IR 05000400/1987013
| ML18004B788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1987 |
| From: | Kahle J, Stoddart P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004B787 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-400-87-13, NUDOCS 8704290042 | |
| Download: ML18004B788 (22) | |
Text
~gh REgy,Ip0 A,
Iv g, n ++*<<+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N,W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
~Q h
W i
Iyk Ii
'I Report No.:
50-400/87-13 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 License No.:
NPF-53 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Inspection Cond
Mare 23-27, 1987
)
Inspector:
~
~
r Approved by:
C.
J.
B>
Ka e, Sect on C ref Divisio of Radiation Safety and Safeguards I
-
k~ f%%uS7 ate igne ro g
ate gne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of radwaste system startup, liquid and gaseous radwaste treatment systems, plant radiochemical analyses, and NUREG-0737 items.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
87oqp9pop~
8 o ADQcK Pgppo~oo PDa
'
J
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager
- 0. N. Hudson, Senior Engineer, Regulatory Compliance
- G. Nathan, Project Specialist
- J.
M. Bradley, Radwaste Supervisor
- J. R. Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control (E8RC)
- T. Lentz, Engineering Supervisor
- E. Morgan, Principal Specialist, E8RC
- A. Poland, Project Specialist, Environmental and Chemistry (E8C)
- G. L. Forehand, Director, guality Assurance/guality Control
- H. Lipa, Supervisor, E8C
- C. L. McKenzie, Principal guality Assurance Engineer J.
Leonard, Project Specialist, E8C T. Woenker, Engineer, E8C R. Denny, Engineer, E8C H. Story, Engineer, E&C W. Lei, Senior Specialist, E8RC P. Hadel, Radiation Monitoring System Maintenance P. Doss, Project.Specialist, Chemistry Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and office personnel.
Other Organizations L. Aspray, Multi-Amp Services, Inc.
NRC Resident Inspector
- G. Maxwell
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 27, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed.in detail the inspection findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The wide-range monitor for gaseous, particulate, and iodine effluents from the Turbine Building Vent continued to have moisture condensation problems causing inoperability.
Correction of the problems of this Technical Specification monitor was identified as an Unresolved Item (URI).
Levels of gross alpha. activity concentrations. in reactor coolant sample analyses were identified as an Inspector Followup Item ( IFI).
Modifications to computer software for the radiation monitoring system resulted in improved
performance and reliability but full testing had not been completed.
Certain portions of the liquid radwaste treatment system intended for treatment of secondary coolant had not completed startup testing; alternate treatment paths were provided and the items of equipment not fully tested were identified as an IFI.
Principal components of the liquid and gaseous radwaste system appeared to be operating satisfactorily and procedures and analyses appeared to be adequate.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the'nspector during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
Unreso1 ved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 6,
The Turbine Building wide-range radioactive gaseous effluent monitor, previously identified as IFI 50-400/86-79-06, continued to have disabling moisture problems and licensee corrective measures did not prove to be adequate.
This concern was made an unresolved item.
Primary Coolant Chemistry and Radiochemistry (84521)
The inspector reviewed daily chemistry reports for the period of-March 9-27, 1987, and discussed analytical results with chemistry personnel.
Where measured concentrations of certain chemical parameters were noted to be outside of specified bounds, causes were appropriately identified, concerned supervision had been notified and where feasible, corrective measures had been taken.
The inspector reviewed selected radiochemistry analyses of primary coolant for the period of January 30, 1987, through March 26, 1987.
Analyses appeared to have been completed in conformance with plant procedures.
The inspector noted that alpha radioactivity. concentrations appeared to be substantially higher than would be expected during plant startup.
Licensee representatives stated that analytical counting procedures and equipment would be reviewed and evaluated for possible errors.
The inspector advised licensee representatives that future results would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(Opened)
IFI 50-400/87-13-01, Review and evaluate alpha activity trends in primary coolant radioactivity analyses.
No violations or deviations were identifie Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Monitoring, Sampling and Analysis (84521, 84723, 84724)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's programs for the monitoring, sampling and analysis of liquid and gaseous radioactive effluent streams.
The liquid and gaseous effluent monitors are integrated together with area radiation monitors into the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) employed at Shearon Harris.
