IR 05000412/1986041
| ML20207P897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1987 |
| From: | Anderson C, Woodard C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P871 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-86-41, NUDOCS 8701200382 | |
| Download: ML20207P897 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I.
Report No.
50-412/86-41 Docket No.
50-412 License No. CPPR 105 Priority
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Category B
Licensee: - Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley, Unit No. 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: November 17 - 21, 1986 Inspector:
O, // h h
/zAr/d C. H. Woodar, Reactor Engineer da'e t
Approved by:
/ /3 /7 C. J. [nderson, Chief, Plant System date Sectron, Engineering Branch, DRS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 17-21, 1986 (Inspection Report No. 50-412/86-41)
Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection by one region based inspe. tor consisting of work observation, work in progress, completed work activities and documentation relative to the installation and rework of electrical power cables to achieve separation in accordance with FSAR require-ments. Additionally, the inspector reviewed licensee calculations and veri-fications of the adequacy of voltage levels during degraded grid and motor starting transients to power class IE loads. The status of previously identi-fied inspection findings was ascertained.
Results: Two new items were identified which require additional information from the lict1see in order to be resolved.
Five previously identified con-struction deficiencies and unresolved inspection findings were closed.
8701200382 870113 PDR ADOCK 05000412 O
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DETAILS-1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Duquesne Light Company R. Swiderski, Startup Manager LT. Noonan, Superintendent of Operations and Maintenance E. Horvath, Senior Project Engineer C. Majundar, Assistant Director of Quality Control J. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer R. Williams, Systems Development Engineer L~ Williams, Director of Startup
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S. Fenner, Director of Operations Quality Control J. Johns, Supervisor Quality Assurance Surveillance
. D. Hunkele, Director of Operations Quality Assurance A. Crevasse, Department QA Manager H. Dougherty, Director, Systems Testing 1.2 Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation R. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer
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M. Pabenan, Licensing Engineer L. Anapp, Senior Engineer 1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. Hunter, Reactor Engineer G. Napuda, Lead Reactor Engineer A.~ Asars, Resident Inspector H. VanKessel, Reactor Engineer The above listed personnel attended the exit meeting on November 21, 1986,
Other managers, supervisors, engineers and quality assurance personnel
were contacted during the inspection.
2.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items L
2.1 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Item No. 86-00 05 pertaining to the emergency diesel generators exhaust pipe insulation failure and subsequent fire on the roof of the diesel generator building.
This deficiency was reported by the licensee in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.5S(e) on March 18, 1986.
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During testing of diesel generator 2EGS*RG2-1 on March 15, 1986, the thermal insulation lining of the exhaust hood and the exhaust pipe i
in the exhaust outlet on the roof of the diesel generator building collapsed. Also the asphalt and gravel roofing and debris in the l
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vicinity of.the exhaust outlet ~ ignited from the high temperature exhaust gases.
The inspector confirmed licensee. actions taken to. replace the thermal sinsulation lining _with'a superior product and to place a gunnite type ~
material under the exhaust outlet-on the roof-to prevent a fire-from the hot exhaust gasses. During this modification the bird screens were' declared unnecessary and were removed from the exhaust.
The diesels ~have been run several times since the modifications ~with no reported evidence of insulation deterioration or of roof fire
. problems.
The inspector. examined the exhaust modification of both diesels and found no discrepancies.
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- This item'is closed.
2.2 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Item 86-00-12 pertaining to
~ the use of commercial grade electrical terminal blocks'in an. area of harsh environment which would require the use of nuclear grade terminal' blocks.
During NRC inspection 85-25, the NRC inspector found commercial grade terminal blocks installed at locations where the licensee's Electri-cal Installation Specification 2BVS-931 required the use of nuclear grade blocks.
The licensee determined that the cause of the misapplication was
. that the 2BVS-931 specification requirements for nuclear grade terminal blocks was not translated into their RE series electrical design / construction drawings.
The inspector determined that the licensee had conducted a review l
of all electrical series RE drawings and had revised them to include
the requirement for nuclear grade terminal blocks where required.
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The drawing revisions and terminal block replacements were performed L
under Stone and Webster E&DCR NO CP-4829.
f-L Confirmation of the drawing changes and terminal block replacements
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were performed under~Duquesne Light Company Site Quality Control Non-Conformance and Disposition Report No.16520.
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This item is closed.
