IR 05000400/1990014
| ML18009A655 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1990 |
| From: | Carroll R, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A654 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-14, NUDOCS 9009140175 | |
| Download: ML18009A655 (17) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/90-14 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
July 21 - August 17, 1990 Inspectors:
J.
Tedrow, enior Resi e
Ins tor M. Shannon, esident In ector Approved y:
R.
arr
,
cting ection C ief Reacto Projects Branch
Division of Reactor Projects License No.:
o ate igned 8 z ate Signed 8 zv Date igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, fire protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, safety system walkdown, licensee event reports, non-conformance reports,
CFR Part 21 reports, design changes and modifications, Plant Nuclear Safety Committee activities, and followup of onsite events.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
Three licensee identified violations were identified:
Failure to maintain the essential chiller operable due to a mispositioned valve, paragraph 6.e; Failure to properly install a safety related damper during construction, paragraph 7.a; and Failure to perform required inservice inspections, paragraph ll.b.
Other items of interest included the contamination of the fuel handling building ( 13,000 square feet),
paragraph ll.c, and an inadvertent PORV activation, paragraph 7.b.
9009i40l75 900827 PDR ADOCK 05000400
PNU
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Collins,'Manager, Operations G. Forehand, Manager, gA/gC C. Gibson, Director, Programs and Procedures C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager
- J. Nevill, Manager, Technical Support
- C. Olexik, Director, Regulatory Compliance R. Richey, Manager, Harris Nuclear Project Department J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring H. Smith, Manager, Radwaste Operation D. Tibbits, Manager, Shift Operations E. Willett, Manager, Outages and Modifications Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and Initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Node 1) for the duration of this inspection period.
a ~
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS)
and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Foreman's Log; Control Operator's Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable Record; Active Clearance Log; Jumper and Wire Removal Log; Shift Turnover Checklist; and selected Chemistry/Radiation Protection and Radwaste Logs.
In addition, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identifie b.
Faci 1 ity Tours and Observati ons Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; reactor auxiliary building; waste processing building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; battery rooms; and electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
( I)
Monitoring Instrumentation - Equipment operating status, ar ea atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operations problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
(4)
Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility pol,icies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected RWPs to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequate.
(5)
Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital area access controls; searching
of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval;.escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory-posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
EST-710, Hot Channel Factor Tests EST-717, Incore/Excore Detector Calibration MST-I0006, Containment Pressure Calibration MST-I0239, Containment Pressure Operational Test MST-I0130, Main Steam Line Pressure, Loop 3 Operational Test MST-I0141, Delta T-TAVG Protection Set II Operational Test No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work package's were reviewed for the following maintenance (WR/JO) activities:
- Replacement of bad containment pressure loop power supply car 'Inspection and calibration of various pressure instruments associated with the "8" essential services chiller in accordance with procedures PIC-I200, Indicators and Differential Pressure Indicators Using Pneumatic Source Inspection and Calibration, and PIC-I100, Pressure and Differential Pressure Switch Inspection and Calibration.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Safety Systems Malkdown (71710)
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the containment spray system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events-that were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance
.
with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
(Closed)
LER 89-20:
This LER reported that several motor-operated valve gear boxes had been overfilled with grease.
This LER was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/90-02.
The licensee has revised applicable maintenance procedures to provide better guidance on maintaining proper grease levels in the limit switch gear boxes and has trained maintenance personnel on this problem.
b.
(Closed)
LER 89-21:
This LER reported an auxiliary feedwater system actuation caused by personnel error in controlling feedwater flow.
This LER was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/90-02.
The licensee has repaired valve 1SP-226, revised the power escalation procedure, and trained operating personnel on this event.
The licensee has further evaluated the main feedwater pump recirculation flow control valve response time and has decided to implement a plant modification to provide modulating flow control.
This modification is planned to be implemented in November, 1990.
C.
(Closed)
LER 89-22:
This LER reported the loss of a residual heat removal train during testing of interlocks.
This LER was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/90-02.
The licensee has revised procedure OST-1071, RHR Hot Leg Suction Valve Interlock Test, to ensure that the valve power supply breakers are open during
d.
e.
connection and removal of test equipment.
The licensee is also pursuing TS changes to eliminate the auto-closure interlock.
The TS change request is presently scheduled for the end of the next refueling outage.
(Open)
LER 90-08:
This LER reported a discrepancy in the amperage rating for a circuit breaker providing overcurrent protection for an electrical containment penetration.
This matter was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/90-06 and was considered to be a licensee identified violation (NCV 400/90-06-01).
Two of the licensee's corrective actions remain to be accomplished:
review of other similar circuits; and revision to plant drawings to indicate breakers used in containment penetration protection.
