IR 05000387/1982011
| ML20053E058 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1982 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Mccabe H, Mccann J, Nicholas H, Nichols H, Rhoads G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053E048 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-1.C.2, TASK-1.C.5, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 50-287-82-11, 50-387-82-11, 50-388-82-04, 50-388-82-4, IEB-79-07, IEB-79-7, IEB-80-01, IEB-80-1, IEB-80-20, NUDOCS 8206070567 | |
| Download: ML20053E058 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORLEMENT Region I Report No. 50-387/82-11: 50-388/82-04 Docket No. 50-387 (CAT B). 50-388 (CAT A)
CPPR-101 License No. CPPR-102 Licensee: Pennsylvania Power and Light Corroany 2 North Ninth Street Allentown. Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name: Susouehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Salem Township, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: April 8 - May 17, 1982 5[ 77/ % 7.
Inspectors:
Gary G. Rhoads date signed
%Wk sldu John F. McCann date signed
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5/20/$5 H. H. N1cholas date signed Approved by:
Ef.( b O FI89Ih Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 2B, DPRP Inspection Sumary: Inspection (Unit I and 2) on April 8 - May 17, 1982 (Combined i
Inspect 1on Report No. 50-387/82-11,50-388/82-04).
Routine resident (143 hr.) and regional inspection (27 hr.) of: TMI Items, Preopera-tional Testing; Preoperational Test Results Review; Bulletins and Circulars, Open Items; and Plant Status. Thirteen open items, three bulletins, 19 circulars, nine-teen TMI items and two Construction Deficiency Reports were closed. No Violations were identified; six other items were opened during this inspection.
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Region I Form 12 (Rev. Aoril 77)
8206070567 820520 PDR ADOCK 05000387
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G PDR L
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (2) J. R. Calhoun, Senior Vice-President, Nuclear (2) N. W. Curtis, Vice-President, Engineering and Construction, Nuclear (Project Director)
S. L. Denson, Project Construction Manager (3),
F. Eisenhuth, Senior Compliance Engineer R. Featenby, Assistant Project Director (3),
J. Green, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor R. M. Harris, Project Licensing Specialist J. T. Kauffman, Executive Vice-President, Operations H. W. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant (2),
B. D. Kenyon, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations R. Matthews Senior Analyst - Nuclear Quality Assurance R. J. Shovlin, Assistant Project Director D. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Plant Bechtel Corporation A. Konjura, Lead Quality Assurance Eng neer W. Maurer, Field Construction Manager J. O'Sullivan, Assistant Project Field Engineer (1) Denotes those present at exit meeting on April 20, 1982.
(2) Denotes those present at management meeting on April 21, 1982.
(3) Denotes those present at exit meeting conducted on May 6, 1982.
(4) Denotes those present at exit meeting conducted on May 14, 1982.
2.
Licensee Action on~NRC Findings:
a.
(Closed) Violation ~ (387/81-08-13; '388/81-04-01) Isotropic Calibration l
Results Accepted in Place of Certified Performance Data for Reactor
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Coolant Radiation Leak Detection System.
The licensee's response to this Violation (PP&L letter PLA-879) stated that the isotopic calibration data demonstrate that the radiation detec-tors meet the required sensitivities of Regulatory Guide 1.45 which were comitted to in the Susquehanna FSAR.
That commitment did not include the ability to detect a 1 gpm leak. Section 5.2.5.1.2.3.1-C7 of the FSAR takes exception to the requirement for detecting the 1 gpm leak rate included in Regulatory Guide 1.45 because no reliable direct cor-relation exists between a primary leak rate and air borne radiation.
This issue was discussed between the inspector and the NRR Licensing
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l Project Manager, who stated that the licensee's proposed set point for
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the instrument was acceptable and that the direct correlation to a 1 gpm leak rate was not required.
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b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/80-28-08) Containment Purge and Vent Valve Operation.