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2.3 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Item 86-00-07: pertaining to emer-gency diesel generators fuel rack boost vent piping configuration i
which could cause a slow response to governor signals potentially i
resulting in engine overspeed and overspeed trip. This deficiency e
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was reported to NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55e on May 16, 1986 following a failure at Seabrook in a similar unit. Corrective actions were implemented to correct the failure at Seabrook by the manufacturer and reported to the NRC on February 4, 1986.
The inspector examined the emergency diesels and confirmed that the licensee had implemented the specified modifications on the two EDG units in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. This work was accomplished under DLC0 Work Authorization Request No. 4751 and DLCO Request for Clearance Permit 86-2306, which were completed and accepted by DLC0 Startup Group and DLC0 Site Quality Control on August 19, 1986.
This item is closed.
2.4 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Item 83-00-03: relating to problems with the undervoltage trip assembly on Westinghouse DS-416 Reactor Trip System Circuit breakers. Westinghouse advised DLCO of potential misoperation of the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear undervoltage
attachments on April 21, 1983. Accordingly, DLCO notified NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) on May 26, 1983.
Westinghouse evaluation of the malfunction based upon input failures from several users revealed a problem with dimensional clearances and another potential problem with a missing retaining ring on the under-voltage assembly pivot shaft.
Either of the problems could lead to misoperation of the circuit breaker upon demand.
The inspector reviewed Westinghouse Field Change Notice 10592 which described and implemented the required modification utilizing Westinghouse field service personnel. The inspector confirmed satis-factory completion of the work by examination of portions of the in-stallation and by a review of Beaver Valley QA and Site Management acceptance of the modification on March 3, 1986.
This item is closed.
2.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 85-16-06:
pertaining to a discrepancy between the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) nameplate rating and the FSAR rating. BV-2 FSAR Section 8.3.1.22 indicates a rating of 20KVA/16KW. The licensee specified a rating of 20 KVA/16KW in speci-fication 2BVS-361A. The manufacturer (Elgar) supplied his standard 25KVA/20KW unit which meets and exceeds the licensee's specification requirements.
The area of concern is that the licensee's circuit breakers, cables and protective circuitry are adequate for the pro-tection of the follower circuits with the larger UPS output capabi-lity. The inspector verified that the licensee's protective cir-cuitry is designed to protect the output cables and load circuits with the 25KVA UPS unit by a review of the engineering data for the UPS system and inspection of the installation.
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This item is closed.
3.0 Electrical Separation The inspector reviewed the licensee's program to achieve electrical separation of cables and equipment as specified in FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.
The licensee's Q-C personnel have walked down all areas using the current spatial acceptance criteria.
They identified where either wraps or cable tray top and bottom covers are required. The inspector verified that the locations of these barriers are documented by inspection reports and/or by changes on the drawings.
The inspector reviewed the latest licensee report 2HCD-06728 dated November 7, 1986 which provides the status of the separation program as of October 31, 1986.
Reported facts include the following:
1.
Cable tray covers required are a total of 32, 515 linear feet. A total of 4,753 feet have been installed since March 5, 1986 with a total of 2,661 linear feet installed in the third quarter. All covers have been installed in the diesel generator building, fuel building and cooling tower and cooling tower pump house.
Cable installation poses a restraint to cable tray cover installation.
One hundred fifty thousand feet of unscheduled cable remains to be pulled by the end of 1986 and 354 cables require rework.
2.
A total of 12,695 Engineering Design Separation Reports for cable have been issued with 12,636 of them dispositioned. The number of cables that require wraps to provide the required barrier separation is 3701. Construction has completed 582 wraps since March 5, 1986 with 218 wraps completed during the third quarter.
3.
Estimated manhours required is one (1) hour for each linear foot of cable tray cover and from 2 to 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for each cable wrap.
This leaves 27,762 manhours remaining for covers and from 5,462 to 6,828 manhours remaining for wraps.
4.
Plans are to complete cover and wrap installation according to area /
building turnovers before March 1,1987.
The inspector walked down work performed in the Service Building and Diesel Generator Building. No discrepancies were observed.
The inspector noted the large amount of work to be performed by construction and inspection in the installation of the covers and wraps by March 1, 1986. During the 7 months since March 6, 1986, only about 16% of the tray covers and cable wraps have been completed.
There is little on going work in these areas at this time.
