IR 05000387/1982007
| ML20042B649 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1982 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Norrow L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042B640 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-82-07, 50-387-82-7, 50-388-82-03, 50-388-82-3, IEB-79-08, IEB-79-09, IEB-79-8, IEB-79-9, NUDOCS 8203250485 | |
| Download: ML20042B649 (7) | |
Text
'
t
.
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report:
50-387/82-07, 50-388/82-03 Dockets: 50-387, (Cat. B), 50-388 (Cat. A)
Licenses: CPPR-101, CPPR-102 Licensee: Pennsylvania Power and Light Company.
2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Allentown, Pennsylvania and Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
February 19-25, 1982 Inspector:
& C.OwCL, 3 t-
,G 2 llo let L. Narrow, Reactor Inspe~ctor date signed Approved By:
Oh 0 bM. h.
1lso I &7-Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, R~eactor date signed Projects Section No. 28 Inspection Summary:
Inspection (Unit 1 and 2) on February 1-4, 1982 (Combined Inspection Report No. 50-387/82-07,50-388/82-03]
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by one region-based inspector (Unit 1 - 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />, Unit 2 - 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) of pipe hangers and supports and the status of outstanding items. No Violations were identified. Ten of 11 open items examined were closed. Two items were opened.
8203250485 820310 PDR ADOCK 05000387 O
P
'
,
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
- R. A. Beckley, Resident Nuclear QA Engineer E. Bigelow QC Inspector, CSG J. R. Buczynski, Lead Construction Surveillance Engineer P. Capatosto, QA Engineer E. Carroll, ISI Site Supervisor
- S. Denson, Project Construction Manager
- R. H. Featenby, Assistant Project Director J. Lindberg, QA Engineer
- R. E. Matthews, QA Engineer T. Newmari, QA Engineer R. Prato, Licensing Engineer J. Saronga, QA Project Engineer Bechte' Power Corporation
- G. C. Bell, Project QA Engineer
- J. E. O'Sullivan, Assistant Project Field Engineer
- G. D. Pederson, Resident Engineering W. Ross, Lead Field Welding Engineer J. Takarski, Assistant Lead Field Welding Engineer F. Wallick, QC Engineer Nuclear Energy Services (NES)
E. Noviello, Site Supervisor Brand Industrial Services, Inc. (BISCO)
T. Gilmore, Project Manager
- Present at exit meeting.
Other licensee and contractor personnel were also interviewed.
2.
Facility Tour Work in progress, completed work and plant status were observed during a general inspection of Unit 1 and 2.
Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments.
QC, craft and supervisory personnel encountered in work areas were inter-viewe,
.
.
Specific activities and work areas examined included:
Unit 1 o
Pipe supports, hangers and restraints in the areas above floors at Elevations 645, 670, 683, 719, 749 and 799 of primary and secondary containment in the reactor building.
Specific supports and restraints were selected for detailed inspection as described in Paragraph 3 below.
o Rework and build-up of welds for structural supports of shock suppressor DBA-102-H10.
o Rework of recirculation pump lug attachments.
Unacceptable linear indications has been found during pre-service inspection by NES.
Removal of indications and blending to remove abrupt surface changes was in process in accordance with Bechtel Procedure FC1-M-220 and GE FDDR KR-300. Any welding, if required, will be submitted for GE approval on an FDDR.
In process inspection of the rework is performed by PP&L NQA Construction Surveillance Group, o
Replacement of embedment plates for recirculation pump shock suppressor hangers. Drilling of holes for setting "Drillco Maxibolts" was in progress in accordance with FCR C-5199.
Unit 2 o
Storage, protection and maintenance of electrical equipment in the reactor building at Elevations 719, 749 and 779, in the upper and lower relay rooms in the control area and in battery rooms C-609, C-614 and C-615.
Welding (Weld Nos.17 and 18) on discharge line from standby liquid o
control pump.
o Protection of cable in cable trays E2PK32 and E2KK32 from grinding and welding in overhead areas by fire resistent mats.
o Installation of Biscoseal at fire barriers between corridor and room C-208.
o Slope of instrument line to Pressure Indicator P1 25209P from Core Spray Pump discharge line.
o Storage and protection of hydraulic control Unit 2 S-239. The inspector questioned the protective measures taken. This item is discussed in Paragraph 4 below.
No violations were identified.
--
--
.
.
-
F.
.
3.
Pipe Supports, Hangers and Restraints The inspector examined the pipe supports listed below for conformance to the following requirements:
(1) Technical Specification M-213 " Installation, Inspection and Documenta-tion - Pipe Supports, Hangers and Restraints" (2) Technical Specification M-391 " Piping As-built Program" (3)
Field Procedure FP-P-20 " Procedure for Field Control of Pipe Supports (Hangers)"
(4) Quality Control Instruction QCI-P-2.10 " Pipe Support, Restraint and Shock Suppressor Installation" (5)
Interoffice Memorandum EMC-7664 " Weld Symbol Clarifications" Pipe Supports inspected:
o HBB-148-H1 o
HBB-148-H2 o
HBB-101-H109 o
HBB-101-H108 o
HBB-118-H1 o
HBB-118-H2 o
HRC-112-H3 o
DBB-121-H18 o
EBC-101-H21 o
EBC-101-H23 o
EBB-102-H5 o
EBB-10?-H4 o
HBB-110-H31 The following attributes of the hangers and supports were inspected as applicable:
o Size, location, contour and workmanship of welds o
Size, configurations and crientation of hangers / supports Bolted connections and mounting plates properly installed o
o Thread engagement, lock nuts, bolt and nut material markings o
Protection of installed snubbers o
Corrosion or damage to units and supports
_
-
.