The check-off list OP-73-001-1 has been revised to check the valves shut during valve lineup.
c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/81-19-02) Instrument Calibration Record Data Sheets - Pressure Switch.
The instrument calibration record data sheets for the HPCI Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Trubine Trip Switches have been corrected and the instruments recalibrated.
d.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/81-25-03) Quality Assurance Audit Response.
Responses to audit No. 0-81-01 were reviewed.
PP&L's NQA review and verifications of the responses to documented by PP&L internal letter, PLIs-2502, dated February 9, 1982. No discrepancies were found.
e.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/79-24-01) Incorporate Freeze Pro-tection as a Generic Procedure in Preoperational Test Program.
The licensee developed a freeze protection program for the preoperational test program as described in Startup Administrative Manual Procedure AD7.9 Revision 1.
f.
(Closed) Violation (387/80-14-06) Use of Unapproved Procedures.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the Violation, PLA-540 dated September 10, 1980, monitoring General Employee Training, and reviewed maintenance procedures in use in the field, g.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/80-24-05) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Preoperational Test.
Preoperational Test P49.1 Revision 2, and FSAR Revision 27 were reviewed to verify all inspector comments were resolved.
h.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/82-04-11) Transversing In-Core Probe System (TIPS).
This item is being reviewed by the NRC:NRR organization.
In a memorandum dated February 8, 1982 the Chief of the Containment Systems Branch of NRR stated that his issue is being considered generically and it not felt to affect the operation of BWR's.
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1. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (387/81-24-10) Review of Plant Procedures.
A team inspection was performed in March including a review of plant procedures.
(See Report 387/82-09)
j. (Closed) Violation (387/80-16-03) Recirculation Flow Testing Not In Preoperation Test.
The flow tested committed to in FSAR Section 14.2.12 has been incorporated into Revision 3 of P64.1.
Overall adequacy of preoperational test pro-gram will be reviewed during closeout of Violations identified in Report 82-04.
k (Closed) Violation (387/81-08-01) Incorrect Use of Supplemental 0A
. Procedure SP-8.
On May 13 the QA manual was reviewed to verify the QA Supplemental Pro-cedure SP-8 had been deleted, and QA Manual Procedure 7.1 Revision 7 had been revised to discuss overall document review requirements.
1. (Closed) Violation (387/81-04-02) Core Spray System Not Adequately Tested.
Preoperational Tests for Core Spray, P51.1 Revision 2, Containment At-mosphere Circulation P60.1 Revision 2, and Standby Gas Treatment P70.1 Revision 3, were revised to resolve testing discrepancies found by the inspector.
Corrective action to assure a adequate preoperational test program will be addressed in followup to the Violations identified in Inspection Report (387/82-04). Core Spray FSAR discrepancies will be l
followed under the followup item 387/80-28-01.
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m. (Closed) Unresolved Item (387/81-19-03) Standby Gas Treatment System Preoperational Testing.
On April 16 the retesting of the Standby Gas Treatment System was witnessed. Bailey Instruments were checked to verify seismically l
qt alified instruments were installed prior to running the test.
l n. (Closed) Unresolved Item (387/81-19-04) Quality Assurance (QA) Manual l
Procedure SP-5 Needs Revision.
l On May 13 QA Procedure SP-5 Revision 3 was reviewed to verify that l
discrepancies noted by the inspector were resolved.
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o. (0 pen)~ Unresolved Item (387/81-02 08) Excess ~ F1ow Check Valve' Testing.
The Proof and Review Copy of PP&L's Technical Specification dated April 29, 1982 has been revised to require that excess flow check valves be demonstrated operable by verifying that the valves check the flow. Table 3.6.3-1 lists excess flow check valves requiring testing. Technical Procedure TP2.21 Revision 0 was reviewed. This procedure was used to test excess flow check valves. The inspector noted several discrepancies between the excess flow check valves listed in the Technical Specification Table and these valves tested in TP2.21.
On May 14, a list of discrepancies was given to a PP&L Compliance Engineer to resolve.
This item remains open.
3.