It was noted that a large increase in the rate of work is needed to meet the March 1, 1987 schedule. This will require a substantial increase in experienced construction and inspection personne )
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'The inspector. questioned licensee consideration of cable derating as a consequence of the application of cable wraps or the addition of cable tray covers in order to achieve separation requirements. The licensee provided documentation which:showed that ampacity tests conducted by Wyle laboratories " clearly demonstrated that no additio-nal derating, beyond the present design ampacity at BVPS-2 is re-quired when a cable or cables are wrapped in either of the approved protective wraps."
However, derating for the cable tray covers was not provided. This is an unresolved item (86-41-01).
For cable-and wire separation internal to the panels, the licensee reports that 276 of 324 panels requiring resolution of separation problems have been reviewed and accepted by engineering or released to construction and site quality control. Approximately 85% of the 276 panels have been fully accepted by DLC/SQC. The remaining 48 panels of the 324 fall into four categories as follows:
Category 1:
16 panels require rework to retrain cables.
Category 2:
Isolation relays have been installed in 3 panels.
Qualification of the relays is in progress.
Category 3:
19 panel sections of the main control board require seismic engineering evaluation of the installed flex conduit to provide isolation.
Category 4:
10 panels require final review by SQC.
The licensee plan to complete this work is consistent with the plan for completion of the cable tray covers and cable wraps by March 1, 1987.
The inspector had for further questions in this area.
4.0 Voltage Availaole to Operate Class IE Electrical Equipment During Degraded Grid Voltage Conditions The Final Safety Analyses, FSAR, section 8.3 requires that nominal operat-ing voltage for Class IE electrical equipment be maintained at not less than 90% of rated voltage and that the minimum voltage transient during starting transients be not less than 80% of rated voltage. Class 1E equipment shall be capable of starting and operating within these voltage limits.
The inspector reviewed SWEC voltage profile calculations E-68 which includes calculations for the 4160, 480 and 120 volt AC and 125 volt DC class 1E load r a
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These calculations are among those which are under review by the DLC0 Project Engineering Organization under their Design Basis Endorsement (DBE) Follow-on Program. Under this program to verify voltage avail-abic to operate class IE equipment, actual as pulled cable lengths and actual equipment starting and running electrical demands are used.
Some of the significant findings of the DBE program include the following:
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Calculation E-72, Revision 1 revealed three phase fault conductor temperatures in excess of 600 *C for 4160 volt AC Class IE cables 2CCPC0H301, 2CHSCPH301 and 2CHSC0H301. All three of these cables have now been replaced with larger conductors to overcome this pro-blem (Licensee Specification 2BVM-42 places a limit of 550 C as a maximum conductor fault current temperature for SKV power cable).
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Calculation E-76, Revision 2 revealed that the 120 volt AC Class 1E cables to multiple motor operated dampers on the same circuit breakers were inadequately sized. This resulted in insufficient starting voltages to operate the dampers. This problem was resolved by the use of larger cables and by the use of alternative cable runs fed from the nearest power panel to reduce the length of the cable runs.
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Calculation E-78 and tests revealed that the 120 volt AC cables to 17 non class 1E radiation monitors was insufficient to provide adequate operating voltage.
These cables will be increased to provide adequate voltage.
Four class IE radiation monitors are currently being evaluated for adequacy of voltage.
Cables to these monitors will be increased if necessary to provide adequate voltage.
The li:ensea continues to evaluate the adequacy of the voltage available throughout the plant through the Design Basis Endorsement Follow-on Program. This program is currently scheduled to conclude its evaluations in December 1986.
The inspector questioned the verification of the voltage profile studies by actual measurements of voltages during load at various points in the plant and was advised that this is a part of tests currently planned to satisfy a previou; NRC commitment.
The inspector questioned the licensee administrative program for the control of electrical systems modifications to assure that their impact is properly evaluated relative to their effect on electrical system loading, cable derating and voltage profile. The inspector reviewed Stone and Vebster Change Management Program 2BVM56 which is now in use and appears adequate for this purpose. However, the in-spector was advised that this program will be phased out December 31, 1986. The need for an ongoing change control program in this area is an unresolved item (86-41-02).
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5.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance or deviations. Unresolved Items disclosed during this inspection are oiscussed in Detail in paragraph 3 and 4.
6.0 Exit Interview The inspector met on site with licensee representative (denoted in Details, paragraph 1.0) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 21, 1986. The inspector summarized the scope and the inspection findings.
In addition, the licensee was informed that any proprietary information provided during the inspection should be identified. There was none. At no time during this inspection was written material given to the licensee or his representatives.
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