IR 05000397/1989031
| ML17285A919 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1989 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A917 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-89-31, NUDOCS 9001040053 | |
| Download: ML17285A919 (26) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report No:
= Docket No:
Licensee:
Facility Name:
50-397/89-31 50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
October 2 - November 12, 1989 Inspectors:
C. J. Bosted, Senior Resident Inspector R.
C. Sorensen, Resident Inspector Approved by:
P.
H. J hnson, Chief Reac o
Projects Section
~~/ia r Date Signed
~Summar:
Inspection on October 2 - November 12, 1989 50-397/89-31 A~Id:
i i
i t
t id i
p room operations, licensee action on previous inspection findings, engineered safety feature (ESF) st'atus, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, procedural adherence, and review of periodic reports.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 86700, 90712, 90713, 92700, 92701 and 92702 were utilized.
Safet Issues Mana ement S stem SIMS Items:
None Results:
General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s
Weaknesses were identified in the preventive maintenance of plant lighting (paragraphs 4.c and 4.d), tracking of class lE breaker operations (paragraph 9),
and proper torquing of Limitorque motor operator capscrews (paragraph 4.e).
a pa",p $91219 9pp 1 p4pp
'
p5ppp <97 pop ADOCK
"
pOC
- 2--
Si nificant Safet Matters:
None Summar of Violations and Deviations:
One deviation was identified, and two issues were left unresolved (see paragraph 4 for details).
0 en Items.Summar
One followup item, four part 21 items, and seven LERs were closed; three new items were opene Persons Contacted DETAILS
'.
McGilton, Manager, Safety and Assurance
- C. Powers, Plant Nanager
- J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager C. Edwards, Ouality Control Manager
- R. Graybeal',
Health Physics and Chemistry Manager L. Grumme, Nuclear Safety Assurance Manager J.
Harmon, Maintenance Manager A. Hosier, Licensing Manager
- D. Kobus, Ouality Assurance Manager R. Koenigs, Technical Manager S.
McKay, Operations Manager J. Peters, Administrative Manager
- G. Gelhaus, Assistant Technical Manager
- W. Shaeffer, Assistant Operations Manager
- R. Webring, Assistant Maintenance Manager The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, and maintenance, enoineering, quality assurance, and management personnel.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on November 13, 1989.
Plant Status At the start of the inspection period, the plant was operating at 72K power while preconditioning fuel.
Full power operation was achieved on October 4.
Main condenser air in-leakage was approximately 150 scfm following the startup; this caused operational concerns when condenser vacuum decreased.
Plant power had to be reduced on several occasions as vacuum responded to changes in condenser cooling due to the effect of ambient temperature and wind conditions on cooling tower efficiency.
On October 23, power was reduced to reset the control rod sequence pattern and recirculation pumps were shifted to 15 Hz.
While power was at 32K, an effort was made to locate the condenser air leakage.
A significant leak was found on the "C" low pressure turbine "dog bone." seal.
This leak was stopped and several other smaller leaks were also controlled.
Air in-leakage was reduced to approximately 90 scf~.
On October 24, while performing channel functional tests (CFT) on the
"B" train average power range monitoring instruments, control rod 58-31 scrammed from position 48.
A blown fuse was found on the "A" reactor protection system solenoid.
No reason for the blown fuse was found, it was replaced, and the control rod was returned to the fully withdrawn position.
After completion of the CFT, the recirculation pumps were shifted to fast speed, and power was raised in accordance with fuel precondi tioning guidelines.
Power remained at nominal full power until November 10.
A local leak rate surveillance test (LLRT) on containment exhaust isolation valves
CEP-V-1A and 2A was found to have an indeterminate leak rate.
A Techni-cal Specification shutdown was started at 3:36 p.m.
At approximately the same time, the main turbine auto stop trips (vacuum, bearing oil pressure, thrust bearing, and electrical solenoid)
were found to be inoperable.
Turbine power was reduced to approximately 20K while repairs were in progress on the CEP valves.
Inspection and trouble-shooting of the turbine trips caused the problem to disappear.
Engineers believed that the problem was due to debris lodged in the trip dump valve, and that the debris was flushed out when the trip feature was exercised.