Plant Tour On April 12 and 13, 1982 the inspector witnessed portions of work per-formed on the Unit 1 refueling floor to remove blade guides, fuel sup-port pieces, and control rod blades from the Unit I reactor vessel. The licensee had found three blade guides partially or entirely dislodged from the top guide.
This had caused some of the control rod blades to shift in the vessel, and also caused a Local Power Purge Monitor (LPRM string SL/35) to bend.
The inspector verified that work was performed in accordance with approved procedures. On April 13, 1982 the inspector looked at the blade guides which had been dislodged, and also looked at the fuel. support pieces, and control rod blades. The blades had scuff marks on the surface, but it did not appear that damage had been done to the poison pins containing the Boron. The licensee stated a General Electric representative was being called in to review the blades and ascertain whether damage was significant. This item will be followed during a sub-sequent inspection.
(387/82-11-01)
On April 14, 1582, the inspector askd the Assistant Superintendent for Outages how the blade guides had been fislodged. He stated that the licensee was attempting to determine >1at had caused the problem.
He stated possible causes were preoperati, nal testing of Recirculation System or Residual Heat Removal System. The determination of how blade guides became dislodged will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
(387/82-11-02)
On April 13, 1982, the inspector toured the internals on the Unit i re-actor vessel down to the top guide.
It appeared that corrosion particles were accumulating below the total support pieces in the lower part of the core. This item had also been identified by the licensee and they determined that all fuel support pieces and control rod blades would be removed and a cleanup of the reactor vessel would be performed.
No unacceptable items were identifie.
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4.
IE Bulletin'and Circular Followup IE Bulletins listed below were reviewed to verify the following:
(a) Bulletins received by PP&L corporate management were forwarded to appropriate individuals within the organization, including station management, for information, review and/or corrective actions as required.
(b) PP&L bulletin responses were submitted to the NRC within the specified time period.
(c) Licensee review and evaluations of bulletins are complete and accurate as supported by other facility records and by inspector observations of installed plant equipment.
(d) Corrective actions specified in licensee bulletin responses have been completed and/or responsibilities have been assigned for completion.
Bulletin 79-07, " Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping."
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This bulletin is closed for Unit 2 based on NRC inspection report 387/82-08.
-- Bulletin 80-20, " Failure of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches."
This bulletin is closed for Unit 2 based on NRC inspection report 387/82-08.
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_ Bulletin 80-01, " Operability of ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply."
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The licensee actions relative to this bulletin were previously re-i viewed by the inspector and are discussed in Inspection and Enforce-
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ment Inspection Report No. 387/81-13. The bulletin was left open at that time pending determination of the need to perform periodic leak rate tests on the ADS accumulators. On April 7,1982, the
i inspector discussed the issue of accumulators leak rate testing with the responsible engineer at the Equipment Qualification Branch of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). She stated that periodic leak rate testing may not be required at Susquehanna because of their improved design, and that the question was being considered by NRR in closing out TMI Action Plan Requirement II.K.
3.28.
This bulletin is closed.
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IE Circulars (IEC) listed below was reviewed to ensure that:
(1) The circular was received by licensee management.
(2) A review for applicability was performed.
(3) For circulars applicable to the facility, appropriate actions have been taken or are scheduled to be taken.
These circulars are closed:
IEC 77-01 - Improper Adjustment of Bypass Switches.
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IEC 77-13 - Reactor Safety Signals Negated During Testing.
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IEC 77-14 - Separation of Contaminated Water System From Noncontaminated
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Plant.
IEC 78-19 - Manual Override of Safety System Actuatica Signals.
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IEC 79-02 - Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies.
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IEC 79-05 - Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors.
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IEC 79-07 - Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recirculation MG
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Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase.
IEC 79-21 - Prevention of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity.
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IEC 80-01 - Service Advice for General Electric Induction Disc Relays.
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IEC 80-05 - Emergency Diesel Generator Lubricating 011 Addition and
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On-Site Supply.
