IR 05000397/1989033
| ML17285A976 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1990 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A975 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-89-33, NUDOCS 9001300236 | |
| Download: ML17285A976 (17) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report No. 50-397/89-33 Docket No. 50-397 License No.
NPF-21 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted;,
November 13 - December 22, 1989 Inspectors:
J. Burdoin, Reactor Insp ctor F.
G
, Reacto ns ct Approved by:
~Sumnar:
. Huey, C
e
,
En ineering Section Date Signed Ins ection Durin the Period of November 13 - December 22, 1989 (Re ort No.
50-39 /89-33
~A<<d:
An unannounced routine inspection by two regional inspectors of various vital
'areas and equipment in the plant, an assessment of the licensee's programs for facility emergency lighting, and followup of open items.
Inspection Procedures Nos.
30703, 62705, 64704, 71707, and 92702 were used as guidance for the inspection.
Results and General Conclusions:
The inspector closed three enforcement items from a previous inspection, performed a selective walkdown and reviewed a sample of the maintenance records for emergency lighting.
This inspection identified a concern with the control room fire/evacuation procedure, which required an hourly temperature monitoring of certain-locations.
Some of the locations and the access routes to the locations were not provided with eight hour battery powered lighting units to adequately support the procedure, The licensee committed to review the requirements of the procedure and to review whether sufficient battery powered lighting was provided in the areas and in the access routes to those areas to support the procedur Si nificant Safet Hatters:
None Summar of Yiolations or Deviations:
None, 0 en Items Summar
Three enforcement items were close DETAILS Persons Contacted The below listed managers, and supervisory and technical personnel were among those contacted a.
Licensee
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b.
Bo Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer Baker, Assistant Plant Manager Campbell, Engineer Associate Davalle, Principal gA Engineer.
Davison, Compliance Dodd, Electrician Elhardt, Electrical Na'intenance Engineer Garvin, Manager, Programs and Audits Harmon, Maintenance Manager Kerlee, Principal gA Engineer
'ippes, Electrical Maintenance Engineer Koenigs, Manager, Plant Technical Kobus, Manager, Plant gA Matthews, Plant Technical, Electrical Supervisor Meade, Plant Technical, Engineer Messersmith, Principal Operations Engineer Morris, Electrical Maintenance Craft Supervisor Nissen, Electrical Maintenance Engineer Powers, Plant Manager Shaeffer, Assistant Operations Manager Trobaugh, Electrical Maintenance, Supervisor Walker, Site Safety Manager of Industrial Safety and Fire Protection
'ashington, Compliance Supervisor Webring, Assistant Maintenance Manager Wise, Engineering, Electrical Supervisor nneville Power Administration
- J. Irish, Program Analysts The inspectors also talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on November 17, 1989.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on December 22, 1989.
In addition, the NRC Resident Inspectors attended the Exit Meeting.
2.
Area Ins ection (71707)
An inspection was conducted in the Control Room and Reactor Building.
The inspector examined areas and equipment for debris, potential hazards, oil and water leakage, and equipment condition, e.g., oil level, valve
position, and electrical connection configuration and cleanliness.
The areas and equipment inspected included:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
Control Room, elev.
501 (RMF)
Cable Spreading Room, elev.
484 Remote Shutdown Room, elev.
467 Two 4160/480Y Switchgear Rooms, elev.
467 Two Battery Equipment Rooms, elev.
467 Two Battery Rooms, elev.
467 Three Diesel Generator Rooms, elev.
441 Two Diesel Generator Control Rooms, elev.
441 Housekeeping and equipment status appeared to be acceptable.
No.violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
3.
Followu of Enforcement Items (92702 A.
(Closed Enforcement Item 50-397/86-12-03, The E ui ment ua ificat>on i
e or Roc bestos Ca e,
Incom ete This violation identified that the licensee did not adequately document qualification of two types of rockbestos cable because documentation of qualification of type 780 polyethylene compound was not contained in the Qualification Information and Documentation (QID) File 036003.
The licensee stated that environmental qualification of Rockbestos Cable is a well known issue.
Rockbestos'esting of their cable was called into question following NRC inspections which included evaluation of Rockbestos environmen'tal qualification testing.
