IR 05000397/1989026
| ML17285A805 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1989 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A804 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-89-26-MM, NUDOCS 8910260137 | |
| Download: ML17285A805 (46) | |
Text
Report No:
Docket No:
Licensee:
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
50-397/89-26 50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2)
Meeting at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Meeting Conducted:
August 8, 1989 Prepared by:
C. J. Bosted, Senior Resident Inspector Approved by:
Summary:
P.
. J nson, e
React Projects Section
a e Signed A Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Meeting was held on August 8, 1989 to discuss the overall conclusions identified in the SALP report (50-397/89-16)
and to continue the dialogue between Region V and Supply System Management on items of interest and improvements in the programs in response to the SALP report.
gqio~bQ>>~
sooos97 ge1004 pDR PgQCN, 0 pN Q
DETAILS 1.
Mana ement Meetin Partici ants Nuclear Re ulator Commission J.
B. Martin, Regional Administrator R. P. Ziomerman, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects R. A. Scarano, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards G. H. Knighton, Director, Project Directorate V,
NRR D. F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch P.
H. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
C. J. Bosted, Senior Resident Inspector R. B. Samworth, Project Manager, NRR Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem P. L. Knight, Chairman, Executive Board Operations Conmittee D. W. Mazur, Managing Director A. L. Oxsen, Assistant Managing Director for Operations G. D. Bouchey, Director, Licensing and Assurance C. M..Powers, Plant Manager C. H. McGilton, Manager, Operations Assurance L. T. Harrold, Manager, Generation Engineering G. C. Sorensen, Manager, Regulatory Programs L. L. Grumme, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Assurance M. M. Monopoli, Manager, Support Services R.
G. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager J.
D. Harmon, Maintenance Manager A. G. Hosier, Licensing Manager R. L. Koenigs, Technical Manager D. W. Martin, Security Force Manager S. L. McKay, Operations Manager J. F. Peters, Plant Administrative Manager W. W. Waddel, Planning and Scheduling Manager Bonneville Power Authorit D. L. Williams, Nuclear Engineer State of Washin ton W. L. Fitch, Executive Secretary, EFSEC W. A. Kiel, State Liaison C.
R. Wallis, Vice Chairman, EFSEC
~AL On August 8, 1989, a meeting was held at the WNP-2 site with the indivi-duals identified in paragraph 1.
The purpose of the meeting was to dis-cuss with licensee management the results of the 'Systematic ASsessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) performed for the WNP-2 facility for the
period June 1, 1988 through May 31, 1989 in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0516.
NRC concerns regarding recent events were also discussed.
The meeting convened at 8:00 AN.
The Regional Administrator opened the meeting by stating that the pur-pose of the meeting was to discuss the results of the SALP assessment.
Nr. Martin briefly discussed the SALP categories and stated that the findings were subject to discussion.
He also noted that improvements had been noted in most areas.
The Plant Operations and Engineering/
Technical Support areas were noted to have seen improvements in SALP ratings, but he also observed that several areas had not improved as much as these two, and that additional work was needed.
Mr. Nazur's opening remarks recognized the Supply System's efforts that had gone into the improvements.
He stated that he believed that the improvements had been imbedded in the organization arid were not temporary.
Mr. Zimmerman'noted the improvements and the lapses in performance which occur red during the appraisal period.
He stated that the conclusions of the SALP Board were that the improved performance was due to management involvement, organization and staff changes, and actions to implement the recommendations from the previous year's SALP Board.
He noted that some
'reas had experienced lapses in performance which were due in part to procedure weaknesses, poor adherence to procedures, non-conservative interpretations of Technical Specifications, and an absence of strict work control.
Mr. Zimmerman stressed that these problems should be addressed so that similar weaknesses do not recur during the next appraisal period.
Mr. Zimmerman noted that the Supply System has depth in the Operations area and that the SALP Board saw improvements in this area.
Weaknesses were noted; however, in the execution of activities that involved questionable plant conditions.
On several occasions, the operators proceeded
"in the face of uncertainty" when confronted with unusual situations.
These events included the starting of a residual heat removal (RHR)
pump while it was rotating backwards, the control rod drift event of March 11, and non-conservative actions in several Technical Specification interpretations.
Mr. Powers commented that the plant has recognized these concerns and has assumed a more conservative role since those events.
