IR 05000400/1990004
| ML18009A448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1990 |
| From: | Dance H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A447 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-04, 50-400-90-4, NUDOCS 9004190208 | |
| Download: ML18009A448 (9) | |
Text
~pIt RE0y UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nor I 50-400/90-04 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket NoeI 50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
License No.:
NPF-63 Inspection Conducted:
.
ebruary 17 - March 16, 1990 inspectors:
C dP~c J.
edrow, Senior Resid nt Inspector D te Soigne M. Shannon, Resident Inspector D te signed Approved by:
C H.
C. Dance, Sect>on Chief Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Reactor Projects Da e Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, fire protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, safety system walkdown,-
review of nonconformance reports, review of emergency response facilities, and control of containment isolation valves.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
A violation which was not cited is identified in paragraph.3.b regarding failure to calibrate vital bus voltmeters.,
r'004190208 900404 PDR AOOCK 05000400 I!
.
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Braund, Supervisor, Security
- J. Collins, Manager, Operations G. Forehand, Director, QA/QC
- C. Gibson, Director, Programs and Procedures
- P. Hadel, Manager, Maintenance
- C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager C. Olexik, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- R. Richey, Manager, Harris Nuclear Project Department
- J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring H. Smith, Supervisor, Radwaste Operation
- D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Design Engineering Support E. Willett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
- L. Woods, Manager, Technical Support Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Node 1) for the duration of this inspection period.
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications.(TS)
and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Foreman's Log; Control Operator's Log; Auxiliary Operator's Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable Record; Active Clearance Log; Jumper and Wire Removal Log; Shift Turnover Checklist; and selected Chemistry/Radiation Protection and Radwaste Logs.
In addition, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control.
room; emergency diesel generator building; Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB); waste processing building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; battery rooms; and electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:-
(1)
Monitoring Instrumentation - Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operations problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
(4)
Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely 'to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequate.
(5)
Security Control - The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm
stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms,'xtinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
OST-1004 OST-1021 OST-1023 OST-1024 OST-1026 OST-1092 MST-I044 MST-I247 MST-E006 MST-E023 Heat Balance Daily Surveillance Requirements Offsite Power Availability Verification Onsite Power Distribution Verification Reactor Coolant System Leakage 1B-SB Residual Heat Removal Pump Operability Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation Metal Impact Monitoring System 480 Vac Molded Case Circuit Breaker Test Pressurizer Heater Kilo-watt Verification a ~
The inspector reviewed procedure OST-1092 which was performed on March 1, 1990.
The test performance was initially considered to be satisfactory by operations personnel.
However, subsequent review of the test data on March 2, by licensee Inservice Testing (IST)
personnel, determined that the code reference value for high system flowrate had been exceeded and therefore the pump should be considered inoperable.
This information was relayed to operations personnel who declared the pump inoperable.
The test procedure did not specify an upper limit on system flow only a lower limit of acceptability.
Later on March 2, IST personnel in conjunction with the system engineer determined that the measured flowrate was in agreement with the manufacturer's pump curve and no degradation of pump performance was indicated.
A review of previous test data showed that the initial flow reference value was low and in error.
A previous test was then utilized to determine a
new set of reference values.
The
pump was then declared operable based upon the new flow reference value.
The licensee is revising procedure OST-1092 to reflect appropriate upper and lower acceptance criteria for pump flow.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's process for determining appropriate corrective action for components which exceed the acceptance criteria of the test.
In the case of this test, IST personnel were able to produce the necessary documentation of what had been done and the reasons for these actions.
However, several different references had to be consulted, including a handwritten note from the system engineer specifying the new set of reference values, to produce the required documentation.
Although all the-required documentation was available for review, no concise document existed which would easily show a summary of the corrective actions made and subsequent inservice testing of pump operability.
The inspector discussed this matter with IST personnel who agreed that the record of corrective actions should be improved.
IFI (90-04-01):
Review the licensee's activities to revise procedure OST-1092 for flow acceptance criteria and to improve records of corrective action.
During the inspectors review of procedure OST-1024 it was noted that the acceptance criteria for the 6900 volt and 480 volt busses appeared to be improper.
The 6900 volt bus lower voltage limit of.-
6210 was less than the trip setpoint of the undervoltage relays (6435).
Also, even if the operators maintained the 6900 volt busses within the allowable acceptance criteria, the 480 volt busses could be unacceptably high or low.
The inspector reviewed design basis documents and discussed this matter with engineering personnel.
A conclusion was reached that the wrong values had been used for the acceptance criteria. Licensee personnel are reviewing necessary data to produce an acceptable acceptance criteria for procedure OST-1024.
IFI= (90-04-02):
Review the licensee's development of acceptable acceptance criteria for procedure OST-1024.
During a review of calibration records for instrumentation used in obtaining data for procedure OST-1024, and MST-E023, the inspector found that the voltmeters on the 6900 volt 1A-SA and 1B-SB vital
'busses had not been calibrated within the established time frame of every two years.
The instruments were subsequently calibrated and found to be acceptable.
Although the bus instruments had not been calibrated, control room voltage indicators were available and properly calibrated and which wer e also recorded hourly.
This data could have been used to verify the surveillance test if allowed by the test procedure.
This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfie NC5 (90-04-03):
Failure to calibrate the vital 6900 volt bus voltmeters.
4.
Naintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, TS requirements were being followed.
Haintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance (WR/JO) activities:
Replace actuator and linkage for motor operated valve SW-1208 and associated post maintenance testing.
Testing of molded case circuit breakers and development of test procedure.
Review of calibration procedures for TS related vital bus voltage instrumentation.
Review of preventive maintenance procedures for electrical distribution system busses and cubicles.
Review of IKC procedures for calibration of nuclear instrumentation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Safety Systems Walkdown (71710)
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the High Head Safety Injection system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedures correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Nonconformance Reports
{71707)
Significant Operational Occurrence Reports (SOORs)
and Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports were accomplished or being pursued for completion, generic items were identified and reported, and items were reported as required by the TS.
a.
SOOR 90-38 reported that the plant periodically operated over the past year with two waste gas decay tanks cross tied together.
On several occasions the licensee cross tied two waste gas decay tanks together through drain piping in attempts to equalize pressure
b.
C.
~
between two tanks.
This operation is not discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or plant operating procedures and is contrary to the FSAR accident analysis Chapter 15.7. 1, Radioactive Waste Gas System Leak or Failure, which assumes that only one waste gas tank would be subject to a system leak or failure.
The licensee promptly notified the NRC Operations Center of this matter upon determining that this operation was not in accordance with the design basis of the plant.
The licensee is presently evaluating this event to determine the safety significance and develop appropriate corrective action to prevent recurrence in the future.
Initial results of the evaluation indicate that the total radioactive curie content in both affected tanks was well below that assumed in the FSAR analysis and therefore a pipe/tank rupture would not have resulted in an unbounded release of radioactive gas.
IFI (90-04-04):
Review the licensee's corrective action to prevent cross connection of waste gas decay tanks.
SOORs 90-19 and 90-27 identified problems associated with the RAB emergency exhaust system area boundaries.
The problems included system operability with an inoperable isolation damper and with various doors to the RAB which are periodically left open.'he licensee is presently evaluating the ventilation envelope to determine appropriate administrative controls to ensure RAB emergency exhaust system operability.
IFI (90-04-05):
Review the licensee's evaluation of the RAB emergency exhaust system ventilation envelope.
SOOR 90-25 reported that actual temperatures of 125'F in certain locations of the containment building exceeded the temperature assumed in the environmental qualification of instrumentation/equipment located inside containment (120'F).
Although licensee engineering personnel do not expect these local "hot" spots to significantly impact the bulk average temperature assumed in the qualification
~
calculations, an engineering evaluation is being conducted to determine the effect on qualified components.
IFI (90-04-06):
Review the licensee's engineering evaluation for containment temperatures in excess of that assumed for environmental qualification of equipment.
7.
Review of Emergency Response Facilities (71707)
The inspector was provided a tour of the emergency response facilities by licensee personnel.
The technical support center, emergency operati,ons facility, and operations support center were toured to assess readiness of emergency equipment necessary when these facilities are activated for an emergency.
The inspector utilized the equipment checklists provided
in procedure PG0-041, Emergency Equipment Inventory Checklist, to perform this assessment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Control of Containment Isolation Valves (71707)
The resident inspectors were informed by a visiting headquarters inspector that a problem existed in the licensee's procedure PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program, which specifies applicable containment isolation valves subject to TS 3.6.3.
The procedure was considered to be improper in that it stated that TS 3.0.4 action requirements were not-applicable to the valves in this table.
TS 3.0.4 states that ascension into higher operational modes cannot be made with the affected component inoperable.
The resident inspector reviewed the safety evaluation report which removed the containment isolation valve table from the TS and placed it in procedure PLP-106.
The previous TS stipulated that TS 3.0.4 was indeed not applicable for selected valves in the isolation valve table.
However, the present TS do not mention any such exclusion for TS 3.0.4 applicability and therefore TS 3.0.4 is applicable.
The licensee has revised procedure PLP-106 to remove the TS 3.0.4 exclusion and is considering a change to the TS to reinstate the exclusion.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on March 14, 1990.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the Violation, and Inspector Follow-up items addressed below.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number 90-04-01 90-04-02 90-04-03 Description and Reference IFI:
Review the licensee's activities to revise procedure OST-1092 for flow acceptance criteria and to improve records of corrective action, (paragraph 3.a).
IFI:
Review the licensee's development of acceptable acceptance criteria for procedure OST-1024, (paragraph 3.b).
NC5:
Failure to calibrate the vital 6900 volt bus voltmeters, (paragraph 3.b).
90-04-04 90-04-05 90-04-06 8.
Acronyms and Initialisms IFI:
Review the licensee's corrective action to prevent cross connection of waste gas decay tanks, (paragraph 6.a).
IFI:
Review the licensee's evaluation of the RAB emergency exhaust system ventilation envelope, (paragraph 6.b).
IFI:
Review the licensee's engineering evaluation for containment evaluation for containment temperatures in excess of that assumed for environmental qualification of equipment, (paragraph 6.c).
CCTV F
FSAR IFI IST LER NC NCR NRC OST PLP PGO QA QC RAB RWP SOOR TS Vac WR/JO Closed Circuit Television Degrees Fahrenheit Final Safety Analysis Report Inspector Follow-up Item Inservice Testing Licensee Event Report Non-Cited Nonconformance Report Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Surveillance Test Plant Program Plant General Order Quality Assurance Quality Control Reactor Auxiliary Building Radiation Work Permit Significant Operational Occurrance Report Technical Specification Volts Alternating Current Work Request/Job Order