IR 05000397/1989004
| ML17285A379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1989 |
| From: | Johnson P, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A377 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-89-04, 50-397-89-4, NUDOCS 8904170062 | |
| Download: ML17285A379 (12) | |
Text
Report No:
Docket No:
Licensee:
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
50-397/89-04 50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
January 9 - February 7, 1989 Inspector:
siic, zq Approved by:
R.
C.
S'o ensen, Resident Inspector g 9 P.
H. fo nson, C ief Reacto Projects Section
Date Signed
~!i fr~
Date Signed Summary:
Inspection on January 9 - February 7,
1989 (50-397/89-04)
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room operations, licensee action on previous inspectio'n findings, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, special inspection topics, and reactor scram and recovery.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 60705, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 90713; 92701, 93702 and 92702 were covered.
Results:
Three violations were identified: (1) failure to perform verifica-tio~ o7 the incomplete starting sequence trip bypass for the HPCS diesel generator (DG), and to properly verify bypassing of certain other trips as required, (2) failure to take the actions required by Sections 3.8.1.1.c and 4.0.3 of the Technical Specifications when it was determi,ned that surveil-lance had not been conducted as required, and (3) failure to report plant operation with delinquent surveillance testing as required by 10 CFR 50.73.
(paragraph 8)
A weakness was observed in Technical Specification compliance, as indicated by the violations identified above.
Two followup items from a previous inspection were closed during this inspection; three new items were opened.
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- DOCK 05000397
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted L. Oxsen, Assistant Managing Director for Operations D. Bouchey, Director, Licensing and Assurance C. NcGilton, Na'nager, Safety and Assurance
- C. Powers, Plant Manager J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager K. Cowan, Nuclear Safety Assurance Manager C. Edwards, Quality Control Manager
- R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager J.
Harmon, Maintenance Manaoer
- A. Hosier, Licensing Nanager
- D. Kobus, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. Koenigs, Technical Manager S. NcKay, Operations Yanager J. Peters, Administrative Yianager h'. Shaeffer, Assistant-Operations Manager
"'R. Rebring, Assistant Maintenance Manager N, h'uestefeld, Assistant Technical Manager
.
The inspector also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors ano shift managers, maintenance, engineering, ouality assurance, and management personnel.
"'Attended the Exit Meeting on February 2, 1989.
2.
Plant Status
't the start of the inspection period, the plant was in cold shutdown to repair'ondenser tube leaks.
Two tubes were found to be leaking and were plugged, and three previously installed plugs were found also to be leaking and were repaired.
Several other tubes were found with signifi-cant wall erosion and were plugged to prevent potential leaks.
The-plant was restarted on January 9 and achieved 100% power on January 14.
The'lant operated at 100K power unti l 5: 13 a.m.
on January 30, when a
plant scram occurred due to a fault on the main transformer and main generator (this event is described
=in more detail in paragraph 10).
The reactor was restarted at 7:51 p.m.
on February 1.
The plant restarted with only three of the four main steam lines operable due to the failure of main steam isolation valve NS-28A to open.
This restricted the power level of the plant to about 78/, which was achieved on Febr'uary 3 and maintained through the end of the inspection period.
3.
Previousl Identified NRC Ins ection Items 92701, 92702 The inspector reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on the following previously identified inspection findings:
a.
Closed)
Enforcement Item (88-02-01:
Incom lete Corrective Action on En orcement Item 7-19-31 This violation resulted from a fai lure to review the installation
'f temporary foam filters on certain Class 1E switchgear, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
The licensee removed the foam filters from the switchgear cited.
However, a
number of filters were observed by the resident inspector to still be installed on the inside of other switchgear, which illustrated a
lack of adequate corrective action.
As a result, the licensee committed to revise PPN 1.3. 19, Housekeeping.
This revision expanded the responsibilities of area coordinators to identify degradation in equipment and structures.
Training was administered to the area coordinators to make them
.
aware of their increased responsibilities.
Also, a criteria list was developed which defined what constitutes a plant modification.
Training was administered concerning this criteria list with the intent being to provide additional awareness in preventing plant, modifications which do not utilize existing programmatic controls.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed Followu Item (88-02-02) Action to Ensure Determination/
Retermination Sheets are Used Pro er The inspector had originally observed Instrument and Control ( IEC)
technicians removing a switcIi for a suppression pool temperature monitor.
Lifted leads were to be documented on a determination/
retermination sheet and verified by a second individual.
However, the leads were being relanded without having been. first verified that they were lifted.
Licensee management had indicated that this was not the way they intended the sheet to be used and that action would be taken to ensure that the determination/retermination sheets were used as they had intended.
The inspector observed two instances wherein these sheets were being used.
