IR 05000400/1990010
| ML18009A594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1990 |
| From: | Dance H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A593 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-10, GL-88-05, GL-88-5, IEB-88-008, IEB-88-8, NUDOCS 9007170287 | |
| Download: ML18009A594 (25) | |
Text
e gp,R RECIrd Wp UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
10'I MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/90-10 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P.
0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
May 19 - June 15, 1990 Inspectors:
J, e row, enior Resi ent nspector License No.:
NPF-63 I
~ /(
ate igned M.
S annon, esident nspector Approved by:
C H. Dance, Section Chic Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Reactor Projects Da'te igned tr Da e
'igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, fire protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, safety system walkdown, licensee event reports, review of non-conformance reports, review of NRC bulletins, review of NRC generic letters, design changes and modifications, PNSC activities, review of drawing and procedure administrative controls, and licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and fa'ci lity operations observed.
Some of these tours and observa-tions were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
A licensee identified NCV is discussed in paragraph 6.c regarding an unplanned release of radioactive gas.
A non-cited violation is identified in paragraph 10 regarding failure to log a
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Collins, Manager, Operations
- G. Forehand, Manager, QA/QC
- C. Gibson, Director, Programs and Procedures
- J.
Hammond, Manager, ONS
- C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager J.
Nevill, Manager, Technical Support
- A. Poland, Project Specialist, E&RC R. Richey, Manager, Harris Nuclear Project Department
- J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring
- H. Smith, Manager, Radwaste Operation
- M. Staton, N.
C.
Power Agency
- D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- N. Wallace, Sr. Specialist, Regulatory Compliance E.
Willett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
- L. Woods, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant began this inspection period in power operation (Mode 1).
On May 19, 1990, a plant shutdown was commenced to make repairs to a steam generator level instrument isolation valve and to perform general reliability related maintenance.
The hot shutdown (Node 4) condition was reached at approximately 2:57 a.m.
on Nay 20.
Outage activities also included leak repair of two reactor coolant system temperature manifold isolation valves, and replacement of a source range neutron detector.
At 5:38 p.m.
on Nay 24, the plant was further cooled down to the cold shutdown (Mode 5) condition to initiate repairs to the emergency diesel generator load sequencers.
Following completion of these repairs, plant heatup was commenced and the hot standby (Mode 3) condition reached at 11:47 a.m.
on May 29.
A reactor startup was performed on Nay 30 with the reactor achieving criticality at 1:30 p.m.
Power operation was resumed at 5:48 a.m.
on May 31.
The plant continued in power operation for the duration of this inspection perio The licensee's decision to shutdown the plant to make reliability repairs enabled the repair of items which enhanced plant safety a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Foreman's Log; Outage Shift Manager's Log; Control Operator's Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable Record; Active Clearance Log; Jumper and Wire Removal Log; Shift Turnover Checklist; and selected Chemistry/
Radiation Protection and Radwaste Logs.
In addition, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; reactor auxiliary building; containment building; waste processing building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; battery rooms; and electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made; ( I)
Monitoring Instrumentation - Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operations problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnover (3)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components, and cleanliness. conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
(4)
Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected RWPs to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequate.
(5)
Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equip-ment, and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
OST-1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification OST-1081, Containment Visual Inspection MST-10051, Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation System Source Range N32 EPT-033, Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test EPT-159T, ASNE Section XI, Article IWB-5000 102 Percent Hydrostatic Test No violations or deviations were identifie,
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed an'd work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance (WR/JO) activities:
Replacement of source range nuclear instrument N32.
Replacement of time delay relay RLY-01EE-1731-3-SA in accordance with procedure PIC-E030, Electromechanical Timing Relay D.C. Drop-0ut.
Leak repair of RTD manifold isolation valves 1RC-11 and 1RC-69.
Repair of cracked welds for containment fan cooler drain valves 1SW-1128 and 1SW-1129.
Packing adjustment to stop boron leakage from valves 1RH39, 1RH40, 1CS-460, 1CS-461, 1CS-492, 1ED-110, 1SI-5, 1SI-101, 1SI-382, 1SI-389 and 1SI-390.
