IR 05000397/1989024
| ML17285A894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1989 |
| From: | Fish R, Good G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A892 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-89-24, NUDOCS 8912200160 | |
| Download: ML17285A894 (15) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
REGION V
Report No.
50-397/89-24 Docket No.
50-397 License No.
NPF-21 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.O.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted:
October 2-5, 1989 Inspector:
oo
,
ergency repare ness na yst Team Leader i> la q
ate
>gne Team Members:
Approved by:.
SUMMARY:
C. J.
Bosted, Senior Resident Inspector, WNP-2 C.
R.
Van Niel, Section Chief, NRR/PEPB G.
T.
Lonergan, Comex Corporation 1s
,
le Emergency Preparedness Section g('~ p.
e ogne Ins ection on October 2-5 1989 (Re ort No. 50-397/89-24)
Areas Ins ected:
Announced inspection to follow-up on open items identified ur)ng t e exercise and to observe the 1989 emergency preparedness exercise and associated critique.
Inspection procedures 30703, 92701 and 82301 were used.
8912200160 8911c.9 PDR ADOCl< 05000397
Results:
One apparent violation of NRC requirements was identified for-7aai ure to correct a weak area identified during previous emergency exercises as required by paragraph IV. F. 5 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The apparent violation involves the licensee's faHure to adequately implement its procedures to notify plant personnel.
Several items for improving the emergency response program wer'e identified as the result of observing the
'exercise.
The exercise did demonstrate the licensee s ability to adequately respond to an emergency at the facility.
Three open items identified during the previous exercise were close DETAILS Persons Contacted L. Bradford, Supervisor, Health Physics'.
Chitwood, Manager, Emergency Planning
'.
Corcoran, Operations Simulator Engineer K. Hannah, Principal Engineer, Maintenance J.
Harmon, Manager, Maintenance R. Hintz, Health Physicist K. Kirley, Senior Maintenance Engineer A. Kl,auss, Supervisor, Emergency Planning J.
Landon, Emergency Planner M. Mann, Shift Manager D. Mannion, Principal Emergency Planner R. Mogle, Supervisor, Drills and Exercises V. Shockley, Emergency Planner S; Mashington, Supervisor, Compliance t
Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s (Ins ection Procedure 92701)
(Closed 0 en Item -(88-29-01:
The Operations Support Center (OSC) did no emonstrate con ro o
radiation safety..
This item was identified as an exercise weakness during the 1988 exercise and was composed of'en individual observations that collectively indicated a breakdown in the management and control of radiation safety.
The observations from the 1988 exercise included'the failure to establish prescribed contamination control points, the failure to conduct adequate habitability surveys, and the failure to post a high radiation area within a timely manner.
The individual points addressed in the 1988 exercise weresatisfactorily demonstrated during this exercise.
Observations made during this exercise indicated that the'icensee has improved its ability to manage and control radiation safety in the OSC; This exercise weakness is considered closed.
(Closed)
0 en Item (88-29-02):
The Technical Data Center (TDC) staff did not emonstrate t e a i sty o provide adequate technical support.
This item was identified as an exercise weakness during the 1988 exercise.
Although this scenario was not as taxing for the TDC staff as the the one used in 1988, the inspector noted improvement in the TDC staff's performance.
No criticisms were identified during this exercise.
This exercise weakness is considered closed.
(Closed 0 en Item (88-29-03):
There is a need for improvement in envsronmen a
mons orang re ated to the emergency preparedness program.
The conduct of field team activities was much improved over last year.
The one field 'team observed used the proper instruments and was careful
'o prevent instrument contamination.
Environmental samples were double bagged.
Radio communications with field teams SS2 and SS3 were successful, as was communication with the Washington State field team.
- While radio communication via the hand held radios was.intermittent, at best, communications using the newly=installed cellular telephone were
very successful.
Field teams marked the sample locations when soil samples were-collected.
It appeared that the Meteorological and Unified Dose Assessment Center (MUDAC) carefully tracked the location of the-field teams.
Also, the members of the field teams were directed to take potassium iodide (KI) due to the nature of the airborne'elease.
This exercise weakness is.considered closed.
Emer enc Pre aredness Exercise Plannin (Ins ection Procedure 82301)
The Manager',
Emergency Planning (EP),
has the overall responsibility for developing, conducting and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
These activities are conducted using Emergency Plan Implementing 'Procedure (EPIP) 13. 14. 8, "Drills/Exercises."