This deficiency was documented in IE Notice 84-44, dated June 8, 1984, Rockbestos responded with a testing program to establish long term qualification of each cable type currently produced by Rockbestos.
Final Rockbestos reports were dated November ll, 1985, November 12, 1985, and March 12, 1986 for chemical'ly cured, irradiation cured and coaxial cables, respectively.
Rockbestos also responded to the NRC's inspection reports and IE Notice by justifying their cables'apability to perform based on correlations between the flawed Rockbestos testing and testing performed by others.
These justifications were accepted by the NRC as adequate interim qualification.
At the time of the NRC audit in April 1986, the Supply System had incorporated the final=Rockbestos reports and with Rockbestos'ssistancce, documented the similarity between all Supply System cable
- insulation and the Rockbestos tests except one wire in each of two cable types with the insulation material formulation KXL-780.
The similarity between KXL-780 and the tested KXL-760 material was open at the time of the audit.
This open issue was explicit'ly recognized in the Supply System documentation.
Because of this open issue, the interim qualification documentation was still being maintained as part of the overall qualification package.
Additionally, procurement had initiated action to obtain a
TVA report whichwould complete qualification documentation for the KXL-780 compound.
This report has now been obtained, the file amended, and the documentation deficiency closed.
In addition, we have since received the Rockbestos similarity evaluation
which establishes that the test of the KXL-760 material formulation quali fies the KXL-780 materi a 1.
The inspector verified that the proper documentation (Rockbestos Report No. TR-6801, Similarity Analysis of-Insulation Materials KXL-780, KXL-760...) was on hand and was included in (ID File 036003 Volume 1 as Revision B, dated May 30, 1986.
The licensee's corrective actions in response to this violation appear to be adequate.
This enforcement item is closed.
B.
-
Closed Enforcement Item 50-397/86-12-04, Inade uate gualification ocumentatson or West>n ouse.
Low o ta e Containment Penetrations This violation identified that the licensee had not adequately established qualification of Westinghouse low voltage containment penetrations in that the plant total integrated radiation dose (TID) was not enveloped by the test report contained in the (ID File 382003.
The licensee stated that the qualification file, ((ID file 382003)
referenced a separate Westinghouse document (PEN-TR-81-58).
This document was referenced as providing "separate effects testing" which established the materials qualification capability of 1.2E+08 rads.
As a
result, it was correctly stated in the qualification file that supplemental separate material effects testing in conjunction with partial type testing was used to establish qualification to the appropriate radiation envelope.
( It should be noted that
CFR 50.49, Section (f)4 allows partial type testing which is supplemented by analysis.)
Although this information was omitted on the summary sheet it was correctly defined in the body of the qualification file.
However, this was not brought to the attention of the inspector at the time of the inspection.
The adequacy of the methodology specified in the Westinghouse report was subsequently confirmed by another Westinghouse report (PEN-TR-81-49)
which qualified the low voltage penetrations by sequential-type testing to a radiation level of 1. 1E+08 rads (total integrated dose) prior to LOCA testing.
The Westinghouse report has now been inserted into the primary file.
The inspector verified that the lice'nsee corrected this discrepancy by obtaining a copy of Westinghouse Test Report TR-55-35/ PEN-TR-81-49 from WNP Unit 3 records, and installed it in QID File 382003 as Revision
dated June 2, 1986.
Test Report TR-55-35 qualified all electrical penetration to the program described in report PEN-TR-81-49.
The inspector examined the report and verified the licensee's assertion that the test r'adiation exposure (1. 1E+08 rads gamma)
enveloped the stated requirement of 7E+07 rads.
The licensee's corrective actions in response to this violation appear to be adequate.
This enforcement item is closed, C.
(Closed)
Enforcement Item 50-397/86-12-05, Procedural Deficiencies
Cl
This violation identified that the licensee had not adequately implemented procedures and instructions for the qualification, documentation or component installations of the following equipment:
(1)
Victoreen High Range Radiation monitor, documentation (2)
-Conax connectors for HRRN, documentation (3 Barber Coleman motor, documentation (4)
Rosemount 1151 transmitter, installation and non-Eg-file documentation and instructions The Victoreen High Range Radiation monitor (HRRN), (ID File 27707-two file deficiencies were identified.