IEC 80-09 - Plant Internal Communications Systems.
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-- IEC 80-10 - Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Equipment.
IEC 80-14 - Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water
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System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel.
IEC 80-16 - Opcrational Deficiencies in Rosemount Model 510 Trip Units
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and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters.
IEC 81-03 - Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.
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IEC 81-05 - Self-Aligning Rod End Bushing for Fire Supports.
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IEC 81-14 - Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close.
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-- IEC 81-11 - Inadequate Decay Heat Removal.
IEC 81-12 - Inadequate Periodic Test Procedure of PWR Protection
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System.
These circulars were kept open for the easons stated:
IEC 78-16 - Limitorque Valve Actuators. This item remains open
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pending reyfEw of plans to minimize manual operation of Limitorque Valves and to ensure motor re-engages after manual operation.
IEC 80-02 - Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours. The circular re-
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quires overtime limits for all persons performing safety related functions; the licensee does not include all of these persons in their response.
This circular will remain open pending review of Technical Specifications which will clearly specify NRC requirements in this area.
TEC 81-13 - Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit for Safeguard
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Service Valve Motors. This item remains open pending review of the Bechtel response to PP&L letter PLI-17238 regarding torque switch by-pass circuit requirements.
IEC 81-04 - The Role ~of' Shift Technical Advisors and The Importance
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of Reporting Operational Events. Administrative Procedures were re-viewed which discussed the functional responsibilities of the Shift Technical Advisors and developed a program for reporting operational i
events. Administrative Procedure (AD)-QA-424 Revision 1 Attachment B includes a table which lists reporting requirements to the NRC.
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However, the table does not appear to be adequate since some of the reporting required by 10CFR50.72 are not noted on the table.
This circular remains open pending resolution to this table.
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5.
Review of Non-Routine ~ Events Identified By The Licensee a.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/79-00-08, 388/79-00-08):
Deficiency in System for Isalating Non-Class IE Loads Connected to the 250VDC IE Systems.
The licensee later determined that this item was not reportable based on a Bechtel Engineering study which shows the proposed loss of isolation path is highly unlikely, and even if it were to occur, no unacceptable degradation of class IE busses would occur. These findings were reported to NRC in PP&L letter PLA-1027.
b.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-34, 388/81-00-34):
Deficiency in Termination of MAC-ADAPT series MPT Compression Adapters.
Disposition of Bechtel NCRf8200 indicates all spare and installed MPT connectors on 1E and affiliated circuits were radiographed.
De-fective adapters were replaced.
c.
(0 pen) Construction Deficiency (387/79-00-10, 388/79-00-10):
Separation of Electrical Circuits Inside 4.16KV Equipment.,
This item remains open pending review of disposition of line items described in Bechtel drawing #E-396, which is a computer listing of all cables which may be subject to the separation problems described in the CDR.
Items Reported ~Under 10CFR21 The status of a reported problem with PGCC flexible conduit grounding (P2180-331-000) was reviewed to ensure that:
(1) The licensee has been notified by the NRC or responsible vendor of the defect, or failure to comply.
(2) Necessary corrective action has been communicated to the licensee.
(3)Thelicenseeistakingthecorrectiveaction.
The licensee also reported this item under 10CFR50.55(e).
No unaccept-able conditions were identified.
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7. TMI ITEMS a.
The following NUREG 0737 Three Mile Island Items were reviewed to verify licensee consnitments:
(1) Item I. A.2.1 - Upgrading of R0 and SR0 Qualification.
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(2) Item I.C.4 - Control Room Access (3) Item II.B.1 - Reactor Coolant System Vents.
(4) Item II.D.1 - Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements.
Recombiner Penetrations.
(5) Item II.E.4.1 - Dedicated H2 (6) Item IT.K 3.16 - Challenges and Failures of Steam Relief Valves.
(SRV's)
(7) Item II.K.3.17 - ECCS Outages.
(8) Item II.K.3.21 - Restart of LPCS and LCPI.
