IR 05000400/1987015
| ML18004B822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1987 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004B821 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-87-15, NUDOCS 8706010402 | |
| Download: ML18004B822 (11) | |
Text
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1p0 4~*~4 LINITEOSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Noei 50-400/87-15 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket NoeI 50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
March 20 - April 20, 1987 Inspector
- 5 UII3 I G.
F.
xwell
- h Approved by
P.
E. Fre r ckson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Proiects SUMMARY License No.:
NPF-63 g/,gt s Date Signe 5 )I1~-1 Date Signed ate igned Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas o<
Onsite Follow-up of Licensee Events, Monthly Maintenance Observation and Maintenance Program Evaluation, Monthly Surveillance Observation, Plant Tours, and Onsite Review Committee.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
F t
8706010402 87051'P PDR ADOCK 05000400
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted 2.
3.
Licensee Employees J.
N. Collins, Manager, Operations G. L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support C. L. Noseley, Jr., Manager, Operations QA/QC G. A. Nyer, General Manager, Milestone Completion M. F. Thompson, Jr.,
Manager, Engineering Management D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance R. B. Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 24, 1987, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
No written material was provided to the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection.
Onsite Follow-up of Licensee Events (93702)
The following event was caused by equipment which is identified as non-nuclear and non-seismic.
The inspectors conducted interviews with licensee personnel and reviewed available records to try to determine the cause of the initiating event since it subsequently led to a
manual reactor trip.
On April 3, 1987, while performing power ascension testing at 75/ reactor power, the plant experienced a flow control problem for the "B" condensate booster pump (CBP) which eventually tripped the CBP and then tripped the
"B" main feedwater pump (MFWP) on an electrical breaker interlock.
On the NFWP trip, the main turbine generator control circuit failed to provide a
runback to 50K power and the control room operator took manual control, and attempted 'to manually run the main turbine load down while trying to maintain constant steam flow and feed flow for the steam generators.
Before reaching the plant power which would be consistent with the feed flow conditions, the
"A" NFWP tripped, resulting in a
loss of all feedwater.
The operators then manually tripped the main turbine which resulted in a reactor tri Prior to this occurrence the licensee made a decision to install personal computers (PCs)
to monitor various plant points to collect data for the evaluation of the feed and condensate systems response problems.
On April 1, 1987, the licensee found that the PCs'nputs could affect instrument response and introduce undesirable plant transients.
These PC test connections were ordered removed until the issue was resolved.
The test connections were initially installed using an informal request; as a
result, one of the test leads failed to be removed from process instrumentation cabinet PIC-11.
On April 3, 1987, the licensee determined that additional resistance was needed to properly isolate the PCs from the plant circuitry.
Under supervision of the test engineer, the I&C technician attempted to install the additional resistance into the test equipment.
When the technician connected additional resistance to PIC-11, card 0345 output (CBP-B flow summer),
a low flow signal was generated, resulting in a
CBP-B low flow trip, and a trip of the main feedwater pumps.
The sequence of events which followed these actions are as described previously.
As a result of this event, the licensee issued a memorandum to all power ascension test personnel that no modifications were to be performed without an approved procedure and proper implementation of the wire and jumper log.
The licensee has documented these circumstances in a Licensee Event Report LER-87-018.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
Monthly Maintenance Observation and Maintenance Program Evaluation (62703)
The inspectors evaluated the maintenance-related activities on several safety-related and nonsafety-related systems and components.
Those nonsafety-related systems were evaluated as a part of the power ascension testing program.
During the 50%
and 75K power range testing maintenance personnel were required to make repairs and trouble shoot several secondary systems and components.
The inspectors observed some of those repair activitie's as they were being performed.
During those observations the inspectors evaluated the licensee to determine if the activities were accomplished within the limitations of the Technical Specifications.
Additionally, the activities were evaluated to determine if the procedures were adequate to control the work activities, if gC inspection hold points were established, if required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation, and if certified replacement parts were used.
Those specific work activities which were evaluated by the inspectors are as follows:
The
"B" steam generator main feedwater regulating valve (FW-F4SN)
control circuit was responding sluggishly when in manual mode and would not control feed flow when placed in the automatic mode.
The
work on the control circuit was accomlished as prescribed on Work Request WR-87-AHIUl.
In brief, the controller had electrical connectors which were not making satisfactory connections with the circuit controls.
