IR 05000400/1990015
| ML18009A719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A718 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-15, NUDOCS 9011090382 | |
| Download: ML18009A719 (21) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 OCT 23 N6 Report No.:
50-400/90-15 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Inspection Conducted:
September 17-21, 1990 Inspector: ~~M W. H. Sartor, Jr.
License No.:
NPF-63 gg gg C'ate Signed Accompanying Personnel:
F.
NcManus (PNL)
D. Nelson Approved by:
W.
H. Rank)n, C ief Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency response exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the simulated Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC),
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
and Joint Information Center (JIC).
The inspection also included a review of the exercise objectives and scenario details, as well as observation of the licensee's post-exercise critique activities.
The exercise, involving partial participation by State and local governments, was conducted on September 19, 1990, from 3:50 a.m. until 10:48 a.m.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The licensee was fully successful in meeting the exercise objectives and demonstrating the adequacy of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Plan, associated implementing procedures, and the CP8L Corporate Emergency Plan for
'-011090382 P0102~
PDI ADOCI 0 0004
dealing with the scenario events as observed and thereby provide for'he health and safety of the public in such a radiological emergency.
Exercise strengths included the timeliness of notifications to offsite agencies and the performance of a shift turnover to demonstrate the capability to staff emergency facilities for a 24-hour perio REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R.
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- S Bassett, Control Room Lead Controller Boone, Radiological Control Foreman Collins, Operations Manager Floyd, Radiological Control Foreman Garrou, Senior Specialist, Harris Nuclear Project Gibson, Director, Program and Procedures Hindman Jr.,
Manager, Control and Administration Hinnant, Plant General Manager Houston, Communications Controller Indelicato, Project Specialist, Emergency Preparedness and Spent Fuel Management Kiser, Radiological Control Supervisor Morris, Project Engineer, Maintenance Procedures Nevill, Manager, Technical Support Olexik, Manager, Regulatory Compliance Olive, Security Team Leader Reck, Radiological Control, Radiological Control Foreman Richey, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project Ross, Manager, guality Assurance Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiological Control Taylor, Supervisor, Project Services Thompson, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness and Spent Fuel Management Wallace, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance Young, Operation Security Team Leader Other 1 icensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors M. Shannon J.
Tedrow
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test an integrated emergency response capability as well as the basic elements existing within the licensee,
State and local Emergency Plans and organization as requir'ed by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee to demonstrate capabilities required to meet the objectives of this exercise.
The scenario data was consistent throughout the exercise and the controller organization provided exercise messages promptly to the exercise players.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an em'ergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that sufficient staff was available to respond to the emergency.
Approximately midway through the exercise, the licensee demonstrated the capability to staff emergency facilities for a 24-hour period by performing a shift turnover.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1)
unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organization interactions.
The inspector observed that the licensee's on-shift organization was effective in responding to the simulated emergency and their responsibilities were clearly defined.
Adequate staff to assure initial facility accident response was demonstrated for fire response by the plant fire brigade's response to the simulated fire in the emergency service water system building.
The coordinator for offsite fire company response was simulated.
No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(4),
Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to
CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
The licensee's emergency classification system was composed of two subsystems:
the Unusual Event Action Level Yiatrix and the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Network/Flowpath.
The system was used effectively by the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) to classify the emergency; however, the licensee did identify a potential need for clarification in the EAL Network/Flowpath for analysis of the containment barrier.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Yiethods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were effectively used to provide prompt and accurate offsite notifications to the State and local authorities.
The NRC was also notified whenever required.
Early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway of required protective actions would be provided by sounding sirens, activation of tone activated radios within five miles of the plant, and supplemented announcements made through radio and television Emergency Broadcast System (EBS),
sound trucks, bullhorns, and knocking on doors.
The simulated events for this exercise had Chatham, Harnett, Lee and Wake Counties and the State of North Carolina sounding the alert notification sirens in the 10-mile area around the Harris Plant around 7: 15 a.m.
and again at 8: 15 a.m.
An EBS message was broadcast at 7: 18 a.m.
and again at 8: 18 a.m.
The latest EBS message advised the public in the 10-mile area around the plant to take shelter.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency facilities, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the EOF.
The inspector also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.
In general, communication of information occurred in an adequate manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing and operation of the emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.
a ~
b.
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Control Room - The simulated Control Room was in the Fuel Handling Building close to the TSC.
Emergency procedures were readily available and the response was prompt and effective.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was located within the Plant Protected area at Elevation 324'-0" in the Fuel Handling Building.
Protective clothing and portable breathing apparatus are kept in the TSC for personnel who must go to the real Control Room if radiological conditions require protection.
The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by the SEC of the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert condition.
The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities and TSC operations proceeded smoothly.
The TSC appeared to have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff.
Operational Support Center (OSC) -
The OSC was located in the lunchroom of the Service Building.
