IR 05000397/1989016
| ML17285A648 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1989 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A647 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-89-16, NUDOCS 8908080287 | |
| Download: ML17285A648 (38) | |
Text
SALP BOARD REPORT U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT NO. 50-397/89-16 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP-2 JUNE 1, 1988 THROUGH MAY 31, 1989
SUMMARY Functional Area Inspection Hours Percent of Effort Enforcement Items*
II III IV V
A.
Plant Operations 1247
B.
Radiological Controls C.
Maintenance/
Surveillance D.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
Engineering/ ~
Technical Support G.
Safety Assessment/
Ouality Verif.
495 644 194'32 290 898
17
4
1
6
Totals 3900 100
4 Severity levels are discussed in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.
One deviation was also identified during this SALP period in the Maintenance/Surveil-lance functional area.
Notice of Violation pending on equipment qualification issues identified in inspection report 50-397/88-39.
This information is current through inspection report 50-397/89-1 TABLE 2 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY INSPECTION REPORT No.
88-17 88-17 88-21 88-21 88-22 SUBJECT Inadequate protected area detection aids Failure to record safeguards event Plant heatup rate exceeded Technical Specification limits Licensee event report not submitted within 30 days of discovery Unauthorized entry into a high radiation area SEVERITY LEVEL FUNCTIONAL AREA 88-22 88-24 88-24 88-24 Failure to lock a high radiation area Licensee not reporting reactor protective system trips per 10CFR 50.72 requirements Failure to use a determination/
retermination sheet in a work request Failure to fallowup on MINUTE which was found to be'ut of calibration C
88-27 88-32 88-32 88-33 88-36 88-37 Procedures not established to provide for installation and replacement of air filters for emergency diesel generators Failure to prepare a nonconformance report for hydraulic control unit discrepancies Deviation - Failure to complete calibration of diesel generator tank level instruments per comitment date Failure to continuously sample main plant vent release Failure to post a radiation area I
MINUTE found overdue for calibration
TABLE 2 -- ENFORCEMENT ITEMS Cont'.'NSPECTION REPORT No.
88-37 88-39 88-40 88-40 88-41 SUBJECT Combustibles not removed from vital areas after completion of work Equipment qualification concerns regarding Limitorque valve operators Failure to sample control room charcoal after 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation as required by Technical Specifications Timely actions not taken for delinquent surveillance on degraded voltage protection Grab samples not obtained and analyzed prior to each vent or purge of containment SEVERITY LEVEL FUNCTIONAL AREA 88-41 89-04 89-04 89-04 Entry into high radiation area without without proper dose rate monitoring Failure to verify Division 3 diesel incomplete starting sequence trip was bypassed during loss of coolant accident testing Failure to report Division 3 diesel inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.3 Failure to report Division 3 diesel trip
bypass problem in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 89-08 89-09 Failure to include information required by
Technical Specifications in the semi-annual radioactive effluent report Failure to post a radiation area
NOV pending on equipment qualification issues identified in inspection report 50-397/88-39.
This information is current as of inspection report 50-397/89-15 (with the exception of several reports still being reviewed).
TABLE 2 -- ENFORCEMENT ITEMS Cont'd Functional Areas:
A - Plant Operations B - Radiological Controls C - Maintenance/
Surveillance D - Emergency Prep.
E - Security F - Engineering/
Technical Support G - Safety Assessment/
Quality Veri TABLE 3
.
SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS LERs Functional Area SALP Cause Code*
A~
X Totals A.
Plant Operations, B.
Radiological Controls ll
3
3
1
C.
Maintenance/
Surveillance D.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
Engineering/
Technical Support G.
Safety Assessment/
Quality Verif.
3
1
Totals'6
3
5
- Cause Code A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other Functional Areas A - Plant Operations B - Radiological Controls C - Maintenance/
Surveillance D - Emergency Prep.
E - Security F - Engineering/
Technical Support G - Safety Assessment/
Quality Verif.
The above data are based upon LERs 88-10 through 89-19.
Note:
LER 89-12 not issue ATTACHMENT 1 AEOD In ut to SALP Review for WNP Unit 2 Washington Public Power Supply System submitted about 37 reports, not includ-ing revisions, for WNP Unit 2, during the assessment period from June 1, 1988 through May 31, 1989.