The power restrictions caused by the CEP LLRT were eliminated by 12:40 a.m.
on November ll.
The leak rate was determined, the isolation valves were verified to be adequately seated, and the Technical Speci-fication action statement was exited.
Power was raised to full power and remained there through the end of the reporting period.
3.
Previousl Identified NRC Ins ection Items (92701, 92702)
The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on previously identified inspection findings as follows:
Closed)
Unresolved Item (397/89-13-02):
Weaknesses in Nuclear Safety ssurance Group NS Mont y Reports The inspector had noted an overall weakness in the quality of NSAG monthly reports to corporate management for the period between September 1988 and May 1989.
These reports had once been technic-ally oriented and had documented technical assessments of operating experience, but they had largely diminished to a status keeping document of backlogged open items, issued at management's request.
.The inspector determined that the licensee did meet the basic Technical Specification requirement to provide detailed recommenda-tions for improving unit safety to the Director of Licensing and Assurance.
This was evidenced by a number of reports during the time period in question containing one or two limited discussions of operating, experience topics.
In addition, the licensee revised the NSAG monthly report format and content in June 1989 to better reflect what the Technical Specifications actually require.
The inspector reviewed the monthly reports for June, July, August, and September 1989 and found them-to be much improved in that they provide technical discussions and resolutions of various operating experiences.
Therefore, this item is considered closed.
4.
0 erational Safet Yerification (71707 a.
Plant Tours The following plant areas were toured by the inspectors during the course of the inspection:
Reactor Building Control Room Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Service Water Buildings Technical Support Center Turbine Generator Building Yard Area and Perimeter b.
The (4)
(5)
(7)
(s)
following items were observed during the tours:
0 eratin Lo s and Records.
Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and admi'nistrative control procedure requirements.
Monitorin Instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed for correlation etween channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
~5li<<
i
.C
6 hi<<
ig b
df conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
The attentiveness of the operators was observed in the execution of their duties and the control room was observed to be free of distractions such as non-work related radios and reading materials.
E ui ment Lineu s.
Yalves and electrical breakers were veri ied to e in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were verified by direct observation.
E ui ment Ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment was in the condition specified.
General Plant E ui ment Conditions.
Plant equipment was o serve or in ications o
system leakage, improper lubrica-tion, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingits functional requirements.
Annunciators were observed to ascertain their status and operability.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment and controls were
'h Plant Chemistr
. Chemical analyses and trend results were reviewe or conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedure (9)
Radiation Protection Cont'rois.
The inspectors periodically observed radio ogica protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also observed compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, proper wearing of protective equipment and personnel monitor-ing devices, and personnel frisking practices.
Radiation monitoring equipment was frequently monitored to verify operability and adherence to calibration frequency.
~ >
(10) Plant Housekee in
. Plant conditions and material/equipment storage were observed to determine
.the general state of clean-liness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
(11) ~Securit
.
The inspectors periodically observed security practices to ascertain that the licensee's implementation of the security plans
'was in accordance with site procedures, that the search equipment at the access control points was operational, that the vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed, and that personnel allowed access to the protected area were badged and monitored and the monitoring equipment was functional.
While touring the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
pump rooms on October 30, the inspector noted a number of fluorescent light bulbs which provide plant lighting were burned out.
These lights were located in the residual heat removal (RHR) "C" pump room and the low pressure core spray (LPCS)
pump room, as well as the vestibule between these pump rooms and the stairwell.
The inspector addressed his concerns to the the electrical maintenance supervisor and showed him the areas in the plant.
The inspector also requested that the lights in these rooms that were "normal emergency" lighting as defined by the WNP-2 FSAR be designated.
Section 9.5.3 of the WNP-2 FSAR describes the plant lighting system as providing four different types of lighting:
( 1)
Normal AC Lighting Systems
- Lighting powered from non-safety related 480 volt motor control. centers.
(2)
Normal Emergency Lighting Systems
- Lighting powered from safety related 480 volt motor control centers.
(3)
DC Lighting Systems - Lighting powered from the plant 125 volt emergency batteries.