Regarding Maintenance/Surveillance, Nr. Zimmerman acknowledged the strengths in the Surveillance area, and stated that the greatest concerns were in the Maintenance area.
He noted that the Supply System seems to depend excessively on the skill of the craft instead of a more rigorous, proceduralized control of work activities.
The procedures are not of the same caliber as those associated with the other organizations, and the staff's compliance with the procedures needs additional improvement.
Several examples of problems with the maintenance work request process were also discusse Mr. Martin stated that he had seen improvement in Operations, Engineer-ing, and Ouali.ty Assurance, but had not seen similar improvement in the Maintenance area.
He questioned whether maintenance is going to improve.
He also questioned whether the improvements in the other areas were permanent.
Mr. Mazur responded by stating that maintenance had not received the level of management attention which had been given to other areas.
He stated that the Supply System would bring maintenance up to the same performance level as other areas.
Mr. Oxsen stated that this conversa-tion would not be repeated at the next SALP meeting.
Nr. Powers stated that more attention would be given to the Maintenance area to bring about the same type of performance improvement seen in other areas.
Mr. Zimmerman noted that improvements had been noted in the Engineering/
Technical area.
Within this area, improvements were observed to have been more significant in the Generation Engineering area, with some weaknesses still noted in the Plant Technical area.
These included previously noted weaknesses in Technical Specifications interpretations, heavy workload on the plant technical staff involved in day-to-day activities, and weakness in technical training for the Technical Staff.
Mr. Martin commented that the accomplishments of the engineering organization have been impressive, and stated that he hopes they can continue during the next year.
He stated that the Technical Staff has not degraded, but has not kept place with other organizations; it needs to be brought up to the same level of performance as the Generation Engineering staff.
The engineering organizations, both Generation Engineering and Plant Technical staff, need to be at the same stature as plant operators to ensure proper operation of the plant.
Mr. Knighton expressed his concern that technical submittals provided to NRR in support of Technical Specifications changes were not always sufficient.
On several occasions, additional technical information had to be requested to satisfy questions about Technical Specifications changes.
Mr. Mazur stated that he was surprised about this when he read it in the SALP report; he had thought that these types of problems were behind them.
Regarding the Safety Assessment/guality Verification area, Mr.Zimnerman stated that the weaknesses noted by the SALP Board involved a need for additional expertise, high turnover rate, Technical Specifications interpretations, and weakening in the nuclear safety assurance manage-ment reports.
Overall, he observed, the Board saw improvements.
Mr. Martin observed that in the past, OA's performance in identifying problems has needed improvement.
Recent improvements in this area will be watched further during the coming year.
He noted that the hardest part, maintaining an apparent improving trend, was yet to come.
Nr.
Bouchey stated that he agreed with that observation.
Regarding the staffing of his organizatio'n, he also wanted the record to show that he has ten individuals with a current or previous SRO license on his staff, two of whom are in the OA organizatio Mr. Scarano discussed the licensee's performance in the Radiological Controls area.
He discussed an observed weakness on the part of plant staff personnel (other than the radiation protection staff) in not complying with radiological controls procedures in the work place.
Mr.
Powers stated that he also was not satisfied with the plant staff's performance in this area and that several improvements woul.d be accomp-lished in the coming weeks to increase worker attention to proper health physics practices.
These changes would involve increased training at the craft level and improved general employee training.
Nr Oxsen stated that these issues had also been discussed during his April and July staff meetings.
Mr. Scarano briefly discussed observed improvements in the Emergency Planning area which led to a Category 1 rating in that area.
In his discussions, he commended the licensee for finding ways to improve and then implementing those enhancements.
In the Security area, Mr. Scarano stated that the program was good and that management was involved.
Training and self-development were also viewed as good.
The only weakness was in the accomplishment of identi-fied corrective actions.
These weaknesses included door closures and radio. communication problems that have existed for the past two years.
Remote TV monitoring and drug testing problems have also been known for some time but no recent actions have been forthcoming.
He stated that when a problem was identified, it appeared that it was "studied" instead of being solved.
Nr. Monopoli stated that identified equipment problems will be corrected over the next five years, and that the coomunications areas had been resurveyed to identify dead spots'.
In summary, Nr. Hartin stated that substantial improvements had been seen in the areas of Operations and Engineering, but that he has a sense of'nxiety about Maintenance and the technical staffs.
He has seen a
number of examples wherein programs have not been followed through.