The inspector reviewed the maintenance records of the eight principal effluent release point monitors in the
'RMS.
Routine maintenance checks were scheduled to be performed at 3-month and 18-month intervals.
'The 3-month maintenance checks, had been performed once since the "baseline" checks made prior 'to plant startup.
At the time of the inspection, only the baseline checks for the 18-month maintenance checks had been made since the plant had not been operational long enough for 18-month checks to be due.
Deficiencies noted during baseline and quarterly maintenance checks included the need to move a
power feed conduit which had been routed in a manner blocking removal of a detector for replacement in the event replacement was needed, replacement of a
low-range gamma radiation detector in an accident radiation monitor, and the failure of a low volume air pump in an accident radiation monitor.
The wide-range gaseous effluent monitor for the Turbine Building vent monitors noble gases, particulates, and radioiodines in the turbine building ventilation exhaust system.
As a result of excessive moisture condensation in the sampling line and in monitor internals, an IFI 50-400/86-79-06 was identified in a previous inspection.
The inspector reviewed this matter during Inspection Report No. 50-400/87-03, during which it was noted that licensee efforts to correct the problem had not been successful.
During the current inspection, the inspector noted that outages of the same monitor had been the subject of two Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
(86-010-00 and 86-005-00),
that the monitor had been declared inoperable on the basis of Technical Specification requirements on March 27, 1987, and again on March 25, 1987, and that a third LER on the same monitor was being prepared at the time of the inspection.
On March 25, 1987, the inspector observed maintenance work in-progress on the monitor and was shown a water-logged charcoal cartridge which had just been removed from the monitor; licensee maintenance personnel also told the inspector that water had damaged the cadmium-telluride beta detector used to detect and measure noble gases.
Based on the above, the inspector informed licensee representatives, at the exit meeting, on March 27, 1987, that the IFI 50-400/86-79-06 would be closed but that an URI 50-400/87-13-02 would be opened for the purpose of obtaining additional information concerning the licensee's proposed measures for the correction of the monitor's moisture problem.
Such information is required to determine whether the monitor is capable of meeting its Technical specification function, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), or if a violation or deviation is involved.
In a telephone conversation on April 9, 1987, the licensee committed to
resolve the moisture-related operability problem by June 15, 1987.
The resolution of this matter will be reviewed at a later date.
The inspector reviewed liquid radwaste release permits for the weeks of March 9-15, 1987, and February 23 - March 1, 1987.
The inspector noted that both the number of releases and the quantities of liquid involved were usually high.
From March 9 to March 15, 1987, 18 batches totaling 364,404 gallons were processed and from February 23 to March 1, 1987, 22 batches totalling 437,059 gallons were processed.
A licensee representative stated that most of the volume resulted from cleaning and flushing of systems to remove construction debris and sludge from tanks, process equipment, and transfer lines and that the volume was expected to.
decrease substantially when cleaning was completed.
The licensee has employed Kurz mass flow probes to measure air/gas flow velocities in principal effluent release stacks as well, as in gaseous effluent monitors to determine volumetric flow.
Licensee representatives stated that a substantial number of 'Kurz probes have failed since the monitoring systems were made operational about October 1,
1986.
In one case, 3 out of 9 probes in one stack sampling system were found to have failed.
The cause or causes of failure had not been determined at the time of inspection but failure is suspected to be the result of aa manufacturer's design change from a ceramic flow element to a stainless steel element.
The licensee, as a result of multiple failures of the Kurz probes, is considering a
FSAR revision to either (1)
reduce the number probes in each stack sampling system, (2) persuade the manufacturer to go back to making ceramic probes, or (3) replace the Kurz probes with an alternate device.
During the inspector's review of the liquid effluent monitoring system and in discussions with licensee personnel, it was determined that the Turbine Building Drain Monitor (1 MD-3528)
was not functioning properly.
The Turbine Building Drain Line was not designed as a continuous release system, with the result that at times no flow was present, while at other times, the line could be dry and filled with air.
When filled with air, the pump can lose its "prime" and could incur damage if run in a dry condition for an extended period of time.
When discharge water flow is resumed, the pump does not re-establish its "prime" until a substantial portion of the discharge flow is beyond the sampling point and therefore the sample may not be fully representative of the discharge.