(Open)
LER 90-17:
This LER reported the inoperability of the "B" essential services chiller caused by a shut pressure switch isolation valve.
The licensee discovered this situation during the performance of surveillance testing on June 20, 1990, and opened the mispositioned valve.
The licensee's investigation into the cause of this event concluded that the valve had been mispositioned since approximately June ll, 1990, when maintenance on nearby pressure indicators and switches was performed.
This matter is considered to be a licensee identified NCV and is not being cited because the criteria specified in section V.G. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NC4 (400/90-14-01):
Failure to maintain the "B" essential services chiller operable.
The LER will remain open pending identification tagging of the chiller valves for clarity and addition of a trough to help protect tubing and valves from external disturbances.
7.
Review of Nonconformance Reports (71707)
Significant Operational Occurrence Reports (SOORs)
and Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports were accomplished or being pursued for completion, generic items were identified and reported, and items were reported as required by the TS.
SOOR 90-99 reported that control room differential pressure was not maintained when the control room emergency filtration system was operated in the recirculation mode.
TS 4.7.6.d.3 requires that this system maintain a positive pressure relative to adjacent areas to preclude the possibility of potentially radioactive or toxic air inleakage into the control room during an accident.
Plant operators discovered this condition during a failure of dampers in the normal control room exhaust system which necessitated recirculation flow with the control room emergency filtration system.
Further licensee
investigation into this concern revealed that a ventilation damper (CZ-B21-SA) in the control room HYAC system was improperly installed and would not fail closed as required.
This was a major contributor to the control room differential pressure problem.
Other contributers included a venti llation boundary door which had been blocked open and a door which had been installed which blocked return flow.
b.
This matter is considered to be a continuation of the licensee's effort to review the plant ventilation systems, in response to the actions of LER 90-10.
The damper has been installed properly and subsequently tested satisfactorily.
The licensee also implemented administrative controls over the ventillation boundary doors.
This matter is considered to be a licensee identified NCY and is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G. 1 of the NRC enforcement policy were satisfied.
NC4 (400/90-14-02):
Failure to properly install a safety related control room ventilation damper.
SOOR 90-100 reported the inadvertent opening of the pressurizer power operated relief valve on July 26, 1990.
During preparation for the performance of surveillance test MST-10251, Reactor Coolant System Cold Overpressurization Instrument (P-0441) Operational Test, the operator mistakenly opened the pressurizer PORV (PCV-444B)
instead of verifying the valve was closed as required by the procedure.
Although alarms immediately sounded and a pressure transient of approximately 50 psig occurred, the operator remained calm, kept his hand on the valve control switch, and immediately reclosed the valve to terminate the transient.
The plant subsequently returned to normal operating pressure within a few minutes.
8.
Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Reports (92701)
a ~
b.
(Closed)
P2188-02:
This
CFR Part 21 report dated April 29, 1988, discussed a problem with Calcon control devices.
The licensee inspected the components in accordance with the report.
Subsequently, P2189-13 was issued on September 13, 1989, which discussed a redesign of the Calcon control devices (emergency diesel air start valves).
For record purposes, P2188-02 is closed and further corrective actions will be documented under P2189-13.
(Closed)
P2188-09:
This
CFR Part 21 report dated September 30, 1988, discussed a problem with Xomox manufactured Limitorque actuators.
The licensee investigated this item by reviewing their equipment database system and vendor manual cross reference system and determined that the subject components were not utilized at this plan c.
(Closed)
P2189-01:
This
CFR Part 21 report dated January 13, 1989, discussed a problem with Brown Boveri K-Line circuit breakers fai ling to properly close.
The licensee investigated this matter and determined that the subject breakers were not utilized at this plant.
d.
(Closed)
P2189-09:
This
CFR Part 21 report dated June 28, 1989, discussed the potential failure of the main steam PORVs to open on demand due to fai lure of a piston ring.
During the 1989 refueling outage, the licensee, in accordance with the notice, installed new plug and piston ring assemblies per PCR 4596 which was completed on March 9, 1990.
e.
(Closed)
P2189-16:
This
CFR Part 21 report, dated October 20, 1989, discussed a diesel generator crankcase explosion at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.
Subsequent inspections have not shown any liner or piston wearing and the Harris facility has an Enterprise DSRV-16-4 diesel which is unlike the Cooper Bessemer KSV20 diesel described in the notice.
f.
(Closed)
P2189-18:
This
CFR Part 21 report dated November 3, 1988, discussed a problem with Limitorque melamine torque switches that underwent mold shrinkage and caused cam binding.
In accordance with the report, the licensee replaced all of the potentially defective melamine torque switches per PCR 4110, which was completed on January 11, 1990.
g.