During a review of the work packages associated with drain valves 1SW-1128/1129, the inspector was informed that these valves had also been recently worked during the previous refueling outage in November 1989.
The pr'evious work was almost identical to the repair required in May 1990.
The welds in the piping for this drain path has been susceptible to pinhole leaks.
Also, a section of pipe which was replaced in May 1990 showed corrosion which could be contributing to the leakage problem.
The licensee has written a PCR to have engineering evaluate the recurrence of leaks on this piping (PCR-5327, 1SW 1128 and 1SW 1129 Cracking).
IFI (90-10-01):
Review the licensee's activities to correct recurrent leakage problems associated with SW drain piping from containment cooling units.
5.
Safety Systems Walkdown (71710)
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the low head safety injection system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requi rements for system operability and that the system drawings and procedures correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Polic a
~
(Open)
LER 90-10:
This LER reported inadequate administrative control of the RAB emergency exhaust system ventilation boundary.
The licensee has completed an engineering evaluation (PCR 5115, Emergency Ventilation Boundaries)
to identify which boundary doors are required to maintain RAB exhaust system integrity.
These doors have been painted and posted as boundary doors.
Additionally, a plant modification (PCR 5222, Emergency Exhaust Boundaries for RAB)
has been completed to remove two rooms from the ventilation boundary (spare charging pump room and a valve gallery room)
so that access hatches to these areas could remain open.
Further testing is currently scheduled for July to verify system operation with various boundary doors open.
Also, a review of other ventilation systems for similar problems, and addition of administra-tive controls in plant procedures, remain to be accomplished.
This LER will remain open pending completion of these additional actions.
b.
(Closed)
LER 90-12:
This LER reported an inadvertent emergency diesel generator actuation while performing undervoltage testing.
This matter was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/90-08.
The licensee has completed a plant modification (PCR-5224, Undervoltage Test Scheme Modification) to install a five second time delay in the test circuit.
c ~
(Closed)
LER 90-13:
This LER reported an unplanned release of a radioactive waste gas storage tank.
Post-release calculations that were performed following this event determined that no significant radiation dose resulted and that release limits were not exceeded.
The inspector reviewed and verified the licensee's corrective action as stated in the LER.
However the tank was not sampled prior to releasing as required by the TS.
This matter is considered to be a
licensee identified NCV and is not being cited because criteria specified in section V.G. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NC4 (90-10-02):
Failure to sample a waste gas tank prior to release.
7.
Review of Nonconformance Reports (71707)
Significant Operational Occurrence Reports (SOORs)
and Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports were accomplished or being pursued for completion, generic items were identified and reported, and items were reported as required by the TS.
SOOR 90-83 reported that the emergency service return valve from the B
chiller (1SW-1208)
was inoperable.
This situation was discovered by a maintenance foreman during a plant tour who noticed that the valve stem had become separated from the operator linkage.
The chiller was declared
inoperable and a work request was initiated to repair the linkage.
The linkage for this valve, and its A train counterpart (1SW-1055),
have previously been susceptible to failure of the linkage.
Modifications performed to correct this problem have not been successful.
The licensee is currently evaluating a modification (PCR-5235, Operator-To-Valve Linkage Design Change)
to utilize a rack and pinion gear arrangement which should correct the problem.
IFI (90-10-03):
Follow the licensee's activities to correct linkage failures of emergency service chiller return valves.
Review of NRC Bulletins (92703)
(Open)
88-BU-OB:
Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Coolant Systems.
This bulletin alerted licensees to the potential for thermal stratification to exist in RCS interfacing systems which could contribute to thermal fatigue and pipe cracks.
The licensee has submitted correspondence to the NRC dated September 28, 1988, and January 26, 1990, addressing the actions required by the bulletin.
The licensee has reviewed unisolable sections of piping connected to the RCS and has identified the following lines most susceptible to the thermal cycling phenomenon:
- SIS Cold Leg Injection Lines (3)
- SIS Hot Leg Injection Lines (3)
All of the welds on the subject piping were examined using dye penetrant testing and ultrasonic testing (volumetric).