One example was the number of Control Room annunciators activated during normal operations.
Since his previous visit three weeks earlier the number had risen,, and one alarm, reactor feedwater pump turbidity high, was not understood'well by the operators, and may not have had a
technical reason for being an alarm.
Mr. Mazur stated that the Supply System has been actively monitoring control room annunciators, including a weekly report by the Operations Manager, and has a goal to have a "Black Board" during normal power operation.
Mr. Hartin stated that at the last SALP meeting, Supply System manage-ment stated that they wanted to be a top 10K plant. 'e noted that this is a worthwhile ambition, and that the Supply System has established a
good foundation.
He stated that he had guarded optimism about the next year.
The hard part is yet to be done, but the Supply System does appear to have the potential to be a top performe Mr. Nazur thanked NRC management for the opportunity to meet.
He stated that he believes the Supply System management has tackled the cultural attitude problems within the organization and will continue to show improvement.
The meeting was adjourned at 10:00 A I
~'~u
~4
rLn0
~ g t C
O n
o~
0y**4 Docket No.
50-397 LNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REQIOM V 1i5O MARIALANE,SUITE 210 WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIAOIS96 JUL C4 188S Washington Public Power Supply System 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Hr. D. X. Nazur Managing Director Gentlemen:
. Subject:
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
The NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Board has
~ com-pleted its periodic evaluation of the performance of your Washington Nuclear Plant No. 2 (WNP-2) facility for the period dune 1, 1988 through May 31, 1989.
The performance of WNP-2 was evaluated fn the functional areas of Plant Operations,,
Radiological Controls, Maintenance/Surveillance, Emergency Pre-paredness, Security, Engineering/Technical Support, and Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification.
The criteria used in conducting this assessment and the SALP Board's evaluation of your performance in these functional areas are contained in the enclosed SALP report.'verall, the SALP Board found your performance to be acceptable and directed toward safe facility operatfun.
Your performance in most areas was judged to have improved over the previous 'period, and no area was rated Category 3..
However, as discussed in the enclosed report, improvement is still needed
'In a number of areas, and continued attention by Supply System management is needed to ensure the timely and effective completion of corrective action programs you have fnftiated.
The issues of principal concern to.the SALP Board and to NRC management are
{1) weaknesses in procedure quality and administrative controls, (2) the inability to achieve consistent adherence to procedures by plant personnel, and {3) non-conservative equipment operability determinations by plant management.
The first two concerns above applied to several areas, including Nafntenance/Surveillance in particular.
Weaknesses were also identified that were specific to the following functional areas:
Radiological Controls Resolution of effluent monitoring issues and and adherence of plant personnel to radiological protection practices.
Nafntenance/Surveillance Work control practices (use of "vital"
'maintenance work requests (NWRs), insufficient guidance in MMR work instructions, and control of changes thereto)
and the scheduling of surveillance tests.
Engineering/Technical Support -- Technical Specifications interpreta-tions, Technical staff training, and reporting of plant events.
r
. 't.
S
JUL 24 1989
Safety Assessment/guality Verification Root cause program, and the quality of licensing submittals, A management seanary of this assessment is provided in Section II of the enclosed.report.-
Strengths, weaknesses, and Board recoamendations are provided in Section IV, Performance Analysis.
As discussed on July 21; 1989 with Mr. L. Oxsen of the Supply System staff by Mr. P. Johnson of the Region Y office, a management meeting to discuss the results of the SALP Board's assessment will be held at the WNP-2 Plant at 8:00 a.m.
on August 8, 1989.
Since no functional area.was assessed Category 3, a written response to the enclosed initial report fs not required.
However, you may submit comnents on the enclosed report,.if desired, within 30 days after the August 8 meeting.
In..accordance with Section 2.790.of the-NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed SALP, ~port will be placed in-,the.,NRC's Public.Document Room, as well as any coaments you may wish to.submit to the NRC regarding the content of the SALP
.report.
The.NRC's Office XorAnalysis and Evaluation of Operational Data performed an assessment of licensee event reports submitted for WNP-2.
This assessment was provided as an input to the SALP process; a copy is therefore included as Attachment 1"to the enclosed report..
Should you have any questions concerning the LP report, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincer y.
