IR 05000400/1987010
| ML18004B783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1987 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004B782 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-87-10, NUDOCS 8704280505 | |
| Download: ML18004B783 (12) | |
Text
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<<g UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,G Eo RG IA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/87-10 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
License No.:
NPF-63 Inspection Conducted:
bruary 20 - March'20, 1987 Inspectors:
P P
urris Approved by:
P.
E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects 17 sr Date Signed
'i/ l (8"7 Date Signed
~~ p-7 D te igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved 1nspection in the areas of Licensee Action on Inspector Follow-up Items,
CFR Part 21 Inspections, Onsite Follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events; Design, Design Changes and Modifications; Monthly Maintenance Observation and Maintenance Program Evaluation, Operational Safety, Verificati'on; and Other Activities.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8704280505 870407 PDR ADOCK 05000400
T
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
'.
L'; Collins,. Manager, Operations G. L. Forehand Director, QA/QC J.
L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations L. I'. Eoflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support f. L. Moseley, Jr.,
Manager, Operations QA/QC G. A. Myer, General'anager, Milestone Completion M. F. Thompson, Jr., Manager, Engineering Management D. L. Tibbitts, Diiector, Regulatory Compliance R.
B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R; A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J.
L". Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized, on March 25, 1987, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
No written material was provided to the.licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Inspector Follow-up Items (92701)
(Closed)
Inspector Fol low-up Item 400/86-85-02
"Exerci se Weakness Failure of the Control Room Staff to Demonstrate Technical Specification and'rocedural Compliance During Cooldown".
The licensee has required that the applicable sections of Procedure GP-007, titled
"Normal Plant Cooldown",
become part of the required reading for plant operators.
Also, the licensee has placed more emphasis on operators complying with procedural requirements.
During the February 28, 1987 emergency preparedness'xercise, as well as other times during, this reporting period, the resident inspectors iaterviewed members of the contro1 room operations staff.
As a result the inspectors determined that the operators are familiar with the Technical Specification and procedural limitations regarding plant cooldown.
This item is close ~0
4.
CFR Part 21 Inspections (36100)
The inspectors reviewed the following licensee-identified Part 21 items to ascertain their status.
a 0 (Closed)
Item 400/P21-86-06
"ITT Air Operated Diaphragm Valves".
This item was evaluated by the licensee and reported as a potential Construction Deficiency as outlined per
CFR 50.55ge).
The item was identified by the licensee as 400/CDR-84-188.
A follow-up inspection was conducted by Region II personnel and the item was closed in Region II report 400/86-62.
The inspection, which was conducted to close 400/CDR-84;188, provided the required evaluation to close item 400/P21-86-06.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Item 400/P21-85-04
"TDI Diesel Valve Spring Failure".
Item 400/P21-85-04 was identified by the licensee as a Construction Deficiency per
CFR 50.55(e).
The deficiency, 400/CDR-85-23, was tracked and a
follow-up inspection was conducted by Region II personnel.
The deficiency was documented and closed in Region II report 400/86-50 in June 1986.
The close out inspection of this deficiency provided the required evaluation to close item 400/P21-85-04.
This item is closed.
c ~
(Cl osed)
Items 400/P21-84-01 and 400/P21-84-03
"Missile Shield Doors - Calculation Errors".
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the conditions identified by the above reports.
The inspectors found that the licensee documented its final evaluation on CP&L letter to Region II dated January, ll, 1987, and on a site Nonconformance Report numbered NCR84-1836.
The CP&L and EBASCO engineering evaluation concluded that the calculation errors which W. J.
Wooley Company reported are not considered to be reportable per 10 CFR, Part 21.
The calculation errors were considered not to have any safety-significant impact on the plant if they had gone undetected.
EBASCO engineering prepared calculations in addition to those documented by the W. J. Wooley Company.
EBASCO concluded that their calculations, based on an acceptable method but one which was less conservative, found that the missile shiel'd door designs are within the allowable limits required by the FSAR.
These items are closed.
(Closed)
400/P21-86-05
"Aluminum Material Certification Technical Noncompliance".
CP&L Reportability Review Request Evaluation (RRRE)86-018 dated August 20, 1986, found that this item was not reportable based on the vendor's (Krueger)
subsequent review of material test ancf chemical comparisons.
These reviews determined that the material batches meet or exceed the requirements of ASTM-B 221.
An evaluation of the material tensile tests indicates that the material in question exceeds ASTM-B 221 tensile requirements.
This item is close (Cl osed)
400/P21-86-08
"ITE/Gould Di sconnect Switch Potential Failure".
RRRE 86-009 dated June 19, 1986, found that this item was not reportable based on the licensee's completion of the vendor's recommended test as specified in Telemecanique's letter dated May 29, 1986.
