate gradients, e.g. steam generator eddy current testing, the inspectors evaluated the use and placement of whole body and extremity dosimetry to monitor worker exposure. The inspectors also reviewed selected whole-body count analyses conducted to evaluate the potential for internal dose.

The inspectors walked-down the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)facility, observing the physical condition of the casks, radiological postings, and barriers.

The inspectors performed independent gamma and neutron radiation surveys of the area and reviewed gamma/neutron radiation surveys of the ISFSI facility performed by licensee personnel. The inspectors evaluated neutron measurement instrumentation being used and planned for use by the licensee. Inspectors compared the independent survey results to previous surveys and against procedural and TS limits. The inspectors evaluated implementation of radiological controls, including labeling and posting, and discussed controls with HP staff. Environmental monitoring results for direct radiation from the ISFSI were reviewed and inspectors observed the placement and physical condition of thermoluminescent dosimeters around the facility.

Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 12, TS Section 5.7, 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20, and approved licensee procedures. Radiological control activities for ISFSI areas were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 72, and TS details. The procedures and records reviewed are listed in Section 2OS1 in the Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution: Licensee Corrective Action Program (CAP)documents associated with access control to radiologically significant areas were reviewed and assessed. This included review of selected PIP records related to radworker and HPT performance. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with procedure NSD 208, Problem Investigation Process, Rev. 27. The inspectors also evaluated the scope of the licensees internal audit program and reviewed recent assessment results. Licensee CAP documents reviewed are listed in Section 2OS1 in the Attachment.

The inspectors completed the 21 specified line-item samples for Inspection Procedure (IP) 71121.01. The inspectors also completed the radiation protection line-item sample activities specified in IP 60855.1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment

a. Inspection Scope

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Post-Accident Sampling Systems: During tours of the auxiliary building, RCA exit points, and administrative building areas, the inspectors observed installed radiation detection equipment including selected area radiation monitors, personnel contamination monitors (PCM), portal monitors (PM), small article monitors (SAM), and whole body counter (WBC) equipment. During the tours, the adequacy of the equipment=s physical location and material condition were evaluated.

From a review of selected records and discussions with cognizant licensee representatives, the inspectors evaluated completion and adequacy of equipment calibrations, and assessed system operability and reliability. In addition, the inspectors reviewed and discussed changes to Post-Accident Sampling System capabilities and selectively evaluated material condition of current liquid and gaseous sampling equipment.

During equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed functional checks of various fixed and portable radiation monitoring/detection instruments with a HPT. The observations included source checks of PCM, PM, SAM, and WBC equipment. The inspectors reviewed calibration records and discussed the functional testing and testing intervals for selected PCM and PM equipment located at the RCA and protected area exits. PCM equipment detection capabilities were demonstrated using a low-level mixed radionuclide source that was passed through the equipment. The operability and analysis capabilities of the WBC equipment were evaluated. WBC equipment operations and training of staff were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee representatives.

For selected portable survey instrumentation used in field tasks, the inspectors observed HPT selection of survey instruments, completion of required performance and/or functional checks, and use of instruments during selected task coverage. Availability of portable instruments for licensee use was evaluated through observation of instruments staged for issue and discussion with licensee personnel. For select frisker and portable survey instruments used in the field, the inspectors noted operability and verified calibration dates. Calibration data for selected portable instruments staged or recently used for coverage of radiation worker were also reviewed.

Operability and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; TS Section 5.4, Procedures; Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual Section 16.7; UFSAR Chapters 11 and 12; and applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in Sections 2OS3 in the Attachment.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and Protective Equipment: Selected SCBA units staged for emergency use in the Control Room and other locations were inspected for material condition and adequate air pressure. The inspectors also reviewed the previous maintenance records for vital components for selected SCBA units. In addition, certification records associated with supplied-air quality were reviewed and discussed.

Qualifications for staff responsible for testing and repairing SCBA equipment were evaluated through a review of selected training records. Selected Control Room operators were interviewed to determine their knowledge of available SCBA equipment locations, including corrective lens inserts if needed. In addition, respirator qualification records were reviewed for selected licensee personnel.