(9) Item II.K.3.24 - Space Cooling for HPCI/RCIC Rooms.
(10) Item I.A.2.3 - Administration of Training Program.
(11) Item I.A.3.1 - Revised Scope of Licensing ' Exams.
(12) Item II.K.1.22 - Proper Functioning of Heat Removal Systems.
(13) Item II.K.3.44 - Evaluate Transients With Single Failure.
(14) Item II.K.3.45 - Manual Depressurization.
(15) Item II.K.3.46 - Michelson Concerns.
(16) Item III.D.3.4 - Control Room Habitability.
No unacceptable conditions were noted,
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b.
The following TMI Items were reviewed by the Emergency Appraisal Team Inspection conducted on April 13 to April 22, 1982.
(1) Item III. A.I.1 - Short Tenn Emergency Preparedness.
(2) Item III.A.1.2 - Upgrading of Emergency Support Facilities.
(3) Item III.A.2 - Longterm Emergency Preparedness, c.
The following TMI Items had discrepancies as noted:
(1) Item I.A.1.1 - Shift Technical Advisor.
Nuclear Department Instruction (NDI) 4.2.2 Revision 0 " Selection, Training and Certification of Shift Technical Advisors" establishes the minimum qualification, training requirements, and certifica-tions for Shift Technical Advisors (STA). On April 29, 1982, the inspector reviewed the training and personnel records for vr.rfous STA's. None of the records reviewed had completed certification of completion of the STA training program, nor could the inspector verify that all aspects of the required training program had been completed. The Manager of Nuclear Training stated that the cer-tification should be done by the end of May. STA training and certification will be reviewed after the certification has been complete.
(2) Item II.B.4 - Mitigation of Core Damage Training.
The licensee comitted to training all STA's and the Operation personnel from the plant manager through the operation chain to and including licensed operators in the mitigation of core damage.
On April 29, 1982 training records for this training were re-l viewed. From the records presented to the inspector, it could not be shown that all required personnel had received the training and had adequately passed the course. The FSAR Section 18.1.22 l
Revision 27 which discusses this training states that a course l
entitled " Operations With Degraded Core Conditions" had been l
developed to comp'.ste this training, but the inspector was shown only training provide l by outside consultants to meet the comit-ment. The Manager, Nuclear Training, stated this area will be looked into to assure that all required training is accomplished.
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(3) Item I.C.2~
Shift and'Pelief' Turnover Procedures The requirement states that at a minimum the checklist for control room operators, and shift supervision turnover shall contain what to check and criteria for acceptable status of availability and proper alignment of all systems essential to the prevention and mitigation of operational transients, and accidents. The checklists for control room operator and shift supervision turnover do not contain these re-quirements.
(4) Item I.C.5
' Feedback ~of ~0perating Experience Nuclear Department Instructions NDI-6.2.1 Revision 0, and NDI-6,2.2 Revision 2 were reveiwed. These procedures discuss the licensee's methods for dissemination of information, and their industry events review program. However, the Safety Assessment Group (NSAG) procedures did not include the Nuclear on the initial distribution list of events found to be applicable to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.
The group does receive a bi-monthly report summarizing the reports issued. The inspector discussed this with members of NSAG, and in-formed them that a formal method should be e,tablished to assure that they do receive industry event reports deemed applicable to the Susque-hanna facility.
These items remain open.
8.
Preoperational Test Program Peferences:
SSES Final Safety Analysis Report;
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Regulatory Guide 1.68 Initial Test Program for Water Cooled Nu-
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clear Power Plants; Startup Administrative Manual;
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Startup Technical Manual
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(a)
Preoperational Test Program' Implementation The inspector met with the Integrated Startup Group (ISG) Supervisor and other ISG personnel, and discussed the preoperational test pro-gram status, testing progress, procedures, test witnessing and evalua-tion of test results.
Discussions also included proposed changes and resolutions to the Cold Functional Test P100.1 as well as tests remaining to be conducted.