First, the test report gave the accuracy established by the LOCA test; however, the file did not contain a statement of performance/acceptance criteria or functional analysis.
Secondly, Section 6. 1 and gRMS Section 2.0 of the file indicated that the vendor-supplied sealed conduit system was not used.
(2)
(3)
The inspector verified the licensee's corrective actions by reviewing /ID File 27707, and sighting and examining, the statement of performance/acceptance criteria for the Victoreen high range radiation monitor which had been installed in the file following the inspection.
The inspector also sighted and examined a
statement dated May 1, 1986 (in the file) which describes the use of the vendor-supplied conduit system in sealing the conduit to the radiation monitors located in the containment.
These corrective actions are acceptable.
The analysis for Conax Connectors (HRRM) from (ID File 049008 was unacceptable for 10 CFR 50.49, which requires in paragraph (e)(5)
that equipment qualified by test must be preconditioned by aging; that is, the aging must precede the LOCA test, rather than follow it.
To address the concern, the licensee planned to change the qualification criterion to Category II of NUREG-0588 and a revised aging analysis was being prepared at the close of the inspection.
The inspector verified the licensee's corrective actions by examining the supply systems Requalification Certificate (049008)
Revision 5 dated May 1, 1986 for Conax connector models N-11111-01 and 7B98-11000-01.
Based on Conax's test results, IPS-409 dated May 21, 1979, the connectors are qualified to Category II of NUREG-0588.
However, Revision 7, presently in process, has upgraded the qualification of the Conax connector 7B98-11000-01 (HRRM) to Category I of NUREG-0588, based on Conax test 1054, Revision F dated September 19, 1986.
These corrective actions are acceptable.
Barber Coleman motor, (ID File 221002-E - the file did not contain evidence of radiation qualification for the lubricant, ATS-DOMET 6 oil, used in the motor.
The file did not clarify whether or not the motor'ould be exposed to either high temperatures or high radiation, depending on the initiating pipe break, but not both.
The inspector examined documentation installed in /ID File 221002E, Volume 2, Revision 1, dated May 2, 1986, which demonstrated that the
'
(4)
Barber Coleman Motor and lubricant were qualified to the temperature of 176'nd a radiation background of 5.0E+05 rads gamma.
The required operating parameters are 154'F and 1.0E+05 rads.
This corrective action is acceptable.
Rosemount 1151 transmitter CMS-LT-1 - The procedural deficiencies include failure, to tag the -component; modification without written procedure; failure to document the modification; fa'i lure to document or report discovery of the unqualified component installation; and fai lure to consider the possibility that other equipment could be similarly deficient.
Contrary to the position of the NRC, the licensee maintains that this issue depends on whether the plug for the unused conduit entry needed to be controlled.
Prior to the modification, the plugs were critical to provide a seal and control was required.
However, after the modificatz-
, the plugs were no longer needed to provide a
moisture harv as this was the purpose of the newly installed silicone foam s alant.
,
This Additionally the licensee contends that the components were not modified without a written procedure.
Field Change Record 86-047, Design Change Package 86-0101-OA and Plant Modification Record 86-0101-0 provide documentation in support of the work performed under Maintenance Work Request AV-0570.
At the time of the inspection the equipment was in a qualified configuration, with all similar equipment having been appropriately addressed.
The inspector reviewed the history on this issue and determined that the related item 86-12-01,
"The installation of three Rosemount 1151 transmitters was not qualified because spare cable entrance hubs had not been sealed,"
had been properly addressed and closed in Region V
Inspection Report 50-397/88-39.
The report concluded
"The licensee appeared to have taken steps to assure that Rosemount transmitters (about 90) were environmentally qualified prior to initial licensing in December 1983."
Additionally this inspector examined in detai 1 field change record 86-047, plant modification record 86-0101-0, and the qualification documentation for the silicone foam sealant used to seal the spare cable entry ports on the transmitters.