Licensee activities associated with maintenance and use of respiratory protection equipment were reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; Regulatory Guide (RG) 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection; American National Standards Institute (ANSI)-Z88.2-1992, American National Standard for Respiratory Protection; and applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in Section 2OS3 in the Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution: Selected CAP documents associated with instrumentation and protective equipment were reviewed and assessed. Inspectors evaluated the licensee=s ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with NSD 208, Problem Investigation Process, Rev. 27.

Documents reviewed are listed in Section 2OS3 in the Attachment.

The inspectors completed the nine specified line-item samples detailed in IP 71121.03.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems

a. Inspection Scope

Effluent Monitoring and Radwaste Equipment: During inspector walk-downs, accessible sections of the U1 and U2 liquid radwaste system including waste monitor tanks A and B, system piping and valves, and the Waste Liquid Discharge monitor (1EMF-49).

Inspected components of the gaseous effluent process and release system included waste gas decay tanks, hydrogen recombiners, the U1/U2 unit vent air particulate/noble gas/iodine monitor (1/2-EMF-35,36,37) skids, and the Waste Gas Discharge monitor (1EMF-50).

The operability, availability, and reliability of selected effluent process sampling and detection equipment used for routine and accident monitoring activities were reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors reviewed results of calibrations for selected process monitors, flowmeters, and air filtration systems, including 1EMF-35, 1EMF-36, 0EMF-49, 0EMF-50 and 0EMF-57. The two most recent surveillances on the Containment Ventilation High Efficiency Particulate Air/charcoal air treatment systems, VQ1B and VQ2B, were also reviewed. The inspectors evaluated out-of-service effluent monitors and compensatory action data for the period of August 2007 to the middle of May 2009.

Installed configuration, material condition, operability, and reliability of selected effluent sampling and monitoring equipment were reviewed against details documented in 10 CFR Part 20; RG 1.21, Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, June 1974; ANSI-N13.1-1969, Guide to Sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities; TS Section 5; the Offisite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Rev. 47; SLC Manual, Section 16.11; and the UFSAR, Chapter 11. Procedures and records reviewed during the inspection are listed in Section 2PS1 in the Attachment.

Effluent Release Processing and Quality Control Activities: The inspectors reviewed the material condition of the gamma spectroscopy and liquid scintillation detectors in the count room. The processing of effluent releases was discussed with Health Physics and Chemistry personnel.

In addition, results of the radiochemistry cross-check program were reviewed from the first quarter of calendar year (CY) 2007 through the first quarter of CY 2009.

Procedures for effluent sampling, processing, and release were evaluated for consistency with licensee actions. The inspectors reviewed three liquid and four gaseous release permits for 2009 against ODCM specifications for pre-release sampling and effluent monitor setpoints. The ODCM was reviewed and discussed with responsible licensee representatives to identify and evaluate any changes made since August 2007.

The inspectors also reviewed CY 2007 and CY 2008 Annual Effluent Reports for effluent release data trends and anomalous releases.

Observed task evolutions, count room activities, and offsite dose results were evaluated against details and guidance documented in 10 CFR Part 20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; ODCM; RG 1.21; RG 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, October 1977; and TS Section 5. Procedures and records reviewed during the inspection are listed in Section 2PS1 in the Attachment.

Groundwater Monitoring: The inspectors discussed current and future programs for onsite groundwater monitoring with Health Physics supervisors, including number and placement of monitoring wells and identification of plant systems with the most potential for contaminated leakage. The inspectors also reviewed procedural guidance for identifying and assessing onsite spills and leaks of contaminated fluids. In addition, the inspectors reviewed records of historical contaminated spills retained for decommissioning purposes as required by 10 CFR Part 50.75(g).

Problem Identification and Resolution: Selected PIP documents associated with effluent release activities were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve selected issues in accordance with NSD 208, Problem Investigation Process, Rev. 27. Reviewed documents are listed in Section 2PS1 in the Attachment.