(4)
Battery Powered Emergency Lighting Systems - Individual power packs and incandescent lamp Also, Table 9.5-8 of the FSAR lists certain areas of the plant for which the licensee has committed to provide emergency and normal lighting.
On October 30, 1989, during a tour of the 471'levation of the reactor building, 'the inspector and the electrical maintenance supervisor observed (by operating all four light switches) that the lighting in the north RHR valve room (listed as RHR valve room 41 in the FSAR) did not work.
The inspector noted that Table 9.5-8 of the FSAR identifies that this room will be provided with normal AC lighting.
He expressed his concern to the electrical maintenance supervisor and asked him to confirm this and to address the lighting deficiency in this room as well as the other ECCS pump rooms mentioned above.
On November 6, the electrical maintenance supervisor informed the inspector that all the lights in the north RHR valve room were replaced on the evening of October 30 because they had burned out.
Since no lighting was provided in this particular room on October 30, as committed in the FSAR, this is considered to be a deviation from a commitment made to the NRC in the WP-2 FSAR (Deviation 397/89-31-01).
On November 9, the inspector reviewed the location of the normal emergency lighting in the pump rooms mentioned above, as well as the vestibule, with the electrical super visor.
One of the burned out lights was determined to have been. the single AC powered emergency light. provided in the pump room vestibule.
Other findings that the inspector brought to the licensee's attention were as follows:
Inconsistencies existed between the FSAR text and Table 9.5-8 of the FSAR.
There were also inaccurate descriptions of DC emergency lighting in the FSAR text.
The licensee agreed to amend the FSAR to provide an accurate description of DC emergency lighting and to correct other inconsistencies.
Emergency lighting battery terminals are cleaned before performing yearly capacity tests.
The licensee agreed to change the applicable procedure to clean the batteries and terminals after conducting the annual capacity test.
This is to'ensure tttat no enhancements are made to the as-found condition of the emergency lighting batteries that may influence a proper demonstration of their capability.
The method of checking DC lighting in the control room for burned out light bulbs was uncertain.
One DC-powered emergency light in the access to the remote shutdown room was found burned out.
The licensee developed a procedure for inspections of various emergency lighting systems for burned out lights.
d.
In addition, while touring the plant with the electrical supervisor on November 9, the inspector noticed certain eight-hour emergency r
light batteries that had electrolyte levels as much as one inch below the low level line.
These were located in the corridors on the 441'levation of the plant in various places among the reactor building, turbine building, and the radwaste building, with equip-ment part numbers (EPNs)
as follows: C120/441-3X, C121/441-1X1, and C121/441/2X.
In addition, one emergency light battery in the remote shutdown room, EPN W 467/4X, also had a low electrolyte level on November 13.
These particular battery-powered emergency lights are required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J., and are required to have an eight-hour capacity.
PPM 10.25.63,
"Emergency Lighting Inspection", provides instruc-tions to check emergency light batteries, for electrolyte level every thirty days and, if required, replenish with water and so note on the data sheet comments block of Attachment B to the procedure.
This procedure is a preventive maintenance procedure
'invoked by Scheduled Maintenance System (SMS) task ID 01 for these EPNs.
Task ID 01 states,
"Perform monthly operability check per PPM 10.25.63, Attachment B".
These SMS instructions are computer printed on a computer data card.
During discussions with the electrical staff, the inspector was told that the card for task ID 01 is attached to a copy of PPM 10.25.63 for perform'ance in the field.
However, following discussions with the electrical super-visor, it appeared to the inspector that the shop practice was to remove the procedure from the cards and take only the Attachment B into the field.
Attachment B is a data sheet which records only a check of the battery charge status.
,Without a.copy of the procedure, the performers of the SMS were relying on their memory to perform the maintenance task.
Records of Attachment B from previous performances of the task indicated that battery electro-lyte levels were identified as being low for one battery in August and had been replenished.
Records for September and October did not indicate any abnormalities.
This issue remains unresolved (Unresolved Item 397/89-31-02).
The inspector toured RHR pump room 81 during mid-shift on October 31, 1989, after the licensee had corrected the lighting problem discussed in paragraph 4.c above.