(Closed)
P2189-20:
This
CFR Part 21 report dated November 28, 1989, discussed a potential problem with replacement intake rocker arm assemblies of diesel generators manufactured by Cooper Industries.
In accordance with the report, the licensee inspected the A and B emergency diesel generator intake rocker arm assemblies and found no evidence of interference.
9.
Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
PCR-3510, 480 Volt Drawout Breakers Used as Contactors, was reviewed.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Review of Plant Nuclear Safety Coranittee Activities (40500)
The inspectors attended selected PNSC meet'ings to observe committee activities and verify TS requirements with respect to committee composition, duties, and responsibilities.
Minutes from this meeting were also reviewed to verify accurate documentation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Follow-up of Onsite Events (93702)
a ~
b.
Pressurizer Relief Tank Hydrogen Inleakage.
The plant experienced a problem with hydrogen inleakage into the PRT possibly due to leaking pressurizer PORV valves.
The PRT is normally maintained with a nitrogen atmosphere to prevent the inleakage of air and oxygen and thereby avoid a potentially explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen.
Although the PRT atmosphere approached a
70 percent hydrogen concentration, no oxygen was detected.
The licensee's evaluation of a potential local missile hazard, indicated no safety problem existed.
This evaluation also concluded that the total hydrogen volume was small and would not impact the potential post accident hydrogen concentration.
Based upon this evaluation, the licensee determined that no hazard exists and plans to continue operation until the valves can be repaired during the next refueling outage in March 1991.
Inservice Inspection.
During the licensee's review of their inservice inspection program, it was found that an inappropriate exemption to the ASME code had been applied to the YT-2 visual examination on ASME code class
piping.
This resulted in code class 2 piping less than 4" in diameter not rec'eiving a proper VT-2 visual examination.
Although the piping outside of containment had been visually inspected by VT-2 qualified personnel, the authorized nuclear inservice inspector was not utilized for this effort as required by the code.
The piping inside of containment is subject to RCS leakage monitoring which would identify any flaws.
Based upon the VT-2 visual inspections which had been performed and the monitoring of RCS leakage for the piping inside of containment, the licensee is developing a justification for continued operation until the subject piping can be properly inspected.
The licensee has identified the piping to be inspected and will complete the required inspections on all piping outside containment by the end of September.
Completion of the piping inside containment will be completed no later than the end of the next refueling outage.
This
item is considered to be a licensee identified NCV and is not cited because the criteria specified in section V.G. 1 of the NRC enforcement policy were satisfied.'C4 (400/90-14-03):
Failure to perform required inservice inspections.
c.
Contamination of the fuel handling building.
The licensee was in the process of dewatering and removing the spent fuel racks from the "B" spent fuel pool for weld repairs.
While lowering the water below the tops of the spent fuel racks, the licensee used a fine mist spray to wash down the pool walls and the tops of the spent fuel racks.
The spray caused contaminated iron oxide crud deposited on the racks to become airborne.
This caused the contamination of approximately 13,000 square feet of the fuel handling building operating floor.
This event also resulted in the low level contamination (40-60 counts above background)
of workers in the building.
All affected workers were given whole-body counts following the event and no internal contamination was detected.
.12.
- Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on August 17, 1990.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the violations.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number Descri tion and Reference 400/90-14-01 400/90-14-02 NC4:
Failure to maintain the "B" essential services chiller operable (paragraph 6.e).
NC4:
Failure to properly install a safety related ventilation damper (paragraph 7.a).
400/90-14-03 (paragrap 13.
Acronyms and Initialisms NC4:
Failure to perform required inservice inspections h 11.b).
AC AFW ALARA ASME Alternating Current Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Amwerican Society of Mechanical Engineers
CCTV CFR CNS CS EDG EST FHB FSAR GP HVAC IFI IST LER MST NCR NCV NED NRC ONS OST PCR PNSC PORV PRT PSIG QA/QC RCS/RC RHR RWP SER SOOR TS URI VIO WR/JO Closed Circuit Television Code of Federal Regulations Corporate Nuclear Safety Containment Spray Emergency Diesel Generator Engineering Surveillance Test Fuel Handling Building Final Safety Analysis Report General Procedure Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Inspector Follow-up Item Inservice Testing Licensee Event Report Maintenance Surveillance Test Non-Conformance Report Non-Cited Violation Nuclear Engineering Department Nuclear Regulatory Commission Onsite Nuclear Safety Operations Surveillance Test Plant Change Request Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Power Operated Relief Valve Pressurizer Relief Tank Pounds per Square Inch Gage Quality Assurance/Quality Control Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Work Permit Safety Evaluation Report Significant Operational Occurrence Report
'echnical Specification Unresolved Item Violation Work Request/Job Order