The Manager, EP, functioned as the Exercise Director and was assisted by three Exercise Coordinators.
A scenario committee was organized to. develop the scenario.package.
The scenario committee consisted of individuals with expertise in reactor operations and health physics (HP).
Persons involved in the scenario development were not participants in the exercise.
Exercise objectives were established as part of the scenario package and included specific objectives to address the problems identified during-the 1988 exercise.
NRC, Region Y, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency {FEMA), Region
Ã, were provided with an opportunity to comment on the'xercise objectives and scenario package.
The offsite response was not evaluated by FEMA this year.
The complete scenario package included
.
the objectives, scope, instructions to exercise controllers, controller assignments, exercise scenario, messages used during the exercise, initial* and subsequent plant parameters, meteorological and radiological data 'and critique sheets to be completed by the controllers and players.
The scenario package was tightly controlled before the exercise.
Players, did not have access to the scenario package or information on the scenario events.
The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IY. F. 2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Exercise Scenario The sc'enario began with fuel sipping activities being conducted on the 606'levation of the Reactor Building; A crew was also in the process of dechanneling fuel.
One of the hoses used in the sipping process ruptured, releasing gaseous fission products to the 606'levation environment.
The operator on the refuel bridge attempted to hurriedly move a bundle irito a safe position in the fuel rack before evacuating the area.
The bridge control failed and dropped the bundle onto other bundles in the rack.
The scenario developers provided for 124 failed rods as a result of the bundle drop accident and a release of the airborne activity to the atmosphere via the Reactor, Building.ventilation exhaust system.
The release began about 8-1/2 seconds after the accident and allowed for 6-1/2 seconds for airborne halogens to be released without being processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system.
One of the refueling crew incurred a head injury while attempting to evacuate the 606'levation.
The Shift Manager (SM), acting as the Plant Emergency Director (PED), declared a Site Area Emergency (SAE) as a
5.
result of the fuel handling accident.
The event ultimately caused a
General Emergency (GE) to be declared.
As a part of the scenario, the "A" SGT train was out of service and test
=-
results, taken four days'earlier, showed only 70K efficiency on the, charcoal for the "B" SGT'rain.
As a result, the "B" SGT train was taken out of service and a'eam was dispatched to put the "A" SGT.train back into service.
A mock-up of an SGT train was used to enhance realism during the exercise.
The ruptured hose on the fuel assembly sipping cask was supposed to trigger additional play for exercise participants..
'The scenario provided for about four hours from the time of the initial incident to complete mitigating damage control actions on the sipping cask bundle before cooling was lost.
The exercise controllers had to prompt the players to get them to respond to this situation.
This will be addressed later, in Section 7.
A mock-up of a fuel sipper w'as available to enhance the realism arid stimulate the players'esponse.
After the emergency phase of the emergency was terminated, the exercise participants'ere instructed to enter into the recovery'phase.
The participants were directed to develop a recovery plan and at least one plant recovery o'peration procedure in order to meet the exercise objective.
Federal Evaluators Four NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee'.s response.
Inspectors were located in the Control Room (CR)/Simulator,- Technical Support Center (TSC),
OSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The NRC inspector who was assigned to the OSC accompanied various repair/monitoring teams in order to evaluate their performance.
One inspect'or accompanied an offsite monitoring field team.
6.
Control Room/Simulator-The following aspects of CR operations were observed:
detection and classification of emergency events, mitigation, notification and protective action recommendations (PARs).
The following are NRC observati'ons of the CR activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are considered to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
Communication with the CR/Simulator was hampered due to the number of telephones and their location.
There are seven telephone lines, into the CR/Simulator and five telephones, but only three of the telephones are located near the controls.
During the exercise, a
telephone was ringing at the opposite end of the room and the operators were too busy to walk to the other end of the CR/Simulator to answer the telephone at the tagging desk.
This could have hampered information flow.
The telephone configuration in the CR and the Simulator is the sam.
Technical Su ort Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:
activation, accident assessment/classification, dose assessment, notifications, PARs and CR support.
The following are NRC observations of the TSC activities.