Findings:
As a result of these discussions with the licensee representatives and review of the referenced documents relative to the preoperational test program, no discrepancies were noted.
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(b)
Test Results Evaluation
The following preoperational test procedures were reviewed to as-
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certain whether uniform criteria are being applied for evaluating completed preoperational tests to assure their technical and adminis-
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trative adequacy
-- P4.1, Revision 2, approved March 19, 1982. Tests results re-viewed and evaluated April 21, 1982, 4.16 KV System.
P28.1, Revision 1, approved June 25, 1980. Test results re-
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viewed and evaluated January 15, 1982, ESSil Pump House H&V.
-- P45.1, Revision 2, approved April 29, 1981. Test results re-
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viewed and evaluated April 14, 1982, Feedwater System.
s P51.1A, Revision 1, approved December 30, 1980.
Test results
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reviewed and evaluated April 21, 1982. Core Spray Pattern Test.
P53.1, Revision 2, approved September 5, 1980. Test results
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reviewed and evaluated March 4,1982. Standby Liquid Control.
P61.1, Revision 1, approved October 9,1980. Test results
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reviewed and evaluated December 2, 1982. Reactor Water Clean-up and Denineralizer System.
P69.1, Revision 1, approved July 14, 1980. Test results re-
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viewed and evaluated March 4,1982. Liquid Radwaste Collection System.
P73.1, Revision 0, approved January 12, 1982. Test results
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reviewed and evaluated March 25, 1982. Containment Atmosphere Control System.
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P73.2, Revision 1, approved December 3,1981. Test results
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reviewed and evaluated March 25, 1982. Containment H2 Recom-biner System.
P78.2, Revision 1, approved June '.1981.
Test results re-
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viewed and evaluated January 28, 1982. Intermediate Range Mon-itoring System.
P78.3, Revision 1, approved November 12, 1981. Test results
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reviewed and evaluated January 20, 1982. Average Power Range Monitor.
P79.2A, Revision 2, approved January 4, 1982. Test results
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evaluation approved February 25, 1982. PERMS, Main Steam Line.
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P79.28, Revision 1, aprroved March 8,1982.
Test results re-
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viewed and evaluated April 15, 1982. PERMS, Liquid Process.
P80.1, Revision 1, approved October 24, 1980. Test results
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evaluation approved March 21, 1982. Reactor Non-Nuclear Instrumentation.
p P99 1, Revision 1, apnroved January 27, 1981. -Test results
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reviewed and evaluate 8 March 5, 1982. Reactor Building Crane.
The inspector reviewed the test results and verification of
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licensee evaluation of tests results by the following methods:
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-- Review of test changes;
-- Review of test exceptions; Review of test deficiencies;
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-- Review of "As-Run" copy of test procedure;
-- Review of QC inspection records; and,
-- Verifying that the test results have been approved.
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Findings:
The following exceptions were noted in the review of these pro-cedures:
Procedure Title Unresolved Exceptions P4.1 R 2 4.16 KV 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 011 P28.1 R 1 ESSW PH HV 002, 003, 004
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P45.1 R 2 FW 001, 004 P51.1A R 1 CS Pattern Exceptions Cleared;-
Needs Approval.
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P53.1 R22 SBLC 013 P61.1 R 1 RWCU 007 P69.1 R 1 Liquid Radwaste 001, 006, 009.
P73.1 R 0 Containment Atmosphere 001. 002. 003, 004.
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P73.2 R 1 Containment.H Recombiner Exceptions Cleared;
Needs Approval.
P78.2 R 1 IRM Exceptions Cleared; Needs Approval.
P78.3 R 1 APRM 001, 004, 005 P79.2 3 R 1 Liquid Process 001, 002.
P99.1 R 1 RB Crane 008, 011 The above listed procedures will be examined on subsequent in-spections for resolution of the listed exceptions and approval by the licensee. (387/82-11-03)
g, Preoperational Test Witnessing
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Parts of preoperational tests were observed to verify the following:
The approved test procedure was current and being followed.