It is concluded there were adequate written procedures for the modifications (sealing the spare cable entry ports) to the transmitters, arid the silicone foam sealant was environmentally qualified.
enforcement item is closed.
4.
Emer enc Li htin 62705/64704)
The plant emergency lighting consists of three systems:
normal-emergency (E)
AC lighting, DC lighting, and battery powered emergency lightin Normal-emergency (E)
AC lighting is provided for safe and orderly shutdown during the loss of normal AC power.
This lighting system consists of two completely redundant systems (Divisions 1 and 2).
Each system has AC lighting energized continuously from critical buses which are connected both to offsite power sources and associated standby diesel generators.
This system is energized continuously from the safety related 480 volt motor control centers through 3-phase, 4 wire 208Y/120 volt dry type lighting transformers.
These transformers feed E lighting panels.
E lighting comprises approximately 15 percent of the normal plant lighting load and consists of fluorescent, sodium (outdoor)
and incandescent sources.
E lighting fixtures in the main control room are designed and supported as Seismic Category I.
h DC lighting is provided in th'e main control room, the access route to the remote shutdown room, and in the remote shutdown room.,
This lighting consists of two completely redundant systems ( I and 2).
Each system is energized continuously from AC power inverters and 125 volt DC plant emergency battery systems that are installed to Seismic Category I
requirements.
The lighting load consists of incandescent light sources.
The battery powered emergency lighting is installed for the safety of-operating personnel to provide lighting for egress routes during a total blackout, period.
This lighting system consists of individual power packs (electric battery units)
and incandescent lamps.
The lamps are automatically energized upon loss of the respective normal and/or normal-emergency ac sources.
The source of emergency power consists of integral battery power packs.
Emergency battery units in Seismic Category I areas of the radwaste building are Seismic Category I mounted and supported.
A.
Electric Batter Units (EBUs The inspector walked-down the DC lighting system and the electric battery units (EBUs) system installed in the control room (elev. 501),
the access route to the remote shutdown room, and in the remote shutdown room (elev. 467).
The two lighting systems were installed in parallel in these areas.
The access route from the remote shutdown room,to 4160 volt switchgear room SM-8 (division 2, dedicated shutdown train), in the switchgear room SM-8 (elev. 567), the access route to division 2 diesel generator (D-G) room, and in D-G,room 2 (elev.
441) are lighted during blackout by EBUs.
The number and locations of the DC lighting incandescent lights and EBUs appeared to be adequate to provide
.sufficient illumination for access to and for the operation of remote shutdown equipment in these areas.
The inspector examined NCRs 288-514, 288-521, and 288-554 which identify a number of Electric Battery Units which failed their annual eight hour discharge test.
As a result of the multiple fai lures of EBUs, the licensee, during the Summer of 1988, purchased approximately 227 ne>> 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and 1$ hour EBUs to replace the failed units and to provide a stock for replacing the older EBUs in the plant.
There are approximately 322 EBUs in the plant.
Some of the first new 8 and 15 hour1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> EBUs delivered were bench/discharge tested to the point of complete loss of illumination. It was found that the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> units provide illumination
for 20 to 22-hours and the 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> units provided illumination for 3 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The installation of these units was initiated in the Fall of 1988 and continued through the present date with many of the new 8 and 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> units being installed.
The inspector examined plant procedure 10.25.'63
"Emergency Lighting Inspection," which describes the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />'nd 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> discharge tests required to be performed on EBUs annually.
The inspector examined twenty five maintenance work requests (MWRs) for the installation of sixty two of the 227 new 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> electric battery units installed.
Following installation, the new EBUs were discharge tested.
Specifics examined in the twenty five MWRs were discharge test results, determination/retermination sheets, gC inspection sheets, clearance orders, etc.
All of the discharge test results examined demonstrated that both 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and lk hour EBUs operated well, completing the discharge test with ample spare capacity.
The inspector also examined nine MWRs for maintenance performed on various older EBU's.
The inspector concluded that the discharge test performed on each newly installed EBU adequately demonstrated the EBU would operate satisfactorily during a station blackout for the required time period of 8 or lk hours.
The inspector further concluded that the prescribed maintenance program for EBUs was adequate to preserve these units in a reliable operating condition.