At 'about 2:00 a.m., the inspector discovered a capscrew missing from the motor operator of valve RHR-V-24A.
What appeared to be the missing capscrew was lying on the valve body of V-24A.
Another capscrew appeared to be backed out because a gap was observed between the capscrew head and the valve yoke flange.
These capscrews fasten the Limitorque motor operator to the valve yoke.
The inspector informed the Shift Manager, who indicated that he would correct the situation by reinstalling the missing bolt and would inform the technical staff mechanical supervisor in the morning to resolve any additional concerns.
RHR-V-24A is the RHR "A" train test return line isolation valve to the suppression pool. It is normally shut and is opened during testing and during the suppression pool cooling mode of RHR on train "A".
During a design basis accident, this valve provides one method of removing thermal energy from the containment.
It is also a containment isolation valve for
suppression pool cooling.
Valve RHR-V-24B provides the same function for the "B" train.
During power operation, these valves are operated daily for suppression pool cooling.
At approximately 3:00 p.m.
on the same day, the inspector disco-vered the same type of problem on RHR-V-24B.
One capscrew had backed out to the point where a one-to two-inch gap separated the.
cap from the valve yoke flange.
Another capscrew was found loose to the touch.
The inspector informed maintenance management, and advised plant management shortly thereafter.
Based on the apparent need for significant additional followup inspection associated with the loose capscrews, it was deemed appropriate to address this issue in a special inspection report.
Accordingly, this issue is considered unresolved and will be addressed in special Inspection Report No. 50-397/89-38.
One deviation was identified, as discussed in paragraph 4.c above.
Two unresolved items were also identified.
5.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walkdown 71707, 71710 Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspectors to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical power=
supplies, cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspectors also verified that system valves were in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated dates.
~Ss tern Diesel Generator Systems, Divisions 1, 2, and 3.
Dates October ll, 24 November
Hydrogen Recombiners Low Pressure Coolant Injection, (LPCI)
Trains "A", "B", and "C" Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
Scram Discharge Volume System October 11, 17,
October 17, 25,
October 19,
October 19,
October 17,
October ll, 17,
Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System Standby Service Water System 125V DC Electrical Distribution, Divisions 1 and
250V DC Electrical Distribution October
October
November
October 10, 17,
November
October 10, 17,
November
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testin 61726 a.
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2)
a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.,
b.
Portions of the following surveillance tests were observed by the inspectors on the dates shown:
Procedure Descri tion Dates Performed 7.0.0 Shift/Daily Instrumentation Check October
7.4.3.2.1.4 Leakage Detection System October
Channel Functional Test (CFT)
7.4.6. 1.4. 19 Main Steam Line High Pressure CFT October
7.4.8.3.2 AC/DC Breaker Lineup Check 7.4.4.1.2 Jet Pump Operability Check 7.4.8.1.1.2.2 Diesel Generator
Operability Check 7.4.8.1. 1.2.12 High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Operability Check October
October
October
October
7.4.3.7.2.21 Radwaste Building Exhaust Sampler Channel Functional Test October
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Plant Yiaintenance (62703 During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements and with administrative and maintenance procedures, required (}A/0C involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspectors verified reportability for these activities was correct.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Descri tion Dates Performed Repair ROA-P18 per AS 2223
~ Install 3-hour fire barrier on instrument sensing line supports per AS 2485 No violations or deviations were identified.
October
November
8.
Part
Re orts (90712 a.
Closed 88-15-P, Xomox/Limitorque Electric Motor Actuators Poten-tia Va ve Fai ures This Part 21 report involved valves supplied by the Xomox Corpora-tion, with Limitorque motor operators, that could.become inoperable under certain circumstances.
This could occur because the drive adapter assembly has the potential to become disengaged from the valve stem under some conditions.
Two butterfly valves were supplied by Xomox to the licensee; one for use in WNP-1 and the other for use in WNP-4.
To date none have been supplied for use in WNP-2.