.
Spherical ball bushings properly installed.
o During review of Specification M-213 and EMC-7664 the inspector observed that:
l Revision 9 of Specification M-213 established requirements for o
evaluation of defects identified during visual examination of the welds which were less stringent than nomally established by AWS or ASME codes. As examples: Arc strikes and weld spatter are acceptable; Convexity height, roll over and butt weld reinforcement are acceptable without limit; 3/64-inch undercut is acceptable for the full length of the weld; crator cracks on single pass intemittent welds are acceptable; etc.
EMC-7664 states "There are no dihedral angle limitations on o
skewed fillet welds."
This item is unresolved pending deteminations that the quality of the welds produced in accordance with these requirements have not been degraded and review of these results by an NRC inspector.
(387/82-07-01)
4.
Hydraulic Control Units (HCU's)
During the facility tour the inspector questioned the adequacy of the visqueen covering over the HCU in Area 32 and 34. The licensee had previously (December 15,1981) identified discrepant housekeeping and storage conditions on NCR No. 8246. This NCR had been dispositioned on December 28, 1981 to remove debris and material from the area, enclose the area, cover entry tops with visqueen and initiate a housekeeping program. The dispositions was revised on February 15, 1982, to pemit certain material to remain within the enclosed area since it was required for work in progress.
The inspector observed that the condition of the area was acceptable, but questioned the delay in providing an adequate visqueen covering.
During discussions with the licensee, he was infomed that this delay was due, in part, to knowledge that the disposition was being revised but that in the interim the area and equipment was cleaned daily and that the daily cleanup would continue until work in the area was complete.
Thisitemisunresolvedpending(388/82-03-01).
installation of an adequate cover and its inspection by an NRC inspector 5.
Licensee Actions on previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (387/78-99-11): Nuts and bolts to meet material specifications.
Inspections of the material designations markings on a selected group of hanger bolts and nuts found no discrepancies.
(Closed) Qualifications of AIW Cable (387/79-38-01, 388/79-20-01): This item was reviewed during Inspection 387/81-20,388/81-10 and resolved during that inspectio.
.
f
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(387/79-41-03): Protection of mechanical snubbers.
Inspection of mechanical snubbers during the facility tour and during a detailed inspection of hangers / supports found no unprotected snubbers.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(387/81-01-02;388/81-01-02): Maintenance and surveillance of electrical panels and equipment in storage. This item was also reviewed during inspection 387/81-12,388/81-06 but remained unresolved.
The inspector observed storage conditions of electrical motors and in panels at elevations 719, 749, and 779 in Unit 2.
Protective covers were in place, except in locations where work was in progress. All equiprrent and panels were heated as required.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (387/81-08-09,388/81-04-07): Lack of design for ISI accessibility. The inspector was infonned that a final walkdown of the piping systems would be performed after modification of pipe hangers /
supports was complete in order to identify all welds requiring in-service inspections which have limited accessibility.
6.
Review on Nonroutine Events Identified by the Licensee (Closed) Construction Deficiency (388/79-00-09): Connector pin crimping defects on control panel insert. This item was reviewed during Inspection 388/81-10 and was resolved.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (388/79-00-12): Wiring damage and damage to inserts 72C and 73C. This item was reviewed and resolved during inspec-tion 387/81-20.
(Closed) Potential Construction Deficiency (387/80-00-05): Cut rebar during core drilling of reinforced concrete. The licensee later notified NRC that this item was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/80-00-07, 388/80-00-07): Use of non-safety pilot solenoid valves in safety-related systems.
The inspector examined NCR 6646 which had been dispositioned to replace all Ncn-Q valves with Q-listed valves mount the valves on valve operators or replace non-Q tubing with stainless steel Q-listed tubing and provid safety-related control circuits and power supplies.
The rework was completed and accepted on January 27, 1982 and the NCR was closed.
(Closed) Potential Construction Deficiency (387/81-00-19, 388/81-00-19):
Use of incorrect check valves on instrument air lines. The licensee later notified NRC that this item was not reportable.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (388/80-00-04):
ITT General Controls Hydramotor Actuators. This item was inspected and resolved during inspection 387/81-27.
.
i
-
,
.
7.
Licensee Action on NRC Bulletins and Circulart The Bulletins and Circulars listed below were closed for Unit 2 during inspections of Unit 1.
Bulletin 79-08:
Events Relevant to Boiling Water Reactors Identified During TMI Incident.
(Closed 387/82-04)
Bulletin 79-09:
Failure of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker.
(Closed 387/82-04)
Circular 77-05:
Possible Liquid Entrapment in Valve Bonnets.
(Closed 387/81-27)
Circular 80-04:
Securing of Threaded Locking Devices on Safety-Related Equipment.
(Closed 387/81-27)
Circular 80-18:
Safety Evaluations for changes in Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems.
(Closed 387/82-04)
.
Circular 80-22:
Confimations of Employee Qualifications.
(Closed 387/81-29)
Circular 81-02:
Performance of NRC Licensed Individuals while on Duty.
(Closed 387/82-04)
Circular 81-09:
Containment Effluent Water that Bypasses Radio-activity Monitor.
(Closed 387/81-27)
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or Violations.
Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3 and 4.
9.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (see Detail 1) at the end of the inspection on February 25, 1982. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and identified the inspection findings.