The inspectors completed the three specified line-item samples detailed in IP 71122.01.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and Radioactive Material Control Program

a. Inspection Scope

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Implementation: The inspectors observed routine sample collection and surveillance activities as required by the licensees environmental monitoring program. The inspectors noted the material condition and operability of air sampling equipment and observed the weekly airborne particulate filter and iodine cartridge change-outs at sample stations 200, 201, 205, 212, and 258, as specified by the current ODCM. The inspectors directly observed collection and initial preparation of groundwater samples at two sampling locations.

In addition, the inspectors verified location and material condition of five environmental thermoluminescent dosimeters (stations 200, 201, 205, 212, and 258) and surface water sampling equipment and configuration at locations 208 and 215. Land use census results, changes to the ODCM, and sample collection/processing activities, including missed environmental samples, were discussed with environmental technicians and licensee staff.

The inspectors reviewed the last two air flow calibration records for selected environmental air samplers. The inspectors also reviewed the 2007 and 2008 Radiological Environmental Operating Reports, results of CY 2007 and CY 2008 inter-laboratory cross-check program, and current procedural guidance for environmental sample collection and processing. Selected environmental measurements were reviewed for consistency with licensee effluent data, evaluated for radionuclide concentration trends, and compared with detection level sensitivity requirements.

Procedural guidance, program implementation, and environmental monitoring results were reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; TS Section 5.4.1, 5.5.1, and 5.6.2; ODCM; RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment; and the Branch Technical Position, An Acceptable Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program -

1979. Documents reviewed are listed in Section 2PS3 in the Attachment.

Meteorological Monitoring Program: During tours of the meteorological tower and local data collection equipment, the inspectors observed the physical condition of the tower and its instruments and discussed equipment operability and maintenance history with licensee staff, including the system engineer. The inspectors evaluated transmission of locally generated meteorological data to other licensee groups such as main control room operators. For the meteorological measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature, the inspectors reviewed calibration records for applicable tower instrumentation and evaluated measurement data recovery for 2007 and 2008.

Licensee procedures and activities related to meteorological monitoring were evaluated against ODCM; UFSAR; ANSI/ANS-2.5-1984, Standard for Determining Meteorological Information at Nuclear Power Sites; and Safety Guide 23, Onsite Meteorological Programs. Documents reviewed are listed in Section 2PS3 in the Attachment.

Unrestricted Release of Materials from the Radiologically Controlled Area: The inspectors observed surveys of material and personnel being released from the RCA using small article monitor, personnel contamination monitor, and portal monitor instruments. The inspectors also observed source check testing of these instruments and discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm set-points, and release program guidance with licensee staff. The inspectors compared recent 10 CFR Part 61 results for the DAW waste stream with radionuclides used in calibration and check sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. The inspectors also reviewed the last two calibration records for selected release point survey instruments.

Licensee programs for monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20 and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material. Documents reviewed are listed in Sections 2OS3 and 2PS3 in the Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed selected PIPs in the areas of environmental monitoring, meteorological monitoring, and release of materials.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with NSD 208, Problem Investigation Process, Rev. 27. The inspectors also evaluated the scope of the licensees internal audit program and reviewed recent assessment results. Documents reviewed are listed in section 2PS3 in the Attachment.

The inspectors completed the ten specified line-item samples detailed in IP 71122.03.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee data to confirm the accuracy of reported performance indicator (PI) data for the eight indicators during periods listed below. To determine the accuracy of the report PI elements, the reviewed data was assessed against PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 5. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Emergency AC Power System, Unit 1

• Emergency AC Power System, Unit 2

• High Pressure Injection System, Unit 1

• High Pressure Injection System, Unit 2

• Heat Removal System, Unit 1

• Heat Removal System, Unit 2 The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and methods for compiling and reporting the Performance Indicators including the Reactor Oversight Program Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator Basis Document for Catawba. The inspectors reviewed the raw data for the PIs listed above for the period of April 1, 2008, through March 30, 2009. The inspectors also independently screened Technical Specification Action Item Logs, selected control room logs, work orders and surveillance procedures, and maintenance rule failure determinations to determine if unavailability/unreliability hours were properly reported. The inspectors compared the licensees raw data against the graphical representations and specific values contained on the NRCs public web page for 2008-2009. The inspectors also reviewed the past history of PIPs for systems affecting the Mitigating Systems Performance Indicators listed below for any that might have affected the reported values. The inspectors reviewed Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify that industry reporting guidelines were applied.