These two valves have been placed on the Restricted Use Equipment List for WNP-2, in the event they should ever be considered for use, which prohibits their use in WNP-2 without an engineering evaluation.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed)
89-13-P and 89-15-P, Limitorque Valve Improperly Assembled The licensee submitted a Part 21 report to NRR detailing a
failure that occurred during a surveillance test of HPCS-V-15.
This is a motor operated valve, with an operator supplied by Limitorque, in the HPCS pump suction line from the suppression pool.
It failed to open automatically on low condensate storage tank level and would only operate manually with difficulty.
The root cause was traced by the licensee to the absence of a part integral to the motor operator.
The licensee concluded that only Limitorque operators provided with a "soft" clutch gear assembly
'10
.
were susceptible to such a failure, because the soft clutch consists of two pieces, and the failure can only occur during manual operation, although it can be manifested at any time.
The licensee identified 24 safety-related valves as having soft clutch gear assemblies.
In the Part 21 report, the licensee committed to the following actions to ensure the operability of these valves:
During the spring 1989 refueling outage, all valves with a soft clutch assembly were manually operated.
The plant procedure for maintenance and repair of Limitorque motor operators will be revised to.include instructions for inspecting the clutch assembly anytime a motor operator is disassembled.
This was scheduled for completion by November 15, 1989.
Cautions will be added to applicable plant procedures regarding disposition of valves found difficult to operate manually.
This was scheduled for completion by January 30, 1990.
This item is closed.
c.
Closed)
89-14-P, ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB) Circuit Breaker with Contaminated Lubrication This reportable condition involved contaminated lubricant on the operating mechanisms of two circuit breakers at another nuclear plant.
This resulted in the breakers failing to close on demand to perform their safety related function.
This was found to be a
result of hardened and discolored lubricant that had affected certain moving parts important to breaker closure.
ABB has supplied two circuit breakers to WNP-2.
They are used in power supplies from vital buses to turbine service water (TSW)
pumps and cooling tower make-up (TNU) pumps.
Their safety related function is to trip on a load shed signal to deenergize these pumps from SYi-7 and SN-8, and they do not have a safety related function that requires them to close automatically.
They were installed approximately two years ago.
ABB provided guidance to all licensees with ABB breakers concerning how to detect lubrication problems and how to correct them.
The Supply System had incorporated this guidance from the ABB technical manual into PPM 10.25. 126, the preventive maintenance procedure for ABB type breakers.
This item is closed.
d.
Closed)
89-11-P Recirculation Flow Control Logic Failure Could xcee t e R Safety Limit General Electric Company determined that there is a design defect in some BWR 5 and BWR 6 recirculation flow control systems such
that core flow could increase to approximately 110$ of rated.
This scenario entails a rapid opening of the flow control valves which could potentially cause a violation of the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit.
This information was conveyed to the NRC and to the affected licensees in a Part 21 report.
,
WNP-2 has a unique flow control system supplied by Rucker, vice the standard design supplied by Foxboro.
The Rucker design is not susceptible to this logic failure problem because, in each flow controller, circuitry exists to detect differences between flow demand and flow feedback.
If this difference exceeds 2.5X, both flow control valves automatically transfer to the local-manual mode of operation, causing both valves to essentially fail as is, with only a slight power increase.
Further, WNP.-2 procedures require operation with the flow control valves in local-manual" control.
This bypasses the logic. circuitry of the master controller, the flux controller, and both flow controllers, and renders WNP-2 unaffected by the above mentioned potential failure.
The inspector considered the licensee's response to this Part
report to be acceptable and this item is closed.
9.
Safet Related Electrical Breakers 62703 During a followup to a failure of service water pump breaker SW-CB-P1B to operate on September 21, 1989, the inspector reviewed the maintenance history for this safety related breaker.
When this pump was started to supply essential cooling water for shutdown cooling following a reactor shutdown, the motor breaker failed to close.
The problem was determined to be due to an open closing coil.
A replacement coil also failed.
The breaker was replaced with a spare, and the original breaker was returned to the vendor for refurbishment.
At the time of failure the breaker had experienced a total of 2239 operations.
F A review of the vendor's maintenance requirements revealed that mainte-nance was recommended every 2000 operations of the breaker.