Mith the exception of item B below, the observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
The technical staff in the TSC, in particular the individual responsible for Core/Thermal Hydraulics analysis, did an excellent job preparing the plan to deal with the fuel sipper problem.
B.
Notifications to plant personnel were not conducted in an appropriate manner.
The following noti'fication problems were observed:
l.
An evacuation of non-essential personnel was not directed at the SAE as required by step 7c of EPIP 13. 1.2,
"PED Duties."
The EPIP requires that either a controlled evacuation or an immediate evacuation of non-essential personnel be considered at the SAE or GE level depending on the severity of the conditions.
A controlled evacuation of the protected area was not ordered unti 1 8:49 A.M., 17 minutes after the GE was declared.
The SAE was declared at 8:00 A.M.
The direction to conduct an evacuation of the non-essential personnel at the SAE would have come from the CR since the SM was acting as the PED at the time.
Subsequent discussions with the SM who participated in the exercise indicated that he thought about the evacuation at one point but that the level of activity in the CR/Simulator prevented him from following through on this matter.
It should be noted that an evacuation of the power block was ordered at the SAE; however, there were many non-essential personnel located outside of the power block at the time.
2.
The public address (PA) announcement made by the CR/Simulator at the SAE did not include ihformation that a release was in progress nor did it address specific instructions for movement of personnel to emergency centers.
Step 8 of EPIP 13. 1.2 requires that personnel be instructed to clear any known hazardous areas.
3.
4.
The 8:49 A.M.
PA announcement from the TSC, that communicated the instruction to conduct a controlled evacuation of the protected area, did not mention that a release was in progress nor did it provide specific routing instructions for the non-essential personnel, located in buildings and trailers outside the power block, who were evacuating to the OSC.
The path to the OSC had individuals passing through the plume.
Tone activation and PA announcements made by the Plant Administrative Manager (PAM) were not repeated throughout the exercise as required by step 8 of EPIP 13..
Because prescripted PA announcement messages were not generated, repeat announcements did not always contain the same information.
During an 8:28 A.M.
PA announcement, the PED announced that the TSC was operational.
This piece of information was not included in the repeat announcement.
These problems could have resulted in personnel becoming contaminated and could have affected or complicated the licensee's ability to respond to the event if the situation had been real.
Characterization of this issue is addressed in Section 12 of this report.
C.
The information about the ruptured hose at the fuel sipper was not.
transmitted to the TSC from the CR/Simulator.
This was apparently caused by incomplete or inadequate communication flow between the the refuel floor crew and the CR..
D.
At 8:21 A.M., the Assistant Plant Manager (APM), in the TSC, assumed the PED duties from the SM in the CR.
During a subsequent PA announcement, at 8:28 A.M., the PED stated that the TSC was
"operational," not that the PED duties had.transferred to the TSC.
Also, a,formal announcement was not made to the TSC staff when the TSC was declared operational or when the PED duties had transferred to the TSC.
Since EPIP 13. 10.3,
"TSC Operations
TSC Director,'s Duties" provides for the TSC to be declared operational with a minimum. staff'(three specified positions), it is very important that all facilities and personnel are notified of the current level of activation.
Use of the term "operational" appears to warrant reconsideration.
It.should be noted that there did not appear to'e any repercussions as a result-of the above observation; however, an observation very similar to this one was identified during the 1988 exercise (see Section 7.D of Inspection Report No. 50-397/88-29).
Review of the-licensee's corrective action record (CAR) for this observation (NRC 88-29-C6), disclosed that the licensee had determined that no specific=action, other than discussions with the TSC Directors and the PEDs, was necessary to correct this matter.
=
E.
There was a delay in the TSC's issuance of the Fixed Nuclear Facility'FNF) form at the GE.
The GE was declared at 8: 33 A. M.:;
however, the FNF form was not faxed to the EOF Communication Center until 8:53 A.M., 20 minutes later.
Also; the form was not complete when it was sent.
This form is used to notify the offsite agencies..
8.
0 erations Su ort Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed:
activation, functional capabilities and disposition of various inplant repair/monitoring teams.
The following are NRC observations of the OSC activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the progra The OSC Director exhibited positive leadership throughout the exerci,se.
Decisions and plans were made and implemented in a timely manner following consultation with technical and support personnel.
Members of a reentry team demonstrated an apparent lack of proficiency in the use of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).