The licensee had recognized the problem and had issued Plant Change Request (PCR)
664 to resolve the problem.
The inspector will review licensee action on this matter at a later'ate.
(Opened)
URI 50-420/87-13-02:
Review status of Turbine Building wide-range radioactive effluent monitor and licensee commitment to resolve moisture condensation problem by June 15, 1987.
(Opened)
IFI 50-400/87-13-03:
Review corrective actions initiated by licensee to achieve representative sampling by the Turbine Building Drain Monitor 1 MD-352 No violations or deviations were identified.
Ventilation Systems (84724)
At about 0900 on the morning of March 25, 1987, licensee personnel discovered that the impeller assembly of an air supply fan serving the Reactor Auxiliary Building had undergone a violent disintegration at an undetermined time and date.
Personnel found, fragments of the cast aluminum fan blades inside the air duct as much as 30 feet upstream and downstream of the fan =location.
The duct internals, flow elements, and duct walls were extensively damaged.
However, no fragments penetrated the duct walls, no personnel injuries occurred, and no adjoining equipment was damaged.
The fan was not a Technical Specification item.
No violations or deviations were identified.
HEPA Filter and Charcoal Adsorber Ventilation Exhaust Treatment Systems (84521, 84724)
The inspector and plant personnel discussed the operation and performa'nce of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers in plant ventilation exhaust treatment systems.
The systems were stated to be operating satisfactorily and that differential pressures across filter banks and charcoal adsorber s were within anticipated ranges.
Visual inspections appeared normal, with no evidence of charcoal fines leakage from the bulk-loaded systems.
One unit described in the FSAR had not yet been installed.
This was Unit R-13 which will service the
"hot" machine shop, which was not complete at the time of the inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Liquid Radwaste System Operation (84723, 84521)
The inspector discussed operation.of the liquid radwaste processing systems with plant personnel and inspected the various items of process equipment.
Three Westinghouse stainless-steel-body evaporators, each with
gpm capacity, were provided in the plant design.
One was utilized in the
"high purity" equipment drains system, one in the boron recovery system (BRS),
and one was being held in reserve as a
spare for the BRS evaporator.
Two additional
gpm evaporators were provided for secondary coolant system wastes but had not been successfully tested as a result of unidentified vibration problems.
At the time of the inspection, secondary wastes
. were routed to the spare floor drain tanks for pre-release analysis.
If radioactivity levels were sufficiently low, tank contents were filtered and released; if not, tank contents were treated through
N mixed bed demineralizers, analyzed at waste monitor tanks, and released if post-treatment analyses were satisfactory.
l Three reverse-osmosis (RO) units were provided in the plant design, one
'30-gpm unit for laundry and hot shower waste and two 30-gpm units for floor drain wastes.
Wastes from the laundry and hot shower system were filtered through stacked etched-disc 5 micron filters to remove particulates and then routed to a
RO unit.
Downstream. of the RO unit, the waste stream was treated through a
50 ft~ mixed-bed demineralizer before being stored in a sampling tank for sampling and pre-release analysis.
Wastes from floor drains were treated in a similar manner through separate process systems.
At the time of the inspection, the RO units were still being tested and were being bypassed, with system flows going directly from the filters to the demineralizers.
The inspector noted that the use of filters and demineralizers only was considered acceptable, provided that the product met rele'ase criteria.
h1ixed bed nonregenerable demineralizers were provided for final cleanup or
"polishing" of all. radwaste streams.
Depending on design flow rates of each system, resin capacities ranged from 20 ft~ to 70 ft~.
At the time of inspection, filtration and demineralization were being used to process radwastes due to the low concentrations of dissolved solids present; evaporators and RO units were bypassed until needed.
The inspector discussed operational characteristics of evaporators and reverse osmosis units with licensee representatives.
Licensee representatives acknowledged that industry experience with evaporators and reverse osmosis units in radwaste processing had generally not been good but maintained that where adequate training, process control, and competent personnel had been used, such systems had been successfully operated.
The inspector noted that training and procedures in radwaste processing appeared to be adequate and that discussions with operating personnel appeared to confirm'
high level of knowledge of systems and system operation and that operating personnel appeared to be competent and highly motivated.