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

• Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness The inspectors reviewed the PI results from July 2008 to March 2009. For the assessment period, the inspectors reviewed ED alarm logs, monthly PI reports, and selected PIPs related to controls for exposure significant areas. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

• Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/ODCM Radiological Effluent The inspectors reviewed the PI results from August 2007 through March 2009. The inspectors reviewed corrective action program documents, effluent dose data, and licensee procedural guidance for classifying and reporting PI events. The inspectors also discussed collection and analysis of PI data with licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Review

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of PIPs, attending selected daily Site Direction and PIP screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized database.

.2 Semi-Annual Reviews to Identify Trends

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screenings discussed in section 4OA2.1 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review primarily considered the six-month period of January 2009 through June 2009, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, plant health team lists, Independent Nuclear Oversight reports, system and component health reports, self-assessment reports, and maintenance rule reports. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. In general, the licensee has identified trends and has appropriately addressed the trends with their CAP. However, the inspectors identified two trends that the licensee had not initially identified.

• Quality Control Inspection Trend Statement: The inspectors initially identified a trend during the first half of 2008 that was associated with the adequacy and thoroughness of inspections performed by Quality Control (QC) personnel while participating in surveillance tests, plant maintenance and installation of permanent modifications.

This trend was documented in inspection report 05000413,414/2008005.

The inspectors observed that the licensee has focused additional attention on the QC inspection process to ensure the inspections are consistently done in accordance with approved procedures and departmental guidance. Following the performance of focused observations on the various QC disciplines, specific areas requiring remediation were identified. Enhanced expectations were communicated to the QC inspectors and revised training developed to be used as part of the annual QC recertification program to increase the consistency of QC inspections performed by both Duke and contract inspectors. Continuing management observations have been conducted over the period from January through June 2009 to ensure expectations are being met in terms of QC inspection activities. Actual performance based on documented observations has shown a marked improvement since the observations were initiated. The resident inspectors monitored this area over the past six months including the spring 2009 Unit 2 refueling outage to assess the effectiveness of the corrective actions taken by the licensee and no weaknesses were identified. The licensee is continuing to monitor progress in this area and implement additional corrective actions if deemed necessary. Accordingly, this trend statement will no longer be followed in subsequent integrated inspection reports.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Foreign Material Exclusion Program Trend Statement: The inspectors identified a trend during the first half of 2009 that the licensee had not previously fully recognized. The trend was associated with weaknesses in the implementation of the Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) program in areas containing safety-related systems and components. The FME program at the station establishes requirements intended to prevent the introduction of foreign material that could adversely affect or damage a system or component. This trend was identified based on inspector observations of major activities as well as the review of station documents as described in the Inspection Scope section and the Attachment to this report.

Observations included:

- FME monitors assigned to specific activities that were physically located out-of-sight of the work location

- FME monitors logging items into / out of the FME zone without visually verifying that the items had in fact been brought in or removed from the work location

- Breakdowns in the maintenance of designated FME zones that while corrected once identified, were not captured in the corrective action program as required

- Corrective action documents that described FME program-related issues yet were not coded in a manner that allowed the FME Coordinator or other station personnel to retrieve them and proactively identify adverse trends The inspectors performed a review of the Corrective Action Program documents generated as a result of the inspectors observations and events that occurred at the station related to FME program implementation. The documents reviewed and used for the basis for this trend statement are listed in the Attachment.