These tests proved the operability of these disconnect switches by verifying that the switches would close as required.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
400/P21-86-03
"K-1 Relay, in the Diesel Generator Voltage Regulator".
The licensee has performed an analysis for the K-1 relay on the Harri s diesel generator control system.
The analysis was based'n physical data collected and evaluated which proved that the suspect" K-1 relay could meet the designed voltage rating of 100 vdc-140 vdc.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
400/P21"85-03
"Westinghouse Safety Grade Core Exit Thermo-couples."
This item was evaluated and reported per
CFR 50 '5(e);
the item was identified as 400/CDR-85-215.
Region II personnel conducted a
follow-up inspection on this CDR and closed it in Region II report 400/86-88.
Based on this previous evaluation, this item is closed.
(Closed)
400/P21-85-02
"Standby Diesel Crankcase Oil Plugs".
The licensee evaluated this item and reported it per
CFR 50.55(e);
the item was identified as 400/CDR-85-211.
Region. II personnel conducted a follow-up inspection on this CDR and closed it in Region II report 400/85-35.
Based on this previous evaluation, this item is closed.
(Open) 400/P21-86-02 "Failure of Lube Oil Sump Tank Foot Valve on TDI Diesels".
The licensee informed the inspectors that this item was still under evaluation by the engineering section; they were waiting for analysis of the fiber liner by the vendor.
This item will be evaluated during future inspections.
(Open)
400/P21-86-07
"TDI Time Delay Relays".
The licensee informed the inspectors that this item had been tested and evaluated by the engineering section and determined not to exhibit problems as identified in the notification letter with regard to the wear on the potentiometer flat spot.
However the licensee found one relay which was labeled as a
110 vdc relay versus the required design 115 vdc relay.
The licensee plans to continue its review of this item.
The inspectors will evaluate the results during subsequent inspections.
(Open)
400/P21-86-04
~Anacon Chlori-ne Probes".
The licensee stated that they were not aware of the concerns identified by this Part
item.
However, the licensee is contacting the supplier of its chlorine probes and will conduct the required evaluations for the Harris Plant probes.
The inspectors will evaluate this item during subsequent inspection No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Onsite Follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events (92700)
For onsite follow-up of nonroutine events, the inspectors determined that the licensee had taken corrective actions as stated in written reports of the events, and that the responses to the events were appropriate and met regulatory requirements, license conditions, and commitments.
During this reporting period the inspectors reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described appropriate corrections, adequately assessed the event, and addressed any generic implications.
When licensee-identified violations were noted,. they were reviewed in accordance with enforcement policy.
Those licensee events which were evaluated are.as follows:
(Closed)
LER 86-02 "Inadvertent Safety Injection Signal on 1B Train; Personnel Error in Failing to Follow Procedure for SSPS Restoration",
This LER was evaluated by the inspectors and documented as a
violation in Region II report 50-400/86-87.
(Closed)
LER 86-04 "Inadvertent Safety Injection Signals; Operator Deenergized Both Process Cabinets Causing the Safety Injection Signal".
This event was evaluated and found to have minimal safety significance, relative to direct impact. on the plant systems or components.
However, it did identify a weakness in the licensee's administrative controls which govern clearance tagging of equipment.
The licensee has placed more details into the existing procedure which controls clearance tagging (AP-013).
These additional proce-dural instructions should help to prevent the recurrence of this incident.
(Closed)
LER 86-08
"Reactor Trip, Due to Failure to Review the Procedure Against the Requirements of Technical Specification Special Test Exception 3. 10.5 Prior to its Use".
This event did not have significant safety consequences; however, it identified a
need for the licensee to conduct an overall review and evaluation of the Power Ascension Test (PAT)
program.
The licensee conducted the evaluation of the PAT program and has'required two action items to be accomplished.
The'irst action item required a daily, evaluation of all power ascension tests scheduled to be completed within the upcoming seven days.
The review includes a checklist outlining a
documented compatibility review of test procedure content, schedule, technical specifications and plant condition The second action item required that each power ascensi.on test has a
responsible test engineer assigned.
The engineer will assure that the above noted compatibility reviews are satisfactorily accomplished.
(Closed)
LER 86-07 "Fire Protection Program Violation; Due to Error and a
Weakness in the Display of the Data in a Procedure".
The inspectors evaluated this condition and determined that it was caused by personnel error and procedural weakness.
The inspectors observed that the licensee has revised the applicable procedure (FPP-013, Rev. 2) to provide clearer instructions for those using it in the future.
The licensee has stressed to the fire protection personnel the -importance of verifying compensatory actions when required by procedures.
Ho additional violations or deviations were identified.
A violation (400/86-87-01)
was previously issued against the 'event reported in LER 86-02.