Radwaste solidification systems had not undergone preoperational testing at the time of the inspection.
Licensee representatives estimated that the solidification systems would not be needed prior to January 1988.
The system was designed to utilize a fluidized bed dryer to process evaporator bottoms and resins by fluidized bed reaction with pre-heated gases.
The dryer is designed to convert these wastes to a solid granular material, thereby achieving maximum volume reduction.
The solid granular product would be transferred to a solidification unit where it would be converted into a solid mass using an organic polymer.
An alternative system was provided which would use cement solidification.
Preoperational testing was being delayed pending results of testing reported to be in progress at another facility.
In the event that the fluidized bed dryer does not function as designed, or if the tests
'in progress at another facility show the principle of
operation to be impractical for application to nuclear power plants, the licensee has installed connections which would permit a portable vendor system to. be brought onsite for resin dewatering and for waste solidification.
The inspector reviewed the circumstances involved in a minor contaminated liquid radwaste intrusion on the floor of the 211'evel of the Waste Processing Building (WPB).
The licensee's guality Assurance Surveillance Report (887-054)
discussed the factors contributing to contamination of portions of Level 211" on March 4, 1987.
Water determined to be slightly contaminated was found in the vicinity of floor drains near the floor drain'ank area.
It was determined that the waste holdup tank had been drained into the floor drain sumps on Level 211'or transfer to the floor drain tanks; this had been done to facilitate removal of construction debris and sludge from the bottom of the waste holdup tank.
At the same time, work requests had been written for correction of problems with the
"G" and
"H" floor drain sump pumps, which are both located in same cubicle.
Maintenance asked the radwaste control room operator to issue a clearance tag on "G" sump to permit necessary repair work, which took
"G" pump out of service.
Because the area around the pumps was cramped, maintenance personnel disconnected and physically removed the floor drain sump's high level alarm mechanism to gain access to "G" pump, but failed to notify the radwaste control room that this had been done.
This caused the radwaste control room to lose their primary means of notification or alarm concerning the high level in the sump.
With the sump at a level in excess of the high level alarm setpoint, waste backed up through floor drains close to the sump location, where it was observed by plant personnel, who initiated remedial action.
Contaminated areas resulting from the overflow were decontaminated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Actions taken by the licensee to prevent reoccurrence included discussion with both the radwaste and maintenance supervisors.
Discussions were also held with maintenance and radwaste personnel on the importance of notifying responsible persons in the event of taking any item of equipment or auxiliary equipment, such as high level alarms, out of service and in following procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Gaseous Radwaste System Operation (84521, 84724)
The inspector discussed operation of the gaseous radwaste processing systems with plant personnel and inspected the various items of process equipment.
The principal gaseous waste process system is the reactor cover gas system, which is designed to function as a closed loop system.
The system contains ten decay tanks, eight of which are utilized in normal operation and two of which are reserved for shutdown and startup use.
The number of
tanks and.their relatively large size are unusual for a single unit plant, but.were originally provided for a 4-unit site.
The closed loop cover gas system incorporates redundant compressors and catalytic recombiners.
The recombiners function by catalytically recombining hydrogen and oxygen to form water.
The percentages of free oxygen and free hydrogen in the cover gas can be controlled through the recombiner, in effect limiting the quantity of gas needed to be added to the cover gas system during operation and minimizing both the potential hazards of explosive mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen and the need to
"bleed-off" excess gases.
With - a closed-loop cover gas system incorporating a
recombiner and adequate gas decay tank storage, the largest potential source of radioactive gases released to the environment is minimized and the only remaining significant sources of gaseous effluents are the leakage of reactor coolant into containment and into the reactor auxiliary building atmosphere, gases vented from liquid radwaste treatment systems, and, in the event of primary coolant to secondary coolant leakage, release of noble gases from the condenser air removal system.
The gaseous waste systems appeared to be functioning properly and no releases had been made from the waste decay tanks.
In the absence of.
releases from the decay tanks, no comparison of effluent monitor readings to decay tank sample analyses could be made.
All systems appeared to be operating in accordance with plant design.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS)
(84723)
In Inspection Report No. 87-03, it was noted that a modified metering valve assembly had been installed in the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
on January 7,
1987.