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Qualified personnel were performing the test.
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Test precautions and prerequisities were followed.
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Test and measuring equipment met requirements and was properly cali-
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brated.
Quality control hold and witness requirements were met.
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Results were properly documented.
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Procedures are technically adequate.
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Results are acceptable.
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Criteria for interruption and continuation of testing were adhered to.
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(1) Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT).
On April 16, 1982 sections 7.3.3 through 7.3.10 of preoperational test P70.1 Revision 3 were witnessed.
During the test it was noted by the licensee that two switches, PDSH-07555A and PDSH-07555B, did not trip near the design setpoint and appeared to need repairs /or replacement.
A Test Change Notice (TCN #3) was written to document the discrepancy.
The necessary repairs and retesting will be reviewed during a sub-sequent NRC insoection.
(387/82-11-04)
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(2) Primary Containment Isolation Valve Timing On April 30, 1982 Section 7.3.1 of Preoperational Test P59.3 Revision 0 was witnessed.
During the test the inboard suction valve to the suppression pool water filter pump (HV-15766) would not close when a i
isolation signal was initiated. When the operator then attempted to cycle the valve manually the valve shut, but could not be opened. No other discrepancies were noted. The resolution to this valve problem will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (387/82-11-05)
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10. Release of Radioactive Material to' Landfill On April 28, the licensee reported that a bag of potentially contaminated trash had been removed from the chemistry sample preparation room and had been disgarded with non-contaminated trash in a fill site near Hazleton, Pennsylvania. The licensee's review concluded that the only contaminated article in the bag was on a towel which had been used by a chemistry tech-nician. The technician had spilled several drops of a Source solution.
The technician had frisked the towel before discarding it into the trash, and had obtained a reading of 250 counts per minute above background. The licensee estimated that a maximum of.25 microcuries of radioactive iso-topes may have been discarded. The licensee also tabulated by isotope what was released. The closest isotope concentration to an exempt quantity was Yttrium-88 which was 4% of the exempt quantity. This quantity does
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not represent a potential hazard.
Thelicenseeisreviewingtheincidentforcorrectiveaction. The NRC will review the licensee s corrective action during a subsequent inspection.
(387/82-11-06)
11. Meetings
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(a)PlantHousekeeping/ Cleanliness On April 14 the inspectors met with members of PP&L Plant Management to discuss plant cleanliness. The licensee discussed their plans for protecting equipment, and instrumentation at various levels of con-struction type work. The program will establish cleanliness require-ments for each area of the plant dependent on the above amount of
construction in progress.
Equipment operation will be restricted in
areas of heavy construction and equipment will be protected with covers, barriers, etc. The NRC will continue routine review of this program.
(b)ManagementMeeting On April 21 members of PP&L Management met with NRC Region I Manage-
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ment to discuss the status of the remaining open issues requiring i
disoosition prior to construction completion. Those members of PP&L attending the meeting are indicated in Section 1.a.
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(c) Emergency Appraisal Team Exit On April 22 the inspector attended the Emergency Appraisal Team exit.
The team leader discussed the significant findings found by the tam with PP&L personnel. Their findings will be issued in a subsequent inspector report.
(d)lEquipmentQualificationBranch On May 6 the inspectors attended a meeting between the licensee and ateamofNRC:NRREquipmentQualificationBranch(EQB). The team was conducting a review of equipment qualification records. Results of their review will be discussed in a subsequent Safety Evaluation Report.
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12. Staff-Training The inspector witnessed General Employee Retraining on May 14, 1982. The retraining covered the areas of Quality Assurance, Security and Safeguards, Health Physics, Firefighting, Industrial Safety and Escort Training. The instructor had and used a lesson plan, and administered written tests to assure particioants had received required knowledge. No unacceptable con-ditions were identified.
13. Ex'it' Interviews
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During the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facilit's management to discuss the inspection and findings identified. Those
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personnel attending these meetings are indicated in Section 1 of this
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report.
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