6.
Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37701)
During this inspection period the inspectors reviewed three Field Change Requests (FCRs),
5050, 6783 and 3556, implemented by the licensee's engineering group to insure the following:
e These design changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with the appropriate requirements and established gA/gC controls.
Design changes were controlled and accomplished as specified in licensee-approved procedures, specifications and drawings, as appropriate.
Operating procedure modifications were made and approved in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Two of the FCRs, 5050 and 6783, concerned Bergen-Paterson'angers vi'olating the minimum distance to an adjacent embed plate.
Harris Plant Engineering Section reviewed the FCRs and provided a
satisfactory engineering evaluation, allowing the hangers to be used
"as is" provided no other attachments would be made to the adjacent embed plate without engiheering, approval.
The engineering evaluation documented on the remaining two FCRs was reviewed and found to comply with NRC requirements.
During. this inspection period the inspectors discussed with Region II personnel and licensee management a potential problem with the issuance of Field Change Requests on systems which previously were declared opera-tional.
Since these systems had been declared operational, the correct document to use for modifications should have been a Plant Change Request (PCR),
not an FCR.
The licensee has identified this problem on a
nonconformance report (NCR 87-023) in accordance with gA procedures.
This area will be eva1uated during subsequent inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte.
Monthly Maintenance Observation and Maintenance Program Evaluation (62703)
The inspectors observed and evaluated maintenance-related activities on safety-related systems and components to determine if the tasks were completed in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications and appropriate industry codes and standards'he inspectors determined that the activities did not violate any Limiting. Conditions for Operations and that required redundant components were operable.
The inspectors also determined the following:
The procedures used were adequate to control the activity.
gC hold points were established,'where required.
Required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation.
Replacement parts and materials used were properly certified.
The inspectors verified that the activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures.
The inspectors verified that the equipment was properly tested before it was returned to service.
The inspectors reviewed several of the most recent outstanding job orders to determine if the licensee was giving priority to safety-related mainte-nance and to prevent a backlog of incomplete work which might affect its performance.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed and'valuated by the inspectors:
Repairs were made to the auxiliary feedwater check valve 1AF91.
The work was done per approved work order 87-AG2M1.
Upon completion of the repairs the valve was tested for operability, prior to placing it back into service.
The 1E power supplies for component cooling water pump motor 1C were switched to the alternate lE bus.
The work was done per approved work order 87-AGKCl.
Operability testing was done prior to placing the pump motor back into service.
The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump had the springs removed between its thrust bearings.
The springs were replaced by metal shims, as requested by the pump manufacturer.
The work was done per approved work order 87-AEGDl.
The containment fan coil units service water supply valve (1'-231)
had repair work done on its position indicator.
The work was done per approved work order 87"AGLMl.
The motor was replaced on the chemical and volume control valve 1CS291.
The work was done in accordance with approved work order 87-AGGF No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met.
Control room, shift supervisor, clearance and jumper/bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to insure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operations.
The inspectors observed the control room panels, instrumentation and recorder readings to verify operability and parameters.
The inspectors observed shift turnovers and noted that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators.
They observed an increased emphasis by the licensee to'esolve the numerous deficiencies which have been allowed to accumulate on the various control room annunciators'and controls.
The inspectors will evaluate the status of the licensee's numerous control room deficiencies during subsequent inspections.
The inspectors observed the security organization throughout the inspec-tion period.
The security organization was properly manned with personnel capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into protected areas; vehicles were searched and properly authorized prior to their entry into protected areas, and security's response to alarms was satisfactory.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping controls and found them to be acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
9.
Other Activities (94600),
a.
On February 28, 1987, the inspectors observed the licensee's performance during a site full-scale emergency 'preparedness drill.
During the exercise the inspectors performed frequent tours of the site outside areas, diesel generator building area, control room, technical support center, emergency off-site facility, and they travele'd on several rural roads within the 10 mile EPZ.
In the afternoon of March 1,, 1987, the inspectors attended an on-site management meeting where the overall exercise observations made by NRC were summarized and discussed with the licensee.
The results of the NRC evaluation will be documented in Region II report 400/87-1 b.
On March 6, 1987, the Senior Resident Inspector and the Region II Reactor Projects Section Chief for CP&L plants conducted meetings with local public officials.
Those officials included the mayor of Holly Springs, the mayor of Fuquay-Varina, the Make County Commissioner whose district encompasses the plant power block, and the chairman of the Chatham County Commissioners.
The officials were given a description of the mission and functional organization of the NRC and its relationship to the preoperational testing, licensing, start-up, power ascension testing and the status of major events yet to be accomplished.
During the meetings the officials were encouraged 'to discuss items of general interest and concern as they related to the Harris Plant.