The licensee has recognized the need to focus attention on the FME program implementation to ensure introduction of debris into safety-related systems and components is prevented and that personnel responsible for the implementation do so in a manner consistent with programmatic guidance and management expectations. The inspectors will continue to monitor this area and assess the effectiveness of planned and in-progress corrective actions.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 Loss of One 230kv Switchyard Bus Followed By a Tornado Watch Declaration

a. Inspection Scope

On April 10, 2009, Catawba Unit 1 was at 100 percent power and Unit 2 was in Mode 6 having just completed core reload. The reactor upper internals were installed; however, the head was not installed and the cavity was filled to 23 feet. Preparations were underway to bring in the reactor head stud racks to support head re-installation early the following day which required the equipment hatch to be open to support moving the racks into the reactor building. At 1726, lightning struck an offsite line which fed back into the Catawba switchyard. A fault was sensed on the Red bus and all power circuit breakers associated with that 230kV line opened causing a loss of half the switchyard due to two strikes occurring on the same line. Low voltage alarms were also received on the remaining bus; however, voltages did not drop low enough to send a start signal to the diesel generators. The station entered the Abnormal Operating Procedure (AP) for the switchyard conditions on both units. As licensee personnel were working through the AP and associated actions, a tornado watch was issued for the immediate area surrounding Catawba. Inspectors observed the licensees actions taken in response to the events and verified the outage unit was placed in a condition commensurate with the challenges created by the electrical issues and weather conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 SSF Diesel Generator Trip due to Overcurrent Condition during Monthly Operability Run

a. Inspection Scope

On May 27, 2009, the SSF diesel generator tripped on a sensed overcurrent condition approximately 20 minutes into its monthly operability run which placed both units into a 7-day Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) action statement with a required action of placing both units in Mode 4 if repairs were unsuccessful. The station entered the Failure Identification Process and staffed up to resolve the operability concern on a 24-hour coverage basis. A vendor representative was brought in to assist in the troubleshooting activities and subsequent tuning of the governor control circuit on the diesel generator. Inspectors followed the troubleshooting activities and observed multiple runs of the diesel as the issue was being addressed. The diesel generator was repaired and successfully passed the required operability tests two days prior to the expiration of the applicable SLC required action completion time. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000413/2009001-00: Both Trains of Chemical

and Volume Control, Auxiliary Feedwater and Containment Spray Systems were Inoperable due to a Component Failure. On January 30, 2009, the 1A train of Component Cooling Water (KC) was being placed in service as part of a planned train swap. When the KC heat exchanger RN outlet control valve was opened from the control room, an open indication was received; however, no flow was indicated on the plant computer or control board gauge. It was determined that the actuator arm connecting the air operator to the valve stem had failed causing the valve to remain in the closed position. A subsequent review of the plant computer revealed that the failure had actually occurred on January 28, 2009. However, since the failure did not produce an alarm or any changes in system parameters since the 1A train was not in operation, it remained undetected until a demand was placed on it by control room personnel. The failed actuator arm assembly was replaced and the 1A train of KC declared operable on January 31, 2009. Additionally, between January 28 and January 30, the 1B train of Chemical and Volume Control, Containment Spray, and Auxiliary Feedwater were taken out of service to perform maintenance activities. Therefore, both trains of these systems were inoperable at the same time due to KC being the cooling source for these systems.

As a result, the licensee reported this condition as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B); Operation prohibited by technical specifications, and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D),

Loss of safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

The LER and supporting documents were reviewed by the inspectors. The corrective actions taken in response to this event included replacing the actuator arm on six of the eight similar valves in the plant. The remaining two valve actuator arms are scheduled to be replaced in the upcoming Unit 1 outage and will be completed by December 2009.

