IR 05000400/1990018
| ML18009A679 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1990 |
| From: | Belisle G, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A677 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-18, NUDOCS 9010110173 | |
| Download: ML18009A679 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/90-18 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
Sep ember 4-7, 1990 Inspector:
J.
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Approved by:
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Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 License No.:
NPF-63 f/zo y'o ate Signed C ~~
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>gne Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of review of results of main steam safety relief valve and pressurizer safety relief valve testing, inspection of the main dam, west auxiliary dam, and separating dike, and followup on licensee action on a previous inspection finding.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Licensee responsiveness to NRC initiatives was timely, sound, and thorough.
Staffing and training was adequate.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. Beane, Manager, guality Control J. Burns, Inservice Inspector (ISI) Engineer
- C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager J. Nevill, Manager, Technical Support
- C. Olexik, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- M. Pugh, Project Specialist, ISI
- M. Wallace, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance H. Williams, Supervisor, Structural Engineering Section, Harris Engineering Support R. Winton, ISI Specialist Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included four design engineers.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- J. Tedrow, Senior Resident Inspector M. Shannon, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Set Point Testing (61701)
The inspector examined results of testing performed on the main steam safety relief valves (SRVs)
and verified compliance with Technical Specifications (TS) Sections "4.0.5 and 4.7. 1. 1 and Table 3.7-2.
The TS require that a specific number of SRVs be tested in accordance with Section XI of the 1983 ASME Code during each refueling outage.
The valves are tested per CP&L Engineering Surveillance Test procedure EST-202, Main Steam Safety Valve Test.
The liftsetting of the valves are specified in TS Table 3.7-2.
The set points are required to be within plus or minus one percent of the specified lift setting.
The inspector reviewed the results of set point verification tests performed on SRV numbers MS-43, 46, 49, 52, and 55 in August 1988 during the first refueling outage.
The set points for all five valves were within acceptance criteria.
The inspector also reviewed the results of set point tests performed on.SRV numbers MS-43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, and 57 in October or December 1989, during the second refueling outage.
Six of the valves had as-found set point slightly below the minus one percent tolerance.
These valves were adjusted and retested.
The as-left set points were within TS limits.
All 15 SRVs have been set point tested during either the first or second refueling outages.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.-
Testing of Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves (61701)
The inspector examined the results of tests performed on the pressurizer safety relief valves and verified compliance with TS 4.0.5.
TS 4.0.5 requires at least one pressurizer safety relief valve be setpoint tested during each refueling outage per Section XI of the 1983 ASME Code.
The valves are tested at an offsite testing facility (Wyle Laboratories)
in accordance with Wyle Test Procedure 1032, Testing of Crosby Safety Valves at Non-Elevated Temperature, with appropriate modifications for testing with a loop seal.
The inspector reviewed Wyle test report, Pressurizer Safety Valve Set Pressure and Leakage Test, dated November 27, 1989.
This report documents the as received test performed on August 19, 1988, on valve serial number 0088, which was removed for testing during the first refueling outage, and the as received test performed on October 23, 1989, on valve serial number 0052, which was removed for testing during the second refueling outage.
Both valves met the test acceptance criteria.
The valves were refurbished and retested to verify compliance with test acceptance criteria prior to reinstallation in the unit.
4.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Inspection of Main Dam, West Auxiliary Dam, and Separating Dike (61701)
The inspector examined the licensee's program for inspection of dams, required by TS 6.8.4(f).
The TS requires the inspection program to be performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1. 127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants.
The inspector performed an inspection of Seismic Category I and/or safety related water control structures which include the main dam, the west auxiliary dam, and the separating dike.
The inspector examined the concrete structures and embankments associated with the dams.
There was no evidence of slope instability, undue settlement, cracking, or displacement of slope protection (riprap)
on the embankment structures.
Some minor cracking was identified in the main dam and west auxiliary dam concrete spillways, but this is a normal service condition.
The inspector noted a
few seepage areas on the west auxiliary dam left embankment downstream toe area and on the main dam toe area, but these had been previously identified by the licensee and are included in their monitoring program.
In addition, the inspector noted a few small trees growing on the embankments, and some minor spalling of concrete in one small portion of the west auxiliary dam spillway.
The licensee plans to remove the trees, and evaluate the concrete spalling to determine if cosmetic repair is required.
The inspector reviewed CP&L engineering performance test procedure EPT-881, Dam/Dike Monitoring, which specifies the frequency for collection of data relative to the dam monitoring program including seepage monitoring, piezometer data, and survey data.
The survey data is used to
establish any changes in the horizontal and vertical alignment of the dams.
The inspector reviewed the prezometer data for 1988, 1989, and 1990 year to date, and the settlement monitoring data for 1988 and 1989.
The inspector also reviewed Law Engineering Inspection Report, titled Harris Water Control Structures, dated June 27, 1988, which documents the special inspection performed in 1988 per the requirements of TS 6.8.4(f).and R.G. l. 127.
The inspection for 1990 was recently completed (the current inspection interval is two years, which will be extended to five years if inspection results are deemed to be acceptable in the recently completed inspection).
The inspector discussed the inspection results with licensee engineers.
These discussions disclosed that the dam inspection team identified several minor differences which the licensee is currently evaluating to determine appropriate corrective actions.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (400/88-13-01),
Effect on Calculation of Strut Locations Using Measured Versus Predicted Thermal Movements.
The inspector reviewed calculation numbers 2500-2, 2500-3, and 2500-4.
These calculations were performed as part of the licensee's snubber reduction program.
These calculations provided the basis for replacing snubbers with struts on small diameter drain lines on the bottom of the steam generators.
Review of the calculations and discussions with licensee engineers disclosed that the actual piping movements measured during the thermal expansion test were evaluated when redesigning the hangers for replacing the snubbers with struts.
Licensee engineers stated that the thermal expansion test movements were evaluated following completion of hot functional testing (HFT)
and the difference between actual versus predicted piping movements were evaluated for all supports.
The differences had little significance unless they exceeded the HFT acceptance criteria.
Licensee engineers calculated the strut orientation using the actual measured HFT piping movements for the three hangers (numbers 1-RC-H-851, 853, and 855).
The above referenced calculations showed that the struts installed in accordance with the design drawing locations would be within allowable tolerances for both the actual movement measured during HFT and the theoretical movements.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 7,
1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.