Station procedure 10.25. 17 "Westinghouse High Voltage Circuit Breakers" speci-fied that the breakers be cleaned and inspected every. two years and have additional inspection and measurements taken every 2000 cycles, six year s of operation, or after a fault operation.
A historical review of the maintenance on this breaker indicated to the inspector that the breaker was being inspected on a periodic'asis.
The breaker counter reading (which indicated the number of breaker operations)
was being recorded on the two-year maintenance check sheet, but the number of breaker cycles was not being tracked as a maintenance requirement.
From plant records, the inspector found 'that the six-year maintenance had
. been performed in January 1984 when the breaker had 465 cycles of opera-tion.
Maintenance staff personnel also indicated that maintenance was performed again in May 1989 when the breaker had 2101 cycles.
This maintenance was covered under the plant's preventive maintenance program, although the tracking and scheduling of maintenance performed under this program were not considered as rigorous as the surveillances of Class 1E equipment which are performed as required by the Technical Specification The May 1989 preventive maintenance records were not available to the inspector or the licensee at the time of the historical review discussed above.
These records had been misplaced since May 1989, but were found during this inspection period.
Based on review of these records, maintenance staff individuals told the inspector that maintenance had not been accomplished on that breaker in 1989.
This indicated to the inspector that tracking of these important maintenance items was weak.
Since this breaker's maintenance tracking was considered marginal by the inspector, a thorough review of all the Class 1E 4160 VAC breakers was conducted.
The inspector noted that cleaning and inspection records were not found for diesel generator breakers 7/DG1 and DGl/7 (the two output breakers for the Division 1 diesel generator)
for the time period before 1985.
The records were complete for all breakers after 1985 and all maintenance was considered current.
Following discussions with licensee maintenance management, the licensee initiated plans to enhance the preventive maintenance program for the Class 1E breakers, to improve the tracking of the number of cycles for periodic maintenance.
Temporary procedure changes were to be made to include these improvements.
This item will be followed up in a future inspection ( Inspection Followup Item 397/89-31-03).
No violations or deviations were identified.
S ent Fuel Pool Leaka e
86700 E
Based on a concern found at another facility,, leakage from the spent fuel pool was reviewed by the inspector.
The WNP-2 spent fuel pool is typical of the BWR design, with an attached spent fuel pool isolated from the refueling cavity by removable dams.
The fuel pool is located in the reactor building on the operating (refueling) floor.
The pool liner in stainless steel and no penetrations exist below the removable dams.
Leakage from the weld areas is collected and monitored.
During discussions with the licensee's technical staff, the system engineer and group supervisor told the inspector that WNP-2 has not experienced any fuel pool leakage.
Any leakage from the pool would drain to the reactor building and end up in the floor drain system.
This drain system is processed by the liquid radwaste system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee Event Re ort LER Followu 90712, 92700 The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspectors.
Based on the information provided in the report it was concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
The below listed LERs are considered close LER NUMBER LER 89-29 LER 89-30 DESCRIPTION Reactor Water Cleanup and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Isolation Caused by Inadequate Test Procedure.
High Pressure Core Spray System Inoperable Due to Suppression Pool Suction Valve Failure.
LER 89-32 LER 89-33 Violation of Electrical Separation Criteria Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation Due to Blown Fuse.
The following LERs were followed up at the time of the event and are considered closed.
LER 89-34 LER 89-35 LER 89-36 Technical Specification Shutdown Due to Inoperable Class lE 480 Volt AC Power System.
Reactor Scram Caused by Personnel Error During Surveillance.
Inadequate Average Power Range Technical Specification Surveillance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts (90713 Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the reported information appeared valid.
Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspectors.
Monthly Operating Report for September 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable items, violations or devia-tions.
Unresolved items addressed during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4.d and 4.e of this repor.
Exit Meetin 30703 The inspectors met with licensee management representatives periodically during the report period to discuss inspection status, and an exit meeting was conducted with the indicated personnel (refer to paragraph 1) on November 13, 1989.
The scope of the inspection and the inspectors'indings, as noted in this report, were. discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representatives.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by or discussed with the inspectors during the inspectio C
gr