J. B. Martin Regional Administrator Enclosure:
SALP Report No. 50-397/89-16; Attachment 1 Enclosed in SALP Report cc w/enclosure:
C. M. Powers, WPPSS A. 6. Hosier, MPPSS G. D. Bouchey.
WPPSS A. L. Oxsen, WPPSS D. E. Doupe, Esq.,
WPPSS M. G. Conn, Burns 5 Roe, Inc.
State of MA N. S. Reynolds, Esq.,
BLCPKR
SUMMARY Functional Area Inspection Hours A.
Plant Operations
.
1247 Percent of Effort
Enforcement Items*
II III IV V
S.
Radiological Controls C.
Naintenance/
Surveillance S.
Emergency Prep.
K.
Security F
Engineering/ ~
Technical Support 6.
Safety Assessment/
guality Verif.
495 194 132 290 898
17
3
'
6
$900 100
4
~
~
Severity 1evels are discussed in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.
One deviation was also identified during this SALP period in the Maintenance/Surveil-lance functional area.
'otals Notice of Violation pending on equipment qualification issues identified in inspection report 50-397/88-39.
This information is current through inspection report 50-397/89-1 TABLE 2 INSPECTION REPORT No.
88-17 88-17 88-21 88-21 88-22 M-24 88-24 88-24
88-27 88-32 88-32 88-33 B8-36 88-37 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY SUBJECT Inadequate protected area detection aids Failure to record safeguards event Plant heatup rate exceeded Technical Specification limits iicensee event report not submitted within 30 days of discovery Unauthorized entry into a high radiation area J
Failure to lock a high radiation area Licensee not reporting reactor protective system trips per 10CFR 50.72 requirements Failure to use a determination/
retermination sheet in a work request Failure to followup on NTE which was found to be'out of calibration Procedures not established to provide for installation and replacement of air filters for emergency diesel generators Failure to prepare a nonconformance report for hydraulic control unit discrepancies
'Deviation - Failure to complete calibration of diesel generator tank level instruments per comnitment date Failure to continuously sample main plant vent release Failure to post a radiation area METE found overdue for calibration SEVERITY LEVEL
FUNCTIONAL AREA E
TABLE 2 ENFORCEMENT ITEMS Cont
INSPECTION REPORT No.
88-37 88-39 B8-40 88-41 89-04 89-04 SUBJECT-Combustibles not removed from vital areas after completion of work Equipment qualification concerns regarding Limitorque valve operators Failure to sample control room charcoal after 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation as required by Technical Specifications Timely actions not taken for delinquent surveillance on degraded. voltage protection Grab samples not obtained and analyzed prior to each vent or purge of containment Entry into high radiation area without without proper dose rate monitoring Failure to verify Division 3 diesel incomplete starting sequence trip was bypassed du>'.ing loss of coolant accident testing Failure to report Division 3 diesel inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.3 SEVERITY FUNCTIONAL LEVEL AREA
C 89-D4 89-08 89-09 Failure to report Division 3 diesel trip 4.
bypass problem in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 Failure to include information required by
Technical Specifications in the semi-annual radioactive effluent report Failure to post a radiation area NOV pending on equipment qualification issues identified in inspection report 50-397/88-39.
This information is current as of inspection report 50-397/89-15 (with the exception of several reports still being reviewed).
TABI E 2 ENFORCEMENT ITEMS Cont'd Functional Areas:
A - Plant Operations B - Radiological Controls C - Maintenance/
Surveillance D - Emergency Prep.
E - Security F - Engineering(
Technical Support 6 - Safety Assessment/
guality Verf TABLE 3 SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS LER~s Functional Area A.
Plant Operations B.
Radiological Controls SALP Cause Code*
a~
r
2
2
1
Tota1s
C.
Maintenance/
Surveillance D.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
Engineering/
Technical Support G.
Safety Assessment/
Quality Verif.
3
1
14 Totals
8
6
48
- Cause Code A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other Functional Areas A - Plant Operations B - Radiological Controls
'
- Maintenance/
Surveillance D - Emergency Prep.
E - Security F - Engineering/
Technical Support 6 - Safety Assessment/
equality Verif.
The above data are based upon LERs 88-10 through 89-19.
Note:
LER 89-12 not issue ATTACHMENT 1 AEOD In ut to SALP Review for MNP Unit 2 Mashington Public Power Svpply System submitted about 37 reports, not includ-ing revisions, for XNP Unit 2, during the assessment period from June 1, 19BB through May 31, 1989.