This issue was dispositioned as a Green NCV in Inspection Report 05000413/2009002.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status reviews and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/174, Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power

Verification for Unit 2.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees modification to provide backup power to the Unit 2 hydrogen igniters to verify that the licensee has adequately implemented commitments related to the provision of backup power to containment hydrogen igniters. The plant modification was designed to provide an alternate power source to the containment hydrogen igniters and an alternate means of starting the igniters from outside the control room in the case of a severe core damage event with station blackout or other event affecting AC power distribution. Program changes were reviewed to verify licensee commitments were completed and implemented consistent with regulatory requirements.

A field observation was performed to verify the modifications were complete, time critical actions could be completed within the allowable time limits, and the changes were consistent with design documentation. Program changes included changes to procedures, design documents, and calculations. Inspection activities were completed on Unit 2 only, as this was the first unit to complete the modification. TI 2515/174 specifically notes that the inspection of physical modifications should only be performed for one unit because dual unit sites are similar. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The Unit 2 modifications and program changes related to TI 2515/174 actions were complete and implemented in accordance with design control and 10 CFR 50.59 regulatory requirements. Normal power feed to the hydrogen igniters is via breaker F07A to Motor Control Center 2EMXI. The alternate alignment for the A Train, Unit 2 igniters is to manually align to the SSF diesel generator from feeder breaker F07E on Motor Control Center 2EMXS via SSF Auxiliary Busses SMXG and 1SLXG. During normal alignment, igniters are controlled from the control room. When in the alternate alignment, igniters are controlled from cabinet 2ELCP0357 in the Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room on elevation 577. The Unit 2 modifications included:

- 2A hydrogen igniter equipment relocated to Aux Bldg Electrical Penetration room, Column HH-58, elevation 577

- Replace HFB3060L breaker with HFD3100VL breaker

- Cable rewiring The licensees hydrogen igniter backup power modification was complete and implemented consistent with the station design control program.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On July 7, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jim Morris, Catawba Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that any proprietary information provided or examined during the inspection period had been returned.

.2 Annual Assessment Meeting Summary

On May 4, 2009, the Senior Resident Inspector met with Mr. Jim Morris and other members of the licensee staff to discuss the NRCs annual assessment of Catawbas safety performance for the period of January 1 through December 31, 2008. The annual assessment results were previously provided to the licensee by a letter dated March 4, 2009.

On May 4, 2009, the NRCs Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 1, and the Resident Inspectors, held a Category 3 meeting for members of the public and local officials. This Category 3 public meeting provided an open house public forum to fully engage the public in a discussion of regulatory issues related to the NRCs ROP and annual assessment of the Catawba Nuclear Station safety performance for the period January 1 through December 31, 2008. The presentation material used for discussions and the list of attendees is available from the NRCs document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML091280303. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www/nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

T. Arlow, Emergency Planning Manager

S. Beagles, Chemistry Manager

D. Brenton, Operations Superintendent

T. Brooks, Licensed Operator Requalification Supervisor

W. Byers, Security Manager

J. Caldwell, Modifications Engineering Manager

S. Coy, Operations Training Manager

J. Ferguson, Mechanical, Civil Engineering Manager

E. Forester, Power Systems Analysis Group

J. Foster, Radiation Protection Manager

T. Hamilton, Safety Assurance Manager / Work Control Manager

G. Hamrick, Engineering Manager / Station Manager

R. Hart, Regulatory Compliance Manager

M. Helton, Radiation Protection

T. Jenkins, Work Control Manager

J. McConnell, Shift Operations Manager

J. Morris, Catawba Site Vice President

K. Phillips, Safety Assurance Manager

J. Pitesa, Station Manager

T. Ray, Maintenance Manager / Engineering Manager

L. Saunders, Operations

M. Sawicki, Regulatory Compliance Engineer

T. Sigmon, Enrad

D. Ward, Civil Engineering Supervisor

R. Weatherford, Training Manager

T. Wright, Radiation Protection

NRC personnel

J. Thompson, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED, AND REVIEWED

Closed

05000413/2009001-00 LER Both Trains of Chemical and Volume Control, Auxiliary Feedwater and Containment Spray Systems were Inoperable due to a Component Failure (Section 4OA3.3)

2515/174 TI Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification Unit (Section 4OA5.2)