Upon completion of the work the controller was tested and then placed back into service.
The inspectors evaluated the work which was performed on the condenser vacuum pump motor.
The pump motor (a nonsafety-related component)
was electrically tripping its main power circuit breaker.
The Work Request (WR-87-AISC1)
required that the power circuit breaker for the vacuum pump motor 1A-NNS be disconnected from its electrical power supply and tested.
The testing revealed that a
piece of metal was preventing. the breaker's main contactors from completely closing.
The metal was wedged between one of the contactors'echanical parts, not allowing it to make the necessary connection.
The maintenance personnel removed the piece of metal, inspected for any potential damage, retested the breaker and returned it to service.
The testing was conducted in accordance with the work request and generic electrical test procedure PM-E0012.
The inspectors observed a leak around the lagging which covered the suction valve for the
"A" main feedwater pump; the valve is a
nonsafety-related valve.
The licensee already had identified the leak and planned to make repairs required to stop the leak.
The inspectors observed portions of the in-process repairs.
The work requi red repair welding a defect in the base metal of the suet'ion valve.
The maintenance was conducted in accordance with Work Request WR-87-AHAE1.
The inspectors observed that an additional feedwater leak resulted from cracks in the drain lines which are located on each side of the main feedwater bypass valve (a nonsafety-related valve) for the
"C" steam generator.
The cracks were located on the one inch drain lines near their entry into the main feedwater bypass line.
The inspectors discussed the cause of the cracks with licensee personnel, and were informed that the cracks occurred in field welds.
The welds were located between the one inch isolation valves (FW-196 and FW-199)
and the main feedwater bypass line.
The inspectors observed portions of the repair work and reviewed the associated Work Request WR-87-AJPC1.
The drain line repairs were completed in the evening of March 31, 1987.
The long term repairs consisted of rigid restraints to be installed between the bypass line, which measured about six inches in diameter, and the one inch drain lines.
The licensee is installing these additional restraints in accordance with a Plant Change Request, PCR-112 The inspectors observed in-process scheduled maintenance on the turbochargers for the
"B" emergency diesel generators.
The maintenance activity, authorized by Work Requests WR-87-AKNN1 and WR-87-AKNM1, required that the holddown bolts for turbochargers 1B-LB and lB-RB be torqued and inspected to the values specified in Maintenance Procedure MPT-M0024.
Periodically torquing and inspecting the holddown bolts for the emergency diesel generator turbochargers resulted from an Owner's Group recommendation for Transamerica Delaval, Inc.
(TDI) diesel generators.
During the torquing and inspection of the bolts, none of the affected equipment required clearance tagging or placing out of service.
However, the maintenance technicians kept the operations shift foreman apprised of the maintenance and the results.
The inspectors observed Instrumentation and Control ( I&C) technicians conducting maintenance on the
"1B" main feedwater flow transmitter.
The licensee had determined that recent data obtained from this flow transmitter was questionable and therefore they issued a
Work Request, WR-87-ALZP1, to investigate and repair, if necessary.
The Work Request required the I&C technicians to check the accuracy of the transmitter, in accordance with Maintenance Surveillance Test MST-I0019, Main Feedwater Flow Transmitter Calibrations.
The inspectors observed that the I&C technicians were familiar with the MST and were knowledgeable of the requirements of the work request.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting surveillance activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with licensee requirements.
These observations included the witnessing of selected portions of each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedure to ensure that administrative controls were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test and the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant-approved procedures.
Other observations included ascertaining that test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of Technical Specifications, any identified discrepancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service.
The following specific surveillance test activities were observed:
Operational Surveillance Test 1009, Containment Spray Valve Lineup Verification.
The inspectors accompanied operations personnel during the performance of this surveillance, which included valve verification in the auxiliary building at elevations 190', 216'nd the control roo s.
Operational Surveillance Test 1021, Daily Surveillance Requirement-verification of cold leg accumulator isolation valves.
Operational Surveillance Test 1073, 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Surveillance.
The inspectors witnessed operations personnel perform the prerequisites, and the verification of precautions and limitations, and establish the initial test conditions.
The test run was satisfactorily completed after a one hour run period.
The inspectors also performed a walk down of the main control board to verify that the alarm and indication boards were operable and indicating current plant status correctly.
While conducting this inspection the licensee received a containment hi/lo unidentified leakage alarm on the main control board alarm panel.