During the current inspection, the inspector discussed additional PASS test experience with system engineers.
The engineers expressed concern that overall accuracy of the boron sampling and analysis procedure, using the high dilution factors associated with the type of sampling employed, had resulted in accuracies of +12 percent whereas the guidelines contained in a 1982 NRR letter setting forth PASS evaluation criteria provided that PWR boron analyses should be accurate within +5 percent.
On April 7, 1987, the inspector discussed this matter with NRR Chemical Engineering personnel who had performed the safety evaluation on the Shearon Harris PASS and was informed that the current PASS criteria applicable to high dilution sampling and analysis systems and procedures were less -restrictive than for undiluted boron sampling and analysis and that
+12 percent would be considered acceptable for high dilution 'systems.
No violations or deviations were identifie Delayed Preoperational Test Programs (84523, 84524)
In a letter dated December 19, 1986, from R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Project, CPSL, to Dr. Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, the licensee notified NRC of the delayed preoperation test program status of three systems, none of which were safety related.
The three systems were:
(1) Secondary Waste Treatment, (2) Solid Waste Processing System; and (3)
Radiation Monitoring Computer.
The inspector reviewed the current status of these three systems during this inspection.
In the secondary waste system, two 15 gpm evaporators had not been fully tested due to excessive vibration, the cause of which had not been determined.
These evaporators were provided for treatment of secondary-coolant-related wastes and are not projected to be needed unless significant primary-to-secondary leaks occur in the steam generators.
The preoperational testing and startup of these evaporators will be reviewed at a later date.
The licensee has delayed preoperational testing of a fluidized bed dryer pending outcome of developmental testing of a similar unit at another facility.
Based on preliminary tests at the other facility, there is some question as to the operability of fluidized bed dryers in the volume reduction of ion exchange resins.
Until the system can be shown feasible, the licensee had delayed activation and testing of the dryer.
This matter will be reviewed at a later date.
In discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee had received about March 26, 1987, modified computer software from the vendor, which the vendor stated would solve an existing problem of data overload on the four data processor consoles in the RMS.
As of the end date of the inspection, the licensee had initiated testing of the modified software and it appeared to be operating satisfactorily.
It was expected that testing and verification of the software would require six to eight weeks.
This matter will be inspected at a later date.
(Opened)
IFI 50-400/87-13-04; Review delayed preoperational testing of evaporators in the secondary liquid radwaste system.
(Opened)
IFI 50-400/87-'3-05; Review delayed preoperational testing of. the radwaste solidification system.
(Opened)
IFI 50-400/87-13-06; Review installation and testing of modified computer software in the radiation monitoring computer of the RMS.
No violations or deviations were'dentifie Inspector Followup Items and Licensee Event Reports (84723, 84724, 84521, 92701)
(Closed), LER 86-005-00.
At 8:00 a.m.
on November 8, 1986, maintenance outage personnel removed electrical power from power panels supplying power to two temporary portable samplers on Process Building Vent Tanks
and 5A and to the normal sample pump for the Turbine Building Vent Stack.
Power was restored to the pumps servicing the WPB stacks at 2:00 p.m.
on November 8,
1986, and to the Turbine Building pump at 8:50 a.m.
on November 8, 1986.
The cause was attributed to personnel error since the personnel involved were not aware that the affected panel was the power supply to the p'umps and did not adequately review the potential consequences of the outage.
Since the two sample pumps on the WPB stacks were operating under -a Technical Specification action statement, the action required was-suspension of effluent releases via that pathway; the releases were terminated until sampling was re-established at 2:00 p.m.
The effluent release from the Turbine Building was not suspended since the length of the TB stack monitor outage did not exceed the 12-hour sampling requirement for noble gases.
Corrective actions instituted by the licensee included use of caution tags on the power panels used for the temporary samples.
Procedures were revised accordingly and per'sonnel instructed on tag practices.
Based on the licensee's report and on discussion with plant personnel, the inspector determined that the,licensee's actions were appropriate.
This matter is considered closed.
(Closed)
Licensee Event Report 86-010-00.