An inspector noted that status boards indicated teams were formed promptly and dispatched.
The availability of emergency equipment and repair team briefings were not observed by the inspector d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) -
The EOF was located in the Harris Energy and Environmental Center.
The facility appeared to be adequately designed, equipped and staffed to support an emergency response.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of radiological emergency conditions were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and specific criteria in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
In general, these assessments were adequately performed and the results properly employed in the development of mitigating actions.
The activities of onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were not observed by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(10)
and specific criteria in Section II.J of NUREG-0654.
The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the 10-mile emergency planning zone.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted
'a series of post-exercise critiques with players, controllers, and management.
The management critique was attended by exercise controllers, observers, and NRC representatives.
Findings identified during the exercise and items needing corrective action were discussed.
The licensee's critique was detailed and addressed both deficiencies and comments.
The conduct of the critique was consistent with regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Action on Previous Inspector Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed)
IFI 50-400/88-12-02:
Re-evaluate need for having 300kM alternate power source for TSC during a station blackout.
Licensee has re-evaluated the need and determined that additional power is not needed for the TSC.
b.
(Closed)
IFI 50-400/88-12-04:
Examine need for User restrictions to insure ERFIS availability to respond to emergency needs of CR/TSC/EOF.
On October 14, 1988, a plant General Order was effective to provide guidance on the proper usage of the ERFIS Computer by Emergency Organization personnel and as preplanned method of reducing computer loading when it becomes excessive.
c.
(Closed)
IFI 50-400/89-22-01:
SEC and TSC staff were not aggressive in interactive problem solving thus delaying accident mitigation.
During the 1990 annual exercise, the SEC and TSC staff were effective in working together for accident mitigation.
13.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 21, 1990, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection observations.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the license CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY PLAN FOR SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 19, 1990 I.
MISSION AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISE To activate and evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities and other elements of the CP&L Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Plan, associated implementing procedures, and the CP&L Corporate Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Regulation 10CFR50.47(b).
II.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES A.
~Sco e
A simulated accident at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)
which could escalate to a
general emergency and involve planned response and recovery actions to include:
emergency classification; notification of off-site organizations and plant personnel; actions to correct the emergency conditions; and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the accident.
The exercise will simulate an emergency that results in off-site radiological releases.
B.
~0b ectives The 1990 Shearon Harris Emergency Preparedness Exercise will provide an opportunity for emergency response personnel to:
1.
Demonstrate the ability to detect accident conditions, assess and project radiological consequences, and formulate near term mitigating actions.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to identify and classify the emergency in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to perform accident assessment and implement those appropriate mitigating actions
'necessary to place the plant in a
safe and stable condition.
4.
Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing on-site and off-site emergency response organization personnel.
5.
Demonstrate the timeliness and adequacy of the information provided in the initial notifications to state and county agencies.
Actual participation may be simulated.
6.
Demonstrate the capability to make timely and accurate notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Actual participation of the NRC Operations Center may be simulated.
(90-021RAI/ebc)
7.
Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization within the time limits specified within the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
8.. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment, and communication/notification activities.
9.
10.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Operations Support Center in providing additional manpower support and coordination.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations Facility in providing off-site dose assessment, environmental monitoring, protective action recommendations, and evaluation/coordination of off-site activities.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate between emergency response facilities, as well as environmental monitoring teams.
Demonstrate that the radiological, meteorological, and process data transmittal to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility is adequate.
Demonstrate the adequacy of emergency kits and equipment in emergency response facilities.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the equipment utilized for off-site radiological monitoring.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate appropriate off-site protective action recommendations.
Demonstrate that emergency exposure control procedures have been established and are utilized in the protection of emergency workers.
17.
18.
19.
Demonstrate the capability to monitor personnel and equipment for contamination.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate off-site radiological monitoring activities.
Demonstrate the capability to draw samples from the Post Accident Sampling System under simulated elevated radiological conditions.
20.
21.
Demonstrate proper procedure for on-site collection and analysis of samples from radiological monitoring and sampling stations within the plant.
Demonstrate the proper procedures and use of protective measures for entering a
Radiologically Controlled Area under abnormal radiological conditions.
(90-021RAI/ebc)
f 22. Oemonstrate the capability to respond to an emergency commencing at a time between midnight and 6:00 a.m.
23. Oemonstrate" the capability to staff emergency facilities for a
24-hour period by performing a shift turnove SCENARIO NARRATIVE ANNUAL EXERCISE At 4:00 a.m.,
Wednesday, September 19, 1990, the reactor has been operating at 100K power for 198 days continuously.
At 4: 18 a.m., the "A" ESW Pump starts on a pressure switch failure (PI9101A1).
The thrust bearing on the pump dis1ntegrates causing the pump shaft to overheat.
The bear1ng seals lose the1r integrity and o11 begins to seep out of the reservoir.
Ignition of the oil occurs and the fire detection system detects a fire on the "A" ESW Pump at 4:20.
