IR 05000400/1987019
| ML18004B860 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1987 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004B859 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-87-19, NUDOCS 8706250331 | |
| Download: ML18004B860 (10) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/87-19 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name.'Harris
License No.:
NPF-63 Inspection Conducted:
April 20 May 20, 1987 Inspectors:
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I Date Signed g )c(sq S.
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1s Date Signed Approved by:
P.
E. Fredricks
, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects-Da e
S gne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas of On-site Follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events; On-site Review Committee; Design, Design Changes and Modifications; Monthly Maintenance Observation; Monthly Surveillance Observation; Plant Tour; Engineered Safety Features Walkdown; and other activities.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted G.
G. Campbell, Manager of Maintenance J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations G.
L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J.
L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support G. A. Myer, General Manager, Milestone Completion D.
L. Tibbitts,'irector, Regulatory Compliance R.
B.
Van jMet',de, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R. A. Watson,! Vice'resident, Harris Nuclear Project J.
L. Willis:!Plant General Manager, Operations Other license'e employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineerin'g personnel and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 20, 1987, with the Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations.
No written material was provided to the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period.
I
.l The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or revi!ewed by the eesident inspectors during this inspection, 3.
On-Site, Follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events (92700)
The inspectors evaluated the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to determine if the details complied with licensee requirements, adequately described the event, identified the root cause of the event, described appropriate corrective action, and addressed any potentially generic implications.
When the licensee identified violations, those LERs were reviewed in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(Closed)
LER 87-03
"AFW Pump Inoperable/Shutdown Mode 4".
When the plant was in hot standby (Mode 3) the licensee found that the lA motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
pump had not satisfactorily passed its flow test. 'he 'licensee declared the pump inoperable and then cooled the plant down to hot shutdown condition (Mode 4).
The licensee attributed the pump's degradation as being,caused by assembly error during the initial installation of the pum As a result of this event the licensee has made improvements to the program affecting the AFW pump flow tests.
The improvements include increasing the frequency of the pump flow testing and requiring a
more prompt review of the test results.
(Closed)
LER 87-04
"Reactor Trip While the Power Level Was Being Reduced Due to One Intermediate Range Channel Which Remained Tripped".
The reactor experienced an automatic trip when the power level was in the process of being reduced to less than ten percent.
The trip was caused by the N-36 intermediate range channel high flux trip bistable; the bistable had been adjusted to values which were too conservative.
The setpoint was near ten percent on the bistable,'herefore it did not reset when the reactor power was being decreased, causing the reactor trip to occur.
The licensee obtained more accurate data for reference and readjusted the bistable trip setpoints.
4.
On-Site Review Committee (40700)
The inspectors attended the regular monthly Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meeting (PNSC).
Prior to attending the meeting the inspectors reviewed the preliminary meeting agenda, dated April 23, 1987.
The agenda outlined the topics which would be discussed during the meeting, including review of the previous meeting's minutes, any special presentations, review of Technical Specificati,ons (TS) required topics, the status of licensing topics, and the status of reportable or potentially reportable items.
The inspectors attended the meeting to observe the conduct of the meeting, and to determine licensee compliance with the,TS concerning the composi-tion of the members present, and if the meeting minutes accurately reflected decisions and recommendations made by the committee.
In general, all subjects on the agenda were discussed in sufficient detail during the meeting, and resolutions were voted on, as required by Adminis-trative Procedure AP-013. 'Additional subjects were discussed during the meeting which were not necessarily shown on the agenda, such as changes which were proposed to the gA program and some secondary system problems experienced at the site
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No violations or deviations were identified in the areas examined.
5.
Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700, 37701)
The inspectors observed in-process work activities involving the modifi-cation of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) piping system.
The modification required that an additional check valve be installed in each of the three AFW lines between the motor-driven pumps and the check valves, which were installed by original design.
During recent weeks the licensee had experienced back leakage through the originally-installed check valves.
License'e personnel stated that the additional check valves should reduce or stop the back leakag The work was initiated on the check valves by Work Request WR87-AMNR1 and the modi fication work package was controlled by Plant Change Request PCR-1286.
