IR 05000400/1987043
| ML18005A272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1988 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A271 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-87-43, NUDOCS 8802090005 | |
| Download: ML18005A272 (9) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 RePOrt NOeI 50-400/87-43 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
License No.:
NPF-63 Inspection Conducted:
November 27, 1987 - December 27, 1987 Inspector: 5Ol4 xwe-u,+
ate igne z-i-ee ate igne
,i Approved by:
re ric son, ection hsef Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY te igned Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas of Operational Safety Verification and Monthly Maintenance Observation.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G.
G. Campbell, Manager of Maintenance J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations G. L. Forehand, Director, gA/gC L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support G. A. Myer, General Manager, Milestone Completion D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance R., B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 23, 1987, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
No written material was provided to the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709, 93702)
a ~
Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented.
These tours were performed to verify that systems, valves and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being imp'lemented as required by procedures; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; and all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current.
Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and inter-views with plant personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the shift foreman's log, control room operator's log, clearance center tag out logs, system status logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control status board.
During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert and aware of changing plant condition The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefings.
They observed that the briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew.
The inspectors verified that various plant spaces were not in a
condition which would degrade the performance capabilities of any required system or component.
This inspection included checking the condition of electrical cabinets to ensure that they were free of foreign and loose debris, or material.
Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authori-zation to be in the respective areas.
The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
b.
Plant Emergency Program Drill On December 16, 1987, the site held a plant drill which was conducted as a part of the quarterly emergency exercise training.
Participants in the drill included the control room, which was manned by a
designated crew of operators, the technical support center, which was fully manned, the operational support center and the off-site emergency operations facility.
In addition, teams were assigned for plant environmental monitoring.
The drill,began at about 8 a.m.
and concluded at approximate1y 12:30 p.m.
The inspectors evaluated the progress of the drill and observed the functions carried out in the control room by the designated operations crew.
The objectives of the drill included the following:
Demonstrate the licensee's ability to properly notify state and county agencies; The adequacy of procedures for notifying and mobilizing CPSL's emergency response personnel; To properly classify emergency conditions in accordance with the site Emergency Plan; To assure that the control room staff could properly perform accident assessment and take the proper actions to place the plant in a safe and stable condition;
To properly analyze the plant conditions, identify and project trends and any potential consequences and formulate mitigating actions.
In addition to the above, areas under observation included manpower support, communications, dose assessment, emergency kits for emergency response facilities, exposure guidelines, capability to monitor personnel for contamination, and radiological monitoring.
The inspectors observed that the exercise was carried out in a well-organized manner and those activities which were observed were conducted in accordance with Emergency Plan guidelines and proce-dures.
Radiation Monitor Alarm -
Containment Ventilation Leak Detection On November 30, 1987, while the plant was operating at 100K power, the control room received a
containment leak detection radiation monitor alarm on the radiation monitoring console number 11.
Licensee personnel investigated the conditions pertaining to the alarm and found that the alarm resulted from loss of sample flow, Further technical evaluation was conducted and it was found that the filter on the monitoring unit had needed to be inspected.
In order to inspect the filter, the monitoring unit was required to have its power deenergized, After the monitoring unit was inspected and reenergized an electrical spike resulted.
The electrical spike caused a false signal to be sent by the monitoring unit, which exceeded the alarm setpoint, therefore causing the alarm to initiate a containment ventilation isolation signal, which was considered by the licensee as an inadvertent engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation.
The containment leak detection radiation monitoring equipment was then declared inoperable and the plant entered into a limiting condition for operation (LCO) in, accordance with Technical Specifi-cations (TS) 3.3.3. 1.
The exact cause of the electrical spike has not been determined and as a result of the event, the licensee has initiated Work Request WR-87-BJKL1, to perform the troubleshooting, determine the cause of the flow problem with the radiation monitor, and once determined, correct the defect.
The monitor was returned to service on December 2, 1987, within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO time frame.
A Second Radiation Monitor Alarm -
Containment Ventilation Leak Detection On December 14, 1987, while operating at 97K power, the plant experienced a containment ventilation isolation condition similar to the Event which occurred on November 30, 1987.
The inspectors interviewed personnel who were associated with the Event and found that the isolation signal was apparently caused by another electrical
spike.
Further inspection revealed that the spike may have resulted from a pressure drop which was sensed by the air particulate monitor during a routine daily test of the air in the containment building.
The pressure drop was caused by an operator having inadvertently connected the input hose to the output connection on the temporary monitoring equipment and vice versa connected the output hose to the input connection.
When the hoses were returned to the correct positions licensee personnel stated that a
pressure transient occurred which could have caused a false signal to occur causing the monitor to exceed its alarm setpoints and ultimately initiate an ESF containment isolation signal.
The monitor was visually inspected and found to be operating correctly and was returned to service for normal operation.
As a result of both of the above Events the licensee has initiated a design change that may help to reduce the future possibility of spurious alarm setpoints being exceeded, because of electrical spikes or sudden pressure surges sensed by the radiation monitoring unit.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities during this inspection period to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks, no maintenance activities reviewed were violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolutions; the required gA/gC reviews and gC hold points were implemented; post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of work activities.
The inspectors obtained copies of several work requests for maintenance activities which were recently completed.
The following work requests were evaluated:
WR-87-ARWE1 concerned the chemical and volume control system.
The work involved making repairs to the charging system valve 1CS-750, which provides an alternate minflow path from the "C" charging pump.
This valve is normally shut.
The valve diaphragm was found to be ruptured, and the disk assembly was broken.
The valve was disass-embled and its internals were inspected.
The valve seat was then lapped and the valve disk assembly was replaced.
The assembly bolts were torqued to the recommended values using a calibrated torque wrenc WR-87-BBLS1 concerned instrumentation tubing on an instrumentation air isolation valve for the main feedwater system.
This instrumenta-tion isolation valve provided air for flow control valve FCV-479 in the main feedwater system.
The instrumentation tubing was found to be leaking and the line was repaired in accordance with the work request and returned to service.
MR-87-BFRR1 concerned safety injection valve 1SI-107.
The valve would not open from the control room when an attempt was made to remotely operate the valve.
This valve is an alternate supply valve for the safety injection hot leg and is normally closed.
The techni-cians cleaned the electrical contacts in the circuit and verified continuity.
The valve was tested, found to operate satisfactorily, and was returned to service.
No violations were identified in the areas inspecte,,i