B.
Ca acit Test of Batter Units Previousl Found to Have Low E ectro te Leve s
In Inspection Report 89-31, the resident inspector noticed that certain eight hour emergency light batteries that had electrolyte levels up to one inch below the low level line.
The equipment part numbers of these batteries were C120/441-3X, C121/441-1X1, C121/441/2X, and W467/4X.
These batteries were installed to satisfy the requirements of providing eight hour lighting per
CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.J.
The capacities of these batteries were uncertain after the battery plates were partially uncovered due to the low electrolyte levels.
During this inspection, the licensee performed an eight hour discharge test on these four batteries.
Because of the ample reserve margin incorporated during the specification of these battery units, at the end of the eight hour discharge test, the illumination levels that were provided by these four battery units were found to be adequate for the intended functions.
The licensee committed to revise Procedure 10.25.63, Emergency Lighting Inspection, to make the verification of electrolyte level as a separate item requiring the checker's initial.
C.
Walkdown of Selective Areas A walkdown of selective areas was made with the licensee to observe the illumination level of the normal-emergency AC and the battery powered emergency lights.
The normal AC to an area was deenergized
to observe the normal-emergency AC lighting, and then the normal-emergency AC was deenergized to observe the lighting from the battery powered units.
The selected areas were:
(I) Remote shutdown panel (2) Alternate shutdown panel (3)
4KV switchgear SM-8 (B train (4)
4KV switchgear SM-7 (A train (5) Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Pump 2B room (6) The three diesel rooms The illumination levels of the normal-emergency AC and the battery powered emergency lightings in the above areas appeared to be adequate except those for the egress by the battery units in the HPCS diesel and Diesel Generator 1 rooms.
One of the normal-emergency AC lights in the RHR Pump 2B room was burnt-out.
A replacement was needed for the light.
In the 4KV switchgear SM-8 room, the inverter panel 1N5 was caution-tagged, and both the front and the back doors were tapped open because of insufficient heat removal capacity for the panel.
The energized equipment inside the panel was exposed to the outside surrounding without any physical barrier.
The licensee was informed of this safety hazard.
Except for-the aforementioned items, the housekeeping of the above areas appeared to be adequate.
The licensee's program of assigning supervisory personnel to an area for housekeeping purposes and posting his/her name and phone number in the respective area appeared to be a good program.
D.
Control Room Fire/Evacuation Procedure Procedure 4. 12. 1. 1 Control Room Fire/Evacuation described the required actions that should be taken when the control room was no longer habitable due to smoke or fire or when there was a'loss of safe shutdown control circuitry due to fire or,flooding.
In Step 27 of Section 4. 12.1.1.4.A for remote shutdown panel operations, the procedure required an hourly monitoring of the temperature in the following locations.
Before the ambient temperature exceeded a specified limit, the related room cooling equipment was required to be made operable.
The locations were:
(1) Division 2 MCC, Rx 572'2)
Division 2 MCC, Rx 522'3)
SM-8 Switchgear (4) Division 2 Battery Room (5) Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Pump 2B Room (6) Diesel Generator
(7) Service Water Pump 1B (8) Remote Shutdown Roo In Step 21 of Section 4.12.1.1.4.B, when operations was at the alternate remote shutdown panel, the corresponding Division 1 locations were required to have an hourly temperature monitoring.
In the RHR Pump 2B room, the normal-emergency AC lighting provided coverage on a loss of normal AC power.
The normal-emergency AC lighting
'anel was fed from downstream of the same division 2 bus that fed the RHR Pump 2B.
There could be a scenario such that the RHR Pump 2B was energized and yet the normal-emergency AC lighting was not available.
The lk hour battery powered egress lights provided in the room
.would not be sufficient to provide the lighting for the prolonged period of hourly temperature monitoring of the area as required in the procedure.
The licensee committed to review the requirements of the procedure and to review whether sufficient battery powered lighting was provided in the areas and in the access routes to those areas to support the procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Meetin (30703)
The inspectors conducted exit meetings on November 17 and December 22, 1989, with members of the licensee staff as indicated in paragraph 1.
During these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the repor r