This matter concerned the missing of a
gas grab sample from the TB vent, required by Technical
,Specification Action Statement 47 of Table 3.3-13.
The action required grab samples to be collected and analyzed at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> intervals during any period in which the Turbine Building Vent Stack Radiation Monitor (RM-1TV-3534-1)
was out-of-service.
The monitor had been removed from service for maintenance at approximately noon on December 15, 1986, and samples at 12-hour intervals were initiated at 5:00 p.m.
on December 15, 1986.
The sample required for 5:00 a.m.
on December 18, 1986, was missed due to technician involvement in other activities; the missed sample was recognized at 11.:00 a.m.
on December 18,,1986, and a
sample was immediately drawn and analyzed.
At that date, the plant had not yet gone critical and there was no possibility of an undetected radioactive release by the affected pathway.
Actions to prevent a reoccurrence included:
(1)
counseling of personnel on attention to routine and special sampling requirements; (2) the Shift Turnover Procedures were revised to include logs of completion of work/tasks scheduled for each shift; and (3)
supervisory reviews of completed work were enhanced.
Based on the licensee's report and on discussions with plant operating personnel, the
inspector determined that the licensee's actions were appropriate.
This matter is considered closed.
(Closed)
IFI, 50-400/85-09-32:
Review functions of area and process radiation monitors.
This topic was reviewed in detail in Inspection Report No. 50-400/87-03 (January 13-14, 1987), 50-400/86-79 (September
October 3,
1986, October 15-17, 1986, and October 27-28, 1986),
50-400/86-54 (June 23-27, 1986),
and 50-400/85-44 (November 5-8, 1985),
as well as in the current Inspection Report No. 50-400/87-13 (March 23-27, 1987).
Based on the discussion in Paragraph 6 of this inspection (50-400/87-13)
and in the references cited, this matter is considered closed.
(Closed)
IFI 85-16-09:
II.B.3 Post Accident Sampling System Capability.
This topic was reviewed in detail in previous inspections, as cited above.
The pre-operational review of post accident sampling system-capability showed the design and installation of the PASS to be adequate.
Pre-operational tests indicated that the system was capable of functioning as designed.
The PASS is scheduled for an operational evaluation by Region II when the plant has operated for at least 30 consecutive days at full power; this test will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 86-79-05.
Inspector Followup Item 85-16-09 is considered closed.
(Closed)
IFI 85-16-15:
II.E.1 Subparts (2A)
and (2B)
Effluent Radiological Monitoring Sampling and Analysis.
This matter was erroneously entered, in the Tracking System as II.E. 1 and should have been identified as II.F.1, Subparts (2A) and (2B).
This matter was discussed and closed in Inspection Report No. 50-400/87-03, Section 7,
Pages 4,5 and 6, issued February 9, 1987.
This matter is considered closed.
(Open) IFI 50-400/86-79-05:
Evaluate PASS operation and performance after the reactor has operated at least 30 consecutive days at full power.
As of the end date of the inspection, the reactor had not been operated in excess of 50 percent of full power.
This matter remains open.
(Closed)
IFI 50-400/86-79-06:
Review Turbine Building effluent air monitor after plant startup to determine if corrective measures have resolved problem of condensation.
In Paragraph 6 of this inspection report, the status of this, matter was changed to an Unresolved Item 50-400/87-13-02.
On that basis, IFI 50-400/86-79-06 is considered closed.
(Closed)
IFI 50-400/86-79-07:
Review results of iodine aerosol sample loss test or evaluation through the post-accident containment atmosphere sampling system line shared with the containment hydrogen sampling system.
A licensee contractor performed a series of evaluations on the sampling line in question and also on sampling lines for. the reactor auxiliary building vent and the turbine building vent.
The inspector reviewed data from calculations on the containment atmosphere sampling lines dated December 31, 1986, and January 15, 1987.
For worst case conditions, the transmission losses of elemental iodine through the sampling lines in question ranged from about 10 percent (89 percent transmitted)
up to a
factor of about ten (10 percent transmitted).
These values are consistent with values obtained elsewhere both by calculation methods and by measurements under controlled laboratory co'nditions.
The evaluation was considered to be both reasonable and appropriate and satisfied the concerns initially raised in this matter.
This matter is considered closed.