One team member was observed to remove the entire air supply connection from the facepiece of the SCBA while in a simulated airborne concentration, apparently in preparation to exchange the air supply tank.
This action left the individual without any respiratory protection and could have resulted in a significant respiratory insult had an airborne radioactivity concentration actually existed in the area.
The lack of proficiency of members of the team was also demonstrated in the amount of time required for each member to exchange the supplied air bottle.
The elapsed time ranged from 35'o 59 seconds.
This time is important because the individual is required to hold his/her breath during the exchange.
Two members of a three member reentry team did not follow the rocedure for removal of protective clothing as described in the NP-2 "General Employee Training Manual."
The team members were observed to remove the hood and respirator prior to removal of rubber shoe covers and rubber gloves't should be noted that this issue was included as one of the ten items in exercise weakness 88-29-01.
The item is considered closed; however, the observation is included to document the fact that isolated imperfections still exist.
Communication.by telephone, while wearing an SCBA, between members of a reentry team and the OSC proved to be very difficult even from a low background noise area.
An inadequate method of documenting the fact that OSC personnel had, or had not, been administered KI was used during the exercise.
It should be noted that this problem was identified during the 1988 exercise (see Section 8.B of Inspection Report No. 50-397/88"29).
The CAR for this item, NRC 88-29-C10, stated that the Personnel Accountability Log was revised to provide space to document this information.
This form was later found to be unacceptable.
In lieu of generating yet another form, the original form, which did not provide a space to note whether KI was recommended/taken, was used during the exercise.
The CAR is still considered to be open.
The due date on the CAR was January 6, 1989.
The space available for the conduct of OSC operations is quite limited.
At times during the exercise the head'ount in the OSC went up to about 56 people.
The use of the corridor for standby personnel provides a potential for lack of control.
Usable space is further decr eased when radiation levels exist by the windows and the area has to be cleared and posted.
The space situation would be further aggravated during evacuations, since non-essential personnel are directed to assemble at the OSC.
Consideration should be given to limiting the number of persons expected to occupy the OSC or
improving the control of the large numbers of persons assembling there.
9.
Emer enc 0 erations Faci lit The following EOF operations were observed:
activation, functional capabilities, notifications, PARs, interface with offsite officials and dose assessment.
The following are NRC observations of the EOF activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
Although the recovery discussions/planning did not completely address all of the items listed in EPIP 13. 13.2,
"Recovery Operations,"
due to time constraints, the Recovery Plan generated was detailed and extensive.
8.
There appeared to be a larger delay than necessary between activation of the EOF and the assumption of the Recovery Manager (RM) duties from the PED.
The EOF was declared activated at 8:34 A. M., but the RN did not assume the duties from the PED until 9: 24 A.M., 84 minutes after the SAE was declared and activation of the Emergency Response Facili,ties (ERFs)
was initiated.
This amount of time appears to be excessive since activation took place during normal work hours.
Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 provides for activation of the EOF in 60 minutes.
The activation of the EOF is supposed to relieve the TSC of some of its duties so that the technical staff in the TSC can provide greater support to the CR.
C.
The failure to properly update a status board caused an inaccurate PA announcement to be made.
The exercise events led to the declaration of an SAE at 8:00 A.N., which escalated to a GE at 8:33 A.N. and was eventually downgraded to an SAE at 11:25 A.M.
The time entry for the second SAE was never changed from the original 8:00 A. M.
A PA announcement was made at ll:48 A.N. which indicated that an SAE had been declared at 8:00 A.N.
This situation could be confusing and could be misleading if inaccurate information were to be released offsite.
,D.
One field team did not continuously monitor radiation levels while proceeding to its assigned location as required by step 15 of EPIP 13. 9. 1, "Environmental Field Team Operations."
The team began making measurements after the controller reminded them to do so.
10.
Crt ti<rues Immediately following the exercise, critiques were held in each of the ERFs.
Controllers and players completed critique sheets and "After Action Reports."
Preliminary findings resulting from the licensee's critique process were presented to the NRC evaluation team during an October 5, 1989 meeting.
The following represent some of the critique findings presented during the October 5, 1989 meetin A.
Some ambiguity was noted in 'the procedural guidance regarding transfer of control of the Plant Emergency Team (PET) from the CR/Simulator to the OSC.
B.
C.
2.