Our review included LERs numbers as follows:
88-010 to 88-038 89-001 to 89-009 The LER review followed the general instructions and procedures of NUREG-1022.
The specific review review criteria and our findings follow.
Si nificant 0 eratin Events There were three reported events at Mashington Nuclear Plant Unit 2, that vere identified as particularly significant events by the AEOD screening and review process fn the assessment period.
Each of these events were consi-dered appropriate for potential further action by the NRC offices.
The three significant events were:
1.
LER 50-397/88-011
"Reactor Protection System Low Level Actuation During Shutdown Cooling System Lineup Change - Personnel Error/Inadequate Design."
During a routine shift of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system lineup. the operator inadvertently opened a suction valve in RHR SDC Loop "B'nd a suction valve in the.Suppres-sion Pool causing dr'a'inage from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the Suppression Pool.
This resulted in low water level in the RPV which in turn-actuated the Reactor Protective System.
Subsequently, the Licensee added an interlock to prevent the opening of the Suppression Pool suction valve when the associated RHR SDC valve was open.
2.
LER 05-397/88-017
"Limitorqve Motor Operator Potential Safety Hazard Caused by Torque Switch Cam Binding and Torque Switch Lug Failure Due to Cause Unknown."
A total of 21 Limitorque Model SMB-000 and SMB-00 Valve Motor Operators have been identified to have defective torque switches.
These defective switches were made from Melamine.
Limitorqve has issued a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification letter. dated November 3, 1988, suggesting replacement of all Melamine torque switches by torque switches made from Fiberite.
The Licensee has replaced all Melamine torque switches in safety related motor operators by Fiberite torque switches.
3.
LER 50-397/88-030
"RPS Actuation Caused by Loss of Power on Both RPS Divisions - due to misapplication of Switch Type."
A Reactor Protective System (RPS) actuation occurred due to a momentary loss of power to both divisions of RPS caused by overtravel of RPS Power Supply Selector Switch, GE Model Number SBM.
Subsequently, the Licensee has placed a
cavtion tag on the switch to serve as a reminder that the switch is not mechanically prevented from overtravelin AEOD Technical Stud Re orts No deficiencies were identified in this assessment period at MNP Unit 2, that were considered sufficiently serious to merit an in-depth technical study review by AEOD.
PNs Issued in Assessment Period Five Preliminary Notices of Events or Unusual Occurrences were issued for MNP-2 during this assessment period.
PNO-V-88-63 Failure to perform Surveillance Test on 4.16 KV degraded voltage time delay relay.
PNO-V-88-64 Leakage from Suppression Pool Vacuum Breaker Valve.
PNO-V-89-05 Condenser Tube Leakage.
PNO-V-89-09 Reactor Trip Due to Flashover of Step-up Transformer 500 kV Bushing.
PNO-.V-89-15 Failure of Suppression Pool Suction Valve.
The licensee has submitted one LER for each of PNO-V-88-63, PNO-V-88-64 and PNO-V-89-09.
Thus far, the licensee has not issued any LER against PNO-V-89-15 even though the licensee has reported it as an unusual event on February 10, 1989. The event in PNO-V-89-05 is not required to be reported as LER.
~ ~
LER ualit The LERs adequately described all the major aspects of the event, including component or system failures that contributed to the event and the signifi-cant corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence.
The reports were thorough, detailed, well written and easy to understand.
The narrative sections typically included specific details of the event such as valve identification numbers, model numbers, numbe'rs of operable redundant systems, the date of completion of repairs, etc., to provide a good understanding of the event.
The root cause of the event was clearly identified in most cases.
The LERs presented the event information in an organized pattern with sepa-rate headings and specific information in each section that led to a clear understanding of the event information.
Previous similar occurrences were properly referenced in the LERs as.applicable.
The update LERs were ade-.
quate.
Effective Corrective Action A review of the LERs does not indicate a large number of recurring events.
However, there does appear to be a pattern of personnel errors or procedure errors with different events.
Several of the errors seemed to occur either as personnel failing to correctly follow a procedure or the procedure was
inadequate (too general, insuffi "ient detail, not complete, vague, etc.).
A total of 22 of 37 LERs were related to personnel or procedure error.
The LERs are 88-10, 11, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, and 89-003, 004, 007, and 009.
In the previous SALP report for the period between June 2, 1987 and Hay 31, 1989, similar deficiency was reported for 17 LERs out of a total of 29 LERs issued during that period.