In both cases, they were being used properly.
This item is closed.
4.
0 erational Safet Verification (71707 a.
Plant Tours The'ollowing plant areas were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:
Reactor Building Control Room Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Service Mater Buildings
Technical Support Center Turbine Generator Building Yard Area and Perimeter b.
The (5)
following items were observed during the tours:
0 eratin Lo s and Records.
Records were reviewed against Tec nica Specification an administrative control procedure requirements.
Nonitorinq Instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed or corre ation etween c annels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
~Chid
.
C
d hhh
1 for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifica-tions, and administrative procedures.
The attentiveness of the operators was observed in the execution of their duties and the control room was observed to be free of distractions such as non-work related radios and reading materials.
E ui ment Lineu s.
Valves and electrical breakers were veri-fied to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the appli-cable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
Technical Specification limiting conditions for opera tion were verified by,direct observation.
E ui ment Tao in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment was in the condition specified.
General Plant E ui ment Conditions.
Plant equipment was o served for indications o
system leakage, improper lubri-cation, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingits functional requirements.
Annunciators were observed to ascertain their status and operability.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment and controls were hT
111 11'1
d admini strati ve procedures.
(s) ~PT" Ch1.Ch1 1 1<<d reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and admi ni s tr ative procedures.
Radiation Protection Controls.
The inspector periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspector also
observed compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, proper wearing of protective equipment and personnel monitoring devices, and personnel frisking practices.
Radiation monitoring equipment was frequently monitored to verify operability and adherence to calibration frequency.
(10) Plant Housekee in
. Plant conditions and material/equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of clean-liness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
(ll) ~Securit
. The inspector periodically observed security practi-ces to ascertain tha't the licensee's implementation of the security plans was in accordance with site procedures, that the search equipment at the access control points was opera-tional, that, the vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed, and that personnel allowed access to the protected area were badged and monitored and the monitoring equipment was functional.
Ho violations or deviations were identified.
5.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Malkdown (71707, 71710)
Se'iected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical power supplies, cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves were in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and,controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated dates.
~Ss tee Diesel Generator Systems, Divisions 1, 2, and 3.
Hydrogen Recombiners Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI),
Trains "A"; "B" and
"C" Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
High Pressure Core Spi ay (HPCS)
Dates January 26,
January
January
January
January
Peactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Trains IIA II a n d II B II I
January
January
Standby Service Mater 125V DC Electrical Distribution, Divisions 1 and
February
Janu'ary
January
January
250V DC Electrical Distribution No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testing 61726 January
a
~
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1} the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2)
a technically adequate procedure was used for performance, of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4)
test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the followino surveillance tests were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:
Procedure 7.4.3.2. 1.22B Main Steam Line High Flow Channel
"B" Channel Functior a', Test (CFl)
Dates Performed January
7.4.3.7.6.3 Source Range Monitor "B" CFT January
7.4.3.1.1.67 Average Power Range Monitor January
(APRY) "F" CFT 7.4.3. 1. 1.74 APRM "C" Neutron Flux
'pscale Setdown No violations or deviations were identified.
Ja nuary
7.
Plant Maintenance 62703)
During the inspection period, the inspector observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verifv compliance with regulatory requirements and with
administrative and maintenance procedures, required gA/(}C involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Descri tion Repair 606'verhead Crane Track per AT 7086 Repair of Diesel Generator Building Louvers per AT 8036 Repair o
SLC-LT-1 per AT 8615 Installation o
Frisking Booths per AT 1608 Replace Relay Base in APRH "F" per AT 8850 No violations or deviations were identified.
!'.
HPCS Diesel Generator lno erabilit 71707)
Dates Performed January
January
January
January
January
The inspector, after discussion with the NRR Project Yianager, reviewed a
Technical Specification amendment request dated December 2,
1988.
It requested that surveillance 4.8. 1. 1.2.e.7 be revised to match the FSAR description of the high pressure core spray (HPCS) diesel generator (Division 3).
Specifically, the FSAR states that the following diesel generator trips are in effect during emergency start:
engine overspeed generator differential relay action incomplete starting sequence emergency stop pushbutton Section 4.8. 1. 1.2.e.7 of the Technical Specifications states that the HPCS diesel generator must be demonstrated operable every 18 months by verifying that all automatic trips are automatically bypassed on a loss of bus voltage concurrent with an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
actuation signal except the following:
engine overspeed generator differential current emergency manual stop The Technical Specifications therefore clearly require that the incom-plete starting'eeuence trip be verified to be bypassed on an emergency start signa The inspector confirmed that the as-built configuration for the HPCS diesel generator was as described in the FSAR, and had been since plant startup, by reviewing drawing CYI 02-02E22-07, Revision N, sheet 2 of 16, and by interviewing knowledgeable and responsible personnel on the plant staff.