PA announcements from the TSC did not advise personnel to avoid the radioactive plume., Also, some of the announcements were not repeated.
Communication system problems were noted:
1.
The difference in telephone ringing characteristics between the Simulator and the CR caused confusion.
The instrum'ent in the Simulator SM s office did not ring for his incoming calls, while the corresponding telephone in the CR does.
Plant PA announcements originating from the Simulator and the TSC were again'ot fully audible.
D.
Serious omissions and confusion were noted in the exchange of important information and instructions:
l.
The exact status of the sipping canister hose failure was not provided to the TSC even though the information was available in the CR/Simulator as evidenced by the SM's log.
E.
F.
2.
The TSC staff did not establish a sequence of events.
This prevented them from identifying the fuel sipper problem.
3.
Numerous key players were not aware that the security officers at the Primary Access Point (PAP)
had been evacuated and that the thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and badges had been moved to the Plant Support Facility (PSF).
4.
TSC status boards contained an erroneous entry about the GE offsite PARs indicating sheltering for 10 miles instead of 5 miles.
Also, the status board did not reflect the decision to administer KI to inplant, reentry team emergency workers.
5.
Security personnel did not instruct personnel in the warehouse to evacuate until 1-1/2 hours after the order was given.
Contamination control problems were identified:
1.
Contamination status of the OSC was not verified"until 55 minutes after the facility was declared operational.
2.
Some of the members of the PET were not surveyed for contamination and uptake in a timely manner.
One field team failed to monitor for possible contamination after traversing the plume as required by procedure.
G.
The notification form completed by the TSC at the GE contained numerous error H.
Supply System news releases.did not contain information that 'a release was in progress until 12:40 P.M.
I.
Plant Procedures Manual (PPM) 9.3.22 on source term calculation did not contain data with which to compute a source term for this scenario.
NUREG 1228 was used instead.
Exit Interview An exit interview was -held on October 5, 1989,'o discuss'he preliminary findings of the NRC inspection team.
The attachment to this report identifies 'the licensee personnel who were present at the meeting.
The NRC was represented by the four members of the inspection team which included Mr.
C. Bosted, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector for MNP-2.
The licensee was informed that it appeared that no deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection.
The findings described in Sections 2 and 6-9 of this report were mentioned.-
The licensee was informed that the problem involving the notifications to plant personnel was being escalated to an exercise weakness because of its impact to personnel safety and because the licensee had failed to correct the problem even though similar observations had been made during the two previous annual exercises.
The NRC Team 'Leader also stated that the number of repeat exercise findings indicated that the licensee's corrective action program was not effective and needed to be improved.
A review of the CARs generated as a resul't of the 1988 exercise indicated that, in some cases, only a superficial analysis of the problem had been conducted and that it appeared that the root cause for each of the problems had not been determined prior to taking corrective action.
The Team Leader also expressed concern about the timeliness of the licensee's corrective action.
These concerns were raised because the review of the
=
1988 CARs i'ndicated that response due dates were not being met and that some CARs were not completed until June. 1989, nine months after the exercise.
One of the CARs is still considered open as indicated in Section 8 abov The licensee was 'informed that its performance in this area was not consistent with a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SAI P) Category 1 performer.
12.
Follow-u Information Subsequent to the exit interview, the licensee's Manager, EP, mailed the NRC Team Leader several documents'hich pertained to the inspector's concerns presented at the. exit interview.
These documents included a
copy of the last 50.54(t) audit report (Audit 89-467, dated April 24, 1989),
a copy of the response to the audit report (dated May 24, 1989)
and a copy of Support Services Instruction (SSI) 9. 1,
"Emergency Preparedness Corrective Action Record Processing,"
dated August 25,1989.
The instruction was generated as a result of the audit finding concerning the licensee's,corrective
.action program.
The following is a quotation from the audit report:
"Results of the evaluation indicate that; in general, deficiencies
, and weaknesses have been satisfactorily identified, tracked and corrected via the.CAR system.,
There were, however, several
instances were the CAR system did not assure that corrective actions were timely or effective.
Further,.investigation during the audit
~
found that failure to take timely, effective corrective actions can be -attributed to a lack of procedural guidance.",
The audit report also states that weaknesses in "root cause determination and documentation by CAR respondent",
and "review/evaluation for adequacy of corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence" have been previously identified by the NRC.
