IR 05000400/1990017

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Insp Rept 50-400/90-17 on 900818-0914. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Security,Fire Protection,Surveillance Observation,Maint Observation & Safety Sys Walkdown
ML18009A699
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/27/1990
From: Carroll R, Shannon M, Tedrow J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18009A698 List:
References
50-400-90-17, NUDOCS 9010180190
Download: ML18009A699 (18)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:

50-400/90-17 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.

Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:

50-400 Facility Name:

Harris

Inspection Conducted:

August 18 - September 14, 1990 Inspectors:

e ow, Senior esi en Inspect or i

License No.:

NPF-63 Date cygne M. Shannon, Resident In ector<

Da e S>gned-Approved by:

ar o

,

cting Section C se Division of Reactor Projects at s

ne SUMMARY Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security,,

fire protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, safety system walkdown, non-conformance reports, plant nuclear safety committee activities, simulator training, and licensee action on previous inspection items.

Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.

Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.

Results:-

No violations or deviations were identified.

Two events, involving the lifting of a component cooling water relief valve and the potential for CCW pump runout, were reported by the licensee (paragraphs 6.a and 6.b).

The licensee's efforts to contain the radiological hazard associated with moving spent fuel racks were successful (paragraph 2.b.(4)).

REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • H. Beane, Manager, Quality Control
  • B. Clark, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance
  • J. Collins, Manager, Operations G. Forehand, Manager, QA/QC
  • C. Gibson, Director, Programs and Procedures C. Hinnant, Plant General Manager J.

Nevill, Manager, Technical Support

  • C. Olexik, Director, Regulatory Compliance
  • R. Richey, Manager, Harris Nuclear Project Department J. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring H, 'Smith, Manager, Radwaste Operation
  • E. Willett, Manager, Outages and Nodifications
  • W. Wilson, Manager, Spent Nuclear Fuel Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
  • Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2.

Review of Plant Operations (71707)

The plant continued in power operation (Node 1) for the duration of this inspection period.

a.

Shift-Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the TS and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed:

Shift Foreman's Log; Control Operator's Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable Record; Active Clearance Log; Jumper and Wire Removal Log; Shift Turnover Checklist; and selected Chemistry/Radiation Protection and Radwaste Logs.

In addition, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.

No violations or deviations were identifie I f

'I I

b.

Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.

Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts.

Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; reactor auxiliary building; waste processing building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; condensate storage tank building, steam tunnel, battery rooms; and electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

( I)

Monitoring Instrumentation

-

Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode; (2)

Shift Staffing '- The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.

In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant informa-tion during these turnovers.

(3)

Plant Housekeeping Conditions

-

Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.

(4)

Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.

The inspectors also reviewed selected RWPs to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequate.

The licensee's activities in the fuel handling building were observed due to the potential for a significant radiological hazard to develop.

As mentioned in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/90-14, the licensee experienced problems while dewatering and removing the spent fuel racks from the "8" spent fuel pool

which resulted in the low level contamination of approximately 25 workers.

The contamination resulted when the racks were sprayed with a fine mist of water which caused contaminated/activated iron oxide crud deposited on the fuel racks to become airborne.

(5)

The licensee's procedure for performing these activities (FNP-501, Preparation of "8" Fuel Pool for Weld Repairs),

radiological surveys, and the radiation work permit (RWP-H90-0249)

were reviewed.

In addition, a pre-job briefing was attended.

As part of the increased radiological precautions implemented by the licensee, two rack processing facilities were fabricated to encompass the spent fuel racks while decontamination efforts were undertaken before transport, and for the receipt of the racks at the destination ("C" spent fuel pool).

These facilities consisted of a herculite tent with a high efficiency particulate absorption unit attached which maintained a negative pressure inside the tent to entrap any potential airborne activity resulting from the decontamination efforts.

In transit, a contamination control bag was attached to the rack to prevent the possible spread.of contamination.

The transportation of several racks were observed without'ishap.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's efforts in controlling this radiological hazard were successful..

Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program.

The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:

protected.and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.

In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of CCTV, monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization

'nterface with operations and maintenance.

Fire Protection

- Fire protection activities, staffing, and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identifie.

Surveillance Observation (61726)

Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

MST-I0078 Residual Heat Exchanger IA Bypass Flow Loop Calibration MST-I0133 MST-10151 OST-1078 Main Steam Line Pressure, Loop 3 Operational Test Steam Generator 3C Narrow Range Level Protection Set III Operational Test Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1BSB Operability No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and TS requirements were being followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following control board deficiencies:

90 AFJgl Containment Sump To Spray Pump Valve Leaks By Seat'9 AX(jC1 Accumulator Green Indicating Light Does Not Work

/

89 AX(1 1 Accumulator 1C-SA Discharge Valve Red Indicating Light Not Working 89 ANKR1 Emergency Servic'e Water Pump Low Flow Alarm 90 AJWR1 RWST Channel 4 Spiking

AGUG1 87 APSZ1

"A" RHR Pump High Vibration Alarm ESW Return To NSW Valve Leaks By Seat When Closed

APSY1 NSW Supply To ESW Header

"A" Valve Leaks By Seat When Closed 89 ATMA1 CCW Valve 1CC-147 Has Duel Indication When Shut 89 AYRBl ESW Pump Chamber Lo-Lo Alarm With Level Normal

90 AEGI1 DG High Temp Lube Oil Alarm Came In While Running DG 90 AEGH1 DG High Differential Pressure Fuel Oil Strainer Alarm Came In While Running DG 90 AIKI1 Generator Control Panel High Temperature Alarm, in Alarm No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Safety Systems Walkdown (71710)

The inspector conducted a walkdown of the auxiliary feedwater system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the, system drawing and procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Review of Nonconformance Reports (71707)

SOORs and NCRs were reviewed to verify the following:

TS were complied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports were accomplished or being pursued for completion, generic items were identified and reported, and items were reported as required by the TS.

a.

SOOR 90-114 reported that during the performance of quarterly valve testing for the CCW system on August 23, 1990, a relief valve lifted in the containment header.

Total inventory lost from the CCW system into the containment sump was estimated to be approximately. 350 gallons.

During this test, both CCW pumps were in service and various isolation valves were cycled closed to verify operability.

When valve 1CC-202 (reactor coolant drain tank and excess letdown heatexchanger discharge isolation valve)

was closed, the resultant high pressure in the containment header was sufficient to lift the relief valve.

The licensee subsequently determined that this system alignment could exist following an accident if the inlet isolation valve were to fail open.

This potential single failure and resultant loss of CCW inventory could cause the subsequent loss of both CCW pumps.

This matter was reported to the NRC Operations Center on August 27, 1990.

Although this event happened on August 23, the single failure scenario was not discovered until August

when the event was reviewed further.

The licensee is presently evaluating this situation (PCR-5448, CCW Relief Valve Setpoint Change)

to prevent subsequent relief valve lifting.

In the interim, the licensee has closed the heat exchanger inlet isolation valve ( 1CC-176)

and implemented a caution tag to alert operators of the potential for, the

relief valve to lift.

Since the heatexchangers involved are not required during normal plant operation, this interim action is deemed to be appropriate.

The licensee plans to submit an LER describing this event.

The inspectors will review further licensee actions when the LER is issued.

b.

SOOR 90-115 reported a condition where a

CCW pump could be placed in a runout condition.

Pump runout is a condition which results in low pump discharge pressure combined with high flow, which can cause motor failure by overload.

The licensee discovered this situation during an engineering review of the event described in paragraph 6.a of this report.

The potential for this situation to occur is when the CCW system is aligned for safety injection post accident recirculation (i.e., where a residual heat removal heat exchanger is receiving CCW flow, the CCW non-essential header remains in service, and one of the CCW pumps fail).