No unacceptable indications were identified.
In November, 1988, a leak test was performed to detect leakage past the SI block valves which could create thermal stratification conditions.
Valves 1SI 52 (isolation valve for cold leg SI), 1SI 86 and 1SI 107 (isolation valves for hot leg SI), were found to exhibit some seat leakage.
The licensee has installed thermocouples on the top and bottom of the subject piping to monitor for thermal stratification conditions (temporary modification PCR 3543, NRC Bulletin 88-08 Temperature Monitoring Instrumentation),
and has established a temperature distribution limit of 50 degrees F to trigger the need for additional engineering evaluation.
The inspector reviewed the results of the temperature monitoring program.
Several lines exhibited differential temperatures in excess of 50 degrees F.
One line, associated with cold leg piping downstream of valve 1SI-82, indicated a differential temperature of approximately 155 degrees F while most of the other lines indicated between 40 - 70 degrees F.
This information was discussed with an NRC NRR specialist, and with licensee system engineers and NfD personnel.
The nuclear steam supply system vendor (Westinghouse)
was contacted by the licensee to evaluate this condition.
Although the thermal stratification condition was found to exist, based upon the relatively small differential temperatures involved,
\\
and the lack of any thermal cycling, the piping integrity was not believed to be jeopardized.
This evaluation concluded that continued plant operation was acceptable, however, the vendor recommended that the leakage be eliminated.
Based upon this information the licensee plans to continue monitoring the above piping until the leakage can be eliminated and also plans to establish new operating limits to trigger additional evaluation.
During the last plant cooldown, the licensee monitored thermocouple performance.
Most of the thermocouples tracked the decreasing temperature with the exception of the 1SI-82 thermocouples which exhibited a negative differential temperature.
Based upon this information the licensee believes this instrumentation to be faulty.
However, the remaining good thermocouples provide enough monitoring capability to bound the faulty instrumentation.
IFI (90-10-04):
Follow the licensee's activities to eliminate thermal stratification in safety injection piping and develop new evaluation trigger limits.
Review of NRC Generic Letters (92701)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees action regarding GL 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants.
In correspondence dated May 27, 1988, the licensee briefly stated their response to the GL.
This response was subsequently reviewed and accepted by the NRC staff in a letter dated September 1,
1988.
The licensee's program for boron corrosion prevention (PLP-600, Boron Corrosioh Program)
is based upon identifying leakage during walkdown inspections during refueling outages and maintenance activities, and monitoring of RCS leakage during power operation.
A work request is generated for any evidence of boric acid leakage which is then routed to the system engineer for resolution.
If corrosion is identified, the system engineer coordinates the repair efforts, or in cases where repair is not feasible, justifies continued operation of the plant.
The licensee performs containment inspections in accordance with procedure OST-1081, Containment Visual Inspection.
This procedure includes an inspection to identify loose debris, and also evidence of RCS leakage such as steam, water, or boric acid crystal accumulation.
This inspection is performed prior to establishing containment integrity following a refueling outage.
The daily data obtained from performance of the licensee's procedure for monitoring RCS leakage (OST-1026, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation) is trended to detect any increase in leakage rates.
During the May outage, the inspectors toured containment to observe previously identified boron corrosion on valves 1RC-11 and 1RC-69.
During this tour the inspectors found several other valves which exhibited signs of leakage and the presence of significant deposits of boric acid crystals.
The inspectors discussed this observation with plant personnel to determine potential operability concerns from corrosion.
Although
these leaks had been previously identified by the licensee, they were not worked during the last refueling outage, and leakage was not further checked during the May outage since this outage was not a refueling outage.
The licensee subsequently formed a team to identify, inspect, and evaluate additional leaking valves (approximately 11)
and adjusted valve packing to prevent further leakage.
No evidence of boron corrosion was found.
Additional repair (live load packing, etc.) will be performed during the next refueling outage if the valves continue to leak.
Since the licensee's program only requires an inspection for leakage during refueling outages, significant leakage/corrosion could accumulate before identification. If leaks are not immediately repaired when identified, periodic inspections for increased leakage/corrosion damage is warrented and should be performed when the opportunity exists.