The PCR specified the changes that were required, how the changes were to be accomplished and the tests to verify system integrity and flow.
The new valves were four-inch tilt disk check valves manufactured by Anchor Darling Valve Company.
When the valves arrived at the site, they were receipt, inspected and accepted by CP&L inspection personnel and were released to the field as being certified for use in the AFW system.
The resident inspectors reviewed the Weld Data Reports and other records associated with the installation of these valves to verify that the welders were qualified and that hydrostatic tests were conducted per procedure and that upon completion of installation the valves were sufficiently tested.
A flow test was conducted to assure that the AFW system flow rate had not been impaired.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the test and verified that it was controlled by a procedure which contained many of the requirements of the normal Operations Surveillance Test (OST-1087).
OST-1087 is a procedure conducted by the licensee to verify proper AFW pump flow characteristics.
During the modification, several safety reviews were conducted by the licensee.
The reviews included evaluating the test method (modified OST-1087),
installation instructions and design methods used by engi-neering.
The inspectors reviewed the specific design review process used by engineering for the modifications and as a result noted that the design group considered the following points:
FSAR commitments or changes; Procedures which may be affected; Any new tests required, other than those specified in the FSAR; Changes which may result from the modification; Effects on the operating license; Any unreviewed safety questions (per 10CFR 50.59) which may result.
lt was noted that the design engineers also referred to the TS Sections 3.7.1.2, 4.7. 1.2
~ 1 and 6.8, and 'SAR Figure 10.4.7-4.
The affected drawings included the previous FSAR figure noted, plus Drawings 2165-G-044, 2165-G-071 and 2165-G-073 and system flow diagram SF-AF-0544.
Subsequent review will be conducted of the design package for this modifi-ciation.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703, 62700)
Maintenance activities were evaluated during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's activities were not violating any limiting condit'ions for operations, procedures were adequate for the work activi-ties being conducted, tagout and clearance approvals were obtained prior to work initiation, personnel involved with the maintenance activities were qualified to perform the necessary work, parts and materials were properly documented prior to use, gC hold points were established and observed, any post maintenance testing activities were conducted, where required, and the equipment was properly returned to service.
Those activities which were evaluated are as follows:
The inspectors observed in-process maintenance activities being conducted on the main steam line instrumentation pressure loops.
The maintenance was conducted as a
Maintenance Surveillance Test (MST-I-0131) which was authorized by Work Request WR87-DgS192.
The objective of the test was to determine if the main steam line pressure instrumentation loop, which inputs into the engineered safety features actuation system, was operable.
During the test a
problem occurred with the procedure which required that step 7.05 of the procedure be revised.
The inspectors observed that the surveil-lance test personnel were alert in finding that the procedure needed revising.
The test personnel initiated the documentation required to obtain a temporary procedure change.
After the change was approved, the test continued and was satisfactorily completed.
The surveil-lance test was a requirement of TS Section 4.3.2.1.
The containment purge system local leak rate (LLRT) valve 1-CP-3 failed.
The valve was repaired under the controls of WR-87-ANGY2.
, Maintenance personnel disassembled the valve and replaced the packing, and then reassembled the valve.
The post-maintenance testing was successfully completed in accordance with LLRT require-ments.
The boron thermal regeneration system valve CS-D577SN leaked.
The valve maintenance personnel replaced the valve stem 0-rings in accordance with Procedure MPT-M0050.
The valve was then reinspected, found not to leak and placed back into service.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas
'inspected.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726, 61700)
The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance tests including al l aspects of two major surveillance tests involving safety-related systems.
The inspectors verified that the appropriate administrative approvals were provided prior to the tests being initiated; test personnel
were qualified; test equipment was properly calibrated; test data met TS requirements; identified test deficiencies were resolved and upon test completion the systems were properly returned to service.
The two survei llances which were evaluated are as follows:
The inspectors observed in-process Operational Surveillance Testing, (OST) 1085, being conducted on emergency diesel generator 1A-SA..
The test was conducted to comply with TS Sections 3.8. 1;1, 3.8. 1.2 and FSAR Sections 9.4 and 9.5.
Two of the operation procedures which were used during the test included OP-155,
"Emergency Diesel Generator System",
and OP-139,
"Service Water System".