Under these conditions, Table 9.2.2-1 and 9.2.2-3 of the FSAR depict that the system flowrate would exceed pump capacity and result in pump runout.

This matter was reported to the NRC Operations Center on August 24, 1990.

Section 9.2.2.2 of the FSAR describes the post accident operation of the CCW system and specifies that the non-essential CCW header be isolated.

Contrary to this, the licensee's emergency procedure EOP-EPP-010, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, allowed the CCW non-essential header to remain in service.

After discovering this potential event, the licensee installed caution tags on the residual heat remov'al heatexchanger cooling water valves to warn operators of the potential for pump runout.

No In addition, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation of this situation (PCR-5459, CCW Pump Runout).

Based upon previously measured system flowrates of 9600 gpm when operated under the above conditions, and discussions with the pump manufacturer (Pacific Pump),

no adverse impact in pump operation is expected when aligned in accordance with procedure EOP-EPP-010.

This evaluation concluded that pump runout would not occur and the information provided in the FSAR was very conservative.

The licensee plans to submit changes to the FSAR reflecting the new post accident operation of the CCW system.

P violations or deviations were identified.

Review of Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Activities (40500)

The inspectors attended selected PNSC meetings to observe committee activities and verify TS requirements with respect to committee composition,.duties, and responsibilities.

Minutes from this meeting were also reviewed to verify accurate documentation.

No violations or deviations were identifie.

Simulator Training Observation (71707)

During the inspection period the inspector witnessed simulator training for licensed RO and SRO personnel.

The current training program increased operator simulator training from 2 weeks per year to 2.5 days per selected training week.

The increased time and periodicity on the simulator should benefit the operators by increasing their efficiency.

The simulator scenarios were'emanding and the post scenario reviews and evaluations were considered to be good.

9.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702

92701)

a.

(Closed)

Violation 400/89-28-02:

Failure to have an adequate procedure for the performance of local leak rate testing which resulted in instrument air contamination.

This item was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/90-02.

The inspectors reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective actions as stated in the licensee's response letter dated January 3,

1990.

b.

(Closed)

Violation 400/90-02-01:

Failure to properly implement procedure OST-1039, Calculation of quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, resulting in inadequate gPTR data calculation.

The inspectors reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective actions as stated in the licensee's response letter dated Harch 23, 1990.

c.

(Closed)

Violation 400/90-02-02:

Failure to calculate the gPTR as required by TS 4.2.4. 1.

The inspectors reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective actions as stated in the licensee's response letter dated Harch 23, 1990.

d.

(Closed)

Violation 400/90-06-02:

Failure to complete post maintenance testing prior to returning inoperable equipment to service.

The inspectors reviewe'd and verified implementation of the corrective

'ctions as stated in the licensee's response letter dated Hay 31, 1990.

e.

(Closed)

Violation 400/90-06-04:

Failure to verify valve leakage following operation of valve 1SI-359.

The inspectors reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective actions as stated in the licensee's response letter dated Hay 30, 1990.

The licensee is pursuing TS changes to change the testing frequency of valve 1SI-35 I

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on September 14, 1990.

During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

Acronyms-and CCTV CCW CFR DG EOP EPP ESW FMP FSAR GPM LER MST NCR NRC NSW OST PCR PNSC QA/QC QPTR RHR RO/SRO RWP RWST SOOR TS WR/JO Initialisms Closed Circuit Television Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Diesel Generator Emergency Operating Procedure End Path Procedure Emergency Service Water Fuel Management Procedure Final Safety Analysis Report Gallons Per Minute Licensee Event Report Maintanance Surveillance Test Non-Conformance Report Nuclear Regulatory Commission Normal Service Water Operations Surveillance Test Plant Change Request Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Quality Assurance/Quality Control Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Residual Heat Removal Reactor Operator/Senior'eactor Op Radiation Work Permit Refueling Water Storage Tank Significant Operational Occurrence Technical Specification Work Request/Job Order erator Report