The licensee was encouraged to improve their program to take advantage of non-refueling outages for identification and prevention of boron corrosion.
Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
The following plant change requests (PCRs)
were reviewed and/or associated testing observed:
- PCR-502, RCS Standpipe
- PCR-3543, NRC Bulletin 88-08, Temperature Monitoring Instrumentation
- PCR-4765, Sequencer Relay Malfunction
- PCR-5115, Emergency Ventilation Boundaries
- PCR-5150, 3AC-B3SB - 1:002 And 3AC-B1SB - 1:002 Not in Eg Program
- PCR-5222, Emergency Exhaust Boundaries for RAB
- PCR-5224, Undervoltage Test Scheme Modification
- PCR-5284, Sequencer Relay Malfunction
- PCR-5288, Temporary Leak Repair of 1RC-69
- PCR-5289, Temporary Leak Repair of 1RC-ll
- PCR-5301, RHR Pump Seal Operability As par t of the review for temporary modifications PCR-5288/5289, which were installed during the May outage, the inspector reviewed procedure MOD-206, Temporary Modifications, to determine applicable administrative
- controls for temporary alterations to plant equipment.
This procedure requires that temporary modifications must be approved by the Shift Foreman prior to installation and that a record of all temporary
modifications be maintained in the Temporary Modification Log.
A tag is also applied to the altered component if applicable.
By a review of the Temporary Modification Log on June 1, the inspector determined that no entries had been made for the 1RC-11/69 valve modifications, nor had tags been issued.
From a review of the most recent temporary modification audit, the inspector considered that the administrative logging error for PCR-5288/5289 was an isolated case.
The licensee attributed the cause for this event to be personnel error and has subsequently updated the log to include the two PCRs.
This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in section Y.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NC5 (90-10-05):
Failure to log temporary modifications in the Temporary Modification Log.
Review of Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Activities (40500)
The inspectors attended a
PNSC meeting which was held to review outage work and recommend plant restart.
Technical Specification requirements with respect to committee composition, duties, and responsibilities, were verified.
Minutes from this meeting were also reviewed to verify accurate documentation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Review of Drawing and Procedure Administrative Controls (71707)
The licensee's administrative controls for drawings and procedures were reviewed.
These controls are contained in procedure RMP-002, Document Control and Distribution, which describes responsibilities and the methods of distributing, controlling, and maintaining documents.
An audit of controlled copies of procedures and drawings is performed approximately every 9-12 months.
The inspector verified that selected control room and clearance center drawings and procedures were of the correct revision.
Procedures utilized in remote plant areas, such as the Auxiliary Control Panel and Emergency Diesel Generator Control Panel, were also verified.
The inspector also reviewed the latest audit of control room documents.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702
92701)
a.
(Closed)
URI 89-34-03, Operability of the main steam lines when filled with condensate.
This item was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/89-34.
The licensee has performed a seismic analysis on the
main steam lines and found that the system was still within the design basis for a seismic event with the main steam lines filled with condensate.
(Open) IFI 89-13-01, Failure of Brown Boveri LK16 breakers to open on demand.
This item was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-400/89-21 and 50-400/90-200.
The licensee, with the approval of Brown Boveri, implemented design changes which were supposed to improve the reliability of the LK16 breakers.
The modified breakers were subsequently tested and began experiencing failures in the ability to close.
On four separate breakers, the modified increase in opening spring tension, although still within design specifica-tions, exceeded the closing spring's ability to maintain the breaker closed.
As noted previously in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/89-21, the opening force of the breaker was causing damage to the opening shock mechanism.
The licensee is continuing to investigate this problem to determine if implementation of the design changes has introduced a
new problem.
From breaker test data, component testing, mechanism analysis, and metallurgical analysis of breaker components, the licensee's task force has identified the root cause for breaker failure to be an inadequate design margin in the breaker's opening spring force in conjunction with inadequate manufacturing controls of critical breaker parts.
Random variations were created in the force necessary to open the breaker due to differences in the critical parts.