OST 1085 is a
semiannual operational surveillance test which satisfies specific commitments made by the licensee to the Transamerica Delaval Owner's Group, requiring the diesel generator to receive a
6200 - 6400 kW electrical load testing within a specific time frame (60 seconds).
The generator is then required to maintain this electrical load for at least 60 minutes.
In addition to satisfying the owner's group commitment, OST 1085 also satisfies the licensee's monthly surveil-lance test commitment requirements specified in OST 1013'he test was conducted with no unsatisfactory conditions identified.
I The inspectors observed the licensee performance of OST 1215 con-ducted on the emergency service water (ESW)
system.
The OST was performed to meet the commitments as outlined in TS 3.7.4, 4.7.4.a and 4.0.5.
OST 1215 is a quarterly surveillance to verify the operability of the ESW system and components.
The inspectors reviewed the OST procedure and its supportive procedures, OP-139
"Service Water System" and OP-169
"Containment Cooling and Venti-lation".
This OST verified that the ESW valves would reposition to their emergency position within a specified time and that the ESW pumps would start as required.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
8.
Plant Tour (71707, 71710, 62703, 61707)
The inspectors conducted numerous plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee met the requirements and commitments as specified in its license.
These tours were conducted to ensure that plant operations personnel were aware of current plant status; equipment out of service was properly documented and tagged; radiation controls were established as required; spare equipment and material was properly stored and controlled; there were no unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint settings; valves and breakers required for safe operation were in the correct position; firefighting equipment was being maintained properly; and equipment requiring calibra-tion was curren The tours included reviews of the shift foremen'
daily logs and other" control room logs, observation of shift turnovers, interviews of on-shift operators, review of clearance center tagout logs, system status logs, chemistry and health physics logs and the control room daily status board.
Ouring all observed instances, the on-shift operations personnel appeared alert and aware of changing plant conditions.
The inspectors toured various plant spaces to verify that these spaces were in a condition which would not degrade the performance capabilities of any required equipment.
Emphasis was placed on checking the condition of electrical and instrumentation cabinets to ensure that they were free of foreign and loose debris, material, unauthorized jumpers or rodent infestations
The inspectors evaluated the site security measures by observing personnel inside the vital and protected areas to ensure that personnel were authorized access, security personnel were alert and attentive, those persons performing vehicular 'searches were thorough and systematic and prompt responses were provided to security alarm conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
Engineered Safety Features Malkdown (71710)
The inspectors verified the operability of one of the engineered safety features (ESF)
systems.
The containment spray system was selected for verification and all of the accessible po'rtions of the system were walked down.
The inspectors reviewed the most recent valve lineup sheets for the system and confirmed that the accessible valves, pumps and electrical circuit breakers were aligned as described on the sheets.
The inspectors veri'fied that the valve lineup sheets for this system were completed and maintained on file in accordance with General Procedure GP-002,
"Normal Plant Heatup from Cold Solid to Hot Subcritical Mode 5 to Mode 3", and Administrative Procedure AP-112,
"Containment Spray System".
This review included the current equipment status, any out of service or deficient equipment, and both the hot and cold minimum equipment list.
The inspectors verified that the -containment spray system was operational as required by TS 3.6.2.1.
No violations or deviations were iden ified in the areas inspecte.
Other Activities (71707)
On May 1, 1987, the licensee provided a presentation to Region II management in the Region II office.
The presentation addressed the following points:
status of the start-up test program, summary of reactor trips due to feedwater and condensate problems, actions being taken to improve performance of the feedwater system, and status of the security system improvement program.
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On May 8, 1987, the licensee briefed the resident inspectors con-cerning the Harris Plant piping erosion/corrosion project.
The project is being developed by the licensee in response to the feedwater piping system failure experienced at the Surry Plant.
On May 11, 1987, the inspectors attended an entrance meeting between the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
and the licensee.
'he licensee briefed the INPO staff on the status of the plant, the site organization, operations, maintenance, technical support, and environmental and radiation control.
INPO personnel then briefed the licensee concerning the members of the INPO team, the general areas to be evaluated and the proposed time and date for their exit meeting.