The operators took immediate steps to determine the root cause for this alarm.
These steps included performance of Alarm Panel Procedure ALB 001-6-1, investigation of sump levels inside containment, and other activities which would affect the transfer of water inside containment.
After an extensive review of the conditions necessary to give this alarm, the licensee determined that the alarm was not an actual condition, and operations personnel issued a
work request to investigate the cause for this erroneous signal.
No violations or deviations were noted.
Plant Tours (71707, 71710)
The inspectors performed numerous plant tours which covered the entire site during this inspection period.
These tours were performed to verify that the licensee was properly implementing site procedures concerning the following:
storage of unused items and equipment; equipment necessary to continued operations was operating properly; equipment which was out of service was properly tagged out as required; operations personnel were aware of the current plant status; maintenance activities were being conducted in accordance with the proper procedural controls; operational logs were being maintained by the appropriate personnel, and plant housekeeping was adequate.
During these tours the inspectors looked for unusual system ar rangements, fluid leakage, equipment or piping vibrations, abnormal restraint or hanger settings, out of service firefighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
The areas toured included the control room, reactor auxiliary building, turbine building, emergency diesel generator building, rad waste building, fuel handling building, service and administration buildings, and various site temporary buildings.
The inspectors toured the engineering spaces to verify that these spaces were being maintained in a plant condition which would not degrade the performance capabilities of any required equipment.
The tours included an inspection of the electrical and instrumentation cabinets for any miscellany, such as foreign or loose debris, material, jumpers, or rodent infestatio The inspection tours included a review of the site security measures by touring the site perimeter, observing personnel within vital and protected areas to ensure that personnel were authorized access to the respective areas, observations of on-watch security personnel to verify that they were alert and attentive, security personnel performing vehicle searches in the search corridor were thorough and systematic in their search methods, and personnel were prompt to respond to an alarm condition, such as inoperable doors.
The inspectors performed a walk down of the auxiliary feedwater system to verify that the system was operable, the accessible portions were in accordance with plant lineup requirements, and the lineups matched the plant drawings and as-built configuration..
The inspectors also verified that the valves for the auxiliary feedwater system were shown by instrumentation to be in their correct position.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
7.
Onsite Review Committee (40700)
The inspectors evaluated the minutes of three Project Nucl'ear Safety Committee meetings (PNSC).
Each of the meetings was a special meeting which was called to address events related to power range testing.
The results of the reviews are as follow:
The PNSC meeting held on February 17, 1987 reviewed and approved the results of the lower power ascension tests and allowed testing to begin at the 50 percent power plateau.
The specific subjects of the meeting included evaluating the test results for the following:
the turbine overspeed trip, dynamic automatic steam dump control, automatic steam generator level control, calibration of main steam and feedwater flow instrumentation at 30 percent power, automatic rod control, automatic steam generator level control at 30 percent power, thermal power measurement, gross failed fuel detection system test, nuclear instrumentation overlap verification, core performance at
percent power, station electrical blackout, main steam and feedwater system test, operational alignment of process temperature instrumentation, remote shutdown test, and the auxiliary feedwater pump endurance test (48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />).
A PNSC meeting was held on March 7, 1987.
At the meeting the status and content of two Licensee Event Reports (LER) were evaluated.
One LER (87-011)
concerned an operational surveillance test (OST-1023) of off site power.
During this test the 1B-SB emergency class 1E electrical bus was inadvertently deenergized.
The other LER (87-012)
identified a reactor trip which occurred during a test of the main turbine rotor instrumentation.
A third PNSC meeting was held on March 16, 1987 to evaluate a
post-trip review report.
The report concerned a reactor trip which resulted from a trip of all condensate and feedwater system pump On April 8, 1987 the inspectors attended a
PNSC special meeting where the status and content of two LERs were evaluated.
One LER (87-013)
documented an event in which a manual reactor trip resulted from a loss of main feedwater.
The other LER (87-014)
concerned containment integrity and the use of "non (}" test pressure gauges.
The inspectors observed the general conduct of the meeting which they attended and determined that, in general, the licensee complied with the requirements
'of operational Technical Specification (TS) Section 6.5.2.
The specific points which were evaluated against Section 6.5.2 of the TS included the composition of the members present and the review process and evaluations.
The meeting was documented to confirm that decisions and recommendations were accurately tracked.
No violations or deviations were observed in the areas inspecte I I
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