The licensee, in cooperation with the breaker manufacturer, has proposed the following corrective action:
- Removal of arcing contact spring washers;
- Replacement of arcing contact springs.
- Installation of a bridge blade torsion spring.
- Replacement of previously modified opening/booster spring assembly with a single spring.
- Clean and relubrication of breaker mechanism.
- Verification of proper contact spacing and alignment.
This corrective action will increase the design margin in the opening spring force and replace critical components with controlled parts.
Following implementation of this corrective action, a breaker will be sent to the vendor for a validation test.
The vendor will perform a
fault current close and latch test to determine if the breaker's capabilities have been altered.
The licensee plans to complete modifications to all of the safety related breaker by the end of the next refueling outage presently scheduled for Narch, 199 c ~
d.
(Closed)
IFI 90-04-05:
Review the licensee's evaluation of the RAB emergency exhaust system ventilation envelope.
The licensee has issued LER 90-10 on this event documenting the corrective actions taken.
For record purposes, the IFI will be closed and future action tracked by the LER.
(Open)
IFI 89-21-03:
Contact overloading of Potter-Brumfield Relays.
The licensee has issued LER 89-16 discussing this event.
Engineering evaluation PCR-4765, Sequencer Relay Malfunction, has been completed to evaluate the contact overloading.
The design engineer, Ebasco Services Incorporated, was contacted to analyze contact ratings and applications.
Although no instances were found where the manufacturer's resistive load rating (0.8 amperes)
had been exceeded, two examples where found where the load on the relay contacts exceeded that recommended by the design engineer.
Since these relays were being utilized for inductive applications and no ratings were available for this usage, the design engineer recommended the contact rating be derated to half (0.4 amperes).
Testing by an outside vendor was also conducted to simulate actual contact load conditions.
in order to determine contact reliability.
This testing determined that the 0.4 ampere rating on the contacts was adequate.
Another problem with the sequencer circuit was identified during this testing.
A microswitch utilized in the time delay relays failed.
Review of the application of this switch revealed that the 0.5 ampere rated switch was subjected to a load of 0.8 ampere.
The licensee implemented PCR-5284, Sequencer Relay Malfunction, to replace these relays and reduce the relay contact loading by installing additional contacts in series.
The licensee plans to submit an LER on this event and will provide the testing report to the inspector.
This item will remain open pending issuance of the LER and review of the testing report.
14.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on June 15, 1990.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the Violations and Inspector Follow-up items addressed below.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number Descri tion and Reference 90-10-01 90-10-02 90-10-03 90-10-04 90-10-05 IFI:
Review the licensee's activities to correct recurrent leakage problems associated with SW drain piping from containment cooling units (paragraph 4).
NC4:
Failure to sample a waste gas tank prior to release (paragraph 6.c).
IFI:
Follow the licensee's activities to correct linkage failures of emergency service chiller return valves (paragraph 7).
IFI:
Follow the licensee's activities to eliminate thermal stratification in safety injection piping and develop new evaluation trigger limits (paragraph 8).
NC5:
Fai lure to 1 og temporary modificati ons in the Temporary Modification Log (paragraph 10).
Acronyms and Initial i sms ASME-BU CCTV-CFR EPT EQ F
GL IFI LER MOD MST NCR NCV NED NRC NRR ONS OST PCR PIC PLP PNSC-PWR QA American Society of Mechanical Engineers Bulletin Closed Circuit Television Code of Federal Regulations Engineering Performance Test Environmental Qualifications Fahrenheit Generic Letter Inspector Follow-up Item Licensee Event Report Modification Maintenance Surveillance Test Non-conformance Report Non-cited Violation Nuclear Engineering Department Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Onsite Nuclear Safety Operations Surveillance Test Plant Change Request Primary Instrument Control Plant Program Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Pressurized Water Reactors Quality Assurance
QC RAB RCS RHR RTD RWP SIS SOOR-SW TS URI WR/JO-guality Control Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Resistance Temperature Detector Radiation Work Permit Safety Injection System Significant Operational Occurrence Report Service Water Technical Specification Unresolved Item Work Request/Job Order