The response to the audit finding that resulted in the generation of SSI 9. 1 listed the following highlights from the new procedure:
"1.
Change our CAR numbering system from sequence within activity to sequence within year.
2.
Identifying activity by a code.
3.
Identifying a coded list of NRC/FENA established objectives to replace issues in order to base a commonality to recall by.
4.
Establishing a root cause code system.
5.
Establishing.responsibilities for responders in procedure.-
6.
Establishing a
new CAR form consistent with coding.
7.
Establishing a features (wish list) list for an electronic tracking system."
Hased on a review of SSI 9. 1, the adequacy of the procedure is doubted because it appears to emphasize problem tracking rather than problem correction.
The observations, of this exercise (see paragraphs 7.8 and 7.0 above)
and several past inspection reports disclose an inability of the licensee's corrective action program to adequately provide corrective actions for weakor deficient areas identified during exercises.
The following are past inspection reports which document problems that lead to this conclusion..
l.
Inspection Report No. 50-397/85-26, dated October 25, 1985-Open Item 85-26-01 identified:
PA announcements were not repeated and the wrong siren was used.
2; Inspection Report No. 50-397/87-20, dated October 30, 1987-Open Item 87-20-01 identified: Notifications to plant personnel, were not made in accordance with procedure.
Follow-up on 87-20-01, Inspection Report No. 50-397/88-06, disclosed that the licensee had not taken any specific action to address the content (i.e., information about hazards)
of the PA announcements.
Item remained open pending satisfactory demonstration during the next annual exercis. 11 3.
4.
Inspection Report No.'0-397/88-06 - Open Item 87-12-01 closed; however, the inspector concluded that there was room for improvement in tracking and that the depth of the corrective actions taken on some CARs appeared to be superficial and could be improved.
Inspection Report No. 50-397/88-29, dated October 24, 1988-Open Item 87-20-01 closed; however, the wrong signal was initially used, PA announcements did not inform personnel of intruders (a hazard),
and PA announcements were'ot always repeated as required by procedure.
5.
Inspection Report No. 50-397/88-42, dated December.29, 1988-Open Item 88-42-02 identified:
Need to improve EP Department capability for root cause analysis.
Fol]ow-up on 88-42-02,
Inspection Report
No. 50-397/89-10,
indicated that the licensee
had sent
two of its-staff to traininq in root cause
analysis
and that a root cause
program
was being developed.
The item
was not closed
and remains
open to date.
Paragraph
IV. F. 5 of Appendix
E to Part
50 requires that any weak or
deficient areas
identified during drills or exercises
be corrected.
The
fai1ure to correct
a prior weak or deficient area involving instructions
to plant personnel
is contrary to to the above requirement
and,
therefore,
represents
an apparent violation,of NRC requirements.
It is
noted that
some of the above past inspection-reports
predate audit report
89-467.
This apparent violation will be tracked
as
Open Item 89-24-0 ATTACHMENT
EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES
A.
Licensee
Personnel
J.
R.
Y.
W.
G.
T.
J.
J.
A.
J.
R.
M.
. D.
R.
M.
G.
D.
D.
N.
C.
F.
V.
D.
S.
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager,
WNP-2
Chitwood, Manager,
Emergency Planning
Derrer, Principal
Emergency Training Specialist
Downs, Supervisor,
Telecommunications
Engineering
Godfrey, Manager,
Performance
Evaluation
Gray, Senior Health Physicist
Harmon,
Manager,
Maintenance
Houchins,
Emergency Planner
Klauss,
Supervisor,
Emergency Planning
Landon,
Emergency Planner
Latorre,
Manager,
Corporate
Licensing and Environmental
Mann, Shift Manager
Mannion, Principal
Emergency
Planner
Mogle, Supervisor, Drills and Exercises
Monopoli, Manager,
Support Services
Oldfield, Principal Health Physicist
Ottley, Supervisor,
Radiological
Assessment
Pisarcik,
Supervisor,
Health Physics
Support
Porter,
Manager, Electrical/I8C Systems
Powers,
Plant Manager,
WNP-2
quinn, Meteorologist
Shockley,
Emergency
Planner
Yule, Lieutenant,
Security
Supervisor,
Compliance,
B.
Other Personnel
W. Kiel, Washington State Liaison Officer
R. Mazurkiewicz,