The incomplete starting sequence contacts in the HPCS diesel engine,.control circuitry are not bypassed on an ECCS actuati'on start or a loss of bus voltage, and have not been since plant startup, a
period of approximately five years.
Therefore, the licensee has not been verifying that this trip is bypassed under these conditions, as required by the Technical Specifications.
In addition, the licensee determined on February 3 that some other trip bypass verifications for the HPCS diesel-generator had not been performed properly.
Bgsed.upon an incorrect understanding that all trip bypasses were effected by the opening of a single'air of contacts on.
relay K-ll, the licensee had been verifying bypassing of the trips by confirming that one trip signal (high jacket water temperature)
would not cause the diesel-generator to trip when actuated.
In actuality, the required bypassing of certain trips is accomplished by the opening of=three pairs of contacts on K-11.
The licensee's. surveillance test therefore verified bypassing of only those trips associated with the contact pair tested (engine trips, including high jacket water temperature and low lubricating oil pressure).
As a result, the licensee had not, since initial plant startup, performed testing to verify opening of two of the three contact pairs, which are associated primarily with generator protective features.
Positive verification of the ability to bypass all trips required by. the Technical Specifications=
to be bypassed was therefore not performed.
The licensee's fai lure to verify bypass of the incomplete start sequence trip and bypass of certain other diesel-generator trips associated with the other two
'ontact pairs on relay K-ll is considered a violation of Section 4.8. 1'. 1.2.e 7( b) of the Technical Specifications (89-04-01).
As stated in the NRC Enforcement Policy,
CFR 2, Appendix C, the NRC does not normally take enforcement action for violations.which are identified by the licensee, provided that certain conditions are met.
As stated in Section V.G of Appendix C, included among these conditions are requirements that the licensee take appropriate corrective actions and, if required, report the violation to the NRC.
In that the licensee did not, as discussed further below,'take appropriate corrective actions regarding failure to perform the above surveillance verifications as required, and did not submit the required LER, NRC enforcement action for, the improper performance of required surveillance testing is considered appropriate.
The inspector also reviewed PPN 7.4.8. 1. 1.2.8, Revision 2, HPCS Diesel Generator LOCA Test, and noted that the bypasses mentioned above were being verified only with an ECCS actuation signal present, not with a less of voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with an ECCS actuation signal
'as specified in Section 4.8. 1. 1.2.e.7 of the Technical Specifications.
The inspector determined that this TS requirement is in error; i.e.,
a loss of power is in fact not associated with bypassing
of the trips, and cannot be physically tested.
This concern with the TS, along with the discrepancy regarding bypassing of the incomplete start sequence trip, was corrected by the Waiver of Compliance issued by NRR on February 2, 1989 in response to the licensee's request of February,l.
Verification of proper opening of the two additional contact pairs on relay 'K-ll was performed by the licensee on February 3, 1989.
'fter determining that the surveillance test to verify bypassing of the incomplete start sequence trip had not been performed as required, the licensee also did not evaluate the operability of the HPCS diesel generator and take the actions required by Sections 3.8.1.1.c and 4.0.3 of the Technical Specifications until these requirements were brought to licensee management's attention by the NRC on February 1, 1989.
This is a violation of the referenced sections of the Technical Specifications (89-04-02).
The licensee reportedly identified this discrepancy between the FSAR and the Technical Specifications in 1984, and initiated a Technical Specifi-cations amendment request which was inadvertently not submitted to the NRC.
The licensee identified the issue again in November 1988, and submitted the Oecember 2,
1988 amendment request referred to above.
However, the licensee did not submit the required Licensee Event Report (LER) within 30 days regarding failure to properly perform the survei l-lance verification required by the Technical Specifications.
This was reportable as an operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications, as required by 10 CFR 50.73.
This is
'onsidered a violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) (89-04-03).
The inspector observed that the above violations further indicated insufficient understanding of TS requirements by the plant staff, inclu-dinq management.
He noted that this weakness had also been recently indicated (in November 1988)
by the violation involving improper surveillance of degraded voltage protection features (documented in Inspection Report 88-40).
9.
Fuel Channel tleasurements in the S ent Fuel Pool 60705 The inspector observed fuel channel measurements being conducted in accordance with PPM 9.5. 1.
The fuel movements were conducted under the cognizance of a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO).
A fuel bundle was moved to an area in the fuel pool where its fuel channel'owing characteristics could be measured remotely, using a state-of-the-art fuel channel measurement device.