Our review included LERs numbers as follows:
88-010 to 88-038 89-001 to 89-009 The LER review followed the general instructions and procedures of NUREG-1022.
The specific review review criteria and our findings follow.
Si nificant 0 eratin Events There were three reported events at Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2, that were identified as particularly significant events by the AEOD screening and review process in the assessment period.
Each of these events were consi-dered appropriate for potential further action by the NRC offices.
The three significant events were:
1.
LER 50-397/88-011
"Reactor Protection System Low Level Actuation During Shutdown Cooling System Lineup Change - Personnel Error/Inadequate Design."
During a routine shift of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system lineup, the operator inadvertently opened a suction valve in RHR SDC Loop "B'nd a suction valve in the Suppres-sion Pool causing drainage from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the Suppression Pool.
This resulted in low water level in the RPV which in turn actuated the Reactor Protective System.
Subsequently, the Licensee added an interlock to prevent the opening of the Suppression Pool suction valve when the associated RHR SDC valve was open.
2.
LER 05-397/88-017
"Limitorque Motor Operator Potential Safety Hazard Caused by Torque Switch Cam Binding and Torque Switch Lug Failure Due to Cause Unknown."
A total of 21 Limitorque Model SMB-000 and SMB-00 Valve Motor Operators have been identified to have defective torque switches.
These defective switches were made from Melamine.
Limitorque has issued a
CFR Part 21 Notification letter, dated November 3, 1988, suggesting replacement of all Melamine torque switches by torque switches made from Fiberite.
The Licensee has replaced all Melamine torque switches in safety related motor operators by Fiberite torque switches.
3.
LER 50-397/88-030
"RPS Actuation Caused by Loss of Power on Both RPS Divisions - due to misapplication of Switch Type."
A Reactor Protective System (RPS) actuation occurred due to a momentary loss of power to both divisions of RPS caused by overtravel of RPS Power Supply Selector Switch, GE Model Number SBM.
Subsequently, the Licensee has placed a
caution tag on the switch to serve as a reminder that the switch is not mechanically prevented from overtravelin AEOD Technical Stud Re orts No deficiencies, were identified in this assessment period at MNP Unit 2, that were considered sufficiently serious to merit an in-depth technical study review by AEOD.
PNs Issued in Assessment Period Five Preliminary Notices of Events or Unusual Occurrences were issued for WNP-2 during this assessment period.
PNO-V-88-63 Failure to perform Surveillance Test on 4.16 KV degraded voltage time delay relay.
PNO-V-88-64 Leakage from Suppression Pool Vacuum Breaker Valve.
PNO-V-89-05 Condenser Tube Leakage.
PNO-Y-89-09 Reactor Trip Due to Flashover of Step-up Transformer 500 kV Bushing.
PNO-V-89-15 Failure of Suppression Pool Suction Valve.
The licensee has submitted one LER for each of PNO-V-88-63, PNO-V-88-64 and PNO-V-89-09.
Thus far, the licensee has not issued any LER against PNO-V-89-15 even though the licensee has reported it,as an unusual event on February 10, 1989.
The event in PNO-V-89-05 is not required to be reported as LER.
I~ER II The LERs adequately described all the major aspects of the event, including component or system failures that contributed to the event and the signifi'-
cant corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence.
The reports were thorough, detailed, well written and easy to understand.
The narrative sections typically included specific details of. the event such as valve identification numbers, model numbers, numbers of operable redundant systems, the date of completion of repairs, etc., to provide a good understanding of the event.
The root cause of the event was clearly identified in most cases.
The LERs presented the event information in an organized pattern with sepa-rate headings and specific information in each section that led to a clear understanding of the event information.
Previous similar occurrences were properly referenced in the LERs as applicable.
The update LERs were ade-quate.
Effective Corrective Action A review of the LERs does not indicate a large number of recurring events.
However, there does appear to be a pattern of personnel errors or procedure errors with different events.
Several of the errors seemed to occur either as personnel failing to correctly follow a procedure or the procedure was
inadequate (too general, insufficient detail, not complete, vague', etc.).
A total of 22 of 37 LERs were related to personnel or procedure error.
The LERs are 88-10, 1'1, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 32. 33, 35, 36, 38, and 89-003, 004, 007, and 009.
In the previous SALP report for the period between June 2, 1987 and May 31, 1989, similar deficiency was reported for 17 LERs out of a total of 29 LERs issued during that period.