The "A" ESW pump tr1ps at 4:22 and the Control Room will d1sable the "A" emergency diesel generator in accordance with plant procedures.
A plant security guard at post 09 will hear the alarm bell and notify Central, who w111 1n turn notify the Control Room.
The plant f1re brigade w111 be mustered to fight the f1re.
The f1re will be extinguished in about 30 minutes.
At some time after 5:23 a.m., the Control Room may attempt to open Service Water Valve 1SW-39, Normal Serv1ce Water Supply to Header "A", a valve to provide service water to the "A" header.
The valve went shut at 4: 18 separating the stem and disk so that no flow can pass through the valve.
An Alert is expected to be declared at approximately 4:37 based upon a
fire potentially affecting safety related equipment.
The Control Room will call in personnel in order to commence activating the Technical Support Center and the Operational Support Center.
At 5:23 a.m. the "B" Normal Service Water Pump trips due to an overcurrent relay setpo1nt drift.
The "A" NSW pump autostarts and the
"B" Emergency Service Water Pump starts, on low pressure.
At 5:47 a.m. high vibration'is detected on the "B" Reactor Coolant Pump, and the Control Room begins a shutdown of the plant at a rate of 25 MWe per minute in accordance with AOP-018,
"Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions."
At 6: 19, the "B" Reactor Coolant Pump trips and the Metal Impact Monitor System alarms.
The reactor power level is below the single reactor coolant pump trip setpoint (P-8).
Radiation monitors associated with RCS p1p1ng beg1n to alarm.
Charging flow 1ncreases due to an 80 gpm RCS leak into the "A" Steam Generator.
Radiation levels reach 1000 times normal on the fuel breach rad1ation monitors and the Technical Support Center should declare a S1te Emergency once they recognize that the SG tube leak (RCS leakage)
exceeds 50 gpm.
Shutdown of the plant continues at a rate of 25 MWe per minute.
A release begins through the Condensor Vacuum Pump Effluent Treatment System to the Turbine Building Vent Stack.
A dose projection based on the "A" ma1n steam line mon1tor will also exceed the Site Emergency emergency act1on level based on adverse meteorology.
Call out for activation of the Emergency Operations Facility should commence.
EX90.TXT SHNPP (9/19/90)
At about 6:45 electrical loads are transferred to the startup transformers from the un1t auxil1ary transformers and the turbine 1s shut down.
At 7:02, a 300 gpm tube rupture occurs in the "C" Steam Generator and at approximately 7:09, safety injection 1s 1nitiated.
After the Safety Injection, a number of problems develop which may necessitate damage control missions.
The "B" CSIP starts in response to the SI s1gnal and trips due to a failed pump bearing.
"A" CSIP remains operable.
A Damage Control miss1on may be formed to place the
"C" CSIP 1n service.
The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator trips at 7:14 due to an overspeed setpoint drift.
This combined with the loss of "A" Emergency Service Water results in a loss of emergency diesel generating capability.
The "A" CSIP normal miniflow isolation valve (tCS-182)
does not shut and 1ED-95, the containment sump isolation valve, also does not shut.
Neither of the containment isolation valve failures cause a breach of containment because the associated redundant valves operate properly.
At approximately 7: 16, the Control Room attempts to open the Containment Nitrogen Isolation Valve in accordance with procedures but the valve will not open.
At 7:23, the "C" SG PORV opens, followed by the "A" SG PORV, and a
release begins through the PORV.
The "A" PORV closes after one minute but the
"C" PORV remains open.
The "A" PORV opens briefly four more times over the next half hour.
Hain Steam is isolated and the release path through the Turbine Building Vent Stack is isolated.
The Technical Support Center should declare a General Emergency based ind1cations of all three fission product barriers breached.
The offsite protective action recommendation should be to shelter all zones.
Offsite dose projections and measured dose rates, however, will be below the General Emergency Emergency Action Levels.
By 7:58 the
"C" Steam Generator PORV goes shut.
As RCS pressure increases after stopping the initial RCS cooldown, the "C" PORV reopens and causes a water hammer that breaks the piping on the "C" steam line at the PORV block valve outlet.
Steam flow is about 180 KPPH.
This event should prompt a mission to enter the steam tunnel and close the
"C" Steam Generator PORV block valve.
Airborne and area radiation levels in the area of the block valve will be about 15 R/hr with steam and hot vapor clouds necessitating care in protecting workers on the mission.
Completion of the mission will stop the release.
The plant staff 1s in a situation where they must evaluate plant conditions and determine if a subcooled or saturated recovery would prov1de the optimal plant recovery.
Data sheets reflect Branch "A" data which corresponds to operator actions taken 1n response to EPP-021, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant; Saturated Recovery.
Branch "B" data will be used if EPP-020, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant; Subcooled recovery, is being implemented.
EX90.TXT SHNPP (9/19/90)
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