If the amount of b'owing was within certain specified criteria, then it was stored back in its original location and the channel was determined to-be acceptable for reuse on a
new fuel bundle.
Otherwise, it was found to be unsuitable for reuse and would remain with the spent fuel assembly.
The portion of the operation observed by the inspector appeared to-be properly controlled and conducted in accordance with PPN 9.5. 1.
E No violations or deviations were identifie.
Reactor Scram (93702 At.5: 13 a.m.
on January 30, 1989 the reactor scrammed from 100i power due to a neutral overcurrent condition on the main transformer.
This overcurrent condition caused an actuation of the "86" lockout relays associated with the main transformer and main generator which in tume generated a turbine trip and reactor scram.
The operations staff was able to recover reactor pressure vessel (RPY)
level before dropping below +2"; however, level then increased rapidly to the level 8 setpoint causing the remaining feed pump to trip on high level.
One feed pump was subsequently recovered to help with level control.
All safety equipment functioned as required, and there were no other complications associated with the scram itself.
When the operators attempted to reset the scram, the inboard vent and drain valves for the scram discharge volume would not reopen.
The preliminary indication was that solenoid pilot valve CRD-V-9 was malfunctioning and not allowing air flow to the vent and drain valve actuators.
After removing V-9, the licensee determined that it was functioning properly, but that there was an obstruction in the air supply line to V-9.
After a'methodical process of elimination, the obstruction was determined to be in the upstream needle.valve, CRD-V-160A.
The valve was removed but no foreign material was found in it.
Although a conclusive root cause for the obstruction could not be established, the licensee concluded that foreign material may have lodged under the disc and restricted air flow, especially since this valve was normally throttled open only about 1/8 turn.
The resident inspector questioned the possible benefit of inspecting the upstream air filter for evidence of foreign material.
By this time, the scram had been reset, and the upstream filter could not be depressurized for inspection.
However, the licensee inspected a similar filter in a parallel air line which was considered to be representative, and no debris or foreign material was found.
The root cause for the scram was determined to be arcing to ground across an insulator associated with the "A" phase 500 KV bus bar between main transformer H1 and the motor operated disconnect (NOD).
The licensee determined that cooling tower drift had accumulated on this insulator and others in the 500 KV switchyard, leaving a deposit that.
allowed, in the presence of a moist environment, a fault to ground to occur.
Testing by Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) of a sample of insulators with deposits on them showed that they retained their dielectric insulating properties when they were dry.
However, when they became wet, the insulating properties diminished and they became conductive.
Cleaning of the insulators using a high pressure washer or cleaning pads alleviated the loss of insulating properties, even when they were wet.
Consequently, all 500 KY insulators were cleaned from inside the plant switchyard to the Ashe substation.
All 115 KV insulators in the vicinity of the plant were replaced.
Due to their location in an area of less cooling tower drift and their distance from the ground, the licensee elected not to clean the 230 KV insulator The 230 KV supply is the primary source of offsite power to the plant, with the 115 KV serving as backup.
The inspector also observed the meeting of the licensee's Restart Decision Committee which was convened in accordance with PPM 1.3.5-Reactor Trip and Recovery.
This committee is charged with rev'iewing all aspects of the scram and recovery, such that the entire event is adequately understood prior to restart.
It is comprised of the Plant Manager and management representatives from Plant Technical, Operations, gA, Engineering, and a Root Cause Assessment representative.
The inspector found this meeting to be frank and open, and to generally focus in the appropriate areas.
At the exit meeting, the inspector encouraged the licensee to continue pursuing the action items that were identified during this meeting.
No violations or deviations were identified.
ll.
Licensee Event Re ort LER Followu (90712, 92700 The following LER associated with an operating event was reviewed by the inspector.
Based on the information provided in the report, it was-concluded that reporting requirements had been met and that the root cause had been identified.
This LER is closed.
LER NUYiBER DESCRIPTION LER 88-38 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Valve Inoperable Due to Valved Out Pressure Transmitter Reviev of this LER indicated a weakness in the interface between Operations and Yiaintenance personnel involving the removal of equipment from service for maintenance, or restoration of equipment to service after maintenance.
Associated procedures did not provide sufficient direction on restoring a system to other than its normal system lineup.
Operations personnel reviewed the local leak rate test (LLRT) procedure which was to be performed after'the vacuum breaker was restored to service, but incorrectly assumed that the associated differential pressure instrument would be removed from service again in the same manner.
The LER stated that the LLRT procedure and Clearance Order Procedure would be revised to include more specific instructions.
12.
Exit Meetin 30703 The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the report period to discuss inspection status and an exit meeting was conducted with the indicated personnel (refer to paragraph 1)
on February 2, 1989.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representatives.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by or discussed with the inspector during the inspection.